SEVEN

Planning for the Private Interest

By 1970 Columbus, Ohio, had grown to several times its turn-of-the-century size. Both the city and its suburbs had adopted public land use controls that affected the metropolitan area's growth and development. But land developers and property owners were also involved; municipalities did not plat lots or build houses. Indeed, developers sometimes also controlled land use. Two sets of controls thus shaped the city's spatial and social structure.

In 1900 Columbus was a city of potential. Stores and offices joined state government downtown, while warehouses and small industries straddled the rivers nearby. But people lived in the city center, too—though infant suburbs were beginning to draw off the well-to-do. Public facilities were inadequate when compared to similar cities, but the Plan of 1908 indicated a desire for improvement.

By 1920 major change had occurred. Few people lived downtown anymore, where businesses flourished. Developers had platted subdivisions along the river banks on the northwest, north, and east sides, and some subdivisions had incorporated as suburban municipalities. Other outlying neighborhoods, especially on the northeast side, remained part of the city though far from its center. The south and west sides experienced little change, however.

Columbus's 1923 zoning ordinance clarified existing land use trends by delineating the commercial and industrial areas. It provided for logical expansion of those areas as needed in the future and surrounded them with an apartment zone to house their moderate income and working class employees. Beyond the apartment zone were the two dwelling house districts, with one for only single-family homes. The suburbs also had zoning codes.
These allowed primarily middle and upper income residences although most also allowed enough commercial uses to meet their own residents' needs. Early zoning in the Columbus metropolitan area was in line with contemporary city planning theory about zoning. Incompatible uses were separated, residential areas were protected from incongruous intrusions, and height and area specifications limited population density. In establishing their zoning, however, both city and suburban municipal officials had essentially confirmed developers' actions.

The city expanded physically as its population grew in subsequent decades. To accommodate that growth, developers platted more subdivisions for new homes on the outskirts of either the city or a suburb, but generally before annexation. They concentrated their efforts on the northwest, north, northeast, and east sides, where they and their predecessors had succeeded before. Columbus city policy on water and sewer extensions facilitated the developers' efforts while ensuring the city's growth. Developers determined the nature and level of development for each location by deed restrictions. City or suburban zoning reaffirmed in general terms for large areas what deed restrictions specified for small ones. As middle and upper income households moved to new homes in suburban areas, their old dwellings filtered down to those who could not afford the suburbs or were restricted by racial prejudice.

Examination of seventy years of residential development in and around Columbus, Ohio, illustrates the impact of private property owners' actions. Individual property owners sought their own greatest financial gain; the aggregate of their actions produced the city's spatial structure. Developers seeking to serve upper income households created attractive neighborhoods in the "right" locations into the 1940s and ensured residential exclusivity with restrictive covenants. Later, developers varied the specific provisions of some restrictions to aim development of certain subdivisions at particular (and not just upper income) segments of the home-buying public. Uses or people excluded from restricted subdivisions were forced to locate elsewhere or to remain where they already existed. Thus as the central city became increasingly commercial, middle or upper income people who had once lived
nearby relocated to exclusive, new outlying neighborhoods. Denied that option, minorities and low income households moved into the older residential areas just outside the city center, where deeds did not restrict land use and where property owners subdivided existing one- and two-family dwellings to house more households or replaced dwellings with commercial uses. Since many developers imposed restrictions over many years—two on a very large scale—the impact of restrictive covenants on the city form was considerable.

Almost all new development through the 1940s occurred outside municipal boundaries. Thus, private land developers, rather than public officials, decided what land would be developed in what way for what people. The metropolitan area's residential patterns were already set by the time annexations and the application of zoning caught up with the development process. Later, when developers subdivided zoned land, they considered the applicable zoning code when designing their restrictions. However, city and suburban zoning provisions generally maintained or extended to new areas an existing type and level of residential development. Both city and suburban zoning codes reflected patterns the developers had already set as much as they guided future growth. While seeking to increase profits, the land developers had also shaped the city. Theoretically, zoning could have.

