Panel Discussion

The discussion that follows* was not and is not intended to draw together the papers in this volume as studies in medieval and Renaissance culture. Stanley J. Kahrl’s introduction discusses the coherence of the papers as scholarly studies and examines their implications for the study of the Crusades and the holy war tradition in the Renaissance.

In the panel discussion attention shifts from the past as past to the present as both product and analogue of the past. But the present is neither a direct product or a simple analogue of the past, and though, as Mr. Alger points out, there are implications in what is said for teaching and research even outside the earlier periods, this discussion does not come to rest on fully wrought conclusions. The exchange of ideas chronicled here is in the fullest sense a seminar—an effort to plant some seeds and to open a dialogue between the past and present for the sake of the future—Editor.

Professor Stanley J. Kahrl: When we were planning the conference, I did not want to require the medieval scholars or Mr. Greene, the Renaissance scholar, to speak about contemporary events with the same air of authority that we expected them to speak

*Professor Linda Seidel was unable to attend the panel discussion.
about their subject matters. Too often, when talking about “relevance” in teaching, for example, we take a scholar who is a recognized authority in an earlier period and expect him, because he is an authority there, to be an authority on things that we wish to have explained about our contemporary experience. However, there are scholars who take it as the focus of their interest to reflect on the evidence that is accumulating in the immediate past and to read recent documents in the same way that the speakers have looked at documents from the more distant past. So, we asked a representative of the Mershon Center of the Ohio State University, Professor Chad Alger, to join us and to do the direct reflecting on what kinds of connections could be made between the papers that have been presented in the conference and the kinds of warfare that all of us have had as an immediate background to our lives.

Professor Alger, a political scientist by training, will lead off the discussion with prepared thoughts. The other members of the panel will then respond to the connections that he may have seen among their papers and to the remarks that he has made. At the conclusion of that, we will entertain questions.

Professor Chadwick F. Alger: The Mershon Center is a research center where scholars from a number of disciplines come together, hopefully pooling their knowledge so that it can be directly useful to government and nongovernmental policy makers outside the university. Other people in the university are doing the same kind of thing, but at the Mershon Center we see this as our particular mission, and it is quite appropriate for what I’m supposed to do today: conduct an interdisciplinary dialogue with my colleagues on the platform and in the audience and speculate a little bit about what the papers we’ve heard mean in our present context.

I am quite out of place in the sense that occasionally I look back to the ancient history of World War I. Once in a while I look back on the prehistoric past of the nineteenth century as I work in the area I know the most about, the United Nations system, and try to discern some nineteenth-century roots of the system, and so forth. So, my own work is mainly about what any historian would call “the present” and has largely to do with international organizations.
Rather lately this has stimulated me, on another line of inquiry, to look into the international connections and links of metropolitan communities, beginning with Columbus as a case, in order to unravel and understand a bit better our present international predicament. Part of that predicament is that masses of the public find it difficult to understand how they personally relate to the world as a whole; they find they are unable to evaluate their own participation and involvement and to know how to accept personal responsibility for the international state of affairs. Though you may think that the international relations of people in Columbus, Ohio, is a subject unrelated to the Crusades, near the end of my comments I will forge a link.

Certainly, we don't have to try very hard to find analogies between the events discussed in the papers and the present scene. For example, modern social science tells us of the importance of internal factors as causes of external wars; there is much in the literature about population expansion, about new weapons technology, and about the effect of other internal problems on external wars. Mr. Cowdrey and Professor Watt have shed new light on these that I think is helpful for scholars of more modern wars. Likewise, Professor Brundage has stimulated us to ponder the ways in which more recent lawyers have justified the conduct of holy wars far from home. He makes us feel uncomfortable that we so readily see through the legalisms of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and smile as we listen, but have often ourselves been swayed by their twentieth-century counterparts. Professor Greene causes us to think more carefully when we use the word “war” in many contexts such as “War on Poverty” and “War on Hunger” and to examine its subtle effect on how and perhaps why we become engaged in these wars. The visual images provided by Professor Seidel and the words and music provided by Professor Crocker have added depth and vividness to the prose images of the holy wars provided by other speakers.

Now, beyond that, as I try to assess the points raised in a more systematic way, I think that my own reactions will be personal and swayed by the fact that much of what I heard, the interpretations,
and so forth, were quite new to me and, I imagine, have a somewhat
different impact on me than they might have on others. As I stand
back from a multitude of concrete analogies to the present, it seems
to me that the holy wars, as analyzed by our speakers, raised three
kinds of questions which those of us concerned about the exercise
of large-scale violence in our own time might wish to speculate on
and about which we might even wish to take some action.

1. What has been the impact of the holy wars in setting cultural
and normative patterns that continue to shape thought and
action in Western civilization to the present day?

2. What has been their impact on the perspectives and atti­
titudes of organized religion in Western civilization that
endures to the present day?

3. What is their relevance as reminders that if we permit
certain conditions to develop, any society, no matter what
its internal values, is capable of holy war?

Now, I would like to briefly talk about those three questions.
First, should the holy wars of the eleventh and twelfth centuries be
looked upon as a kind of cultural learning or normative develop­
ment in Western civilization that has been applied and reapplied up
to the present day? Professor Brundage suggested this interpreta­
tion when he asserted that vestiges of holy war are to be found in
Western colonialism in Africa and Asia, in United States expansion
westward, with the Spanish collanges, and some would wish to add
Vietnam. If this is true, those abhorring violence might wish to
consider how we might revise patterns of cultural learning. Do
wars, holy and otherwise, play too prominent a part in our dis­
cernment of who we are as cultures and societies and who we have
been? Thus, do they have undue influence on who we wish to
become, as cultures and societies, and on the techniques chosen for
achieving these objectives? What does this have to do with the
selective way in which we teach about the past and particularly the
more recent past?

