From the early 1910s to the mid-1920s, the premier example of the application of scientific management in industry was the factory of the Joseph & Feiss Company, a Cleveland, Ohio, manufacturer of men's suits. The architects of this remarkable effort were the company's vice president, Richard A. Feiss, and its pioneering personnel manager, Mary Barnett Gilson. Feiss and Gilson demonstrated that scientific management was as appropriate to the comparatively labor-intensive production of suits as it was to the more capital- and energy-intensive operations that Taylor had reorganized. But they also grasped, better than Taylor, the larger implications of scientific management for the worker and society. Sensing the limitations of the engineers' approach, they combined Taylor's industrial engineering techniques with contemporary welfare practices to create a synthesis that anticipated the trend of the post–World War I years. In the process they challenged conventional ideas about the relations of employer and employee and the roles of women in industry. For a decade, Joseph & Feiss was as famous for its social engineering as it was for its suits.

Founded by German-Jewish immigrants in the 1840s, Joseph & Feiss grew slowly until the 1890s when it became one of the first clothing manufacturers to dispense with outside contractors and to produce suits and clothing entirely within its own plant. This change meant that the small contractors, primarily Czech immigrants, who had been doing the skilled tailoring and pressing work for the firm could no longer maintain their own shops.
Many of these displaced craftsmen found employment at Joseph & Feiss Company as inspectors and foremen.

These changes occurred at a time when new technology and new managerial techniques were transforming the manufacture of men's clothing. Making use of semiautomatic machinery driven by electric power, employers thoroughly divided and subdivided operations so that the manufacture of a suit involved as many as 189 separate steps. Female employees performed most of the repetitive tasks, such as sewing on pockets, collars, and sleeves, and men worked primarily as cutters and tailors.

The men's clothing industry proved suitable for the use of high-volume production techniques since it did not have the constant changes of style that characterized the women's clothing industry. In addition, since Joseph & Feiss concentrated on the production of medium-priced suits (sold mainly through outlets in small towns of the middle west), its product lines proved relatively easy to standardize. Indeed, the firm's staple, the blue serge suit, came to be known as the "Model T" of the men's clothing industry. In peak years the company sold over 200,000 garments of this type.

Good salesmanship as well as mastery of mass-production techniques accounted for the firm's success. Capitalizing on the popularization of the craft ideal by the book publisher and editor Elbert Hubbard, the company in the 1890s began to market its goods under the "Clothcraft" label. Sales shot up immediately even though this bit of advertising gimmickry disguised the fact that changes initiated by Joseph & Feiss had eliminated the jobs of the custom tailors, which had been the basis of the craft.¹

A turning point in the firm's history came in 1905 when Richard A. Feiss, the son of one of the company's owners, became vice president in charge of organization and manufacturing. Feiss graduated from Harvard in 1901 and received a law degree from Harvard Law School, but found the practice of law too "routine." While living in Boston, Feiss became a devotee of Frederick W. Taylor's theories of scientific management. Feiss hung Taylor's portrait in his office, acquired an extensive collection of pamphlets and books on Taylorism, and eventually became president of the Taylor Society. A person so compulsive and methodical that he measured the exact distance between his dormitory and his classrooms and later numbered each paragraph of his articles, Feiss set
out to prove Taylor's theories could be applied to the notoriously seasonal and changeable clothing industry.  

Supremely confident in his own abilities, Feiss wanted to make the Clothcraft Company the most efficient clothing firm in the country. In keeping with Taylor's recommendations, engineers and time and motion study technicians scrutinized each task performed by operatives and placed them in eight separate grades. Each task was subdivided to the "last possible degree" and piece rates were reviewed four times annually to see if any readjustments were necessary. The greatest care was taken not to set the initial rate too high so that if reclassification proved necessary it would be in an "upward direction only." Operatives generally began at the lowest grade so they would have an opportunity to work their way up. Production clerks kept careful records and employees always had a slip informing them of their earnings. The piece rate system was so detailed that John R. Commons considered it "as highly refined" as any in the country. Nowhere had he seen "such minute measurement."  

To spur on its workers and to reduce turnover and absenteeism, the Clothcraft Company developed an interlocking system of six separate bonuses. A daily production bonus was paid to each operative who maintained his or her standard rate; a daily quality bonus was paid to operatives who avoided rejections for defective workmanship; a daily attendance bonus of 50 cents per day rewarded those who came to work on time; an excuse bonus (which reduced the penalty for not reporting to work) rewarded those who explained their absence; a service bonus of 5 cents per day for every year of service rewarded long-term employees; and an advance notice bonus encouraged employees to forewarn the company about their intention to leave.  

