Notes

Introduction

3. I refrain from saying that the description absolutely could not refer to a real person because one could construct a plausible context for Lodge's sketch. But unless we had evidence to know that such an unusual context was operating, we would, by drawing on our conventional understanding of people in the real world, quickly conclude that the description was fictive discourse. For more on fictive discourse, see Barbara Herrnstein Smith, *On the Margins of Discourse* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
6. Although Bernard J. Paris uses the terms mimetic, thematic, and aesthetic to talk about literary character, the eventual direction and emphasis of his studies of character are very different from my own. His schema is a prelude to his discussion of the mimetic component in the terms of third force psychology. See his *A Psychological Approach to Fiction* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974) and *Character and Conflict in Jane Austen's Fiction* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978). Much of my work on character in this book also has some point of contact with numerous other works on the subject (especially those done in the past ten years), but my argument typically leaves that common point and goes on to make its own different claims. Thus, I have typically found those works to be useful supplements or contrasts to mine but have not drawn on them in an extended way. The useful works include Mary Doyle Springer, *A Rhetoric of Literary Character* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), Martin Price, *Forms of Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), Thomas Docherty, *Reading (Absent) Character* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), Baruch Hochman, *Character in Literature*

Of these studies, Springer's shares more of my theoretical principles than any of the others, but my way of talking about character is quite different from her concern with "people like us" and my study has a much larger scope: she focuses on female characters in Henry James's novellas; I range from protagonists to minor characters in narratives from Austen to Calvino. I share Hochman's desire to defend the mimetic component, but again our studies move in different directions. Docherty provides the greatest contrast with my approach; he is far less accepting of the realist tradition in narrative and of the critical tradition of talking about the mimetic component of character. Higbie's thoughtful attempt to develop a "syncretic criticism" that can account for the psychological, structuralist, and sociohistorical elements of character has some affinities with my approach here, but there are many issues on which we part company, especially about the way in which character interacts with the other narrative elements. I have chosen not to discuss these alternative approaches to character at great length because, as will be noted later in this introduction, I felt that I could better indicate the implications and consequences of my approach by examining its consequences for issues in the interpretation of narrative that go beyond the element of character itself. I will, however, shortly compare my approach with one version of a strict structuralist approach.


9. Ibid., p. 236.


conventions of "authorial reading" that in many ways complements the analyses I undertake in this book. Although there are some important overlaps between Rabinowitz's work and mine, for the most part we are focusing on different problems: he is concerned with conventions that govern reading in advance of our encounters with narrative; I am concerned with the dynamics of those encounters themselves; in a sense, with how texts themselves tell us which conventions apply.

12. In this connection, I find the crucial detail of the revelation to be a place where Browning can't help but let the seam between mimetic and synthetic components of the poem show. Although the Duke is someone concerned about relationships of power, his enunciating what he and the envoy both obviously know ("the Count your master") strikes me as motivated less by the dramatic situation and more by Browning's needs to get that information to the reader. But this rough spot makes the seamlessness of the rest of the poem even more striking.

13. Interestingly, however, many structuralists, including Culler, would want to resist any direct move from "work to world," any claim that the propositions had reference to the world beyond the text. For more on this point, see my "Thematic Reference, Literary Structure, and Fictive Character: An Examination of Interrelationships," *Semiotica* 48 3-4 (1984): 345–65, which also sets forth an early version of my account of "My Last Duchess."

14. It will be obvious by now that my conception of a rhetorical theory of character—or of literature more generally—is sharply different from the rhetorical approach to literature taken by such deconstructive critics as J. Hillis Miller in *Fiction and Repetition* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982) and Paul de Man in *Allegories of Reading* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979). Although these critics have their differences from each other, they share the idea that a rhetorical approach involves the analysis of rhetorical figures and tropes implied in a text's use of language. Implicitly defining the text as a linguistic structure first and foremost, they cut the language of the text off from its author and its implied audience. They then scrutinize the figures and tropes of the text and typically show how the apparent logic behind the use of these figures and tropes undermines itself. By contrast, within my rhetorical approach I define the text as a communicative transaction between author and reader carried out through the various elements of the text (including such translinguistic ones as character and action) as these are shaped and designed for a particular purpose. In one sense, because the definitions of the text within these two rhetorical approaches are so different, their rivalry is not as intense as might first appear. In effect, one approach asks, what did the author mean to communicate through this language?; and the other asks, what can the language of this text, when viewed from the logic of figuration, be construed to mean? Each might say to the other that what the approach yields is valid, given its starting point. To argue over the starting point here would require me take a detour so wide that I might never get back to the main track of my investigation. I have decided, therefore, to stay on the main track and let my findings be a partial argument for the validity of my starting point. For an argument that directly takes up Miller's
view of language and tries to indicate its deficiencies, see my *Worlds from Words*, Chap. 4.