Second, should the holy wars of Christianity be looked upon as a
significant turning point for the religious institutions of Western
A PANEL DISCUSSION

185

society? Up to that point, there seems to have been a possibility that the Church could become a vital force in the implementation of its doctrines on nonviolence and brotherhood as behavioral norms for Western civilizations, but the Church undermined this potential when it became immersed in large-scale violence itself. This left a heritage of military symbolism that could be exploited by rising interests, and the potential the Church might have had for moral leadership against violence was undermined when the Church itself took up the sword. Thus, and as a twentieth-century historian I simply speculate, it would seem that forever afterward, Western civilization was deprived of what could have been the key institutional base for restraining the use of violence. If this is true, those in the Church concerned about large-scale violence in the present and future might ask how the Church might rid itself of its military symbolism and use symbols more in accord with its nonviolent teachings. They might wish to examine how the Church came to be organized in the image of the nation-state system. They might wish to question the continuing impact of this method of organization on the capacity of Christians to wage holy wars, even against each other.

Third, should the holy wars, both Christian and Islamic, be looked at not purely in terms of the societies in which they occurred but as a kind of phenomenon to which all societies and nations are susceptible under certain conditions? From this point of view, we would not look on Western colonialism, in Africa and Asia, as vestiges of earlier holy wars, but as a recurrence of holy war under similar conditions. This perspective would assert that these holy wars would have taken place even if the Crusades had not. Under what conditions does this kind of war then occur? The papers seem to provide four main conditions: (1) the ability to define some out-group in such a way that restraints on violence within your group do not apply to them, and certainly a condition for this is ignorance about out-groups, an ignorance based partly on considerable lack of contact with these out-groups; (2) inability to use certain skills, equipment, and human energy in any other enterprise within the society, and therefore, the need to use it in foreign
ventures of this kind; (3) an available external target—such as resources, holy places, markets, infidels—against which in-group feelings can be exercised with available technology; (4) an ideology in which this activity can be clothed so that mass support can be obtained for the activity.

What are the obligations of researchers and teachers to help their own society understand that, no matter what the ideals of the society, they are not immune from holy war? How might this be done? All three of these questions have implications for thought, for research, for teaching, and for action. Each question reflects a number of other questions and further concerns, and before I conclude I would like to come around again to each of these questions and make some comments on them.

First, I will return to the question of the impact of holy war on our cultural and normative heritage. The symposium has convinced me that the historical roots of militarism through symbols, selective history, models of heroes, and so forth has a greater impact than I had realized. In my own teaching, which I indicated focusses on international organizations, particularly the UN system, I have long recognized the problem of obtaining interest in, and disseminating information about, the economic and social activities of the UN system. Whereas there is tremendous interest in the peacekeeping activities of the UN system, the press, the public, and the university courses are much less concerned with the economic and social progress of the UN. Now, I had always believed that this was because American society thinks it has more of a vested interest in peacekeeping than in economic and social activities; because wealthy, healthy, powerful societies have a vested interest in preserving the status quo, and therefore, they want law and order. Those that don't have economic and social justice want it, and they are more interested in these activities. That has been my explanation; now I'm not so sure. I think perhaps there is some deeply engrained cultural interest and fascination in military activities, and this carries through today so that the UN is continually perceived as mainly involved in peacekeeping activities and not very much perceived as an organization engaged in
a variety of economic and social good works. So, in the context of my own scholarly activity, I perceive a challenge to my assumptions about why Americans have such a strong interest in peacekeeping.

Turning back to the second point, related to the impact of the Crusades on the Church, I see a new perspective, the widespread military symbolism of the Christian Church, and understand a little better why the Christian Church lacks the capacity to provide strong moral leadership in support of its nonviolent precepts. This reinforces my own belief that international violence is in part a consequence of the fact that nongovernmental institutions, such as churches, so thoughtlessly mirror the nation-state system in their own organizations. This form of organization has a pronounced effect on the perspectives and activities of churches and inhibits their capacity to restrain leaders of violence against other nations. The international ties of churches are not strong enough to overcome the impact of their basic nation-state form of organization, and the international ties do not touch the activities and perceptions of members at the grass roots.

Let me turn now to the third point, that any society, no matter what its internal values, is capable of conducting holy wars, and to the problems and responsibilities this creates for us as scholars. I think that the term *holy war*, not in my personal vocabulary before yesterday, is an exceedingly useful concept for considering the conditions under which *all* nations and societies will violate their own fundamental values in military campaigns against *them* (i.e., those defined as out-groups) and will usually do this in the name of defending these internal values. Although we have superb analyses of holy war, as revealed in this symposium, we have not adequately expressed the notion that all, even *us*, are susceptible to involvement. This is more the fault of those of us who teach about men and events that are closer to the present time and closer geographically to the locale where we are teaching. It is more our responsibility than that of the other scholars who are sitting at the table here. This is partly because scholars, like churches, are organized in the image of the nation-state system. As a result, no national academic
community is as able to analyze with insight the holy wars in its own society as it is to analyze the holy wars of them.

