In the "Nestor" and the "Proteus" episodes, Joyce extends the psychological boundaries of Irish paralysis: time and space become the limits of Stephen's claustrophobia, and enclosedness characterizes all of human history. The ghost of Mary Dedalus gives way to the haunting shadow of past time, the tower-prison to historical confinement. Stephen feels shackled to the temporal categories that define Western thought, the "nightmare" from which he must try to break free.

You, Cochrane, what city sent for him?
—Tarentum, sir.
—Very good. Well?
—There was a battle, sir.
—Very good. Where?
The boy's blank face asked the blank window.
Fabled by the daughters of memory. And yet it was in some way if not as memory fabled it. A phrase, then, of impatience, thud of
Blake’s wings of excess. I hear the ruin of all space, shattered glass and toppling masonry, and time one livid final flame. What’s left us then? (P. 24)

Aristotle’s definition of time as “the motion of matter” sets the precedent for Stephen’s history lesson: “It must be a movement then, an actuality of the possible as possible. Aristotle’s phrase” (p. 25). Stephen forces himself, as well as his pupil, to spatialize temporal phenomena: “What city sent for him?” (p. 24). Cochrane gropes for a geographical location, then re-creates the scene descriptively: “There was a battle,” he murmurs, using “there” as an expletive. The teacher insists that “there” be employed adverbially: he demands an exact location, which he himself must verify by “glancing at the name and date in the gorescarred book” (p. 24). The whole phenomenon of history suggests temporal-spatial disjunction. Cochrane can remember the date of the battle, but not its location. The two facts exist separately as independent categories. History is defined in terms of time and place, as the intersection of two linear axes, with no further dimension for human imagination.

Stephen counterpoints the lesson with private reflections on William Blake’s description of history as allegory, “a totally distinct and inferior kind of Poetry... Form’d by the daughters of Memory” from the “Vanities of Time and Space.” In his notes for the “Vision of the Last Judgment,” Blake insists that “Vision or Imagination is a Representation of what Eternally Exists, Really and Unchangeably.” The romantic poet would destroy the edifice of past history because it contradicts pure imaginative thought. But if time collapses into “one livid final flame,” “What’s left us then?” (p. 24). The Platonic form of eternal being ignores both perceptual reality and individual experience: it shuns the phenomenal world of empirical revelation. Stephen is determined to fly beyond the labyrinth of history without Blake’s “wings of excess.”

He thinks of Pyrrhus as “any general to any officers,” murmuring words applicable to all historical triumphs: “Another
victory like that and we are done for” (p. 24). Every individual, whether he wins or loses particular battles, is “done for” in the end. And every era of civilization gives way to the new, collapsing in Viconian spirals of repetition. All history is a “pier,” a “disappointed bridge” that ostensibly leads to some teleological goal, but ends abruptly in the waves.

Stephen completes his dialectic by contemplating history in Aristotelian terms of act and potency: “Had Pyrrhus not fallen by a beldam’s hand in Argos or Julius Caesar not been knifed to death? They are not to be thought away. Time has branded them and fettered they are lodged in the room of the infinite possibilities they have ousted. But can those have been possible seeing that they never were? Or was that only possible which came to pass?” (p. 25). The events of history are metaphorically lodged in a closed chamber where they occupy all available space, leaving no room for further contingencies. As a poet, Stephen is a “weaver of the wind” who fashions stories from the historical possibilities that were never actualized. In so doing, he asserts the superiority of creative consciousness over the solidified structure of a nightmare past.

