The Presidential Agenda
Sources of Executive Influence in Congress

ROGER T. LAROCCA

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Columbus
Contents

List of Illustrations vii

Part I The Theoretical Problem of Presidential Agenda Setting in Congress
1. An Informational Theory of Presidential Agenda Setting 3
2. Game Theory and Presidential Agenda Setting 21
3. Public Addresses and the Legislative Programming Process 32
4. Draft Bills and the Legislative Clearance Process 47

Part II An Empirical Study of Presidential Agenda Setting in Congress
5. Redefining Congressional Agenda Setting 63
6. Presidential Agenda Setting in the House 87
7. Presidential Agenda Setting in the Senate 117
8. Information and Presidential Agenda Setting 142

Appendixes
A. Proof of Legislative Programming Equilibrium 149
B. Proof of Legislative Clearance Equilibrium 160
C. Tables of Comparative Characteristics of House and Senate Committees 165
D. The Linear Probability Model with Dichotomous Independent Variables 168
E. Indirect and Total Effects in Path Analysis 172
F. Tables of Regression Coefficients for Direct Effects on House Agenda 174
G. Tables of Regression Coefficients for Direct Effects on Senate Agenda 179

Notes 183
Bibliography 189
Index 199
Illustrations

Figures

FIGURE 2.1  Spatial representation of policies on spectrum allocation in 102nd Congress.  
FIGURE 2.2  Spatial representation of ideal points on two issue dimensions.  
FIGURE 2.3  Example of policy effects of veto in subgame perfect equilibrium.  
FIGURE 3.1  Configuration of ideal points and uncertainty on two issues in legislative programming.  
FIGURE 3.2  Chronology of the legislative programming stage game.  
FIGURE 3.3  Presidential preferences with respect to congressional preferences for Legislative Programming Equilibrium for $\delta = 3/4$ and $k = 1/4$.  
FIGURE 4.1  Configuration of ideal points on two issues in legislative clearance game.  
FIGURE 4.2  Conditions on $c_1$ and $p_2$ for existence of separating equilibrium when $\varpi_1 = \varpi_2 = 1$.  
FIGURE 4.3  Conditions on $\varpi_1$ and $\varpi_2$ for existence of separating equilibrium when $c_1 = p_2 = \frac{1}{4}$.  
FIGURE 5.1  The hierarchy and scope of CRS-LIV abortion-related issues in the 107th Congress.  
FIGURE 5.2  The complexity of bills and scope of issues as represented in the relationships between tables of a relational database.  
FIGURE 5.4  Paths of issues covered by House bills referred to House Commerce, 1979–2002.  
FIGURE 5.5  Legislative paths of all 7,879 bills introduced in the 103rd House and Senate.  
FIGURE 5.6  Legislative paths of all 7,468 issues covered by bills introduced in the 103rd House and Senate.
TABLES

TABLE 3.1 Legislative programming equilibrium strategies. 42
TABLE 4.1 Agenda-setting equilibrium messages, beliefs, and policies. 57
TABLE 5.1 Ratio of scope (number of bills) of presidential issues to scope of non-presidential issues, for both the State of the Union (SOTU) and presidential draft (draft) legislation. 66
Illustrations

| TABLE 5.2 | Misleading scenarios resulting from analysis of issues with different scopes. | 70 |
| TABLE 5.3 | The titles of 96th Congress bills from Figure 5.2 | 72 |
| TABLE 5.4 | The number of CRS-LIV issues in different stages of the legislative process among bills referred to the House Commerce Committee (number of bills in parentheses). | 73 |
| TABLE 5.5 | Percentage of all House Commerce bills and issues in major agenda stages, 1979–2002. | 74 |
| TABLE 5.6 | Average number of bills per legislative hearing in House Commerce, 1979–2002. | 81 |
| TABLE 6.1 | Predicted direct effects of president, committee leaders, and the Senate on stages of the House agenda. | 88 |
| TABLE 6.2 | Definition and measurement of independent variables for House Commerce models. | 91 |
| TABLE 6.3 | Statistically significant (p < .10) total effects from president, committee, and Senate on the House floor agenda for all issues covered by bills referred to House Commerce, 96th–107th. | 93 |
| TABLE 6.4 | Expected influence of issue characteristics on the House agenda | 94 |
| TABLE 6.5 | Statistically significant total effects from selected issue and contextual binary variables on the House floor agenda for all bills referred to House Commerce, 96th–107th. | 95 |
| TABLE 6.6 | Scope, complexity, and agenda consideration of issues from Carter’s State of the Union addresses to the 96th Congress. | 97 |
| TABLE 7.1 | House and Senate committee jurisdictions in 97th Congress. | 118 |
| TABLE 7.2 | Overlap in the issues covered by bills referred to House and Senate Commerce Committees, 96th–107th Congresses. | 119 |
| TABLE 7.3 | Statistically significant (p < .10) total effects from president, committee, and House on the Senate Commerce floor agenda, 96th–107th. | 126 |
| TABLE 7.4 | Number and origin of Senate issues referred to Senate Commerce, 96th–107th. | 127 |
| TABLE 7.5 | Statistically significant (p < .10) total effects from issue and contextual variables on the Senate Commerce floor agenda, 96th–107th. | 129 |
| TABLE 7.6 | Republican House and Senate candidate campaign agenda pledges. | 137 |
| TABLE C.1 | Comparative characteristics of House committees in the 103rd Congress. | 165 |
| TABLE C.2 | Comparative characteristics of Senate committees in the 103rd Congress. | 167 |
| TABLE F.1 | LPM Regression slopes (and t-statistics for White-Huber robust standard errors) for determinants of floor consideration of House Commerce Committee issues in the House. | 175 |
| TABLE F.2 | LPM Regression slopes (and t-statistics for White-Huber robust standard errors) for determinants of subcommittee markup of House Commerce Committee issues in the House. | 176 |
Illustrations

TABLE F.3  LPM Regression slopes (and t-statistics for White-Huber robust standard errors) for determinants of hearings of House Commerce Committee issues in the House. 177

TABLE F.4  LPM Regression slopes (and t-statistics for White-Huber robust standard errors) for determinants of committee leader sponsorship of House Commerce Committee issues in the House. 178

TABLE G.1  LPM Regression slopes (and t-statistics for White-Huber robust standard errors) for determinants of floor consideration of Senate Commerce Committee issues in the Senate. 179

TABLE G.2  LPM Regression slopes (and t-statistics for White-Huber robust standard errors) for determinants of committee markup of Senate Commerce Committee issues in the Senate. 180

TABLE G.3  LPM Regression slopes (and t-statistics for White-Huber robust standard errors) for determinants of committee hearings of Senate Commerce Committee issues in the Senate. 181

TABLE G.4  LPM Regression slopes (and t-statistics for White-Huber robust standard errors) for determinants of committee leader sponsorship of Senate Commerce Committee issues in the Senate. 182
PART I

The Theoretical Problem of Presidential Agenda Setting in Congress
An Informational Theory of Presidential Agenda Setting

Introduction

Clinton’s Plan for Health Care Reform in the 103rd Congress

In February 1993, President Bill Clinton announced in his first speech before a joint session of Congress that health care reform would be his administration’s top priority. Seven months later, in September, Clinton gave a speech before both chambers of Congress calling for a national health insurance program. In the wake of Clinton’s September speech, in which he offered a detailed proposal and its potent symbol, the Health Security Card, health care reform dominated the schedules of House legislators more than any single policy issue Congress had faced in more than a decade.

Health care reform was not a new issue. Universal health care legislation had been introduced in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1970s. Michigan Representative John D. Dingell Sr. introduced a national health insurance bill in 1943, and his son, House Commerce Committee chair John D. Dingell Jr., continued to introduce a national health insurance bill in each Congress of his half-century tenure in the House. Despite these tireless efforts by “one of the most powerful and effective committee chairman ever” (Barone, Ujifusa, and Cohen 1997), universal health care legislation never found its way out of Dingell Jr.’s committee in the House, let alone to a floor vote in either chamber (Rovner 1995). Not until a national health care plan became the president’s main focus in 1993 did Congress seriously consider it. Largely through his two televised addresses to Congress,
Clinton was able to raise the salience of the health care issue to the point where Congress was impelled to take action. A *Los Angeles Times* poll in June 1993 found that only 9% of survey respondents believed that health care was the “most important problem” facing the country, well behind the percentage who believed that the most important problem was the economy (20%) and also trailing those who mentioned the budget deficit (12%) and unemployment (10%). However, on September 25, only three days after Clinton’s address, a similar *Los Angeles Times* poll showed that health care was considered the most important problem by a larger percentage (16%) of survey respondents than any other problem. Clinton had seemingly raised the health care issue to be understood by many as the most important issue facing the country, and Congress responded by scheduling hearings and markups on the issue. Although no health care bill even reached a vote for final passage, Clinton succeeded in dominating the congressional agenda for several months.

