The failure of the Model Cities experiment to produce an acceptable plan for Over-the-Rhine coincided with the arrival in the neighborhood of a new cadre of community organizers, most of them highly religious former members of the middle class who deeply distrusted government and drew support from Protestant and Catholic churches inside and outside of Over-the-Rhine. They also knew and took advice from Harris Forusz, but unlike him they did not seek to empower Over-the-Rhine residents so that they could define and pursue their own life styles. Instead, the new community organizers pushed the idea of cultural individualism to its extreme by contending that the residents had already been empowered and made their choice. On these grounds the new community organizers fought any proposal to racially or socioeconomically integrate, gentrify, or otherwise “improve” the physical design of the neighborhood or the culture of its residents, including not only its poor and predominantly African American inhabitants but also its growing population of homeless people, including especially its alcoholics.

These views created trouble, for the arrival of the new community organizers coincided with an attempt by the city government to make Over-the-Rhine a chic neighborhood with a racially and socioeconomically
mixed population. This conformed, of course, with city council's resolution of 1974 in favor of balance in all of Cincinnati's neighborhoods. But city officials reluctantly pushed the idea in Over-the-Rhine in response to heavy pressure from the Miami Purchase Association (MPA), the city's major historic preservation advocacy organization, and several other civic organizations for the designation of many parts of the city, including some inner-city locales such as Over-the-Rhine, as historic conservation zoning districts.

Some of the impetus for this conservationist pressure came from the U.S. Historic Preservation Act of 1966, which had helped shift the focus in historic preservation from authentic restoration and national patriotism to the "adaptive reuse" of rehabilitated old buildings and neighborhoods and the stimulation of local and neighborhood patriotism. As the act put it, historic preservationists wanted to make the commonplace physical legacy of the past "a living part of our community life and development in order to give a sense of orientation to the American people." The act also strengthened the hand of the MPA and other preservationists in additional ways. It provided federal funds for the establishment of state historic preservation offices to conduct surveys of historic resources and to inflate the volume and accelerate the rate of processing nominations to the National Register of Historic Places. And while the act did not prohibit the demolition of historic resources, it sought to deter their rash destruction in projects involving federal funds by instituting a review process to assess the impact of such projects on potential or designated historic resources and to seek ways of mitigating any adverse impact, not merely demolition, on such resources.

The movement of Cincinnati historic preservationists toward Over-the-Rhine may be traced to December 1964, when the Planning Commission defined open spaces and hillsides, including those on the northern boundary of Over-the-Rhine, as resources for preservation and enhancement because of their aesthetic and psychological value, a definition qualifying them as subject to zoning for the health, safety, and welfare of residents. The next year the Park Board and the Planning Commission set down a schedule by which the Park Board would purchase hillside and hilltop land for use as parks, a scheme that sparked an increased interest among private developers of such land. That in turn intensified efforts to control private hillside developments, including the
design of such developments. City council responded to this pressure in 1972 by appointing a Citizens Task Force on Environmental Quality to make recommendations to protect the right of every citizen to "clean air, pure water, the scenic, natural and aesthetic qualities of his environment, and freedom from excessive noise."

In the meantime the Planning Commission took on a related but somewhat narrower project, the preparation of an overlay zoning ordinance to control the design of hillside developments, neighborhood business districts, areas of high public investment, and historic areas. Between 1970 and 1973 the Commission drew up several drafts of ordinances, including one for historic conservation and one for environmental quality zones covering hillsides, high public investment areas, and neighborhood business districts for which city council had adopted an urban design plan. The Citizens Task Force on Environmental Quality endorsed such a dual approach in its report of 1973, but spent the next three years wrangling with opponents of environmental quality zones instead of working out the language for new historic preservation legislation.

By 1973, however, the MPA and several civic organizations in favor of historic preservation had grown dissatisfied with the historic area protection ordinance of 1964 because it provided no way to cover individual buildings. The concern climaxed in 1972 and 1973 after the Southern Railway announced its intention to demolish the concourse at the rear of the forty-year-old Union Terminal rail passenger station, which, like the front part of the building, contained enormous mosaic tile murals. City council responded in two ways to the public furor over this matter. It negotiated an agreement with the Southern Railway to remove the murals before demolishing the concourse and then adopted an ordinance to protect from demolition or inappropriate alteration three kinds of properties: buildings significant in the history of the city's neighborhoods, the city itself, the state of Ohio, and/or the United States; properties of notable architectural character or of special character because of some other feature, such as landscaping; and properties noteworthy because of public investment for the improvement of their quality or value.

