Wyndham Lewis, to Joyce's somewhat irritated fascination, called Ulysses "an encyclopedia of English literary technique, as well as a general-knowledge paper. The schoolmaster in Joyce," he continued, "is in great evidence throughout its pages" (76). Although Lewis never appreciated what was most innovative in Joyce's teaching (indeed, he learned very little from Joyce), he was right to lay emphasis on the pedagogical effect of Joyce's work, on the way it sets out to inform and reshape the reading subject. Any work of literature or any writing can be said to produce this effect, but I want to argue that in Joyce's later work such an effect is primary. In relation to the issue of pedagogy, other questions about Joyce's work—whether Ulysses is a novel or what Finnegans Wake is about—become secondary; they are seen as questions posed and subsumed by Joyce's style.

In A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, the narrative events unfold in academic settings, often in the classroom, but more frequently in those places where we see Stephen Dedalus struggle against biological, spiritual, and academic fathers in order to achieve personal autonomy—the autonomy he demonstrates in chapter 5 by conveying his aesthetic theory to Lynch and by taking his imaginative life into his own hands in deciding to leave Ireland. Pedagogy is seen from the point of view of the student who uses his teachers and their teaching as Wittgenstein argued we should use his philosophical propositions—as a ladder to be climbed and then discarded. The teacher, like the father in Joyce, seems doomed to failure, especially for Stephen who, like his author, must teach himself to fly beyond the nets of language, nationality, and religion. Ironically, though, in the scene with Lynch in chapter 5, Stephen's own approach to knowledge and his method of conveying it are purely conventional, expository, magisterial. In advancing his aesthetic theory, Stephen
takes into account neither himself as a desiring subject implicated in a web of words nor Lynch as a subject on whom the theory is intended to work and to produce an effect. The theory stands on its own as a cognition to which the teacher and the student, the voice and the ear, are only tangentially related. Ultimately, all that Stephen succeeds in proving is his quasi-mastery of the traditional thought associated with the names Aristotle, Aquinas, Ibsen, etc. He has a certain textual knowledge but no knowledge of the teaching process itself. Lynch would appear to have more understanding of that process in the way he carefully urges Stephen to speak by facetiously playing the part of the one who doesn’t know and who has nothing better to do than to listen to the cogitations of genius. On the whole, the pedagogical effect in Joyce’s book is not much more developed than in Stephen’s demonstration. *A Portrait of the Artist* is only a novel; and, in spite of its complex ironies, it remains faithful to the convention of the novel and refuses to problematize the relation between the writer and the reader. It does not require the extensive restructuring of the reader through self-analysis and the overcoming in the reader of resistance to the act of reading.

Although such a restructuring is the pedagogical effect of Joyce’s later work, the beginning of *Ulysses* is not greatly different from *A Portrait* in focusing on scenes of teaching. However, these scenes, as I will show, provide a critical view of pedagogy that the performative dimension of the entire book illustrates. In the “Nestor” episode, for example, Stephen at first epitomizes the awkward, bungling pedagogue who can hardly sustain the interest of his pupils. Based on what we see, he clearly fails as a teacher, at least in any normative sense of the word, although he does bring about the possibility of learning. He does this by exploiting the linguistic accident resulting from his pupil’s attempt to identify the name Pyrrhus in a lesson on ancient history. Out of ignorance and frustration, young Armstrong associates the name of the ancient general with the word “pier”; and when Stephen asks for a definition of the latter, the boy says, “A kind of bridge. Kingstown pier, sir.” Stephen cannot resist making a verbal joke: “Kingstown pier...Yes, a disappointed bridge” (*U-GP* 20–1).