**Bush’s Proposal for Radio Frequency Auctions in the 102nd Congress**

In 1991, President George H. W. Bush submitted draft legislation, H.R. 1407, to auction the use of a range of radio transmission frequencies that had been reserved for government use (*CQ Almanac* 1991, 157). Unlike the Clinton health care plan, Bush did not mention radio spectrum auctions in any of his State of the Union addresses. Interest in the auctions was confined largely to industry and economic specialists, and the issue remained unfamiliar to most voters. The House Democratic leadership and the powerful Commerce Committee chair, Dingell Jr., opposed the use of auctions instead of traditional lotteries because of a fear that competition would squeeze out minority-owned and other smaller broadcast companies.¹ In spite of both Democratic opposition and public unfamiliarity, the House Commerce Committee considered spectrum auctions in hearings and the Senate Commerce Committee marked up and reported a bill to the Senate floor that included auctions after Bush submitted his draft legislation.²

The argument for the economic efficiency of auctions is complex and would have proven more challenging than Clinton’s Health Security Card to explain to the broader public.³ Economists argued that some entrepreneurs had entered the traditional government lotteries with the sole intent of obtaining licenses and then later selling the licenses privately for a substantial profit, essentially pocketing as private profit what would otherwise have been collected as a public tax. Studies by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in the Department of Commerce showed that certain types of auctions could reduce the incentives for such profiteering, while delivering more efficient market-like prices for the licenses (e.g., National Telecommunications and Information
Administration 1991). Although Reagan and Bush had recommended auctioning the radio spectrum in their budget proposals to previous Congresses, in the 102nd Congress Bush submitted detailed draft legislation to implement the auctions (Allard 1993). Because of the complex and technical nature of spectrum auctions and the lack of public interest in them, it is unlikely that many members of Congress would have come to a full understanding of the benefits of auctions without the expertise provided by the administration’s proposal. In fact, once they understood the anticipated effects of auctions, some Democrats began to see that they could be used to add significant revenue for other programs and threw their support behind them. In particular, Dingell Jr., who had actually placed a provision prohibiting spectrum auctions in H.R. 2965 in the 101st Congress, was noted to have “seen the light” and the budgetary advantages of auctions by the end of the 102nd Congress (Mills 1993).

The president’s use of executive expertise in the form of draft legislation acts as an alternative mechanism to his major addresses for presidential influence on the congressional agenda and has received far less attention in political science research. Instead of raising public salience, the expertise in the president’s draft legislation can provide important new information to members of Congress that can alter their agenda decisions. This expertise is at the president’s disposal as the head of the enormous federal bureaucracy and its thousands of policy experts, like those of the NTIA. Through the legislative clearance process, the president has gained control over which departmental proposals are forwarded to Congress as draft legislation, and this has given presidents the opportunity to harness this expertise in order to influence the congressional agenda. In this book, I compare the president’s influence on the congressional agenda arising from the policy expertise in his draft legislation (i.e., the legislative clearance process) to the influence arising from the traditionally recognized presidential programming that takes place through his major addresses, and I show that the often-overlooked legislative clearance process frequently offers the president a more persistent and more effective influence on the congressional agenda.

The Puzzle of Presidential Agenda Setting

In the common textbook view, modern presidents are generally understood to be the chief agenda setter in Congress (e.g., Nelson 2002). The president, however, has no formal authority to compel Congress to consider his legislation. Although the Constitution requires the president to report to Congress on the state of the union and to recommend any legislation he finds “necessary and expedient,” the Constitution does not require Congress to consider the president’s recommendations. The president cannot even introduce a bill in Congress without getting a representative or senator to sponsor it. The only formal legislative power granted
Part I: The Theoretical Problem

to the president by the Constitution, the veto, is exercised at the end of the legislative process, after bills have been passed by both the House and Senate. So how are presidents able to influence the issues that are taken up by Congress at the very beginning of the legislative process? Despite recent scholarly attention to these questions, there is still no convincing argument for why Congress puts aside its own agenda priorities in order to work on the issues considered “necessary and expedient” by the president—particularly when the president and majorities in Congress are from different parties. This book looks for the source of this influence in the modern presidential functions of legislative programming, the promotion of issues in the president’s major speeches, and in legislative clearance, the submission of draft bills written by executive agencies to Capitol Hill.

Part I explores the theoretical question of why Congress defers to the president when the president has no formal power over its agenda. My research suggests that the president’s agenda-setting influence can arise from two informal powers: (1) the provision of information to voters through public addresses, which influences the way voters evaluate the agenda choices of Congress; and (2) the provision of information to Congress in draft bills from executive agencies regarding the policy consequences of different courses of legislative action. That is, the president is able to set the legislative agenda both because he has a more powerful ability than Congress to communicate information to voters and therefore to inform them of the optimal course of public policy for the nation, as Clinton did on health care policy, and because he has greater control than Congress over the vast policy expertise of executive agencies, like the NTIA expertise Bush employed to promote radio spectrum auctions.

Part II seeks to answer the empirical questions of how, to what extent, and in what stages of the legislative process does the president influence the congressional agenda? A sketch of the main results suggests that the president is able to use public appeals to influence a broad range of issues on the floor stage of agenda setting in the House, but only during the beginning of his term. However, the president is able to use executive policy expertise to influence committee stages (e.g., hearings and markups) in both the House and the Senate agendas throughout his term(s), but only for issues that are technical or relatively noncontroversial.

Defining Agenda Setting

Before developing my informational theory of agenda setting, I must first distinguish the two common meanings for “agenda setting” in the political science literature. Traditionally scholars who claim that the president sets Congress’s legislative agenda have meant that he decides the major legislative issues on which Congress works. More recently, formal theorists have defined agenda setting as the process of determining the specific voting order of alternative bills or amend-
ments within a single issue area (Romer and Rosenthal 1978). Though I also take a formal theoretic approach, I return to the traditional definition of agenda control as control over the issues under consideration, rather than control over the voting order of alternative bills on a given issue. By under consideration I mean those issues that are marked up in subcommittee or committee and those that reach the floor. I will also be less concerned with whether the president has influence over what bills ultimately pass than with whether he has influence over which issues Congress considers at these critical stages of the legislative process. This approach represents a departure from studying the effects of an actor with a formal authority to determine the agenda (e.g., Romer and Rosenthal 1978) and toward studying how an actor who has no such formal power still comes to exercise this kind of influence in practice.

Because the president has no specific formal powers over the congressional agenda, the problem of how he is nevertheless able to set the agenda has the potential for broad application to agenda-setting problems beyond those involving the president and Congress. In particular, it applies to situations where an agent has no formal control over an institution’s agenda and yet tries to use either outside pressure or expertise to influence the institution’s agenda. For example, this basic agenda-setting setup can also be used to model the efforts of interest groups and nongovernmental organizations to use both salience-raising activities and expert policy studies to influence the issues considered by policymaking bodies at the local, national, and international levels.

Theoretical Explanations for Presidential Agenda Setting

My informational theory of presidential agenda setting has been both informed by and developed in response to other influential models of agenda setting, including bounded rationality models and “going-public” models. I will discuss these briefly before presenting my own models.

Bounded Rationality Perspectives on Agenda Setting

The most influential model of congressional agenda setting has been the “garbage can” model that John Kingdon (1984) adapted from the bounded rationality models of organizations of Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972). Kingdon offered the garbage can model as an alternative to the bottom-up models of agenda setting, including rational choice approaches that suggested that agenda items rose to the congressional agenda after they had become salient in the general public. On the contrary, Kingdon finds that some issues, like deregulation, seemed to
rise on the agenda without broad public support and with plenty of entrenched opposition. He proposes instead that agenda setting is a mix of three separate processes: problem recognition, solution development, and political opportunity, and—most importantly—that each of these processes operates independently of the others. In other words, government bureaucrats developing policy solutions do not always coordinate their agenda with congressional leaders trying to address policy problems. Moreover, there is also unpredictability in the way these actors come into contact with each other, though they can also be brought together by a policy entrepreneur, who has a unique ability to match solutions with problems. In spite of the actions of policy entrepreneurs, Kingdon argues the agenda-setting process can be disorganized and unpredictable even when all individual actors behave rationally.

Although Kingdon employed the garbage can as an alternative to rational choice explanations, his political entrepreneurs behave similarly to strategic actors modeled by game theorists. These entrepreneurs anticipate conditions and the reactions of others in choosing their own actions to further their goals. It is not clear from Kingdon’s model, however, why policy experts and political decision makers in the model do not also behave strategically. In other words, why don’t the policy analysts look around for problems to solve, and why don’t they anticipate coming problems and try to develop expertise in advance? One could ask a similar question of the political decision makers. Why don’t they anticipate coming political conditions and figure out where to find the expertise needed to solve their pressing and future public policy problems? Both of these types of actors seem to behave unusually myopically, especially compared to the policy entrepreneurs.

As an explanation for this myopia, analysts who use the garbage can model and its extensions, like Kingdon (1984), Feldman (1989), and Baumgartner and Jones (1993), point to Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality critique of the rational actor model as too demanding of the informational processing capacities of human decision makers (Simon 1982). According to Simon, humans cannot analyze all possible strategies and they cannot even observe all of the information typically modeled in rational choice models. From this perspective, the real difference between Kingdon’s entrepreneurs and his other policy actors may be their information-processing capacity. Entrepreneurs may be able to act more strategically because they see more of the “big picture” in a given political situation than any other actor. Although Simon’s bounded rationality critique is compelling, it was developed before the advent of incomplete information models (Harsanyi 1973) in game theory, which offer a response to many of the important information limitations of human decision makers that Simon pointed out (Rubinstein 1998). Furthermore, a question remains about why policy entrepreneurs are free from this kind of myopia if bounded rationality is a feature of all human decision makers.
Feldman, in her 1989 study of policy experts, offers another reason why policy experts might look myopic from the perspective of the larger political agenda process. Intentionally or not, Feldman’s analysis suggests that much of the seeming myopia of bureaucratic policy analysts may stem from the restrictions of bureaucratic rules and procedures rather than a limitation in the expert’s own rational capacity. Her interviews suggest that bureaucrats continue to view their role as solving problems even when that rarely is the end result of their policy reports (Feldman 1989, 114). The frustration that analysts themselves feel when impelled to work in ways that take them away from addressing problems suggests that Kingdon’s decoupling of the solution and problem processes may be as much a question of institutional design as of the inherent myopia in policy analysts. Such institutional constraints could also be modeled within a rational choice framework without resort to imposing different levels of bounded rationality on different actors.

The garbage can model is further extended by Bryan D. Jones (1994), who claims that abrupt changes in the salience of issues in U.S. national politics occur because of changes in the issues to which voters give their attention rather than because of changes in voters’ actual preferences on those issues. In his model, political elites, like the president, are able to shift the focus of public attention from one issue to another, even if they are able to have little influence over public policy preferences on any given issue. Indeed, Jones shows that aggregate policy preferences are remarkably stable over time, and therefore changing preferences cannot explain more volatile changes in issue salience among the general public.