This, of course, did not satisfy the MPA and other advocates of historic conservation zoning districts, whose continued pressure on the Citi-
zens Task Force on Environmental Quality finally paid off. The Task Force’s report, released just after the passage of the listed properties ordinance, supported the idea of environmental quality overlay zoning districts and also proposed the consolidation of the city’s protected areas ordinance, the listed properties ordinance, and the proposed historic preservation zoning overlay district ordinance into a new and comprehensive historic landmarks ordinance modeled on the New York City landmarks legislation.

Director of city planning Herbert Stevens responded unenthusiastically to the Task Force’s call to overhaul the city’s historic preservation legislation. He argued that any action on historic preservation zoning should await the passage of environmental quality zoning district legislation, which might or might not provide for historic conservation zoning. He also contended that the area and listed property ordinances seemed to be functioning satisfactorily.

Stevens did not oppose all design control innovations, however, for he took this occasion to push for the adoption of Interim Development Control (IDC) district zoning, which became law in December 1974. This kind of zoning regulated demolition and development in IDC districts for periods of three months (extendable) while the Planning Commission and city council considered zoning changes affecting the districts. The enabling legislation authorized the Planning Commission to approve only work in IDC districts deemed consistent with proposed amendments to the zoning code and with the prevailing land use, building, and structure patterns in the surrounding neighborhood and community, with the planning policies of the neighborhood, city, metropolitan area, region, or state, and with “sound” planning principles, including physical, social, and economic considerations.

The IDC device gave the Planning Commission a chance to become a major player in the fight to control Over-the-Rhine’s future in connection with the Findlay Market/Pilot Center project. As part of that project the director of the Department of Urban Development tried to persuade Stevens to designate the Findlay Market area as a historic district under the city’s protected areas ordinance and to nominate the area for a place on the National Register to qualify it for federal subsidies for historic preservation projects. Stevens refused both requests. He claimed
that the plans for the project inadequately described the historic characteristics of the area and contended that the Dayton Street protection area stood first in line for National Register designation.\textsuperscript{11}

Nonetheless, Stevens and the Planning Commission stood ready to protect the Findlay Market area through the IDC device because of the anticipated passage of an environmental quality enabling ordinance, the consideration of which made it possible to set up temporary IDC districts to protect potential environmental quality districts. The Planning Commission approved the creation of such an IDC district for Findlay Market in December 1974, instructed the staff to secure the support of community organizations in the area, and held a public hearing on the proposed IDC in March 1975. No one at the hearing opposed the IDC, and several participants, including representatives of the Findlay Market Association and the Over-the-Rhine Planning Task Force, spoke in favor of the proposed IDC regulations,\textsuperscript{12} which cleared the Planning Commission and city council without opposition.\textsuperscript{13}

At this point, however, the environmental and historic preservation district issue in Over-the-Rhine became more controversial because the focus shifted from Findlay Market to the Music Hall–Washington Park area. This shift occurred in the context of the rush by big cities in the 1970s to create mixed-use performing arts centers. To compete in these “amenities” sweepstakes, the Music Hall Association, which managed Cincinnati’s hundred-year-old Music Hall for the city government, decided to undertake an expensive refurbishment of the three buildings making up the facility. To raise money for the project and to protect and enhance the prestige of Music Hall, the Association in short order entered it on the National Register, secured its designation as a listed property under the city’s listed property ordinance, and in 1975 got it designated as a National Historic Landmark under the National Historic Landmark Act of 1935.\textsuperscript{14}

The drive to secure historic status for Music Hall represented merely one event in a general upsurge of nominations to the National Register, including many buildings in Over-the-Rhine. This created confusion and consternation in city hall, where the issue became not pro- or anti-preservation but why so much of it.\textsuperscript{15} To answer that question the Planning Commission contracted with the MPA for a new and “professional
survey and ranking" of Cincinnati's historic resources. The MPA saw this as a golden opportunity to identify and document the thousands of buildings it regarded as eligible for the National Register, but the Planning Commission saw it as a first step toward stemming the proliferation of nominations. The next step would be finding some way to secure an agreement between MPA and the city on which historic sites, buildings, and areas should be nominated to the National Register, which might be considered for local designation under the city's protected area legislation, and which might be left unconsidered and unprotected.  