I would like to give an example that relates to events about two and one-half miles from here. I would imagine that quite a number of the graduates of the public schools in Columbus, and of this university, are aware of the burning of books during the Hitler regime in Germany, and that this has created negative attitudes toward them that still endure, while at the same time reinforcing a sense of the superiority of us. Although I have been a resident here for less than three years, I would guess you would find only a handful of graduates who know about the burning of books in Columbus during World War I. I would like to read a paragraph from the history of that period that is buried near the end of a somewhat lengthy analysis of Columbus during World War I:

The study of German in the public schools was first restricted and later banished entirely. Unpatriotic actions and comments by teachers were so persistently reported that the Board of Education in May 1918 adopted a resolution warning all employees that all reports of disloyal acts and utterances would be promptly investigated and that proof would be followed by speedy and positive discipline, regardless of all considerations of service. The banishing of German from schools was made the occasion of the public burning of German textbooks. Woodpiles were made on the street corners on East Broad Street and books brought to them were burned April 19, 1918, while members of the Columbus Reserve Guard stood by to see that there was no interference. The Board of Education was more thrifty than individuals: it sold its German texts at 50 cents a hundred pounds on condition that they be reduced to pulp. The proceeds totaled more than $400.

Likewise, I would imagine that few citizens in Columbus would know of the restraints that were at the same time placed on those who attempted to give a more literal interpretation to Christian scriptures about nonviolence and peace. I read again from the same page: "More than 6,000 copies of Pastor Russell's The Finished Mystery and 20,000 copies of the Kingdom News, organ of the International Bible Students' Association, were seized here as dangerously pacifist, and distribution was prohibited except to bonafide members. A map maker in state employ, for distributing
this sort of literature, was dismissed from his place as a result of his arrest." The point is, that, whereas we teach sometimes quite effectively about their holy wars, we are negligent in helping develop better understanding of our own.

In conclusion, I hope the panel will react to the three themes I have selected in order to apply the main currents of their papers to a present context. I hope, too, they will have some thoughts on how the academic community can more adequately make citizens understand the mechanism whereby they become susceptible to holy wars. By academic community I mean not only national communities of scholars but also the more vital international communities of scholars that might provide an essential guarantee against holy wars. Our deliberations on these issues are exceedingly important. If history teaches us anything, it teaches us that holy wars will continue until we develop more adequate knowledge, educational programs, and public policies for preventing them. It would be folly to believe that Vietnam was the last holy war of this society. It would be irresponsible for scholars to entirely shift guilt for past and future holy wars to policymakers and off their own shoulders.

Professor James A. Brundage: Since you are interested in the United Nations, why not point out what may be a blood-chilling thought to you: that while there was no United Nations organization in the medieval period, the closest thing they had to it was the medieval church, the only viable international society the Middle Ages knew, and it was precisely that international society which became involved in the holy war.

Professor W. Montgomery Watt: The holy war seems to be found everywhere, and therefore, as one thinks about the future peace of the world, one shouldn’t hope to eliminate the conception of the holy war from man’s makeup, but to see rather whether this can be sublimated in some sense.

I have something like twenty Muslim post-graduate students working with me in Edinburgh, and I read the paper to them that I read to you. Now, when I did this, there was a surprising reaction. As you realize, for part of the paper I was trying to defend Islam
from the charge of spreading by the sword, but the students took up
an entirely different point of view. In a sense, they were all for the
holy war, but they were all for it because it is a necessary part of
their conception of the Islamic "commonwealth," since there was
also a kind of Islamic commonwealth of nations in the medieval
period.

Part of our conception of ourselves as members of a community
or a society requires both a belief in certain positive values for
which we stand and a belief in certain negative values against which
we campaign and which we strive to eliminate. Thus, if we are to
have a universal society of mankind, I think it has to have both
positive values in which it believes firmly and negative values,
though we would hope that the negative values are not all projected
onto one unfortunate group of people, but are perhaps things we
have to struggle against inside ourselves, a point that came out in
several of the papers.

Professor Richard L. Crocker: I would like to continue briefly
exploring the idea that Professor Watt just mentioned. In studying
the text of the trouvère Crusade songs, I became impressed with the
nature of the inner experience as one of the great motivating forces,
and this idea was buttressed by what Mr. Cowdrey had to say at
much greater length and with much more substantial documenta­
tion: the inner conviction of the pilgrim as he goes on the holy war
seems to be one of the important contributing factors.

But then I look at our experience in the Vietnam War and that
kind of inner sense of mission either seemed to be lacking or so
extraordinary that when somebody did pop up with a sense of
mission, there was usually a news article written about him, some
special mention made of this person who really felt he knew what he
was doing in Vietnam and had no doubts about his purpose there.
Yet it would seem that a comparable mechanism in the absence of a
strong internal sense of mission was operating in the minds of many
of us. I would translate it by saying we were so concerned with our
own problems, whether or not we had a solution and therefore a
mission, that we were not able to see clearly the problem of the man
standing in Vietnam, the Vietnamese, his view of the world, his
needs, his problems, and how they were focussed in this particular situation. If there were some cultural mechanism through which we could gain self-consciousness of our own total absorption in our own needs, perhaps this would be one way out of this situation.

But I think it was remarkable in the Vietnam War that the sense of mission apparent in the First World War, and the Second World War, and perhaps even in the Korean War seemed to me to be absent. Professor Alger, your fourth point was the need for an ideology that justifies the particular holy war in question. My feelings about the Vietnam War was that had there been an ideology at the beginning, it had drastically deteriorated towards the end of the war. Did you feel that was the case?