No aspect of factory organization escaped scrutiny. The arrangement and placement of machinery was "scientifically" worked out to minimize lost time. An orthopedic surgeon designed new chairs for employees, and special tables made it possible for garments to be "handled as quickly and with as few motions as possible." To reduce monotony and fatigue the company allowed female operatives to get new batches of garments rather than have them delivered to their work stations.  

In keeping with Taylor's emphasis on the importance of the smooth flow of production, Feiss greatly enlarged the planning
department, which developed a system by which trousers, vests, and coats were sent through the plant simultaneously. Pressing operations were also integrated into each step of production. A centrally located tally board served as the plant's "pulse" and foremen knew "at a glance" where "pressure" needed to be applied. Operatives were usually trained to perform more than one task and moved from one work station to another to remove bottlenecks. Since practically all of the sewing operations were carried out in a mammoth, well-lit, well-ventilated workroom in a state-of-the-art factory building (located in a westside residential neighborhood), supervisors did not even have to go from room to room to check on the production process.\(^7\)

Speed became the firm's hallmark. A visitor to the plant in 1914 noted: "At the Clothcraft shops all workers are at full speed within a minute after the first bell rings and they keep up the drive until the last bell." Another outside observer commented: "Speed—lightning speed—is probably the first impression that forces itself upon the visitor in the factory. The operatives work with a smoothness, rapidity and precision that are astonishing."\(^8\) According to Feiss, these methods enabled the firm to produce medium-grade clothing at one-half the cost of its competitors. They also meant that the company needed 20 percent fewer workers to produce the same amount of clothing as previously, although the firm's workforce continued to grow between 1910 and 1920 (when it reached a peak of 1,500) because of greatly expanded output.\(^9\)

The company's initial efforts to implement this system led to one of the earliest walkouts against scientific management. In January, 1909, skilled pressers struck to protest wage cuts that they said would reduce their earnings from 25 to 50 percent, work rules that they considered onerous, and fines that penalized workers for damages. Ethnic solidarity also played a role in the strike. The Czech pressers protested against Feiss's efforts to eliminate the independent tailors, who were also Czech immigrants.\(^10\)

One object of the workers' anger was a book of twenty-three rules that the firm issued in early 1909. The regulations mandated fines for tardiness and for failing to report a change of address and required all employees to obtain buttons when they arrived for work (instead of punching a clock) which meant that even those who were just a few minutes late had to go through the humiliat-
ing procedure of reporting to the supervisor's office. The rules also prohibited anyone from leaving the plant at lunch time.

It is hardly surprising that skilled, veteran, male workers led the protest against regulations that workers termed "penitentiary rules." Yet over 600 female workers joined the men on the picket lines, actively participated in the walkout, and insisted that they be included as officers in a branch of the AFL's United Garment Workers that was established during the month-long strike.

Despite demonstrations, parades, and picket lines, the company retained the loyalty of enough workers and hired enough strike-breakers to defeat the walkout. Those who were not fired returned to a factory that not only retained the twenty-three rules but that remained so regimented that male and female employees had to line up in "fire drill formation" before marching to separate lunchrooms at the noon hour.11

Clearly, the strike failed to halt or even to slow down the implementation of scientific management at the Clothcraft Company. On the other hand, the firm soon adopted a wide variety of welfare programs, despite Taylor's strictures against welfare work. By 1916 the firm had gone further in combining Taylorism and welfarism than any other company in the country.12 Several factors in addition to the strike led Feiss to choose this course of action. Always concerned with improving productivity, he believed a more contented workforce would be more productive. He was also influenced by a wave of walkouts that hit the clothing industry between 1909 and 1911. In addition, Cleveland provided a sympathetic milieu, serving as home to a number of welfare-minded firms.13 Lastly, Richard Feiss's personal motivations played a major role; in the manner of Henry Ford, he set out to uplift, Americanize, and remold his workforce. Feiss sincerely believed that industry had the responsibility for the "mental, moral and spiritual advancement" of its employees and desired that his factory perform functions that one normally associated with parenting or the public school.14