For Stephen, the nightmare of history is a composite of deterministic forces that threaten individual creativity. Its landscape embraces the formidable night world of the unconscious, where specters of biographical trauma abide. Stephen wonders how much of his own life has been determined by consubstantial parents, Catholic training, Irish nationality, and a Celtic cultural heritage.3

One of the principal themes of the “Nestor” episode is the “burial of the dead.” How can the individual dispose of his past and free himself from the viscosity of its presence? The shaggy dog riddle of a “fox burying his grandmother under a holly-bush” (p. 27) is a pedestrian version of the resurrection myth in Lycidas. Stephen is frantically trying to bury the specter of his mother in the ground of past history. But like the fox, he feels compelled by “remorse of conscience” perpetually to resurrect her threatening apparition. He cannot dismiss her as a “poor soul gone to heaven” (p. 28), but must dig in the earth to
uncover the corpse of his guilt: “and on a heath beneath winking stars a fox, red reek of rapine on his fur, with merciless bright eyes scraped in the earth, listened, . . . scraped and scraped” (p. 28).

Stephen sees in the figure of Cyril Sergent the helplessness of childhood bending beside him. He painfully recalls his own vulnerability and youthful isolation: “Secrets, silent, stony sit in the dark palaces of both our hearts: secrets weary of their tyranny: tyrants willing to be dethroned” (p. 28). Only a “mother’s love” protects the melancholic child. “Amor matris: subjective and objective genitive” seems to be the “only true thing in life” (pp. 27–28).

Stephen is desperately searching for a philosophy that will transcend the spectral past and confirm the uniqueness of a creative vision rooted in the present moment. At the heart of his colloquy with Garrett Deasy lies the antinomy between historical determinism and imaginative freedom. The schoolmaster’s notion of history is linear and eschatological. It is, in a restricted sense, “Aristotelian.” In his “Natural Science,” Aristotle depicted the temporal moment spatially, as an individual point on a line; he visualized time as a serial progression of instants inexorably bound together. His model provided a basis for the Western conceptualization of temporality. Applied to human experience, the Aristotelian trope suggests that each individual is rolled along a track from birth to death, with little rational or volitional control over his destiny. He is bound to a “domino” set of causes and effects: the external categories of time and space govern an ineluctable progression toward the stasis of death.

Christianity made use of Aristotle’s metaphor to explain its own eschatology: human history moves forward to an apocalypse, a last judgment, and the second coming of Christ. Deasy’s language is biblical, as well as Hegelian, when he declares that “all history moves towards one great goal, the manifestation of God” (p. 34). Evangelism provides a rationale for predestination, Protestant election, and anti-Semitism.

Deasy’s office is a miniature replica of the decaying “room”
of history from which imaginative possibilities have been ousted. The mouldering atmosphere of the enclosed chamber recalls Stephen’s claustrophobia in the Martello tower: “Stale smoky air hung in the study with the smell of drab abraded leather of its chairs. As on the first day he bargained with me here. As it was in the beginning, is now. On the sideboard the tray of Stuart coins, base treasure of a bog: and ever shall be . . . world without end” (p. 29). Stephen muses: “And now his strongroom for the gold. . . . An old pilgrim’s hoard, dead treasure, hollow shells” (p. 29). Like the tower room, Deasy’s study is lifeless and suffocating, unchanged since the first day Stephen entered. The cloister provides sanctuary for the gold coins and hollow shells greedily amassed by the schoolmaster. The old man’s “treasure hoard” is built on the skeleton of paralyzed time. Deasy believes that he has somehow captured the past in his collection of Apostle spoons and Stuart coins. He has tried to shut out the flux of life and to deny the changing phenomena of the present. His endeavor is as futile as it is naive. “A sovereign fell, bright and new, on the soft pile of the tablecloth” (p. 29). The Edwardian coin is an unheeded reminder that kings are continually falling in history and that even the “sovereign power” of a monarch is evanescent.

The schoolmaster is fettered to lifeless objects of the past, as well as to the archetypal categories of an outmoded tradition. He inhabits a mechanical, automatic world and is entranced by “enclosedness.” His aim is to stockpile as much gold as possible, with little concern for output in a vital, operative economy. “Money is power,” Deasy insists (p. 30), as he proudly displays proof of sovereignty. Deasy is evidently unfamiliar with either Keynesian economics or Freudian psychoanalytic theory. He sees virtue in greed, delights in controlling static objects, and manifests all the traits of a typically anal-retentive personality.