Alger: I certainly agree with you. My impression is that, as the war began, the leadership believed that anticommunism, which had sustained a tremendous variety of U.S. public policies ever since the McCarthy period, would sustain the war. Midway through the war the degree of anticommunism fell below the level necessary to sustain the war, and in the end large numbers of Americans viewed that war in quite a different sense from the other wars you spoke of.

Professor Thomas M. Greene: I would like to comment primarily on the first point raised by Professor Alger, a question of enduring influential normative patterns set by the holy war. One might argue that, on the basis of twentieth-century history, normative patterns last all too briefly, and are derived simply from the experience of the immediate past. One might say, for example, that all the nations who engaged in World War I, engaged in that war on the basis of the long relative peace that prevailed in Europe after the Napoleonic wars; one might then argue that democracies were so slow in recognizing the dangers of Hitlerism in the thirties because they were still reacting to World War I, and were feeling the revulsion from war that stemmed from World War I. One might also argue that the Korean War was fought on the basis of some kind of false analogy with World War II. And one might then argue that the Vietnam War was based on a false analogy with the Korean War, and so on. We may well be condemned to misunderstand
Vietnam and react badly to some future situation. The indication seems to be that we need a sense of the particularity and uniqueness of each historical situation.

The lessons that we draw from events are always simpler than the events themselves. We can’t stand the intolerable complexities of events, and it’s important for us, if we are going to remain sane, to draw interpretations from them. We must not, then, become the victims of those inadequate interpretations. For example, I remember that Secretary of Defense Forrestal, who served under President Truman, spoke of the Cold War—America confronting Russia—in terms of the Peloponnesian War in the history of Thucydides. I would see that as a more flexible, less rigid, less determining pattern than the pattern of the Crusade or the pattern of the holy war itself; it leaves more open to the human intelligence in dealing with contemporary events. Perhaps, still more refined patterns might emerge.

I think ultimately, if we are going to be talking about these issues at all, we have to decide whether we are basically Erasmians or Machiavellians; few of us perhaps are Lutherans in this particular sense. If we are going to speak intelligently about what we are told, we have to decide whether we think with Erasmus that war is really something essentially inhuman, something inappropriate for human society, or whether, on the other hand, we have to admit, reluctantly, that indeed, armed conflict is something inevitable, an essential part of human experience. Only if we put ourselves on the line facing that issue, can we go on and talk intelligently about all these subsidiary questions.

Mr. H. E. J. Cowdrey: One of the most impressive things about all that has been said in this conference is that from very different standpoints, we all seem to be basically of one mind about this whole problem of holy war. This, in a sense, underlines the one point I would like to make, and that is the tremendous responsibility the scholarly community has to the world at large in respect to holy war and all the problems it raises in society. I speak with terrible shame as not just a committed Christian but an ordained minister of a Christian church, that the churches must be admitted
to show up so badly in this respect. You Americans have been talking about your trauma in Vietnam; our trauma is in our own United Kingdom, in Northern Ireland. In many ways the situation there is more depressing than Vietnam and probably more intractable. It doesn’t augur well for the capacity of the Christian churches, at least at the moment, to ward off holy war ideas and ghetto mentalities, when internal pressures and tensions in a society generate the kind of ideas that are current on both sides in Christian Ulster.

On the other hand, I am very much heartened as a scholar. No book, I think, has been of greater importance on this whole subject of the holy war than one written in 1935—and that date is very significant—by a German scholar, Carl Erdmann, and called *The Origins of the Crusading Idea*. This is one of the finest and most influential works of modern Crusading scholarship, as I think almost any medieval scholar would allow; and it was written as a deep protest against Nazism by a scholar who remained in Nazi Germany. In his own way, though an indirect one, in the end he died for his convictions. See the obituary by F. Baethgen, in Erdmann’s posthumous *Forschungen zur politischen Ideenwelt des Frühmittelalters*. A long-term result of such witness has been to enable us to have the kind of discussion we are having today and to achieve from our very different standpoints so large a note of agreement, at least about the basic approach to this problem. I suppose it is the great vocation of the scholar not just to retire into medieval studies or even into modern studies and escape from the modern world, but always to try to see his study as a means to self-understanding and to try to communicate that to the world at large. Perhaps, in particular, Erdmann did this, with his tremendous influence not only in German scholarly circles but, since the war especially, beyond them as well.

*Kahrl*: The defining of out-groups is certainly one of the most crucial aspects in developing a sense of the mission of a holy war, and, in focussing on the responsibilities of the academic community, Professor Alger has raised questions that all of us can reflect on at leisure later. Mr. Cowdrey, you have certainly provided a
case of the type that we ought to consider. Halberstam's book *The Best and the Brightest* makes it clear that the people in American academic and public life suffered in the early fifties for the same kind of witness, if you would like to use that word, against the policies of that day, notably McCarthyism. And though they suffered rather horribly, some of them at the cost of their careers, the majority of the academic community stood by and did very little to support them.

But I suppose the real issue is that nobody speaking at this conference seems to be in favor of holy wars, and yet many of the texts that we deal with are very much in favor of holy wars. Perhaps, with the exception of Machiavelli, this is not true of the ones Mr. Greene cited; but I think of the *Chanson de Roland* and there is no question that is a propaganda text for the kind of attitude which we all now deplore. I think it is worth teaching those things because they are not texts which are isolated in time but texts which have connections with the present of the type we have been exploring today.