If, as Derrida has suggested, education in its traditional forms “has as its ideal...the effacement of language” (“Living On” 93–94), then Stephen’s teaching, in this instance, challenges such idealization by drawing attention to a use of language that resists
effacement. This use does not negate language's signifying or referential functions but shows to what extent these functions depend on a rhetorical surface, to what extent the grammar and logic of reference bring about their own displacement by uncovering the metonymic links between apparently unrelated signifiers. Stephen's young pupils are confused by his joke because they cannot see through the phrase "a disappointed bridge" to the referent that would yield an objective meaning and, thus, stop the play of words. They don't know how to respond to the joke because they don't know how to repeat it. As Freud stressed, a joke is only understood when it can be repeated; even our initial response has less to do with grasping its meaning than with grasping the logic of its construction, the way it capitalizes on linguistic coincidence. The troubled gaze of Stephen's students after hearing the joke is a symptom of their traditional education, of their lack of knowledge about language as language, about its rhetorical dimension. Knowledge of such a dimension entails the ability not only to tell jokes but to make the figures of speech that are crucial to the construction of both literary texts and persuasive arguments. Indeed, ignorance of rhetoric blocks the process of invention itself, prevents the subject from being able to take a position from within language and to assert its linguistic independence in the process of self-representation.

Just in case his students did not grasp the point about language the first time, Stephen decides to give them a second chance. He tells them a riddle: "The cock crew, / The sky was blue: / The bells in heaven / Were striking eleven. / 'Tis time for this poor soul / To go to heaven." When no one guesses the answer, Stephen reveals it himself: "The fox burying his grandmother under a hollybush" (U-GP 22). Stephen lays a trap with this unanswerable riddle in order to teach his pupils a lesson. Precisely because the rhetorical force of language surpasses its power of signification, it can always be used to mystify, to create the illusion of a positive referent where there is none. The riddle creates the illusion of meaning, but the answer subverts that illusion (and hides the private meaning known only to Stephen, i.e., the reference to his dead mother) by insisting on the arbitrariness of its relation to the riddle. This forces us to see what we frequently do not see when we read formulations as different as an intelligence quotient or a political slogan: the gap between the raw signifier and the set of interpretive constraints that produce meaning and social value. However, Stephen can convey this knowl-
edge only by risking failure as a teacher insofar as nothing guarantees that either we or his pupils will “get the message” or be able to repeat the performance.

