CHALLENGING PARTIES,
CHANGING PARLIAMENTS

*Women and Elected Office in Contemporary Western Europe*

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THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Columbus
For Michael and Nikolas
list of illustrations

Figures

Figure 1.1  Party Types and the Increase in Women in Parliament 9
Figure 2.1  Sequence of Influences in Party Change 33
Figure 2.2  Effective Strategy for Party Change 34
Figure 2.3  Opportunities and Mechanisms for Increasing Women’s Representation in Parliament 36
Figure 3.1  Average Percentage of Women on Party NECs, 1975–97 42
Figure 4.1  Cumulative Quotas Adopted, 1972–95 58
Figure 4.2  Women on the NEC and Internal Party Rules, 1975–97 62
Figure 4.3  Percentage of Women in Parliament by Year in Which Women Reach “Critical Mass” on NEC 63
Figure 4.4  Average Percentage of Women MPs by Adoption of Quotas, 1975–95 64
Figure 5.1  British Women in the House of Commons, 1970–97 68
Figure 5.2  British Trends in the Gender Vote Gap and Women MPs from Leftist Parties, 1970–98 69
Figure 5.3  British Trends in Left Vote among Supporters of the Women’s Movement and Women MPs from Labour Party, 1970–97 71
Figure 6.1  German Women in the Bundestag, 1969–2002 86
Figure 6.2  German Trends in the Gender Vote Gap and Women MPs from Leftist Parties, 1970–98 89
Figure 6.3  German Trends in Left Vote among Supporters of the Women’s Movement and Women MPs from Leftist Parties, 1970–98 90
Figure 7.1  Finnish Women in the Eduskunta, 1966–2003 104
Figure 7.2  Finnish Trends in the Gender Vote Gap and Women MPs from Leftist Parties, 1970–95 107
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Tables

Table 1.1 Increases in Representation of Women in National Legislatures 3
Table 1.2 Increase in Women MPs by Party, 1975–97 6
Table 2.1 Opportunity Structure for Increasing Women’s Representation in Parliament 21
Table 3.1 Women on Parties’ NECs, 1975 and 1997 43
Table 3.2 Multivariate Model Explaining the Number of Women in Party Leadership 48
Table 4.1 Political Parties and Candidate Gender Quotas 51
Table 4.2 Logit Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Event History Analysis Model of Candidate Gender Quota Adoption 60
Table 8.1 Multivariate Model Explaining Women’s Representation as Party MPs 124
Table 10.1 Percentage of Women in Parliament, 2005 139
Table 10.2 British Women MPs, by Party, as of 2005 146
Table 10.3 German Women MPs, by Party, as of 2005 148
Table 10.4 Finnish Women MPs, by Party, as of 2005 153
I would like to express my deepest appreciation to Russell Dalton, who provided incredibly helpful advice from the planning to data analyses stages and beyond. His insights have been invaluable. Katherine Tate provided both substantive and professional advice, which is greatly appreciated. I would also like to thank Martin Wattenberg and Bernard Grofman for their thoughtful feedback on this project. Financial support was provided by the German Marshall Fund and The Center for German and European Studies. Insights into party processes were provided through interviews with party officials and politicians, and by materials given by the parties. I am grateful for the time granted to this project by several individuals. Although I agreed not to quote or mention some of them by name in the text, many did grant me permission to offer them the thanks they deserve. MP Maria Kaisa Aula, Vice President Parliamentary Party KESK; Peter Coleman, former Labour Director of Organization and European Parliamentary Labour Party leader; Leena Eerola, Finnish Green Party activist; MP Tarja Filatov, SDP; Sandra Hartman, German FDP, Bundesfraktion; Lisa Husu, former Finnish National Coordinator of Women’s Studies; Aki Hyodym, Finnish Green Party; Ronnie Jaeckel, German Alliance 90/The Greens; Peter Jepson, Labour Party member; Christa Karras, Die Grünen; Stefan Kapferer, Head of Strategy and Campaigns, FDP; MP Tarja Kautto, SDP; Deborah Lincoln, former Labour Party National Women’s Officer and Director of Public Relations; Rachel McLean, Labour National Women’s Officer; Heli Paasio, SDP; Val Price, President, Labour Women’s Network; Eeva Raevaa, Kristina Institute for Women’s Studies at
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

the University of Helsinki; MP Susanna Rahkonen, SDP; Helena Riutta, KOK; Meg Russell, former Labour Party National Women's Officer; MP Ter- tuu Savolainen, SDP; MP Anni Sinnemaki, Finnish Green Party; Caroline Abel Smith, Conservative Party Women's Organization leader; MaryAnn Stevenson, Director of Campaigns, Fawcett Society; Madame Speaker, MP Katja Svarinen, Vice President of Finnish Left Alliance Party; Stefan Thomas, Director of Public Relations, German Bundestag; Mrs. Riita Uosukainen, Speaker of Eduskunta and KOK nominee for Finnish President; Lord Larry Whitty, former Labour Party General Secretary; and Annette Widman-Mauz, Chair of Frauenunion Baden-Württemberg CDU. Several individuals and organizations made available materials that were essential to this research. Professor Richard Matland, University of Houston, gathered data on women in parties from several party and country experts in Scandinavia. Professor Paul Webb, University of Sussex, provided information on the British Conservative Party. The Labour Party Archives provided assistance in locating minutes from women's organization meetings. For statistics on Denmark, Karina Pedersen, University of Copenhagen, was tremendously helpful.

I would also like to thank my parents, who gave me the opportunity to pursue this research, and a career in academia more broadly. I am grateful to Greg for his moral support, which makes it possible for me to balance both a professional and a personal life. Finally, thank you to my sons, Michael and Niko- las, for the sacrifices they do not even know they've made.
In May 2000 British Prime Minister Tony Blair and his wife Cherie welcomed a newborn son to their family. Just before the baby’s birth, Cherie Blair praised then Finnish Prime Minister, Paavo Lipponen, for taking a week of paternity leave to care for his baby, and she called for the “widespread adoption of his fine example” (Hoge, 2000). Yet in his public response, Prime Minister Blair said, “I’ve got a country to run... I know what people want me to say, but the truth is, if I went away and stopped taking calls, or having conversations, it just wouldn’t be real... I cannot stop being Prime Minister” (Hoge, 2000).

The implications of this story go beyond the issue of paternity leave. Blair’s refusal followed an intensive, decade-long effort by the Labour Party to portray itself as the “woman-friendly” party in Britain. In addition to emphasizing gender-related policies, Labour has taken great strides in promoting women candidates for Parliament, and Blair has appointed an unprecedented number of women, sarcastically dubbed “Blair’s Babes” by the British press,
to high-profile government positions. By taking a parental leave upon the birth of his son, Blair might have signaled his commitment to gender equality and a socially progressive “New” Labour Party. Even *The Mirror* ran front-page headlines urging parental leave for the Prime Minister—“Show New Dads the Way, Tony.”

The Blair parental leave story illustrates the ongoing struggle between women and party politics. Not only was this a botched opportunity for Labour to demonstrate its support for women’s changing roles in society, and perhaps to attract the much sought-after women’s vote, but it also represents the larger picture of party gender politics. On the one hand, the Blairs’ case illustrates how far political parties have come for the prime minister to even consider paternity leave. On the other hand, it also illustrates just how far party politics has to go in order to move beyond rhetoric to create a truly “woman-friendly” environment. An environment conducive to women’s participation will encourage a greater number of women to enter party politics and run for elected office.

Past explanations for women’s lower participation levels in both parties and parliament, relative to men’s levels, often focus on a shortage of women stepping forward to run for office. Several studies attribute the problem of women’s underrepresentation in part to women’s lower levels of participation in the types of professions (e.g., law) that serve as springboards to office (Rule, 1994; Darcy et al., 1994; Taagepera, 1994; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). Yet Pamela Paxton’s (1997) large cross-national analysis finds that women’s general numbers among the labor force and in higher education have little impact on their parliamentary presence. But more specifically, women’s rising presence among the traditional pool of applicants in high-profile professions will gradually bring greater gains in parliament. Importantly, the inadequacy of the “supply side” reasoning is that it places the onus for change solely on women themselves. This book flips this question on its head to ask how political parties can be transformed to encourage women’s participation—especially as members of parliaments. Certainly women must play an active role in creating opportunities for themselves, but in addition, as the gatekeepers to elected office, parties can facilitate or impede women’s participation in parliament. I will argue that women’s efforts to gain a foothold in party politics and parliament are most effective where women recognize favorable conditions within the party and the party system, and where they devise context-contingent strategies for inclusion. Certainly there is no one-size-fits-all strategy across parties, and this book examines how women’s strategies most effectively interact with party and political environments.

Identifying the ways political parties can facilitate women’s access to national legislatures has recently become a pressing issue among academics, democratic activists, and political leaders alike. A December 2003 National
Democratic Institute (NDI) forum, entitled “Win With Women: Strengthen Political Parties,” brought together female political leaders from around the world to address the role of political parties in women’s political advancement. Madeline Albright, NDI Chair and a former U.S. secretary of state and ambassador to the United Nations, led the forum, asserting that “there have been many initiatives to promote women’s political leadership, but little attention has been paid to reforming and modernizing the way political parties operate . . . After all, political parties are the gateway to political office, and are key to advancing women’s participation” (NDI, 2004).

