

THE UNITED STATES
AND THE
EUROPEAN RIGHT, 1945–1955

Deborah Kisatsky



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*To my loving parents,
Thomas and Elaine Kisatsky*

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Preface

THE UNCONDITIONAL surrender of Nazi Germany to Allied forces on 7 May 1945 inaugurated a decade-long occupation by Germany's conquerors. All four victor powers—the United States, France, Britain, and the Soviet Union—resolved “to destroy the National Socialist Party” and to bar “more-than-nominal” Nazi Party members from public life.¹ The United States Office of Military Government (OMGUS) proved the most ambitious of all four occupation regimes in cleansing totalitarian remnants from postwar Germany. U.S. forces assiduously examined and punished thousands of ex-Nazis and collaborators, most notably in the high-profile Nuremberg trials of 1945–49. Such endeavors reflected an idealistic and sincere desire on the part of American leaders to cultivate democracy on the ashes of a brutal dictatorship.²

Before long, however, the United States, in competition with the other three occupiers for control of German military and espionage secrets, quietly began sheltering scientists, industrialists, and military figures who had formerly worked for the Third Reich and now faced trial for complicity in Nazi atrocities. The U.S. Army employed Klaus Barbie, Wernher von Braun, and Walter Dornberger, all wanted for war crimes, while U.S. High Commissioner John J. McCloy pardoned wartime industrialist Alfred Krupp, among others.³ Occupiers also acquiesced in the appointment to leading positions in the new West German government of such former aides to Adolf Hitler as Hans Globke, who had co-authored the antisemitic Nuremberg Laws of the 1930s and then went on to become one of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's closest advisors.⁴

What explained this apparent contradiction between the spirit and practice of American denazification? Why did the United States reempower some servants of Hitler's regime at the same time that it officially punished and discredited others? The following study explores these and related questions. It places American interactions with former Nazis into a

broad context, evaluating U.S. responses to a spectrum of rightist thought and action in postwar Germany and Europe. Based on extensive research in U.S., German, British, French, Italian, and Canadian primary and secondary sources, the work engages scholarly debates about the nature of postwar U.S. foreign policy and of American international power in general.

The study shows that U.S. responses to the German and international Right were more complex than has commonly been acknowledged. Many scholars have accepted the premise that the United States has traditionally favored right-wing forces of “order” abroad against left-wing revolutionary challenges.⁵ The recruitment of former Axis enemies into a Cold War defense apparatus appeared consistent with an ongoing U.S. practice of using antidemocratic forces to promote “stability, anti-Bolshevism, and trade with the United States.”⁶ President Ronald Reagan’s ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, implicitly validated the premise that the United States favored autocratic forces against destabilizing movements for social change when she defended authoritarian dictatorships that preserved “existing allocations of wealth, power, status, and other resources.”⁷

Yet the “search for order” thesis leaves unanswered the question of why the United States, as often as not, provoked political chaos in pursuing American interests abroad. Particularly in the non-Western world, but also in visible ways in Western Europe, U.S. forces opposed even “right-wing” figures who shared the American antipathy for communism and endorsed existing distributions of wealth and power but in one way or another affronted the United States. U.S. leaders likewise displayed some flexibility toward left-wing forces. Even as the Cold War ossified East-West divisions and launched the United States on a global quest to contain communism, American administrators worked with an array of individuals who had Marxist inclinations but who welcomed U.S. help in preventing Soviet advances.

This study proposes that a search for opportunity, not order, guided American policy toward Germany and other states during the postwar era. Democratic ideals informed decision making, and U.S. officials preferred to work with political moderates where available.⁸ But American leaders aimed foremost to secure U.S. interests against threats from any quarter. The ideological rightness or leftness of prospective allies ultimately mattered less than did their political pliancy.

An analysis of American responses to the West German Right during the U.S. occupation (1945–55) illuminates these themes. American offi-

cials cooperated with moderate conservatives—namely Christian Democrats—who largely shared the United States’ liberal capitalist vision for postwar Western Europe. They also co-opted nationalistic figures who appeared willing to accept an expanded American presence in exchange for financial or other rewards. But U.S. policymakers simultaneously worked to contain right-wing neutralist-nationalists who promoted German non-alignment in the Cold War and, like communists, corroded Western unity. These patterns recurred in France and Italy, where the United States fought hostile forces at both ends of the political spectrum while bolstering rightists and leftists thought useful to the United States.

The notion that opportunism, not order, impelled American foreign policy has implications for how scholars think about the nature of U.S. overseas power and about the links between American domestic and international history in general. The very means by which the United States sought to manage its West European alliance—its tactic of alternately containing, co-opting, and cooperating with perceived allies and adversaries—had origins in American political culture. These methods reflected and extended techniques of hegemonic social control employed by governing forces and their allies throughout the nation’s history.

Chapter 1 explores the intersections between American domestic and international systems of hegemonic power. The chapter also defines key terms and provides a detailed overview of the book. Chapter 2 analyzes U.S. cooperation with the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party, and especially with West Germany’s Christian Democratic chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who abetted U.S. power in Europe but also exploited cooperation toward West Germany’s own ends. Chapter 3 shows that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) during the early 1950s secretly co-opted German far rightists in an ill-fated plan to contest a Soviet attack. Chapter 4 discusses joint Allied efforts to prevent the ex-Nazi Otto Strasser from returning home following wartime exile in Canada, lest he rouse nationalist and neutralist sentiment that undermined Atlantic unity. Chapter 5 describes parallel U.S. containment, co-optation, and cooperation efforts in France and Italy and elucidates further the significance of the study.

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Deborah Kisatsky
Worcester, Massachusetts
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INTRODUCTION

*The United States, the German Right, and
American Hegemony in Europe*

“OUR GOAL,” the State Department’s Henry Byroade asserted in fall 1951, “is to obtain the type of German nation which . . . will not again cause the United States to be plunged into war, but will instead freely cooperate with the West.” The newly established Federal Republic had so far resisted “extreme Right” and “extreme Left” belligerence. But protracted Allied control now risked German “irritation.” This unproductive emotion, Byroade warned, could foster “extremist nationalism” in Germany. Byroade recommended that the Western powers accord “full control over foreign and domestic affairs” to Germans themselves. Only by “[convincing] the Germans that they are equals” could the United States “retain . . . power” and achieve its global objectives.¹

Byroade’s remarks illuminated multiple dimensions of postwar U.S.-German policy. American leaders during the Allied occupation (1945–55) worked to transform the former Nazi dictatorship into a reliable partner of the West. Denazification and related programs helped expunge totalitarian practices and promote democratic governance. German economic and military integration with Europe minimized risk of a third world war by enhancing mutual interdependence among the major Continental states.²

Extremist nationalism potentially undermined U.S. goals. Growing resentment of Germany’s occupation and division roused competitive national urges inimical to peace. Allied leaders could best ensure the Federal Republic’s allegiance to the West by granting full autonomy and by treating West Germans as equals. Cooperative Allied-German relations facilitated progress and enabled the United States to “retain power” in Europe.

Byroade's statement holds significance not merely for its pithy summation of U.S. aims. The fact that he identified hostile nationalism, as well as communism, as threats shows that American leaders feared both left- and right-wing German extremism. This point is crucial because historians have widely depicted the era following World War II as a global confrontation of the U.S.-backed international Right against the Left.

According to this view, the Soviet-American rivalry stemmed in part from the United States' quest for a world environment in which capitalism could flourish. Moscow's perceived expansionist designs imperiled U.S. access to coveted markets and bases. The United States battled the international Left—understood to mean communism and socialism, which affirmed anticapitalist action as a means to social change—on behalf of the Right, the worldwide agent of stability, which defended property rights and power hierarchies central to capitalism itself.³ Democratic rhetoric and ideology sometimes complemented this American “search for order,” insofar as the free flow of wealth, goods, ideas, and technology apparently advanced “liberal-developmentalism” globally.⁴ But U.S. leaders readily sacrificed lofty ideals to political expediency. This moral pragmatism resulted in American alliances with numerous authoritarian governments that used brutal, antidemocratic means to preserve an economic climate conducive to production and profit.⁵

The following study affirms key elements of the “search for order” thesis. It holds that tangible objectives—the control of markets, raw materials, and territory, and of people as laborers, buyers, sellers, and consumers—underpinned U.S. foreign policy after World War II, as throughout the twentieth century. It confirms that American leaders were, by and large, stridently anticommunist, and that the U.S.-Soviet conflict helped impel American decision making. The need to protect capitalism spawned alliances with numerous right-wing dictators, especially in regions where endemic poverty appeared likely to spark social unrest. And while Wilsonian visions helped explain and justify U.S. actions abroad, *Realpolitik* objectives frequently undercut democratic principles.

But although American leaders often propped up status quo forces, focusing on U.S. favoritism of rightists over leftists diverts attention from an essential point. The chief objective of American policy was not to defend political order, per se. Nor was it to promote anticommunism as an end in itself. The central goal of U.S. power was, quite simply, to perpetuate itself. By maximizing American influence overseas, the United States could enhance and defend its growth-based political economy at home. Where desirable conditions for investment already existed, policymakers

worked to preserve continuity in economic and political relations abroad. Where indigenous conditions proved hostile to a U.S. presence, the United States readily engineered coups and other forms of destabilizing change in order to achieve a more hospitable climate. That American officials regularly sought occasion to remake societies abroad into acquiescent clients of the United States suggests that a search for opportunity, not order, drove U.S. foreign policy after World War II.⁶

These insights prompt a broader rethinking of the postwar era. Historians have largely worked within the Cold War paradigm when analyzing international politics after 1945. Despite interpretive differences among them, most scholars agree that American leaders viewed the Soviet Union as the chief obstacle to U.S. global power after World War II, and that communist containment constituted the foreign policy establishment's main preoccupation.⁷ Communism was feared not only because it assaulted the cherished American ideals of individualism, property rights, and religious tolerance; communism also threatened because the Soviet Union, as a large, populous, communist state, appeared well positioned to exploit postwar chaos and establish an "autarkic," or closed, political and economic system in Europe and Asia.

Such prospects conflicted with a U.S. policy that had, since at least the 1920s, labored to create a liberal-corporatist international system that eased American access to overseas markets and resources. Believing that "unregulated international rivalries posed a threat to global peace" and to the freedom- and abundance-based American way of life, government officials joined important segments of industry, banking, and organized labor in promoting transnational economic growth as a means to "integrate national economies into a world capitalist order."⁸ State-private expansion of the economy promised universal benefits. An open world would ensure "markets for American producers, . . . profitable foreign investment opportunities for U.S. investors, and critical raw materials for U.S. manufacturers, all of which would create more jobs for American workers."⁹ This pattern would proliferate globally, spreading "peace and prosperity" everywhere.¹⁰

Soviet encroachments in Eurasia endangered liberal international arrangements. Communist control of strategic territories prospectively deprived the United States and its allies of essential raw materials and commerce. U.S. leaders feared having to marshal American resources to compensate for chronic shortages. Stringent rationing could transform the freedom-loving United States into a regimented "garrison state" that drastically curtailed individual liberties.¹¹ Protecting national security

meant preserving a “political economy of freedom” abroad, as well as at home.¹²

The billions of dollars spent on economic, military, and political programs aimed at thwarting communism, and countless statements, in public and private, by American policymakers intent on undercutting Soviet advantages, appear to justify a Cold War–centered interpretation of the postwar era.¹³ The embrace by countless Americans of the anticommunist crusade attests to the Cold War’s mobilizing power in the popular imagination, as in official discourse.¹⁴ That overseas leaders, particularly in Europe, enlisted U.S. help in forestalling potential Soviet aggression signaled transatlantic solidarity in the anticommunist cause.¹⁵

Yet the postulate that the postwar half-century was really *about* the clash between the United States and the Soviet Union deflects attention away from the deeper sources of American anticommunism. The freedom-based way of life that U.S. diplomacy defended against Soviet-style tyranny purportedly offered opportunities for wealth and status to all law-abiding U.S. residents. But efforts to promote democracy overseas served, at the most fundamental level, to maintain the structure of unequal class relationships inherent to capitalism itself. The pursuit of an open world redounded primarily to the advantage of those most able to profit directly from free trade—namely, manufacturers, financiers, and other “transnational capitalists” who competed for business contracts on the world market.¹⁶ While the growing availability of commercial goods affirmed Americans’ self-image as a “people of plenty,” an ever-widening postwar income gap and intensifying problems of social violence underscored the relative powerlessness of those lacking substantial material wealth.¹⁷

The Western alliance held within it a similar paradox. The nations of Britain, France, Iceland, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Italy, Canada, and Portugal—all founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—shared the United States’ commitment to a peaceful, noncommunist Western Europe. The governments of those states agreed that European security required American economic and military assistance, and they urged the United States to commit dollars and troops to the war-torn Continent.¹⁸ American planners initially hesitated to keep large forces in Europe. Postwar demobilization, combined with the massive expenditures a permanent presence required, made President Harry S. Truman and numerous key advisors uncertain about whether or how the United States could aid Western Europe militarily.¹⁹ But by 1950, General Omar Bradley and other proponents of a strong forward defense had convinced skeptics that the United States must have the

ability simultaneously to attack the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons and to protect Western Europe, as far east as possible, from Soviet aggression. This strategy apparently necessitated an extensive U.S. arms buildup and a significantly expanded American military presence on the Continent.²⁰ The United States quickly acquired nuclear and conventional weapons superiority over its allies and gained significant and lasting influence over European military and political affairs. The welcomed international flood of American dollars, consumer goods, and cultural commodities after World War II constrained Europeans' economic, military, and political independence, prompting claims that the United States had established a *Pax Americana*—an American empire—at the “invitation” of Europeans themselves.²¹

The Cold War paradigm acknowledges these contradictions of American domestic and international power. Existing scholarship demonstrates the complementarity of internal and external policy imperatives and considers the importance of economic and cultural, as well as geopolitical, factors in shaping U.S. decisions and their outcomes.²² But few interpretations have contemplated the relationship between the anticommunist consensus at home and its counterpart overseas. Working and middle-class Americans endorsed a multibillion dollar enterprise to “make the world safe for democracy,” even as persistent social disparities exposed the shortcomings of the democratic promise. The United States' European allies embraced the United States as an economic and military bulwark against communism despite the power imbalances that Americanization produced. Although in each case countervailing voices surfaced—critics of McCarthyism and of the burgeoning military-industrial complex decried the Cold War's harmful effects on American life, while Europeans complained that “Coca-colonization” obliterated local cultures—American Cold War internationalism encountered little sustained opposition at home or abroad prior to the 1960s.²³ What explained this transatlantic support for an activist U.S. foreign policy? Why did elites and non-elites alike in Europe and the United States accept American globalism if the benefits of U.S. power dispersed unequally within and between states?

These apparent puzzles may be solved if we change our interpretive lens—if we view as the defining feature of the postwar era not the rivalry of superpowers (an interpretation that places the struggle of *states* at the center of the story), or of ideology (communism vs. liberalism, narrowly defined), or even of opposing economic systems (capitalist vs. statist), but rather the competition between *hegemonic systems* or *blocs*: political, economic, and social constellations of power that were dominated by the

United States and the Soviet Union but that transcended the boundaries of nations themselves.²⁴ Hegemony here must be understood to mean more than top-down control by one state over another, as the term is commonly used.²⁵ Hegemony, rather, is organic; it is “a social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure,” all combined, that operates *within*, as well as between, states.²⁶ While one group dominates a subordinate population, the two sectors are in many ways mutually interdependent, and the boundaries between them fluid, not fixed.²⁷

In the case of postwar America, social and political hegemony was largely exercised by the same class of lawyers, bankers, and entrepreneurs that had governed throughout the nation’s history. This alliance of wealth and power had already been foreseen in 1787, when the American “People,” comprised mainly of planters, attorneys, merchants, and slaveholders, constructed a government whose chief purpose was to secure the political and economic liberty of the propertied classes by facilitating commerce, perpetuating slavery, and restricting suffrage to white males.²⁸ The longevity not only of the Constitution itself, but of the political economy it helped legitimate, enabled the creation of a liberal capitalist order wherein select individuals who accepted the broad contours of civil society laid out in that document and refined in subsequent decades had the opportunity to share in the benefits of the system.²⁹ Those who questioned that arrangement, or whose subordination helped sustain the propertied classes, materially or otherwise, were denied legitimacy as Americans and remained disempowered.³⁰

The boundaries between insider and outsider were not absolute. While income, race, and gender barriers disenfranchised many, the system provided a built-in mechanism by which prospective insurgents could be “co-opted,” or enticed, through power-sharing arrangements with the dominant class. The administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt defused a half-century of strife among workers, employers, and the federal government by bringing representatives of those groups together on the National Labor Relations Board, a move that guaranteed unions’ right to organize and collectively bargain but limited their autonomy.³¹ The promotion under Preseident John F. Kennedy of the Voter Education Project, which urged the private subsidization of black voter registration instead of desegregation, similarly aimed to transform forces of social unrest into manageable interest groups.³² The most powerful form of co-optation has occurred in the realm of culture and ideas.³³ The pervasive belief that anyone, through hard work and thrift, can become wealthy and successful has historically dampened social organizing by undercutting collectivity in

favor of individual action.³⁴ The modern corollary to the upward-mobility ideal—credit—perpetuates the illusion of classlessness and affluence in American society, while the mind-numbing allure of mass consumerism fosters political complacency and impedes alternative thought and action.³⁵

Populist anticommunism served a similar co-optive function. Few Americans, when polled, could accurately define communism. Yet more identified themselves as “anticommunist” than by any other political label.³⁶ This pattern occurred in part because communism came to be associated, in the minds of large numbers of Americans, with much more than abstract Marxist political and economic ideas. It conflated with anything perceived as alien, radical, or subversive of the “American Dream,” meaning, namely, the ability of white Christian males and their families, the presumed inheritors of the Revolution, to transcend barriers of class to attain elevated material status.³⁷

As the historian Joel Kovel explains, anticommunism provided a “powerful ideological force” in persuading ordinary citizens that “civilization,” and not the wealth of a few, “was at stake in the struggle against Soviet Russia.” The nation’s interests came to be identified with those of its “business elites. . . . Freedom of the market, that is, freedom of capital to invest and move labor anywhere . . . axiomatically identified with real human freedom; and a narrow vision of democracy, in which citizen participation is limited to the passive act of voting” sufficed as an expression of the popular will.³⁸ Americans who made the transition from rags to respectability, if not from rags to riches, and who perceived American abundance and democracy as synonymous, needed little coaxing to view communism as an abomination in both theory and practice.³⁹ But anticommunism was an “ideology of unhappiness,” as well as of hope. It appealed to “that portion of the national experience for which the American Dream has been bogus”; it expressed a “sense of betrayal” for those who had “no better way to speak.” “Broken promises” permitted demagogues like the Communist-hunting Wisconsin senator Joe McCarthy to “channel . . . people’s rage” and allow them, “at least momentarily, to feel whole again.”⁴⁰

Not all residents of the United States could be co-opted, however. Those who opposed the prevailing political and economic paradigm—who mounted a “counterhegemonic” challenge—had to be checked, or better yet, removed, in order to preserve the liberal (bourgeois) basis of society and government. American efforts, through force and law, to contain not just communism, but also domestic anarchism, labor activism, feminism, civil rights agitation, and militant nationalism, displayed the

system's readiness to crush dissent when consensus could not otherwise be achieved.⁴¹ The state itself often used police powers to silence critics. Endemic popular suspicion of radicalism joined vigilante activism—both products of long American historical traditions—to curtail from below grassroots challenges to the status quo.⁴²

Elites and non-elites alike, united by America's liberal creed and by the fears and anxieties that attended it, together preserved the vitality of a hierarchical social order.⁴³ Cooperation among like-minded forces ensured that counterhegemonic challenges were co-opted or contained to keep the system running smoothly. With its "fusion of consent and coercion for the purposes of rule," the United States exemplified the workings of hegemony within the modern liberal state.⁴⁴

This domestic power configuration had international ramifications. The ideal and reality of affluence that sustained the U.S. hegemonic system flourished in a global context. Social forces, like capital, information, and ideas, traverse state boundaries, enabling faraway events profoundly to affect domestic life. The makers of postwar U.S. policy recognized this when they called for a world marked by free-flowing commercial and cultural exchange. Such arrangements maximized American opportunity and privilege by lubricating the mechanisms of international capitalism itself. But overseas, as at home, a universalist promise of peace and prosperity fortified class-based hierarchies of power. U.S. "interests" were foremost the interests of the transnational sector and their domestic allies. What amounted to a pursuit by the United States of "world hegemony" was in fact an "outward expansion of the internal (national) hegemony established by a dominant social class" which "[connected] the social classes of all the different countries."⁴⁵

The United States succeeded better in Western Europe than elsewhere at extending its hegemonic system abroad. In the non-Western world, where liberal democracy functioned poorly, if at all, U.S. leaders relied on strongmen to protect American interests.⁴⁶ Nondemocratic governments required no broad-based effort to co-opt the masses, and coercion and force functioned crudely to contain dissent. But, as the political theorist Robert W. Cox notes, it is the "consensual element that distinguishes hegemonic from nonhegemonic world orders."⁴⁷ While superior U.S. economic and military might gave the United States considerable influence over domestic life in countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, visible anti-Americanism weakened popular support for the United States. The United States attained dominance, but not hegemony, in the Third World.⁴⁸

Postwar Western Europe, by contrast, enjoyed parliamentary and plu-

ralistic governance. There the United States exerted influence not through a reliance on autocrats, but by working with capitalist-minded political and economic groups. While differing with each other over countless issues, and while often resenting and contesting American ubiquity on the Continent, Europe's governing elites commonly favored an open international system that synchronized government and business interests. They feared any popular movement that could upset their power, and they worked to ensure consensus through a mix of overt and indirect tactics. Sometimes the governing classes used force—physical or penal—to counter dissidence.⁴⁹ More commonly, they “manufactured consent” via threats and political trade-offs.⁵⁰ The United States supplemented those efforts with propaganda, loans, and other pressures that helped resuscitate shattered economies and shore up dwindling support for capitalism. Like-minded U.S. and European leaders cooperated to contain rivals who could not otherwise be coerced. The social dominance of bourgeois elites and their co-opted allies became “organized and legitimized” within a “supranational framework.”⁵¹

Collaboration among Western nations and constituencies provided the basis for postwar “Atlanticism,” or European-American political and economic solidarity. Allied states differed on the precise meaning and scope of Atlantic identity. But this normative construct, as Frank Costigliola writes, “centered on an exaggerated sense of sameness—in particular a democratic heritage ostensibly common to Portugal as well as to Britain and France—and a magnified sense of difference from the Soviet bloc.” The alliance offered “feelings of security: familiar friends and everyday insurance against the Soviets; an assuring ritual of regular meetings, military maneuvers, and other earnest activities; and ceremony and ideology that generated feelings of . . . belonging.”⁵² Implicit was a defense of rationalist and humanist precepts. Atlanticism “institutionalized freedom” by advancing liberal practices around the world.⁵³ It simultaneously deepened historical divisions of class, ethnicity, and race by perpetuating traditional correlations of wealth and power.

Atlanticism aided the United States in achieving “structural hegemony” in postwar Western Europe. American dominance emerged not just by virtue of U.S. economic and military strength, but because the transatlantic allegiances and class-based relationships essential to the preservation of American authority came to be accepted and subconsciously replicated by most major sectors of European society.⁵⁴ The United States’ chief international rival, the Soviet Union, attained a weaker “surface hegemony” in Eastern Europe. Totalitarian forms required ongoing, conscious efforts to

coerce consent in a system that restricted individual freedom.⁵⁵ Both sides acquired degrees of imperial control over other regions, where they exerted military and other influence but failed to craft a consensus in their favor among the populations at large.