To Feiss, these endeavors had to become an integral rather than a peripheral part of management. To insure that the firm recognized their importance, he created a new department called Employment and Service (rejecting Welfare because it smacked too much of "philanthropy"). In 1913, he invited Mary Barnett Gilson, a Wellesley College graduate, to become its head.15
Gilson was an example of a Progressive era reformer who cast her lot with industry rather than with settlement houses or trade unions. Upon graduating from college she helped train department store clerks but had come to dislike the "artificiality" of that environment. She subsequently worked as a vocational counselor at a trade school for girls, where she gained her experience making home visits. Sympathetic to the needs of working women, she had even walked a picket line in support of striking textile workers. In 1912, she heard Taylor speak and became a convert to his theories, in particular because of the stress he put on the "responsibilities" of management. Thus when Feiss offered her a position with the Clothcraft Company, she jumped at the opportunity to integrate personnel work with factory management.¹⁶

Assuming the position of superintendent of the Employment and Service Department in 1913, Gilson remained with the firm for twelve years and became the nation's best-known welfare secretary.¹⁷ Since Feiss and Gilson both shared a commitment to Taylorism and to service work (the term they preferred), they made an ideal team.

Many of the programs that Feiss and Gilson introduced resembled those in existence at other industrial plants. For example, they sponsored dances, picnics, choral societies, clubs, an orchestra, and an extensive athletic program.¹⁸ On the other hand, no employer made a more determined effort to alter the values and behavior of the Czech, Italian, Hungarian, Slovak, and Lithuanian women who comprised the bulk of its workforce. In the process of trying to create more productive workers and an achievement-oriented business culture, the firm left little to chance. As Gilson later admitted, "There was no facet of life we did not touch."¹⁹

Gilson's role began when the prospective employee appeared at the plant. During the hiring process the Employment and Service Department administered a battery of psychological, intelligence, and dexterity tests. Upon being hired, a new employee had her "duties" explained to her by a company representative who emphasized "the unfairness of trying to work in the factory and at home."²⁰ This issue particularly concerned Gilson, who believed that fatigue caused by overwork in the home reduced the productivity and increased the absenteeism of female workers. For this reason, she used systematic home visits and in-plant talks with
women workers and their mothers to convince them to be more assertive within their families. This could involve getting “foreign-born men” to share the cooking rather than treating their wives as “beasts of burden;” convincing parents to allow their daughters to attend wholesome evening entertainments in the plant rather than making them “practically” prisoners in their own homes; or suggesting to a “fat, comfortable and tradition-worshiping woman” that her six sons could pack their own lunches and do their own mending rather than leaving such chores exclusively to the sole daughter who worked at the Clothcraft Company. But as a realist, Gilson knew that most men wished to avoid “effeminating themselves” and thus advocated the five-day workweek so that women would have Saturday to work in the home.\(^{21}\) Since Feiss also believed Saturday work to be inefficient, the plant in 1919 went on an eight-and-one-half hour day, five-day week, fulfilling Taylor’s prediction that implementation of his system would lead to a reduction in hours.\(^{22}\)

Assaults on traditionalism concerned “even the most intimate matters.” A well-equipped medical department offered birth control information, gave instruction on diet and hygiene, and discouraged employees from patronizing quacks. Other members of the Employment and Service Department visited “every absentee” in order to investigate home conditions. At such times, they might give advice on how to make more “practical” use of parlors and how to ventilate homes in order to prevent headaches. The firm also began a savings program since it believed young, female operatives lacked incentives when, as occurred in “an astonishing number of cases,” they had to hand unopened pay envelopes over to “avaricious parents.”\(^{23}\)

Feiss and Gilson, who both frowned upon any form of ostentation, also made a concerted effort to control the conduct and dress of their employees. On various occasions, Feiss berated workers for smoking, for wearing rolled-down stockings, makeup, or jewelry, and for chewing gum, which he considered “unhealthy” and “disgusting.”\(^{24}\) Gilson later admitted that the company became overly “authoritarian” and “obsessed” with personal habits, but in 1916 she claimed that “it is no longer a debatable question that elaborate clothes and jewelry and powder and paint have a demoralizing effect on the character and ability of a working girl.”\(^{25}\) Articles in the Clothcraft magazine, such as “What Shall I
Wear to Work Today,” aimed at instructing young women on the proper way to dress. Foremen (who frequently objected to being given such petty tasks) were responsible for enforcing the personal standards set by Feiss and Gilson.26