Well before the completion of the survey, the Department of Urban Development (DUD) started work on a historic preservationist urban design plan for the revitalization of the Washington Park area of Over-the-Rhine as part of its downtown development activities. In the early 1970s DUD conferred with representatives from Over-the-Rhine and with their approval prepared a proposal for a new construction residential development in Garfield Park, which sat four blocks south of Central Parkway, as a complement to a future residential development around Washington Park. The urban design plan for Washington Park (1977) called not only for the refurbishment of the park but also for historically compatible new residential construction on vacant lots and the renovation of old residential buildings to create a neighborhood with a historic ambiance.  

The Washington Park plan failed to specify the income and racial composition of the population that it proposed to accommodate, but several people assumed that implementation of the plan might lead to a mixed-income neighborhood and eventually to higher rents that would displace poor persons. Indeed, the announcement of the Washington Park plan provided the occasion for the first public outcry against displacement from rehabilitation in Over-the-Rhine since the Model Cities planning effort. This time it came from Jack Towe, the holder of a Harvard law degree (but not a practicing lawyer), a white resident of Over-the-Rhine, and one of the new activists on its Community Council. He referred to inner-city neighborhood rehabilitation as "gentrification," by which he meant "rich people moving poor people out" and inflicting on them as a result "psychological, social, and economic stress and family strains." He also called gentrification a major problem in Mt. Adams, Mt.
Auburn, Over-the-Rhine, and the West End, all neighborhoods on the edge of downtown, and quoted approvingly Carl Westmoreland, a young and dynamic black Mt. Auburn community organizer, who contended that neighborhood residents must "own the dirt" or be moved out by owners seeking higher profits.19

These outbursts ended for a time the serious consideration of the Washington Park revitalization plan but did not slow the MPA's drive to put on the National Register many Over-the-Rhine buildings, including several in the Washington Park area. By the end of 1977 these included not only Music Hall but also the Apostolic Bethlehem Temple Church (formerly known as St. John's German Evangelical and Reform Church). In 1978 the Ohio Valley Chapter of the Victorian Society in America added another, the Hamilton County Memorial Building, constructed in 1908 just south of Music Hall to commemorate soldiers, sailors, marines, and pioneers.20

Stevens opposed none of these nominations publicly, but their announcement led him to take the second step in his effort to regulate the nomination of buildings to the National Register. For this purpose he proposed a preservation planning program in which he hoped all parties with an interest in historic preservation would participate and ultimately agree on three things: a list of "excellent" buildings and districts that the city would take the initiative in preserving, a list of marginal buildings and districts that would be considered for preservation on a case-by-case basis by all parties concerned, and a list of buildings and districts that might qualify for the National Register but that would not be nominated by anyone except the owners of the buildings.21

Stevens could not be sure of the outcome of such a participatory planning process. But he pressed on nonetheless and persuaded both the MPA and the Planning Commission, which contained a few preservationist members, to go along. He included the idea in his request for federal Community Development Block Grant money for 197822 and worked hard to keep the proposed preservation planning project alive. In February 1978, for example, he presented to the Planning Commission a report on the U.S. Reform Tax Act of 1976, which provided tax reduction incentives for the rehabilitation of National Register properties for commercial uses, including residential ones. This law, explained Stevens, comprised "a serious threat to the local government's ability to
control and direct the redevelopment of its own communities," for it ap­
plied not only to listed properties but also to historic resources eligible
for but not yet nominated to the National Register.23

At this point Stevens received critical assistance in his effort to de­
velop a comprehensive historic preservation plan from Fred Mitchell, an
ardent preservationist who believed the city's Department of Economic
Development (formerly Urban Development) had not complied ade­
quately with the impact review procedures of the Historic Preservation
Act of 1966. Mitchell checked city hall for documentation of such proce­
dures, found none, and informed the federal Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD). HUD officials then told city manager
William V. Donaldson that the failure to comply could lead to a cutoff of
urban renewal and Community Development Block Grant funds, and
that the responsibility for compliance rested with the city government.24

Donaldson responded to this news by backing Stevens's efforts to se­
cure city government control over historic preservation. Stevens then
took to the Planning Commission the recently completed MPA survey of
historic resources, which he had hoped to use as the basis for developing
the comprehensive historic preservation plan.25 But the staff report on
the inventory noted with dismay that its ranking system classified as "sig­
nificant" 1,000 properties and 209 districts, including all of Over-the-
Rhine (the city's inventory of 1960 identified as significant just 350 sites
and nine districts). Stevens found the list appallingly long and persuaded
the Planning Commission to accept the inventory merely as a "resource
document."26