Jones also claims that voters face an overabundance, rather than a paucity, of information about policy. In his bounded rationality model of political change, a change in the agenda does not come about because of the provision of new information about policy. Instead, political change comes from attention shifts that are not necessarily governed by the laws of rationality. The overabundance of available information results in voters’ inability to decide which of this information to use in making their decisions.

Jones sets his model of agenda setting against rational choice models by claiming that attention shifts are governed by the laws of bounded rationality. That is, human beings are limited information processors and are typically only able to process information serially, or one issue at a time. Jones’s work, however, mixes elements of rational choice models within a bounded rationality framework. For Jones, once voters are focused on one salient issue area they are able to make policy choices within that issue dimension by the dictates of the spatial models of rational choice. In chapter 3, I present an alternative model of presidential agenda setting which suggests that even shifts in public attentiveness can be understood as a process of rational, albeit imperfect, decision making, and that the president can indeed provide information that influences these shifts.
The chief difference between my approach to agenda setting and garbage can approaches lies in modeling all political actors and voters as potentially strategic agents (i.e., like Kingdon’s policy entrepreneurs), who receive messages, whether from the president or mass media, skeptically rather than uncritically. In Jones’s model, for instance, voters may care about unemployment simply because it appears repeatedly in the news. A skeptical, rational choice voter, however, would only be concerned about the economy if such messages came from a news program she trusts.

The garbage can models fail to recognize that informational asymmetries can be a source of power if exploited by strategic agents. In the garbage can model, some actors acquire policy information that remains unobserved by others because of built-in human limits on information processing. However, in this model actors do not intentionally acquire such informational asymmetries in order to gain strategic advantages. A rational choice model of the informational asymmetries between policy analysts and policy decision makers can be used to examine whether either side has an interest in acquiring private information in order to exploit the other side’s ignorance for its own political advantage.

Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), for instance, explore how the policy expertise gained by the specialization of congressional committees allows them to get final bills biased in their favor compared to the median voter on the House floor. There is a strategic trade-off whereby the floor gives up some policy concessions to the committee in return for the policy expertise provided by the committee. The part of this that is missed by bounded rationality approaches is that committees actively cultivate informational advantages by specializing in order to gain this influence over the policies that are passed. In chapter 4, I will show that presidents since FDR have strategically cultivated such informational advantages over Congress in order to gain more influence in the policymaking process.

“Going Public” and the Congressional Agenda

Kernell (1993), in a widely influential study, *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership*, introduced an alternative model of agenda setting that is more directly aimed at understanding the president’s influence on Congress. Kernell argues that modern presidents have been forced to “go public” and lobby legislators indirectly through their constituents because they have lost the ability to bargain with congressional leaders “with promises of goods and services for their constituencies.” Instead of such bargaining, “if a large number of votes is needed, the most obvious and direct course is to go on prime-time television to solicit the public’s support” (Kernell 1993, 31). Miller (1993) and Canes-Wrone (2001) have brought the “going-public” argument within a more rigorous rational choice framework, arguing that the president’s ability
to “go public” can lead to his influence over legislative outcomes because the president’s speeches can shift the salience of issues and therefore alter the policy preferences of members of Congress. Canes-Wrone (2001) formalizes and enriches this argument in order to explain why the president does not therefore seek to go public on all issues.

Kernell’s going-public thesis assumes that the president will be able to stimulate the electorate in the district of the targeted member of Congress (hereafter MC). This either means that he can bring out voters in the district who would not normally vote or that he will provide new information to ordinary voters who will use it to update their beliefs about the ideal policy. Reagan sometimes made such appeals to voters explicit in his televised addresses: “I urge you to contact your Senators and congressmen. Tell them of your support for this bipartisan proposal” (quoted in Kernell 1993, 130). In the case where the president chooses to go public, then, an MC will presumably be forced to alter his legislative behavior to accord with the new ideal policy of the median voter in his district. If the MC does not alter his voting, he might be susceptible to defeat in the next election by a challenger who proposes a policy platform closer to the median constituent’s.

Gronke, Koch, and Wilson (2003) have recently found evidence that voters’ attitudes toward their representatives are indeed shaped by the representative’s support for the president. This electoral check provides the going-public thesis with an automatic enforcement mechanism. However, as an agenda-setting technique, going public may be too resource hungry to influence a large number of issues. Kernell (1993), for example, notes that Reagan was refused network television time in 1985 and 1986 after his addresses failed to attract enough viewers. Typically, the president will submit dozens of bills to Congress each session, but it is unlikely that the president can use the going-public strategy for more than a handful of these issues. Instead, Kernell claims, “The president finds the threat to go public frequently more attractive than the act” (Kernell 1993, 37).

There is some internal inconsistency, however, in Kernell’s claim that a president’s threat to go public is as effective as the act of going public. If the presidential threat is a promise to go public in order to make unresponsive incumbents susceptible to challengers closer to the induced ideal policy, then an MC who goes along with the president thereby insulates himself from such a challenge. However, since the president only threatens to go public in this circumstance, he has not actually induced the threatened changes in the constituency’s ideal policy. An MC who responded to the threat by updating his policy is thereby left with a policy that deviates from the unchanged median voter in his district. He has thereby opened himself up for a challenge from a candidate who places himself closer to the median’s still-unchanged ideal policy. Because of this, it is never in the interest of an incumbent to respond to the mere threat to go public. Going public is therefore only likely to serve as an agenda-setting tool on a more limited scale, i.e., when the president actually carries out the threat.
Canes-Wrone (2001) produces a more rigorous formalization of Kernell’s going-public model and offers an explanation of how the threat to go public may still sometimes be credible. But this model restricts attention to the policy choice on a single issue and does not consider the president’s ability to influence which issue is chosen by Congress. Although the choice among policy alternatives on a single issue is the more common meaning of “agenda setting” within the rational choice tradition (Romer and Rosenthal 1978), I seek to explain the more conventional and more fundamental type of agenda setting, the choice of which issues to address.

Like Kernell (1993), Miller (1993), and Canes-Wrone (2001), I adopt a rational choice framework and argue that when the president introduces his agenda items in his public addresses, he is able to raise the salience of issues that hold more potential utility for voters. But I also argue that the president’s success in raising the salience of issues is not automatic but depends on his credibility with voters.

An Informational Theory of Agenda Setting

Both the bounded rationality studies and the “going-public” argument present incomplete pictures of the president’s agenda-setting influence. Bounded rationality studies fail, for instance, to explain why only policy entrepreneurs seem to act in a strategically rational manner, anticipating the actions and reactions of other actors. It is not clear, for instance, why voters would not be strategic in responding to agenda-setting attempts by the president or the media. The going-public models fail to fully explain how the mere threat to go public can provide the president with influence over the choice of which issues Congress considers. I develop alternative models in which the president is able to influence the issues on the congressional agenda both by providing information to voters that is helpful in evaluating legislative behavior and by controlling information that is useful to Congress in its policymaking decisions. By providing information to voters through public addresses, the president is able to influence the way voters evaluate congressional behavior. By controlling the information of the federal bureaucracy through draft bills submitted to Congress, the president is able to provide expertise about policy consequences of different courses of legislative action and thus influence the issues Congress chooses to work on.

Avenues of Influence

Public addresses include those issues the president identifies as significant enough to include as a part of his legislative program (Cohen 1997; Rudalevige
Issues in executive draft legislation, by contrast, commonly include the issues that must be dealt with as a matter of course in the functioning and adapting of government as well as technical policy innovations proposed by executive departments (Neustadt 1954; Wayne 1978). Issues in the president’s public addresses are handled differently from legislative clearance issues because they are more important to the president and are often more contentious.

Public Addresses

When the president is referred to as the foremost agenda-setting influence in Congress, this is usually a claim about the issues raised by the president in his State of the Union addresses or in other key speeches, not by the many technical draft bills that are passed through the White House to Congress without public notice. Although elements of the president’s public program are also submitted to Congress in the form of draft legislation, high profile presidential agenda items are primarily promoted through public addresses. Barbara Sinclair’s (1995) assessment of Congress’s ability to set its own agenda suggests what type of effect the president’s speeches might be intended to have: “Agenda setting can be pursued through in-house activities intended to influence the legislative process directly and through external activities aimed at favorably shaping the environment in which legislative decision making takes place” (274–75). If the congressional leadership exercises agenda influence through direct control over the legislative process, then the president, who has little direct control, might exercise agenda influence by favorably shaping the public environment, e.g., influencing the expectations of voters with regard to legislative action. Therefore, the public nature of the president’s program is a key part of its influence, because by providing information to voters about the best course of legislative action, the president can influence the way voters evaluate the actions of their members of Congress.

Kernell (1993, 25) claims that the president can use public addresses to ensure passage of his proposals by Congress. Although this claim may overestimate the president’s influence because it essentially assumes the voters are automatically responsive to the president’s message, it is quite likely that by going public the president can inform voters of the urgency of policy issues he is addressing. To the extent that the voters agree with the president about which policies are pressing concerns, MCs seeking reelection have a greater incentive to consider the president’s policy issues, if not his particular proposals on these issues.

It is true that voters are sometimes ill-informed to make voting decisions during congressional elections because they observe the consequences of legislative action only over time and are therefore unsure of whether or not their representatives are making good policy decisions. It was difficult, for example, for voters
to determine whether the Medicare catastrophic illness coverage would improve health care at the time it was being considered in 1987 and 1988. It became very clear by 1989, however, that many voters regarded it as unnecessary or bad policy, and it was repealed before the 1990 midterm elections (Himelfarb 1995).