Zoning was not without import, however. In both the city and the suburbs zoning maintained the residential quality that developers had provided to middle, upper middle, and upper income neighborhoods. In the two suburbs that grew appreciably after they adopted zoning (Upper Arlington and Worthington), local officials effectively used zoning to determine development in newly annexed land. In older, less exclusive areas—never or no longer protected by deed restrictions—the administration of zoning allowed land use or density changes that substantially altered those areas, diminishing their residential character. This process increased the potential income of property owned by nonresident investors while decreasing the property value and equity of those owning and occupying modest homes. The requests of property owners, instead of the initiative of zoning officials, drove this process of change, however.
The Effectiveness of Zoning

This research set out to examine the role of both private and public land use controls in shaping urban spatial and social structure. With respect to public controls a secondary purpose was to evaluate the effectiveness of zoning, whose earliest proponents had hoped it would serve the public interest (i.e., promote and protect the public health, safety, and welfare) in its broadest sense. The city planners and reformist lawyers who were zoning's earliest proponents had specific goals for public land use controls. Accordingly, they essentially established criteria to be met if zoning was to fulfill its potential. The realtors who allied with the city planners to gain support for zoning had very different goals. By examining the application of zoning against the planners' criteria, one can also see how well it served the realtors' agenda.

The criteria the planners established were necessary not only for zoning to be effective in planning growth and development but also to meet the legal requirement of the police power to serve the public interest. Four things were necessary for zoning to protect the public health, safety, morals, or welfare by limiting the use of private property. First, a zoning ordinance was to be in accordance with a comprehensive plan that would serve as a guide for the ordinance's application. Second, zoning actions had to produce, or strive to produce, a balance of land uses designed to meet all the community's needs. Third, zoning was to prevent the intrusion of incongruous, potentially harmful, uses into existing areas, especially residential neighborhoods. Finally, zoning actions, taken as a whole, were to benefit all income groups. This last had two elements. The early planners hoped zoning would disperse all income levels of population, lessening congestion and preventing further deterioration, rather than sending only the rich to spacious new suburbs while leaving the poor in overcrowded, underserviced, inner city neighborhoods. They did not suggest mixing housing types or income groups within neighborhoods. However, they knew that congestion in tenement and slum districts would be relieved only if multifamily and working class housing were available elsewhere—in outlying areas. Moreover, zoning should protect the existing residential environment of the working and lower classes, who lacked financial resources to protect it themselves—
as the wealthy did through buying restricted exclusivity. If zoning met these four standards it would serve the public interest.

With respect to conformance with the comprehensive plan, early planners and zoning experts such as Harland Bartholomew believed that one way to determine if zoning code design and application conformed to a comprehensive plan was by the number and nature of changes made subsequent to code adoption. Indeed, that was the only way if there was no formally adopted comprehensive plan. A well-drafted ordinance, designed to meet all the community's needs, should require few changes.

The City of Columbus did not adopt a comprehensive plan prior to passing its first zoning ordinance or at any later time. However, Bartholomew's consulting firm performed studies jointly for the city and the regional planning commission for a comprehensive plan in the 1950s. One of those reports revealed problems with zoning in Columbus. Land was zoned for commercial uses far in excess of the amount needed, a large area zoned for industry was almost entirely residential in actual use, and areas occupied by single-family homes and duplexes were zoned for apartments. Nevertheless, over a fifty-year period, the Columbus City Council and the BZA consistently increased the amount of commercial land in older areas of the city when property owners requested a change while commercially zoned land elsewhere lay undeveloped. Council zoned outlying newly annexed land for low density single-family use, then sometimes rezoned it for apartments or commercial development in response to a developer's proposal. The zoning code itself was comprehensive in nature but it was not administered in such a way as to serve as a comprehensive plan. Council and the zoning board responded to the requests of private property owners rather than planning where various land uses ought to be and in what amounts.

The suburbs had greater success. One was begun as a consciously planned community. It and another later commissioned formal plans. In addition, all the suburbs but one essentially administered their zoning ordinances so consistently as to imply the existence of a plan. They allowed few use changes, and those that they approved accommodated growth but did not alter the character of either individual neighborhoods or the community at large. Zoning in the final suburb functioned much as it did in
Columbus, with officials almost giving property owners and developers carte blanche.