Disturbed by their employees’ patronage of “cheap amusements” and attendance at “cheap dance halls and movies,” the company instituted a series of choral performances, entertainments, and dances that aimed at providing a wholesome alternative to the coarser forms of amusement. Company programs ended promptly at 9 P.M., “thereby setting a standard of proper hours.” Another opportunity to control behavior came at the noon hour when employees sat at tables with assigned “heads” who monitored conversations and forbade the use of foreign languages.27

Gilson also sought to ensure that women had opportunities for promotion. Wishing to discourage hasty marriage, she urged female employees to think of their jobs as more than a way station to matrimony. In general, the firm preferred to promote from within and, far more than most firms, encouraged women to seek “positions of responsibility.” By 1920, twenty-one of the firm’s forty-six supervisors were female and a number of the women managed men—an uncommon occurrence in American industry.28

Gilson also hoped to “bridge the gulf between office and factory” and tried to discourage clerical employees from regarding themselves as superior to factory hands. However, she had less success in this endeavor since the firm’s executives refused to submit their “blond twinkle toes secretary(s)” to the same discipline as other employees.29

In keeping with Taylor’s recommendations, the firm also reduced the foremen’s authority. This meant that foremen and forewomen no longer had the power to hire and fire and that all planning was now done by management. To avoid any possible favoritism on the part of supervisors, all batches were assigned to sewing room operatives in numerical sequence. And as a sign of the firm’s solicitousness of employees, Employment and Service personnel elicited complaints about foremen and forewomen during home visits.30 Indeed, the firm tried so hard to remove the “old style bosses with their petty tyrannies” that Richard Feiss claimed “one of the words we never permit used in our factory is ‘authority.’ Foremen are employed for responsibility alone.”31
By the early 1920s, Gilson and Feiss could claim considerable success in their efforts to join scientific management with welfare capitalism. As one of the many laudatory articles written about the company put it, this truly was “a shop where science and humanity combine[d].”\(^{32}\) Morris Cooke, Carl Barth, Lillian Gilbreth, and many other luminaries of the management movement visited the plant and many journalists wrote favorable articles about working conditions, which the company reprinted in its advertising campaigns. Through the use of home visits, bonuses, the five-day week and other means, the turnover rate was reduced from 150.3 percent per year in 1910 to 41.3 percent in 1923. Feiss even claimed that his firm had “the steadiest payroll force in the city of Cleveland.” Despite all of his denials of philanthropic intent, Feiss believed that employers had a “duty” and a “moral responsibility” to provide steady employment under “all possible conditions.” This goal was achieved through the firm’s practice of producing its staple—blue serge suits—during slack seasons rather than laying off large numbers of employees.\(^{33}\)

It is difficult to assess the impact these programs had on the company’s employees. By paying higher wages, reducing the hours of labor, promoting on the basis of performance, providing instruction on health and hygiene and encouraging women to think in terms of self-advancement, the Employment and Service Department contributed to the employees’ well-being. On the other hand, the Clothcraft Company also demanded loyalty to the corporation. Whatever benefits workers realized from the company’s programs came at the expense of privacy. By requiring yearly physical exams, by forbidding workers from leaving the plant at lunchtime, by exercising the right to visit a worker’s home after each and every absence, by inspecting lockers and by regulating employees’ dress and conduct, the Clothcraft Company exercised authority over all aspects of workers’ lives.\(^{34}\) Defending management’s right “to interest itself in the lives of workers outside as well as inside the factory,” Gilson claimed it as not just a “right” but as a “duty” that was “a natural outgrowth of executive responsibility.”\(^{35}\) Significantly, a report prepared for the firm suggested that “husky and oftentimes obstreperous men” might have raised more objections to these programs than young female operatives.\(^{36}\) More recently, historians have suggested that women might have proven more amenable to social control
than men because they had already been socialized to accept authority.\textsuperscript{37}

From the firm's perspective, one measure of the success of welfare capitalism was the fact that after 1909 the company remained free of labor unrest. Most notably, between 1922 and 1925, Joseph & Feiss withstood a well-financed organizing drive conducted by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA). The ACWA had been founded in 1914 when Sidney Hillman and other members of the AFL's United Garment Workers decided to leave that organization. Immediately upon its formation, the ACWA successfully organized thousands of immigrant and female workers. It scored even greater gains between 1916 and 1919 when it took advantage of war-induced prosperity and the immediate postwar boom to secure contracts from all of the large firms in such men's clothing centers as Baltimore, Rochester, and Chicago.\textsuperscript{38}