As in the tower, Stephen experiences the paralysis of a world where nothing lives of its own accord, nothing wills its own existence. In the stagnant cloister, he is hemmed in by inanimate objects that never change. “As it was in the beginning, is
now . . . and ever shall be” (p. 29). “The same room and hour, the same wisdom: and I the same. Three times now. Three nooses round me here. Well. I can break them in this instant if I will” (p. 30). Stephen is aware of the hangman’s rope around his neck, for he perceives a direct correlation between the money he earns and the shells of history: both are dead relics of a living past. His third salary constitutes still another link with a claustrophobic death-world. Stephen realizes that there is a way to avoid the foredoomed noose. He need not subscribe to Deasy’s Edwardian ethic or embrace a utilitarian definition of success. In a moment of self-determination, he can choose his own existence and break free of the paralyzed environment that threatens to destroy him.

Stephen recognizes Deasy’s “history” as nothing more than a series of “disappointed bridges” by which greed for power drives men to automated, irrational behavior. The nightmare becomes another manifestation of the horrifying “Ghoul, Chewer of corpses”: “Time shocked rebounds, shock by shock. Jousts, slush and uproar of battles, the frozen deathspew of the slain, a shout of spear spikes baited with men’s bloodied guts” (p. 32). The children’s field hockey is emblematic of the “joust” of life undertaken in a warlike, competitive society. Stephen realizes the grotesque nature of the game of “getting ahead” that Deasy plays with so little awareness.

History is indeed a nightmare. But Stephen questions the necessity of perpetuating the conflict—of contributing to the “frozen deathspew of the slain” until we ourselves taste the blood of battle. It must be possible to get beyond a Hobbesian state of nature to the freedom of artistic vision—to exist “as gods,” fashioning a “postcreation” from the fertile realm of human imagination. Stephen refuses to play the game of life as Deasy defines it. He will not capitulate to a society that measures success in terms of aggression and gives the prize to those who have “paid their way” with the shells of other men’s bones.

The rhetoric of imperialism seals the bonds of historical imprisonment. When Deasy insists that “we are a generous
people but we must also be just,” Stephen complains that he fears "those big words . . . which make us so unhappy” (p. 31). He sees neither justice nor generosity in the subservience of his countrymen to a foreign power. The British have reduced Irish political history to a tale of poverty and subjugation. The vocabulary of rationalization sanctions atrocities in the name of manifest destiny.

Garrett Deasy can see the morbid conditions surrounding him, but he projects them onto the scapegoat Jews, “signs of a nation’s decay.” His conversation reflects a political terror of the Jewish financiers attached to the court of King Edward: “Wherever they gather they eat up the nation’s vital strength” (p. 33). Deasy vilifies the Hebrew merchants for a work of destruction that he himself perpetuates. He fails to see the resemblance between his own greed for money, power, and relics of the past and the caricature by which he depicts the Jewish moneylender. In fact, he refuses to consider the possibility that guilt may be universal to mankind:

—A merchant, Stephen said, is one who buys cheap and sells dear, jew or gentile, is he not?
—They sinned against the light, Mr. Deasy said gravely. And you can see the darkness in their eyes. And that is why they are wanderers on the earth to this day. . . .
—Who has not? Stephen said.
—What do you mean? Mr. Deasy asked.
He came forward a pace and stood by the table. His underjaw fell sideways open uncertainly. Is this old wisdom? He waits to hear from me.
—History, Stephen said, is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake.

From the playfield the boys raised a shout. A whirring whistle: goal. What if that nightmare gave you a back kick?
—The ways of the Creator are not our ways, Mr. Deasy said. All history moves towards one great goal, the manifestation of God.
Stephen jerked his thumb towards the window, saying:
—That is God.