Henry Byroade's call for a cooperative Germany can thus be seen not merely as a bilateral policy prescription, but as a reflection of the ideology of American hegemony itself. A Germany that freely and voluntarily cooperated with the West was one that had internalized the values and assumptions of Atlanticism and, in turn, of U.S. and European governing elites.⁵⁶ The United States could achieve such ideological and political consensus once Allied leaders "convinced the Germans that they are equals" by granting them "full control over foreign and domestic affairs."

Yet the language of equality itself served to "mystify" the power disparities at the heart of the U.S.-German relationship.⁵⁷ The United States' purpose, as Byroade conceded, was not to bring about a Germany that rivaled the United States in status and strength. Americans sought to "retain . . . power"—to preserve a hegemonic system under U.S. control. The United States' chief West German ally, Christian Democratic chancellor Konrad Adenauer, likewise viewed German-American cooperation from a self-interested perspective. The chancellor worked alongside the Western powers to solve numerous German and European problems in order to demonstrate West Germany's deservedness of full political autonomy. Such endeavors met ongoing resistance from France and other neighboring states who sought to restrict German economic and military capabilities. The conjoined social and economic structures of the West gave the leaders of all involved countries a shared set of global objectives rooted in Atlanticist ideals. But disparate perceived national interests pitted the internal hegemonic systems of states against each other.⁵⁸ The rhetoric of cooperation masked the reality of ongoing strife.

The nexus of the domestic and international spheres, the policy-making establishment, itself demonstrated hegemonic processes of cooperation, co-optation, and containment at work. The individuals in charge of postwar German policy—Henry Stimson, John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, Dean Acheson, George Kennan, Lucius Clay, Lewis Douglas, George Marshall, William Clayton, James Byrnes, Robert Murphy, John McCloy, and others—shared a strikingly similar social profile that conditioned their responses to world events.⁵⁹ The family backgrounds of the group were diverse; Stimson, Acheson, and the Dulles brothers all came from wealthy northeastern families and attended elite educational institutions (Princeton, Yale, and Harvard). Kennan, born in Milwaukee,

descended from old New England stock and graduated from Princeton University. The Georgian Clay followed in a long line of distinguished military officers and civil servants when he enrolled at the elite U.S. Military Academy. Douglas's father owned a profitable Arizona mining firm, and Douglas attended Amherst College.

Others had humbler family origins. Marshall experienced a solid middle-class upbringing in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, before studying at the Virginia Military Institute. Clayton's father was a struggling cotton farmer in Mississippi, and Clayton himself left school in the seventh grade. Byrnes, raised in South Carolina, ended his formal schooling at age fourteen, when his father died and he began working as a messenger at a local law firm to help support his family. Murphy, like Kennan, came from Milwaukee, where Murphy's father went unemployed for long stretches during the Great Depression. McCloy's own father died when McCloy was young, and McCloy's mother raised her son by working several low-paying jobs.

Yet except for Kennan, who entered the Foreign Service immediately upon graduation, all settled on the East Coast and trained in law, business, or the military before entering politics. Army Colonel Henry Stimson's membership in the New York firm of Root & Clark helped ease appointments as secretary of war (1911–13 and 1940–45) and secretary of state (1929–33). Dean Acheson served briefly in the U.S. Navy during World War I before joining the prestigious law firm of Covington & Burling in Washington, DC, and advancing a long career as a diplomat. John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles, both partners in the influential Wall Street law firm Sullivan & Cromwell, respectively held posts under Dwight D. Eisenhower as secretary of state and CIA director. The self-taught Byrnes passed the South Carolina bar and ran his own law practice before serving in the U.S. House, Senate, and Supreme Court, and eventually as Truman's secretary of state. Murphy's business and law degrees at George Washington University prepared him for a lengthy tenure in the State Department. Clayton, notwithstanding his lack of schooling, ascended from the rank of clerk-stenographer to president of the board at Anderson-Clayton, the world's largest cotton trading company, and became a millionaire. General Clay oversaw the American military occupation of Germany (1945–59) and spent the following twelve years as chairman of the board of Continental Can Company. His chief financial advisor in Germany was Lewis Douglas, a successful insurance executive with stakes in the chemical, mining, banking, shipping, and automotive industries, who later served as U.S. ambassador to Britain. General

Marshall commanded Allied forces to victory in Asia during World War II and then, as Truman's secretary of state (1947–49), gave his name to the "Marshall Plan," a multibillion-dollar government-business partnership to promote postwar European recovery. McCloy graduated from Amherst College and Harvard Law School and went on to become a symbol of the East Coast establishment, serving variously as assistant war secretary, chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, high commissioner of Germany, president of the World Bank, and advisor to several presidents.

Many members of this policymaking elite had personal and professional connections with Germany that long predated the war. Milwaukee was an ethnically German enclave, and Murphy recalled his maternal grandmother, an immigrant from Essen, speaking German in the home.⁶⁰ Kennan during the 1920s served at the Hamburg Consulate and in the 1930s became an enthusiastic student of German language and culture. His studies, combined with his wartime service in Berlin, convinced him that a strong Germany could balance Soviet power in Europe.⁶¹ The Dulleses' law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell did business with German companies well into the 1930s.⁶² John Foster Dulles also participated in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and helped author the Versailles Treaty's "war guilt clause," which assigned Germany blame for the war but helped soften economic and other penalties.⁶³ Allen Dulles during the 1940s brought his own German expertise to the Council on Foreign Relations, where, alongside such leading figures as the corporate attorney Laird Bell and the Foreign Service veteran Dewitt Poole, he crafted recommendations on Germany for the State Department.⁶⁴ McCloy's wife Ellen Zinsser was distantly related to West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's wife, Gussie Zinsser, whose family helped direct the powerful Morgan and Dresdner Banks.⁶⁵ Ellen's sister Peggy Zinsser married Lewis Douglas.

Reflective of shared backgrounds and experiences, America's German hands became key figures in an emerging, bipartisan "growth coalition" that called for state intervention at home and internationalism abroad. East Coast-based and Europe-oriented, this alliance of political and business elites promoted transnational economic growth as a means to harmonize dominant economic sectors with America's electoral base.⁶⁶ Germany figured prominently as the prospective hub of Western prosperity. Believing that restored German industrial capacity would promote Western European recovery while depriving the Soviets of the coal- and steel-rich Ruhr basin, growth advocates pushed for rapid German reindustrialization and political integration with the West.⁶⁷

Among the major U.S. policymakers for Germany, only Henry

Morgenthau, Jr., deviated markedly from the pattern. His experiences illustrate the ways in which consent was manufactured within the foreign policy bureaucracy, and, more broadly, within the American hegemonic system itself. While he descended from New York wealth and had a German heritage, Morgenthau was a Jew, whereas most of his peers were Catholic (Byrnes and Murphy), or decidedly Protestant (notably Acheson, the son of an Episcopal bishop, and the Dulleses, sons of a Presbyterian minister). Morgenthau never finished college, and he worked at a settlement house before becoming a successful New York banker.⁶⁸ Fond of the outdoors, he bought up large tracts of farmland in Dutchess County. He then became active in the state Democratic Party, where he met and befriended Roosevelt, who appointed Morgenthau treasury secretary in 1933.⁶⁹ From that post, Morgenthau promoted, in 1944 and 1945, a post-war occupation plan that envisioned Germany's division into two autonomous states, with the coal-rich Ruhr placed under international control and other territory and resources distributed among the victims of Nazi aggression. Massive deindustrialization, demilitarization, and denazification would punish Germany for its barbaric crimes and impede future aggression by eliminating heavy industry.⁷⁰

Morgenthau's plan briefly gained sympathy with Roosevelt and with the president's chief aide, Harry Hopkins. Some of that proposal's punitive aspects found expression in Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 (JCS 1067, April 1945), the United States' first postwar occupation directive for Germany. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, though an avid free-trader, agreed that extreme measures might be needed to "uproot" Nazism, which apparently went "down in the German people a thousand miles deep."⁷¹ But War Secretary Stimson viewed quick German economic recovery—especially the reestablishment of coal and other basic industries—as essential to the survival of Western Europe, and, in turn, to the prosperity of the United States. A punitive peace would foster German revanchism and likely inaugurate another cycle of international autarky and war.⁷²

These beliefs were very much in Assistant War Secretary McCloy's own mind as he helped draft JCS 1067, which provided a built-in escape hatch from that document's own more restrictive features. The "disease and unrest" clause empowered the military governor to suspend any punitive measure that appeared likely to provoke political and social strife. Clay broadly interpreted this provision—and his own powers as deputy and U.S. military governor (1946–47 and 1947–49)—to push western Germany toward economic rehabilitation along liberal-capitalist lines.⁷³ Secretary of State Byrnes in September 1946 signaled that Clay's approach had become

official policy when he announced at Stuttgart the U.S. decision to permit German economic production and to hand over control for many political affairs, including denazification, to the Germans themselves. Byrnes's message had at its core the premise that "Germany is a part of Europe, and European recovery, particularly in Belgium, the Netherlands, and other adjoining states will be low indeed if Germany with her great resources of iron and coal is turned into a poorhouse."⁷⁴ Byrnes signaled a policy shift that helped pave the way for the economic fusion in late 1946 of the British and U.S. zones, and, in turn, for the division of Germany itself in May 1949.

Political conflicts over Germany showed that the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy was not a monolith. Wealth and a faith in capitalism did not alone determine any individual's position on issues. In Morgenthau's case, profound ideological convictions and a personal identity with the Jewish victims of Nazi aggression helped inspire advocacy of a plan that privileged retribution over recovery and subordinated economic gain to moral vengeance.

Yet Morgenthau's influence was ultimately short-lived. Drummed out of the government in June 1945, soon after Truman's inauguration as president, Morgenthau came to be smeared as a communist sympathizer on grounds that his views coincided with those of Assistant Treasury Secretary Harry Dexter White, a suspected Soviet spy.⁷⁵ The system again rejected whatever it could not absorb. The bureaucratic rivalry that plagued German policy was the product of a hegemonic system that relied on co-optation, as well as cooperation and containment, to perpetuate itself. Although fundamental dissent could not be tolerated, disagreement within prescribed parameters was theoretically essential to problem solving, while the process of taming critics required that disparate voices be heard, if only to be drowned out by a louder chorus.⁷⁶ What is most remarkable is how well the system worked—how little disagreement existed on the essential premise that global economic growth was essential to maintaining the American way of life. Even Morgenthau defended capitalism; as treasury secretary he promoted production as the key to business confidence and economic stability.⁷⁷ One professed benefit of the Morgenthau Plan was that it could eliminate German industrial competition in Europe to the benefit of Britain and other U.S. allies.⁷⁸

The hegemonic power of the dominant class was hence assured on three levels: within American society at large, throughout the Atlantic world, and inside the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy itself. This system of control was made possible by a transnational liberal-corporatist system

that linked social groups to each other in ever more intricate ways. By containing and co-opting uncooperative forces, the United States, with the help of its allies, thwarted disruptive political conflict and helped preserve traditional hierarchies of power.

At the same time, power struggles recurred within hegemonic units themselves. Wherever common interests broke down, the integrity of the Atlantic system became weakened. The United States applied techniques of co-optation and containment to allies, as to adversaries, in efforts to manage discord and sustain American power. Alliance members used similar techniques to maximize their own advantage in relation to each other. The “structural contradictions” of Atlanticism required a constant negotiation of hegemony’s obligations and limits.⁷⁹

This book examines the workings of American hegemony in Europe from 1945 through 1955, the period that witnessed the postwar consolidation of U.S. power on the Continent. Following that crucial decade, proliferating counterhegemonic forces increasingly challenged American supremacy. Although the Western alliance endured and American economic and cultural power remained predominant, the emergence of France as a nuclear power ended the Anglo-American atomic monopoly in the West, while France’s subsequent withdrawal from NATO roused the specter of an armed “Third Force” rival to Atlantic defense.⁸⁰ Nationalist movements in the decolonizing world prompted disparate and divisive responses, as when France, Britain, and Israel, without prior U.S. knowledge or approval, in 1956 jointly attacked the Suez Canal to prevent its nationalization by Egyptian leader Gamel Abdel Nasser.⁸¹ The growth of antiwar, antinuclear, and other movements for social change across the Western world during the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated widespread popular discontent with the status quo and with the policymakers who helped craft and defend it.⁸² The United States’ transformation from a creditor to a debtor nation as a consequence of global overextension weakened American economic power, especially as the former vanquished Axis states of Germany and Japan, industrialized and modernized through massive postwar injections of Allied capital and expertise, competed with the United States for shares of the world market.⁸³ The dollar’s liberation from the gold standard in August 1971 unleashed global capital and shifted domestic and international power away from the Eastern “Atlantic circuit” over to service, investment, and oil sectors concentrated in the Sunbelt and in the less developed periphery.⁸⁴ Prior “national regulatory and economic intervention systems” gave way to “global markets rooted in consumption and profit,” which left “to an untrustworthy, if not altogether-

er fictitious, invisible hand issues of public interest and common good.”⁸⁵

From 1945 to 1955, however, American hegemony advanced through a combination of state-based and less-formal mechanisms. Western leaders coordinated economic and military action to defend a way of life based on liberal mechanisms of capital exchange. The vague and contested but ever-present ideal of Atlantic union, combined with the powerful allure of American mass culture, helped forge an elite and popular consensus conducive to U.S. influence. The United States preserved its privileged position within the Atlantic bloc by applying internationally the techniques of cooperation, co-optation, and containment refined in the domestic realm.

Unlike many surveys of the period, this work assesses U.S. hegemony building through an exploration of American interactions with European rightists. Three case studies respectively evaluate U.S. efforts to cooperate with, co-opt, and contain key figures of the West German Right. A final chapter compares these endeavors with related enterprises in France and Italy.

By systematically treating U.S. relations with overseas rightists, the work charts largely unexplored historiographical terrain. Official U.S. views of the international Left are fairly well documented. In some sense, every study of American foreign policy during the Cold War directly or indirectly engages U.S. responses to communism and socialism abroad. The pervasiveness and intensity of the United States’ anticommunist crusade, and the readiness of American leaders to prop up authoritarian forces against destabilizing movements for social change, has helped generate the widespread assumption that the United States reflexively propped up the international Right in its global war against the Left. But while communist containment undeniably impelled much U.S. foreign policy during the postwar era, it did so because communism posed the most visible counterhegemonic threat to American power in the world. Left-right descriptors ultimately mattered less in figuring U.S. friends and foes than did the willingness of overseas forces to accept the values and practices of an American-dominated international system.

One reason the image persists of the postwar era as a simple Left-Right conflict is that few scholars have rigorously defined the political “Right” in their scholarship on the period. Historians commonly use “the Left” to designate socialists and communists, who acknowledged some intellectual debt to Karl Marx and promoted state-sponsored reduction of social and economic inequality.⁸⁶ The Right lacked any precise pedigree or program. Some scholars have questioned the term’s utility, given the multiple forms the Right has assumed in various historic contexts.⁸⁷

But, at least in post–World War II Western Europe, the Right had a fairly coherent meaning. Most non-Marxists, whatever their views on particular subjects, shared a strong commitment to private property. Most believed that “Eastern” doctrines and ways (especially communism) threatened “Western Civilization” and must be combated. Many favored particularistic and rural identity over urbanity. They adhered to, or at least allied with, Christian (often Catholic) ideals and institutions; and they defended traditional gender and racial hierarchies, which accorded social and political dominance to white males.⁸⁸

Within these postwar rightist boundaries, a spectrum of West German political alignments emerged. The moderately conservative Christian Democratic Union (*Christlich-Demokratische Union*, CDU) accepted limited economic planning, promoted state aid to religious schools, and embraced supranationalism as an antidote to Continental strife.⁸⁹ The Free Democratic Party (*Freie Demokratische Partei*, FDP) endorsed a classically liberal program, and, along with the German Party (*Deutsche Partei*, DP), displayed nationalistic and anticlerical tendencies.⁹⁰ Some veterans’ organizations, such as the League of German Youth (*Bund Deutscher Jugend*, BDJ), defended the Atlantic alliance. Others tended toward neutralism and, like the parlimanetary Bloc of Expelled and Dispossessed Persons (*Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten*, BHE), helped sow popular opposition to Germany’s partition.⁹¹ The ex-Nazi Otto Strasser and other neutralist-nationalists vocally promoted a German “Third Way” between the U.S. and Soviet superpowers.⁹² The National Democratic Party (*Nationaldemokratische Partei*, 1945–49) and Socialist Reich Party (*Sozialistische Reichspartei*, SRP, 1950–53) repudiated parliamentary forms and sought an autocratic state along the Nazi model.⁹³

This range of rightist thought prompted varied U.S. responses. As chapter 2 shows, American officials cooperated with bourgeois parties and groups, especially the CDU, which headed West Germany’s government throughout much of the Cold War. The United States favored the CDU over that party’s main rival, the Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, SPD), because Christian Democrats shared the American commitment to an open international system, the perceived key to Continental health and to U.S. power in Europe. Social Democrats conversely promoted state control of major industries, and some, like SPD chief Kurt Schumacher, favored reunification over partition and Western alignment.

Christian Democratic Chancellor Konrad Adenauer appeared to epitomize the United States’ best hopes for postwar Germany. An avid propo-

nent of Franco-German rapprochement and of European economic and military integration, the fervently anticommunist Adenauer rejected nationalism as a value in itself. He defended Germany's division into sovereign eastern and western halves, claiming that reunification should not precede alliance with the West. At an early stage, he advocated German rearmament within a supranational framework, a goal promoted by U.S. leaders themselves beginning in mid-1950. Adenauer also helped craft a "corporatist" domestic order that foreclosed political extremism and hosted a "social market economy" akin to American welfare capitalism.⁹⁴

U.S. officials provided material and other aid to keep the pro-American chancellor and his party in power. This help included direct intervention in the 1953 parliamentary elections, which secured an absolute CDU majority and put Adenauer's government on secure footing for the first time. U.S. psychological warfare portrayed the CDU as Germany's foremost anticommunist bulwark, while friendships of Adenauer with Acheson, McCloy, and John Foster Dulles strengthened political ties between the two countries during the 1950s.

Yet Adenauer himself understood the coercive element latent in cooperation. West Germany could not fully enjoy the benefits of an open international order without regaining autonomy over foreign and domestic affairs. Adenauer proved adept at manipulating the United States—its fear of nationalism, communism, and neutralism—in order to speed the way to German self-government. His tactics ultimately succeeded; in May 1955 the Allied occupation ended. The price of national freedom was circumscribed international power. A truncated Germany, divided by the victors, subordinated its newly formed army to NATO and accepted supranational control of industrial resources. Cooperation empowered West Germany at the same time that it co-opted and contained future German threats.

The confluence of Adenauer's Atlanticist vision with the security concerns of Western states helped cement close U.S. ties with the chancellor and his party. This constructive relationship was open and acknowledged, based in part on joint and public opposition to nationalism in all its guises. But while American policymakers often iterated their antipathy for right-wing extremism, the United States in reality employed a utilitarian approach. Antidemocratic nationalism, though morally repugnant, was not in itself seen as a major threat, unless those sentiments targeted the United States, its allies, or the political and economic system they endorsed. Properly handled, and enticed by political or personal incentives, even prospectively subversive nationalists could be co-opted into serving American hegemony.

As chapter 3 shows, this mindset was evident at the immediate outset of the postwar era. The United States, racing with the other victors to control German scientific and espionage secrets, enlisted numerous Nazis and Nazi-allied figures in postwar international ventures. In the case studied most intensively here, the United States in 1951 and 1952 co-opted members of the *Bund Deutscher Jugend* (BDJ), a militaristic, anticommunist veterans' organization. World War II fighters often resented Germany's occupation and division. But recruits to the U.S.-sponsored "Technical Service" (*Technischer Dienst*) proved willing to accept American dominance in exchange for financial and personal rewards. The Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) founded the secret paramilitary group, which trained members to stay behind and resist any Soviet attack. When in fall 1952 the Hessian Interior Ministry determined that the organization targeted both communists and socialists for eventual "liquidation," a scandal erupted that embarrassed the United States and brought the ill-conceived project to an end. The BDJ affair demonstrated that at least some agencies of the U.S. government willingly worked with undemocratic elements in service to American power. The sorry ending to that debacle revealed the risks inherent to the strategy itself.

Yet Americans, as suggested, did not favor all rightists everywhere. U.S. leaders worked to contain anti-American forces of every political stripe—regardless of whether proponents endorsed capitalism, opposed communism, or believed in a Christian God. U.S. containment of Otto Strasser, described in chapter 4, offered a blatant example of Americans obstructing rightists who challenged U.S. hegemony in Europe. The National Socialist purist had turned against Hitler in 1930 and then fled Germany soon after the Nazi seizure of power. Britain in 1941 brought Strasser to Canada, hoping he could aid the anti-Hitler cause. Strasser's vociferous anticommunist and nationalistic views instead embarrassed the Allies, and Canada spent much of the war silencing its troublesome ward. Strasser hoped upon war's end to lead a movement back in Germany that resembled Nazism in core respects. But his ongoing criticism of the Western powers and his growing calls for a neutral Germany alarmed Allied officials. For nearly a decade after World War II, the United States, Britain, and ultimately the Federal Republic itself cooperated to prevent Strasser from returning home, lest he roil nationalist and neutralist sentiment and derail Germany's path toward full partnership with the West. The tactics used to contain this ex-Nazi—pressuring a reluctant Canada to detain him long past the end of the war, urging other nations to deny him travel rights, and exploiting numerous

bureaucratic loopholes indefinitely to forestall his homecoming—violated the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (1948), which, as Strasser himself pointed out, guaranteed everyone the right to “leave any country, including his own” and to return home.⁹⁵ The episode showed that Americans did not view all rightists uniformly. Those who challenged U.S. power in any way were viewed as suspect, even if such figures—like Strasser himself—were stridently anticommunist. While Americans willingly exploited some former and current German nationalists, they feared and contested any individual who directed his or her energy against the United States.

Cooperation with the CDU, co-optation of the BDJ, and containment of Otto Strasser all revealed disparate U.S. approaches to the German Right. These cases show that American leaders did not simply prop up the Right against the Left. The United States, rather, distinguished allies from foes according to which individuals served or impeded American hegemonic objectives abroad.

As chapters 2 and 5 reveal, U.S. responses to the German Left likewise proved diverse. The Detroit banker Joseph Dodge betrayed a common American tendency to view all Marxist groups with suspicion. Dodge declared in 1947 that “the world political problem today is the extent to which Government controls of ownership will replace private enterprise. . . . The expansion of socialism,” Dodge predicted, would inevitably lead to “totalitarianism.”⁹⁶ Dodge’s statement has been cited to sustain the premise that, in the words of one scholar, it was a “fixed policy” of the United States “to thwart the Left wherever it might do so,” and that American leaders “failed to distinguish between various kinds of Left movements and their connections to Russia, since it was uncontrollable change more than the extension of Soviet power that threatened the larger American vision of the ideal world order.”⁹⁷

U.S. anticommunism appears to have been fairly unyielding in Western Europe.⁹⁸ Yet the United States sought persistently throughout the first Cold War decade to drive a wedge between pro- and anti-American or neutralist wings of the SPD and to prop up perceived socialist allies, economically and politically. Americans worked assiduously as well, in a classic instance of labor co-optation, to create and bolster noncommunist unions against communist variants. And as the 1960s witnessed the SPD casting off Marxism altogether and gaining control of the federal government for the first time during the postwar era, the United States proved openly willing to work with that party. Such cooperation sometimes occurred at the expense of traditional right-wing allies, like the CDU, who

increasingly proved susceptible to nationalist and unilateralist appeals.