Admittedly, the suburbs had a much easier task than did Columbus. They were smaller and more homogeneous. Property owners and developers alike might have felt the pressure of negative public opinion had they requested unpopular zoning changes. The reaction of Upper Arlington residents to the gas station and church controversies, and of Grandview residents to the proposed apartment tower, show that efforts to use land in unpopular ways did not go unnoticed. At the same time, for their part suburban zoning officials did not face the same type of requests as their counterparts in Columbus. Property owners in the suburbs generally did not ask to put commercial uses in residential areas or to build more or larger multifamily buildings than permitted by code (except in Whitehall). The key to that exception may lie in administration. By requiring strict adherence to the code from the beginning and permitting few changes, officials in six suburbs made clear to developers and property owners how requests would be received. Meanwhile, Whitehall officials implicitly told property owners, “Ask and it shall be granted.”

All in all, then, six of the eight municipalities essentially followed a comprehensive plan in their zoning activities. But one of the other two is the principal city of the metropolitan area.

Results on the second criterion, a balanced mix of uses, are more diverse. On the face of it, Columbus appears to have done rather well in this respect. Both the initial zoning ordinance and the revision of 1954 provide for industrial, commercial, and residential land uses, with enough different residential classes to house a variety of income groups. The appropriateness of the mix to the city’s needs is another matter, however. The Bartholomew report indicated overzoning of both commercial and industrial land, and officials created additional commercial parcels through rezoning or by granting permission for nonconforming uses. So although the mix was there, the balance was not right.

The suburbs present a different situation—by and large they lack the mix. The smallest, Riverlea, is entirely residential. Residential development in Marble Cliff is all upper middle or upper income and covers almost the entire village. Although Bexley and Upper Arlington are much larger, both are also overwhelmingly
single-family residential, and predominantly upper middle income or above. Most commercial development in both suburbs is of a scale and type to meet only local neighborhood or community needs. Grandview Heights, Whitehall, and Worthington all have a mix of uses. Commercial and industrial land exists along with a variety of housing types, though in Worthington middle and upper middle income single-family homes predominate. Judged by the balance and mix of uses, then, three suburbs score highest. Four others lack the mix and the city has the mix but not the balance.

With respect to the third criterion—the intrusion of incongruous or incompatible uses—the experience was much the same as with the comprehensive plan. Between the turn of the century and 1920 the central city of Columbus became increasingly commercial as residents moved to new outlying subdivisions or to older neighborhoods just outside the core. The zoning code then designated the downtown as a commercial district and earmarked all nonindustrial areas in the rest of the city—except along major streets—for some type of housing. Through the next fifty years, by single-lot rezoning or by permitting nonconforming uses, zoning officials in the City of Columbus regularly allowed incongruous uses into the older residential areas where, increasingly, minorities and low income persons lived. Neighborhoods developed after the first decade of the century were saved from this fate. However, city officials had much less to do with that than did the developers who had so thoroughly restricted the use of land through covenants in the deeds. The city could not, through a zoning action, negate a private contractual agreement.

In six of the suburbs the situation was quite different. Officials rarely granted nonconforming uses. The few rezonings extended existing commercial or industrial districts but did not permit their intrusion into established neighborhoods, even in older areas. But this is not surprising because it was the older residences that gave such exclusive suburbs as Bexley, Marble Cliff, and Upper Arlington their distinctive character, and Worthington took pride in its historic heritage. Whitehall again is the exception, although not so much as it at first appears. Whitehall rezoned many single parcels for industrial use in commercial districts, which seems to be incongruous. However, these rezonings were to allow gasoline service stations, car dealerships, and other auto-related uses that
would have been permitted of right in commercial districts else­where. At the same time, rezonings or variances to permit apart­ments or commercial uses in areas zoned for single-family housing sometimes were intrusions.

Overall, then, most of the suburbs maintained existing areas well and prevented the deterioration that might have accompanied incompatible uses. The city, however, permitted intrusions into older areas but not newer ones, where deeds often already restricted land use.