Table 1.1 Increases in Representation of Women in National Legislatures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% Women MPs, 1975</th>
<th>% Women MPs, 1997</th>
<th>% Points Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>+22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>+18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>+ 5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>+17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>+18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>+10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>+8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>+25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>+4.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>+20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>+9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>+0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>+7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>+3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>+14.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>+26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>+24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>+20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>+5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>+15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>+21.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>+14.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>+14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>+9.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>+14.2</td>
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Note: Data collected from Inter-Parliamentary Union statistics on women in parliaments. The first time point is the election before and closest to 1975. The second time point represents the election closest to 1997.
Women in Parliament

In this book I assess the degree of women’s integration into political parties and parliamentary office in ten Western European nations from 1975 to 1997, and the conditions under which their entrance occurred. This is both a study of how women pressed for greater representation and how democratic party systems responded to their demands. The activism of women and the actions of political parties work together as catalysts for change.

Although the women’s movement has made dramatic progress in improving opportunities, women are still numerically underrepresented in the national legislatures of all established democracies (IPU, 1997). Thus, women participate little as elected representatives in the national decision-making process.

For a set of twenty-four post-industrial nations, table 1.1 presents the percentages of women in the lower house national legislature at two time points—1975 and 1997—and the percentage point difference between those two time points. On average, the percentage of women in office in 1975 was only 7, and this number grew by fourteen points, to 21, by 1997.

It is most striking that in each nation, the proportion of women in parliament has grown since the 1970s. In comparison with the larger set of postindustrial nations, Western European nations demonstrate some of the highest levels of parliamentary participation by women, and some of the greatest increases. The Netherlands and Germany made the greatest strides. In 1975 the German Bundestag had only 6% women, but by 1997 women made up 31% of the lower house. Similarly, in 1975, 9% of the members of the Dutch parliament were women, yet this figure climbed to 36% by 1997. By contrast, by the late 1990s, the United States had only 13% women in the House of Representatives. However, there is a great deal of variation across Western Europe. For example, under similar electoral systems, Austria and Belgium differ substantially, registering increases of eighteen and five percentage points, respectively. Britain, with its plurality electoral system, realized a larger increase than Belgium, Finland, or Ireland, all nonplurality systems.

Comparative research on the number of women in national parliaments has primarily focused on the structure of electoral systems to explain cross-national patterns. Several studies have established that party list proportional representation (PR) systems produce higher percentages of women in parliament than single-member district plurality systems (Reynolds, 1999; Lakenman, 1994; Duverger, 1955; Beckwith, 1992; Caul, 1997). One example of a national-level finding that supports this relationship is the German case. Half of the Bundestag is elected by a plurality system and the other half by PR. In 1994, women won 19.1% of the seats by plurality election and 26.2% by PR. The standard explanation for this finding is that parties in plurality systems are reluctant to nominate a woman for fear they will lose the seat to a male
competitor from another party. In contrast, parties in PR systems are more willing to add women to the party list in hopes of broadening the party’s appeal to different groups. The perceived electoral risk with a female candidate decreases when she is part of a group, rather than the sole candidate (Lakeman, 1994; Lovenduski and Norris, 1993).

Supporting this explanation, studies have demonstrated that as the number of candidates elected in a district (district magnitude) increases, so does the number of women nominated to the list and elected (Beckwith, 1992; Matland, 1993; Rule, 1981). Three or more seats per district means that more than one person on the party list might win a seat. Czudnowski (1975) broadly theorized that party lists allow parties to balance the ticket to represent a number of groups within the party (p. 226). This logic applies to striking a gender balance on the ticket; women can be added to the party list to broaden appeal without unseating men with established positions. Even if women are not ranked first on the list, a woman may still be elected to office if the party wins more than one seat. Hence, research suggests that large, multimember districts and party lists are most conducive to women’s representation in legislatures.

The bulk of previous comparative empirical research on women’s representation focuses on these national-level patterns of women’s representation. By comparing the static percentages of women in national parliaments, prior research misses an important point in explaining women’s representation; while the electoral systems of most nations have remained stable over the past twenty years, the proportion of women in office has climbed. Thus, explanations based on fixed institutional characteristics deliver little leverage in explaining change over time.

An important new book by Ron Inglehart and Pippa Norris (2003) attributes women’s rise toward equality to changing attitudes towards women’s roles across postindustrial societies. Systematically examining the mass publics of seventy nations worldwide (agrarian, industrial, and postindustrial), the authors argue that in nations where there are more egalitarian attitudes, there are more women in political leadership positions. Similarly, Paxton and Kunovich (2003) create an index of gender attitudes and find this index highly correlated with women’s political representation. Inglehart and Norris’s data show that Western European nations display some of the highest levels of support for women’s equality. In fact, “all of the postindustrial nations . . . are clustered at the top right-hand corner” of the graphs showing support for gender equality. Thus, there is little variation among Western European nations when it comes to gender attitudes. Certainly attitudes and values matter for rising levels of women’s representation, and they must be taken into account in any study of women’s representation. Yet among the set of nations within the scope of this book, cultural attitudes and values provide a fairly even and common force for change over time.
**Table 1.2 Increase in Women MPs by Party, 1975–97**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>% Women MPs 1975</th>
<th>% Women MPs 1997</th>
<th>% Point Change</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Number of Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Austria</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Party (OVP)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>+13.0</td>
<td>1975-95</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Party (FPO)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>+19.0</td>
<td>1975-95</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party (SPO)</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>+21.3</td>
<td>1975-95</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greens (GA)</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
<td>1987-95</td>
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<td><strong>Belgium</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Christian People's (CVP)</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>+9.0</td>
<td>1974-87^a</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberty (Flemish) (PVV)</td>
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<td>1974-87</td>
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<td>People's Union (VU)</td>
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<td>1974-95</td>
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<td>Socialist People's (SF)</td>
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<td>Social Democrats (SD)</td>
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<td>Social Liberals (RV)</td>
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<td>1975-94</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>1975-94</td>
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<td>Progress Party (KRP)</td>
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<td>1975-94</td>
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<td><strong>Finland</strong></td>
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<td>People's Democrat (SKDL)</td>
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<td>Swedish People's (SFP)</td>
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<td>National Coalition (KOK)</td>
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<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
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<td>Social Democratic (SPD)</td>
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<td>1972-94</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Free Democratic (FDP)</td>
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<td>Greens (G)</td>
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<td>+23.5</td>
<td>1983-94</td>
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</table>
### Table 1.2 Increase in Women MPs by Party, 1975–97 (continued)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>% Women MPs 1975</th>
<th>% Women MPs 1997</th>
<th>% Point Change</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Number of Elections</th>
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<td>Worker’s Party (WP)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1973-89</td>
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<td>Labour (LAB)</td>
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<td>1973-97</td>
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<td>Fianna Fail (FF)</td>
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<td>1973-97</td>
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<td>Communist Party (CPN)</td>
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<td>Labour Party (PvdA)</td>
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<td>Pacifist Socialist (PSP)</td>
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<td>2.1</td>
<td>+2.1</td>
<td>1972-89</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats (CDA)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>+13.7</td>
<td>1977-94</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats 1966 (D 1966)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>+34.5</td>
<td>1972-94</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>People’s Party (VVD)</td>
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<td>18.5</td>
<td>+16.5</td>
<td>1972-94</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td><strong>Norway</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Socialist People’s (SV)</td>
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<td>33.3</td>
<td>+14.5</td>
<td>1973-97</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labour Party (DNA)</td>
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<td>49.2</td>
<td>+29.8</td>
<td>1973-97</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center Party (SP)</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>+22.0</td>
<td>1973-97</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christian People’s (KRF)</td>
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<td>45.8</td>
<td>+40.8</td>
<td>1973-97</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberals (V)</td>
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<td>1973-97</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>+8.0</td>
<td>1973-97</td>
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<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
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<td>Communist Party (VPK)</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>+27.9</td>
<td>1973-94</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Dem Worker (S)</td>
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<td>47.8</td>
<td>+30.6</td>
<td>1973-94</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center Party (C)</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>+24.3</td>
<td>1973-94</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>People’s Party (FP)</td>
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<td>34.6</td>
<td>+24.3</td>
<td>1973-94</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Right Party (M)</td>
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<td>27.5</td>
<td>+17.7</td>
<td>1973-94</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour (LAB)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>+19.2</td>
<td>1974-97</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberal Dem (LIB/SDL)</td>
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<td>6.5</td>
<td>+6.5</td>
<td>1974-97</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservatives (CON)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>+5.8</td>
<td>1974-97</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Katz and Mair (1992) and Inter-Parliamentary Union (1997).

*For Belgium the percentage of women in the 1991 and 1995 elections is not available for most parties. Data for the following Belgian parties are not published: BSP, PSB, AGA, and ECO.*
Cross-national studies miss the substantial variations in women’s parliamentary presence between parties. Across parties and within the same parties over time, parties differ substantially in the number of women they nominate, where they rank women on party lists, and in the number of women they send to parliament (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). The variation in the proportion of women to men is even greater across parties than across nations. Table 1.2 displays the number of women by party in the national legislatures of the nations in this study in the elections closest to 1975 and 1998; the third column displays the percentage point difference between these two time points. The variation in parties, even within the same nation, is often quite striking. For example, in Norway in 1997 the Progress Party had only 8% women in its delegation to parliament, while the Labour Party had 49% women. In stark contrast, the Irish Labour Party had only 6% women in its delegation.