That “domestication of the Left” was itself a prerequisite to American cooperation with socialists might be said to prove the point that U.S. leaders trusted only nominal leftists—who arguably were not leftists at all—validating the premise that Americans uniformly preferred the political Right. It was, indeed, the SPD’s acquiescence in a class-based order that finally made that party a palatable partner of the West. Yet the SPD’s very turnaround reflects the process of hegemony at work—the absorption and dilution of opinions and views that challenge the dominant consensus. Had U.S. leaders behaved from the outset with complete inflexibility toward all leftists, starting from the days when the SPD still officially embraced Marxist dogma, such a taming process could not as easily have come about. At the very least, that development might have taken longer, leaving large pockets of German political life outside of U.S. influence.

Americans behaved with similar expediency elsewhere, as chapter 5 reveals. In France and Italy, the two other major Continental states, U.S. leaders cooperated with Christian Democrats and their “tame” socialist allies, both of whom sought a politically and militarily integrated and non-communist Western Europe. American authorities poured millions of dollars into the coffers of the Italian Christian Democratic Party (*Democrazia Cristiana*, DC), which held power throughout the Cold War and pursued an overtly pro-American foreign policy. The United States also helped break off from Italy’s Socialist Party (*Partito Socialista Italiano*, PSI) a conservative wing, which became the basis for the strongly pro-Western Social Democratic Party (*Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano*, PSDI). In France, the Socialist Party (*Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière*, SFIO), even more than the weaker Christian Democrats (*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*, MRP), proved the major beneficiary of American support. The SFIO had largely rejected Marxism before the war, and that party’s leader, Léon Blum, helped ease France toward full alliance with the United States in 1947.

U.S. authorities simultaneously co-opted French and Italian nationalists, as chapter 5 also shows. In both states, Americans during the early 1950s built “stay-behind nets” that resembled the BDJ and that aimed to defend Western Europe against any Soviet attack. The French program apparently shriveled without harmful effects. But Italy’s “Operation Gladio” brought blowback, or negative, unintended consequences, that far surpassed those of their German antecedent. During the 1960s, Italian terrorist groups armed with weapons left over from Gladio days carried out a violent campaign of bombings and intimidation designed to generate

support for the establishment of an authoritarian regime. This effort directly targeted a contemplated DC coalition with the Italian Communist Party (*Partito Comunista Italiano*, PCI), which itself had grown considerably more moderate since the 1940s. While U.S. leaders vocally opposed the DC's "opening to the Left," the United States' precise part in those plans remains unclear. The bloodshed that resulted from the far Right's "strategy of tension" nonetheless highlighted the dangers that attended covert U.S. recruitment and arming of European nationalists.

And yet, as in Germany, Americans battled those French and Italian rightists who challenged U.S. power in Europe. General Charles de Gaulle's brand of French neutralist-nationalism particularly vexed American officials. While the general's leadership of France was purportedly "preferable to the Communists," de Gaulle's call for a French-led European "Third Force" appeared poised to rupture Atlantic unity. The United States hence worked to impede both Gaullist nationalism and Communism, lest civil war occur and a hostile regime of either the Right or the Left triumph in France. In Italy, neutralism proved less problematic, but it surfaced in both the left wing of the DC and in the form of such figures as the maverick oil tycoon Enrico Mattei. U.S. leaders here, as elsewhere, worked to quell neutralist vigor. The ultimate purpose in every case was to perpetuate a political climate conducive to the exercise of U.S. power.

All these examples might, at first glance, appear to sustain the premise that a "search for order" impelled U.S. policy in Europe after World War II. American officials' distrust of both the far Left and the far Right reflected a deeply held and pervasive American "antirevolutionary" bias—the presumption that chaos anywhere subverted American freedom everywhere.⁹⁹ Stability and peace are prerequisites to free trade, and in turn to a functioning transnational liberal alliance, as marked U.S.-European relations after World War II. Indeed, wherever existing social and political arrangements looked familiar, and so, safe—in that they either paralleled conditions within the United States (as parliamentary Europe largely did), or else preserved a hierarchical social structure (as many non-Western nations did)—American leaders largely worked to preserve the status quo.

Close inspection, however, reveals that U.S. efforts to preserve order were in fact confined to regions already within the American hegemonic sphere. In areas where U.S. power was tenuous—as in parts of Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East—or very limited—as in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union—American-sponsored coups and anticommunist action abounded, suggesting that expanded U.S. control, not stability itself, was the foremost goal. If it could be demonstrated that the

United States in any way helped promote post-Gladio chaos in Italy, that point would be doubly underscored. While firmly pro-American, Italy ranked among Western Europe's poorest, least-industrialized states; it suffered from much of the corruption, poverty, and political violence characteristic of so-called Third World nations that experienced U.S.-sponsored political violence throughout the Cold War.

Even in postwar Germany itself, an argument can be made that the United States helped craft what the Italian political philosopher Antonio Gramsci described as a "passive revolution"—a series of political, economic, and social transformations brought about not through popular uprising, but by elite forces to serve their own interests. Gramsci used the notion to describe the transformation of a state trapped between an old and a new regime, such as pre-unification Italy or post-revolutionary France. In those cases, a single individual—Cavour and Napoleon respectively—imposed token reforms but generated little substantive change for the lower class.¹⁰⁰ The Allies themselves arguably served this Caesar-type function in West Germany, easing that state's transition from dictatorship to democracy, but rendering the Federal Republic a quasi-client of the United States.¹⁰¹

Such insights invite a fresh look at enduring debates on the nature of U.S. foreign relations history in general. Scholars have long divided over the question of what role ideology, culture, bureaucratic processes, "core values," material interests, military objectives, and other forces have played in shaping U.S. foreign policy, and about whether "continuity" or "discontinuity" marks the history of U.S. diplomacy over time.¹⁰² Discerning patterns is, of course, at the heart of history itself—an exercise that elevates the profession above mere antiquarianism. At the same time, however, embedded in this endeavor lies a set of assumptions that very often, regardless of historians' own political and personal biases, serves on a functional level to perpetuate an "exceptionalist" view of American history. At root is the notion that the United States, whether for good or ill, has historically acted in particular ways because U.S. leaders, by virtue of their unique position as Americans, have distinctly imagined and defined national interests and foreign policy. The notion that the United States traditionally favored rightists over leftists at home and abroad reflects this implicit belief that traits and impulses unique to the United States persistently led American leaders toward alliance with certain types of individuals. Advocates of this view have tended to be critical of the extent to which crude material objectives often overrode higher considerations and generated a hypocritical disjunction between the rhetoric and reality of

American policy. Unstated, however, is the notion that the United States could and should do better. Americans were exceptional; they just had not yet learned how to live up to their best expectations of themselves.

Thinking in terms of exceptionalism encourages focus on the features that make American history unique. But thinking in terms of hegemony—economically based, politically expressed, and culturally, economically, and militarily manifested—casts postwar U.S. foreign relations into broader relief. The United States, no less than any other great power in modern history, sought throughout the postwar era to maximize and preserve its own economic and military might.¹⁰³ That power was predicated first and foremost on the functioning of a world capitalist economy that ensured American access to markets and raw materials abroad. The underlying purpose of U.S. hegemony in Europe during the Cold War was to maintain the integrity of American capitalism by advancing and refining the international mechanisms that vitalized the system. Wherever those processes ceased to serve perceived American interests, U.S. leaders readily adopted other methods of control.¹⁰⁴

An analysis of U.S. responses to the West German Right thus offers a window into the question of how Americans exercised hegemony in Europe, and to what effect. U.S. cooperation with the CDU, co-optation of the BDJ, and containment of Otto Strasser demonstrated the multiple ways Americans interacted with nonsocialist, noncommunist political groups. Those disparate responses were paralleled in France and Italy and revealed that, throughout Western Europe, neither a search for order nor a war of the Right against the Left fundamentally drove U.S. postwar foreign policy. An effort, rather, to perpetuate and enhance the power of the dominant classes at home found its counterpart in the pursuit of preponderance abroad. The purpose and effect of hegemony at home and overseas was essentially the same: to reinforce the wealth and status of American capitalists and their allies by strengthening the economic and political arrangements that legitimated their power.

Notes

Notes to Preface

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5. See, for example, Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1945–1953* (New York, 1972), 445–50; Adam Garfinkle and Alan H. Luxenberg, “The First Friendly Tyrants,” in *Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma*, eds. Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle (New York, 1991), 27; and David F. Schmitz, *Thank God They’re On Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921–1965* (Chapel Hill, 1999), 3–11, 304–5.

6. Schmitz, *Thank God*, 4.

7. Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” *Commentary* 68:5, January 1981, 44.

8. Schmitz, *Thank God*, 125–27.

Notes to Chapter 1

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2. Recent scholarship on the U.S. occupation of Germany includes: Petra Goedde, *GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945–1949* (New Haven, 2003); John Palmer Hawkins, *Army of Hope, Army of Alienation: Culture and Contradiction in the American Army Communities of Cold War Germany*, 2nd ed. (Tuscaloosa, 2005); Felicitas Hentschke, *Demokratisierung als Ziel der amerikanischen Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland und Japan 1943–1947* (Münster, 2001); Maria Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany* (Chapel Hill, 2002); James McAllister, *No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943–1954* (Ithaca, 2002); Dorothee Mussnug, *Alliierte Militärmissionen in Deutschland 1946–1990* (Berlin, 2001); Frank Schumacher, *Kalter Krieg und Propaganda: die USA, der Kampf um die Weltmeinung, und die ideelle Westbindung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945–1955* (Trier, 2000); James C. Van Hook, *Rebuilding Germany: The Creation of the Social Market Economy, 1945–1957* (Cambridge, 2004); and John Willoughby, *Remaking the Conquering Heroes: The Social and Geopolitical Impact of the Postwar Occupation of Germany* (New York, 2001).

3. Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York, 1972), 3–28, 66, 69; David F. Schmitz, *Thank God They're On Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921–1965* (Chapel Hill, 1999), 3, 313.

4. Robert H. Wiebe's term, in Wiebe, *The Search For Order, 1877–1920* (New York, 1967); Schmitz, *Thank God*, 10, 176; Emily Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1898–1945* (New York, 1982), 7–12, 230–34.

5. Schmitz, *Thank God*, 308–9.

6. Walter LaFeber makes this argument with respect to an earlier period in *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865–1913* (Cambridge, 1993), xiii, 234–39.

7. See, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations* (New York, 1992), 18, 155–56.

8. Michael J. Hogan, "Corporatism," in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, 2nd ed., eds. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (New York, 2004), 141.

9. Kevin M. Casey, *Saving International Capitalism During the Early Truman Presidency: The National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems* (New York, 2001), 8.

10. Thomas G. Paterson, "America's Quest for Peace and Prosperity: European Reconstruction and Anti-Communism," in Paterson, *Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan* (New York, 1988), 18–21.

11. President Harry S. Truman, quoted in Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, 1992), 13. For related discussions, see Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (New York, 1998), 156, and Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton, 2000), 34–80.

12. Leffler, *Preponderance*, 13. On the American international crusade of “freedom,” see Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The American Crusade against the Soviet Union* (New York, 1999), 1–4.

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20. *Ibid.*, 100–101.

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37. *Ibid.*, 22.

38. *Ibid.*, 134, 242–43.

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41. See, for example, Paul Avrich, *Sacco and Vanzetti: The Anarchist Background* (Princeton, 1991), 165–217; Philip S. Foner, *The Great Labor Uprising of 1877* (New York, 1977); Susan Faludi, *Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women* (New York, 1991), esp. 229–311; Gerald D. McKnight, *The Last Crusade: Martin Luther King, Jr., the FBI, and the Poor People's Campaign* (Boulder, 1998); Frederick J. Simonelli, *American Fuehrer: George Lincoln Rockwell and the American Nazi Party* (Urbana, 1999), 52–71; Lane Crothers, *Rage on the Right: The American Militia Movement from Ruby Ridge to Homeland Security* (New York, 2003), 81–92, 104–14.

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43. On the power and persistence of the liberal tradition in America, see Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution* (New York, 1955).

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46. See the treatments in Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle, eds., *Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma* (New York, 1991); Michael T. Klare, *Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad* (Washington, DC, 1977).

47. Cox, “Realism,” 55–56.

48. For a related theoretical discussion, see Gill, *American Hegemony*, 47.

49. See the now-classic theoretical discussion in Michel Foucault, “Panopticism,” in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York, 1984), 206–13.

50. Walter Lippmann's phrase (Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, 1965 [1922], 158). Two recent works that explore the relationship between class and the Cold War policies of the major European states—with a special focus on economic integration—are Guglielmo Carchedi, *For Another Europe: A Class Analysis of European Economic Integration* (New York, 2001), esp. 1–35, 60–61, 114–18, and Werner Bonefeld, ed., *The Politics of Europe: Monetary Union and Class* (New York, 2001), esp. Bernard H. Moss, "The E.C.'s Free Market Agenda and the Myth of Social Europe," 107–35.

51. Kees van der Pijl, *The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class* (London, 1983), xiii.

52. Frank Costigliola, "Culture, Emotion, and the Creation of the Atlantic Identity, 1948–1952," in *No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Europe: Past, Present, and Future*, ed. Geir Lundestad (New York, 1998), 22. See related discussions in Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and Post-War American Hegemony* (New York, 2002), ix; and Mark Rupert, *Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power* (New York, 1995), 44.

53. Giles Scott-Smith states that "from the point of view of American internationalism, freedom had to be created and, literally, institutionalized, in post-war Western Europe. Nothing should be left to chance." Scott-Smith, *Politics*, 66.

54. For the related theoretical discussion, see Jonathan Joseph, *Hegemony: A Realist Analysis* (New York, 2002), 131–39.

55. The structural and surface aspects of hegemony existed dualistically (Joseph, *Hegemony*, 131–34). The United States utilized surface, as well as structural, hegemonic tactics in a purposeful attempt to shape popular opinion abroad through anticommunist propaganda, psychological warfare, and cultural diplomacy. At the same time, East European regimes, while backed and to a large extent controlled by the Soviet Union, were also indigenous creations, organic outgrowths of domestic social relations and conflicts of power. Bernd W. Kubbig claims that the Soviets achieved imperial, rather than hegemonic, dominance over Eastern Europe because they acted "against" the popular "will" by imposing communism. But this interpretation obscures the fact that that, while never accounting for a majority in any state, "a strikingly large number" of East European voters "freely went to the polls in 1945–46, and elected communists." Bernd W. Kubbig, "The U.S. Hegemon in the 'American Century': The State of the Art and the German Contributions—Introduction," in Kubbig, guest ed., "Toward a New American Century? The U.S. Hegemon in Motion," *American Studies* 46:4 (2001):393–422, on-line (HTML) at <http://216.239.51.104/search?q=cache:M7H016mDhpUJ:www.hsfr.de/abm/back/docs/vorwort.pdf+Kubbig+US+Hegemon+American+Century&hl=en&lr=lang_en&ie=UTF-8>, pp. 5 and 17; Norman M. Naimark and Leonid Giblianskii, "Introduction," in *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949*, Naimark and Giblianskii, eds. (Boulder, 1997), 9.

56. In the words of G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Hegemonic control emerges when foreign elites buy into the hegemon's vision of international order and accept it as their own—that is, when they internalize the norms and value orientations espoused by the hegemon and accept its normative claims about the nature of the international system" and "therefore pursue policies consistent with the hegemon's

notion of the international order.” G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” *International Organization* 44:3 (Summer 1990):283, 284.

57. Cox, “Realism,” 55–56.

58. For a related discussion, see Klaus Knorr, *Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power* (New York, 1973), 27–29.

59. For biographical backgrounds on each, see, respectively, David F. Schmitz, *Henry L. Stimson: The First Wise Man* (Wilmington, 2000); Ronald W. Pruessen, *John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power, 1888–1952* (New York, 1982); Peter Grose, *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles* (Boston, 1994); Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (New York, 1986) (Acheson and Kennan); Jean Edward Smith, *Lucius D. Clay: An American Life* (New York, 1990); Robert P. Browder and Thomas G. Smith, *Independent: A Biography of Lewis W. Douglas* (New York, 1986); Mark A. Stoler, *George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century* (Boston, 1989); Ellen Clayton Garwood, *Will Clayton: A Short Biography* (Austin, 1958); David Robertson, *Sly and Able: A Political Biography of James F. Byrnes* (New York, 1994); Robert D. Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (Garden City, NY, 1964); and Kai Bird, *The Chairman: John J. McCloy: The Making of the American Establishment* (New York, 1992).

60. Murphy, *Diplomat*, 2.

61. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–1950* (Boston, 1967), 129–30.

62. Grose, *Gentleman Spy*, 125.

63. Ronald W. Pruessen, “John Foster Dulles,” in *The Encyclopedia of U.S. Foreign Relations*, 4 vols., eds. Bruce Jentleson and Thomas G. Paterson (New York, 1997), 2:37.

64. Michael Wala, “‘Ripping Holes in the Iron Curtain’: The Council on Foreign Relations and Germany, 1945–1950,” in *American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945–1955*, eds. Jeffry M. Diefendorf et al. (New York, 1993), 5–19.

65. Pijl, *Making*, 45.

66. Alan Wolfe, *America’s Impasse: The Rise and Fall of the Politics of Growth* (Boston, 1982), 24–25.

67. Pijl, *Making*, 144–47.

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70. John Morton Blum, ed., *From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of War, 1941–1945* (Boston, 1967), 327–69; Warren F. Kimball, *Swords or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany, 1943–1946* (Philadelphia, 1976).

71. Quoted in Eisenberg, *Drawing*, 38.

72. *Ibid.*, 39–51.

73. John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949* (Stanford, 1968), 1–23. See also chapter 2.

74. Quoted in Eisenberg, *Drawing*, 246.

75. John Dietrich, *The Morgenthau Plan: Soviet Influence on American Postwar Policy* (New York, 2002), 23. Claims that White was a spy have intensified since the decoding of Soviet documents under the Venona program. See John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America* (New Haven, 1999), 125–26, 139–43; and Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America—The Stalin Era* (New York, 1999), 157–71.

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77. Brinkley, *End of Reform*, 31–34.

78. Henry Morgenthau, Jr., “Our Policy toward Germany,” *New York Post*, 24 November 1947, 2.

79. Gramsci, *Selections*, 178.

80. Leffler, *Preponderance*, 15–19; Shane J. Maddock, “Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and the Maintenance of American Hegemony,” in *The Nuclear Age*, ed. Shane J. Maddock (Boston, 2001), 192–99.

81. Keith Kyle, *Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East*, 2nd ed. (London, 2003).

82. Mark Kurlansky, 1968: *The Year That Rocked the World* (New York, 2004).

83. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York, 1987), 514–35.

84. Pijl, *Making*, xiii, 272. President George W. Bush’s director of policy planning at the State Department, Richard Haas, summed up the newer U.S. policy outlook with the phrase “à la carte multilateralism.” Quoted in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone* (New York, 2002), 159.

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87. For example, Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber, eds., *The European Right: A Historical Profile* (Berkeley, 1966), 5.

88. This typology of the postwar European Right is gleaned from readings in Klemens von Klemperer, *Germany’s New Conservatism: Its History and Dilemma in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, 1968); Zig Layton-Henry, ed., *Conservative Politics in Western Europe* (New York, 1982); Roger Eatwell and Noël O’Sullivan, eds., *The Nature of the Right: American and European Politics and Political Thought since 1789* (London, 1989); Martin Blinkhorn, ed., *Fascists and Conservatives* (London, 1990); Paul Hainsworth, ed., *The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA* (New York, 1992); Hans-Georg Betz, *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe* (New York, 1994); K. von

Beyme, "Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe," *West European Politics* 11:2 (1988):2–18; and Roger Morgan and Stefano Silvestri, eds., *Moderates and Conservatives in Western Europe: Political Parties, the European Community, and the Atlantic Alliance* (Cranbury, NY, 1982). On Fascism's and Nazism's somewhat ambiguous relationship to the political Right, start with Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (New York, 1991).

89. For background on the CDU, see Winfried Becker, *CDU und CSU 1945–1950: Vorläufer und regionale Entwicklung bis zum Entstehen der CDU-Bundespartei* (Mainz, 1987); Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, *Unionsparteien, Sozialdemokratie und Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika 1945–1965* (Düsseldorf, 1983); R.E.M. Irving, *The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe* (London, 1979), 112–63.

90. On the FDP, see Jörg Michael Gutscher, *Die Entwicklung der FDP von ihren Anfängen bis 1961*, 2nd ed. (Königstein, 1984); Dieter Hein, *Zwischen liberaler Milieupartei und nationaler Sammlungsbewegung: Gründung, Entwicklung und Struktur der Freien Demokratischen Partei 1945–1949* (Düsseldorf, 1985); on the DP, see Hermann Meyn, *Die Deutsche Partei: Entwicklung und Problematik einer national-konservativen Rechtspartei nach 1945* (Düsseldorf, 1965).

91. Peter Dudek and Hans-Gerd Jaschke, *Entstehung und Entwicklung des Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik: Zur Tradition einer besonderen politischen Kultur*, 2 vols. (Opladen, 1984), 1:69–70, 356–73.

92. Kurt P. Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika: German Nationalism since 1945*, 2 vols. (Middletown, CT, 1967), 1:110–12.

93. Daniel E. Rogers, *Politics after Hitler: The Western Allies and the German Party System* (New York, 1995), 53–58; Tauber, *Beyond*, 1:689–725.

94. David E. Patton, *Cold War Politics in Postwar Germany* (New York, 1999), 1–2.

95. Letter, Otto Strasser to Louis St. Laurent (prime minister, Canada), Bridgetown, 28 July 1949, RG 25 (Records of the Department of External Affairs), 44-GK-40/3369/8, National Archives of Canada, Ottawa, Canada. For the text of the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights, visit <www.un.org/overview/rights.html> (10 July 2004).

96. Quoted in Kolko and Kolko, *Limits*, 24.

97. *Ibid.*, 46.

98. But normalization of military and economic relations with communist Yugoslavia between 1948 and 1951 and with the People's Republic of China during the 1970s and after showed that U.S. anticommunism was not completely unbending. In both cases, efforts to contain Soviet power led the United States to compromise its commitment to communist containment in general. Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War* (University Park, 1997); James H. Mann, *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton* (New York, 1999).

99. Hunt, *Ideology*, 92–124.

100. Gramsci, *Selections*, 106–14.

101. John D. Montgomery argued that Americans imposed an artificial, democratic revolution on Germans, in *Forced to Be Free* (Chicago, 1957).

102. For a survey of views, see Paterson and Hogan, eds., *Explaining*.

103. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall*, 514–40. For the competing view that the United States'

postwar empire was “different” from that of traditional imperial powers because the United States’ “general mission was to promote democracy” abroad, see Lundestad, “‘Empire’ by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1996,” in Kathleen Burk and Melvyn Stokes, eds., *The United States and the European Alliance since 1945* (New York, 1999), 17–41; Tony Smith, *America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, 1994), 3; and John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York, 1997), 33–53.

104. See the related discussion in Alan P. Dobson, “The USA, Britain, and the Question of Hegemony,” in *No End to the Alliance: The United States and Western Europe: Past, Present, and Future*, ed. Geir Lundestad (New York, 1998), 134–63, esp. 137 and 142.