*Question:* The Crusade as a holy war continued until the pontificate of Gregory X, and probably really ended with Acre's fall in 1291. Thereafter, numerous propagandists called for a renewed Crusade, yet none ever occurred. In the indifference expressed after 1291, is there any comparison to the reaction that is taking place today, i.e., an indifference toward the events in Southeast Asia or the indifference of many in the United States to the future of the countries that at one time we felt we had to support as a crucial part of our national interest?

*Brundage:* That's a very difficult question. Of course, after 1291 you do have crusading armies raised. They didn't get very far, but they were raised; and they tended more and more to take the characteristics of plundering expeditions rather than anything else.

There is one other reflection along that line I might mention. One of the reasons why I think you have so little reaction after 1291 to these repeated appeals for Crusades, is that the impetus, for monarchs in particular, to pursue Crusades is largely dormant, since the "perfection" of a system of taxation to support Crusades was a constant enticement for monarchs to declare their intention of
going on a Crusade, to levy a crusading tax, which was enormously profitable, and then to postpone going on a Crusade, hopefully, *ad infinitum*. This left them with a bag full of money, which they could then deploy for other, and sometimes deplorable, purposes. It enabled them to buy internecine wars, although, of course, one of the reasons for starting the Crusades in the first place had been to deflect internal conflicts. There is a possibility the thing had come full circle.

I wouldn’t like to suggest that this is an analogy that will be repeated. It is what you see in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries very largely. You do have crusading armies raised until the time of Pius II, who raised one, and then he died at Ancona just as he was about to set off, but that is the last I know of.

*Kahrl:* Mr. Crocker raised the whole issue when he suggested, on the basis of his evidence, that the middle classes and the bourgeois elements of northern France, at least, seemed to have a considerable indifference to the idea of the Crusades. Would you feel there is any historical justification to this suggestion?

*Brundage:* The cities that get involved are primarily maritime cities, as in Italy: the Genoese get involved, the Pisans get involved, the Venetians get involved. But inland cities, having less direct economic interests in the Levant, tend to be relatively uninvolved except where the Crusade takes the form of an eschatological religious movement, as it does, for example, in the popular Crusade of Peter the Hermit. Other than that, cities seem to take a relatively small part in it. One exception would certainly be Milan, in the Crusade of 1101. That’s the only major exception I can think of.

*Cowdrey:* The second part of the question—about the withdrawal of responsibility after a trauma like the failure of a Crusade—suggests a danger in modern society, certainly in the Common Market countries of Europe, but also in the United States. I sense that we are getting very preoccupied with our own problems, economic problems particularly, and one danger is that both in Europe and America, we shall find good ideological reasons, of one kind or another, for no longer trying to help
underdeveloped countries—for example, for genetic reasons, or cultural reasons, or what have you. I see a very big danger in both American and European societies, that we shall find excuses of that kind for turning in on ourselves and trying to solve our own problems in isolation. This could set off a chain reaction resulting in a kind of backlash from the underdeveloped world, which could prove extremely dangerous to civilization. A lesson we could well learn in the long term from over-reaction against the holy war, is the danger of reacting against international involvement and turning right back into one’s own society, to the neglect of the world at large.

**Question:** In Mr. Cowdrey’s lecture he referred to a hierarchy of reasons for war in medieval Europe—rights, interests, and ideas. When he inaugurated the growth of ideological warfare in the time of Gregory VII and Urban II, he left somewhat ambiguous the problem of which came first. Did ideological warfare rise after the fact of wars for interest or was ideological warfare a new species of *raison d’être* for warfare?

**Cowdrey:** In the quotation from Stubbs’s *Constitutional History of England*, Stubbs was saying that the sequence of rights, interests, ideas is largely postmedieval rather than medieval. Warfare for rights really occurred in the late Middle Ages when the kings took over, so to speak, with the secular wars, after the crusading epoch. Henry V of England was his great example of warfare for rights. Warfare for interests is more a seventeenth- and eighteenth-century phenomenon, and insofar as modern history is concerned, warfare for ideas crops up again subsequent to the French Revolution.

Crusading, however, back in the eleventh century, had been a warfare for ideas, and we can see modern warfare for ideas as being, in some sense, a resurgence of the older crusading kind of warfare. As regards the relationship between ideas and what one might call interests in the First Crusade itself, we’ve got a sort of chicken and egg situation here, partly, I think, because the medieval people were less demanding than we tend to be in expecting people to have some sort of consistency in their motives. The text about the
Lisbon Crusade of 1147, the *De expugnatione Lyxhonensi*, shows very clearly how Crusaders could go off at one and the same time trying to glorify God and win the remission of sin and spiritual benefits by their crusading activities, and also in search of booty. These two things seemed quite compatible in their minds. I don’t think they were aware of a contradiction, as we probably would be, in this kind of thing. On the First Crusade, too, not long after the Crusaders set out from Constantinople toward Antioch, they had to do battle against the Turks, and they won. There was a war cry, “Stand fast all together; trusting in Christ and in the victory of the Holy Cross. Today, please God, you will all gain much booty” (*Gesta Francorum*, ed. Hill, pp. 19–20). I’m not, therefore, sure that one can really talk about priorities, but in the West, anyway, warfare for ideas took a big leap forward in the late eleventh century. That certainly is true.

**Question:** Now that Professor Watt has given us a more sympathetic view of the supposedly fanatic Muslims, I wonder what the Muslims’ reaction was to these strangely motivated invading Crusaders?