In other words, Stephen, whatever his intention, teaches his students that understanding involves more than effacing words in order to grasp a referent. It involves seeing or hearing words as iterative, as self-reflexive. If we are blind or deaf to this dimension of language, then we become susceptible to every kind of mystification and block our own capacity for creative self-transformation. We surrender our positions as subjects and become the objects of another’s subjectivity, instead of subsuming subject and object, through the critical use of language, within the collective being of the social symbolic. Stephen’s pupils are confused because they have heard language that refuses to be effaced and demands to be repeated—a language that must be repeated in order to be understood. But what purpose exactly does this confusion serve? Is it possible to learn from confusion? After Stephen’s pupils have fled the classroom for the hockey field, Stephen remains behind to teach Cyril Sargent how to solve some math problems. Mr. Deasy has told Sargent to copy the problems off the board, but Stephen wants to know if the boy can do them himself. When he says no, Stephen sits down and works out a problem in front of him. Demystifying his own knowledge by refusing to give Cyril an overly complicated explanation, Stephen simply performs and then asks Cyril to repeat the performance on a different problem. Cyril copies the data and then, “Waiting always for a word of help his hand moved faithfully the unsteady symbols, a faint hue of shame flickering behind his dull skin” (U-GP 23). Cyril, however, awkwardly, manages to repeat Stephen’s performance which is not the same thing as copying something off the board. Cyril succeeds, but he might have failed. By any measurable standard, Stephen’s pedagogy does not succeed; he does not illuminate the boy’s darkness or fill the void of his ignorance or dissolve his shame. If Cyril were asked, he would not know what Stephen had done to teach him. And yet Cyril learns something from Stephen in learning not to fear the problem—not to fear a certain language. Stephen’s refusal to finalize knowledge on the blackboard forces Cyril to teach himself. It forces him to repeat Stephen’s repetition since, contrary to what Cyril thinks, Stephen is not the one who knows but the one who repeats the steps of a formula that were already a repetition in the first place.
The "Scylla and Charybdis" episode dramatizes a related aspect of Joyce's pedagogy. Stephen presents a theory of Shakespeare's life and work that impresses the small collection of Dublin intellectuals in the library in the same way the "grandmother" riddle impresses the pupils in "Nestor." Stephen faces an audience that not only resists the knowledge he conveys but also questions the authority with which he speaks. Rather than working to legitimate himself before these archons of Irish letters, Stephen plays a game of intellectual brinksmanship, which collapses, at the end of his discussion, in the following dialogue: "You are a delusion, said roundly John Eglinton to Stephen. You have brought us all this way to show us a French triangle. Do you believe your own theory?—No, Stephen said promptly" (U-GP 175). Contrary to what Eglinton asserts, Stephen probably never intended to compel belief but to show a problem. In "Telemachus," Mulligan said that he "proves by algebra that Hamlet's grandson is Shakespeare's grandfather and that he himself is the ghost of his own father" (U-GP 15); but Eglinton comes closer to the truth in identifying Stephen's performance as a kind of geometrical demonstration. Stephen does not teach his audience the truth about Shakespeare; he shows them the shape of the desire for truth, a French triangle. This geometry underlies not only Stephen's story of Shakespeare's quest for an identity which is perpetually complicated by the triangular structure of desire in the relation between self and other, Shakespeare and Ann Hathaway. It also underlies Stephen's own performance as a speaking subject in relation to the audience as other. This geometry of desire destabilizes the relation between self and other by insisting on the structural possibility of a third position (which may or may not take the form of a third party), the position of the other as subject or the subject as other. This third position is what Jacques Lacan calls the desire of the capital Other, which is a desire inherent in the use of language. Stephen's pedagogy makes him into a delusion or a ghost in that it destabilizes the position of authority from which he only pretends to speak; it foregrounds the rhetorical dimension to such an extent that it forecloses the possibility of any stable referent as the object of his thought. As a result, in speaking his thought, Stephen articulates speech as desire—a desire that appears to be collective in that it exceeds the intention of the autonomous subject. The French triangle Stephen constructs in front of the librarians and Mulligan, like the math problem he solves in front of Cyril Sargent,
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is useless knowledge until it is repeated with a difference, until the audience draws it out of their own experience as linguistic beings. Nothing, of course, insures that they will.

The whole of *Ulysses*, I would suggest, possesses the structure of a French triangle. It has this structure in the obvious way that it is a novel of adultery and in the more subtle way that it triangulates the desire of writer and reader by foregrounding language itself, by perpetually undoing the grammar of narrative and the logic of content through rhetorical displacement. The book’s pedagogical effect derives from this stylistic emphasis, and thus it goes against the grain of Western education which privileges logic and grammar over rhetoric. As Derrida remarks in “*Ulysses Gramophone,*” “Joyce laid stakes on the modern university, but he challenges it to reconstitute itself after him.” The first step of that reconstitution involves a reading of *Ulysses* that would require as its condition the reeducation of the reader. Of course, in this first step, Joyce takes the resistance of the reader into account by providing a relatively coherent narrative structure and logical content in spite of the rhetorical forces that pull against them in the second half of the novel. In the actual marketing of the book, he initiated a seduction of the reader by encouraging and participating in the construction of a pedagogical apparatus, which includes criticism, source studies, notes, schemata, plot summaries, etc. The spectacular history of this apparatus in the formation of the “*Joyce industry*” testifies to the book’s resistance both to reading and to teaching. In effect, the book must be taught in order to be read; reading must become self-teaching.