The ACWA's first victories in Cleveland came in March 1919 when a concerted drive led to the unionization of a number of the city's smaller shops.\textsuperscript{39} At this time, the ACWA made little effort to organize Joseph & Feiss or Richman Brothers, the city's other large nonunion firm.\textsuperscript{40} Upon the onset of the 1920-1921 depression, the ACWA was forced to assume a defensive posture, but when prosperity returned in late 1922, the ACWA decided to take on the Clothcraft Company.

Given Sidney Hillman's open support for scientific management, it may seem surprising that the Joseph & Feiss Company did not welcome the ACWA. However, Joseph & Feiss was not one of the "elite" firms that believed unions had a role to play in establishing standards and bringing stability to the industry.\textsuperscript{41} Feiss may have been an admirer of Hillman but he definitely believed the firm would be better off without the interference of local Cleveland ACWA leaders, whom he deemed less capable and more militant than Hillman. Though Gilson in her memoirs claimed the company did not interfere with the organizing drive, the firm fired one ACWA organizer, and management convened a special meeting of foremen and forewomen to discuss inroads made by the union.\textsuperscript{42}

The ACWA launched its campaign in October 1922. Led by a female organizer, Hortense Powdermaker, the union opened an office near the Joseph & Feiss plant and began to distribute leaflets to employees. By November 1922, the ACWA had enrolled 236
male and 122 female Clothcraft employees. Confident that it was on the road to victory, the ACWA formed a local for the plant's employees in February 1923, and began the second phase of its drive. During the next six months, the union sponsored a number of meetings for various ethnic groups and held numerous educational and social gatherings. During the entire period it said little about welfarism and focused its demands on wages, union recognition, and abolition of the "hated blue marks," which reduced employees' bonus earnings.43

In late 1923 the ACWA concluded that it lacked the support to carry out a successful organizing strike and dropped the entire effort. During the next year local leaders ceased open activity, but in December 1924 the ACWA launched a second campaign, led by a male organizer, Beryl Peppercorn. This time the ACWA challenged the company's welfare policies more directly, urging workers, "Demand to be let alone." Challenging notions that the factory could be thought of as a "charitable institution," the ACWA mocked the "hypocritical smile of the uplifter who gets paid to smile" and ridiculed the handing out of gifts at Christmas time. In questioning the level of regimentation inside the plant, the union asked workers: "Are you free men and women?"

This drive proved even less successful than the first one. In early 1925 the union began to issue sarcastic leaflets that asked: "How much longer are you going to sleep and have them keep a veil over your eyes"; "Don't stand still, you are blocking the traffic"; and most tellingly of all, "Play bridge girls, it is a very good game if you have no other troubles." The union ended its campaign in May 1925.44

A number of factors accounted for the failure of the two organizing drives. Undoubtedly, Feiss and Gilson had created a "family" atmosphere that the union threatened.45 The ACWA itself blamed "continuity of work," which had largely eliminated layoffs.46 The company also screened out potential organizers or militants during the hiring process, dismissed those whose views ran counter to the "spirit" of the organization and followed a policy of hiring friends and relatives of current employees.47 The smooth flow of work did much to remove bottlenecks that often irked pieceworkers; an employee representation plan established in 1919 provided a means of presenting grievances; and the curbs on foremen and forewomen removed other problems.48
Ironically, the ACWA’s campaign collapsed at a time when tensions that had been brewing within the firm for a number of years finally came to a head. The company’s problems began with a sales slump during the postwar depression. That decline coincided with the opening of a new factory building that after 1921 housed all of the company’s operations and imposed a considerable burden on the firm. Even after the depression lifted, the company’s position did not improve much. Its major difficulty was that “the farmer, the coal miner and the factory worker,” who were the company’s best customers, now had automobiles and no longer had to shop in their own immediate localities. By 1925, many clothing stores in small midwestern towns that had previously served as outlets for the firm’s goods had closed entirely. Compounding the difficulty, many of the company’s old customers began to buy more stylish suits and overcoats. The firm was poorly situated to cope with changing fashions since it had only a small design department, and Feiss was indifferent to if not contemptuous of trends in clothing styles.\textsuperscript{49}