Of the parties under investigation, forty-seven out of fifty registered an increase from 1975 to 1998. The percentage of women decreased only in the Austrian Green and Finnish People’s parties, and it remained stagnant at zero in the Irish Worker’s Party. However, in the case of the Austrian Greens, the period of time under study is shorter than for the other parties in the project—1987 to 1995. Further, in 1987, of their delegation to parliament, 63% of the MPs were women. In short, the Austrian Greens experienced a “regression toward the mean”—a 1995 move toward 50% women registered a decline. Thus, this case does not constitute a significant loss over time for women in Green Party politics. Likewise, the percentage of women in the Finnish People’s Party began at a high level in 1975—23%—and the level fell to 14% in 1997.

Overall, the change in women’s parliamentary participation over the last two decades can be characterized as a widespread and sustained increase. An exemplar of this increase in women’s participation in parliament at the party level is represented by the Dutch Communist Party which, in 1975, sent no women to parliament, yet this number increased to 33% by 1997.

To present the variation across parties more concisely, figure 1.1 displays the average percentage of women MPs for several general “families,” or types, of political parties. The three bars for each family represent the average percentage of women during the periods 1975–81, 1982–89, and 1990–97. As one can observe, all categories except religious parties register an increase. Surprisingly, Socialist parties did not start out with the highest percentage of women, but this percentage rose to the highest level during the 1990s. Rural and conservative parties averaged especially high proportions of women in the 1970s, relative to the other party types, yet they did not display the substantial gains evident among the Socialist parties. Even the ultra-right parties increased their proportion of women over the 20-year time period—although
they began at a very low percentage and only ended up averaging 10% women in the 1990s.

These increases in the proportion of women to men in certain parties often result from new party measures designed to make it easier for women to enter politics. Many parties adopt formal policies to promote women candidates, and these measures denote a process of changing attitudes toward women in politics. The implementation of policies to encourage women candidates not only reflects the acceptance that women are underrepresented; it also demonstrates a willingness to fix the problem. Parties have not only adopted gender quotas for candidates, but also for internal party positions. In addition, parties have founded women’s branches within the party organization, changed their method of recruiting candidates, and offered special training programs and fundraising assistance for potential women candidates. Policies to promote female candidates have diffused across nations and within party systems. The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) reports that by 1995, eighty-four parties in thirty-six nations had enacted quotas to increase the proportion of women in their delegations to the national legislature.

One example of party efforts to assist women candidates is illustrated in the British party system. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Labour Party ran weekend training programs for potential women candidates to improve their confidence and speaking skills. The British Conservative Party followed

Figure 1.1 Party Types and the Increase in Women in Parliament

Source: Katz and Mair (1992) and IPU (1997); party type follows Lane and Ersson (1991).
Labour’s lead in the early 1990s by beginning to take steps to promote women. Rather than waiting for qualified women to come forward, the Tories began to “talent spot,” choosing women who would make good MPs, recruiting them, and offering them special training. In addition, the central party leadership provides training seminars to selection committee members in order to reduce their bias toward women and minorities in the selection process.

Goals of the Book

Rising numbers of women in parliaments are commonly attributed to the efforts of women’s movements, and to growing numbers of women in the workforce, universities, and law schools. Certainly these social processes are necessary, but they are not always sufficient explanations for why women’s parliamentary representation increased when it did. In most cases, women’s parliamentary presence has not grown in a strictly incremental fashion, but rather in punctuated and sometimes dramatic increases (Studlar and McAllister, 2002). Klausen and Maier (2001) theorize that the basic tenets of liberal democratic theory lead to the expectation that gender-blind rules produce equal opportunities that would bring women equality over time. Yet inequalities persist. A growing force within both democratic theory and in the democratic process calls for direct mechanisms to alleviate inequalities for women (Klausen and Maier, 2001). I will argue that the key mechanism for increases in women’s parliamentary representation is the political party. As the “gatekeepers” to elected office, parties in Western Europe control which candidates are recruited and nominated, and they can take action to promote women. In short, parties can make or break women’s efforts to run for office.

This book presents a more complete theoretical argument and empirical picture of how parties influence women’s parliamentary presence. I bring new theory and data to uncover the party-level mechanisms that explain the growth in women in parliaments since the 1970s. Most prior research addressing the role of parties is limited to case studies of individual parties or countries. My systematic comparison of women’s representation across parties and over time illuminates some common characteristics of parties that lead to increases in women’s parliamentary presence. Party efforts are often attributed to mounting pressures from activists and public opinion at large. This book contradicts the conventional wisdom by showing that women’s gains within parties flow not only from pressure from party supporters, but also from calculated efforts made by the central party leadership in a top-down fashion under specific circumstances. Certainly women’s efforts are essential, and they can be most effective when they are framed, timed, and pitched toward the most opportune targets within the party hierarchy.
This book has broad implications at two levels. First, it examines how and why political parties respond to challenges from new contenders by focusing on change in one arena—the inclusion of women in party and parliamentary office. At another level, the findings shed light on how women, and new contenders more generally, find access within party politics, and how institutions shape their choices. To examine these questions, I bring together two growing bodies of literature—women and politics, and party change.

Research on women’s parliamentary participation has largely focused on the national level. In a seminal volume on parties and women in politics in Western Europe, Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris (1993) offer illuminating insights into the characteristics of parties that facilitate women’s participation in party politics, and the evidence is based on discrete case studies of individual countries. This book builds upon Lovenduski and Norris’s important findings by systematically comparing the role of the party in women’s parliamentary representation across ten European nations.

Another body of research addresses how parties change in the face of new challenges. Herbert Kitschelt (1994) examines the electoral fortunes of Socialist parties in Western Europe and argues for the centrality of the party as an active agent in shaping its own destiny. I build upon Kitschelt’s contention that the most effective strategy results from a match between political environment and the structure of the party organization. I apply these theoretical insights from a new perspective—from the view of new contenders trying to make inroads within party politics.

Methodological Approach

This research calls for a multimethod approach. I use two types of evidence. At one level, cross-national, cross-party statistics allow for systematic analysis of several sets of explanations for increases in women’s representation. I assemble national surveys and aggregate statistics from various published sources. Data are drawn from such diverse sources as The Eurobarometer surveys, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and data handbooks assembled by party scholars (Katz and Mair, 1992; Laver and Hunt, 1991; Lane and Ersson, 1992). Details on the sources of data can be found in the Appendices.

At another level, qualitative case studies complement the broad statistical analyses. I examine select parties in Britain, Germany, and Finland. While aggregate data reveal patterns among the conditions and characteristics that lead to women’s integration into parties, it is also important to understand the way in which power was yielded to promote women. By focusing on a few well-selected cases in detail, I uncover the processes and debates behind party decisions to promote (or not promote) women candidates for office.
Furthermore, for purposes of broad, cross-national comparison, the statistical analysis explains women’s numerical representation. In contrast, the case studies can focus both on women in parliament and on an important intervening step—party campaigns to increase women’s representation.

In late 1999, I spent nearly a month in each nation interviewing party officials, party workers, members of parliament (MPs), and women’s movement coordinators. Only by interviewing those involved in the efforts to promote women candidates could I establish why certain parties decided to take action when they did. Specifically, I interviewed twelve MPs, five heads of party women’s organizations, two party vice presidents, four party directors, a party general secretary, a campaign coordinator, the speaker of the Finnish Eduskunta and presidential nominee, seven party activists, and five representatives from independent women’s groups. In addition, I analyzed a great deal of written material from party archives and government agencies. For example, I combed through minutes from meetings of women’s organizations in the British Conservative and Labour parties. I visited the offices of the ombudsman for equality in Finland, and I read several reports. I scoured countless political pamphlets from parties in Britain, Germany, and Finland.

Case Selection

The book focuses on a set of Western European nations (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Britain) that are common to four comprehensive, party-level datasets (Katz and Mair, 1992; Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1997; Laver and Hunt, 1992; Lane and Ersson, 1991). The cross-national analysis is based on fifty parties in those ten nations (see table 1.2 for a list of parties). Because this group of nations is not a random sample of postindustrial democracies, my conclusions can only be cautiously generalized beyond these ten cases. Further, I examine the period from 1975 to 1997 because beginning in the 1970s, women dramatically stepped up pressures on parties for greater political representation (Jenson, 1995; Lovenduski and Norris, 1993: 5). During the 1970s, gender equality became part of the social agenda of advanced industrial societies, and a growing number of women took their demands for increased representation to political parties.

From this set of countries, I selected three for in-depth investigation: Britain, Germany, and Finland. In order not to introduce bias into the research design, I selected these nations, and several parties within each nation, based upon key explanatory variables (see King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994). Previous research on the role of parties in women’s representation suggests that the most important influences are the party’s ideology, the presence or absence of candidate gender quotas or targets, and the number of women among the
party's highest decision-making body (Caul, 1999; Lovenduski and Norris, 1993).

Because ideology is a key variable, I included parties from across the ideological continuum in Britain, Germany, and Finland. In Britain, I included the Labour and Conservative parties. In Germany, I selected the Social Democratic (SPD), Free Democratic (FDP), and Christian Democratic/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) parties. In Finland, I selected the Social Democratic (SDP), Center (KESK), and National Coalition (KOK) parties.

Another important mechanism in explaining change in the inclusion of women candidates is the adoption of candidate gender quotas. As such, party systems have been chosen to maximize variation in the use of quotas or less stringent targets for the proportion of women candidates. At the high end, in Germany all of the parties (except the CSU) have adopted some form of gender quotas or targets. The use of quotas began with the Green Party and diffused across the party system. In contrast, in Finland none of the parties implemented formal candidate gender quotas or targets. Between these two extremes, in Britain the Labour Party adopted a version of quotas for short-listing candidates, but quotas failed to diffuse across the ideological spectrum to the Conservatives.