Nonetheless, the president can play a role in informing the voter through his public addresses. Cohen (1997) and Iyengar and Kinder (1987) have shown that the president can have a significant effect on which issues voters consider important. Recent studies (Cover 1985; Simon, Ostrom, and Marra 1991; Atkeson and Partin 1995; Gronke, Koch, and Wilson 2003) have also shown that the voters’ views of the president can affect their congressional vote. Attention to the president’s agenda thus arises naturally among MCs concerned with reelection.

I develop a formal model in chapter 3 in which the president serves as an agent for voters by providing them information, e.g., issue priorities that voters can then use to evaluate legislative behavior. I argue that the information the president provides to voters can indeed affect the electoral fate of MCs. In chapter 3, I will show that the president can influence the congressional agenda in this way even when he is able to convey only very coarse (i.e., imperfect) information to the voters. Finally, the formal model in chapter 3 suggests that in equilibrium with presidential agenda setting, Congress chooses legislative actions more in accord with national interests than it would choose in the absence of the president’s monitoring role. This occurs simply because the president’s issues are driven by his national constituency, whereas MCs would otherwise be inclined to turn to the more parochial interests of their individual constituencies.

My proposed model of this presidential influence in the public addresses model can be broken down into five steps:

1. The president observes private information about the most important policy issue for the nation.
2. The president announces to the public and Congress a request for legislation on this issue.
3. Congress hears the presidential message and decides whether to continue with its own priority issue or to work on the issue identified by the president.
4. Voters observe the policy issues considered by Congress and decide whether to reelect their MCs in the midterm election.
5. Voters observe their benefits (in hindsight) from policies proposed by the president and enacted by the first Congress and decide whether to reelect the president.

Again, my concern is with the president’s ability to influence the issues considered by Congress rather than the exact policy outcome on these issues. It turns out, however, that these concerns are intertwined. Both the choice of policy issue
by Congress and the message sent to voters by the president depend on the policy outcomes that can be passed on each issue. Nevertheless, the concern of the voters in this model is over which issue is made a legislative priority, because I assume that the voters cannot fully observe the benefits and problems of specific policies except in hindsight. The predictions of this model are tested on detailed, issue-level data on legislative activity in Congress in chapters 6 and 7.

**Legislative Clearance**

The president also exercises informal influence on the congressional agenda through a process called legislative clearance, whereby the White House sifts through legislative proposals of the federal agencies and departments, withholds those which are unimportant or objectionable to the president’s policy goals, and sends to Congress proposals that further White House objectives.

Through the legislative clearance process, created by FDR, the White House reviews all of these agency-drafted bills in the White House before they are forwarded to Congress to ensure that the proposals are consistent with White House goals. The clearance process thus allows the White House to control the policy expertise that is relayed from the executive agencies to congressional committees (Wayne 1978). Executive proposals that are approved by the legislative clearance process are sent on to Congress as draft legislation. These proposals incorporate the specialized information acquired by the agency or department. This information is useful to Congress in making its agenda choices, i.e., in its choice of which issue to consider. In chapter 4, I model the process by which the president can use policy expertise he channels from the bureaucracy to influence the congressional agenda.

My model accounts for the fact that Congress understands that the president’s policy goals are often different from its own, and observes that the information presented in the draft legislation will be biased in the direction of the president’s or executive agency’s preferred policy ends. If the president and Congress have identical policy goals, the president’s draft legislation can perfectly reveal the executive’s policy expertise about the consequences of the bill (Crawford and Sobel 1982). With divergent policy preferences, however, Congress will not know how much of the bill is informative about the likely policy consequences of the legislation and how much is biased by the president’s preferences. In these cases, Congress will not be able to fully trust the administration bill as a reliable means of achieving Congress’s goals. In response, Congress may hold hearings and markup on bills submitted by executive agencies rather than reporting them directly to the floor, in order to acquire further information about the topics of these bills.
When Congress holds hearings and markup sessions for issues submitted by the president, it can research and amend the legislation it is considering to counterbalance some of the bias in any executive-authored draft. In particular, it may call in executive branch officials and outside experts who are well informed on the issue. Despite these alternative sources of policy expertise, the president’s draft legislation may serve an informative role. For example, at the beginning of this chapter, I described how George H. W. Bush was able to use technical expertise in draft bills from the NTIA to put radio spectrum auctions on the agenda of the 102nd Congress. Though there are alternative sources of information, Congress has limited resources and cannot explore the consequences of all possible pieces of legislation. In choosing agenda items, Congress must estimate both the policy preferences of its constituents on an issue and the likely policy consequences of enacting a bill on that issue. The president’s drafts will be informative of the likely policy consequences of legislation on an issue, since draft legislation incorporates the expertise of the executive agencies. In the 102nd Congress, MCs began to see the unanticipated benefits of radio spectrum auctions after the submission of Bush’s draft bills and the issue was given serious consideration on the congressional agenda, particularly in the Senate. Congress must weigh its more certain understanding of the consequences of the president’s issues against the uncertain consequences of working on another issue that is uninformed by such expertise. Since the information contained in the president’s draft legislation can be somewhat informative as long as presidential and congressional policy preferences are not too far apart (Crawford and Sobel 1982), the president’s submission of draft legislation may have a significant positive effect on the probability that an issue reaches the congressional agenda or beyond.

Information the president provides to Congress can thus shape the value Congress places on different courses of legislative action, because it can reduce the risks involved in taking action on an issue on which Congress was not previously well informed. In chapter 4, I develop a formal model of legislative clearance which generalizes the basic one-dimensional Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) model of congressional delegation to the multidimensional context of presidential agenda setting. I will show that the president can exercise agenda-setting influence through the legislative clearance process, but that this influence can only be effective on issues where the president either holds a large advantage in expertise, like spectrum auctions, or where the president’s preferences are similar to Congress’s. Legislative clearance is thus expected to be most influential either on issues that are noncontroversial, generating little disagreement between Congress and the president, or on highly technical issues where the amount of the federal bureaucracy’s private information or policy expertise might be quite extensive relative to the difference in policy preferences between the president and Congress.
Chapter 1: An Informational Theory of Presidential Agenda Setting

Since the agenda setting that occurs through the expertise in executive draft legislation is expected to be most effective on noncontroversial or technical issues, it may have its greatest impact on that part of the congressional workload that involves matters of continuing concern or issues arising from previous legislative enactments, rather than on bold new policy initiatives where the president may be as uncertain as Congress. For example, large and complex laws, like the Social Security Act and the Clean Air Act, require constant updating by minor and sometimes major legislative amendments that draw little public attention and are often highly technical. Many of these amendments originate as draft bills in the legislative clearance process where the president can decide which ones to forward to Congress and which to hold back. Since this kind of influence is expected to persist throughout the president’s term, and since the “continuing agenda” makes up a large and growing part of the legislative agenda (C. Jones 1994), I argue that the president may ultimately exercise a greater overall influence on public policy through the persistent influence of his draft legislation on this continuing agenda rather than through setting the agenda for a handful of major legislative initiatives.

My proposed model of the legislative clearance process can be broken down into three steps:

1. The president observes the policy expertise gathered by an executive agency on a given policy issue.
2. The president decides whether to submit a draft bill that contains executive expertise on the issue.
3. Congress decides whether to act on its own priority issue with uncertainty about policy outcomes or on the president’s issue with more certainty about the final policy outcome.

This model looks like an adaptation of the standard Gilligan and Krebsiel (1987) setup for modeling the informational role of committees in the lawmaking process, but there are two important differences: the model involves the choice among multiple issues, i.e., agenda setting, as well as the choice of policy on one of these issues; and here it is the president who provides policy information, though he enjoys neither the proposal power nor the amendment power that is shared by congressional committees. The equilibrium solution to this model is presented in chapter 4, and it suggests that presidents can indeed harness such expertise to influence the issues under consideration but only under the conditions stated above: for issues that are either highly technical or noncontroversial. These predictions are tested on new issue-level data in chapters 6 and 7.
A New Issue-Level Analysis of Presidential Agenda Setting

Previous studies of presidential agenda setting have analyzed the president’s influence on enactments (Chamberlain 1946; Moe and Teel 1970; Goldsmith 1983; C. Jones 1994), proposals (Light 1991; Peterson 1990), bills (Edwards and Barrett 2000; Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997; Taylor 1998; Theriault 2002), and hearings (Edwards and Wood 1999; Flemming, Wood, and Bohte 1999). Aside from Light (1991) and Peterson (1990), none of these studies has been conducted at the level of analysis, policy issues, that is most appropriate for studying agenda setting. Issues provide a more suitable unit of analysis for examining agenda setting than bills because many bills cover the same issue and are substitute solutions for the same problem. A hearing on a single policy issue may involve half a dozen bills. And many bills are laid on the table at some stage of the legislative process in favor of a substitute on the same issue that advances further on the agenda. In this case, the issue advances on the agenda, but it is not apparent from looking at the original bill. Furthermore, many bills cover a multitude of issues, some of which may advance further and others which may stall.

Conducting analysis of the congressional agenda at the level of issues instead of bills provides a more accurate understanding of the agenda process, but issues are not as easy to analyze as bills because they are harder to identify and distinguish. As I explain in chapter 5, I employ relational database techniques to exploit the multidimensional nature of most bills and to construct a database of congressional activity with issues as the unit of analysis. This new relational database of congressional issue consideration allows me to directly study the issues as well as the bills on the congressional agenda, while still controlling for the valuable contextual variables associated with individual bills, like the number of sponsors, the main sponsor’s ideology, and whether the bill is multiply referred, and many others. What results is a completely new dataset on the legislative activities and characteristics of issues rather than bills, and it provides penetrating insight into the nature of the congressional agenda process.

I explore the implications of my informational models of presidential agenda setting with new highly detailed data on the legislative actions on all bills referred to the House and Senate Commerce Committees over twelve Congresses (1979–2002). My data probe into the inner workings of committees and subcommittees and allow me to construct an unprecedented and detailed examination of the forces shaping each stage of the agenda process from committee consideration to the floor in both the House and the Senate.