In this respect, Joyce’s work anticipates and supports Paul de Man’s speculation on the pedagogical implications of the resistance to theory. According to de Man, the resistance to theory is “a resistance to the use of language about language,” that is to say, “a resistance to language itself or to the possibility that language contains factors or functions that cannot be reduced to intuition” (13). Traditional historical scholarship, for example, takes for granted that one is able to see through language to the truth, whether the truth is the referent, the historical context, the author’s intention, etc. Such an intuitive view of reading foregrounds logic and grammar over rhetoric for the simple reason that logic and grammar are allied to the referential function of language, its truth function, while rhetoric studies figures of speech or tropes which “pertain primordially
to language." As de Man points out, in the medieval *trivium*, tropes, officially considered a part of grammatical study, actually occupied a disputed borderline between rhetoric and grammar, since they were and are "text-producing functions that are not necessarily patterned on a nonverbal entity." Grammar, on the other hand, is "by definition capable of extra-linguistic generalization" (15). The reading of any text precipitates the tension between rhetoric and grammar in such a way that grammar (along with its conceptual cohort, logic) finds the order of knowledge it postulates destabilized by the figurative power of language. "The resistance to theory," therefore, as de Man writes in yet another formulation, "is a resistance to the rhetorical or tropological dimension of language, a dimension which is perhaps more explicitly in the foreground in literature (broadly conceived) than in other verbal manifestations or—to be somewhat less vague—which can be revealed in any textual event when it is read textually" (17). It is no accident that Joyce's work has lent itself so frequently to theoretical formulations, most notably in the work of Lacan and Derrida. For to the extent that Joyce's work capitalizes on the tension between the referential function and the rhetorical dimension of language, it operates like a theory, that is, as language about language forcing us to recognize reference as one function of the rhetorical. In other words, the pedagogical effect of Joyce's writing constitutes it as a theoretical discourse.

*Ulysses* is, as I am placing it, the first step in Joyce's reconstitution of the university, and *Finnegans Wake* is the second. To an extent, Joyce merely continues the pedagogical experiment of *Ulysses* by radicalizing it; he challenges the reader's resistance by blurring plot and diffusing content to an unprecedented degree. But ultimately the extent of this radicalization produces a pedagogical effect of such magnitude that it becomes almost impossible to teach the book within the frame of the university—not only as presently constituted but as fundamentally conceived. In other words, *Finnegans Wake* tends to resist any institutional framework—no matter how radical—founded on the principle of reason. I say that it resists, not that it opposes. Joyce's last work is not a celebration of the irrational—which, in any case, would only submit it to the principle of reason; it offers no alternative, no counterculture, no counter university. I don't believe that it is unreadable or unteachable, though its resistance to teaching and reading exceeds that of any other book in our culture, including *Ulysses*. Finally, this resistance to reading is what
we teach; the purpose of *Wake* pedagogy is to show our students how to recognize, manage, and write about this resistance. Every time *Finnegans Wake* breaks into the space of the university, it calls that space into question by drawing attention to what the university only assimilates as a problem it cannot solve, unlike *Ulysses* which creates the illusion that the university can solve any problem. It is no accident that the *Wake* usually appears in the margins of the university—that it has been so frequently taught in the living rooms of professors, during the evening hours, without university credit.

I would like to think of *Finnegans Wake* as an extension course on the French triangle. It extends the lessons of Stephen in "Scylla and Charybdis" and of Joyce in *Ulysses*; but only with difficulty can it be appropriated to the official "core" curriculum. In *Ulysses*, Stephen explores the French triangle within the house of reason, the library, whose boundaries he more or less respects. In *Finnegans Wake*, the library is engulfed by the triangle, an opening to the abyss that the principle of reason desperately tries to fill. The triangle is the sigla of ALP, the mother, and the outline of her sexual organs, the hole into which the critic tries to insert the principle of reason. Of course, such a critic is at least figuratively male, like the Shaun figure, Professor Jones, modeled on Wyndham Lewis, in the chapter of riddles and answers that recall Stephen's "grandmother" riddle. The professor, reasoning against brotherly love, reveals a form of domination inherent in magisterial pedagogy: "My unchanging Word is sacred," he says. "The word is my Wife, to exponse and expound, to vend and velerate, and may the curlews crown our nuptias! Til Breath us depart! Wamen." The professor describes himself and his discourse as "The ring man in the rong shop but the rite words in the rote order!" (*FW* 167.28-33). Roughly translated: the man married to reason in the place of unreason with the sacred words of tradition memorized by rote. The patriarchal professor impresses with his knowledge and threatens with his authority; but, fortunately for us, his words, asserting their own autonomy, refuse the system he wants to instill in them.