Next, the proportion of women on the party’s highest body was considered. In Finland the proportion of women on the National Executive Committees (NECs) of most parties began at a high level, relative to the levels of other parties. Germany witnessed substantial increases; the number of women on the NEC in the Social Democratic Party rose dramatically after 1975, while the number in the remaining German parties increased more moderately. By contrast, the number of women on the NEC in the Labour and Conservative parties has remained virtually stagnant.

The Importance of the Representation of Women in Parliament

This book hinges on the contention that the numerical, or descriptive, representation of women in national legislatures is essential to the quality of the democratic process. Yet how are women most effectively represented by their elected officials? In her seminal book, The Concept of Representation, Hannah Pitkin (1967) argues that a correspondence between representative and constituent on issues (“substantive” representation) is more critical than a match based upon personal characteristics, such as race or gender (“descriptive” representation). Anne Phillips (1995) argues for the addition of the “politics of presence,” or descriptive representation. Several arguments underpin the call for “presence.” The most persuasive contends that traditionally excluded groups raise new issues, and therefore their participation at the
agenda-setting and debate stages of policymaking is essential to the quality of the democratic process (Mansbridge, 1999). The groups that are represented in the legislature shape the issue agenda, alter the salience of certain issues, and influence the nature of the debate surrounding issues.

Specific to this research, many women elected officials may raise and support issues that are shaped by their life experiences. In a cross-national study of women’s presence in the national legislatures of industrialized nations, Valerie O’Regan (2000) finds that the higher the proportion of women, the more likely are stronger policies such as employment and wage protection policy, and equal wage legislation. In addition, case study evidence shows that women elected officials highlight issues that are distinct from those emphasized by their male counterparts. For example, in Britain, female MPs, regardless of partisan affiliation, prioritize health and education and oppose nuclear energy more than male MPs (Norris and Lovenduski, 1989). In more recent research, on the basis of more fundamental values, British female MPs, regardless of party, differ from their male counterparts on support for affirmative action and gender equality issues (Norris and Lovenduski, 2001). Research on state legislatures in the United States finds that female legislators are more favorable toward expanding welfare programs than male legislators, and this gender difference is especially pronounced among Republicans (Poggon, 2004). Similarly, research on the United States Congress shows that although women members tend to vote along party lines at the same rate as men, women appear to raise new issues that are important to women as a group (Thomas, 1993; Dodson, 1995). And women in Congress show greater intensity of commitment to these “women’s issues” in the legislative process, even when controlling for their party affiliation (Swers, 2002). Importantly, interviews with former and current congresswomen reveal that these women most often share a group identity as women and feel a special responsibility to represent women’s interests in Congress (Carroll, 2002).

Research on the Scandinavian nations, who lead the world in the percentage of women in parliament, confirms that women’s presence makes a difference. At the municipal level in Norway, Bratton and Ray (2002) find that the proportion of women elected is positively related to the percentage of children in state-funded childcare facilities, especially during the process of formulating a childcare policy. Hege Skjeie (1991) documents how a significant number of women in the Norwegian parliament first raised the issue of quality daycare in the legislature. Although Conservative women favored one policy outcome, and Labour women another, the significant breakthrough was that the national legislature took up the issue of daycare coverage and kept it on the agenda until a policy was passed. Further, through the eyes of elected officials themselves, women’s presence impacts politics. In a survey of MPs from all parties in all five Scandinavian nations, Lena Wangnerud (2000) finds the
majority of those surveyed confirmed that their party had indeed changed issue positions because of an increase in the number of women MPs among them.

The argument for a politics of presence is linked to another body of comparative politics literature that concentrates on group representation based on shared ethnic background, cultural heritage, or even language. Arend Lijphart’s (1977) “consociational democracy” calls for elite power sharing among politically relevant segments of society to encourage full inclusion, thus decreasing the need for protest outside political channels. A representative body that includes women may signal the importance of their input, thereby lending legitimacy to the regime and thus encouraging democratic stability.

Lijphart’s (1999) more recent research shows that across thirty-six nations, consensus-based governments lead to higher quality democracy. Specifically, consensus governments are more likely to have more women in parliament, be welfare states, have fewer citizens in prison, and protect the environment. Here, I argue that in addition to being a measure of the outcome (democratic quality), having more women in office is also part of the inclusive dimension of the consensus-based model. Where power is shared with new contenders such as women, rather than held exclusively by entrenched interests, the policymaking process itself is transformed.

Importantly, women’s numerical representation in parliament may also empower women as democratic citizens and encourage their participation. Schwartz (1988) argues that descriptive representation brings constituents into the process and unites them into a political group. Some research on women’s political participation in the United States supports this contention. Women are more highly engaged in politics in states where women candidates have run visible and competitive races (Atkeson, 2003). High-Pippert and Comer (1998) find that in districts where a woman is elected, women voters are more likely to be interested in and participate in politics, and to have a greater sense of political efficacy and competence. However, Lawless (2004) controls for party congruence among representative and constituent and finds little support for the idea that descriptive representation encourages efficacy or activity among women.

Further evidence for the importance of descriptive representation is found among other underrepresented groups. At the presidential level, Katherine Tate’s (1991; 1994) research reveals that Jesse Jackson’s presidential campaign stimulated turnout among blacks. At the congressional level, in separate studies Lawrence Bobo and Frank Gilliam (1990) and Claudine Gay (1997) show that African-American participation rates are higher in districts that are represented by an African-American. The mechanism behind higher participation appears to be the engagement of the marginalized group through a symbolic cue of likely responsiveness to racial concerns. Katherine Tate (2001) provides powerful evidence for this explanation by showing that
African-Americans in descriptively represented districts are significantly more knowledgeable about their representatives.

A final argument for encouraging women’s candidacies is based on equality of opportunity, or equal access to the national legislature, for all citizens. In other words, if the democratic process is to be truly democratic, then all groups, including women, should have an equal chance of running for office. Thus, if norms and rules are consistent for all, then women’s low levels of representation might be attributed to women’s lack of motivation or interest. However, if there are barriers to women’s parliamentary representation, then those barriers must be broken down to encourage women’s representation. Although the legal barriers to women’s participation have long been dismantled, this project examines some of the more subtle party norms and rules that historically inhibited women’s participation, and the institutional and political context that encourages women’s entrance into party politics.

**Overview of the Book**

This book uncovers the process of women’s increasing participation in party politics and parliamentary office. In chapter 2, I draw on party, institutional, and social movement theory to develop a new framework for explaining how and why parties incorporate new contenders. I will argue that parties are more likely to incorporate women when women’s organized strategy takes into account the institutional and political “opportunity structures” of both the party and the party system. To examine the timing of party change, I then tie the structure of opportunity into two analytical models of the sequence of party change, derived from the broad literature on comparative parties.

The second part of the book applies this theory to the systematic study of ten Western European nations. Previous research shows women’s power in top decision-making bodies within the party improves women’s opportunities in parliament (Caul, 1999). As women gain power within the party, they gain resources to pressure for further representation. Therefore, lobbying efforts from the top party ranks appear to be a powerful mechanism for increasing women’s parliamentary participation. But how do women rise to these positions of power within the party in the first place? Chapter 3 turns to the conditions under which women made the most progress inside the party hierarchy. The multivariate statistical analysis uncovers the party institutions that encourage women’s ascendance to the top ranks.

Candidate gender quotas spread across many parties in Western Europe in recent years; they signal a party’s commitment to women’s numerical representation. In chapter 4 I not only build upon and update previous studies to determine which parties are most likely to adopt quotas (Caul, 2001), but I
also discuss how quotas fit into the process of change among parties, women in top-level party positions, and increases in women’s representation in parliament.

The third part of the book applies my theory in depth to three nations. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 investigate how women challenged parties and accessed parliament in Britain, Germany, and Finland, respectively. The data in these chapters are derived from extensive interviews and party records and materials in each nation, and from national election studies and Eurobarometer Surveys. In each case, I identify the conditions under which parties have intensified efforts to run women candidates for office, and where these candidacies translated into office holding. I assess the impact of electoral pressures, party competition, the party’s women’s organization, key women in party leadership positions, and party rule changes.

Broad similarities and differences make these nations ripe for comparison. All three offer capitalist economic systems that have undergone similar socioeconomic transformations in the postwar period, hold similar Western values, share long-standing democratic processes, and are members of the European Union. Importantly, all three witnessed a dramatic transformation in women's roles over the past fifty years. With rising economic affluence, restructuring of the labor force, and secularization, women have come to play a larger role in the public sphere, entering the workforce and institutions of higher education in unprecedented numbers. Yet at the same time, the three systems vary greatly. Their rich and unique histories and intricate governmental structures allow adequate variation to uncover the differences that underpin women’s distinct strategies and parties’ varying responses to women’s demands.

The final section of the book represents the culmination of the project’s efforts to explain the role of parties in increasing women’s presence across ten Western European parliaments. Chapter 8 presents a multivariate analysis based on party-level time series cross-sectional data, with observations for all national elections between 1975 and 1998. The most important factors identified in the previous chapters are combined with opportunity structure variables to model both the variation and change in women’s parliamentary presence across parties.

Finally, in chapter 9 I connect the case study and statistical findings, tying this evidence into the opportunity structure theory. This concluding chapter addresses how the case of women’s representation has broader implications for a unified theory of party adaptation to new demands, and for how new contenders can best press their claims for presence within the party and parliamentary office.
appendix a

List of Sources for Party Variables Used in the Study

1. Percentage women among the total of a party’s MPs and candidates were collected from Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1992) and from the published statistics from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (1997) and Women in Parliament 1945–1995: A World Statistical Survey. 1995. Geneva, Inter-Parliamentary Union.