I also take into account the roles of important actors who are sometimes neglected in studies of presidential and congressional agenda setting and law making, like committee leaders and the Senate. And I analyze the effect of influential stages of the legislative agenda process that are sometimes overlooked,
such as “requests for executive comment” and floor consideration under “suspension of the rules.”

Finally, I use path-analytic statistical techniques to pinpoint the president’s direct effect on each distinct stage of the agenda process, as well as the indirect effects he exercises on these stages through his influence on other actors such as committee chairs and the other chamber. This means that I can separate the president’s direct influence on each agenda stage from any indirect influence that he exercises by working through important committee leaders or from the indirect influence he exercises in one chamber by setting the agenda of the other chamber.

Altogether, I construct a detailed and complex portrait of the president’s influence on the congressional agenda, including the methods of influence that are effective, what kinds of issues these methods influence, what stages of the agenda process the president influences, and at what points in his presidency these influences are effective.

Plan of the Book

As the subsequent chapters will demonstrate, much of the president’s influence over the congressional agenda arises from the role he plays in acquiring and providing information about the optimal direction of national public policy both to voters and to Congress.

Chapter 2 introduces the conceptual and technical tools of rational choice methodology that will be used to model the president’s agenda-setting influence. In particular, I introduce a two-dimensional spatial model that provides a very general representation of the problem of issue-level agenda setting. Chapter 3, “Public Addresses and the Legislative Programming Process,” develops a formal model of the president’s agenda-setting influence that arises from providing the voters with information about the most urgent policy issues facing the country. The president can exercise influence through this process even when the policy preferences of the president and Congress are opposed, but this influence is expected to disappear after the president’s first Congress.

Chapter 4, “Draft Bills and the Legislative Clearance Process,” develops a formal model of the presidential agenda-setting influence that arises from executive policy expertise. Executive policy expertise lends the president influence over the congressional agenda only when the executive has a large advantage in expertise or when the president and Congress share somewhat similar policy preferences, but the president can exercise this power throughout his term. Chapter 5, “Redefining Congressional Agenda Setting,” discusses the inadequa-
cies of studying bills to understand agenda setting and describes the advantages and disadvantages of the novel approach of studying the congressional agenda at the level of policy issues. Chapter 5 also describes the complex legislative process and the difficulty of determining when an issue is “on the agenda.” I analyze issue-level data to identify the three most important agenda stages in the agenda process in the House: hearings, markup, and floor. Chapter 6, “Presidential Agenda Setting in the House,” presents tests of the predictions of the formal models presented in chapters 3 and 4 using new data on the pre-floor action on all issues referred in the House Energy and Commerce Committee from 1979 through 2002. Chapter 7, “Presidential Agenda Setting in the Senate,” presents a model of the role of the Senate in presidential agenda setting and tests the predictions of this model using new data on the pre-floor action on all issues referred in the Senate Commerce Committee from 1979 through 2002. Chapter 8, “Information and Presidential Agenda Setting,” reviews the findings of the book, considers extensions of the argument, and discusses the political implications of the president’s agenda-setting power.
Notes to Chapter 1

1. Since 1981, the use of radio frequencies had been offered for a nominal license fee and allocated through a lottery. In return for nearly free use of the spectrum, broadcasters were expected to provide emergency broadcasting and other public services.

2. Although Bush’s spectrum auctions did not pass in the 102nd Congress, they were enacted in the 103rd Congress under Clinton.

3. Spectrum auctions were first proposed by economists Herzel (1951) and Coase (1959).

4. Reagan’s 1988–90 budget proposals included revenue from spectrum auctions, although Reagan did not submit separate draft legislation on the issue (Hazlett 1998). In the last months of Reagan’s last Congress (100th), Phil Gramm had introduced S. 2807 in the Senate and Don Ritter introduced H.R. 5166 in the House to implement spectrum auctions. Gramm reintroduced his Senate bill at the beginning of the 101st Congress as S. 170, but not in the 102nd.


6. For example, Fishel (1985); Huntington (1973); B. Jones (1994); Light (1991); Rohde (1991); Sinclair (1995); Sundquist (1981); Wayne (1978).

7. In his critique of Kingdon’s model, Gary Mucciaroni (1992) provides further evidence in the case of the 1986 tax reform that solutions can be linked more closely to problems than Kingdon suggests.

8. Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991), Popkin (1994), and Lupia and McCubbins (1998), among others, argue that poorly informed voters may still be able to make reasonable vote choices through the use of heuristics, and I argue that the president may provide one of the most powerful heuristics in their voting calculus, since he is the most visible actor in national politics.
Notes to Chapter 2

1. If there is a monopoly agenda setter, it will be able to achieve policies other than the median legislator’s by making take-it-or-leave-it policy choices to the floor that do not include the median’s position. In such cases, it is inappropriate to use the median voter theorem. In the House, although the Rules Committee can report closed rules prohibiting amendments, these rules must be adopted by majority vote, so it is still appropriate to use the median voter theorem to model the House.


3. In repeated interaction, however, it may be rational for the president to veto bills in order to build a reputation or in order to force Congress to rewrite a bill in a way that is more favorable to the president (Cameron 2000). Unfortunately, I must ignore such repeated-game concerns in the simple model I construct in this chapter. Nevertheless, veto threats offer very little agenda influence even in the repeated-game models of chapter 3.

Notes to Chapter 3

1. Technically, the ability of House committee and subcommittee chairs to schedule hearings and markups is subject to being overruled by a majority of the panel, but this rarely occurs.

2. Riker (1993) goes one step further and claims that an issue is salient if the voter uses it in her decision making. This suggests that another precondition of salience is that it orders preferences. An issue cannot be salient if the voter is indifferent between all outcomes. But by claiming that salient issues are those that voters use in their decision calculus, Riker assumes away the problem I would like to ask: how does salience affect vote choice?

3. Coherent preferences are defined to be both complete and transitive, as explained in chapter 2.

4. A discount factor less than 1 also helps represent the fact that the voter and her representatives do not expect to live forever in the infinitely repeated game.

Notes to Chapter 4


2. Congress’s ability to invite or subpoena experts from the federal bureaucracy to its hearings and to require special reports are less direct mechanisms for such access than the president’s control over all draft legislation written by the federal agencies, and modern presidents have maintained some control over these mechanisms, as I discuss in the next section.

3. Requests for executive comment are formal congressional requests for executive agency expertise and recommendations on a pending legislative bill.

4. Congress does have its own institutional sources of expertise, such as the Congres-
Notes

sional Budget Office and the General Accounting Office as well as lobbyists and interest
groups, but with more than one million civilian employees in the federal bureaucracy
(Light 1999) the executive generally holds an informational advantage.

5. “Cheap-talk” models involve signals that impose no direct cost or benefit to the
sender or receiver of such signals. The only way such signals can affect the welfare of
the agents who send and receive them is if the information conveyed in them leads to a
change in behavior that influences their welfare.

6. Another way to characterize agenda setting is as an ordering problem where Con-
gress may take more than one action, i.e., send more than one bill to the president for
approval, but it may not take all possible actions at once (Cox and McCubbins 1993). This
ordering decision becomes an agenda problem with the introduction of time discounting
in repeated play so that actions chosen later will result in lower payoffs than they would
if chosen in the present period, thus forcing the scheduler to prioritize actions.

7. Another way for the president to affect the outcome is through the use of the veto
or the threat of the veto. The president would only veto Congress’s ideal policy if it were
further from the president’s ideal policy than the status quo is. The veto plays a very
limited role in restricting the conditions under which legislative clearance can influence
the congressional agenda, as shown in the proof of the legislative clearance equilibrium
in Appendix B.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. The other key House committee, Energy and Commerce, however, failed to even
bring a bill to markup, because chair John Dingell could not get enough supporters to
agree to report a bill from committee that would be acceptable to the president (CQ Alma-

2. However, the size of the discretionary budget, which is the subject of Canes-
Wrone’s studies, is a small fraction of the total federal budget, which is dominated by non-
discretionary items like entitlements and interest on the national debt (Schick 1995).

3. I can then also measure to some degree whether the scope exercises a moderating
influence on the president’s agenda power by introducing an interaction effect (Jaccard
and Turrisi 2003). Such tests show that there is no support for the idea that the president’s
effect on the agenda differs by the level of scope, once scope is controlled for.

4. The following analysis is of the House; I briefly look at the House and Senate
together at the end of this chapter. Unlike the House, the Senate has almost no restrictions
on nongermane amendments.

5. If committee markup adds nongermane amendments to a bill, these nongermane
amendments can be incorporated into a new “clean bill” in order to take advantage of the
fact that the original provisions of a bill are immune to the germaneness rule. But such
a clean bill must then be introduced in the House and referred back to the committee
(Oleszek 2001). This is not so in the more informal environment of the Senate, as I will
discuss in the chapter 7.

6. In figures 5.3 and 5.4, I exclude bills already passed in the Senate, which elicit a
different pattern to be shown in figures 5.5 and 5.6.

7. I consider committee and subcommittee actions that occur exclusively in House
Commerce. If a jointly referred bill reaches the floor after being reported from another committee, it is not available for floor consideration unless House Commerce also reports or discharges the bill.

8. What I call the textbook legislative process is that usually portrayed in introductory American politics textbooks and includes bill introduction, hearing, markup, floor consideration under a special rule, floor vote, consideration by the other chamber, and signing or vetoing by the president.

9. Oleszek does, however, consider requests for executive comment in his co-authored study of joint referrals (Davidson, Oleszek, and Kephart 1988).

10. I argue that the preferences of the administration rather than the agency matter here, since the administration controls to some degree the information provided by the agency in its comment, even if only indirectly as described by Neustadt (1954).

11. In investigative hearings, the committee may have to rely on executive officials as the only source of information, but it may request testimony under sworn oath, so that it can use sanctions to elicit more truthful testimony.