The final criterion is one of social equity. Early zoning propo­nents sought to disperse people of all income groups throughout the metropolitan area—though not into mixed-group neighbor­hoods—to relieve urban congestion. At the same time, they wanted to protect the residential quality of both lower and upper income neighborhoods. Given the governmental structure of the metro­politan area, such a goal was impossible to achieve. Within the area this study examined are eight separate municipal entities, each with its own zoning ordinance and administrative board. No municipality could zone land inside another's borders. Only by having all land in the metropolitan area covered by a single ordinance could the equity standard have been met.

One can, of course, evaluate the actions of each of the eight municipalities with respect to its own land. On this basis, the results for Columbus are mixed. Columbus was in the enviable position of being able to grow out to, and beyond, its suburbs because of its aggressive annexation policies. Theoretically, this allowed zoning officials to provide for some dispersal of all income groups. They could zone outlying land for modest apartments as well as for large homes. The standard practice, however, was to zone newly annexed land for the least dense (and by implication highest income) single-family development. Then, if a developer presented a proposal for an alternative land use and requested a rezoning, the city could grant it. This was the case for several parcels in the northeast part of the city and accounts for the presence of apartments there. However, city officials did not decide ahead of time where different types of housing ought to be built; they responded to the plans of the developers.

On the other half of the equity standard, the city was even less successful. It was the older, pre-1900 residential areas the city
initially zoned for apartments that housed most of the working class and lower income individuals. In these same areas city officials allowed increased lot density and intensity of use, thus detracting from the overall residential quality. In middle and upper income areas city officials perpetrated by public land use controls what developers had initiated by private ones. As noted in chapter 5, the lessened residential quality of older neighborhoods caused by commercial intrusions and parking lots effectively lessened population density in areas around the city center. (At the same time, of course, the number of persons living in individual buildings or lots increased as variances permitted more apartment units than the code allowed.) In one sense the city accomplished the theoretically desired deconcentration of population in older districts, but it did so at the expense of the residential quality for those remaining, who had no housing options elsewhere in the city. The hopes of early zoning proponents thus were not met, since relieving area-wide residential congestion did not result in dispersal of the low income population or protection of their neighborhoods from intrusions.

The suburbs, being small by comparison, had no opportunity to disperse their populations, although none had very dense development. In addition, having few or no low income areas, they did not need to protect them. In the spacious suburbs middle and upper income households could seek and find residential sanctuary. Early hopes for social equity, then, were doomed from the start.

How effectively did zoning serve the overall public interest of the metropolitan area? Measured by the hopes of its early proponents the answer is "not well." Columbus made an attempt to serve it by passing a zoning code that was, on its face, comprehensive and that provided for a mix of uses. But the mix was not balanced and code enforcement was inconsistent at best. There was no real effort to use zoning to direct growth and development in a comprehensively planned manner, so the original potential was not realized. Moreover, some residential areas experienced incompatible intrusions. Most of the suburbs, on the other hand, served the interests of their individual publics quite well. They planned their growth and development and protected their residential districts. Consisting largely of upper and upper middle income single-family neighborhoods, the suburbs found it much easier to
define—and consequently to serve—their public interests than did the city.

In both city and suburb, however, the interest most clearly being served was that of the property owner. The two types of property owners expected somewhat different things from zoning, but there was no inherent conflict between their expectations. Those who earned their livelihood buying, selling, or developing land, or who rented or leased their property to produce income, wanted zoning to increase the income potential of their land. If platting and building new subdivisions, they wanted zoning provisions that allowed them to target specific markets and that reinforced the provisions of their deed restrictions. Those holding land for investment income wanted profitable apartment or commercial zoning. The zoned “highest and best” use of land for them was what was most profitable. Residential property owners—those who owned and occupied their own single-family homes—had a different goal. They wanted zoning to protect their residential quality and consequently stabilize or increase the market value of their property.