Given its large overhead costs, the firm could ill afford a slump in sales. By 1925, the new plant, with a capacity of 750,000 suits per year, was only producing 350,000 per year. The company’s net earnings dropped from $375,006 in 1923 to $138,422 in 1924, and it failed to pay its preferred dividend for the first time.\textsuperscript{50} Not very surprisingly, given the dire economic situation, some of the firm’s executives began to view the work of the Employment and Service Department as “frills.” Facing deep cuts in the welfare program and the end of her influence, Gilson chose to resign at the end of 1924.\textsuperscript{51}

Feiss’s troubles were far worse. His father and brother (both of whom held high executive positions in the firm) had come to believe that scientific management was too costly and no longer provided the “efficiencies or economies” it had in better times.\textsuperscript{52} As part of their revaluation of the firm’s commitment to Taylorism, Feiss’s relatives also began to question the “‘big’ salaries” paid to engineers and other scientific management experts in the manufacturing department. Feiss made every effort to defend the application of Taylor’s principles and blamed the firm’s difficulties on its failure to apply scientific management to the merchandising and selling departments. But his father and brother gained the support of all of the firm’s other executives and he had little choice
but to resign in mid 1925. According to Kepple Hall, the firm's superintendent of planning and a nationally known management expert whose own "big" salary was being questioned, Feiss was "crushed" by this series of events.  

From Hall's perspective, the "unenlightened members" of the firm had gained control and were about to dismantle key aspects of scientific management, including the bonus system, the routing plan, and the cost system. Nothing this drastic seems to have occurred, although in June 1926 Feiss complained about "changes" that had been made in "some of the control methods which mean a step away from the fundamental principles of coordination and control." In reality, the firm appears to have maintained many of the essential features of Taylorism but "dropped many of the refinements" and simplified controls so as to require a smaller supervisory force.

Regardless of how many changes the firm actually made, the business difficulties encountered by the Joseph & Feiss Company and the subsequent revaluation of its commitment to Taylorism were a major embarrassment to the scientific management movement. Richard A. Feiss had served as president of the Taylor Society, and as late as October 1924 had published an article on "Personal Relationship as a Basis of Scientific Management" in the *Bulletin of the Taylor Society*. Kepple Hall, who also lost his job, probably spoke for many in the Taylor Society when he insisted that the problem was not scientific management but a "temperamental Jew losing his head because he does not see a profit."

The reorganization of Joseph & Feiss was thus a blow to the progress of scientific management. After 1925 the company was no longer a showcase for industrial and social engineering; proponents no longer could point to it as proof of the power of scientific management to overcome the vicissitudes of the marketplace; and Feiss and Gilson no longer played the practical and symbolic roles they had performed so convincingly in earlier years. Yet it would be wrong to exaggerate these changes. Joseph & Feiss recovered quickly and resumed its growth with most of its managerial infrastructure and many of its welfare programs intact. The management movement also became more, not less, prominent in the late 1920s. Gilson went on to a distinguished career in university teaching and most Joseph & Feiss employees were reemployed by 1926. Only Richard A. Feiss did not fare well. His dismissal
marked the beginning of a personal and professional decline that effectively ended his career. His brother later wrote that he was poorly qualified for the clothing business, which depended on financial and merchandising expertise more than on production management. But it appears that his inflexibility and obsessiveness, which had helped make him and Joseph & Feiss stars in the scientific management firmament, also made it difficult for him to work for anyone in any industry.

In the meantime Feiss, Gilson and their subordinates had demonstrated what a commitment to scientific management could mean. Starting with Taylor's technical and organizational reforms, they pursued the logic of scientific management to the factory door and beyond, challenging convention at every step. Their initiatives obliterated the distinction between contemporary Taylorism and welfare work; exposed the artificiality of customary notions of women's abilities and motivations; redefined the boundaries of employer-employee relations; and challenged a host of other orthodoxies, for example that supervisors were the best judges of current or potential employees, that turnover was inevitable, and that shorter hours increased production costs. Their approach was not the only way to interpret Taylor's message and it was not the choice of most executives. But for a decade it enabled them to explore, as well as anyone, the possibilities that Taylor had in mind when he spoke of “a mental revolution.”

NOTES


2. Foster, “‘Short Cuts’ to Long Steps of Progress.”


10. The strike events can be followed in *Cleveland Citizen*, January 16, 23, 30; February 6, 13, 20, 1909; *Cleveland Press*, January 6, 10, 11, 14, 1909; *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, January 6, 10, 14, 17, 28, 1909.