12. The Corrections Calendar was added in the 104th Congress, when an earlier calendar was eliminated. Neither of these calendars has played an important role in the congressional agenda.

Notes to Chapter 6

1. Exogenous or explanatory variables in figure 6.1 are those that have no causal arrows pointing to them. The levels of these variables are assumed to be set by forces other than those represented in the model. Variables that have causal arrows pointing to them are called endogenous because they are influenced by variables within the model.

2. The committee was called “Interstate and Foreign Commerce” in the 96th, “Energy and Commerce” from the 97th through the 103rd and from the 107th on, and “Commerce” from the 104th through the 106th, but I shall almost always refer to it as just the “House Commerce” Committee in order to avoid confusion.

3. In this case, statistical significance means that if we were able to take repeated independent and identically distributed samples of the same size in the hypothetical case where there is no association between the variables, then we would expect less than 10% of these samples to have effects (association) as large as they are in our actual sample.

4. Many of the Public Health Service bills that the House Commerce Committee deals with also have an educational dimension.

5. Before the 96th Congress, no bill could have more than 25 sponsors, so additional sponsors were added by introducing duplicate bills. This makes analysis of the agenda at the bill level misleading, but it also complicates analysis at the issue level because it changes the way that important control variables, like the party of the chief sponsor or the maximum number of sponsors, are measured.

6. “The Constitution gives me relevance. The power of our ideas gives me relevance. The record we have built up over the last two years and the things we’re trying to do to implement it, give it relevance. The President is relevant here, especially an activist President. And the fact that I am willing to work with the Republicans. The question is, are they willing to work with me?” (William J. Clinton, Presidential Press Conference, April 18, 1995).
Notes to Chapter 7

1. Only each chamber’s Foreign Affairs and Judiciary Committees received more television coverage.
3. The danger still exists that Congress could act on the issue the president indicates but offer legislation that is unacceptable to the president compared to the status quo. It is undeniable that sometimes Congress presents legislation to the president that it is confident he will veto. This was a conscious strategy of the Democratic leadership under Speaker James Wright in the 100th Congress. Similarly, the president also often requests action on policy issues, such as the line-item veto under Reagan and Bush, which he is confident that the Congress will not deliver. Such position taking can serve strategic purposes for both the president and Congress. The role of such “blame-game” legislation is ignored here for the purpose of analyzing the president’s influence on the congressional agenda. See Groseclose and McCarty (2001).
4. The role of conference committees in policy making is considered at length in Longley and Oleszek (1989) and treated formally in Tsebelis and Money (1997).
5. In figure 5.6, I plot all issues that were covered by all House bills referred to Senate Commerce rather than just those issues initiated by House bills.

Notes to Chapter 8

1. In particular, Reagan submitted H.R. 6720, “[a] bill to authorize the formation of a bank securities affiliate to deal in, underwrite and purchase government and municipal securities, to sponsor and manage investment companies and underwrite the securities thereof” in the 97th Congress; H.R. 3537, “[a] bill to authorize depository institution holding companies to engage in activities of a financial nature, insurance underwriting and brokerage, real estate development and brokerage, and certain securities activities,” in the 98th Congress; and H.R. 1603, “[a] bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to authorize the Securities and Exchange Commission to subject banks, associations, and other entities that exercise fiduciary powers, to the same regulations as broker-dealers” in the 99th Congress.
2. The model of draft legislation in chapter 4 also suggests that the informational advantage of the executive branch offers the president a more permanent influence over the congressional agenda than public addresses. While public addresses are only effective in a president’s early Congresses, the influence he exercises through draft legislation can persist through his last Congress.
3. Legislative organizations, such as the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Research Service, are essentially bicameral organizations that provide common resources to the House and Senate, offering some counterpoint to executive policy expertise.

Note to Appendix A

1. The payoff for each action is calculated to include all of the actions in the remaining periods of the infinite game, assuming the other actors play their equilibrium strate-
gies. I take advantage of a property of infinite sequences to simplify these infinite-period payoffs. The sum of an infinite sequence of terms like the discount factor $\delta^k$, where $0 < \delta < 1$ and $k = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, \infty$, is simply $1/(1-\delta)$ and the sum from $k = 1, 2, \ldots, \infty$ is $\delta/(1-\delta)$.

For sequences of numbers that occur only periodically, like presidents’ first Congresses, we can summarize for $k = 0, 4, \ldots, \infty$ in the case where all presidents serve two terms, yielding $1/(1-\delta^4)$, or for $k = 4, \ldots, \infty$ the sum is $\delta^4/(1-\delta^4)$. Non-presidential election years can be summarized simply by subtracting the sum for presidential election years from the sum for all years, e.g., $[\delta/(1-\delta)] - [\delta^5/(1-\delta^5)] = (\delta + \delta^5\delta)/(1-\delta^5)$. There will be variations on these sums depending on whether the president is reelected after two Congresses.

**Note to Appendix D**

1. Amundsen (1973) and Amemiya (1977) have also shown that if the LPM includes only dichotomous variables and all possible interactions among the independent variables, then it is the same as the maximum likelihood estimator, which means that it is guaranteed to be an ideal estimator for large samples.

**Note to Appendix E**

1. One may also calculate the direct effect of the president on the agenda in the previous example simply by omitting the committee leader control variable. The president’s total effect $\beta_1 + \alpha_1\beta_2$ is equal to the slope of a bivariate regression that does not “hold constant” the committee chair’s influence. This does indeed produce an unbiased estimate of the president’s total (direct + indirect) effect, but because the committee leader’s influence is absorbed in the error term (unexplained causes), this model has errors that are correlated with presidential agenda independent variables, a condition called “endogeneity,” which leads to invalid standard errors and statistical tests.
Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


196
Bibliography


Bibliography

Health Policy, 2d ed. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.


Index

abortion, 68–69, 71, 103, 105, 137
Achen, Christopher H., 70
acid rain, 103; as policy example, 25–26, 28–29
additively separable preferences, 27, 36, 39, 184n2
agenda setting, 22, 24, 37, 120, 152; definition of agenda problem, 6–7, 25–26, 52, 53, 185n6; nontrivial, 37, 44, 53, 56; trivial, 44, 53. See also “garbage can” model of agenda setting; “going public” presidential strategy; legislative clearance process; legislative programming process
AIDS, 106, 111
Aldrich, John H., 122
Allard, Nicholas W., 5
Amtrak, 103
Anderson, Gordon J., 169
appropriations, 49–50, 65
Atkeson, Lonna Rae, 14
authorization legislation, 91, 94–96, 128–29, 175–82
backwards induction, 28–30
Baker, Ross K., 120, 146
Barone, Michael, 3
Barrett, Andrew, 18, 64, 80, 148, 183n5
Baumgartner, Frank R., 8, 68–69, 80
bills as unit of analysis, 6–7, 18–19, 63–86, 147
Binder, Sarah A., 120
bioterrorism, 113–14
“blame-game” legislation, 187n3
Bohte, J., 18, 64–65, 80
Bond, Jon R., 148
bounded rationality, 7–10, 12
Brady, David W., 25, 122–24, 145–46, 187n2
Broder, David S., 64
Brody, Richard A., 183n8
Brown, William, 75, 79–80
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 34, 49
Budget Bureau, 34, 49–50. See also Office of Management and Budget
“Budget Circular A-19,” 34, 50
“Budget Circular 49,” 49
bureaucracy, 5, 12, 15–16, 48–49, 52, 55, 60, 87, 110, 114, 145, 146, 148, 184n2, 185n4
Bush, George H. W., 144, 187n3; influence on House agenda, 93, 104, 106–8; influence on Senate agenda, 126, 134–35; natural gas deregulation, 184n1; radio spectrum auctions, 4–6, 16, 21, 183n2
Bush, George W.: homeland security proposal, 39; influence on House agenda, 93, 108, 110, 113–14; influence on Senate agenda, 126, 139–40

199
calendar: Corrections, 82–83, 109, 186n12; Discharge, 82–83; House, 82–83; Private, 82; Union, 82
Cameron, Charles M., 22, 184n3
campaign finance reform, 99, 103, 110–13
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, 10–12, 35, 64–65, 183n5, 185n2
Carter, Jimmy, 39, 47, 55, 121, 143; deregulation of natural gas, 47; influence on House agenda, 92–93, 96–101, 104, 108–9, 115; influence on Senate agenda, 126, 130–31
Catastrophic health insurance, 14, 103, 105, 144
Caudill, Steven B., 169
Chamberlain, Lawrence, 18, 64
“cheap-talk,” 52, 56, 185n5
“Circular 336,” 50
“Circular 344,” 50
Clean Air Act, 17, 50, 102, 103, 106, 144
clean bill procedure, 185n5
Clean Water Act, 50, 104, 108, 111
Clinton, Bill, 45–46, 121, 183n2; health care reform, 3–4, 6, 39, 63–64, 66, 106, 143; influence on House agenda, 93, 106, 108–13, 114, 145; influence on Senate agenda, 126, 135–39
clothing of humans, 111, 112
closed rules. See special rules
closure, 121. See also filibuster
coeal, 97, 106
Coase, R. H., 183n3
Cohen, Jeffrey E., 13–14, 35
Cohen, M. D., 7
Cohen, Richard E., 3
coherent preferences, 25, 36, 184n3
collective goods, 45
committee chairs. See committee leaders
committee leaders, 18–19, 23, 35, 50, 142–43, 170, 172–73, 188n1; influence on House agenda, 33, 63, 75, 87–94, 96, 98, 100–4, 106, 111–12, 115–16, 175–78, 184n1; influence on Senate agenda, 126–28, 130–31, 133–35, 139–40, 142, 147, 179–82. See also Dingell, John D. Jr.; Waxman, Henry
complete and transitive preferences. See coherent preferences
complexity of a bill, 71–72, 86, 91, 96–97, 165–67, 175–82. See also scope of an issue conditional party models, 122–23
conference committees, 124, 187n4
Congressional Budget Office, 49, 184n4
Congressional Research Service (CRS), 68–69, 91, 187n3
Congressional Research Service Legislative Indexing Vocabulary (CRS-LIV), 68–70, 72–73, 77, 91–92, 94, 97–98, 147, 169
Conley, Patricia, 45–46, 144
customer protection, 71–72, 112, 118. See also liability
“continuing agenda,” 17, 115, 144, 147
“Contract with America,” 109, 137
Coolidge, Calvin, 49
Cooper, Rep. Jim, 63
cosponsors, 91, 94–96, 128–29, 175–82
Cover, Albert D., 14
Cox, Gary W., 185n6
Crawford, Vincent P., 15–16, 41, 52
crime, 137; environmental, 110, 112; juvenile, 110
Dahl, Robert, 45–46
Davidson, Roger H., 96, 186n9
Dawes, Charles G., 49
Deering, Christopher, 119
Department of Commerce, 4
Department of Energy (DOE), 54, 55, 118
Department of Health and Human Services, 144
deregulation, 7, 102; of buses, 103; of electric power industry, 112; of financial services industry, 144, 187n1; of natural gas, 47–48, 51–52, 54–56, 102–4, 184n1; of oil pipelines, 107; of railroads, 98, 103
Deschler, Lewis, 75
Dingell, Rep. John D. Jr., 3–5, 47, 185n1
Dion, Douglas, 120, 122
discharge of a bill from a committee, 23, 74, 76–78, 83–86, 186n7
discount factor, 38, 150, 184n4, 185n6, 188n1
divided government, 101, 105–6, 121–22, 126. See also unified government
Domestic Council, 50
Downs, Anthony, 25
Index