2. Party types are taken from Lane and Ersson (1991).

3. Percentage of a party’s votes and seats in the election closest to but before 1975 through 1997 were collected from Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1992) and from the IPU website (www.ipu.org).

4. Percentage of women on the party’s national executive is collected from Katz and Mair (1992) and updated with data from Steinenger (2000) for Austria, and Gallagher (1998) for Ireland. Unpublished data was collected by party experts (Professor Paul Webb of the University of Sussex for the British Conservative Party, Karina Pedersen of the University of Copenhagen for the missing data on Danish parties), and from the parties themselves (Vera Claes from the Belgian Socialist Party, Thomas Hansen of the Norwegian Liberal Party, and Rachel McLean, National Women’s Officer for the British Labour Party).

5. Presence or absence of a party quota: Initially collected from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (1992; 1995), Katz and Mair (1992), and then checked against the case study chapters in Lovenduski and Norris (1993), and also with data collected from country experts by Professor Richard Matland, University of Houston. Where there were any discrepancies among the data sources, I relied on the knowledge of the country experts.
6. Indices of Old and New Left politics: From Laver and Hunt (1992), I have added together both elite and voter-level scores of ideology based for each of the following issue positions. For each issue, a party could be scored from one to twenty; the lower the scores, the further left the party position on the issue. (I have recoded the variables in the opposite direction so that the sign of the relationship is clearer.) The variables break down as follows.

Old Left is based upon the addition of scores on these two issues:

(a) leader and voter adjusted mean scores on increased services
(b) leader and voter adjusted mean scores on public ownership

New Left is based upon the addition of scores on these two issues:

(a) leader and voter adjusted mean scores on pro-permissive social policy vs. anti
(b) leader and voter adjusted mean scores on environment vs. growth

7. Index of party centralization: The measure of party centralization in the data analysis is taken from Lane and Ersson (1987). They call it the “index of programmatic orientation,” and it is a summary variable. Parties that require a higher degree of party integration and uniformity in adherence to the party’s program score higher on this measure (Lane and Ersson, 1991: 126).

8. Level of candidate nomination: 1 = nom. at low level, 2 = other levels. I have supplemented Lane and Ersson (1987) scores for this measure by filling in data for missing parties upon the same criteria. I relied upon three sources that describe candidate selection: Gallagher (1991), Gallagher and Marsh (1988), and Norris (1996).


Cross-national data on attitudinal support for the women’s movement, gender, and vote intention were collected from the Eurbarometer Studies. These data were acquired from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. The 1970–92 Cumulative Eurobarometer Study was supplemented with later data from the Eurobarometer 39.0 (ICPSR #6195), EB 39.4 (#6194), EB 42.0 (#2563), EB 43.1 (#6839), EB 44.1 (#6536), EB 44.3 (#2443), EB 40.0 (#6360), EB 43.1 (#6840), EB 44.0 (#6721), and EB 46.1 (#6940).

Variables on support for the women’s movement and vote intention were taken from the Eurobarometer 1975 (ICPSR# 7416), 1977 EB 8 (#7604), and 1983 EB 19 (#8152).

There are two Eurobarometer surveys in most years. Therefore, the average was taken from the two observations.

Data from Britain on gender and party vote choice were collected from the British Election Studies (BESIS). These data were acquired from the ICPSR, and were originally made available by the ESRC Archive at the University of Essex, England. The cumulative file was supplemented with the British General Election Cross Survey, 1997 (ICPSR #2615).

Data from Germany on gender and party vote choice were collected from the German Election Studies. These data were acquired from the Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung (ZA), University of Cologne, Germany.

Data from Finland on gender and party vote choice were collected from the Finnish Election Studies. These data were made available by the Finnish Social Science Data Archives at the University of Tampere.
Note to Chapter 1

1. The ten nations included in this book are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. See table 1.2 for a list of parties.

Note to Chapter 2

1. Although the focus of this book is on opportunity structures within political parties, it is important to mention Karen Beckwith’s (2003) application of the restructuring of opportunities at the state level to women’s “parliamentary presence” (as she so aptly titles this issue) in Britain, France, and the United States. Beckwith argues that as power has shifted up to supranational bodies, and down through devolution, women have recognized and used these new points of access to press for greater representation.

Notes to Chapter 3

1. Kunovich and Paxton (2003) find that the degree of women among the party elite affects women’s numerical representation in parliament only in nonproportional representation systems. Their tempered support for the importance of women among party decision makers likely results from their worldwide analysis and their focus on national-level patterns. Rather than examining women activists at the party level, the authors average the percentage of women party elites for all parties in the system.

2. The data is arranged first by nation, then by party, and then by year, providing a stacked series of observations for each party over time.
Notes to Chapter 4

1. Parties have adopted not only candidate quotas, but internal quotas, as well. Intraparty quotas aim to increase the number of women in high-level party positions. Some parties have set gender quotas for their national executives (e.g., the Irish Workers’ Party), and others have set quotas for their party conventions (e.g., the U.S. Democratic and Republican Parties). The quota system has been much more commonly used within party structures than for legislative elections (IPU, 1994). However, these quotas are an indirect way to increase women’s parliamentary representation. In addition, several parties with internal quotas have essentially created token positions for women within the party. Candidate quotas are more comparable because they are standard across parties. While internal party quotas are important on their own, we will concentrate on candidate quotas and targets in this research.

2. Surprisingly, these three sources differed in some cases. For example, while the IPU data indicate that the Norwegian Christian People’s Party has a 50% quota on women candidates, the Katz and Mair data indicate that there is no candidate quota at all. Because of the inconsistencies among sources, my coding decision was to register a quota where one source cites a quota, even if another source mentions nothing about it.

3. The number of parties analyzed in this chapter is ten higher than the fifty parties analyzed in the rest of the book. The reason is that data on the proportion of women MPs by party is not published for all parties, limiting the scope of other chapters. However, I was able to obtain data on the adoption of candidate gender quotas for a broader spectrum of parties. In particular, this chapter adds the Austrian Socialist Party; Belgian Francophone and Flemish Socialist Parties, Christian Social, and Flemish and Francophone Ecology Parties; Irish Progressive Democrats and Greens; Dutch Radical Political and Green Left; and Swedish Environmental Party.

4. In my earlier research on gender quotas (Caul, 2001), Italy was part of my analysis, but it is not included here. The quota analysis of this book significantly updates and expands my early research. The Italian party system suffered a major shake-up in the 1990s, rendering updated, consistent analysis all but impossible.

5. For policy analysis, the standard practice is to use discrete-time models, which treat the unit at risk at predefined times (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997). These models are estimable using logit, and the interpretation of the coefficients is only slightly different.

6. The estimates are based on the following EHA model: ADOP T_{i,t} = \Phi (b_1 \% Women MPs National Level 1975_{i,t} + b_2 \%Women MPs 1972 Party Level + b_3 \% Women Party Leadership 1975_{i,t} + b_4 Electoral System (District Magnitude)_{i,t} + b_5 Year Quotas First Adopted in Party System_{i,t} + b_6 Old Left Index_{i,t} + b_7 New Left Index_{i,t} + b_8 Level of Candidate Nomination_{i,t} + b_9 Index of Institutionalization_{i,t} + b_{10} Age of Party (Year Founded)_{i,t}). The conceptual dependent variable, ADOP T_{i,t}, is the probability that party i will adopt quotas in year t, given that the party has not adopted quotas prior to this point. It is measured by a series of zeros up to the year in which quotas are adopted (if at all). The symbol signifies the cumulative normal distribution of the function.

7. When the index of New Left politics is substituted for Old Politics, the overall model remains significant (log likelihood = 82.5, p = .001), and the coefficient yield-
ed by New Politics is comparable to that of Old (\(B = -.45, \text{Exp}(B) = .64, p = .02\)). Thus, for every point toward the left on the New Politics scale, a party is 26% more likely to adopt quotas.

8. Because they were established after 1972, the parties not included in the analysis presented on table 4.2 are the Greens in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden, and the Danish CD, the Finnish KOK, the Irish PD, the Italian DP, the Dutch CDA, and the Norwegian SV and Progress Parties.

9. The same analyses were also run for a larger set of parties by only examining the years 1982 to 1995. As such, parties established after 1972 and before 1982 are added to the dataset. The results are similar to those in the model in table 4.2. The year quotas were first adopted by a party in the party system, New Left values and electorally large parties are still found to be significant and strong indicators of the likelihood a party will adopt quotas or targets. By limiting the time frame most Green parties are included in the analysis, the number of parties increases to fifty-eight, and 57% of the cases score as adopting quotas or targets. Further, the -2 (log-likelihood ratio) is 142.35 and is significant.

10. The transformation of the logit coefficient (raising the number \(e\) to the \(B\) power), displayed under the label “Exp(\(B\)),” is the change in the hazard rate for a unit increase in the particular covariate. To find the percentage change as a function of a one-unit increase in the variable, one is subtracted from \(\text{exp}(B)\) and the difference is multiplied by 100. For dichotomous variables, this is called the “relative risk,” and it is the ratio of the estimated hazard for a case with the characteristic of interest to the case without that characteristic.