Notes to Chapter 2

1. Dulles quoted in Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer: German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction*, vol. 2, *The Statesman, 1952–1967*, trans. Geoffrey Penny (Providence, 1997), 78–79.

2. Department of State, Information Statement on State Department and U.S. Information Agency Policy: “The German Elections of September 6,” Washington, 18 August 1953, 5, RG 466: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (hereafter HICOM): Security Segregated General Records, 1953–55, box 180, “Elections—Germany, 1953–55” folder, NARA.

3. John J. McCloy (U.S. high commissioner for Germany) to Dean Acheson (secretary of state), 13 September 1949, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949* (Washington, DC, 1974), 3:595–96 (hereafter *FRUS* followed by year, volume and page numbers).

4. Quoted in Ronald J. Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949–1966* (New York, 2003), 29.

5. Adenauer (“Christianity, Christian culture”) quoted in Wolfram Kaiser, “Trigger-happy Protestant Materialists? The European Christian Democrats and the United States,” in *Between Empire and Alliance: America and Europe During the Cold War*, ed. Marc Trachtenberg (New York, 2003), 68; Dulles’s phrase (“godless terrorism”), incorporated into the 1952 Republican Party Platform, first appeared in his *Life* magazine article “A Policy of Boldness,” *Life* (19 May 1952), 146–60. See also Andrew Johnston, “Massive Retaliation and the Specter of Salvation: Religious Imagery, Nationalism and Dulles’s Nuclear Strategy, 1952–1954,” *Journal of Millennial Studies*, 2:2 (Winter 2000):1–2, 9–12, and passim, at <www.mille.org/publications/winter2000/johnston.PDF> (10 July 2004).

6. Michael H. Hunt explores the liberal—and non-liberal—dimensions of postwar U.S. leaders’ outlook in Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, 1987), 150–70. For an example of Adenauer’s embrace of liberal and rationalist ideas, see Adenauer, “Grundsatzrede des 1. Vorsitzenden der Christlich-Demokratischen Union

für die Britische Zone in der Aula der Kölner Universität,” 24 March 1946, in *Konrad Adenauer Reden 1917–1967: Eine Auswahl*, ed. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Stuttgart, 1975), 82–106. For a related discussion of how Adenauer’s view of the “West” incorporated Enlightenment ideals, see Granieri, *Ambivalent*, 15–22.

7. Michael J. Hogan, “Corporatism,” in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, 2nd ed., eds. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (New York, 2004), 139; Scott Lucas, *Freedom’s War: The American Crusade against the Soviet Union* (New York, 1999), 2–3, 93–106, and passim; Oliver Schmidt, “Small Atlantic World: U.S. Philanthropy and the Expanding International Exchange of Scholars after 1945,” eds. Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, *Culture and International History* (New York, 2003), 120–26.

8. Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and Post-war American Hegemony* (New York, 2002), 28. See the related discussion in Kees Van der Pijl, *The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class* (London, 1984), xii–xviii, 9–10, 26–34, 177.

9. Alan Wolfe, *America’s Impasse: The Rise and Fall of the Politics of Growth* (Boston, 1981), 25–26; Van der Pijl, *Making*, 138–77.

10. The term *hegemonic bloc* adapts Gramsci’s notion of the “historic bloc.” See chapter 1 for a fuller treatment.

11. On the U.S. strategy of “dual containment” see Thomas A. Schwartz, *America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, 1991), 299; Wolfram Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy* (New Haven, 1989), 6–11; and Rolf Steininger et al., eds., *Die Doppelte Eindämmung: Europäische Sicherheit und deutsche Frage in den Fünfzigern* (Munich, 1993). James McAllister similarly argues that U.S. policy aimed to prevent a “latent tripolar order”: “The belief that Germany represented a potential third power whose defection or allegiance would determine the overall balance of power” in Europe “exerted a dominant influence on American foreign policy” after World War II. James McAllister, *No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943–1954* (Ithaca, 2002), 11.

12. Hans W. Gatzke, *Germany and the United States: A ‘Special Relationship?’* (Cambridge, 1980), 279.

13. For related but differing treatments of the relationship between hegemony, coercion, and international security cooperation during the postwar era, see David P. Calleo, *Beyond American Hegemony* (New York, 1987), 13–23; Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton, 1995), 12–41; and David A. Lake, *Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century* (Princeton, 1999), 4–11, 128–97, esp. 129–42.

14. On U.S. relations with the British Labour government, see Bradford Perkins, “Unequal Partners: The Truman Administration and Great Britain,” in *The ‘Special Relationship’: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945*, eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (New York, 1986), 46–47, an article that parallels many themes presented here; on U.S. cooperation with French socialists, liberals, and Christian Democrats, see Deborah Kisatsky, “The United States, the French Right, and American Power in Europe, 1945–1958,” *The Historian* 65:2 (Spring 2003):619–25.

15. Despatch 1462, Robert Murphy (political adviser in Germany) to James F. Byrnes (secretary of state), Berlin, 4 December 1945, RG 84 (Records of the U.S. Political Adviser for Germany), box 13, "800 Political Affairs-Germany: September-October 1945" folder, NARA; Rebecca Boehling, *A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reform and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany: Frankfurt, Munich, and Stuttgart under U.S. Occupation, 1945-1949* (Providence, 1996), 124, 162-78; Daniel E. Rogers, *Politics after Hitler: The Western Allies and the German Party System* (New York, 1995), 76-80.

16. Christoph Kleßmann, *Die doppelte Staatsgründung: Deutsche Geschichte 1945-1955* (Göttingen, 1982), 61; Harold Zink, *American Military Government in Germany* (New York, 1947), 92, 133-34; Rolf Badstübner, *Restauration in Westdeutschland 1945-1949* (Berlin, 1965), 73.

17. Carolyn Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949* (New York, 1996), 127-28.

18. Diethelm Prowe, "Democratization as Conservative Restabilization: The Impact of American Policy," in *American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945-55*, eds. Jeffery M. Diefendorf et al. (New York, 1993), 310-11; Roger Wells, "Local Government," in *Governing Postwar Germany*, ed. Edward H. Litchfield (Ithaca, 1953), 65.

19. Boehling, *Question*, 146.

20. Ibid., 121-22, 142.

21. Telegram, Lucius D. Clay (U.S. military governor for Germany) to War Department, Berlin, 20 August 1946, in *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945-1949*, 2 vols., ed. Jean Edward Smith (Bloomington, 1974), 1:256-57.

22. Murphy to George C. Marshall (secretary of state), Berlin, 30 October 1947, *FRUS 1947* (Washington, DC, 1972), 2:893-95.

23. Quoted in Frank Ninkovich, *Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question since 1945*, rev. ed. (New York, 1995), 27.

24. Clay to Major General David Noce (chief, Army Central Affairs Division), Berlin, 29 April 1947, *FRUS 1947*, 2:912-13.

25. Eisenberg, *Drawing*, 336.

26. Ibid., 341.

27. Directive to the Commander in Chief of the United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany, 26 April 1945, *FRUS 1945* (Washington, DC, 1968), 3:494-95.

28. Quote from Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, *Unionsparteien, Sozialdemokratie und Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika 1945-1966* (Düsseldorf, 1983), 111.

29. Hans-Hermann Hartwich, *Sozialstaatspostulat und gesellschaftlicher Status quo* (Cologne u. Opladen, 1970), 68. On U.S. thwarting of socialization in state constitutions, see also Wilhelm Hoegner, *Der schwierige Aussenseiter: Erinnerungen eines Abgeordneten, Emigranten und Ministerpräsidenten* (Munich, 1959), 249, 252, 256; Gerd Winter, "Sozialisierung in Hessen, 1946-1955," *Kritische Justiz* 7 (1974):159-60; Conrad F. Latour and Thilo Vogelsang, *Okkupation und Wiederaufbau: Die Tätigkeit der Militärregierung in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1944-1947* (Stuttgart, 1973), 117; Eberhard Schmidt, *Die verhinderte Neuordnung 1945-1952: Zur*

Auseinandersetzung um die Demokratisierung der Wirtschaft in den westlichen Besatzungszonen und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main, 1971), 85–86; Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany, 1944–1955* (New York, 1957), 181; John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949* (Stanford, 1968), 117; Ernst-Ulrich Huster et al., *Determinanten der west-deutschen Restauration 1945–1959* (Frankfurt am Main, 1972), 47–48. Dörte Winkler and Dietrich Orlow have challenged the premise that Americans uniformly challenged socialism in occupied Germany, rightly showing that many strains of policy competed, but this interpretation obscures larger patterns in favor of discrete ones. Dörte Winkler, “Die amerikanische Sozialisierungspolitik in Deutschland 1945–1948,” in *Politische Weichenstellung im Nachkriegsdeutschland 1945–1953*, ed. Heinrich August Winkler (Göttingen, 1979), 88–89; Dietrich Orlow, “Ambivalence and Attraction: The German Social Democrats and the United States, 1945–1974,” in *The American Impact on Postwar Germany*, ed. Reiner Pommerin (Providence, 1995), 35–52. Clay biographers Jean Edward Smith and Wolfgang Krieger take at face value Clay’s publicly stated impartiality toward German politics, socialism included, although Smith quotes Clay as saying that “it was the job of military government to maintain free enterprise in Germany until the Germans were capable of making that choice for themselves.” Jean Edward Smith, *Lucius D. Clay: An American Life* (New York, 1990), 393; Wolfgang Krieger, *General Lucius D. Clay und die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1945–1949* (Stuttgart, 1987), 22–23.

30. Quoted in Hartwich, *ibid.*, 69.

31. Konrad Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945–53*, trans. Beate Ruhm von Oppen (Chicago, 1965), 23.

32. Lutz Niethammer, “Die amerikanische Besatzungsmacht zwischen Verwaltungstradition und politischen Parteien in Bayern 1945,” *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 15 (1967):165.

33. Theodore White quoted in Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer*, vol. 1: *From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952* (Providence, 1995), 413; also 46–47, 70.

34. Gerald Braunthal, *Parties and Politics in Modern Germany* (New York, 1996), 21–22; Karl-Egon Lönne, “Germany,” in *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1965*, eds. Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway (New York, 1995), 155–58.

35. Ingelore M. Winter, *Der unbekannte Adenauer* (Cologne, 1976), 101–2.

36. Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer*, 1:130.

37. Noel D. Cary, *The Path to Christian Democracy: German Catholics and the Party System from Windthorst to Adenauer* (Cambridge, 1996), 196.

38. *Ibid.*; Helmuth Pütz, “Einführung in die Dokumentation,” in *Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der britischen Besatzungszone 1946–1949*, ed. Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung (Bonn, 1975), 46–50. On the relationship of Erhard to Adenauer’s political thought, see Ludger Westrick, “Adenauer und Erhard,” in *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit: Politik und Persönlichkeit des ersten Bundeskanzlers: Beiträge von Weg- und Zeitgenossen*, eds. Dieter Blumenwitz et al. (Stuttgart, 1976), 169–76.

39. Lewis Edinger’s biography of Kurt Schumacher remains the best comprehensive work in English (Lewis Edinger, *Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior* [Stanford, 1965]). In German, consult Günther Scholz, *Kurt Schumacher*

(Düsseldorf, 1988); Willy Albrecht, *Kurt Schumacher: Ein Leben für den demokratischen Sozialismus* (Bonn, 1985); Waldemar Ritter, *Kurt Schumacher* (Hannover, 1964); and Arno Scholz and Walther Oschilewski's massive 3-volume edited work, *Turmwächter der Demokratie: Ein Lebensbild von Kurt Schumacher*, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1954).

40. Quoted in Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 53–54.

41. *Ibid.*, 54.

42. Edinger, *Kurt Schumacher*, 156–57.

43. *Ibid.*, 159–67.

44. *Ibid.*; quotation from Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 55.

45. For an exhaustively detailed chronicle and analysis of the making of the Basic Law, consult Edmund Spevack, *Allied Control and German Freedom: American Political and Ideological Influences on the Framing of the West German Basic Law (Grundgesetz)* (Münster, 2001).

46. "Letter of Advice to Military Governors Regarding German Constitution," *FRUS* 1948 (Washington, DC, 1973), 2:240–41.

47. Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer*, 1:299–300. For an example of anti-Allied statements, see Adenauer, "Rede vor Studenten im Chemischen Institut der Universität Bonn," 21 July 1948, in *Konrad Adenauer Reden 1917–1968: Eine Auswahl*, ed. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Stuttgart, 1975), 111.

48. Adenauer to William E. Sollmann, Bonn, 16 March 1946, in *Adenauer: Briefe 1945–1947*, ed. Hans Peter Mensing (Bonn, 1983), 189–91. See also Adenauer to Father Paul Schulte, 15 September 1946; Adenauer to Raymond L. Hiles, 17 December 1947; and Adenauer to Simon J. Vogel, 26 January 1948, same volume, pp. 328, 126, and 161–62.

49. Granieri, *Ambivalent*, 16; also ix, 14–15.

50. Spevack, *Allied Control*, 294–99.

51. *Ibid.*, 294–312; Van der Pijl, *Making*, 140, 162–63, 172–75.

52. Erich J. Hahn, "U.S. Policy on a West German Constitution, 1947–1949," in *American Policy*, eds. Diefendorf et al., 36.

53. Teleconference, 2 April 1949, *Clay Papers*, 2:1076–77.

54. Grabbe, *Unionsparteien*, 163. Ronald J. Granieri explores the "ambivalence" of some members of the CDU/CSU toward Atlanticism, and Adenauer's efforts to balance among competing Atlanticist and Gaullist strains of Christian democracy, in Granieri, *Ambivalent*, 13–22.

55. Wilhelm Hoegner, *Der schwierige Aussenseiter: Erinnerungen eines Abgeordneten, Emigranten und Ministerpräsidenten* (Munich, 1959), 165–66, 169, 172–73, 185–201; Badstübner, *Restauration*, 82.

56. Edinger, *Kurt Schumacher*, 135–36; Grabbe, *Unionsparteien*, 74.

57. Grabbe, *Unionsparteien*, 75.

58. Eisenberg, *Drawing*, 151–64.

59. James E. Miller, "Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," *Diplomatic History* 7:1 (Winter 1983):35–56. For an extensive analysis of the CDU campaign and victory of 1949 that makes little reference to the United States, see Udo Wengst, "Die CDU/CSU in Bundestagswahlkampf 1949," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 34:1 (1986):1–52.

60. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ORE 67–49: “Probable Consequences of the Forthcoming West German Elections,” 19 July 1949, Papers of Harry S. Truman: PSF Intelligence File, box 257, “PSF Intelligence File: O.R.E., 1949,” folder, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri (hereafter HSTL).
61. Drew Middleton, “German Campaign Sees West Scored,” *New York Times*, 4 August 1949, 6; “German Red Calls West Vote Fraud,” 25 August 1949, *New York Times*, 5.
62. “Schumacher Reports Plan to Delay State,” *New York Times*, 9 August 1949, 9. For a history of *Die Neue Zeitung*, see Jessica Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1999).
63. Middleton, “U.S. Help Pledged to German Regime of Conservatives,” *New York Times*, 16 August 1949, 1.
64. “Acheson Cautions Western Germans,” *New York Times*, 18 August 1949, 13.
65. Middleton, “U.S. Help,” 8.
66. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 177–78.
67. “Principles Governing Exercise of Powers and Responsibilities of U.S.-U.K.-French Governments Following Establishment of German Federal Republic,” *Clay Papers*, 2:1088–90.
68. “Erste Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Adenauer,” 20 September 1949, in Adenauer, *Reden*, 166–68.
69. Kai Bird, *The Chairman: John J. McCloy: The Making of the American Establishment* (New York, 1992), 78–95, 115–268, 309. On McCloy’s background and early career, see also Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (New York, 1986), 65–71; and Schwartz, *America’s Germany*, 1–28, passim.
70. Bird, *Chairman*, 320–21.
71. Quoted in Schwartz, “John J. McCloy and the Landsberg Cases,” in *American Policy*, eds. Diefendorf et al., 445–46.
72. Schwartz, *America’s Germany*, 42.
73. Drew Middleton, “U.S. Help Pledged to German Regime of Conservatives,” *New York Times*, 16 August 1949, 1; Schwartz, “John J. McCloy,” in *American Policy*, eds. Diefendorf et al., 433–54.
74. William Manchester, *The Arms of Krupp, 1587–1968* (New York, 1964), 749–50, 754–56, 758, 780, 932, 963.
75. Acheson to Robert Schuman (foreign minister of France), 30 October 1949, *FRUS 1949* (Washington, DC, 1974), 3:623–24.
76. Paper Prepared in the Department of State, Washington, undated, *FRUS 1949*, 3:131.
77. Ibid.; Leon W. Fuller (member, Policy Planning Staff), Paper Prepared for the Policy Planning Staff: “U.S. Policy toward Europe—Post EDC,” Washington, 10 September 1954, *FRUS 1952–54* (Washington, DC, 1983), 5:1174; McCloy to Acheson, Frankfurt, 25 April 1950, *FRUS 1950* (Washington, DC, 1980), 4:634; Policy Directive for the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Washington, 17 November 1949, *FRUS 1949*, 3:338, 319.

78. McCloy to Acheson, Frankfurt, 13 September 1949, *FRUS 1949*, 3:594–95.
79. James Riddleberger (acting U.S. political adviser for Germany) to Acheson, Frankfurt, 14 September 1949, *FRUS 1949*, 3:597.
80. Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 71.
81. McCloy to Acheson, Frankfurt, 13 September 1949, *FRUS 1949*, 3:594–95.
82. *Ibid.*, 595–96.
83. Riddleberger to Acheson, 14 September 1949, *FRUS 1949*, 3:598.
84. For an exploration of the image of NATO as a “family” led by an American “patriarch,” see Frank Costigliola, “The Nuclear Family: Tropes of Gender and Pathology in the Western Alliance,” *Diplomatic History* 21:2 (Spring 1997):163–83.
85. John J. McCloy, “Adenauer und die Hohe Kommission,” in *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit: Beiträge von Weg- und Zeitgenossen*, eds. Blumenwitz et al., 422; Bird, *Chairman*, 319.
86. McCloy, *ibid.*; Bird, *Chairman*, 321–22.
87. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 183.
88. *Ibid.*, 184.
89. Quoted in Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 60.
90. *Ibid.*, 63.
91. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 184.
92. Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 75.
93. Acheson to Schuman, 30 October 1949. See also Paper Prepared in the Department of State: “United States Interests, Positions, and Tactics at Paris,” Washington, 5 November 1949, *FRUS 1949*, 3:296.
94. *Ibid.*; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York, 1969), 341.
95. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 341; Memorandum of Conversation Prepared in the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Bonn, 13 November 1949, *FRUS 1949*, 3:308–13.
96. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 341.
97. Memorandum, 13 November 1949, *op. cit.*, 312–13.
98. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 342.
99. Protocol of Agreements between the Allied (Western) High Commissioners and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (Petersberg Protocol), Bonn, 22 November 1949, in U.S. Department of State, *Documents on Germany* (Washington, DC, 1985), 310–11.
100. Transcript of debate printed in Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 222–28.
101. McCloy to Acheson, Bonn, 25 November 1949, *FRUS 1949*, 3:352–53.
102. McCloy, “Adenauer,” 424.
103. Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, 1992), 10–12, 23–24.
104. Schuman to Adenauer, Paris, 8 May 1950, in *Adenauer Briefe 1949–1951*, ed. Hans Peter Mensing (Bonn, 1985), 210–11, 508–10.
105. William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954* (Chapel Hill, 1998), 41.
106. Adenauer to Schuman, Bonn, 8 May 1950, in *Adenauer Briefe 1949–51*, 208–9;

Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer*, 1:505. For a treatment of Adenauer's personal and political relationship with Schuman, see Paul Wilhelm Wenger, "Schuman und Adenauer," in *Konrad Adenauer und Seine Zeit: Beiträge von Weg- und Zeitgenossen*, eds. Blumenwitz et al., 395–414.

107. Arkansas Senator J. William Fulbright and U.S. Ambassador to France David K.E. Bruce quoted in Michael Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–52* (New York, 1987), 367, and in Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 105.

108. Averell Harriman (U.S. special representative in Europe) to Acheson, Paris, 20 May 1950, *FRUS 1950* (Washington, DC, 1977), 3:702.

109. McCloy to Acheson, Frankfurt, 7 November 1950, *FRUS 1950* (Washington, DC, 1981), 4:731; "McCloy Asserts Germans Still Need Controls: Says Allies Won't Relax Curbs Until People Show More Governing Capacity," *New York Herald Tribune*, 24 January 1950, transcript in RG 466: Classified General Records, 1949–1950," box 6, "Jan 50, D(50) 146 through 169" folder, NARA.

110. Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer*, 1:613; 616–18.

111. David K.E. Bruce (ambassador to France and U.S. observer at the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community) to Acheson, Paris, 20 March 1951, *FRUS 1951* (Washington, DC, 1985), 4:106.

112. Quoted in David Clay Large, *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era* (Chapel Hill, 1995), 54–55.

113. Klaus Schwabe, "Konrad Adenauer und die Aufrüstung der Bundesrepublik (1949 bis 1955)," in *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit: Beiträge der Wissenschaft*, eds. Dieter Blumenwitz et al. (Stuttgart, 1976), 19.

114. But military planners beginning in 1947 contemplated Germany's place in the strategic balance. See Lawrence W. Martin, "The American Decision to Rearm Germany," in *American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies*, ed. Harold Stein (Birmingham, AL, 1963), 646; Robert McGeehan, *The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II* (Chicago, 1971), 6.

115. McGeehan, *German Rearmament Question*, 22–23; Doris M. Condit, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Test of War, 1950–1953* (Washington, DC, 1988), 317–18; Gerhard Wettig, *Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland 1943–1955. Internationale Auseinandersetzungen um die Rolle der Deutschen in Europa* (Münich, 1967), 306–12.

116. Quoted in Large, *Germans to the Front*, 103.

117. Quoted in *ibid.*, 151.

118. Rainer Dohse, *Der Dritte Weg: Neutralitätsbestrebungen in Westdeutschland zwischen 1945 und 1955* (Hamburg 1974), 12–18.

119. National Security Council, Report on Neutralism, quoted in T. Michael Ruddy, "U.S. Foreign Policy, the 'Third Force,' and European Union: Eisenhower and Europe's Neutrals," *Midwest Quarterly* 42:1 (Autumn 2000):70; Arnold Wolfers, "Allies, Neutrals, and Neutralists in the Context of U.S. Defense Policy," in *Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs*, ed. Laurence W. Martin (New York, 1962), 153, 160. For further elucidation of U.S. views on neutralism, see H. W. Brands, *The Specter of*

Neutrality: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960 (New York, 1989); Winston L. Prouty, “The United States versus Unneutral Neutrality,” and McGeorge Bundy, “Isolationists and Neutralists,” in *Neutrality and Disengagement*, ed. Paul F. Power (New York, 1964), 137–42, 114–22; Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., *The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of Nonalignment* (New York, 1965), 168–218; Peter Lyon, *Neutrality* (Leicester, UK, 1963), 22–58; and Hamilton Fish Armstrong, “Neutrality: Varying Tunes,” *Foreign Affairs* 35:1 (October 1956):57–71. For a brilliant exegesis of the term and its multiple meanings, see Faye A. Sayegh, “Anatomy of Neutrality—A Typological Analysis,” in *The Dynamics of Neutrality in the Arab World: A Symposium*, ed. Faye A. Sayegh (San Francisco, 1964), 1–101.