Hooray! Ay! Whrrwhee!
—What? Mr. Deasy asked.
—A shout in the street, Stephen answered, shrugging his shoulders. (P. 34)
Deasy quotes the biblical statement “They sinned against the light” to reassure himself of Protestant election. He considers the Jews children of darkness and identifies subtlety as a characteristic of the enemy. He believes that Christian light shines on those who are prosperous and that wealth signifies divine approval. Despising the Hebrew merchants, Deasy paradoxically worships mercantile grandeur.

Earlier in the chapter, Stephen thought of Christ as a man with “dark eyes” whose mythic shadow lay over the earth. Jesus turned away from Caesar’s coins of tribute and renounced political authority. He looked into the obscure depths of men’s souls to proclaim the truth obliquely, through parable and metaphor: “To Caesar what is Caesar’s, to God what is God’s. A long look from dark eyes, a riddling sentence to be woven on the church’s looms. Ay” (p. 26).

Deasy seems to have missed the purport of Christ’s teachings: that he who is without charity is like a clanging cymbal. In his condemnation of the Jews, the schoolmaster has regressed to a mode of thinking far less sophisticated than the Judeo-Christian ethic. For Deasy, “darkness” signifies a stain of defilement, the “something” that infects the condemned scapegoat. Darkness is necessarily ambiguous: it constitutes a sign of moral turpitude, as well as a concrete blemish visible in the eyes of those contaminated. The Jews have been marked by communal guilt, a racial uncleanness imposed by a vengeful God. They have been condemned to wander over the earth as representatives of man’s servile will. To a Deasy-mind, “evil is not nothing... it is posited; in this sense it is something to be ‘taken away.’” By persecuting the guilt-ridden scapegoat, the elect can reify its fear of impurity and purge itself of infection.

Insisting that the Jews must be wanderers, Deasy invokes the classical concept of atoning exile. He accuses the Hebrew race of “blood guilt” for the crucifixion of Christ. Every member of the Jewish family is an involuntary criminal who must atone for the tragic murder of God. The heirs of defilement have to be removed from contact with their fellow citizens. Persecution of the Jews becomes a virtue, a manifestation of justice, and an expression of exemption from the darkness of sin.
Deasy’s morality of contamination comes full circle when he interprets the historical suffering of the Jews as evidence of transgression. He believes that the Hebrews have been dispossessed of Israel, their homeland, in just punishment for their sins. “That is why they are wanderers on the earth,” Deasy argues. The schoolmaster appeals to history as proof of guilt. He has reverted to a pre-ethical stage of thinking, “in which evil and misfortune have not been dissociated, in which the ethical order of doing ill has not been distinguished from the cosmobiological order of faring ill: suffering, sickness, death, failure.”

Deasy is convinced that the misfortunes of the Jews are signs of divine wrath. He rationalizes hatred in the name of justice and places it in the grand scheme of God’s self-revelation. Not only does he agree with Haines that “history is to blame” (p. 20), but he insists that the events of history are directed according to a supernatural plan. By appealing to the deity, he denies human freedom and abnegates personal responsibility for injustice.

Deasy clings to a primitive philosophy of exclusion. Even the language of his argument is structured by a preconscious terror of defilement, a fear of intermixture and infectious contact. “They sinned against the light, Mr. Deasy said gravely” (p. 34). He denotes the Jews by means of the anonymous, subtly condemnatory pronoun, “they,” branding the Hebrew race as irretrievably alien. “They” connotes “otherness”; it refers to “l’autrui,” “those who are different from us.” The first-person subject, “we,” is the direct pronominal opposite of “they.” And it is “we” who have the “light,” another ambiguous term signifying the truth, mysterious and secret, exclusively possessed by us. “Sin” and “light” are words that primitive myth, Greek tragedy, and Christian philosophy have archetypally defined. “Sin” connotes all that is evil; “light,” all that is good. Hence the Manichean antithesis that distinguishes “them” from “us,” vice from virtue, darkness from light. The Jew today is “l’autre,” bound by a two-thousand-year-old transgression so heinous that it continues to defile.