15. For a good overview of the story-discourse model of narrative, see Seymour Chatman, *Story and Discourse* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978). My concern with the temporal movement of narrative and with the dynamics of the audience’s relations with authors and narrators follows to some degree Meir Sternberg’s excellent *Expositional Modes and Temporal Ordering in Fiction* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1978). Since my analysis is pitched toward progression in general, it does more with action and less with exposition than his. But his book is a strong argument for the power of two critical principles that we hold in common: (1) to do justice to a narrative’s effect one must pay strict attention to the interaction of all narrative elements through the temporal process of the narration; and (2) to assess an author’s treatment of any individual element the critic must make reference to its interaction with others.


17. To be sure, Whitey is not simply interchangeable with the other men: his nickname has a positive connotation and his general good nature sets him apart from the cruel group that accompanies Kendall in his effort to humiliate Julie Gregg.

18. Whitey’s synthetic function as narrator and commentator is of course very important and I will discuss it below, but as noted earlier, Lardner, like the poet in a dramatic monologue, wants to keep the synthetic aspect of the character in the background in order to preserve the illusion that we are overhearing a real conversation.


Chapter I

1. Critical books and journals are filled with thematic interpretations of canonical works, theorists such as Gerald Graff and Robert Scholes have ex-
plicitly defended thematizing as a central act of criticism, and even someone such as Jonathan Culler, who has argued that we should move away from interpretation toward a description of literary competence or the semiotics of reading, builds into that description a “rule of significance,” which in effect is a rule of thematizing. Furthermore, deconstructionists often proceed by establishing a binary opposition between two thematic issues that they then dismantle. For Graff, see “Literature as Assertions,” in American Criticism in the Poststructuralist Age, ed. Ira Konigsberg (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1981); for Scholes, see Textual Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); for Culler, see Structuralist Poetics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975) and The Pursuit of Signs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981). My formulation of the slogan of course echoes the principle that Fredric Jameson argues for in The Political Unconscious (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981): “Always historicize!”


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psychology and so is concerned, for example, with separating author and character at the end of the novel.


5. See Mark Crispin Miller, "The Fate of 1984" in Howe, 1984 Revisited.

6. In a letter to F. J. Warburg, 22 October 1948, Orwell says, "I haven't definitely fixed on the title but I am hesitating between 'Nineteen Eighty-Four' and 'The Last Man in Europe.'" Howe, 1984 Revisited, p. 284.


9. Indeed, I think that this emphasis in the narrative helps explain why the space given over to Goldstein's book, despite its clear thematic significance in setting forth much of the totalitarian philosophy behind the Party's operations, seems excessive. In that space we lose—or at least suspend—the mimetic involvement that Orwell has been developing, and we do not learn enough new information to make up for that loss.


12. Zwerdling's discussion of the "Psychopolitics of 1984" in the Jensen anthology cited in note 3 perceptively traces the transfer of Winston's feelings for his mother to Big Brother, a transfer now about to be completed.


15. Levin has recently published a new version of the attack, focusing this time on "Feminist Thematics and Shakespearean Tragedy," PMLA 103 (1988): 125–38. The principles he relies on in this essay are essentially the same as the ones I outline here, so my reply would be essentially the same as the one I make here.

16. See the works cited in the second note to this chapter.

17. Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice, ed. Donald J. Gray (New York: Nor-
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ton, 1966), p.1. Hereafter page numbers will be given in parentheses in the text.

18. By using Mr. Bennet this way here, Austen faces an interesting problem later when she wants to distance herself and her narrator from Mr. Bennet's values. As usual, she is equal to the task: she solves the problem by focusing on Elizabeth's own dawning sense of her father's limitations. As it dawns on her, it dawns also on us, and we can come to appreciate both the superiority and the limitations of his values, without feeling that Austen has initially misled us about his character by making him a narrator-surrogate.

19. This discussion of voices follows to some extent principles of analysis outlined by Mikhail Bakhtin, especially in his essay on "Discourse in the Novel" in The Dialogic Imagination (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981). Like many others, I regard Bakhtin as one of the most important narrative theorists of this century. I have not made more extensive use of his work in this book, however, because of the differences in our focus. He wants to analyze novelistic discourse, I want to analyze character and progression. Moreover, his discussion of character presents me with a choice. For him characters become sites of languages revealing sociocultural values that interact with each other and with the languages of the narrator to produce the heteroglossia of the novel. I believe that this approach is very fruitful, but it finally does not account for— is not interested in accounting for—the mimetic component of narrative. (It would, however, account for the thematic, though in a rather different way from the one I have undertaken here.) Since I believe that the mimetic component is typically a crucial aspect of our reading of narrative, I have not followed him in folding character under language.


21. In one respect my argument here is in keeping with the general direction of Ralph Rader's work over the last decade or so. Dissatisfied with the fit between Sacks's theoretical descriptions of forms and many individual novels, Rader has suggested (among other modifications) that we recognize the moral purpose typically attached even to the action. See his "From Richardson to Austen: 'Johnson's Rule' and the Development of the Eighteenth-Century Novel of Moral Action," in James Engell, ed., Johnson and His Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984): 461-83.