draft legislation from executive agencies.  
   See legislative clearance process

drug: enforcement, 106, 107; illegal drugs as 
   policy example, 36–38, 66; pharmaceuticals as policy example, 71–72; treatment, 
   106, 108

dynamic games, 28

ecological inference problem, 70–72

Economic Recovery Tax Act, 101

Edwards, George C., 18, 45, 64–65, 80, 148, 183n5

Eisenhower, Dwight, 35

Employment Act of 1946, 34

endogenous (explained) variables, 90, 99–100, 186n1

energy: alternative, 107, 113; conservation, 97–98, 107, 108, 113, 118

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 104, 107

environmental technologies, 108

   See also Nash equilibrium; Perfect Bayesian equilibrium; subgame perfect equilibrium

Evans, C. Lawrence, 119

Federal Communications Commission (FEC), 21

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), 104, 118

Feldman, Martha, 8–9

filibuster, 25, 120–25

Fishel, Jeff, 183n6

Fleisher, Richard, 148

Flemming, Roy B., 18, 64–65, 80

floor consideration, 3, 7, 15, 18, 23, 60, 64, 86, 142, 143, 145, 169, 172–73, 184n1, 186n8; defined, 82–83; in House, 6, 10, 20, 32, 52, 63, 73–78, 80, 82–84, 86, 186n7; influences on floor agenda in House, 88, 90, 92–97, 100–16, 175; influences on floor agenda in Senate, 120, 125–41, 179; in Senate, 4, 20, 21, 48, 84, 179


Galloway, George B., 146

Gallup poll, 36, 37

game theory, 8, 21–31, 55

“garbage can” model of agenda setting, 7–10

General Accounting Office, 185n4, 187n3

germaneness of amendments, 74, 120, 185n4, 185n5

Gilligan, Thomas W., 10, 16–17, 43, 52

Gilmour, Robert S., 47, 501, 144


Ginsburg, Benjamin, 122

“going public” presidential strategy, 7, 10–13

Goldberger, Arthur S., 170

Goldsmith, William M., 18, 64

Gramm, Rep. Phil, 183n4

gridlock region, 121–25.  
   See also “pivotal model”

gridlock theory.  
   See “pivotal model”

Gronke, Paul, 11, 14

Groseclose, Tim, 187n3

Harding, Warren G., 49

Harsanyi, J. C., 8

Hazlett, Thomas W., 183n4

health care, 3–4, 6, 14, 32–33, 37, 39, 63–64, 66–67, 69, 97, 98–99, 103, 107–9, 118–19, 143

health care vouchers, 103

health insurance: portability, 110, 111, 112; for uninsured, 112; for uninsured children, 112

health maintenance organizations, 102, 104

hearings, 4, 6, 16, 20, 21, 23, 48, 60, 63–65, 68, 72–78, 79–82, 84, 175–78, 184n1, 184n2, 186n8, 186n11; influences on issues in House hearings, 88–91, 93–94, 96–97, 100, 115–16; influences on issues in Senate hearings, 120, 129, 140–41, 146–48, 179–82; as unit of analysis, 18, 66–68, 147–48

Herron, M. C., 64–65

Herzel, Leo, 183n3

201
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. See regression
Himelfarb, Richard, 14
homeland security, 39, 113–14
hospital cost control, 69, 99
House Committee on Appropriations, 49–50, 165
House Committee on Commerce, 186n2. See also House Committee on also Energy and Commerce
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 3, 20, 21, 32, 33, 47, 73–78, 80–84, 87, 92–114, 175–78, 185n7, 186n2, 186n4
House Committee on House Administration, 75, 166
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 186n2. See also House Committee on Energy and Commerce
House Committee on Rules, 23, 166, 184n1
Huber, John, 170
Huntington, Samuel, 183n6
impeachment of Bill Clinton, 138
incomplete information models, 8; of the legislative programming process, 35–45; of the legislative clearance process, 51–60
incumbents, 11, 34, 41, 101
indirect effects, 19, 90, 92, 95–96, 100, 116, 126n, 131, 171–73
interest groups, 7, 22, 45, 48, 185n4. See also lobbyists
Internet, 98, 108, 109, 112; consumer protection in Internet prescription drug sales, 115
issues: definition, 24; major, 39–40; minor, 39–40; as unit of analysis, 64–86, 151–52
Iyengar, Shanto, 14
Jaccard, James, 185n3
Jeffords, Sen. Jim, 113, 139
Johnson, Haynes, 64
joint referral. See multiple referral
Jones, Bryan D., 8–10, 68–69, 80
Jones, Charles O., 17–18, 33, 50, 60, 64, 114–15, 142, 147–48, 183n5
jurisdiction of committees, 75, 94, 96, 98, 101–2, 109, 115, 118, 119, 132, 147;
common law, 98, 119; of Senate committees, 118, 119, 132
Kessel, John H., 35
Kinder, Donald R., 14
King, David C., 98, 101, 109, 119
Kingdon, John W., 7–10, 68, 147, 183n7
Kline, Rex, 173
Koch, Jeffrey, 11, 14
Krehbiel, Keith, 10, 16–17, 25, 43, 52, 121–23, 146, 187n2
Lacy, Dean, 184n2
Larocca, Roger T., 58
lay (bill) on table, 18, 65
laws. See legislative enactments
legislative clearance process, 5–6, 13, 15–17, 19, 22, 31, 43, 47–60, 142–45, 147–48, 187n2, 187n7; formal model, 51–60, 160–64; influence on House agenda, 93, 102, 106–16; influence on Senate agenda, 125–41
legislative enactments: as unit of analysis, 17–18, 50, 64, 75–78, 147–48
legislative programming process, 5–6, 13–15, 19, 24, 31, 32–44, 46, 50–51, 142–48, 187n2; formal model, 35–44, 149–59; influence on House agenda, 93, 102, 106–16; influence on Senate agenda, 125–41
legislative proposals: as unit of analysis, 18, 64–65
liability: medical, 108, 112; product, 107, 137
Light, Paul C., 18, 34–35, 44, 60, 64–65, 114, 142, 148, 183nn5–6, 185n4
linear probability model (LPM), 96, 99, 168–71
lobbyists, 48, 55, 99, 110, 185n4. See also interest groups
logit, 99, 168–71
Longley, Lawrence D., 119, 187n4
Lupia, Arthur, 183n8
Index

mandates, 45–46, 143–44
March, J. G., 7
markups, 4, 6, 16, 20, 23, 33, 38, 60, 63, 73–78, 81–82, 84–86, 147–48, 169–70, 172–73, 184n1, 185n5, 186n8; influences on issues in House markups, 88–91, 93–94, 96–97, 99–116, 175–78; influences on issues in Senate markups, 130–41, 179–82
Mayhew, David, 76, 105, 122
McCarty, Nolan, 187n3
McCombs, Maxwell, 36
McCubbins, Matthew D., 183n8, 185n6
McDermott, Rep. Jim, 63
McGovern-Fraser Commission, 51
Medicare and Medicaid, 103, 104, 111, 112, 113, 114; cap on spending, 32–33, 36–38; catastrophic illness coverage, 14; prescription drug coverage, 112
median voter theorem, 10–11, 21, 24–26, 30, 36, 44, 121, 123–24, 184n1
medical records privacy, 112
mental health, 106, 112
midterm election, 14, 40, 103, 153–57
Miller, Gary J., 10, 12, 35
Miller, George, 36
Miller, Jeffrey C., 48
Mills, Mike, 5, 21
mining: minerals in Antarctica, 109
modified rules. See special rules
Moe, Terry, 18, 64
Money, Jeannette, 187n4
money laundering, 113
monopoly agenda setter, 23, 46, 184n1
“most important problem.” See Gallup poll
Mucciaroni, Gary, 183n7
multiple (joint) referral, 18, 165–66, 167, 186n7, 186n9; influence on House agenda, 91, 94–96, 98, 110, 175–78; influence on Senate agenda, 128–29, 179–82
Munger, Michael C., 119
Nash equilibrium, 28
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), 4–6, 16
Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, 184n1
Nelson, Michael, 5
Neustadt, Richard, 13, 35, 49–50, 144, 186n10
Nixon, Richard, 50–51
nuclear power safety, 109
nuclear waste, 102, 106–7, 110
nursing home care, 112
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 47, 50. See also Budget Bureau
Oleszek, Walter J., 76, 83, 88, 94, 117, 119, 129, 185n5, 186n9, 187n4
Olsen, J. P., 7
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 101
parliamentarian in House, 75, 79
Partin, Randall W., 14
path analysis, 92, 94, 96, 99, 171, 172–73
“patients’ bill of rights,” 112, 113
Peake, Jeffrey, 18, 64, 80, 183n5
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, 28, 42, 56, 150–51, 161, 162
pesticides, 109, 111
Peterson, Mark A., 18, 48, 49, 64–65, 142, 183n5
pipeline safety, 110, 112
Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel, 45
“pivotal model,” 121–25, 146
policy entrepreneur, 8, 10, 12
political capital, 33, 60. See also presidential capital
political uncertainty, 48, 52, 86. See also programmatic uncertainty
pollution, 108; cleanup of toxic brownfields, 113; environmental crimes, 110, 112; Superfund toxic waste cleanup, 99, 103, 108, 111. See also Clean Air Act; Clean Water Act; Safe Drinking Water Act
Poole, Keith T., 68–69
Popkin, Samuel, 183n8
pork barrel spending, 40
presidential capital, 46, 60. See also political capital
private bills, 49, 128–30, 169, 179–82
probit. See logit
programmatic uncertainty, 48, 52–54, 60.
See also political uncertainty
Public Health Service Act, 144, 186n4