“And you can see the darkness in their eyes,” Deasy continues, again appealing to the antinomy between “you” and
“they,” the unforgettable otherness of the scapegoat. Deasy extends his original aphorism by piling up sentence units that substitute conjunctive parallelism for a logical sequence of causes. “You” who have the light can “see” darkness in their eyes. Deasy is not cognizant of the physical contradiction in terms: one cannot see darkness, a word denoting all that is not visible. But the stain of defilement always “dwells in the half-light of a quasi-physical infection.” The pedagogue assumes the validity of the second term of his syllogism and hastily rushes on to its conclusion. He triumphantly explains: “And that is why they are wanderers on the earth to this day.” “That” includes “all that went before” and vaguely alludes to a rational explanation for Jewish persecution. Deasy attempts to evoke preconscious dread of the exile and fear of contamination. The auditor should infer the antecedent of “that,” not through logical deduction, but from the emotional hostility he has supposedly associated with “they.”

The first and second persons that constitute the “we” are defined by a process of restriction and alienation. It is precisely this movement of rejection that Deasy depends on for his bigoted harangue. The schoolmaster has turned against the Jewish race a Sartrian regard, the “gaze” of petrifaction. In the act of condemnatory judgment, he excludes the Hebrews from the subject-community of the “we” and from the rhythm of humanity. His “Medusa gaze” transfixes his enemy in historical stasis.

Stephen responds to the assertion that “they sinned against the light” by asking the question, “Who has not?” He appeals to a syntactical form of inclusion to make all men participants in the scapegoat category. The phrase “Who has not?” implies that “We all have.” Stephen invokes the language of confession to raise the notion of defilement to a more generalized concept of universal “sin.” Darkness is not a stain imposed by the deity for a particular transgression. It is, in fact, our common experience of limitation, the darkness of fallibility inherent in the human condition. As Stephen declares in “Proteus,” “Darkness is in our souls, do you not think? . . . Our souls,
shame-wounded by our sins, cling to us yet more, a woman to her lover clinging" (p. 48). Stephen imagines the soul as a feminine anima embracing the darkness at the center of human life. Because the individual cannot escape the shadowy side of his nature or deny a "shame-wounded" condition of animality, he unconsciously ascribes the experience of finitude to some inherent fault. In an Augustinian vision of original sin, Stephen suggests that darkness abides not in the eyes of the Jews, but in the soul of every human being.

Deasy clings so fiercely to the idea of contamination that he feels dumbfounded by the terminology of inclusion. He fails to understand even the basic denotation of Stephen's language and can only query, "What do you mean?" "He came forward a pace and stood by the table. His underjaw fell sideways open uncertainly. Is this old wisdom? He waits to hear from me" (p. 34). The schoolmaster has been shaken from his original posture of certitude. In his perplexity, he alters his geographical as well as his psychological stance, in order to get a closer look at the enemy. He has begun to wonder if Stephen actually belongs to the first-person elite and can be counted among those blessed with light. Perhaps he is even searching the young man's eyes for signs of hostile darkness.

According to the schema that Joyce sent Carlo Linati, Mr. Deasy supports the "wisdom of the old world," the archaic modes of Western historical thought. Like the taverners in "Cyclops," Deasy insists that the Hebrews must bear their religious burden of guilt. "They are wanderers on the earth to this day," he declares, attempting to justify by false logic the contemporaneity of racial prejudice.