Shem's approach to the triangle, though more circular, is less indirect. In the pedagogical chapter of *Finnegans Wake*, "Night Lessons," Shem, in the guise of Dolph, teaches his brother Shaun, in the guise of Kev, to construct an equilateral triangle within intersecting circles, another chapter in the geometry of desire. In doing so, Dolph figuratively lifts his mother's "maidsapron" (*FW*
297.11); and Kev, beginning to get a confused notion of what the triangle is all about, remarks: "Mother of us all! O, dear me, look at that now! I don't know is it your spictre or my omination but I'm glad you dimentioned it!" (FW 299.3-6). Dolph thinks Kev too stupid to follow his demonstration (at first, Kev is more interested in his mother's navel than in her genitals); but the problem is stated more accurately by saying that Kev doesn't know what his language knows—i.e., the triangle has to do with his mother or generation through sex. Kev's words, "mother of us all," answer the question he is afraid to ask about his own desire (for his mother or rather for her desire), while a rhetorical reading of the interjection undoes that answer in the same gesture. Kev doesn't know if he has followed the logic of Dolph's demonstration, if what he knows is the product of Dolph's "spectre," a Blakean word for the principle of reason. He doesn't know if his knowledge is rational or if it comes from his "omination," that is, his imagination or his prophetic sense and ability to recognize omens. He is glad Dolph "dimentioned" it, though he resists the knowledge of what those dimensions signify.

Language defines its own dimensions in the pun "dimention." For in the "dimentioning" of language, in doubling it so that we read it grammatically and logically (however ungrammatical and illogical it may be) even as we undo its "grammatical cognition" through a rhetorical reading of its figurative play—in this double speech or double writing, we discover the dimensions of language, its materiality or spacing. To use the distinction from speech act theory that Derrida likes to play with, language oscillates between "use" and "mention." In the Wake, Shem-Dolph mentions and Shaun-Kev tries to put what he mentions to use; but in that very act Shaun stumbles or stammers like his father and everything he says doubles back or, in Derrida's terminology, "invaginates." "My Lourde! My Lourde!" Kev further remarks, "If that aint just the beatenest lay I ever see! And a superposition! Quoint a quincidence!" (FW 299.6-8). Kev puns away without the slightest knowledge of what he is saying. My lord and master is also the miracle of Lourdes which had to do with a virgin mother; but Kev's mother, "the beatenest lay" he ever saw, is no virgin. And neither is his language with its superpositions, one word on top of another, one word inside of another, and everywhere coincidences, including the one revealed by the superposition of the early English word "queynt," which was a vulgar name for the vagina, on the phrase "Quite a
coincidence.” “Quoint a quincidence!”—such coincidences are the invaginations of the rhetorical dimension.