Stevens next gave the Planning Commission a memo from Donaldson
that endorsed the idea of developing a preservation plan to establish a
priority system to create a "reasonable and manageable list of buildings
and districts we want to protect." Stevens and his staff then drew up a
preservation planning program to work out compromises between the
city government, which wanted to restrict preservation to the protection
of a few architectural or historical gems, and preservation advocates, who
wanted protection for anything that met National Register criteria for
significance. The proposal sought to bridge the gap by creating an Urban
Conservation Task Force made up of representatives of city council, the
Planning Commission, the city's manager's office, the Department of
Economic Development, the Department of Buildings and Inspections,
the Division of Community Assistance, the Environmental Advisory Council, the MPA, the local chapter of the American Institute of Architects, the Greater Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce, real estate developers, and other persons with expertise related to the issue.27

City council endorsed this strategy in August 1978, but it took two years for the Urban Conservation Task Force to complete its work, largely because it used the occasion to work out the details of new historic preservation legislation and to draft ordinances embodying those details. During this time new actors intensified the preservationist pressure on both the Music Hall–Washington Park area and Over-the-Rhine generally. In 1977 sixteen chief executive officers of major Cincinnati-area businesses organized as the Cincinnati Business Committee (CBC) to assist local governments in solving problems, especially downtown problems, that might threaten the economic viability of greater Cincinnati.28 City manager Donaldson shortly thereafter approached the CBC for assistance in developing neighborhood housing, a proposition that Fred Lazarus III, a CBC member, soon focused on the Music Hall–Washington Park area of Over-the-Rhine,29 although Hubert Guest, the former head of the city’s Model Cities program and now director of the city’s Department of Buildings and Inspections, and Susan Utt, the head of the city’s Revolving Loan Fund, told him that the Over-the-Rhine Community Council had failed to unify various factions in the neighborhood and probably would not offer effective cooperation.30 Nonetheless, the CBC organized a complicated operation not merely to develop housing in the Washington Park area but also to make it the first phase in the revitalization of all of Over-the-Rhine and to use historic preservation as a key renewal treatment. It first delegated several of its members to form a charitable company, the Queen City Housing Corporation, to raise and distribute money to a housing developer, and then assessed all of its members to provide Queen City Housing with seed money of $38,250 for the first year of a three-year commitment to the Washington Park project. As developer, Queen City Housing selected Cincinnati Neighborhood Housing Services, Inc., the director of which was Carl Westmoreland. The staunch opponent of gentrification came on board because he believed Lazarus’s vow to avoid the involuntary displacement of poor people from Over-the-Rhine.31

Queen City Housing, however, soon altered this arrangement after it
learned that city, state, and federal law required representation by neighborhood residents on the board of any development corporation operating on their turf, something Westmoreland's organization could not provide. To solve the problem Queen City Housing set up the Heritage Preservation Development Corporation as the not-for-profit agency with which Westmoreland would work most directly, and placed on its board three members of the Queen City Housing board, including Lazarus and W. Joseph Dehner, a young lawyer in one of the city's largest and most prestigious law firms. These three selected six other people, including the president of the Over-the-Rhine Community Council and enough other residents of Over-the-Rhine to give them a majority on the board.

By May 1979 this interesting coalition of corporations and Over-the-Rhine insiders and outsiders had formulated intentions to integrate the Washington Park area racially and socioeconomically. Specifically, it aimed to tap federal historic preservation subsidies and other government programs as well as private sector funds to build new housing and rehabilitate old structures for the creation of a residential area containing blacks and whites and people of low, middle, and upper incomes. It intended also to minimize displacement in the Washington Park area by starting with low-income housing rehabilitation and to avoid forcing anyone out of Over-the-Rhine by raising $2 million to $3 million to purchase from the city's largest low-income housing developer some 1,500 housing units, 80 percent of them in Over-the-Rhine and 1,238 of which qualified for federal rent subsidies. And it proposed to start new construction within eighteen months and to complete the other phases of the Washington Park program in five years.