History, moreover, has determined the pedagogue's linguistic attitudes. Deasy spouts meaningless aphorisms like an automaton declaring the content of its memory chamber. He envisions time as a line of points progressing from an initial creation to a distant teleological end. His perspective is Christian, historical, and eschatological—hardly in line with the cyclical philosophy Joyce adopted from Vico. The old "history," like a ball in a hockey game, moves through time toward
"one great goal." To Stephen, the linear framework is absurd. "What if the nightmare gave you a back kick" (p. 34) and put the ball back into play? The younger man tries to dissociate the present phenomenon of the moment, an individual instant of time and space, from the vast categorical structures invoked by the schoolmaster. He negates the Western concept of history as an infinite number of points on a line, an unbreakable time-space continuum. History is a pier, a "disappointed bridge": reality is constantly in cyclical flux, thrusting the individual back into the waves of Heraclitean movement.

Because language, too, belongs to history, Stephen must revert to signs, to gestures, to a hand that points toward the phenomenon itself. He "jerked his thumb towards the window," saying, "That is God" (p. 34). God is no longer an atemporal deity inhabiting a noumenal realm. The divinity that the new religion shall worship is the god-like freedom of human consciousness to transcend itself in a moment of epiphany:

Hooray! Ay! Whrrwhee!
What? Mr. Deasy asked.
A shout in the street, Stephen answered, shrugging his shoulders. (P. 34).

The quidditas suddenly revealed is the radiance of pure being. By their cries of excitement, the children have achieved a condition of "ecstasy" insofar as the meaning of ekstasis is "a distance from self." They momentarily exult in spontaneous existence, the unmediated union of perceiver and object.10

As a twentieth-century artist, Stephen realizes that the moment itself constitutes the temporal dimension of psychological freedom: it allows the individual to get beyond the historical axes of time and space. For the modern hero, "the moment is all"—whether it is the moment of vision, of fantasy, or of epiphanic discovery. Spontaneity becomes the temporal mode of revelation. The instant negates linear time and asserts the primacy of perception within the "here and now." As Joyce declares in his essay "James Clarence Mangan," "poetry... makes no account of history, which is fabled by the daughters of
memory, but sets store by every time less than the pulsation of an artery, the time in which its intuitions start forth.'"

Consciousness may freely create itself by transcending historical stasis and the confines of a self-reflexive past. The artist becomes god-like in the ecstasy of phenomenal discovery. Once the mind is liberated from the bonds of historical determinism, it stands open to "sudden spiritual manifestation." It can unite with the newly formed object of epiphanic vision in an act of aesthetic "postcreation."

Unlike the boys on the playing field, Garrett Deasy has yielded to the nightmare of viscosity. The fluidity of his consciousness is slowly being sucked into a murky past. Deasy's thoughts are disordered, his historical data jumbled, and all his arguments confused. Like a man drowning in quicksand, he is well on his way to death. Deasy is not an evil person: he has simply fallen prey to a grandiose myth of history and to the imperialistic rhetoric that supports it. His life has been fashioned by forces of the past—by Puritan frugality, evangelical Christianity, and Edwardian xenophobia. Raised on fifty years of Victoriolatry, he attributes political conflict to unfaithful women, from Eve and Helen to Kitty O'Shea. Per vias rectas, he will travel by the straight roads of narrow-mindedness toward the attainment of "one great goal," the manifestation of God.

Stephen, for his part, refuses to serve the self-revelation of an "allbright" deity. He takes refuge in the "mind's darkness" that shelters "a sloth of the underworld, reluctant, shy of brightness, shifting her dragon scaly folds. Thought is the thought of thought. . . . Tranquillity sudden, vast, candescent: form of forms" (p. 26). Like Christ, like the Hebrew race, like Averroes and Moses Maimonides, he will join those "dark men in mien and movement, flashing in their mocking mirrors the obscure soul of the world, a darkness shining in brightness which brightness could not comprehend" (p. 28).

Stephen aspires to become the god of his own creation, outside of time, politics, and determinism. He will explore those imaginative possibilities for which history has no room,
and which art alone can actualize. He will draw the past into the present in the mode of creative memory. Stephen intends to break out of the closed chamber of history into the realm of the intellectual imagination. He will become a god unto himself, creating that which "never was" by transforming the nightmare of history into the magical stories of art.