120. Department of State, “Weekly Review,” 12 April 1950, Truman Papers: Central File, box 59, “State Department File: Reports and Publications” folder, HSTL.

121. Paper Prepared by Henry B. Cox (Office of German Political Affairs): “German Unity and East-West Political Relations within Germany,” Washington, 13 March 1950, *FRUS* 1950, 4:609–10; CIA, ORE 1–50: “Political Orientation of the West German State,” 25 April 1950, Truman Papers: President’s Secretary’s File: Intelligence File, box 257, “PSF Intelligence File, ORE 1950 (1, 2, 4, 7–9, 11,17)” folder, HSTL.

122. McCloy, quoted in Summary Record of a Meeting of Ambassadors at Rome, 22–24 March 1950, *FRUS* 1950, 3:816; McCloy to Acheson, Frankfurt, 10 April 1950, *FRUS* 1950, 4:623; Cox Paper, *ibid.*

123. Wolfers, “Allies,” 159.

124. HICOM, “Report on Nationalism in Western Germany,” 3 March 1950, p. 8, RG 466: Office of the Executive Secretariat, General Records, 1947–52, box 55, “920-Nationalism in Western Germany” folder, NARA; Summary Record of a Meeting of Ambassadors at Rome, 22–24 March 1950, *FRUS* 1950, 3:813.

125. Department of State, Political Directive for McCloy, Washington, 17 November 1949, *FRUS* 1949, 3:320, 338–39. See also Enclosure to Kenneth Dayton (chief, Internal Political and Governmental Affairs Division, Office of Political Affairs, HICOM) to HICOM Office Directors and Division Chiefs, U.S. Land Commissioners and Division Directors, U.S. Land Observers, and U.S. Kreis Resident Officers, Frankfurt, 4 May 1950: HICOM, Policy Directive No. P-1, RG 466: Office of the Executive Secretariat, General Records, 1947–52, box 4, “219” folder, NARA.

126. Cox Paper, 607, 610–11; see also Paper Prepared in the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Frankfurt, undated, but probably April 1950, *FRUS* 1950, 4:643–53.

127. McCloy to the Department of State, Public Affairs Guidance No. 159, Bonn, 31 January 1952. *FRUS* 1952–54 (Washington, DC, 1986), 7:328–30.

128. For a full treatment of the Strasser affair, see chapter 4.

129. McCloy to Acheson, Frankfurt, 28 October 1949, *FRUS* 1949, 3:293; Dohse, *Dritte Weg*, 45–46.

130. Telegram OLCB-831, Office of the Land Government in Bavaria to HICOG Frankfurt, 11 March 1950, and Memorandum: “Professor Ulrich Noack,” R.W. Benton (Political Affairs Division, HICOM) to Samuel Reber (deputy U.S. high commissioner for Germany), Frankfurt, 29 November 1950, both in RG 466: Security Segregated General Records, 1949–52, box 39, “350.2 German Political Movements and

Organizations, 1949–52” folder, NARA.

131. HICOM to McCloy and Riddleberger (chief, Office of Policy Affairs, HICOM), “Background on Noack and Nauheim Circle,” Frankfurt, 7 November 1949, and Memorandum: “Ulrich Noack, or the Absent-Minded Professor,” Benton to Reber, Frankfurt, 5 December 1950, both in RG 466: Security Segregated General Records, box 39, “350.2 German Political Movements and Organizations, 1949–52” folder, NARA.

132. Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer*, 1:596; Helga Haftendorn, “Adenauer und die Europäische Sicherheit,” in Blumenwitz et al., eds., *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit: Beiträge der Wissenschaft*, 95.

133. McCloy to Acheson, Frankfurt, 28 October 1949, *FRUS* 1949, 3:293.

134. Franz Hange (journalist), Aktennotiz: “Tee-Empfang,” Bonn, 15 December 1950, in Adenauer, *Teegespräch 1950–54*, ed. Hanns Jürgen Küsters (Berlin, 1984), 28.

135. Adenauer to Pastor Martin Niemöller (president, Evangelical Church of Germany), Bonn, 18 January 1950, Band 12.07, fiche 3, Nachlaß Konrad Adenauer, Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus (Archiv), Rhöndorf, Germany.

136. On antineutralist propaganda, see “Kabinettsitzung,” 13 April 1951, *Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung*, ed. Ursula Hüllbusch (Boppard Am Rhein, 1988), 4:309; on the Strasser affair, see chapter 4.

137. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 419.

138. Niederschrift (Junges) für Adenauer, “Zur Lage der CDU in Niedersachsen,” n.d. (probably 1949 or 1950), Band 12.05, fiche 26/2, Nachlaß Adenauer, Adenauer-Haus (Archiv).

139. Geoffrey Pridham, *Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition, 1945–76* (New York, 1977), 82 and 108n23.

140. Adenauer to Dr. Dr. Gustav Heinemann (minister of the interior), Rhondorf, 23 September 1950, in Adenauer, *Briefe 1949–51*, 275–76. For an excellent treatment of the Heinemann affair, see “Einleitung,” in *Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung 1950*, eds. Ulrich Enders and Konrad Reiser (Boppard am Rhein, 1988), 3:14–21. See also the account, sympathetic toward Heinemann, in Diether Koch, *Heinemann und die Deutschlandfrage* (Munich, 1972), 168–77. For Heinemann’s own version of the affair, see “Warum ich zurückgetreten bin: Memorandum über die deutsche Sicherheit vom 13. Oktober 1950,” in Gustav W. Heinemann, *Es gibt schwierige Vaterländer . . . Reden und Aufsätze 1919–1969*, ed. Helmut Lindemann (Frankfurt am Main, 1977), 97–107.

141. “Besprechung der drei Hohen Kommissare mit dem Bundeskanzler,” Bonn, 12 October 1950, *Kabinettsprotokolle* 1950, 3:207–8.

142. For a fuller treatment of the Federal Constitutional Court’s founding and organization, see Large, *Germans*, 155, and Bundesverfassungsgericht, ed., *Das Bundesverfassungsgericht* (Karlsruhe, 1963).

143. The German federal government kept close watch on the SRP, monitoring its electoral program, goals, and organization, and tracking international responses. See the records in B104 (Records of the *Sozialistische Reichspartei*), Band 7, BA; also: Aufzeichnung, Hans Schlange-Schönigen (German ambassador to England): “Der niedersächsische Wahlerfolg der SRP im Spiegel der britischen Presse,” London, 15 May 1951, Abteilung 2, Band 200, Aktenzeichen 201–10 (1951–52), Auswärtiges Amt Archiv, Bonn Germany (now Berlin).

144. "Wortprotokoll der Sitzung," Bonn, 9 May 1951, in *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Adenauer und die Hohe Kommissare 1949–51*, ed. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Munich, 1989), 1:359.

145. "Verbot der SRP," Kabinettsitzung, 25 July 1952, *Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung 1952* ed. Kai von Jena (Boppard am Rhein, 1989), 5:480. See also the discussion in Norbert Frei, *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration*, trans. Joel Golb (New York, 2002), 251–76.

146. Ivone Kirkpatrick (U.K. high commissioner for Germany) to Frank K. Roberts (deputy under secretary of state, Foreign Office), Wahnerheide, 15 January 1953, RG 371: Records of the Foreign Office, file 103897 (hereafter FO 371 followed by file number), Public Records Office, Kew Gardens, England (hereafter PRO); Telegram 13, Kirkpatrick to Sir Anthony Eden (foreign minister of Britain), Wahnerheide, 17 January 1953, FO 371/103897; Adenauer, "Unterredung (Aufzeichnung)," Bonn, 19 January 1953, *Teegespräche 1950–54*, 398–406. See also the discussions in Frei, *Adenauer's Germany*, 277–302 and Manfred Jenke, *Verschwörung von Rechts? Ein Bericht über den Rechtsradikalismus in Deutschland nach 1945* (Berlin, 1961), 161–79.

147. For German documents related to the affair and its deleterious effects on the unity and viability of the FPD, see the report of Leo Frhr. Gehr von Schweppenburg to Hans Globke (State Secretary of the Federal Chancellor's Office), Munich, 28 October 1953, in Nachlaß Otto Lenz, I-172–73, KIII/5, Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik, Sankt Augustin, Germany; the report of Franz Blücher (Vice Chancellor) to Thomas Dehler (Minister of Justice), Bad Godesberg, 28 May 1953, Band 811; plus related documents in Bänder, 812, 815, 822, 823, and 824, in Nachlaß Thomas Dehler, Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung Archiv des Deutschen Liberalismus, Gummersbach Germany. For copious British documentation of the affair, consult FO 371/103896–103912.

148. HICOM, Office of Public Affairs, "A Year End Survey of Rightist and Nationalist Sentiments in West Germany," 12 January 1953, in RG 466: Office of the Executive Secretariat, General Records 1947–52, box 55, "920-Nationalism in Western Germany" folder, NARA; Telegram 3350, Reber to Acheson, Bonn, 20 January 1953, Telegram 3358, Reber to John Foster Dulles (secretary of state), Bonn, 21 January 1953, and Telegram, Dulles to Reber, Washington, 21 January 1953, all in RG 466: Security Segregated General Records, 1953–55, box 181, "350.23 Nazism, 1953–55" folder, NARA. For the article, see Drew Middleton, "Rise in Neo-Nazism Is Shown by Survey in West Germany," *New York Times*, 18 January 1951, 1, 19.

149. Telegram 3363, Reber to Dulles, Bonn, 21 January 1953, RG 466: Security Segregated General Records, 1953–55, box 181, "350.23 Nazism, 1953–55" folder, NARA; Adenauer to Reber, Bonn, 22 January 1953, in *Adenauer: Briefe 1951–53*, ed. Hans Peter Mensing (Bonn, 1987), 329–30.

150. Memorandum of 29 August 1950 printed in Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 280–81.

151. On the contract ideal in American history, see Robert Asher, *Concepts in American History* (New York, 1996), 49–54.

152. Quoted in Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 235.

153. McCloy to Acheson, Bonn, 17 November 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 4:780.

154. McCloy to Acheson, Bonn, 1 December 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 4:790.

155. McCloy to Acheson, Frankfurt, 16 January 1951, *FRUS 1951* (Washington, DC, 1982), 3:1452.
156. *Ibid.*, 1454.
157. Quoted in Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 277. For the path to the Contractual Agreements, see pp. 235–78.
158. See the treatment in Gimbel, *American Occupation*, 57, 167, *passim*.
159. Gimbel, *The Origins of the Marshall Plan* (Stanford, 1976), 17, 34, 58, 157–58, 231, *passim*.
160. Irwin Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945–1954* (New York, 1989), 263.
161. McCloy to Acheson, Frankfurt, 28 October 1949, *FRUS 1949*, 3:290–92.
162. See chapter 4.
163. Quoted in Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer*, 1:597. See also McCloy to Acheson, Bonn, 1 December 1950, *FRUS 1950*, 4:348; Acheson to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, 12 January 1951, *FRUS 1951*, 3:1447–49.
164. Large, *Germans*, 65; quote from Ninkovich, *Germany and the United States*, 97.
165. Quoted in Schwartz, “The ‘Skeleton Key’—American Foreign Policy, European Unity, and German Rearmament, 1949–54,” *Central European History* 19:4 (December 1986):380.
166. John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace* (New York, 1950), 220. Studies of Dulles's life and thought include Richard H. Immerman, ed., *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War* (Princeton, 1990); Immerman, *John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Wilmington, 1999); Michael A. Guhin, *John Foster Dulles: A Statesman for His Times* (New York, 1972); Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston, 1973); Frederick W. Marks III, *Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles* (Westport, 1993); and Ronald W. Pruessen, *John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power, 1888–1952* (New York, 1982).
167. Quoted in Ninkovich, *Germany and the United States*, 95.
168. Statement of Dulles to the North Atlantic Council, 14 December 1953, *FRUS 1952–54*, 5:462–63.
169. Brian R. Duchin, “The ‘Agonizing Reappraisal’: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the European Defense Community,” *Diplomatic History*, 16:2 (Spring 1992):202.
170. Dieter Oberndörfer, “John Foster Dulles und Konrad Adenauer,” in *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit: Beiträge der Wissenschaft*, eds. Blumenwitz et al., 231–32.
171. Quoted in Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblenz, *Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power* (New York, 1960), 41–42.
172. Eleanor Dulles, “Adenauer und Dulles,” in *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit: Beiträge von Weg- und Zeitgenossen*, eds. Blumenwitz et al., 383.
173. Telegram 3358, Reber to Dulles, Bonn, 21 January 1953, RG 466: Security Segregated General Records, 1953–55, box 181, “350.23 Nazism, 1953–55” folder, NARA.
174. Quoted in Ninkovich, *Germany and the United States*, 94.
175. *Ibid.*
176. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 438.
177. Large, *Germans*, 169.

178. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 456.
179. U.S. Delegation Minutes of the First General Meeting of Chancellor Adenauer and Secretary Dulles, Washington, 7 April 1953, *FRUS* 1952–54, 7:431–32; Dulles to the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn, Washington, 8 April 1953, *FRUS* 1952–54, 5:786–87.
180. Minutes, Chiefs of Mission Meeting at Luxembourg, 18 September 1953, *FRUS* 1952–54 (Washington, DC, 1986), 6:672.
181. Grabbe, *Unionsparteien*, 193.
182. Minutes, Chiefs of Mission Meeting, 18 September 1953, 672; *ibid.*
183. Conant to Eisenhower, Bonn, 8 September 1953, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States 1953–61 (Ann Whitman File); Administrative Series, box 10, “Conant, Dr. James B. (2)” folder, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter DDEL); Minutes, Chiefs of Mission Meeting, *ibid.* For a fuller treatment, see Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber and Klaus Schütz, *Wähler und Gewählte: Eine Untersuchung der Bundestagswahlen 1953* (Berlin/Frankfurt am Main, 1957), 87.
184. Minutes, Chiefs of Mission Meeting, 18 September 1953, 672.
185. Dulles to the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany at Bonn, Washington, 30 July 1953, *FRUS* 1952–54, 7:499.
186. Hirsch-Weber and Schütz, *Wähler und Gewählte*, 78, 125; “Editorial Note,” *FRUS* 1952–54, 7:533.
187. Hirsch-Weber und Schütz, *Wähler und Gewählte*, 128.
188. *Ibid.*, 129.
189. Reber to the Department of State, Bonn, 16 June 1953, *FRUS* 1952–54, 7:472; Conant to Dulles, Bonn, 6 July 1953, *FRUS* 1952–54, 5:1591.
190. Alfred V. Boerner (director, Office of Public Affairs, HICOM) to the Department of State, Despatch A-1840: “First Monthly Report on Implementation of PSB D-21 (June 1953),” RG 466: Office of the Executive Director, Top Secret General Records, 1953–55, box 1, “321.6 Psychological Working Group, 1953–54–55” folder, NARA.
191. Quoted in German in Hirsch-Weber and Schütz, *Wähler und Gewählte*, 130.
192. Quoted in *ibid.*
193. Minutes of the First Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, Washington, 11 July 1953, *FRUS* 1952–54, 5:1617.
194. Quoted in Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer* 2: 78–79.
195. Grabbe, *Unionsparteien*, 193.
196. Eisenhower, quoted in Dulles to Conant, Washington, 8 September 1953, Dulles Papers: Subject Series, box 8, “Germany 1953–54 (2)” folder, DDEL; Dulles, quoted in Grabbe, *Unionsparteien*, 193; Conant, in Conant to Department of State, Bonn, 7 September 1953, *FRUS* 1952–54, 7:533; Bruce (U.S. observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community), in Bruce to the Department of State, Paris, 8 September 1953, *FRUS* 1952–54, 5:800.
197. HICOM to the Department of State, Foreign Service Despatch 998: “German Federal Elections of 6 September 1953,” Bonn, 18 September 1953, RG 466: Security Segregated General Records, 1953–55, box 180, “Elections–Germany, 1953–1955” folder, NARA.

198. Dulles to Conant, 8 September 1953, op. cit.
199. Bruce to the Department of State, 8 September 1953, op. cit., 801–2.
200. Eisenhower to Joseph Laniel (prime minister of France), Washington, 20 September 1953, *FRUS* 1952–54, 5:812–13.
201. Large, *Germans*, 172–73.
202. Quoted in James Hagerly (press secretary to Eisenhower), Diary Entry, Augusta, 24 December 1954, *FRUS* 1952–54, 5:1520.
203. Summary in Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 291–92. For an alternative interpretation of France's choices during the EDC debate, see Michael Creswell, "Between the Bear and the Phoenix: The United States and the European Defense Community, 1950–54," *Security Studies* 11:4 (Summer 2002):89–124.
204. "NATO Ministers Don New 'Old School Tie,'" *New York Times*, 10 May 1955, 5.
205. Peter H. Merkl makes a similar point in Merkl, "Das Adenauer-Bild in der öffentlichen Meinung der USA (1949 bis 1955)," in *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit: Beiträge der Wissenschaft*, eds. Blumenwitz et al., 220.
206. Grabbe, *Unionsparteien*, 15, 21, 230–55, 256–418, passim.

Notes to Chapter 3

1. Translation of Georg August Zinn, "Address to the Hessian Landtag," Wiesbaden, 8 October 1952, in "With 'Werewolf' for Democracy," *D.G.B. Newsletter* (published by the Executive Committee of the German Federation of Trade Unions [D.G.B.]) 111:12 (December 1952), FO 371/97968, PRO. For the German text, see Peter Dudek and Hans-Gerd Jaschke, eds., *Entstehung und Entwicklung des Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik: Dokumente und Materialien*, 2 vols. (Opladen, 1984), 2:181–86.
2. Leo A. Müller, *Gladio: Das Erbe des Kalten Krieges: Der Nato-Geheimbund und sein deutscher Vorläufer* (Hamburg, 1991), 73–74; Statement of Hans Werner Franz Otto to the Frankfurt Police, 1 October 1952, in "Documents Concerning the Technischer Dienst," ed. German-American Investigatory Commission (Frankfurt am Main 1952? [sic]), 140–43, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Statement of Otto to the German-American Investigatory Commission, 9 October 1952, "Documents Concerning the Technischer Dienst," 149–62.
3. Herr Schmidt (senior advisor, Hessian Office for the Protection of the Constitution [Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz, LfV]), Memorandum on the "Bund Deutscher Jugend (BDJ)," Wiesbaden, 7 February 1951, B106 (Records of the Federal Interior Ministry [Bundesinnenministerium, BMI]) Band (volume) 15585 (hereafter record group followed by volume number), Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Germany (hereafter BA).
4. Müller, *Gladio*, 81.
5. Enclosure to letter, Norbert Hammacher (member, BDJ board of directors) to Adenauer, Frankfurt am Main, n.d. (probably May 1951): "BDJ Program," B136 (Records of the Federal Chancellor's Office [Bundeskanzleramt])/4430, BA; BDJ, "Die Rezis und Noacks," *Informationsdienst Bund Deutscher Jugend*, 3:3 (March 1952):63, B106/15584, BA; BDJ, "Hinter Ihnen steht einer!" *Informationsdienst Bund Deutscher*

Jugend, 3:5 (May 1952):110, B106/15584, BA.

6. Bund Deutscher Jugend, *Arbeitsplan 1952* (n.d.), 3, B106/15584, BA.

7. Dieter von Glahn and Stephan Nuding, *Patriot und Partisan für Freiheit und Einheit* (Tübingen, 1994), 49.

8. Ibid.

9. Bund Deutscher Jugend, *Denkschrift über die systematische Vorbereitung des Krieges durch die sowjetische Besatzungsmacht in der "Freien Deutschen Jugend"* (FDJ) (n.d., probably Frankfurt am Main, 1952). The BDJ also claimed to have infiltrated the FDJ in Emden, near Hannover. See Memorandum, BDJ to Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution (Bundesverfassungsschutzamt, BfV), Subject: "Gruppe des Bundes Deutscher Jugend in Emden," 28 June 1952, B106/15584, BA.

10. Letter, Schmidt to Zinn, Subject: "Bund Deutscher Jugend," Wiesbaden, 19 December 1950, B106/15585, BA; Letter, Schmidt to Zinn, Subject: "Bund Deutscher Jugend," Wiesbaden, 7 December 1950, B106/15585, BA.

11. Müller, *Gladio*, 78 and 94.

12. Memorandum, Schmidt to Zinn, Subject: "Aktionskomitee gegen die 5. Kolonne," Wiesbaden, November 1950, B106/15585, BA; Memorandum, Schmidt to Franz Thiedick (state secretary, Ministry for All-German Questions [Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen]), Wiesbaden, November 1950, B106/15585, BA; BfV to BMI, "Enclosure to Report Number III 9483/52," Cologne, 13 October 1952, B106/15587, BA; Müller, *Gladio*, 80. For a photographic illustration of one placard campaign of the BDJ, see Glahn and Nuding, *Patriot und Partisan*, 182. See also the discussion and illustrative documents in Dudek and Jaschke, *Entstehung und Entwicklung*, 1:360–76 and 2:164–80, and the brief treatment in Ernst Nolte, *Deutschland und der Kalte Krieg* (Munich, 1974), 460–61.

13. "Abschriften aus dem Graubuch der Hessischen Regierung—Zweite Dokumentarsammlung S. VII–XIII," B136 /4430, BA; Müller, *Gladio*, 111–12.

14. Letter, Amtmann (privy councilor) to Robert Lehr (interior minister), Bonn, 16 October 1952, B106/15585, BA; Report of the Bundestag Subcommittee for the Protection of the Constitution, printed in "Nicht Wahlmache, sondern Wahrheit: Bundesregierung unterstützte BDJ-Partisanen," *Neuer Vorwärts* 31 (31 July 1953):1.

15. Letter, Leyerer (privy councilor, Hessian LfV) to Zinn, Subject: "Pfingsttreffen des Bundes Deutscher Jugend," Wiesbaden, 27 May 1952, B106/15585, BA; Letter, Leyerer to Zinn, Subject: "Pfingsttreffen des Bundes Deutscher Jugend," Wiesbaden, 7 June 1952, B106/15585, BA; Excerpts of the Proceedings of the 252nd Meeting of the Cabinet, 20 October 1952, B106/15585, BA.

16. Whether Soviet Premier Josef Stalin gave North Korea's Kim Il Sung the "green light" to invade South Korea remains a subject of intense scholarly debate, especially as Western scholars have gained widening access to Chinese, Korean, and former Soviet archival sources. See the exchanges between Kathryn Weathersby, Bruce Cumings, and others, plus related documents, in Cold War International History Project, ed., "New Evidence on the Korean War," at <http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuse-action=topics.home> (10 July 2004).

17. Karen Paget, "From Stockholm to Leiden: The CIA's Role in the Formation of the International Student Conference," and Joël Kotek, "Youth Organizations as a

Battlefield in the Cold War,” in *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945–1950*, eds. Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (Portland, OR, 2003), 134–67, 168–191.

18. Enclosure, Schmidt to Hessian LfV, Wiesbaden, 2 December 1950: Report on the “Bund Deutscher Jugend,” Wiesbaden, 1 December 1950, B106/15585, BA.

19. Statement of Otto to the Frankfurt Police, 9 September 1952, B106/15587, BA.

20. Statement of Otto to the Frankfurt Police, 9 September 1952; Statement of Otto to the German-American Investigatory Commission, 9 October 1952.