This dimension of Joyce’s writing resonates with what Lacanian psychoanalysis calls “la bêtise.” In the *Encore* seminar, Lacan notes that “le signifiant est bête,” the signifier is stupid, beastly, animalistic. Beyond those meanings inscribed within the imaginary register, language is *en corps* (a pun on the title of the seminar), “in or of the body”; and Lacan considers this relation to be “the foundation of the symbolic dimension that alone permits us to isolate analytic discourse as such” (24). *La bêtise* can also mean “nonsense”; and language at its most substantial is nonsense. Lacanian theory, like Joyce’s art, depends for its content and its effect on linguistic play and coincidence—for example, when Lacan directs our attention to the substantial dimension of language by rewriting the French word “dimension” as “dit-mension” (25). Whereas Joyce changes the *s* of the English “dimension” to *t* to signify the double-mentioning or iterative dimension of language, Lacan adds a *t* to the first syllable of the French “dimension” to signify the priority of the signifier over the signified in speech. Both Joyce and Lacan use the pun to collapse the distinction between “use” and “mention” into a single rhetorical act. Insofar as the pun can be said to signify, it has been used to produce a semantic effect; however, insofar as the puns of both Joyce and Lacan illustrate the very thing they signify, which is the always possible subversion of meaning through rhetorical displacement, they are mentioned or cited as examples of the impossibility of meaning in the absolute sense. Grammar and logic, or the order of signification, are subsumed by the rhetorical dimension; yet without the grasp of grammar and logic in the act of reading it is virtually impossible to grasp the rhetorical dimension in the full scope of its cognitive function.

To carry the comparison between Lacan and Joyce a step further, the pedagogical effect of Lacan’s writing is directly related to what many consider to be the eccentricity of his style. As Shoshana Felman eloquently argues, pedagogy is not a theme in psychoanalysis but a rhetoric, an utterance, an action, and finally a style. Lacan was “the first to understand that the psychoanalytic discipline is an unprecedented one in that its *teaching* does not just reflect upon itself, but turns back upon itself so as to *subvert itself*, and truly *teaches* only insofar as its subverts itself” (39). In support of this assertion, Felman cites a passage from Lacan from which she makes a curious omission:
“Any return to Freud founding a teaching worthy of the name will occur only on that pathway where truth...becomes manifest in the revolutions of culture. That pathway is the only training we can claim to transmit to those who follow us. It is called—a style” (39). Felman omits the superlative adjective modifying the word for “truth” in Lacan’s text, which speaks of “la verité la plus caché,” the most hidden truth becoming manifest in cultural revolutions (Écrits 458). What is the most hidden truth that any teaching worthy of the name discloses? After Lacan’s seminar on “The Purloined Letter,” we should be able to guess that the most hidden truth of psychoanalysis is out in the open where everyone is free to misconstrue it. It is language itself, or rather the rhetorical dimension of language, the field of operation of what Lacan calls the Unconscious. Lacan, like Joyce, theorizes by giving play to the Unconscious in the disfigurements or dislocations of style.

In the “Night Lessons” episode of Finnegans Wake, Dolph disfigures language and thus illustrates Paul de Man’s formula for pedagogy which says that “it is better to fail in teaching what should not be taught than to succeed in teaching what is not true” (de Man 4). Dolph tries to teach Kev the truth about his mother by problematizing the relation to truth, the distinction between the literal and the figurative. He teaches what should not be taught not only in exposing the private parts of his mother’s anatomy but also in showing that even anatomy has its rhetorical dimension and ideological function. But this strange geometry lesson fails in teaching Kev the truth that language, like sex, is not a mystery—that language invaginates not because it is feminine but because it is rhetorical. It fails because the truth cannot be simply communicated; it can only be shown. Dolph shows Kev “figuratively the whome of your eternal geomater” (FW 296.30-297.1) It is not that Dolph, Kev, or the reader sees the womb/home of the eternal earth mother figuratively as opposed to literally but rather that the figurative, or the rhetorical, and the ideological frames must limit any possible vision of home, womb, or mother. In “Night Lessons,” the closer Dolph gets to describing the facts of sex the more abstract and mathematical his language becomes, reducing feminine sexuality to the “power of emphthood,” that is, a logarithmic value of nought. To these male-centered rationalizations of sex balanced against the puritanical ignorance of Shaun-Kev, Issy retorts in the footnotes with a language whose rhetoric lies in its simplicity: “I enjoy as good as anyone” (FW 298.F1).
Issy’s enjoyment undoes the principle of reason Joyce caricatures in Dolph; she constitutes the third side of the triangle pointing toward an invisible fourth position, “beyond.” In the summary of his demonstration, Dolph nearly says as much himself: “there are trist sigheds to everysing but ichts on the freed brings euchs to the feared” (FW 299.1-3). Stated simply, there are three sides to Shem-Dolph’s triangle: I, you, and s/he. When the Is are freed, including the “I” in Issy, you will move to the fourth position beyond the triangle. The word for “you” here, the German euch with an English s-ending, could be taken as a pun on the word “us”: euchs is us. As Professor Jones says parenthetically, “I am speaking to us in the second person” (FW 161.5-6). In the liberation of the feminine subject through the assertion of feminine desire and pleasure, you, that is, all of us, will move to the fourth position, the position of the collective where there is no contradiction between the first and second persons, between the singular and the plural. As the diagram on page 293 of Finnegans Wake shows, the fourth position is generated out of the first three as the second triangle is generated out of the first. The triangle is the structure of desire that constantly repeats in displacing itself. It is the structure of desire in language or the rhetorical dimension.