11. Foster, "'Short Cuts' to Long Steps of Progress."


24. For Feiss's concerns, see Foremen's Council Minutes, J & F Papers, Container 4, Folder 6.


30. Lux Report; Mary B. Gilson, "Taking Stock in an Employment Department," J & F Papers, Container 5, Folder 8; Gilson, "Work of the Employment and Service Department of the Clothcraft Shops," J & F Papers, Container 5, Folder 8; Gilson, *What's Past is Prologue*, pp. 152–56. For rules and regulations that applied to the foremen and forewomen and for their objections to assuming some of these responsibilities, see Foremen's Council Minutes, J & F Papers, Container 4, Folder 6.

32. "A Shop Where Science and Humanity Combine."


34. See, for example, Foremen's Council Minutes, July 6, 1920, July 11, 1921, J & F Papers, Container 4, Folder 6.

35. Gilson, "The Relationship of Home Conditions to Industrial Efficiency."

36. See Fisher, "Clothcraft Shops."


41. For firms that did welcome the union role, see Steve Fraser, "Dress Rehearsal for the New Deal: Shop Floor Insurgents, Political Elites and Industrial Democracy in the Amalgamated Clothing Workers," in Michael M. Frisch and Daniel J. Walkowitz, eds., Working Class America: Essays on labor, Community and American Society (Urbana, IL, 1983), pp. 219-55.

42. Gilson, What's Past is Prologue, pp. 108-12. For the special meeting to discuss the union question, see Foremen's Council Minutes, December 18, 1922, J & F Papers, Container 4, Folder 7.

43. Advance, October 20, 27, November 3, 24, December 1, 15, 22, 1922; January 19, February 2, 16, March 2, 30, April 16, May 15, June 15, 29, August 10, 1923.

44. Beryl Peppercorn Papers, Western Reserve Historical Society, Folder 1.

45. For the ability of welfarism to create a "family" atmosphere, see Gerald Zahavi, Workers, Managers and Welfare Capitalism: The Shoeworkers and Tanners of Endicott Johnson, 1890-1950 (Urbana, IL, 1988).


For these aspects, see Gilson, *What's Past is Prologue*, pp. 91, 105–7; Truesdale, "Personal Relations in Scientific Management."

For the best analysis of the firm's difficulties, see Paul L. Feiss to Mary Gilson, June 3, 1940, J & F Papers, Container 1, Folder 12. See also Gilson, *What's Past is Prologue*, pp. 206–8. For the more general shift from the approach that Joseph & Feiss relied on to a "segmented" marketing strategy, see Richard S. Tedlow, *New and Improved, The Story of Mass Marketing in America* (New York, 1990).


Paul L. Feiss to Mary Gilson, June 3, 1940, J & F Papers, Container 1, Folder 12.

Kepple Hall to Morris Cooke, November 1, 1924, October 5, 1925, Hall Papers; Minutes of the Board of Directors, November 19, 1924, and July 3, 1925, J & F Papers, Container 1, Folder 2. For another account that also stresses that business differences preceded family divisions, see Paul L. Feiss to Mary Gilson, June 3, 1940, J & F Papers, Container 1, Folder 12.

Kepple Hall to Morris Cooke, October 5, 1926, Kepple Hall Papers.

Richard Feiss to William O. Stillman, June 6, 1926, J & F Papers, Container 2, Folder 2. Feiss had managed to obtain a position with the Denison Manufacturing Company in Framingham, Massachusetts, a firm that remained committed to scientific management. See Richard Feiss to Emma Stark, July 7, 1925, J & F Papers, Container 2, Folder 1.

Paul L. Feiss to Mary Gilson, June 3, 1940, J & F Papers, Container 1, Folder 12.

Kepple Hall to Morris Cooke, November 1, 1924, October 5, 1925, Kepple Hall Papers; Emma Stark to Richard Feiss, March 3, 1926; John Younger to Emma Stark, April 27, 1926, J & F Papers, Container 2, Folder 1.

The firm was unionized in 1934. See "The J and F Company: History and Outline of Its Operation," J & F Papers, Container 1, Folder 1.

Paul L. Feiss to Mary Gilson, June 3, 1940, J & F Papers, Container 1, Folder 12.