11. Parties other than the Greens that score highly in terms of their concern for New Left values are the Danish Socialist People’s Party and the Social Democrats; the Finnish People’s Democratic Party; the Irish Labour Party; the Italian Progressive Democrats, Communists, and Radical Party; the Dutch Communists, Labour, Pacifist Socialist, Radical Political, and Democrats 66; the Swedish Communist Party; and the British Liberal Democrats.

12. Further evidence for this 20% threshold is in Thomas (1991; 1994), who finds that when women constitute 20% of the legislature in the United States, the legislature is more likely to pass bills concerning women.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. Unhappy with Labour’s centrist drift, a faction of the party had broken away in 1981 and formed the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The SDP formed an electoral alliance with the Liberal Party, and those two parties finally merged to form the Liberal Democratic Party.

2. Data on gender and vote choice collected from the British Election Studies. See Appendix B for details.

3. Data on gender, support for the women’s movement, and partisan preferences were collected from the most comprehensive cross-national source possible in terms of availability over time—the Eurobarometer Studies. By using these studies it is possible to track gender and attitudinal differences in the vote for the entire period of this study, 1970 to 1997. The advantage of the Eurobarometer is its longitudinal breadth.
and consistency. Appendix B details the full list of the specific questions, variables, and studies that were used, and the archives from which these studies were obtained. The gender gap in partisan preference is measured using respondent vote intention.

4. Kaplan (1992) contends that “second wave” may be a misnomer in the case of the British and Scandinavian feminist movements, because women made continuous organized efforts to push for women’s rights.

**Notes to Chapter 6**

1. Known as the Greens in their entrance into the German system in the early 1980s, the party’s name changed in 1993 to Bündnis 90/Die Grünen after unification because of the merger of the West German Greens, the East German Greens, and an East German Civil Rights group called Alliance 90.

2. The Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) entered the united German party system in 1990. For continuity’s sake, the PDS is not analyzed here.

3. Data on gender and vote intention collected from German Election Studies. See Appendix B for details.

4. Data on gender, feminist values, and partisan preferences were collected from the Eurobarometer Studies. The advantage of the Eurobarometers is its longitudinal breadth and consistency. Appendix B details the full list of the specific questions, variables, and studies that were used, and the archives from which these studies were obtained. The gender gap in partisan preference is measured using respondent vote intention.

**Note to Chapter 7**

1. Data on gender and partisan preferences were collected from the Finnish election studies. Appendix B details the full list of the specific questions, variables, and studies that were used, and the archives from which these studies were obtained. The gender gap in partisan preference is measured using respondent vote intention.

**Notes to Chapter 8**

1. Feminist attitudes among a party’s constituency might be a more powerful indicator of the proportion of women in their parliamentary delegation, yet this variable cannot be tested in a multivariate model because the long-term, consistent measures of feminist attitudes are not available for six of our ten countries.

2. The data is arranged first by nation, then by party, and then by year, providing a stacked series of observations for each party over time.

3. The sample size and resulting degrees of freedom allow for the legitimate use of ordinary least squares regression (OLS). I used a variety of time-series, cross-sectional methods. These same models were run with the dependent variable as the level of women MPs with a lag on the explanatory side of the equation (as presented), and with the dependent variable transformed into a first-differences measure. With the first-differences method, the dependent variable, the proportion of women MPs, was transformed into a measure of change from one election to the next. Through this process, most of the national-level variation is removed. Importantly, the results are fairly con-
In each model, women on the national executive committee, the gender gap, and a centralized party structure are the most important indicators. However, the model that transforms the dependent variable to a measure of change explains little of the adjusted variance.

4. Data is not published for some parties in certain years. Therefore, a pairwise deletion of missing cases is used, so that these cases are not dropped entirely from the analysis. Because data is missing from the gender gap variable for four countries, Models 1a and 1b were also run without the measure of the gender gap in votes. The results are similar to those in which the variable is included. Women on the national executive is the strongest predictor, followed by the measures of centralization and candidate nomination.

5. Country dummy-variables are not included in Models 1a or 2a, because the explanatory variable that describes the electoral system (district magnitude) is a national-level variable and appears to act as a dummy-variable. For the full model (1a and 2a), SPSS automatically drops the electoral system variable when the model is run with country dummies. Therefore, I present a scaled-down model without the insignificant electoral system variable. Dummy-variables for each country (minus one) can be included in Models 1b and 2b. Two of these country dummies are significant (Denmark and Finland). When the same model is run without country dummy-variables, the results are similar. The first-differences model was also run with and without country dummy-variables, and with dummy-variables for each year, as well (fixed-effects model). The results are consistent: again, the national executive, the gender gap, and centralization emerge as the most important.

6. A lagged increase in the proportion of women on the party’s national executive is used in this model, because the theory indicates that women newly elected to top party positions pressure the party to increase women’s parliamentary representation. The results of this pressure will not be observable until the next election. When a simple difference measure from one election to the next is used in the multivariate model, the indicator is insignificant.

Notes to Chapter 10

1. Under the new electoral system (additional member, AMS), Scottish voters elect a representative in their constituency, and there are additional “top-up” seats that complement this by adding a dimension of proportionality.

2. The twinning strategy certainly would not work in the House of Commons. This mechanism is most appropriate to a body with many open seats. Because of the single-member district system and the incumbency advantage, there is little turnover among MPs. Thus, vacancies are few and widely dispersed across the country. It would be nearly impossible to match up open seats.


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REFERENCES


Page numbers in italics refer to tables or figures in the text.

Act of Equality Between Men and Women (Finland), 116
African-Americans, 15–16
Agrarian Party. See Center Party (Finland, KESK)
Albright, Madeline K., 1, 3
Alliance 90. See Greens (Germany, G)
“all-women shortlist” policy (UK, AWS), 81–83, 120–21, 144–47, 157
ASF (German SPD women’s organization), 92–94, 99–100, 150
Association of Liberal Women (Germany), 95
Association 9 (Finland), 109
Australia, 3, 139
Austria, 3–4, 139. See also individual political parties
Baldez, Lisa, 25
Beckwith, Karen, 121, 123, 163n1 (ch. 2)
Belgium, 3–4, 138–39. See also individual political parties
Bergman, Solveig, 109
Berman, Sheri, 31–32
Blair, Cherie, 1
Blair, Tony, 1–2, 76, 82, 89
Bobo, Lawrence, 15
Brandt, Wily, 92, 99
Bratton, Kathleen A., 14
Britain. See United Kingdom (UK)
Brooks, Rachel, 80–81
Brown, Alice, 141–42
Canada, 3, 24, 139–40
candidate development, 9–10, 29, 77–79, 83, 151
candidate gender quotas. See gender quotas
Carmines, Edward, 32
Caul, Miki, 119–20
Center Democrats (Denmark, CD), 6, 43, 51
Center Party (Finland, KESK), 6, 13, 43, 51, 106, 112–13, 152–53
Center Party (Norway, SP), 7, 44, 52
Center Party (Sweden, C), 7, 52
centralized party structures, 28, 34, 38; gender quotas and, 35, 56, 133; NEC composition and, 46–47, 49, 120; parliamentary presence and, 125–27, 133–34
Charlot, M., 72
Childs, Sarah, 147
Christian Democratic Union (Germany, CDU), 88; gender quotas and, 13, 51, 53, 101, 131, 148; NEC composition of, 43, 96–98, 149–50; party competition and, 91–92; voting patterns and,
INDEX

89, 98, 130; women MPs from, 6, 86–87, 148; women’s organizations in, 96–97, 119, 131
Christian Democrats (Netherlands, CDA), 7, 44, 52
Christian People’s Party (Belgium, CVP), 6, 43, 51, 53
Christian People’s Party (Denmark, KRF), 6, 43, 51
Christian People’s Party (Norway, KRF), 7, 44, 52, 164n2
Christian Social Party (Belgium, PSC), 51
Christian Social Union (Germany, CSU), 88; gender quotas and, 51, 148; NEC composition of, 43, 96; voting patterns and, 98; women MPs from, 6, 86, 148
Clark, Janet, 122
Clemens, Clay, 150
Cloward, Richard, 21
Comer, John, 15
Commission for Equality (Germany), 92–94
Communist Party (Italy), 165n11
Communist Party (Netherlands, CPN), 7–8, 44, 52, 165n11
Communist Party (Sweden, VPK), 7, 52, 165n11
competition. See party competition
Conover, Pamela Johnston, 70
conservative parties, 8–9, 56. See also rightist parties
Conservative Party (Denmark, KF), 6, 24, 43, 51
Conservative Party (Finland), See National Coalition Party (Finland, KOK)
Conservative Party (Norway, H), 7, 24, 44, 52
Conservative Party (Scotland), 142
Conservative Party (UK), 68–69; gender quotas and, 13, 52, 79, 83–84, 157; NEC composition of, 13, 77–79; training programs of, 9–10, 78, 83; voting patterns and, 70, 75; women MPs from, 7, 146; women’s organizations in, 78
Conservative Party (Wales), 143
Conservative Women’s National Committee (UK, CWNC), 78
contagion theory, 24, 54–55, 61, 66
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN), 23, 144
Council for Equality (Finland), 110, 115–16, 153
Cowley, Phillip, 147
“critical mass” theory, 41, 54, 63
Czudnowski, Moshe M., 5, 29, 57
Dahlerup, Drude, 108, 110
Darcy, R., 121, 122, 123
Dauphin, Sandrine, 154
Davis, Rebecca Howard, 55
decision-making bodies. See national executive committees
Democratic Party (U.S.), 21, 25–26, 31, 164n1
Democrats ’66 (Netherlands, D’66), 7, 44, 52, 165n11
Denmark, 3, 53, 139–40. See also individual political parties
deVaus, David, 22
Downs, Anthony, 32
Duverger, Maurice, 29, 54
Eagle, Angela, 80–81
East Germany. See Germany
Ecology Party (Flemish) (Belgium, AGA), 51
Ecology Party (Francophone) (Belgium), 51
electoral systems, 27, 121–23; district magnitude in, 5, 53–55, 122, 125; in Finland, 105–6, 116–17, 122, 132, 157; “first past the post” type, 68; in France, 155; gender quotas and, 55, 121; in Germany, 4, 22, 88, 121; incumbents and, 27, 122; instability and, 21–23, 35, 134; “mixed-member proportional (MMP)” type, 88; “party list proportional representation (PR)” type, 4–5, 27, 35, 37–38, 55, 122, 127; “responsible party model” type,
INDEX