Both Columbus and the suburbs served property owners’ interests. They steadfastly protected areas where middle and upper income people owned and occupied their own homes. At the same time, those individuals seeking income from their land had the opportunity to build apartments (sometimes at a greater density than permitted by code) or maintain commercial establishments (sometimes where the code did not allow them). Zoning thus was very successful at protecting property values, even as it limited the right of some individual owners to do as they wished. Early planners had viewed such property-value benefits of zoning as coincidental and secondary to its primary purpose of promoting the public health, safety, and welfare allowed by the police power.²

But the two were not inconsistent. Indeed, increasing property values—and everything that is part of them—could be construed as a legitimate element of promoting the public welfare. Justice Sutherland did not mention property values per se in his Euclid opinion, but the access of homes to light and air and the “privilege of quiet and open places for [children’s] play” he spoke of certainly contributed to them.³ Almost fifty years later Justice William O. Douglas used similar language when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld another zoning ordinance. “A quiet place where yards are
wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines’ for land use regulations that “lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion, and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.” Although Douglas did not say it, they can also raise property values. “The police power,” he noted, “is not confined to the elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places.” The police power can protect as well as restrict property rights, as the Columbus zoning experience shows. And if Columbus is typical, the real estate interests who supported zoning have no call to be disappointed.

For their part, the city planners and urban reformers can only hope that the worst land use abuses were prevented. Zoning did not function quite as they wished, but the very existence of land use controls may have dissuaded some from trying to use their land in undesirable ways. Though minimum standards were sometimes lowered, still there were minimum standards.

**Land Use Controls and Urban Form**

Private and public land use controls functioned differently, but both served property interests. How did they affect the city? Have controls determined the spatial and social structure of the metropolitan area?

Private developers determined how land would be used throughout the growing city and its suburbs through their imposition of restrictive covenants in deeds. The developers’ covenants also determined who could—and could not—live in newly platted subdivisions. Thus in shaping the city’s spatial structure, private controls also shaped its social structure. When they brought restricted lots in exclusive neighborhoods, with the assurance that the neighborhoods would remain exclusive, individual home owners contributed to the developers’ prosperity as well as their own, since no unpleasant or unanticipated changes on nearby lots would lessen their property value.

Public land use controls, on the other hand, did not so much shape development as respond to it. Real estate developers, platting subdivisions outside the corporate limits, determined what type of neighborhoods should be where and increasingly protected them
through deed restrictions. Local zoning provided another layer of protection when their developments joined the city or a suburb. Public land use controls, then, formalized and perpetuated existing development trends; they did not shape or direct them.

In this sense, zoning was not directly a cause of social stratification or racial segregation. Through restrictive covenants developers determined the income levels of their various subdivisions. Municipal officials zoning land for modest apartments that was deed restricted for large-lot upper income single-family homes would not have created economically mixed communities or provided housing for low or moderate income households in outlying areas. Moreover, using racial covenants during the times of greatest black population growth, developers also determined where minorities would or would not live. Landlords, private individuals, real estate agents, and mortgage lenders (including the FHA) supported and continued discriminatory housing patterns.5 Zoning affected them only indirectly and primarily to the extent that racial minorities had lower incomes than necessary to live in some single-family areas.

Although zoning did not cause the segregation of people by race and class in Columbus or elsewhere, it certainly encouraged and maintained it. Early zoning proponents never explicitly claimed segregation as one of their goals but they implicitly supported it by mandating separate zones for different land uses and types of housing. As zoning protected residential districts from harmful intrusions, it also protected rich from poor and white from black. The small early twentieth-century black population of Columbus was concentrated on the near east side, in a portion of the band of older housing designated for apartments in 1925. Up through 1948 race restrictions in deeds effectively kept the growing black population confined to that area. After 1948 high housing cost or size minimums in deed restrictions combined with city and suburban zoning provisions for middle or upper income single-family neighborhoods continued the practice, for few blacks could meet the high minimum standards. At the same time, zoning actions affecting land near the central city lessened residential quality, which encouraged the departure of those who could afford it. But race prejudice and discriminatory real estate and mortgage practices limited housing alternatives for blacks regardless of income. By
1970, the Columbus metropolis exhibited a general pattern common to many American urban areas. The city center was given over to business activities and the poor and black lived in declining neighborhoods around it. Wealthy whites lived out in the suburbs. Although early zoning proponents supported dispersal of the population (which depopulation of the Columbus core accomplished), they never suggested that it be dispersed into neighborhoods that mixed people by race and income. Zoning thus furthered the market practices that complicated the efforts of civil rights activists seeking to integrate schools and neighborhoods in the 1960s and 1970s. No, zoning did not cause the illness of segregation; neither did it try to cure it.