**Watt:** The point to be stressed is that the Crusades occupy a large part in European history and have had, as we have seen from this conference, a continuing influence on the thinking of Europeans and Westerners. This is a much greater part than the one they play in Islamic history, where, I think, the Crusades are best described as a kind of frontier incident. They were relatively unimportant. At this period you are dealing with Islamic territories that stretch into Central Asia (Bukhārā and Samarkand) and include North India, a large part of Central Persia, Iraq, and eastern Syria, which were at that time under the Seljuqs, whose capital was somewhere in the center of Persia. Things happening in a few square miles on the Mediterranean coast were of no interest at all.

I spent quite a lot of time studying a man called al-Ghāzalī, who was in Jerusalem a year or two before it fell to the Crusaders, and nowhere in his writings or any of the accounts of his life is there the least reference whatsoever to the Crusades. If you take the general histories of Islam, some of the chief events of the Crusades do get a
paragraph or two here and there, but it was a thing of no impor­
tance.

At that period this part of the world—Syria, Palestine—was not
securely controlled by the Seljuq sultan who ruled Persia and Iraq.
The local princes, who were princes in a very small way, were
relatively independent, and the Crusaders just looked like another
of these little princelings you see squabbling with one another. This
is all it was in the eyes of the Muslims. To be fair, perhaps I ought
to say that there were certain Muslims who were more closely
affected by it, and we do find poems about the Crusades and they
are mentioned in local histories.

By and large, however, the Crusades were quite insignificant in
the histories of Islam, and, therefore, it is wrong to speak about the
Crusades as damaging relations between Christians and Muslims.
Muslims had been dealing with Eastern Christians from the very
beginning of the Islamic state, and to deal with Christians and to
have intellectual defenses against the Christian ideas was nothing
new. For the Europeans, on the other hand, it was necessary, along
with the Crusades, to set up their intellectual defenses against
Islam. It was in the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries
that Europeans set up their intellectual defenses against Islam in
the form that I call the distorted image of Islam, which is something
that still affects us. As I like to put it, we in the West are still
influenced by the aftermath of medieval war propaganda.

Kahrl: One of the points Mr. Crocker made in his talk was that
the attitudes expressed in the songs were those of people who knew
nothing about Islam. Is there any evidence that increased tolerance
for the Muslims developed in the Western communities that were
in contact with them as opposed to the communities that remained
at home?

Brundage: There’s a certain amount of evidence that this hap­
pened, for example, in the Latin settlements in the East. The peo­
ple who settled in the East became to some degree acclimatized.
For example, the memoirs of Usāma ibn al-Munqidh, the twelfth­
century Syrian writer, clearly indicate he was aware that the newly
arrived Franks from the West were more barbarous and less polite
than the ones who had been settled there for a while. And this is also perceived more in a negative sense, by Crusaders who arrive fresh on the scene and are rather startled, shocked, and indignant at the way Latin populations of the Kingdom of Jerusalem had gone native. They didn't like this a bit, and they find the notion of a Latin ruler wearing Arabic dress, eating Arabic style foods, and even having a harem totally abhorrent. Probably you would find the same sort of thing on the Spanish frontiers; Burns's studies of the crusading Kingdom of Valencia, for example, I think would bear out this thought.

Kahrl: I asked that question because it relates to an issue Mr. Alger raised: the more one can get to know about the people who have been defined as aliens, the less easy one finds it to treat them as aliens, the less available they become as a target for hostility and intolerance. From what little I know of the activities of the Crusaders, once they had settled down in the area, their fervor seemed to be considerably less than the Franks who followed them out.

Crocker: Mr. Kahrl, I have a question on the mechanism of the identification of the out-group. I was meditating on this point which Professor Alger raised, and it seems to me there is a slight complexity in the mechanism involved. On the one hand, the out-group needs to be singled out, identified, given attributes that would make them worthy targets of aggression, and, on the other hand, this is made possible by, as he pointed out, ignorance and lack of contact on the part of the people partaking in the holy war. It occurs to me that these two aspects possibly weren't carried out by the same people. Some of the people are ignorant, and somebody else is articulating the out-group against which their aggression can be directed. Since this point was brought up in at least one of the lectures, and I wasn't aware that there was so much information on it, I would like to ask to what degree were the out-group and the aims of the Crusades articulated, defined, even proposed by highly placed authorities, not welling up from below but set forth by the pope. And then, if we could ask Professor Alger, as a scholar looking at a recent event, to comment upon to what degree he thinks the articulation came from above?
Cowdrey: If I may just say a word with the First Crusade mainly in mind. With all the reservations I made in my paper about our poor documentation of what those who preached the Crusades actually said, one’s impression is they said very little about the Muslims or about the character of their religion, simply because they knew next to nothing about Muslims. One authority on this subject, Sir Richard Southern, in *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages*, says he has found only one mention of the name Muhammad in a Western source outside Spain and Southern Italy before the twelfth century. They were as ignorant as that about the Muslim religion; they knew just nothing about even the prophet himself. Urban seems to have talked about the Holy Sepulchre, the familiar place of pilgrimage that people had been visiting frequently, particularly in the eleventh century, since the Christianization of Hungary made it possible to take an overland route to the Holy Land. Urban also spoke of the subjection of Eastern churches to the Muslim yoke, without, of course, defining very clearly what the Muslim yoke involved. It was these two decidedly Christian things—the Holy Places and certain churches that were subject to an alien yoke—rather than anything intrinsic in Islam itself that people were talking about, insofar as people talked about the Muslims at all. The only connection, I think, in which this came up, was some of the “propaganda” literature at the time of the First Crusade, which turned on the destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in 1009 by the Fatimid Caliph Hakim. But this was fabricated and secondary, and I doubt whether it had a very wide influence.