21. Statement of Otto to the Frankfurt Police, 9 September 1952. Technical Service chief Erhard Peters, in his statement to federal authorities, claimed that between March 1951 and September 1952, U.S. donations totaled some 500,000 DM. But in his prior remarks of 4 October 1952 to the Frankfurt police, he claimed not to know exactly how much money Americans gave to the Technical Service. Memorandum, Carl Wiechmann (chief prosecuting attorney of the Federal Supreme Court) to Thomas Dehler (minister of justice), “Preliminary Proceedings against the Businessman Otto Rietdorf,” Karlsruhe, 7 January 1953, 17, B136/4430; Statement of Peters to the Frankfurt Police, 4 October 1952, “Documents Concerning the Technischer Dienst,” 144–47.

22. Statement of Otto to the Frankfurt Police, 9 September 1952; Wiechmann to Dehler, 4–5; Zinn, Address to the Hessian Landtag; Statement of Rudolf Radermacher (TD leader in Hesse) to the German-American Investigatory Commission, 29 October 1952, “Documents Concerning the Technischer Dienst,” 173–79.

23. “Mission of the Apparat” (English translation), 4 April 1951, B106/15587, BA. For the German version, see “Ausgaben des Apparates,” 4 April 1951, “Documents Concerning the Technischer Dienst,” 15–18. The German version of the document was uncovered during the Frankfurt police raid on BDJ headquarters, while the English copy was found during the police search of Garwood’s private residence in Steinbach im Odenwald. Wiechmann concluded that the English-language plan “originated in the American military,” that the “authenticity of this document is scarcely beyond doubt,” and that “numerous German participants, to whom Garwood’s writing is familiar, agreed that the handwritten changes” in the margins were Garwood’s (Wiechmann to Dehler, 14–15). But Leo Müller, in his short history of the “partisan affair,” identifies the “staff” of the Technical Service itself as the document’s author (Müller, *Gladio*, 119). This explanation appears more plausible, given that numerous spelling and grammatical errors throughout the English translation do not appear in the German text. Probably Peters or Lüth authored this document, and Peters, who by his own account had worked as a translator for Allied occupiers after the war (Statement of Peters to the Frankfurt police, 4 October 1952), translated it into English for Garwood.

24. Mission of the Apparat, 4 April 1951.

25. Paul Lüth (BDJ co-chair), “Grundsätzlich Anweisungen für den Mob-Plan B: Netz B,” “Documents Concerning the Technischer Dienst,” 30–33.

26. Mission of the Apparat, 4 April 1951; Lüth, “Mob-Plan A,” “Documents Concerning the Technischer Dienst,” 24–29.

27. Richard Topp (TD leader, Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg), “Massnahmen zur Bekämpfung innerer Unruhen,” “Documents Concerning the Technischer Dienst,” 36–39.

28. "Mission of the Apparat," 4 April 1951. This document states that "all prospective members of the Apparat must be cleared by the chief [Peters] and assistant chief [Otto]." Completed questionnaires of prospective members were in turn passed on to "Staley for CIC, EUCOM [European Command], U.S. clearance." I have not been able to ascertain the full name, rank, or title of "Staley."

29. Statement of Otto to the Frankfurt Police, 9 September 1952; Statement of Otto to the German-American Investigatory Commission, 9 October 1952; Statement of Hans Breitzkopf (head, TD Information and Defense Department) to the Bremen Police, 18 October 1952, "Documents Concerning the Technischer Dienst," 168–72.

30. Statement of Rudolf Pintscher (TD leader in Lower Saxony) to the Federal Prosecution, 17 October 1952, B106/4430, BA.

31. Ibid.

32. Statement of Otto to the German-American Investigatory Commission, 9 October 1952; Statement of Otto to the Frankfurt Police, 9 September 1952.

33. Statement of Otto to Frankfurt Police, 9 September 1952.

34. Statement of Otto to the Frankfurt Police, 1 October 1952; Statement of Otto to Federal Attorney Güde, n.d., B106/15585, BA.

35. Statement of Otto to the German-American Investigatory Commission, 9 October 1952; Statement of Otto to Güde.

36. Statement of Otto to Güde.

37. Ibid.

38. "Personalblätter (Auswahl)," "Documents Concerning the Technischer Dienst," 59–88.

39. Statement of Otto to the German-American Investigatory Commission, 9 October 1952.

40. Statement of Otto to the Frankfurt Police, 9 September 1952.

41. Statement of Otto to Güde, n.d.

42. Ibid.

43. "Personalblätter (Auswahl)," "Documents Concerning the Technischer Dienst," 59–88.

44. Statement of Otto to the German-American Investigatory Commission, 10 October 1952, in *ibid.*, 163–65.

45. Statement of Otto to Güde, n.d.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Statement of Otto to the District Attorney of the County Court (Oberstaatsanwalt bei dem Landgericht), Frankfurt, 13 November 1952, "Documents Concerning the Technischer Dienst," 193–96. See also Statement of Otto to the German-American Investigatory Commission, 9 October 1952.

50. Statement of Otto to the German-American Investigatory Commission, 9 October 1952. Otto relays a briefer version of these events in his Statement to Güde (n.d.), wherein the character in question is identified as "Sallaba." I use the spelling of the earlier document in my account ("Sallawa") although Breitzkopf, in his testimony, identified this figure as "Salaba" [*sic*]. I have been unable to verify any spelling.

51. Statement of Otto to the German-American Investigatory Commission, 9 October 1952.
52. Ibid; Statement of Otto to Güde, n.d.
53. See the sampling of press opinion compiled in Dudek and Jaschke, *Entstehung und Entwicklung*, 1:384–85.
54. Quoted in Wiechmann to Dehler, 3.
55. Truscott's status as the CIA's top representative in Germany is confirmed in Document I-7, Memorandum, Walter B. Smith (director, Central Intelligence Agency) to Lt. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, 9 March 1951, Subject: "Instructions," in *On the Front Lines of the Cold War: Documents on the Intelligence War in Berlin, 1946–1961*, ed. Donald P. Steury (Washington, DC, 1999) at <www.cia.gov/csi/books/17240/index.html> (10 July 2004); Wiechmann to Dehler, 7.
56. Weichmann to Dehler, 8.
57. Statement of Peters to the Frankfurt Police, 4 October 1952.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Letter, Lüth to the Commissioner of the Frankfurt Criminal Police, Laufach/Ufr., 7 October 1952, "Documents Concerning the Technischer Dienst," 148. Wiechmann, in his report, stated that the federal government had questioned Lüth (Wiechmann to Dehler, 13), but I found no record of the testimony. According to the investigative journalist Daniele Ganser, Lüth was a top "CIA contact man" who, after the TD was discovered, "was hidden by the Americans, could not be arrested, and disappeared without a trace." Daniele Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe* (London, 2005), 197.
61. Statement of Hans Breitkopf (assistant security chief, Technical Service) to the Bremen Police, Bremen, 18 October 1952, in "Documents Concerning the Technischer Dienst," 168–72.
62. Statement of Pintscher, 17 October 1952.
63. Ibid.
64. Statement of Breitkopf, 18 October 1952; Statement of Otto Rietdorf (security chief, TD) to the German American Investigatory Commission, 30 October 1952, "Documents Concerning the Technischer Dienst," 168–72, 173–79; also statement of Pintscher, 17 October 1952, and statement of Radermacher, 29 October 1952.
65. Statement of Breitkopf, 18 October 1952.
66. Statement of Rietdorf, 30 October 1952; Rietdorf quoted in Wiechmann to Dehler, 32–34.
67. Statement of Breitkopf, 18 October 1952.
68. Rietdorf quoted in Wiechmann to Dehler, 32–34.
69. Statement of Rietdorf, 30 October 1952.
70. Statement of Peters, 4 October 1952; Wiechmann to Dehler, 33.
71. Statement of Pintscher, 17 October 1952.
72. Statement of Radermacher, 29 October 1952.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Statement of Otto to the German-American Investigatory Commission, 9

October 1952.

76. Ibid.

77. Statement of Otto to the Frankfurt Police, 1 October 1952; Statement of Peters to the Frankfurt Police, 4 October 1952.

78. Statement of Otto to the German-American Investigatory Commission, 9 October 1952.

79. Ibid.; Müller, *Gladio*, 118.

80. Statement of Rietdorf, 30 October 1952.

81. Ibid.

82. Statement of Breitkopf, 18 October 1952.

83. Ibid.

84. Wiechmann to Dehler, 34, 37.

85. Ibid., 29.

86. Statement of Otto to the German-American Investigatory Commission, 9 October 1952.

87. Wiechmann to Dehler, 27.

88. Ibid., 35–36.

89. “BDJ in Hessen Verboten: Geteilte Aufnahme in Bonn,” *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 11 January 1953, clipping in B106/15586, BA; Memorandum, Lehr to Dr. Walter Menzel (Bundestag representative), Subject: “Bund Deutscher Jugend,” Bonn, 18 February 1953, B106/15585, BA; Memorandum, Franz Thedieck (federal minister for All-German Questions) to Otto Lenz (state secretary for the Federal Chancellor’s Office), Bonn, 29 September 1955, B136/4430, BA.

90. Memorandum, Otto John (president, Office for the Protection of the Constitution) to Lehr and Hans Globke (ministerial director, Federal Chancellor’s Office), Subject: “Verbot des Bundes Deutscher Jugend durch den Hessischen Minister des Innern,” Bonn, 10 January 1953, B136/4430, BA; “Kurzprotokoll der 38. Sitzung des Ausschusses (Nr. 5) zum Schutze der Verfassung,” 5 February 1953, B106/15585, BA. For additional documentation on the prohibition of the BDJ and TD at the state level, see B106/15585, BA. For speculation about the stay-behind net’s possible reconfiguration and absorption into the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) and NATO after 1955, see Ganser, *NATO’s Secret Armies*, 202–11.

91. Office of the U.S. High Commission for Germany, Information Division, Public Liaison Branch, Press Release No. 909: “Joint Release Concerning German-American Investigation of Peters Technical Service,” Mehlem, 18 November 1952, B106/15587, BA.

92. The memorandum, “Economic and Political Trends in France, Italy, and West Germany in the Next Years,” is unsigned, but it originated in the Office of European Regional Affairs, is directed to Richard M. Bissell, Jr., assistant administrator of the European Cooperation Administration, and later CIA spymaster, and is dated 30 March 1950. Miriam Camp Files, Lot 55D105, “Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1946–53” folder, NARA.

93. Jay Lockenour, *Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945–1955* (Lincoln, 2001), 11–32.

94. Quoted in David Clay Large, *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era* (Chapel Hill, 1996), 25–26, 128–29.

95. Jay Lockenour makes a parallel point in Lockenour, *Soldiers as Citizens*, 125.
96. See related treatments in John Gimbel, "U.S. Policy and German Scientists: The Early Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly* 101:3 (1986):433–51 and Clarence Lasby, *Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War* (New York, 1971).
97. John Patrick Finnegan, *Military Intelligence* (Washington, DC, 1998), 108.
98. Reinhard Gehlen, *The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen* (New York, 1972), 1–20, 125–64. For treatments based on freshly released CIA documents, see National Security Archive, Tamara Feinstein (ed.), *The CIA and Nazi War Criminals* (Washington, DC, 2005) at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEB13146/index/htm> (10 March 2005); also Timothy Naftali, "Reinhard Gehlen and the United States," in *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis*, eds. Richard Breitman et al. (Washington, DC, 2004), 375–418. James H. Critchfield offers a first-hand American account (James H. Critchfield, *Partners at the Creation: The Men behind Germany's Defense and Intelligence Establishments* [Annapolis, 2003]).
99. Allan A. Ryan, Jr., *Klaus Barbie and the United States Government: A Report to the Attorney General of the United States* (Washington, DC, 1983).
100. See James H. Critchfield's assessment of the failures of U.S. intelligence coordination in occupied Germany in Critchfield, *Partners at the Creation*, 198.
101. John Prados, *President's Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations since World War II* (New York, 1986), 35; Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Washington, DC, 1982), 42–51, 54–57.
102. Paddock, *U.S. Army*, 107, 120–21, 126, 135, 157.
103. Document 241, Memorandum, Lawrence R. Houston (general counsel, Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]) to Roscoe K. Hillenkoetter (director, CIA), Department of State, *FRUS 1945–1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment* (Washington, DC, 1996), on-line version at <www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/241_249.html> (hereafter cited as *FRUS Intelligence*, followed by location). Also Document 253, Memorandum from the Executive Secretary (Sidney Souers) to the Members of the National Security Council (NSC 4/A), Washington, 9 December 1947, *ibid.*, at <www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/250_259.html>; Document 292, National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects (NSC 10/2), Washington, 18 June 1948, *ibid.*, at <www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/290_300.html>; Document 52, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (NSC 68)," Washington, 14 April 1950, in *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950*, eds. Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis (New York, 1978), 435–36; NSC 10/5 of October 1951 quoted in Gregory Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956* (Ithaca, 2000), 67.
104. Evan Thomas, *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA* (New York, 1995), 29; Document 298, Memorandum of Conversation and Understanding, Washington, 6 August 1948, *FRUS Intelligence*, at <www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/290_300.html>. See also Thomas, *Very Best Men*, 64–65, and William R. Corson, *The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire* (New York, 1977), 295–96. For background on Smith, see Ludwell Lee Montague, *General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950–February 1953* (University Park, 1992).

105. Peter Grose, *Operation Rollback: America's Secret War behind the Iron Curtain* (New York, 2000), 104; Thomas, *Very Best Men*, 29.

106. Grose, *Operation Rollback*, 115–17, 124–29, 140–41, 152–63, 165–89; Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin*, 36–46; Thomas, *Very Best Men*, 32–43. For fuller treatment of the CCF, see Frances Stoner Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York, 2000) and Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and Post-war American Hegemony* (London, 2002).

107. Quoted in Burton Hersh, *The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA* (New York, 1992), 360.

108. Statement of Otto to the German-American Investigatory Commission, 9 October 1952.

109. Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London, 2001), 361.

110. For general treatments of the Europe-wide program, see Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, and Jens Mecklenburg, ed., *Gladio: Die geheime Terrororganisation der NATO* (Berlin, 1997). See also Jean-François Brozzu-Gentile, *L'affaire Gladio: Les réseaux secrets américains au coeur du terrorisme en Europe* (Paris, 1994), 253–59 and Jan Willems, *Gladio* (Brussels, 1991). On Italy, see Arthur E. Rowse, “Gladio: The Secret U.S. War to Subvert Italian Democracy,” *Covert Action Quarterly* 49 (Summer 1994):20–27, 62–63. The “Stragi Commission” of the Italian Parliament between 1988 and 1995 investigated the postwar history of Italian domestic terrorism and reported on the parameters of the Gladio operation in Italy (Senato della Repubblica, Camera dei Deputati, XII Legislatura, Commissione Parlamentare d’Inchiesta sul Terrorismo in Italia e sulle Cause della Mancata Individuazione dei Responsabili della Stragi [Commissione Stragi], *Il terrorismo, le stragi ed il contesto storico-politico: Proposta di relazione*, at <<http://www.clarence.com/contents/societa/memoria/stragi/>> (10 July 2004). On Austria's program, see Christian Stifter, *Die Wiederaufrüstung Österreichs: Die geheime Remilitarisierung der westlichen Besatzungszonen 1945–1955* (Vienna, 1997), 127–28; on France, see Deborah Kisatsky, “The United States, the French Right, and American Power in Europe, 1945–1958,” *The Historian* 65:3 (Spring 2003):634–40.

111. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., *Command Missions: A Personal Story* (New York, 1954). Truscott's memoirs end in 1945 and contain no discussion of events treated here. But see Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (New York, 1979), 154; Thomas, *Very Best Men*, 65; Corson, *Armies of Ignorance*, 333; Russell F. Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944–1945* (Bloomington, 1981), 223; and Hersh, *Old Boys*, 360–61.

112. Hersh, *Old Boys*, 109, 127.

113. Quoted in Thomas, *Very Best Men*, 65–66.

114. *Ibid.*, 65.

115. Quoted in Hersh, *Old Boys*, 360–61.

116. Document 301, Letter, Robert Lovett (acting secretary of state) to James V. Forrestal (secretary of defense), Washington, 1 October 1948, and Document 304, Letter, Forrestal to Lovett, Washington, 13 October 1948, both in *FRUS Intelligence*, at <www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/301_316.html>.

117. Forrestal to Lovett, *ibid.*; Document 310, Memorandum, Frank Wisner (assistant director for policy coordination, Central Intelligence Agency) to Members of His Staff, Washington, 1 June 1949, in *ibid.*, at <www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/310.html>.

118. Wisner, Staff Memorandum, 1 June 1949; Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 8–9.

119. Wisner, Staff Memorandum, 1 June 1949.

120. Quoted in Kai Bird, *The Chairman: John J. McCloy, the Making of the American Establishment* (New York, 1992), 355.

121. *Ibid.*, 345–52.

122. Hans Buchheim, “Adenauers Sicherheitspolitik 1950–51,” in *Aspekte der deutschen Wiederbewaffnung bis 1955*, ed. Hans Buchheim (Boppard am Rhein, 1975), 123; Klaus Schwabe, “Konrad Adenauer und die Aufrüstung der Bundesrepublik (1949 bis 1955),” in *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit. Politik und Persönlichkeit des ersten Bundeskanzlers: Beiträge der Wissenschaft*, eds. Dieter Blumenwitz et al. (Stuttgart, 1976), 21.

123. Schwabe, “Konrad Adenauer,” 17–18; Lawrence W. Martin, “The American Decision to Rearm Germany,” in *American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies*, ed. Harold Stein (Birmingham, 1963), 647.

124. Norbert Wiggershaus, “Bedrohungsvorstellungen Bundeskanzler Adenauers nach Ausbruch des Korea-Krieges,” *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 1 (1979):80. For the competing argument that Adenauer saw limited parallels between Korea and Germany, see Arnulf Baring, *Aussenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie: Bonns Beitrag zur Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft* (Munich, 1969), 87. For general treatments of the connection between German rearmament and the Korean War, see Robert McGeehan, *The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense After World War II* (Urbana, 1971), 22–23; Doris M. Condit, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Test of War, 1950–1953* (Washington, DC, 1988), 317–18; Gerhard Wettig, *Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland 1943–1955. Internationale Auseinandersetzungen um die Rolle der Deutschen in Europa* (Münich, 1967), 306–12.

125. Thomas A. Schwartz, “The ‘Skeleton Key’—American Foreign Policy, European Unity, and German Rearmament, 1949–54,” *Central European History* 19:4 (December 1986):372.

126. Martin, “American Decision,” 647.

127. The Bundestag in June 1953 approved the formation of a federal border police containing 20,000 men (Baring, *Aussenpolitik*, 76–80). For detailed accounts of the domestic and international debates over the Bundespolizei and the border police, see Wettig, *Entmilitarisierung*, 289–305, 333–59, *passim*; Wiggershaus, “Bedrohungsvorstellungen,” 81–83, 95–96, 104–13; Schwabe, “Konrad Adenauer,” 17–21; and McGeehan, *German Rearmament Question*, 19, 24, 50, 57.

128. Historical Division (European Command), U.S. Army, “Labor Services and Industrial Police in the European Command, 1945–1950” (Karlsruhe, Germany, 1952), 1–13, Center of Military History, Washington, DC.

129. Herbert Blankenhorn, “Memorandum,” Bonn, 17 July 1950, Nachlaß Herbert Blankenhorn, Band 5, Fiche 1, BA.

130. Ibid. German leaders also considered related proposals on their own. See the letter of Blankenhorn to Dr. Ing. Hans-Christoph Seebohm (minister of transportation), Bonn, 21 May 1951, and of Seebohm to Adenauer, Bonn, 4 May 1951, in Ref: Abteilung 2, Band 201, Aktenzeichen: 201–18 (1951–54), Archives of the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), Berlin, Germany.

131. Buchheim, “Adenauers Sicherheitspolitik,” 126.

132. Dudek and Jaschke, *Entstehung und Entwicklung*, 1:358.

133. See Glahn and Nuding, *Patriot und Partisan*, 11–14; also, Statement of Rietdorf, 30 October 1952.

134. Dudek and Jaschke, *Entstehung und Entwicklung*, 1: 358.

135. Statement of Pintscher, 17 October 1951. At a 1951 exchange rate of 4.2 DM to the American dollar, county leaders like Pintscher, who claims to have earned 250 DM per month in service to the Americans, would have netted the equivalent of \$720 per year—not enough to live off, and certainly not enough to become rich.

136. See the related discussion in Lockenour, *Soldiers as Citizens*, 181–87.

137. Dudek and Jaschke, *Entstehung und Entwicklung*, 1:381.

138. “Verhandlungen des Deutsch-Amerikanischen Untersuchungsausschusses unter Vorsitz des Generalstaatsanwalts,” Frankfurt, 5 November 1952, “Documents Concerning the Technischer Dienst,” 189–90.

139. “Aktenvermerk über die Auseinandersetzung mit Mr. Gaines innerhalb des Deutsch-Amerikanischen Untersuchungsausschusses,” Frankfurt am Main, 31 October 1952, in “Documents Concerning the Technischer Dienst,” 187–88.

140. Ibid.

141. Otto John, *Twice through the Lines: The Autobiography of Otto John*, trans. Richard Barry (New York, 1972), 214.

142. See the discussion of the SPD-CDU conflict over the BDJ affair, and of the resultant SPD-sponsored investigations, in Dudek and Jaschke, *Entstehung und Entwicklung*, 1:381–83. For documents relating to these investigations, consult the files in B106/15585, B106/15588, and B136/4430, BA.

143. Office of Public Affairs, Reactions Analysis Staff (U.S. High Commission for Germany), “The Impact of the BDJ Affair upon American Prestige in Germany,” 161:2 (30 October 1952), RG 466 (Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany), Box 10, “Special Reports” folder, NARA. This report was one of the few documents related to the affair to have attained declassification status on the U.S. side.

Notes to Chapter 4

1. “Strasser Leaves Canada,” *Montreal Star*, 17 February 1955, RG 18 (Records of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police [RCMP]), “Otto Strasser Newspaper Clippings” file, box 3317, folder 3 (hereafter RG 18, followed by box and folder number), National Archives of Canada, Ottawa, Canada (hereafter NAC); R.O. Jones (inspector, RCMP) to George S. Southam (Defense Liaison Division, Department of External Affairs), Ottawa, 16 February 1955, RG 25 (Department of External Affairs), 44-GK-40 file, box 8007, folder 11.2 (hereafter RG 25 followed by file, box, and folder number), NAC.

2. On postwar Allied denazification, start with Rebecca L. Boehling, *A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reform and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany: Frankfurt, Munich, and Stuttgart under U.S. Occupation, 1945–1949* (Providence, 1996), 18–40, 52–63, and passim; Lutz Niethammer, *Entnazifizierung in Bayern: Säuberung und Rehabilitierung unter amerikanischer Besatzung* (Frankfurt am Main, 1972); Klaus-Dietmar Henke, *Politische Säuberung unter französischer Besatzung: Die Entnazifizierung in Württemberg-Hohenzollern* (Stuttgart, 1982); Ian D. Turner, “Denazification in the British Zone,” and David Welch, “Priming the Pump of German Democracy: British ‘Re-Education’ Policy in Germany after the Second World War,” in *British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 1945–55*, ed. Ian D. Turner (New York, 1989), 215–38 and 239–67; James F. Tent, *Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany* (Chicago, 1982).

3. Daniel E. Rogers, *Politics after Hitler: The Western Allies and the German Party System* (New York, 1995), ix, 51, 73–74, and 49–103, passim.