Clive Hart noted long ago that “The primary energy which maintains the highly charged polarities of Finnegans Wake is generated by cycles of constantly varied repetition—‘The seim anew’ as Joyce puts it [FW 215.23]” (31). Hart says explicitly what Joyce says implicitly in writing Finnegans Wake as a repetition, with a difference, of Ulysses. (To continue the parallel with Lacan, the title of Encore, meaning “still” and “once again,” emphasizes the repetition with a difference characteristic of his teaching.) Of course, this function of repetition in Joyce could be taken as an impasse, perhaps even the poststructuralist impasse. As many have stressed, Joyce’s work anticipates poststructuralism, anticipates the impasse of repetition that poststructuralism identifies as its first principle. But I think there is a way of reading Joyce that goes beyond the impasse, beyond poststructuralism—though I don’t mean to say that poststructuralism itself is without knowledge of this “beyond.”

Derrida, in his meditation on the university, remarks that “‘Thought’ requires both the principle of reason and what is beyond the principle of reason, the arché and an-archy. Between the two, the difference of a breath or an accent, only the enactment of this ‘thought’ can decide. That decision is always risky, it always risks
the worst. To claim to eliminate that risk by an institutional program
is quite simply to erect a barricade against the future” (“Principle
of Reason” 18–19). The pedagogy that emerges out of Joyce’s work,
particularly *Finnegans Wake*, is the pedagogy of enactment. It is a
pedagogy that constantly risks itself in undoing the so-called objective
knowledge we inject into our students and in capitalizing on the
function of desire in the language we derive our knowledge from.
This pedagogy is rhetorical because it teaches knowledge not merely
as content but as enactment. At its limit, in teaching *Finnegans Wake*
for example, this pedagogy actually challenges the foundation
of the university: it offers itself as a form of resistance to the
university’s totalizing functions, to the encyclopedic unity of its
knowledge, to the social and intellectual hierarchies into which it is
organized. This does not mean, however, that such a pedagogy is
opposed to the university in principle since it has no principle beyond
the university. It challenges the university by exploring the thought
of what lies beyond the principle of reason, both in the future and
in the present. It also insists that the university can never contain
knowledge in its totality and that teaching is never simply a matter
for the university. For Joyce, the only teaching worthy of the name
is self-teaching in the radical way I have indicated. But, as every
reader of Joyce knows, teaching oneself is a collective act. Such a
pedagogy, *as theory*, points beyond its own institutional framework,
even beyond poststructuralism as the still-emerging critical institution
of our time. We should not be afraid to go beyond poststructuralism
or to fail in teaching it. As Joyce urges, we should not be afraid to
teach ourselves or, like Issy in *Finnegans Wake*, be ashamed to be
“selfthought” (*FW* 147.9).

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