Although the private control mechanism of the restrictive covenant had a greater impact on the urban form than publicly imposed zoning, the two were not unrelated. They had no legal connection in tradition or in theory. One was a private contractual matter between two individuals and its purpose was to control land use for the benefit (fiscal or otherwise) of those two individuals. The other was an exercise of the police power to serve the public good: the general welfare of the whole city. Thus there were two separate mechanisms, each controlling land independently of the other.

In fact, as the urban area grew and developed, the two devices exhibited a relationship that was almost reciprocal in nature. Initially, restrictive covenants preceded zoning, since developers platted unincorporated land. But when restricted land was annexed to the city or a suburb and subsequently zoned, the zoning provisions often matched the deed restrictions. In later years, when developers subdivided land outside municipal boundaries, they considered the zoning standards of the municipality they intended to annex their subdivision to and structured the deed restrictions accordingly. Consequently, public controls could potentially shape development (at least to the extent that they set a minimum level or designated use) but in actuality the effect was minimal, as by then the residential patterns of the metropolitan area already had been established.

Zoning thus was only marginally effective as a land use control device to plan and direct growth and development while preventing the deterioration that resulted from uncontrolled land use.
Smaller communities that had a clear idea of what they wanted to become were able to achieve their goals. Generally they sought to maintain the character and level of residential quality that private developers had bequeathed to them. Strict adherence to a zoning ordinance that was based on or reflected a comprehensive plan allowed them to do that. Those communities (one suburb and the major city) that had no plan—either implicit or explicit—were less successful at directing their own growth and development. They faced a multiplicity of interests and lacked a standard against which to measure the impact of serving those interests. The very existence of zoning may have allowed those two communities to avoid the worst impacts of uncontrolled land use, but repeated exceptions and alterations could not prevent those impacts altogether.

Additionally, if public controls were only partially effective at directing growth and controlling land use, they cannot have been solely responsible for the social and spatial structure of American urban areas. Just as individual private land owners, acting independently and seeking their own ends, created the conditions that led city planners and urban reformers to call for the institution of zoning, so those private property owners also created the modern middle and upper income suburbs and the chaos of older residential areas. Zoning, or its misapplication, aided their efforts but the private property owners led the way.

A case study such as this one has obvious limitations. It provides only one example, and other cities may exhibit different patterns. Still, the findings here in part support those of other works. Sam Bass Warner's view, referred to in the introduction, on the role that private individuals played in shaping the city and creating class and racial segregation, proved as valid for a midwestern city that grew and continues to expand in the twentieth century as for eastern cities that filled their borders in the nineteenth.6 The conclusions of zoning's observers have also been confirmed. Almost from zoning's inception city planners and legal authorities on zoning have bemoaned the gap between the planning theory of zoning and zoning practice. In examining the application of zoning to actual parcels of land, this research confirms that at times (e.g., in Columbus and Whitehall) zoning has not performed as it theoretically should have. Other times (maintaining exclusive suburbs,
for example) it performed all too well. Moreover, the study revealed that Columbus exhibited a spatial and social structure common to many U.S. cities studied by historians and social scientists. If private and public land use controls created that structure in Columbus, it is likely that they did elsewhere too.

And what of Jane Jacobs's complaints? She blamed the city planning profession for zoning the "life" out of American cities and for stratifying and segregating their residents, largely because planners did not "understand" how urban areas function. City planners in and around Columbus, Ohio, may or may not have "understood" the city's neighborhoods and their residents. But zoning officials played a much smaller part in separating the city's races and income groups than did the developers who platted and restricted exclusive subdivisions or the property owners who requested land use and density changes in older residential areas just outside the city's core. Moreover, in older parts of Columbus zoning facilitated the variety of land uses Jacobs so praised, but that variety contributed to their demise, not their strength and vitality.