This seemed a fair, democratic, and practical proposition to Hubert Guest, who steered it through city hall despite the protests of a faction of the Over-the-Rhine Community Council. The leadership of this faction came from Buddy Gray, who had recently won a well-publicized battle with the city's Department of Health to keep open his Drop-Inn Shelter for alcoholics, a Main Street agency which provided food, clothing, and shelter but not treatment of the conventional sort to homeless alcoholics. Before the end of the fight Gray had earned a sympathetic hearing from city council, which deferred to him out of its commitment to community control, despite the opposition of
city manager Donaldson and other members of the city administration. Gray also secured city council support, again over the opposition of the city administration, when he moved the Drop-Inn Shelter to quarters a block south of Music Hall. The location not only offended major patrons of Music Hall, including Lazarus's wife, Irma, but also put the Drop-Inn Shelter within the Washington Park area project, the director of which, in Gray's view, wanted to clear him and his shelter out of the neighborhood.\(^3\)

Despite this opposition, Queen City Housing and its allies, which now included the MPA, pushed ahead with the Washington Park project.\(^3\) The MPA, which Joe Dehner served as a board member, completed in the fall of 1979 a nomination to the National Register for an Over-the-Rhine historic district encompassing 350 acres and 1,300 buildings, and the Ohio Historic Preservation Office and the Planning Commission decided to hold in 1980 a public hearing on the nomination jointly with the Ohio Historic Sites Preservation Advisory Board,\(^3\) the citizens participation agency of the state preservation office. Prospects for approving the nomination brightened in November 1979 when Carl Westmoreland informed the Queen City Housing board that he had conducted a number of successful meetings with Gray and other members of the Over-the-Rhine Community Council at which they expressed dislike for the Washington Park project but seemed willing to discuss plans for the area.\(^3\)

That willingness soon faded, in part because Joe Dehner failed to consult formally with the Over-the-Rhine Community Council when he pushed for the establishment of an emergency IDC district for the Washington Park area in the expectation that the neighborhood would soon become a local historic district under legislation being drafted by the Urban Conservation Task Force. Dehner felt he had to take this hasty step to prevent the Central Park YMCA from lopping off the top six floors of its building, space that Heritage Preservation hoped to convert into apartments for low-income residents of the Washington Park area and Over-the-Rhine.\(^4\)

The Planning Commission considered the IDC request,\(^4\) which as an emergency measure required no public hearing, at a session that featured a stern warning from Barbara Lichtenstein, a member of the city government's Community Assistance Team for Over-the-Rhine. She announced that the Over-the-Rhine Community Council had recently
gone on record against historic preservation (a sign of Gray's growing strength in the organization) because of its belief that such activities would lead to gentrification regardless of Heritage Foundation's pledge to avoid displacing the poor, and she stressed that the Community Council had not been informed of the proposal. Describing Over-the-Rhine as a "very sensitive community," Lichtenstein said, "I'm afraid you are going to be stormed if you enact an IDC without even notifying them. I'm not saying you're not going to be stormed anyway because they're opposed."42

That plea did not sway the Planning Commission or, as it turned out, city council, which was not stormed and which promptly voted for the emergency IDC district.43 Nor was that all. The Planning Commission sent a grant proposal to the U.S. Department of the Interior to fund the writing of a historic conservation plan for the Washington Park area that, it hoped, would placate the Over-the-Rhine Community Council and especially Gray, to whom the staff sent a description of the project and an invitation to participate. The proposal called for an "unparalleled" level of neighborhood involvement in a process that would involve a committee of residents and a community organizer in writing "a plan for the neighborhood . . . largely generated by the neighborhood."44

By this time the Urban Conservation Task Force had virtually completed its work, which produced city council approval of a new chapter (35) of the zoning code that established historic conservation zoning and passage of supplementary legislation to give the city government control over both National Register and local designations. These laws created a Historic Conservation Board to recommend to the Planning Commission historic resources, including districts, for local designation, to review and approve building and demolition permits involving historic properties, to replace the MPA as the Cincinnati liaison to state and federal historic preservation agencies, and to carry out for city departments environmental and historic reviews required by federal law. In addition, the legislation created the position of urban conservator as an assistant to the director of city planning to work with the Historic Conservation Board and to supervise the staff assigned by the Planning Commission to the Board.45