3. The "nightmare" that Stephen is trying to escape approximates the complex of ideas and feelings that Jean-Paul Sartre describes by using the word "facticity." The English neologism fails to convey Sartre's precise meaning, since the English word "factitious" has inappropriate and misleading connotations. "Facticity" indicates an amalgam of the individual's present situation and past history, both biographical and social; it constitutes the temporal dimension of "being-in-itself" that restricts consciousness to the static viscosity of the past. "Facticity" is, in effect, the persona that the individual presents both to the self and to the world. It is the social identity contingent on one's situation, accomplishments, failures, and victories—in short, all those things that make up the dead past of experience. According to Sartre, the existential self is "pure possibility," defined entirely by future project and by the ability of consciousness to "nihilate" its past. "Nihilate" is another term coined by Sartre. As Hazel Barnes explains: "Consciousness exists as consciousness by making a nothingness [q.v.] arise between it and the object of which it is consciousness. Thus nihilation is that by which consciousness exists. To nihilate is to encase with a shell of non-being" (Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 632, glossary).

4. In his "Natural Science," Aristotle accounts for the eternality of time by the argument that "time can neither exist nor be conceived apart from an actual 'now.' But what we call 'now' is a kind of intermediate state, having the twofold character of a beginning and an end—a beginning, that is to say, of future and an end of past time. Hence . . . it follows that time must necessarily extend backwards from that 'now' as well as forwards from it" ("Natural Science," in Wheelwright, Aristotle, pp. 49–50).

5. Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, p. 155. Deasy invokes a primitive notion of defilement, which "precedes any ethics of the second person and is immersed in the archaic belief in the maleficent virtues of shed blood" (p. 28). As Ricoeur explains, "the representation of defilement dwells in the half-light of a quasi-physical infection that points toward a quasi-moral unworthiness. This ambiguity is not expressed conceptually but is experienced intentionally
in the very quality of the half-physical, half-ethical fear that clings to the representation of the impure” (p. 35).

6. Ibid., p. 27. “Vengeance causes suffering. And thus, through the intermediary of retribution, the whole physical order is taken up into the ethical order: the evil of suffering is linked synthetically with the evil of fault. . . . Suffering evil clings to doing evil as punishment proceeds ineluctably from defilement” (ibid., p. 31).

7. Ibid., p. 35.

8. As Sartre declares in Being and Nothingness, the Other tries to confer on the for-itself an identity as “a thing among things. This petrifaction in itself by the Other’s look is the profound meaning of the myth of Medusa” (p. 430).

9. The Linati schema and its English translation were first published by Richard Ellmann in Ulysses on the Liffey. Ellmann explains: “The famous table of colours, techniques, organs, and other aspects of Ulysses, which Gilbert printed in his book, had a predecessor in one which Joyce made for Carlo Linati in September 1920. In the letter accompanying it he remarked, ‘My intention is not only to render the myth sub specie temporis nostri but also to allow each adventure . . . to condition and even to create its own technique’” (pp. xvi-xvii).

10. According to Sartre, “the For-itself has to be its being ekstatically”; and “change belongs naturally to the for-itself inasmuch as this for-itself is spontaneity” (Being and Nothingness, pp. 136, 148). Sartre takes the term ek-stasis from Martin Heidegger, who writes in Being and Time: “We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, the ‘eestases’ of temporality. . . . That Present which is held in authentic temporality and which thus is authentic itself, we call the ‘moment of vision’. This term must be understood in the active sense as an ekstasis. It means . . . a rapture which is held in resoluteness” (pp. 377, 387).

11. The Critical Writings of James Joyce, ed. Ellsworth Mason and Richard Ellmann, p. 81. Joyce is, of course, adapting Blake to his own purposes. In Virginia Woolf’s novel The Waves, Bernard declares: “The moment was all; the moment was enough” (Jacob’s Room and The Waves, p. 369).