R², 100
radio frequency allocation, 4–6, 16, 21–25,
29, 48, 107, 108, 113, 145, 183n1,
183n2, 183n4
radio frequency lotteries, 4, 21–23, 183n1
radio spectrum auctions. See radio frequency
allocation
Ragsdale, Lyn, 144
rational agent, 25. See also strategic agent
rational choice, 7–12, 19
Reagan, Ronald W., 5, 11, 32–33, 40, 45,
144, 183n4, 187n3, 187n1; and deregula-
tion of natural gas, 47–48, 51, 103,
104; influence on House agenda, 92–93,
101–6, 115; influence on Senate agenda,
126, 131–34
reauthorization legislation. See authorization
legislation
regression, 89–90, 96, 100; controlling
for other variables, 18, 65, 89, 168,
170–71, 172; heteroskedasticity-robust
(White-Huber) standard errors, 99, 170,
175–82; House results, 175–78; interac-
tion effects, 128, 170, 185n3; ordinary
least squares (OLS), 99, 168–71; Senate
results, 179–82. See also linear prob-
ability model
relational database, 18, 71, 91
request for executive comment on a bill, 19,
49, 74–79, 86, 91, 93, 95, 126, 176–77,
180–81, 184n3, 186n9
restrictive rules. See special rules
Riker, William H., 184n2
Ritter, Rep. Don, 22, 183n4
Rohde, David W., 33, 122, 183n6
Romer, Thomas, 7, 12, 23
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (FDR), 10, 15,
34, 50
Rosenthal, Howard, 7, 12, 23, 68–69
Rovner, Julie, 3, 63–64
Rudalevige, Andrew, 13, 34, 51
Safe Drinking Water Act, 108, 109, 111
salience of issues, 4–5, 7, 9, 11–12, 33,
35–39, 48, 52, 66–67, 72, 87–98, 144,
157, 184n2
savings and loan crisis, 144
Schick, Allen, 64, 185n2
scope of an issue, 66, 69–72, 86, 91, 95–98,
165–67, 175–82, 185n3. See also com-
plexity of a bill
securities law, 106, 107, 118, 187n1
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 18, 20, 21, 73, 118–
20, 125–40, 167, 179–82, 187n5
Senate Committee on Environment and Pub-
lic Works, 99, 166
separating equilibrium, 43, 58–59
sequential referral. See multiple referral
“Seven More in ’94,” 137
Shaw, Donald, 36
Shefter, Martin, 122
Shively, W. Phillips, 70
Shotts, K. W., 64–65
signaling game, 53
Simon, Dennis M., 14
Simon, Herbert A., 8
Sinclair, Barbara, 13, 88, 117, 120, 126, 141,
146, 183n6
single-peaked utility function, 25
Smith, Steven S., 119–20
Sniderman, Paul, 183n8
Sobel, Joel, 15, 16, 41, 52
Social Security Act, 17, 112, 137, 144. See
also Medicare and Medicaid
spatial models, 9, 19, 21–22, 24, 26, 36, 120
Speaker of the House, 33, 75, 94, 105–6,
109, 129, 187n3. See also Wright, Rep.
James; Gingrich, Rep. Newt
special rules, 23, 52, 74, 76–78, 83, 86, 120,
184n1, 186n8
Spitzer, Robert J., 51
State of the Union address, 4–5, 13, 27,
on House agenda, 87–88, 90–92, 96–115,
143–44, 175–78; influence on Senate
agenda, 130–41, 179–82
statistical significance, 170, 173, 186n4
Stockman, David, 32

Index
Index

strategic agent, 8, 10, 12, 55, 143. See also rational agent
strategy: in legislative clearance game, 161; in legislative programming game, 150–51; in policymaking game with veto, 27–30, 42–43; stationary, 149–51
subcommittee chairs. See committee leaders subgame, 28
subgame perfect equilibrium, 28–30
Sundquist, James L., 33–34, 105, 122, 183n6
sunset laws, 97, 99
supermajoritarian procedures, 77, 120–25, 145. See also “pivotal model”
suspension of the rules, 19, 74, 76–78, 83, 120
synthetic fuels, 97, 99

task forces: Congressional, 109, 111, 145; presidential, 50
Taylor, Andrew J., 18, 64, 88, 148, 183n5
Teel, S. C., 18, 64
Tetlock, Philip E., 183n8
Theriault, Sean M., 18, 64, 183n5
THOMAS legislative database, 73, 82, 91–92, 94
Torrent, G. M., 119
trade agreements, 97, 106, 107
Truman, Harry, 34–35, 50
Tsebelis, George, 187n4
Turrisi, Robert, 185n3

Ujifusa, Grant, 3
unanimous consent procedure: in House, 76–78, 83; in Senate, 120
unified government, 100, 108–9, 115, 121–22, 134. See also divided government
utility function, 31, 36; definition, 24–27; in legislative clearance game, 54, 164; in legislative programming game, 38–40; in policymaking game with veto, 27; single-peaked, 25
USA PATRIOT Act, 113–14

vaccines: bioterrorism, 113–14; childhood, 104, 110; injury compensation, 106
V-chip for televisions, 110
veto, 6, 64, 79, 186n8, 187n3; effect on Congressional agenda, 22–23, 26–31, 190n3; line-item veto, 137; role in clearance model, 53, 57, 59, 185n7; role in gridlock (pivotal) models, 123; threat, 23, 27–31, 64, 184n3, 185n7
Volden, Craig, 25, 122–24, 149–46, 187n2

Waxman, Rep. Henry, 33
Wayne, Stephen J., 13, 15, 183n6
Webb, James E., 34
Weissert, Carol S., 89
Weissert, William G., 89
welfare reform, 105, 107, 108, 110, 113, 137
White, Halbert, 99, 176
White-Huber robust standard errors. See regression: heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
Wilson, J. Matthew, 11, 14
Wilson, Woodrow, 142
windfall profits tax, 99
Wood, B. Dan, 18, 64–65, 80
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M., 170
Wright, Rep. James, 33, 105–6, 187n3
Zhu, Jian-Hua, 36
Parliaments and Legislatures
Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and David T. Canon, Series Editors

Parliaments and Legislatures is a series of books on legislative and parliamentary assemblies across the globe, with a focus on the U.S. Congress. We are actively recruiting new work of high quality and innovation for publication in the series and welcome all methodological approaches.

The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation
Sona Nadenicheck Golder

Challenging Parties, Changing Parliaments: Women and Elected Office in Contemporary Western Europe
Miki Caul Kittilson

Parties, Rules, and the Evolution of Congressional Budgeting
Lance T. LeLoup

The Power of the People: Congressional Competition, Public Attention, and Voter Retribution
Sean M. Theriault

101 Chambers: Congress, State Legislatures, and the Future of Legislative Studies
Peverill Squire and Keith E. Hamm

Doing the Right Thing: Collective Action and Procedural Choice in the New Legislative Process
Lawrence Becker

Authorizing Policy
Thad Hall

Congress Responds to the Twentieth Century
Edited by Sunil Ahuja and Robert Dewhirst

Committees in Post-Communist Democratic Parliaments: Comparative Institutionalization
Edited by David M. Olson and William E. Crowther

U.S. Senate Exceptionalism
Edited by Bruce I. Oppenheimer

Reforming Parliamentary Committees: Israel in Comparative Perspective
Reuven Y. Hazan

Political Consultants in U.S. Congressional Elections
Stephen K. Medvic

Hitching a Ride: Omnibus Legislating in the U.S. Congress
Glen S. Krutz

Comparing Post-Soviet Legislatures: A Theory of Institutional Design and Political Conflict
Joel M. Ostrow

Beyond Westminster and Congress: The Nordic Experience
Edited by Peter Esaiasson and Knut Heidar

Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary World
Edited by Samuel C. Patterson and Anthony Mughan

Parliamentary Representation: The Case of the Norwegian Storting
Donald R. Matthews and Henry Valen

Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government
Edited by Shaun Bowler, David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz

Politics, Parties, and Parliaments: Political Change in Norway
William R. Shaffer

Citizens as Legislators: Direct Democracy in the United States
Edited by Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Caroline J. Tolbert

Creating Parliamentary Government: The Transition to Democracy in Bulgaria
Albert P. Melone

Coalition Government, Subnational Style: Multiparty Politics in Europe’s Regional Parliaments
William M. Downs

Cheap Seats: The Democratic Party’s Advantage in U.S. House Elections
James E. Campbell