It is also noteworthy both in the First Crusade and in the Second Crusade that much of the case against the Muslims, insofar as it was intellectually formulated, didn’t concern their religion so much as the fact that both at Antioch in the First Crusade and at Lisbon in the Second Crusade Muslims were unjustly detaining land that had once been Christian. These Crusades were seen as attempts to win back justly for Christian domination land that rightly belonged to Christians anyway. I don’t think there was any authentic awareness whatsoever of Islam in the early stages of the crusading movement.
Kahrl: That comment of yours reminds me of nothing so much as the attacks that were made on various presidents during the last twenty years for “losing China” or “losing Vietnam” and Johnson’s own feeling that he was not going to go down in history as the man who “lost Vietnam,” somehow or other thinking it was something he had to lose in the first place.

Alger: I would like to respond to Professor Crocker’s excellent question. We certainly have learned that the relationship between contact and degree of conflict is complicated. Too many of us carry around in our heads the notion that if there would only be more contact, somehow conflict would vanish, but we all know that there can be no conflict without contact. A potential enemy has to be seen, and you have to have ways to get at him before you can have any conflict at all. On the other hand, it does seem that the situations and roles through which cross-cultural contact takes place are rather important. For instance, it is quite possible for an American tourist to circle the globe in his Western bubble—inside a Hertz car drinking Coca-Cola and staying in intercontinental hotels—and there is really no intercultural contact except with citizens from the other countries in lowly service positions. So that’s the image you get. We have the same kind of phenomena in cross-cultural relations in our own society, where stereotypes generate because of the roles that people are assuming when they engage in this kind of contact. I’m not sure exactly how that relates to the Crusades. I think it relates very importantly to the kinds of things that American servicemen said: what I, in my war, said about Japanese and what other people in this room said about their wars in Korea and Vietnam. “Gooks,” “Japs,” these kinds of things are a result of contact, but contact of a very special kind.

The question also causes us to take note of the ways in which different people in a society play different kinds of roles. In this regard, the rights, interests, and ideas trichotomy is a very useful mode of analysis. In large-scale modern war, the leadership may well initiate a military action on the basis of rights or interests for the total society. But it is easiest for the leadership to obtain popular support by proclaiming a war of ideas, some kind of an
ideological war. This brings me back to Professor Greene’s com-
ment. I disagree with his tendency to say that most of these wars are
unique. I agree with him that the Pearl Harbor analogy applied in
Korea, and the Korean and Pearl Harbor analogies in Vietnam
were quite misleading. But there were aspects of all these wars that
can be placed in the holy war context. Particularly for most of the
populations that supported the last two wars, for as long as they
supported them, it was a war of ideas. For more people than not, it
was a matter of simple anticommunism, whereas for some of the
more sophisticated leadership, those wars had more limited objec-
tives and were also waged out of some analogy to some other
situations.

*Question:* I am concerned that we have isolated the phenomenon of
holy war from a whole spectrum of different types of cultural im-
perialism, if you want to call it that. If we look at the Islamic case, the
greatest degree of conversion actually occurred through relatively
peaceful means; I can’t comment on a Christian experience in this
respect. Are the causes of what we are calling holy wars and the
conflicts they involve really so different from the causes of our human
conflict in general? Is our question not whether we can keep people
from having positive values that they want to impress on other people,
but whether we can keep the exercise of this kind of cultural contact on a
nonviolent plane?

*Kahrl:* There is a distinction, which I found illuminating, be-
tween the just war, the definitions of which apparently go back to
Augustine, and the holy war. When the Japanese attacked Pearl
Harbor, they seemed to have fulfilled completely the conditions for
the just war defined by Augustine, as Mr. Brundage gave it in his
paper, and, therefore, that conflict had a sense of moral rightness
that Roosevelt would never have been able to achieve though
persuading the country that the war in Europe, for example, in-
volved our interests. Mr. Cowdrey, at the end of his talk, asked us
to reconsider “just war” as at least something that one might
substitute for ideological war. I do think that the distinction that
Mr. Brundage and Mr. Cowdrey are making is a real one, and one
that lies at the root of positive response to one kind of conflict, that
is, World War II, and negative response to a more recent one.
**Brundage:** I think we ought to be very clear that in talking about the Crusade, the holy war, as an ideological war we do not mean that it is a war in order to convert. There is very little effort on the part of the Crusaders to convert the indigenous Muslim population to Christianity; there is some, but it is very minor. Conversion is not the main thing they’re after. What they want to do is repossess this territory and to get it for themselves. They want to plant Christian communities there, and they want to plant them, as it turns out, almost entirely in the cities. There is no effort to penetrate the countryside, simply to exploit it.

**Question:** Do the leaders of any country ever really wage war for ideas? They may preach ideas to the people, but don't they really go to war for their political interests?

**Cowdrey:** Obviously, these things are usually very mixed in people’s minds. I saw the Second World War coming on when I was a boy, and as I look back on it, it seemed clear even then that the Germans found themselves in a position where they could not solve their own domestic problems. It was those domestic problems that generated Nazism, and ideas really were fundamental there—ideas that had terrible consequences, particularly for the Jews. One had to face oneself the question of joining up to fight in the Second World War. The critical thing, I think, was that a whole people was being slaughtered by the Nazis. This seemed to me, in Europe, an absolutely classic case of the just war: doing what was necessary to restrain this act of terrible crime against a whole people, quite apart, of course, from the Nazi occupation of so much of Europe. But certainly it was not in Britain’s interest to fight the Second World War. It finished us as a great power; we knew it was going to, and it has. I think, perhaps, that’s the difference in the way we saw going into the Second World War and the way the Americans saw going into it; we knew it was finishing us as a great power, i.e., as a power with the economic and political capacity to act on its own.