68; “single-member district plurality”
type, 4–5, 27, 37–38, 55, 81, 122;
third parties in, 27; “twinning” in,
142–43; in UK, 22, 68, 73, 81, 121
elite-led change, 30–33, 126, 157–58
Emily’s List UK, 77
Environmental Party (Sweden, MP), 52
Epstein, Leon, 28, 30
equality. See gender equality attitudes
Equality Act (Finland), 115
Eurobarometer studies, 11, 165n3, 166n4
(ch. 6)
European Union, 144–45, 154
event history analysis, 58–61
Federal Women’s Council (Germany,
Greens), 98
feminism. See women’s movement
Fianna Fail (Ireland, FF), 7, 44, 52
Fine Gael (Ireland, FG), 7, 44, 52
Finland, 12–13, 17, 103–17, 131–32;
electoral system of, 105–6, 116–17,
122, 132, 157; gender quotas in, 13,
51, 53, 114–16, 157; issues agendas
in, 109, 111; party competition in,
108; party power organization in, 13,
41, 108–14, 111–14; political back-
ground of, 105–6; voting patterns in,
107, 114; women MPs in, 3–4, 103–4,
106–7, 139–40, 152–53; women’s
movement in, 107–10, 116, 131. See
also individual political parties
Finnish People’s Democratic League. See
People’s Democratic Party (Finland,
SKDL)
Flemish Greens (Belgium, AGA), 43
Flemish Socialist Party (Belgium, BSP),
43, 51
Follett, Barbara, 75, 77
France, 3, 24–25, 137, 139–40, 153–56
Franco Greens (Belgium, ECO), 43
Franco Socialists. See Socialist Party
(Francophone) (Belgium, PSB)
Frauenforderplan (Germany), 95
Frauenunion (Germany), 96–97
Free Democratic Party (Germany, FDP),
88; gender quotas and, 13, 51, 53,
100–101, 151; NEC composition of,
43, 94–96, 150–51; party competition
and, 91; women MPs from, 6, 86–87,
147–48, 150
Freedom Party (Austria, FPO), 6, 43, 51
fundraising assistance, 9, 77
Gay, Claudine, 15
Gelb, Joyce, 84
gender equality attitudes, 5, 12, 19, 33,
36–38; in Finland, 104–5, 115–16,
131–32, 153; in Germany, 86; in UK,
70
gender gap. See voting patterns
gender quotas, 9, 12–13, 16–17, 50–66,
125, 127, 156–57; data analysis of,
57–65; electoral systems and, 55, 121;
in Finland, 13, 51, 53, 114–16, 157; in
France, 25, 153–56; in Germany, 13,
50–51, 53, 99–101, 131, 148, 151,
157; NEC composition and, 47–49,
60–63, 65–66, 75, 133; party change
and, 35, 61–65; party competition and,
25, 38, 55, 61, 66; party ideology and,
35, 56, 60–61, 66, 121, 127, 134;
party structure and, 35, 38, 55, 56–57,
120–21, 133; in UK, 13, 47, 52–53,
75, 79–84, 120–21, 131, 137, 144–47;
year of adoption of, 60–61
German Women’s Council, 87
Germany, 12–13, 17, 85–102, 130–31;
electoral system of, 4, 22, 88, 121;
gender quotas in, 13, 50–51, 53,
99–101, 131, 148, 151, 157; issues
agendas in, 87–88; party competition
in, 91–92, 119; party power reorgani-
zation in, 13, 25, 42–43, 85, 92–99,
149–51; political background of, 88;
unification of, 86–88; voting patterns
in, 89, 98, 119, 130, 149; women MPs
in, 3–4, 85–87, 89–91, 137, 139–40,
147–51; women’s movement in,
87–88, 90–91, 93, 108, 131. See also
individual political parties
Gilliam, Frank, 15
Gould, Joyce, 74
Greece, 3, 139–40
INDEX

Green Left Party (Netherlands, GL), 52
Green Party (Finland, VIHR), 106, 108, 114, 152–53
Green Party (France), 24, 154
Greens (Austria, GA), 6, 8, 51
Greens (Flemish) (Belgium, AGA), 43
Greens (Francophone) (Belgium, AGA), 43
Greens (Germany, G), 88; gender quotas and, 13, 50–51, 55, 99, 101, 151; mentoring programs in, 151; NEC composition of, 43, 98–99; voting patterns and, 91; women MPs from, 6, 89–91, 147–48, 151
Greens (Ireland, G), 52
Haavio-Mannila, Elina, 112
Hall, Jane, 85
Hampton, Mary N., 98
Harmel, Robert, 24, 31, 46
Harris, Evan, 146–47
Harvey, Anna L., 25
Hayes, Bernadette C., 70
High-Pippert, Angela, 15
Hofmann, Elfriede, 92
Iceland, 3, 139
identification, party, 70
ideology, 8–9, 12–13; gender quotas and, 56, 60–61, 66, 121, 127, 134; NEC composition and, 45–46, 48–49, 66, 121, 127, 134; party change and, 29, 33–34, 125. See also types of parties (e.g., leftist parties)
incumbents, 27, 122
Inglehart, Ron, 5, 22, 70
Inhetveen, Katharina, 157
institutionalized party structures, 29, 33, 38, 56
institutional opportunity structures, 26–29, 33, 38, 55–57, 120–23, 126–27; definition of, 20–21
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), 9, 11
Ireland, 3–4, 53, 55. See also individual political parties
Israel, 3, 139–40
issues agendas, 14–15, 18–19; in Finland, 109, 111; in Germany, 87–88; party competition and, 23–24; party power reorganization and, 25–26, 41, 134; in UK, 14, 72, 76
Italy, 3, 139, 164n4
Jäätteenmäki, Anneli, 152
Jackson, Jesse, 15
Janda, Kenneth, 31, 46
Japan, 3, 139–40
Jospin, Lionel, 155–56
Jowell, Tessa, 75
Kaplan, Gisela, 166n4 (ch. 5)
Katz, Richard, 164n2
Kinnock, Neil, 80
Kirchheimer, Otto, 30
Kitschelt, Herbert, 11, 20, 28, 29, 30, 44, 45, 89
Klausen, Jytte, 10
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, 18
Kohl, Helmut, 97, 98, 101, 131, 149
Kolinsky, Eva, 86, 96, 100–101
Kriesel, Hanspeter, 132
Krook, Mona Lena, 22–23, 24
Kunovich, Sheri, 5, 163n1 (ch. 3)
Labour Party (Ireland, LAB), 7–8, 44, 52, 165n11
Labour Party (Netherlands, PvdA), 7, 44, 52, 121, 165n11
Labour Party (Norway, DNA), 7–8, 44, 52
Labour Party (Scotland), 141–42
Labour Party (UK), 1–2, 68–69; gender quotas and, 13, 47, 52–53, 75, 79–83, 120–21, 145–46, 157; NEC composition of, 13, 67, 73–77, 131, 133; training programs of, 9, 77; voting patterns and, 69–71, 75–76, 130; women MPs from, 7, 70–71, 82, 123, 131, 144, 146; women’s organizations in, 73–74, 93, 119, 131
Labour Party (Wales), 143
Labour Women National Executive Committee (UK), 81
Labour Women’s Action Committee (UK, LWAC), 74, 78, 81, 93
Labour Women’s Network (UK, LWN), 76–77
Lawless, Jennifer, 15
leadership, party. See national executive committees
Left Alliance (Finland, VAS), 106
leftist parties, 8–9, 29, 45, 56; data analysis on, 59; gender quotas and, 35, 60–61, 121; issues agendas and, 18–19, 34; NEC composition and, 49, 66, 121; parliamentary presence and, 121; party competition and, 24. See also New Left parties
Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 155
Liberal Democratic Party (Scotland), 141–42
Liberal Democratic Party (UK), 7, 52, 68, 72–73, 83, 146–47, 157, 165n11
Liberal Democratic Party (Wales), 143
Liberal Party (Denmark, V), 6, 43, 51
Liberal Party (Germany). See Free Democratic Party (Germany, FDP)
Liberal Party (Norway, V), 7, 44, 52
Liberal Party (UK), 70, 72
Liberty (Flemish) (Belgium, PW), 6, 43, 51
Lijphart, Arend, 15
Lincoln, Deborah, 74
Lipponen, Paavo, 1
Lovenduski, Joni, 11, 46, 56, 75, 157
Luxembourg, 3, 139

Maier, Charles S., 10
Mair, Peter, 18, 164n2
Martiny, Anke, 100
Matland, Richard E., 24, 46–47, 54–56, 61
May, Teresa, 146
McAdam, Doug, 26
McAllister, Ian, 22, 41, 54, 83, 138–39
McKay, Joanna, 94, 148, 149, 151
McLean, Rachel, 74
mentoring programs. See training programs
Merkel, Angela, 149–50
Meth-Cohn, Delia, 28
Mexico, 25
Mintrom, Michael, 24