4. Rudolf Jordan, *Erlebt und Erlitten: Weg eines Gauleiters von München bis Moskau* (Leoni am Starnberger See, 1971), 69; Kurt Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika: German Nationalism since 1945*, 2 vols. (Middletown, 1967), 1:109. A fuller scholarly bibliography exists on Gregor than on Otto Strasser, although admirers have produced more tracts in homage to the latter. On both brothers’ relationship to National Socialism, see Kurt Gossweiler, *Strasser-Legende: Auseinandersetzung mit einem Kapitel des deutschen Faschismus* (Berlin, 1994). On Gregor Strasser, see Udo Kissenkoetter, “Gregor Strasser: Nazi Party Organizer or Weimer Politician?” in *The Nazi Elite*, eds. Ronald Smelser and Rainer Zitelmann and trans. Mary Fischer (New York, 1993), 224–34; Peter D. Stachura, *Gregor Strasser and the Rise of Nazism* (London, 1983); and Udo Kissenkoetter, *Gregor Strasser und die NSDAP* (Stuttgart, 1978). On Otto Strasser, consult Günter Bartsch, *Zwischen drei Stühlen: Otto Strasser: Eine Biografie* (Koblenz, 1990); Patrick Moreau, *Nationalsozialismus von Links: Die “Kampfgemeinschaft Revolutionärer Nationalsozialisten” und die “Schwarze Front” Otto Strassers 1930–35* (Stuttgart, 1984); Moreau, “Otto Strasser: Nationalist Socialism vs. National Socialism,” in *Nazi Elite*, eds. Smelser and Zitelmann, 235–44; Tauber, *Eagle and Swastika*, 1:109–116, 216–19, and passim; Reinhard Kühnl, *Die nationalsozialistische Linke, 1925–1930* (Meisenheim an Glan, 1966); Wolfgang Abendroth, “Das Problem der Widerstandstätigkeit der ‘Schwarzen Front,’” *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 8 (April 1960):181–87; and Karl O. Paetel, “Otto Strasser und die ‘Schwarze Front,’” *Politische Studien* 8 (December 1951):269–81. Douglas Reed, Richard Schapke, and Peter Thoma present highly sympathetic, non-annotated treatments of Otto Strasser: Reed, *Nemesis? The Story of Otto Strasser and the Black Front* (Boston, 1940) and *Prisoner of Ottawa: Otto Strasser* (London, 1953); Schapke, *Die Schwarze Front: Von den Zielen und Aufgaben und vom Kampfe der deutschen Revolution* (Leipzig, 1932); and Thoma, *Der Fall Otto Strasser* (Cologne, 1972). Strasser’s Canadian exile receives brief treatment in Klemens von Klemperer, *German Resistance against Hitler: The Search for Allies Abroad, 1938–1945* (Oxford, 1992), 54 and 234–36, though the best scholarly analysis of Strasser’s Canadian exile remains Robert H. Keyserlingk’s lively “Die deutsche Komponente in Churchills Strategie der national Erhebungen, 1940–1942: Der Fall Otto Strasser,” *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 31 (October 1983):614–45, to which

the present chapter is indebted. Otto Strasser voluminously recounted his own political struggles in Strasser, *Hitler and I*, trans. Gwenda David and Eric Mosbacher (Boston, 1940); *History in My Time* (London, 1941); *Flight from Terror* (New York, 1943); *Dr. Otto Strasser, der unbeugsame Kämpfer für ein freies Deutschland* (Frankfurt, 1955); *Exil* (Munich, 1958); and *Mein Kampf: Eine politische Autobiographie* (Frankfurt am Main, 1969).

5. Moreau, "Otto Strasser," 236.

6. Bartsch, *Zwischen drei Stühlen*, 27–31; Tauber, *Eagle and Swastika*, 1:8–16; Gordon Craig, *Germany, 1866–1945* (New York, 1978), 487–95; Peter Gay, *Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider* (New York, 1968), 70–101.

7. Tauber, *Eagle and Swastika*, 1:15. Kissenkoetter maintains that Gregor Strasser, by contrast, never "wanted to split the party . . . or separate himself from Hitler, to whom he was attached by a remarkable personal devotion" (Kissenkoetter, "Gregor Strasser," 232). But Stachura maintains that if Gregor himself was no revolutionary, he differed with Hitler on key points. Stachura, *Gregor Strasser*, 45–47.

8. Strasser, *Aufbau des deutschen Sozialismus*, 2nd ed. (Prague, 1936), 29–57; Strasser, *Germany Tomorrow*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (London, 1940), 60–70; Kühnl, *Nationalsozialistische Linke*, 21–26.

9. Strasser, *Hitler and I*, 81–83; Strasser, *Germany Tomorrow*, 58–60.

10. See especially Strasser, *Europa von Morgen: Das Ziel Masaryks* (Zürich, 1939).

11. Tauber, *Eagle and Swastika*, 1:109; Abendroth, "Problem," 183; Strasser, "Meine Aussprache mit Hitler," *Aufbau*, 116–25.

12. Kissenkoetter, "Gregor Strasser," 232. Otto Strasser offered his own interpretation of the bloody "Night of the Long Knives" in Strasser, *Die deutsche Bartholomäusnacht* (Zürich, 1935).

13. For Strasser's claims that he tried but failed twice during the 1930s to murder Hitler—once by sending a proxy to assassinate the Nazi leader (Hitler's chauffeur took the bullet instead), and once by arranging for his train to be bombed (the wrong train was destroyed)—see Ian Sclanders, "The Last Survivor of the Hitler Gang," *Macleans*, 4 January 1952, 28.

14. Paul Kennedy, *The Realities behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865–1980* (Boston, 1981), 350–53.

15. W. N. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade* (London, 1952); Michael Balfour, *Propaganda in War, 1939–45: Organization, Politics, and Publics in Britain and Germany* (London, 1979).

16. "First General Directive from the Chief of Staff," 25 November 1940, in David Stafford, *Britain and European Resistance: A Survey of the Special Operations Executive* (Buffalo, 1980), 219–24, esp. 221; Keyserlingk, "Deutsche Komponente," 615, 623.

17. Keyserlingk, "Deutsche Komponente," 622; Strasser, *Exil*, 144–45.

18. Letter, H.H. Wrong (special economic advisor, Canadian High Commission) to H.R. Hoyer Millar (British Embassy at Washington), London, 9 July 1941, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2705/1, NAC.

19. Klemperer, *German Resistance*, 53–58.

20. Berle quoted in Thomas A. Stone (first secretary for external affairs), Memorandum of a Conversation in the State Department, Subject: "Otto Strasser," 7

October 1942, RG 25, 44-GK-40/3, NAC. See also "Otto Strasser Is Denounced: Leadership Declared Unwelcome to Liberal Democratic Germans," *Montreal Star*, 14 January 1942, RG 18, 3317/1, NAC.

21. Letter, W. C. Hankinson (principal secretary, British High Commission) to O. D. Skelton (undersecretary of state), Ottawa, 21 December 1940, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2705/1, NAC; Strasser, *Exil*, 157; Keyserlingk, "Deutsche Komponente," 631.

22. Telegram 1512, Skelton to Vincent Massey (high commissioner to Britain), Ottawa, 27 September 1940; Letter, F. C. Blair (director of immigration) to Skelton, Ottawa, 27 October 1940; Letter, Hankinson to Skelton, Ottawa, 21 December 1940; Letter, Norman A. Robertson (acting secretary of state) to Blair, Ottawa, 5 April 1941; Letter, Robertson to Blair, Ottawa, 14 April 1941; all in RG 25, 44-GK-40/2705/1, NAC.

23. "Strasser Sees Hun Invasion Attempt Soon," *Montreal Star*, 14 May 1941, RG 18, 3317/1, NAC; Letter, Blair to Robertson, Ottawa, 22 April 1941, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2705/1, NAC.

24. Keyserlingk, "Deutsche Komponente," 632.

25. Walter C. Langer et al. (Office of Strategic Services), "A Psychological Profile of Adolf Hitler: His Life and Legend" (Washington, DC, n.d.), at <www2.ca.nizkor.org/hweb/people/h/hitler-adolf/oss-papers/text/profile-index.html> (10 July 2004).

26. Telegram 1512, MacKenzie King (secretary of state) to Massey, Ottawa, 27 September 1940; Letter, F. E. Jolliffe (chief postal censor) to Robertson, Ottawa, 26 April 1941; both in RG 25, 44-GK-40/2705/1, NAC.

27. Letter, Robertson (undersecretary of state) to Charles A. Ritchie (first secretary, Canadian High Commission in Britain), Ottawa, 26 April 1942; Letter, Robertson to Lester B. Pearson (minister-counselor, Canadian Legation in the United States), Ottawa, 30 September 1942, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2705/3, NAC; Despatch 1473, Robertson to Massey, Ottawa, 16 November 1944, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2706/7, NAC.

28. "Would Organize German Prisoners against Hitler," *Toronto Daily Star*, 22 April 1941; "Strasser Sees Argentine Tension Close to a Break with Germany," *Montreal Gazette*, 23 September 1941; both in RG 18, 3317/1, NAC.

29. Letter, S. T. Wood (commissioner, RCMP) to Robertson (acting undersecretary of state), Ottawa, 3 May 1941, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2705/1, NAC.

30. Draft letter, Robertson to Wrong (assistant undersecretary of state), Ottawa, 2 February 1942, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2, NAC.

31. Inaugural column, Otto Strasser, "Strasser Sees Reichswehr Plot to Make Goering Germany's Ruler," *Montreal Gazette*, 10 September 1941, in RG 18, 3317/1, NAC; Keyserlingk, "Deutsche Komponente," 629.

32. Quoted in "This Doesn't Seem Helpful," editorial of the *Ottawa Journal*, 17 February 1942, RG 18, 3317/1, NAC.

33. Ibid; Strasser, *Exil*, 162.

34. Letter, Malcolm MacDonald (high commissioner for Britain in Canada) to Robertson, Ottawa, 20 November 1941, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2705/2, NAC; Thomas A. Stone (first secretary), "Memorandum of Conversation in the State Department," Washington, 7 October 1942, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2705/3, NAC. For a summary of U.S. views of and policy toward Strasser from 1941 through 1949, see Enclosure to Memorandum, Mr. Wendelin (Office of the U.S. Political Adviser for Germany) to

James Riddleberger (chief, Division of Central European Affairs, U.S. Department of State), Subject: "Otto Strasser," Frankfurt, 3 February 1949: Intelligence Division, Office of the U.S. High Commission for Germany (HICOM), "SY Summary of Data on Strasser," RG 466, box 271, "350.1-Political Parties, General, 1949" folder, NARA.

35. Both Strasser and his chief defender, the British journalist Douglas Reed, discussed H.G. Wells with venom. See Strasser, *Exil*, 152–53, and Reed, *Prisoner of Ottawa*, 198–206.

36. H. G. Wells, "Wells Asks Why Strasser Leader of 'Free Germans' Not Behind Canadian Bars," *Toronto Evening Telegram* 24 January 1942, RG 18, 3317/1, NAC.

37. "Asks How Strasser Entered Canada," *Ottawa Morning Journal*, 2 February 1942; "Strasser Not Raising Armed Forces in Canada," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 2 February 1942; "Honest German is Anti-Nazi," *Globe and Mail*, 6 May 1942; all in RG 18, 3317/1, NAC.

38. Letter, Strasser to Robertson, Montreal, 21 April 1942, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2705/2, NAC.

39. Sargeant R. J. Noel (RCMP, Montreal Detachment), Report on Morris Haltrecht, Montreal, 25 April 1942, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2705/2, NAC; Letter, L. S. Lancaster to the *Ottawa Citizen*, 26 April 1942; Letter, "Disgusted Private" to the *Montreal Standard*, 14 November 1942; Letter, Marks Paul to the *Montreal Standard*; all in RG 18, 3317/1, NAC.

40. Letter, Wood to Robertson, Ottawa, 24 April 1942, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2705/2, NAC.

41. Keyserlingk, "Deutsche Komponente," 636.

42. Among Strasser's correspondents was the exiled German Fritz Ermarth, who after 1933 worked in the United States to promote public awareness of and sympathy for the German resistance. Letter, Strasser to Ermarth, 12 May 1941, and letter, Strasser to Ermarth, Toronto, 10 February 1942. I thank Michael Ermarth for kindly sharing with me these letters of his father and for providing thoughtful feedback on this chapter.

43. Keyserlingk, "Deutsche Komponente," 638.

44. Letter, Robertson to MacDonald, Ottawa, 28 November 1941; Robertson to L. D. Wilgress (deputy minister of trade and commerce), Ottawa, 27 November 1941; both in RG 25, 44-GK-40/2705/2, NAC.

45. Keyserlingk, "Deutsche Komponente," 637–38. On the weakness of the Free German Movement in South America, see Bartsch, *Zwischen drei Stühlen*, 152, 156.

46. Draft letter, Robertson to Wrong, Ottawa, 2 February 1942, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2705/2, NAC; Letter, R. H. Tarr (secretary, Foreign Exchange Control Board) to Robertson, Ottawa, 25 August 1942, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2705/3, NAC.

47. Letter, Robertson to Wood, Ottawa, 21 August 1942, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2705/3, NAC; Memorandum, H. A. R. Gagnon (superintendent, "C" Division, RCMP) to Wood, Ottawa, 10 December 1942, RG 25 44-GK-40, NAC; Letter, F. P. Varcoe (deputy minister of justice) to Robertson, Ottawa, 27 September 1943, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2706/5, NAC.

48. Ian Sclanders, "Last Survivor," 23.

49. "Memorandum on Otto Strasser," Wood to Robertson, Ottawa, 19 January 1943,

RG 25, 44-GK-40/2705/4, NAC; Letter, Robertson to Strasser, Ottawa, 24 September 1943, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2706/5, NAC.

50. Memorandum, Marjorie McKenzie (personal secretary and aide to the under-secretary of state) to Robertson, 3 October 1944, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2706/7, NAC.

51. Intercepted letter, Richard Schleissner (Czech refugee in Canada) to Otto Strasser, Ontario, 14 March 1943. Wood confessed that he found this fleshy packaging “most objectionable.” Letter, Wood to Robertson, Ottawa, 31 March 1943; both in RG 25, 44-GK-40/2705/4, NAC.

52. Letter, Strasser to Jolliffe, Paradise, Nova Scotia, 5 January 1944, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2706/6, NAC.

53. Strasser, letters to Bruno Fricke (13 January 1943, 28 January 1943, and 5 February 1943), cited in “SY Summary of Data on Strasser” (Enclosure 1 to Memorandum, Wendelin to James Riddleberger [chief, Division of Central European Affairs, U.S. State Department], Frankfurt, 3 February 1949), RG 84, box 271, “350.1–Political Parties, General, 1949” folder, NARA.

54. I. P. Garra (German Political Department, Foreign Office) to Foreign Office, Berlin, 31 March 1949, FO 371 (Records of the Foreign Office)/76518, PRO; “Bericht des Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung–Inland,” Bonn, 3 October 1950, RG B136 (Records of the Federal Chancellor’s Office [Bundeskanzleramt])/1746, BA; “SY Summary of Data on Strasser;” Tauber, *Eagle and Swastika*, 1:110–12.

55. Memorandum, Office of European Regional Affairs to Richard M. Bissell, Jr. (assistant administrator of the European Cooperation Administration), 30 March 1950, Subject: “Economic and Political Trends in France, Italy, and West Germany in the Next Years,” Miriam Camp Files, Lot 55D105, “Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1946–53” folder, NARA.

56. Strasser, “Conference Baruch-Stalin in Moscow,” *Der Kurier*, 13 July 1949, RG 18, 3317/2, NAC.

57. Strasser, “Circular Letter for Germany’s Revival,” 10 June 1947, cited in “SY Summary.”

58. Bradford Perkins, “Unequal Partners: The Truman Administration and Great Britain,” in *The ‘Special Relationship’: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945*, eds. William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (New York, 1986), 54.

59. Telegram 1693, Robertson to Massey, Ottawa, 23 July 1945, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2706/7, NAC; Telegram 1447, Pearson (undersecretary of state) to Robertson (high commissioner of Canada in Britain), Ottawa, 12 August 1949 and Telegram 419, T.W.L. MacDermot (head, Personnel Division) to Canadian Embassy in Paris, Ottawa, 26 August 1949, both RG 25, 44-GK-40/3369/8, NAC; Telegram 236, Jean A. Chapdelaine (chief, European Division) to T.C. Davis (Canadian ambassador to Germany), Ottawa, 5 November 1953, RG 25, 44-GK-40/8007/10.2, NAC.

60. Draft Memorandum, A. D. Wilson (Foreign Office) to J. W. Holmes (second secretary, Office of the High Commission for Canada in Britain), London, July 1945 [no day given], FO 371/55819, PRO; Despatch A745, Holmes to Pearson, Ottawa, 6 September 1946, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2706/7, NAC.

61. Letter, B. A. B. Burrows (Foreign Office) to F. C. Bates, Esq. (Colonial Office), Foreign Office Memorandum, 30 May 1946, CO (Records of the Colonial Office,

537/1326, PRO.

62. Letter, Strasser to Robertson (and marginalia by McKenzie), Nova Scotia, 15 September 1945, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2706/7, NAC.

63. John Hilliker and Donald Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs* (Montreal, 1990), 3–43; Denis Smith, *Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941–1948* (Buffalo, 1988).

64. Letter, Escott Reid (head, Second Political Division) to Leslie Chance (chief, Consular Division), Ottawa, 28 July 1947, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2706/7, NAC.

65. Memorandum, MacDermot for A. J. Andrew (European Division), Ottawa, 4 October 1949, RG 25, 44-GK-40/3369/8, NAC.

66. Reed, *Prisoner of Ottawa*, 5.

67. See, for example, Despatch 1351, Lt. General Maurice Pope (head, Canadian Military Mission to Berlin) to Pearson, Berlin, 4 November 1947, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2706/7, NAC.

68. Numbered letter 729, John K. Starnes (chargé d'affaires, Canadian Embassy at Bonn) to Pearson, Bonn, 23 August 1955, RG 25, 8007/44-GK-40/11.2, NAC.

69. Sclanders, "Last Survivor," 23–24.

70. *Ibid.*, 23.

71. Letter, Strasser to Robertson, Paradise, 15 September 1945, and Letter, G. G. Crean (chief, Interdepartmental Security Panel) to Pearson, Ottawa, 2 December 1947, both in RG 25, 44-GK-40/2706/7, NAC; Letter, Strasser to Pearson, Bridgetown, NS, 25 November 1947, and Memorandum, Crean for Pearson, 2 December 1947, RG 25, 44-GK-40, both in RG 25, 44-GK-40–2706/7, NAC; "Otto Strasser Chronology," no author or date, RG 25, 44-GK-40/3369/8, NAC; Letter, Strasser to Chance, Bridgetown, 19 November 1948 and Letter, Strasser to Léon Mayrand (chief, American and Far Eastern Division), Bridgetown, 23 November 1948, both in RG 25, 44-GK-40/2706/7, NAC; Memorandum, Mayrand to S. F. Rae (first secretary, Canadian High Commission in Britain), Ottawa, 10 January 1949, and Letter, Strasser to Pearson, Regina, Saskatchewan, 1 July 1949, both in RG 25, 44-GK-40/3369/8, NAC.

72. Letter, Strasser to Louis St. Laurent (prime minister, Canada), Bridgetown, 28 July 1949, RG 25, 44-GK-40/3369/8, NAC. For the text of the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights (1948), visit <<http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>> (10 July 2004).

73. Memorandum, Patrick H. Dean (head, Foreign Office) to Ivone Kirkpatrick (U.K. high commissioner for Germany), 23 December 1948, and Letter, Dean to Jules Léger (External Affairs liaison to the prime minister), London, 13 January 1949; both in FO 371/76516, PRO; Letter, Strasser to Chance, Bridgetown, 19 November 1948, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2706/7, NAC; Telegram 2312, Robertson (Canadian high commissioner to Britain) to Pearson (secretary of state), London, 28 December 1948, RG 25, 44-GK-40/2706/7; Letter, Howard Trivers (assistant chief, Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State) to R.L. Rogers (third secretary, Canadian Embassy at Washington), Washington, 30 December 1948, RG 84, Box 721, "350.1–Political Parties, General, 1949" folder, NARA.

74. Letter, Dean to Kirkpatrick, London, 23 December 1948, and Letter, Dean to Jules Léger (Office of the High Commissioner for Canada), London, 13 January 1949

in FO 371/76516, PRO; Trivers to Rogers, 30 December 1948, op. cit.; Teletype WA-58, H. H. Wrong (Canadian ambassador to the United States) to St. Laurent, Washington, 10 January 1949, RG 25, 44-GK-40/3369/8, NAC; Letter, J. A. Chapdelaine (Canadian Embassy at Paris) to St. Laurent, Paris, 13 January 1949, RG 25, 44-GK-40/3369/8, NAC.

75. Foreign Office Minute on Otto Strasser, Patrick H. Dean (head, German Department) to Ernest Bevin (minister of foreign affairs), 9 March 1949, FO 371/76518, PRO.

76. Philip G. Cerny, *The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy* (New York 1980), 3–7, 74–126; Jean-Paul Brunet, “Le RPF et l'idée de puissance nationale (1947–1948),” *La puissance française en question (1945–1949)*, eds. René Girault and Robert Frank (Paris, 1988), 362–84.

77. Foreign Office Minute on “Otto Strasser,” Dean to Bevin, London, 9 March 1949, FO 371/76518, PRO.

78. Telegram 2075, Sir Alexander Cadogan (U.K. ambassador to the UN) to the Foreign Office, New York, 7 October 1949, FO 371/76524, PRO; Telegram 4, James Webb (undersecretary of state) to John J. McCloy (U.S. high commissioner for Germany), New York, 7 October 1949, RG 466, box 39, “350.2” folder, NARA; Letter, Gilchrist to Christopher Steel (political adviser to the U.K. High Commission), London, 1 December 1949, FO 371/76525, PRO.

79. See, for example, Telegram 590, Canadian Embassy to Pearson, Paris, 9 September 1949, RG 25, 44-GK-40/3369/8, NAC; Telegram 741, Canadian Embassy to Pearson, Paris, 16 November 1953, RG 25, 44-GK-40/8007/10.2, NAC; Despatch 1090, Davis to Pearson, Bonn, 16 November 1953, RG 25, 44-GK-40/8007/10.2, NAC; Kirkpatrick to Philippe Baudet (ambassador of France to Britain), London, 9 February 1949, and Baudet to Robert Schuman (minister of foreign affairs, France), London, 14 February 1949; both in Z-Europe (Allemagne) file, volume 55, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, France. I am grateful to Daniel E. Rogers for generously sharing these French documents from his own files.

80. Letter, Duncan Wilson (Political Division, Berlin) to A. J. Gilchrist (German Political Department, Foreign Office), Berlin, 26 August 1949, FO 371/176523, PRO; Trivers to Rogers, 30 December 1948, op. cit.

81. Letter, Gilchrist to Steel, London, 1 December 1949, FO371/76525; Memorandum on Otto Strasser, A. D. P. Heeney (clerk, Privy Council) to Pearson, 31 October 1949, RG 25, 44-GK-40/3369/8, NAC; Attachment to Gilchrist, Foreign Office Minute, 20 September 1949: Office of the U.K. High Commissioner for Canada, Aide Memoire, FO 371/76524, PRO.