In anticipation of this outcome Over-the-Rhine activist Jack Towe, who was representing the neighborhood on the Urban Conservation
Task Force, began a drive to protect Over-the-Rhine through the enactment of an anti-displacement ordinance and developed in the process an effective twist to the anti-gentrification argument that connected it to the widely discredited urban redevelopment policies of the 1950s and early 1960s. Towe argued that large stocks of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century residential buildings in the inner city would soon be purchased at low prices for private development projects that would displace massive numbers of poor people. This, he contended, would result in an enormous intracity migration of blacks that would transform once white neighborhoods and yield the re-ghettoization of blacks, a phenomenon, he asserted, that had set off days of rioting by blacks in Avondale during the summer of 1967. To back this up he claimed that gentrification had already driven working-class whites out of Mt. Adams and both whites and poor African Americans out of Corryville near the University of Cincinnati and the Liberty Hill neighborhood immediately north and northeast of Over-the-Rhine. In this context Over-the-Rhine appeared to be next in line for massive displacements.  

That argument attracted attention in city hall and so disturbed the city manager that he appointed a committee of seven people from various agencies of city government to assess the extent of displacement since the mid-1960s and consider what might be done to prevent or mitigate it. The group concluded that not much displacement had occurred or could be expected in Cincinnati, not enough to adopt rent controls and other anti-displacement devices of the sort suggested by Towe. Instead, the group recommended continued monitoring of the situation, both to keep track of the movement of middle- and upper-class people into old poverty neighborhoods and to gauge the extent of involuntary displacement of poor people from their homes and neighborhoods.  

The report never reached city council, but a Planning Commission staff member sent a copy to Towe. Shortly thereafter, People Against Displacement, a new Over-the-Rhine organization, asked John Schrider of the Cincinnati Legal Aid Society to draft an anti-displacement ordinance. In the spring of 1979 Schrider completed a draft that provided for rent controls on federally subsidized housing and the payment of relocation benefits of up to $4,000 to people forced out of their dwellings by rehabilitation. Schrider then persuaded Tecumseh X. Graham, a black clergyman and city council member, to ask city solicitor Thomas A.
Luebbers to use Schrider's draft in preparing an ordinance that Graham might bring before council. Luebbers responded with a draft closely resembling Schrider's, but warned Graham that it contained expensive and currently unfunded relocation benefits, including benefits for persons displaced by private sector investments unaided by city assistance.

Luebbers also sent the ordinance to the city administration, including various department heads, all of whom objected to it. As a result Sylvester Murray, the city's new and first black city manager, prepared a draft that lacked rent controls and that applied only to cases of involuntary displacement caused by housing activities involving city assistance. Murray circulated it among his top administrators, most of whom did not like this version either, then sent it to city council with a cover letter noting that he found little support among department heads "for any aspect of the proposed ordinance" and that "different Departments disagree with different sections." Murray concluded by observing that any "final ordinance on displacement will be one the City Council specifically dictates and City Departments will simply have to accept."

Murray's willingness to endorse anti-displacement legislation over the objections of his department heads suggested two things. It implied city council support for an anti-displacement ordinance as well as historic preservation and intimated that the revitalization of Over-the-Rhine would proceed along lines and through means worked out in the 1970s. No one had objected to the rehabilitation of older buildings, though Buddy Gray led a faction of the Over-the-Rhine Community Council that had registered its opposition to the use of historic conservation techniques and subsidies as a means of achieving that goal. The rehabilitation of the Findlay Market area had begun, and a powerful and resourceful coalition with a special interest in the viability of downtown had secured city government support for a Washington Park historic conservation project to create a neighborhood of mixed land uses and mixed peoples as the next major step in revitalizing Over-the-Rhine. That commitment also conformed with the spirit of the city council resolution of 1974 in favor of integrating racially and socially all the neighborhoods of the city.

But the idea of creating a city of integrated neighborhoods in the era of cultural individualism and community control created a potential dilemma for the city's bureaucrats and council members. It left no place for racial and economic separatists, including neighborhood leaders in
Over-the-Rhine who might prefer to preserve it as a pocket of poverty rich in social services, charitable agencies, cheap housing, bars, and homeless shelters for people who had allegedly chosen a life style congruent with such conditions, despite the crime and vice that accompanied them. And confronting that dilemma seemed unavoidable if Gray, who wanted to preserve the status quo in Over-the-Rhine, secured control of the Community Council, unified, eliminated, or mitigated factionalism in its jurisdiction, and demanded that city government adhere to its long-standing commitment to neighborhood autonomy and maximum feasible participation by the poor.