“More Opportunities for Women in the FDP” campaign (Germany), 95
“More Women in the Parliaments” campaign (Germany), 87
Mueller, Wolfgang, 25, 28, 30

National Assembly for Wales, 141, 143–44
National Coalition Party (Finland, KOK), 6, 13, 43, 51, 113–14, 152–53
National Democratic Institute (NDI), 2–3
national executive committees (NECs):
“critical mass” theory and, 41, 54, 63
National Party (Scotland), 142
National Women’s Charter (UK), 74–75
Netherlands, 3–4, 42, 44, 53, 139–40. See also individual political parties
Network of Women in Finland’s Parliament (NYTKIS), 110
New Left parties: data analysis on, 59; in Finland, 109; gender quotas and, 38, 134; issues agendas and, 18, 23–24, 34, 46, 61; NEC composition and, 133; parliamentary presence and, 121, 127; party change and, 125; party competition and, 24, 119, 127
“New Partnership” plan (Germany, CDU), 97
New Politics, 46, 49, 56, 59, 61
New Zealand, 3, 139
Norris, Pippa, 5, 11, 22, 46, 56, 70, 75, 157
North, Douglass, 27
INDEX

Northern Ireland, 141
Norway: gender quotas in, 50, 53, 57; issues agendas in, 14; party competition in, 24; party power reorganization in, 42, 44; women MPs in, 3, 139–40. See also individual political parties

“one-member one-vote” policy (UK, OMOV), 81

O’Regan, Valerie, 14

Pacifist Socialist Party (Netherlands, PSP), 7, 42, 44, 52, 165n11
Panebianco, Angelo, 28, 29, 40


party competition, 24–25, 134; in Finland, 108; gender quotas and, 25, 38, 55, 61, 66; in Germany, 91–92, 119; issues agendas and, 23–24; NEC composition and, 35; in UK, 72–73, 119, 157

Party of Democratic Socialism (Germany, PDS), 151, 166n2 (ch. 6)

party list proportional representation (PR electoral systems, 4–5, 27, 35, 37–38, 55, 122, 127

party organizations. See women’s party organizations

party structures, 28–29; centralized, 28, 34–35, 38, 46–47, 49, 56, 120, 125–27, 133–34; factionalized, 28, 33, 38, 49, 133–34; fractionalized, 47, 120–21; institutionalized, 29, 33, 38, 56; pragmatic, 47, 49, 121; size/age of, 56–57

Paxton, Pamela, 2, 5, 163n1 (ch. 3)

People’s Democratic Party (Finland, SKDL), 6, 8, 43, 51, 165n11

People’s Party (Austria, OVP), 6, 43, 51, 53

People’s Party (FP, Sweden), 7, 52

People’s Party (Netherlands, WD), 7, 44, 52

People’s Union (Belgium, VU), 6, 43, 51

Phillips, Anne, 13

Phillips, Vicky, 74

Pitkin, Hannah, 13

Piven, Frances Fox, 21

Plaid Cymru (Wales), 143

Plan for the Advancement of Women (Germany), 95

policy entrepreneurs, 57

political opportunity structures, 20–26, 33, 54–55, 119–20, 126; definition of, 20–21

political parties, 10–11; data analysis of, 47–49, 57–65, 123–26; data sources on, 17, 159–61; event history analysis and, 58–61; methodological approach to, 11–13. See also individual parties

Portugal, 3, 139

pragmatism, party, 47, 49, 121

Praud, Jocelyne, 154

Price, Val, 77

Progressive Democrats (Ireland, PD), 44, 52

Progressive Democrats (Italy), 165n11

Progress Party (Denmark, KRP), 6, 24, 42–43, 51

Progress Party (Norway, FRP), 7–8, 24, 42, 44, 52

quotas. See gender quotas

Radical Party (Italy), 165n11
INDEX

Radical Political Party (PPR, Netherlands), 52, 165n11
Ray, Leonard P., 14
recruitment. See candidate development
religion. See social divisions
religious parties, 8–9
Republican Party (U.S.), 14, 25–26, 31, 164n1
“responsible party model” electoral system, 68
Richardson, Jo, 74
rightist parties, 18, 24, 35, 45. See also conservative parties
Right Party (Sweden, M), 7, 52
Riker, William H., 32
Rohrschneider, Robert, 18–19, 24, 47
Ruddock, Joan, 144, 145
Rueschemeyer, Marilyn, 94
Rule, Wilma, 45, 122
rules, party. See gender quotas
rural parties, 8–9
Russell, Meg, 74, 76, 142, 144
Sanbonmatsu, Kira, 25
Schroeder, Gerhard, 89
Schwartz, Nancy L., 15
Scotland, 141–42
Scottish Women’s Co-ordination Group, 141
Selwyn Lloyd Report, 77
Sex Discrimination Act (UK), 82, 142, 144
Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act (UK, 2002), 137, 145–46
Short, Clare, 74–76, 80–81
single-member district plurality electoral systems, 4–5, 27, 37–38, 55, 81, 122
single-transferable vote systems (STVs), 55
Skjeie, Hege, 14
Smith, Gordon, 18
Smith, John, 80
social class. See social divisions
Social Democratic Party (Finland, SDP), 106; gender quotas and, 13, 51, 115; NEC composition of, 43, 111–12; women MPs from, 6, 152–53;
women’s organizations in, 111, 119
Social Democratic Party (Germany, SPD), 88, 121; gender quotas and, 13, 50–51, 99–101, 131, 150; NEC composition of, 13, 43, 92–94; party competition and, 91; voting patterns and, 89, 91, 130; women MPs from, 6, 86–87, 89–90, 147–48; women’s organizations in, 92–94, 99–100, 119, 131, 150
Social Democratic Party (UK, SDP), 72, 83, 165n1
Social Democrats (Denmark, SD), 6, 43, 51, 165n1
Social Democrat Worker Party (Sweden, S), 7, 52
social divisions, 18, 21, 46, 69, 89, 135–36
socialist parties. See leftist parties
Socialist Party (Austria, SPO), 6, 25, 43, 51
Socialist Party (France, PS), 154–56
Socialist Party (Francophone) (Belgium, PSB), 43, 51
Socialist People’s (Denmark, SF), 6, 43, 51, 165n1
Socialist People’s Party (Norway, SV), 7, 44, 52
Social Liberals (Denmark, RV), 6, 43, 51
societal change, 30–31, 33, 36–37, 132–34
Spain, 3, 138–39, 140
Steinmo, Sven, 26
Stimson, James, 32
Stoiber, Edmund, 149
Sundberg, Jan, 114
Sussmuth, Rita, 98
Svensand, Lars, 24
Sweden, 3, 22–23, 53, 139–40. See also individual political parties
Swedish People’s Party (Finland, SFP), 6, 43, 51
Switzerland, 3, 139
“talent spotting,” 79, 83
INDEX

Tarrow, Sidney, 20, 21, 26
Tate, Katherine, 15
Thomas, Sue, 165n12
300 Group (UK), 78
Tories. See Conservative Party (UK)
trade unions, 69, 73, 81, 105, 111–12
training programs, 9–10, 77–78, 83, 151
True, Jacqui, 24
“twinning,” 142–43

ultra-right parties, 8–9
unions. See trade unions
United Kingdom (UK), 12–13, 17,
67–84; electoral system of, 22, 68, 73,
81, 121; gender quotas in, 13, 47,
52–53, 75, 79–84, 120–21, 131, 137,
144–47; issues agendas in, 14, 72, 76;
party competition in, 72–73, 119,
157; party power reorganization in,
13, 25, 73–79, 131; political back-
ground of, 68–69; voting patterns in,
69–71, 75–76, 119; women MPs in,
3–4, 67–68, 137, 139–47; women’s
movement in, 71–73, 108, 131. See
also individual political parties
United Nations, 23–24, 144
United States (U.S.): electoral instability
in, 21–22; issues agendas in, 14, 26;
party power reorganization in, 25–26;
women legislators in, 3–4, 122,
138–39, 140, 165n12; women’s move-
ment in, 70. See also individual politi-
cal parties
Uosukainen, Riita, 114

“Vote for Women” campaign (Germany),
87
voting patterns, 22, 33, 38, 125–26, 130;
in Finland, 107, 114; in Germany, 89,
98, 119, 130, 149; in UK, 69–71,
75–76, 119, 130
Wales, 141, 143–44
Wangnerud, Lena, 14–15
Welch, Susan, 73, 122
Weldon, Laurel, 109
Wilson, Frank, 26
“Winning Words” campaign (UK), 76,
79, 130
Wolbrecht, Christina, 25, 31
“Women Say Yes” campaign (Wales), 143
women’s equality. See gender equality
attitudes
Women’s Federation (Finland, KESK),
112
women’s movement, 19, 23, 31, 36–37,
45, 130–31; in Finland, 107–10,
116–117, 131; in France, 154; in Ger-
many, 87–88, 90–91, 93, 108, 131; in
UK, 71–73, 108, 131; in U.S., 70
women’s party organizations, 9, 37, 45,
48, 125–26; in Finland, 109–11, 119,
132; in Germany, 92–94, 96–97,
99–100, 119, 131, 150; in UK, 73–74,
78, 93, 119, 131
“Worcester Woman,” 76
Worker’s Party (Ireland, WP), 7–8, 44,
52, 164n1
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