Having examined the application of both private and public controls to actual parcels of land, this work provides another layer of support for the contention that by and large public land use controls have not effectively shaped urban growth and development patterns. One is left to wonder, then, if perhaps the goals its first proponents set for zoning were impossible to achieve. For zoning to direct development in a metropolitan area effectively, there must be either a single code for the entire area or cooperation between and among its constituent municipalities. When several municipalities control only their own land independently of one another, as they did in Columbus and do elsewhere, there can be no comprehensive regional planning and no assurance that all needs will be met. However, having a single jurisdiction large enough to include all metropolitan land increases the number and variety of interests within that jurisdiction who will seek to have zoning serve their own, sometimes conflicting, purposes. Zoning was most effective where the purpose of all involved (developers, residents, local officials) was the same: to preserve the quality of upper and upper middle income residential suburbs. Consequently, creation of a single metropolitan or regional jurisdiction that
would be necessary for truly regional land use planning would at the same time create a circumstance where agreement on the goals of that planning would be difficult or impossible to achieve because of the multiplicity of differing interests.

Social equity issues are also problematical. Tenements and slums sparked the early city planners' and reformers' calls for zoning. They wanted to prevent the overcrowding, deterioration, and land speculation that lowered residential quality for the lower and working classes. However, restricting the use of land bids up its price. Indeed, developers who used restrictive covenants to create and maintain exclusive residential areas counted on that. Had the reformist zoners succeeded in so restricting land as to prevent deterioration and raise residential quality, they might also have raised the price of housing to a level the lower and working classes could not pay.7

Such theoretical questions as the inherent impossibility of zoning to achieve its goals are beyond the scope of this work. My initial intention was to test its effectiveness as a land use control reform by examining its application to the land, and to determine its impact on urban social and spatial structure. I wanted to find out what happened to American cities because of zoning. The story did not end with New York's ordinance in 1916 or the Euclid decision in 1926.

However, I could not examine zoning's impact on the physical and social city without also examining the process of residential real estate development and the private restrictions developers imposed on their land. I discovered two parallel, and sometimes interacting, processes and two primary actors. Through their activities early in the twentieth century, land developers laid the foundation for the growing metropolitan area's spatial and social structure. Through their zoning actions, city and suburban officials confirmed existing patterns and, especially after 1950, encouraged their perpetuation. This is so not only in outlying neighborhoods, where zoning protected middle and upper income residential areas and encouraged or required additional similar development, but also in unrestricted older areas, where Columbus zoning officials' responses to property owners' requests consistently increased the variety, density, and intensity of land use in primarily residential areas. Thus though the two groups—private
property owners and public local officials—did not necessarily act together, they also did not act in opposition to each other.

Some researchers have studied the process of zoning in cities and others have studied land development. This research combines the two. Zoning in Columbus functioned much as it did elsewhere and Columbus land developers behaved like their counterparts from New Jersey to California. Moreover, by 1970 Columbus exhibited the same spatial and social patterns—though in less extreme form—as many other U.S. cities. This research shows how private and public land use controls collectively shaped those patterns in Columbus as they may have elsewhere.

The imposition of land use controls—whether private or public—is a form of planning. Whether by design or default those who imposed controls shaped the city. What interest did they serve? Both platters and purchasers of lots in restricted subdivisions benefited from stable or increasing property values. Those owning land whose potential profitability was increased by zoning changes that Columbus and Whitehall city councils and zoning boards allowed also benefited. But the legal justification for publicly restricting private property by zoning was to promote the health, safety, and welfare of all citizens. Indeed, the entire profession of city planning is premised on serving the public interest in its broadest sense. This study shows that, at least in Columbus, Ohio, zoning only partially met the goals its reformist proponents established for it. Moreover, as far as urban spatial and social structure are concerned, public controls did not so much shape land use patterns as perpetuate those that private controls had set. When all was said and done, planning served the private interest.