82. Heeney to Pearson, *ibid.*

83. Letter, George C. Nowlan (minister to Parliament from Nova Scotia) to Pearson, Wolfville, Nova Scotia, 6 December 1950, RG 25, 44-GK-40/8006/9, NAC; Letter, Pearson to W. E. Harris (minister of citizenship and immigration), Ottawa, 16 June 1950, RG 25, 44-GK-40/8006/9, NAC. See also Bartsch, *Zwischen drei Stühlen*, 169–70.

84. Pearson to Harris, *ibid.*

85. Circular Airgram, Acheson to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Washington, 19 December 1949, RG 466, Box 39, “350.2” folder, NARA. For a

discussion of “red fascism,” “national bolshevism,” and the implication of those concepts during the Cold War, see Thomas G. Paterson, “Red Fascism: The American Image of Aggressive Totalitarianism,” *Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan* (New York, 1988), 3–17, esp. 13.

86. I. P. Garran (German Political Department, Foreign Office) to Foreign Office, Berlin, 31 March 1949, FO 371/76518, PRO; “Bericht des Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung–Inland,” 3 October 1950, op. cit.; HICOM Intelligence Division, “SY Summary of Data on Strasser,” Tauber, *Eagle and Swastika*, 1:110–12; “U.S. General Warns Against Plans of Dr. Otto Strasser,” *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, 11 January 1949; “British Prohibit Strasser’s Bund,” *Montreal Gazette*, 25 January 1949; both in RG 18, 3317/2, NAC.

87. Robert Taylor, “Won’t Let Strasser Go Back to Germany—Ottawa,” *Toronto Daily Star*, 11 January 1949, RG 18, 3317/2, NAC.

88. Copy of letter from Riddelberger to Jacques T. de Saint Hardouin (political adviser to the French Military Government of Germany), Berlin, 11 March 1949, FO 371/76518, PRO; Wilson to Gilchrist, 26 August 1949, op. cit.

89. Gilchrist to Steel, London, 1 December 1949, op. cit.; Airgram, Acheson to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Offices, op. cit.; Foreign Office Minute on “Otto Strasser” by Gilchrist, 28 December 1949, FO 371/76526, PRO; Letter, Steel to Gilchrist, Wahnheide, Germany, 28 December 1949, FO 371/84995, PRO; Telegram 3 (Saving), Foreign Office to Belgrade, Berne, Brussels, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Rome, Stockholm, The Hague, Copenhagen and Vienna, 9 January 1950, FO 371/84995, PRO; W. D. Allen (German Political Department, Foreign Office) to Steel, London, 10 January 1950, FO 371/84995, PRO; Despatch 424, Rae to Pearson, 27 February 1950, RG 25, 44-GK-40/3369/8, NAC.

90. Despatch 489, Davis to Pearson, Bonn, 28 September 1950, RG 25, 44-GK-40/8006/9, NAC.

91. Letter, C. O’Neil (head, Chancery of the U.K. High Commissioner for Germany) to Allen, Wahnheide, 12 April 1950, FO 371/84995, PRO.

92. Gilchrist to Steel, 1 December 1949, op. cit.

93. “Bericht des Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung–Inland-,” op. cit.

94. Quoted in C. L. S. Cope (Office of the U.K. High Commissioner for Canada) to R. Ross (Commonwealth Relations Office), London, 29 February 1952, FO 371/98229, PRO.

95. Ibid.

96. “Bericht des Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung–Inland,” op. cit.; Enclosure to L. H. Long (chief political officer, Land Commissioner’s Office) to G. A. R. Ebsworth (Internal Affairs Branch, Chancery, Office of the U.K. High Commissioner), Düsseldorf, 24 April 1951: “Neutralism and Neutrality Groups in North Rhine Westphalia,” FO 1013 (Records of the Control Commission for Germany)/1355, PRO; Notes for Adenauer, “Zur Lage der CDU in Niedersachsen,” no author or date (probably 1950), Band 12.05, fiche 26/2, Nachlaß Konrad Adenauer, Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus (Archiv), Rhöndorf, Germany.

97. “Bericht des Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung–Inland-,” 3 Oktober 1950, op. cit.

98. O'Neil to Allen, 12 April 1950, op. cit.

99. Dr. jur. G. A. Jacoby (attorney for Otto Strasser) to the Federal Constitutional Court at Karlsruhe, Frankfurt am Main, 12 January 1952, Subject: "Verfassungsbeschwerde des Schriftstellers, Dr. Otto Strasser," B136/1746, fiche 1, BA. See also Bartsch, *Zwischen drei Stühlen*, 169–70.

100. Letter, Waldemar Wadsack (chair, Bund für Deutschlands Erneuerung [BDE]) and Eugen Grotz (secretary, BDE) to Konrad Adenauer (federal chancellor of Germany), Munich, 30 July 1951, Subject: "Dr. Otto Strasser's Einreise nach Westdeutschland," B136/1746, BA.

101. See Jacoby to the Federal Constitutional Court at Karlsruhe, 12 January 1952, op. cit.

102. Ibid.

103. Letter, A. D. P. Heeney (undersecretary of state) to Nowlan, Ottawa, 22 March 1951; Letter, Nowlan to Heeney, Ottawa, 10 April 1951; Memorandum, R. E. Collins (European Division) to Chance, Ottawa, 4 December 1951; all RG 25, 44-GK-40/8006/9, NAC.

104. Jacoby to the Federal Constitutional Court at Karlsruhe, 12 January 1952, op. cit.

105. "Aufenthaltsgenehmigung für Bayern: Dr. Otto Strasser," Bavaria, 11 December 1951, RG 25, 44-GK-40/8007/10.1, NAC.

106. Cope to Ross, 29 February 1952, op. cit.

107. Letter, Cope to A. D. Wilson, Ottawa, 4 February 1952, FO 371/98229, PRO; Telegram 1478, Acheson to McCloy, Washington, 7 February 1952, RG 466, box 39, "350.2" folder, NARA; Telegram 1499, Acheson to McCloy, Washington, 8 February 1952, RG 466, box 39, "350.2" folder, NARA; Letter, D. Malcolm (Chancery, Office of the U.K. High Commissioner) to P. F. Hancock (Central Department, Foreign Office), Wahnerheide, 10 February 1952, FO 371/98229, PRO; Letter, Strasser to March Shipping Agency, Paradise, 16 February 1952, B136/1746, fiche 2, BA; Cope to Ross, 29 February 1952, FO 371/98229, PRO; Dr. Robert Lehr (interior minister of the Federal Republic of Germany), "Auszug aus dem Schreiben des BMI vom 27. März 1952," Bonn, 27 March 1952, B136/1746, fiche 2, BA.

108. Jacoby to the Federal Constitutional Court at Karlsruhe, 12 January 1952, op. cit.

109. "Urteil in der Verwaltungsstreitsache des Dr. Otto Strasser, gegen den Bundesminister des Innern in Bonn, wegen Wiedereinbürgerung gemäß Artikel 116 GG," 29 April 1953, B136/1746, fiche 2, BA; Telegram 437, Kirkpatrick to the Foreign Office, Wahnerheide, 30 April 1953, DO 35 (Records of the Dominions Office)/7043, PRO.

110. Telegram 469, Ward to the Foreign Office, Wahnerheide, 14 May 1953, DO 35/7043, PRO. See also Telegram 361 (Saving), Kirkpatrick to the Foreign Office, Wahnerheide, 12 May 1953, DO 35/7043, PRO; Telegram 4943, James Conant (U.S. high commissioner for Germany) to Department of State, Bonn, 15 May 1953, RG 466, box 181, "350.1 Strasser Party, 1953–1955" folder, NARA.

111. Conant to Department of State, Bonn, 15 May 1953, ibid.

112. Minutes by Ritchie (deputy undersecretary of state) and J. B. C. Watkins (European Division) on cover sheet of Memorandum, Watkins to Heeney, Ottawa, 22 October 1951, RG 25, 44-GK-40/8006/9, NAC.

113. Hancock, "Memorandum on Otto Strasser," London, 9 November 1953, DO 35/7043, PRO; "Memorandum on Dr. Otto Strasser," Wrong (Canadian ambassador to the United States) to St. Laurent, Washington, 3 November 1953, RG 25, 44-GK-40/8007/10.2, NAC.

114. Letter, V. C. Moore (Canadian Embassy in Bonn) to W. McB. Swain (British delegate, Working Party of the Allied High Commission), Bonn, 19 November 1953, RG 25, 44-GK-40/8007/10.2, NAC.

115. Roger Dow (Office of Intelligence, Reports and Analysis Division), "The Strasser Movement," "350.2" folder, Box 39, RG 466, NARA.

116. Steel to Gilchrist, 28 December 1949, op. cit.; Letter, E. J. W. Barnes (Chancery, Office of the U.K. High Commissioner) to Hancock, Bonn, 31 December 1953, DO 35/7043, PRO.

117. Airgram A-3191, Acheson to McCloy, Washington, 27 March 1951, RG 466, box 39, "350.2" folder, NARA.

118. Document D(49)287, Interview of McCloy with Robert Kleiman (Central Europe editor, *U.S. News and World Report*), U.S. Army Press Release No. 51, Frankfurt am Main, 31 October 1949, RG 466, box 3, "D(49)271- 292" folder, NARA.

119. Barnes to Hancock, 31 December 1953, op. cit.

120. Letter, Davis to the Allied High Commission, Bonn, 19 November 1953, Moore to Swain, 19 November 1953, op. cit., and Telegram 296, Davis to St. Laurent, Bonn, 27 November 1953, all in RG 25, 44-GK-40/8007/10.2, NAC.

121. Letter, Ritchie to Henry D. Hicks (minister of education in Nova Scotia and attorney for Otto Strasser), Ottawa, 10 December 1953, RG 25, 44-GK-40/8007/11.1, NAC; "Note Verbale," Numbered Letter No. 1230 of the Canadian Embassy to the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, 28 December 1953, RG 25, 44-GK-40/8007/11.1, NAC.

122. Note Verbale, *ibid.*

123. R. A. MacKay (deputy undersecretary of state), "Memorandum for the File on Otto Strasser," Ottawa, 9 February 1954; Draft Despatch, Chapdelaine (chief, European Division) to Davis, Ottawa, 13 January 1954, drafted by P. C. Dobell (European Division), edited by Chapdelaine and N. F. H. Berlis (European Division); cover Memorandum, Dobell to Chapdelaine, Ottawa, 13 January 1954; and final despatch, Chapdelaine (acting undersecretary of state) to Davis, Ottawa, 18 January 1954; all in RG 25, 44-GK-40/8007/11.1, NAC.

124. Translation, Note Verbale, German Foreign Office to Canadian Embassy, Bonn, 5 March 1954, RG 25, 44-GK-40/8007/11.1, NAC.

125. Telegram 642 (Saving), Sir F. Hoyer Miller (Private Office of the U.K. High Commissioner) to the Foreign Office, Bonn, 20 November 1954, FO 371/109706, PRO.

126. Quoted from *Time* magazine in Numbered Letter 1203, Starnes to Heeney, Bonn, 9 December 1954, RG 25, 44-GK-40/8007/11.1, NAC.

127. Telegram 882, U.K. High Commissioner in Canada to British Representative in Bonn and British Embassies in Washington, Paris, Berne, and Stockholm, Ottawa, 22 November 1954, DO 35/7043, PRO; Letter, Millar to Hancock, 23 November 1954, FO 371/109706, PRO.

128. On Strasser's return, see Letter, Dr. Kanter (adviser to the justice minister) to

Adenauer, "Beleidigung des Herrn Bundeskanzlers durch Otto Strasser, z.Zt. München," Bonn, 21 March 1955, B136/1746, fiche 5, BA.

129. Duncan Wilson to Gilchrist, 26 August 1949, op. cit.

130. Ibid.

131. For a positive assessment of the Allied occupation's legacies, see Thomas A. Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, 1991), x–xi.

132. Quoted in Tauber, *Eagle and Swastika*, 1:219. On the founding and goals of the German Social Union, see Bartsch, *Zwischen drei Stühlen*, 177–81.

133. Numbered Letter 296, Starnes for Ritchie, Bonn, 30 March 1955, RG 25, 44-GK-40/8007/11.2, NAC.

134. Numbered Letter 729, Starnes to Pearson, Bonn, 23 August 1955, RG 25, 44-GK-40/8007/11.2, NAC.

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136. Ibid.

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111. See Cyril Buffet, *Mourir pour Berlin: La France et l’Allemagne 1945–1949* (Paris, 1991) and Annie Lacroix-Riz, *La choix de Marianne: Les relations franco-américaines* (Paris, 1985); also Georges-Henri Soutou, “France and the German Problem, 1945–1953,” *The Quest for Stability: Problems of West European Security, 1918–1957*, ed. R. Ahmann et al. (Oxford, 1993), 487–512, and Alfred Grosser, *Affaires extérieures: La politique de la France 1944–1984* (Paris, 1984). The classic English-language overview of postwar Franco-American tensions over Germany remains John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949* (Stanford, 1968).

112. Irwin Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley, 2001), ix; Costigliola, *France*, 118–59; Hitchcock, *France Restored*, 169–202, esp. 201–2. On the troubled U.S.-French relationship under de Gaulle’s leadership of the Fifth Republic,

see Frédéric Bozo, *Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance* (Lanham, 2001).

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114. De Gaulle's apparently authoritarian domestic vision is discussed in Despatch 2192, Jefferson Caffery (U.S. ambassador to France) to Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. (secretary of state), Subject: "Constituent Assembly versus National Assembly," Paris, 7 June 1945, SD 851.00/6–745, reel 1, in U.S. State Department, *Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files: France, Internal Affairs, 1945–49. Part 1: Political, Governmental, and National Defense Affairs, Decimal Numbers 851.0–851.3* (Frederick, 1986); also Despatch 2347, Caffery to Stettinius, Subject: "Constituent versus National Assembly—Further Developments," Paris, 22 June 1945, SD 851.00/6–2245, reel 2.

115. Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires de guerre: L'unité 1942–1944* (Paris, 1956), 97.

116. Cerny, *Politics of Grandeur*, 3–7, 74–126; Brunet, "Le RPF;" Paul Marie de la Gorce, *Naissance de la France moderne: L'après guerre 1944–52* (Paris, 1978), 423–68. Richard Kuisel analyzes de Gaulle's anti-Americanism during the Fifth Republic in Kuisel, "Was De Gaulle Anti-American?" *Tocqueville Review* 13:1 (1992):21–32. For broader overviews of de Gaulle's international vision, consult Charles Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman: Life of Charles de Gaulle* (New York, 1993) and Jean La Couture, *De Gaulle: The Ruler, 1945–1970* (New York, 1992).

117. See the NSC Staff Report, "Neutralism in France," n.d., WHO Files, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948–61, Planning Coordination Group Series, box 2, "#9 Bandung (3)" folder, DDEL; also Helen P. Kirkpatrick (Bureau of European Affairs), Draft, "The Changing Relationship Between the U.S. and Europe," 26 November 1952, Harry S. Truman Papers, SMOF: Psychological Strategy Board Files, box 11, "PSB File: 091.4 Europe-File #2 [1 of 2]" folder, HSTL; also Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National*

Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 230, 277. For an analysis of neutralist anti-Americanism in France, consult Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, CA, 1993), 42–46, 139, and Costigliola, *France*, 82–85.

118. See, for instance, Caffery to Byrnes, Despatch 4458, Subject: “Political Prospects of the Left Wing Parties,” Paris, 13 February 1946, SD 851.00/2–1346, reel 4; Caffery to Byrnes, Despatch 4550, Subject: “An Attempt to Evaluate the French Political Scene Between Elections and Following General de Gaulle’s Resignation,” Paris, 25 February 1946, SD 851.00/2–2546, reel 4; Caffery to Byrnes, Paris, 22 June 1946, *FRUS 1946* (Washington, DC, 1969), 5:465.

119. Bossuat, *France, l’aide américaine*, 1:53–79; Telegram 2420, Caffery to Marshall, Paris, 7 May 1948, SD 851.00/5–648, reel 21; “French Advance German Accords: Agree to Assembly Debate with Three Reservations—de Gaulle Sees Threat,” *New York Times*, 10 June 1948, 11:1; Airgram A-215, Caffery to Acheson, Paris, 2 February 1949, SD 851.00/2–249, reel 7; Pierre Gerbert, *Le Relèvement 1944–1949* (Paris, 1991), 355–57.

120. Central Intelligence Agency, ORE 39–48: “France’s German Policy,” 29 December 1948, Truman Papers, box 255, “PSF, Intelligence File: ORE, 1948 (30–32, 34, 35, 37–39)” folder, HSTL; Enclosure—Tab 4, of Lovett (acting secretary of state) to W. Averell Harriman (U.S. special representative to Europe, temporarily at Washington), Washington, 3 December 1948: “Question Raised by Mr. Harriman: Our Policies toward France, Particularly in the Manner in Which Our Influence Can be Exerted toward the Attainment of Greater Political and Financial Stability,” *FRUS 1948* (Washington, DC, 1974), 3:306–8.

121. Wall, *United States*, 81ff.

122. Alexander Smoltczyk, “‘Gladio’ in Paris: Résistance im Notfall,” *Taz*, 14 November 1990.

123. Daniele Ganser pieces together numerous journalistic accounts and memoirs dealing with the “secret war in France” in Ganser, *NATO’s Secret Armies*, 84–102.

124. “Chevènement: ‘Quelques erreurs ont été commises,’” *Le Figaro*, 13 November 1990, 4. The Austrian journalist Alexander Smoltczyk claims the French organization was dissolved in 1953, in the wake of Stalin’s death. Smoltczyk, “‘Gladio’ in Paris.”

125. U.S. Naval Attaché (hereafter ALUSNA) to State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (hereafter SANA), Joint WEEKA Report 46, Paris, 17 November 1950, SD2 751.00 (W)/17–350, reel 5; ALUSNA to SANA, Joint WEEKA Report 39, Paris, 29 September 1950, SD 751.00 (W)/9–2950, reel 5.

126. ALUSNA to SANA, Joint WEEKA Report 38, Paris, 22 September 1950, SD2 751.00 (W)/9–2250, reel 5.

127. Romero, *United States*, 16.

128. Del Pero, “United States,” 1313, 1324; William A. Crawford (aide to the U.S. ambassador to France, David K.E. Bruce), Memorandum: “Measures to Counter the Communist Parties of France and Italy,” Truman Papers, Psychological Strategy Board Files, Box 11, “091.4 Europe—File #1 [1 of 2]” folder, HSTL.

129. Alfred W. McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade* (New York, 1991), 51–63.

130. Stragi Commission Report, Chapter 1, “Il quadro storico-politico nel dopoguerra,” (1994), available at <<http://www.clarence.com/contents/societa/memoria/stragi/2.html>> (10 July 2004).

131. According to Willems, many French, Belgian, and Italian Peace and Liberty members also participated in Operation Glaiive or Gladio programs, highlighting the internecine links among these groups. Willems, *Gladio*, 35–52, esp. 35 and 52.

132. Colby, *Honorable Men*, 82–83.

133. Daniele Ganser, drawing on journalistic accounts memoirs, identifies the French External Documentation and Counterespionage Service (*Service de Documentation Extérieure de Contre-Espionage*, SDECE) as having primary responsibility, alongside the CIA, for operating the French program during the 1950s. Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 90–93.

134. Joint WEEKA 39, op. cit.

135. Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 91.

136. Christian Stifter, *Die Wiederaufrüstung Österreichs: Die geheime Remilitarisierung der westlichen Besatzungszonen 1945–1955* (Vienna, 1997), 127–28; John Foster LeMay, “Belgien,” *Zoom* (April and May 1996), available at <zoom.mediaweb.at/zoom_4596/belgien.html> (10 July 2004); Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 125–26, 212–20, and passim.

137. On efforts by the Croix de Lorraine to gain U.S. financial assistance, see Ridgway B. Knight (secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Paris) to Donald A. Dumant (American vice-consul, Tunis), Paris, 15 March 1948, and Knight to Wallner, Paris, 15 March 1948, both in Lot File: “Records of the Office of West European Affairs, 1941–54: Subject Files, 1941–54—Records of the French Desk, 1941–51,” Lot 53D246, box 2, “France—U.S. Policy Toward, 1945–46” folder, NARA. On similar efforts by other rightist groups, see Despatch 4553, Caffery to Byrnes, Subject: “Attempts to Bring about New Political Alignments,” Paris, 25 February 1946, SD 851.00/2–2546, reel 4.

138. Charles Bohlen (State Department counselor), Memorandum: “Possible Developments of Prospective French Political Crisis and its Effect on U.S. Foreign Policy,” 28 June 1947, SD 851.00/6–2847, reel 6; Lt. Col. Charles H. Bonesteel (special assistant to the under secretary of state) to Robert Lovett (under secretary of state), Subject: “Improvement of U.S. Counter-Communist Activities in France,” 8 September 1947, SD 851.00B/9–847, reel 8.

139. MacArthur to Wallner, Paris, 26 March 1947, SD 851.00B/3–2647, reel 8. See also telegram 1249, Caffery to Byrnes, Paris 14 March 1946, SD 851.00/3–1446, reel 19; and Caffery to Byrnes, Paris, 1 April 1946, SD 711.51/4–146, “France, Resistance Groups—Indochina, General (1946–48),” Lot File: Records of the Office of Western European Affairs, 1941–54, Subject Files, 1941–54: Records of the French Desk, 1941–51, Lot 53D246, box 2, “France: U.S. Policy Toward, 1945–46 folder, NARA.

140. Christopher Simpson, *Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War* (New York, 1988).

141. Ganser alleges a connection between the CIA-backed French stay-behind net and violence in the Fourth Republic in 1958–61, but, as he acknowledges, the evidence is sketchy. Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, 93–98.

142. Gabriel Kolko, *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy*,

1945–1980 (New York, 1988), 292.

143. For an exploration of this theme, see Leffler, “National Security,” in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, 2nd ed., eds. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (New York, 2004), 123–36.

144. See the related discussions in Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Man: Science, Technology, and the Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca, 1989), esp. 343–418. See also Michael S. Sherry, *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon* (New Haven, 1975), and Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (New York, 1991).

145. The classic elucidation of the realist paradigm is George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* (Chicago, 1951).

146. Tony Smith, “Making the World Safe for Democracy in the American Century,” *Diplomatic History* 23:2 (Spring 1999):175, 182–83. For a fuller explication of Smith’s views, see Smith, *America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, 1994).

147. David F. Schmitz makes a parallel argument about U.S. support of right-wing dictatorships in the twentieth century. Schmitz, *Thank God*, 306–9.

148. Ibid., passim. Also: Michael T. Klare, *Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad* (Washington, DC, 1977); Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle, eds., *Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma* (New York, 1991); Melvin Gurtov, *The United States against the Third World: Antinationalism and Intervention* (New York, 1974); Eric Roorda, *The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930–1945* (Durham, 1998); Frederick Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator: America’s Bungled Affair with Noriega* (New York, 1990); Boris N. Liedtke, *Embracing a Dictatorship: U.S. Relations with Spain, 1945–1953* (New York, 1998); Michael Grow, *The Good Neighbor Policy and Authoritarianism in Paraguay: The United States Economic Expansion and Great Power Rivalry in Latin America During World War II* (Lawrence, 1981); Michael Schaller, *American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York, 1985); Michael D. Gambone, *Eisenhower, Somoza, and the Cold War in Nicaragua, 1953–1961* (Westport, 1997); Mark Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, eds., *Mohammed Mossadeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran* (Syracuse, 2004); John K. Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism*, 3rd ed. (London, 2002); Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Cambridge, 1999); Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill, 1988); Raymond Bonner, *Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy* (New York, 1987).

149. Schmitz, *Thank God*, 5.

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