**Greene:** I would like to comment briefly on that question by citing the situation in Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries involving the Turkish menace, which was very real into the six-
teenth century, and which might have constituted an ideal cause for a holy war, which never really occurred.

It was not for the lack of the Holy See attempting to organize a Crusade; a whole series of popes tried very hard to do that. One of the most interesting popes of the fifteenth century, Pius II, called an international council to discuss this, and almost nobody turned up as representatives of the armed heads of Europe. There was clearly nothing in it for anybody. There was not much booty to be gained by repelling the Turks, and there was clearly the risk of much bloodshed. Thus, the Turks were able to maintain very strong military pressure annually throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Eastern Europe. Nobody was interested in fighting them except those who were immediately under the menace, and those were the only people who did fight them. On the contrary, the Very Christian King of France, François Premier, proved his right to that title by allying himself with the Turks against their common enemy, the emperor.

Watt: There's a lot of truth in the assertion that people are moved to war by material motives; at the beginning, Islamic holy war was a razzia to get booty. But it should be noticed that insofar as people mention ideas as part of their reason for going to war, even if there are also material factors, these ideas can dictate their actions at a later period. The razzia contributed to the growth of the Islamic empire because the people realized that if they joined the empire, they ceased to be the object of the razzia. Similarly, you could say in the First World War, European powers talked a great deal about national self-determination because it was going to help them to split up the Austrian Empire, and so forth. Once they had talked about that, however, this came back like a boomerang on their own heads in the events after the First World War. So, I think that if you say you are going to war for certain ideas, you reinforce these ideas, and they then determine certain of your later decisions.

Question: One of the things Western cultures and Western European cultures particularly have been significant for is the scientific and academic study of the out-groups. This began probably around the sixteenth century, and has continued through to today; we have Af-
ricanists, Orientalists, and Arabists in a way that few other cultures have ever had. This study seems to me to have been employed, almost from the beginning, for two reasons. One of these was curiosity about the out-group for the sake of understanding, for the sake of pure knowledge. But another one, and a very significant one, is the idea of intelligence about the enemy, finding out about him. Certainly the whole support that the United States government has given to the study of other cultures has been largely under the label of national defense. We find, therefore, in the Arab world, for instance, a good deal of reaction against Western Orientalism as just a brand of intellectual imperialism. I don't think this is necessarily a very well advised reaction on their part, but nonetheless the reaction exists.

Now—and I am addressing Alger's point about the responsibility of the academic community—our academic structures, our faculties in most Western universities, reflect the need for further knowledge of the out-groups. We know something; we have a fair amount of background from Arabists and Islamists, but we know very little about the Far East. A comment was made a couple of years ago that ten years of involvement in Vietnam had generated not more than half a dozen experts in the field of Vietnamese studies. This, I think, is a very sad thing, and I would really appreciate the members of the panel addressing the problem with the academic and disciplinary structures for the study of the out-groups, the objects of most Crusades. How do you feel this study should be approached by Western universities? Do you think it will lead only to propagandistic or military usage, or do you see this as leading to some sort of understanding? How do you see it as advancing our knowledge of the out-group in such a way as to obviate, eventually, the necessity of the Holy War mentality?

Alger: The way we have gone about studying the out-group has had tremendous impact on how we see out-groups, and I don't think we completely understand the consequences of this as yet. When one society looks at another, it often goes there looking for contrasts, images of itself, and how this foreign society differs from itself. As a result, it often finds things that, while they're true, may be rather irrelevant. Take, for example, political scientists like myself. The first thing we're inclined to study will be parliamentary elections, and you just can't learn very much about certain societies by studying parliamentary elections. Vietnam is a good example of how we reached all kinds of wrong conclusions by looking at the wrong things. Now, that's one thing.
Another thing is that many societies that are studied by the stronger and more powerful cultures have the advantage of an external image of themselves. Some of these smaller, weaker societies, therefore, see the world as a whole much better than we do because they have the benefit of these studies. Looking mainly in the political areas, I don’t think since Brice and de Tocqueville we have had very widely distributed images of ourselves done by people abroad. One of the problems, then, is that the resources for foreign study are unevenly distributed, and this has very important consequences.

The third item is that the best way to learn about other cultures—and I think scholars are beginning to learn this—is jointly, in a reciprocal, symmetrical relationship between those that are interested outside the culture and those that are being studied inside. This is more and more the case, and the more this happens and the more that ethnocentric college administrations realize that work abroad has to be done cooperatively if we are going to get real insight, the more likely we will be able to see others as they are and the more they will have a capacity to see us as we are. This will, in general, require more flexible organization than funding and research by national governments permits—perhaps by state governments and universities—and more flexible staffing of research institutes and more movement of scholars across national boundaries.

If we were discussing universities in the Middle Ages, I have the impression that we would have noticed more of an international community of scholars in those periods than there is now. Certainly your question focusses on an important point, the unwitting, unconscious, unthinking ways in which scholarly communities have allowed their forms of organization and financing to affect how they see the world.

2. Ibid.