In quite another respect my argument has affinities with Gerald Graff's case in Poetic Statement and Critical Dogma (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980; first published 1970) that both the New Critics and their Neo-Aristotelean opponents shied away from acknowledging that most literary works do make statements.

22. One possible exception here is the proposal scene itself, where one might argue that the deep feeling behind Elizabeth's accusations is necessary to make Darcy see the error of his ways. I think, however, that this interpretation underestimates Darcy's virtues. In any case, neither Elizabeth nor Darcy is grateful for the manner of her behavior in the proposal scene in the way that they are grateful for her behavior to Lady Catherine. Darcy is willing
to give Elizabeth the credit for the amelioration of his character, but he focuses more on the facts of her rejections and reproofs than on the feeling behind them.

23. Another variation on this pattern of thematic dimensions not being converted into thematic functions can be found in Orwell's use of Winston's optimism. The progression of Orwell's novel requires the attribute—or something like it—but the progression does not thematize the trait itself.

Chapter 2


2. I too will undertake a quest for that grail, or more accurately, will reflect on some problems in such quests as part of my interests in the relations among the components of Catherine Barkley's character in *A Farewell to Arms* (Chapter 6).

3. My account of the progression will, I think, highlight certain features of the novella and James's method that have not been noticed before, but it seeks to deepen rather than challenge the general reading of the tale that has been offered by or implicit in most of the criticism: "The Beast" is the tragic story of a man, who, believing that life has singled him out for some grand fate, wastes his life waiting for its arrival, who discovers his waste only at the very end of his life, when he also realizes that he has been too blind to see the escape through love that had been offered him by his fellow-watcher, May Bartram. Many critics work with this general understanding of the tale in the background as they focus on one or more specific features of the narrative. On style, for example, see Jane P. Tompkins, "'The Beast in the Jungle': An Analysis of Henry James's Late Style," *Modern Fiction Studies* 6 (1971): 185–92, and David Smit, "The Leap of the Beast: The Dramatic Style of Henry James's 'The Beast in the Jungle,'" *Henry James Review* 4 (1983): 219–30. On narrative technique, see Elizabeth Shapland, "Duration and Frequency: Prominent Aspects of Time in Henry James's 'The Beast in the Jungle,'" *Papers on Language and Literature* 17 (1981): 33–47, and Wayne C. Booth's discussion in *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 278–81. For discussions of naming in the tale, see David Kerner, "A Note on 'The Beast in the Jungle,'" *University of Kansas City Review* 17 (1950): 109–18; Edward Stone, "James's Jungle: The Seasons," *UKCRR* 21 (1954): 142–44; and Rachel Salmon, "Naming and Knowing in Henry James's 'The Beast in the Jungle': The Hermeneutics of the Sacred Text," * Orbis Litterarum* 36 (1981): 302–22. For a somewhat negative view of James's technique, see Allen Tate, "Three Commentaries," *Sewanee Review* 58 (1950): 1–15. And for a view that the tale is more ambiguous than most critics admit, see Janice H. Harris, "Bushes, Bears, and 'The Beast in the Jungle,'" *Studies in Short Fiction* 18 (1981): 147–54.


5. Mary Doyle Springer identifies this attribute as an important source of


7. This perhaps mealy-mouthed identification of the narrative as tragic is done advisedly; I do not want to enter discussions of whether Marcher is more like Lear or Willy Loman, or of whether "The Beast" is a genuine tragedy. My point is that if we abstract from the progression and think about a loose generic placement, tragedy is appropriate. Readers who are more concerned with stricter or tighter generic placements will soon see that my reluctance to be similarly concerned stems from what I regard as the special quality of the tale—and of James's use of Marcher's mimetic and thematic functions.

8. Interpretation, for Scholes, is itself the second step in a recommended three-step encounter with texts. The first step is reading, an activity concerned with focusing on the particulars of texts; Scholes recommends that one highlight especially salient particulars by considering alternative versions of the text, or as he says, producing "text within text." The third step is criticism, the activity of embracing or, more importantly, resisting the stance taken toward the cultural codes revealed by interpretation; Scholes's shorthand for criticism is "text against text."


10. This observation might be the starting place for Scholes's kind of criticism: does James's own anxiety of being like Marcher cause him to stack the deck against his protagonist, make him too easily the butt of the reader's and author's amusement so that we are left wondering why May would have anything to do with him in the first place? For more on what Scholes means by criticism and how it works, see his three chapters in *Textual Power* on "The Text in the Class," pp. 18–73.


12. For an example of evaluation and its attendant problems, see my discussion of Catherine Barkley in Chapter 6.

**Chapter 3**

1. Some of Fowles's critics—even some of his better ones such as Linda Hutcheon—take at face value the narrator's reference to Sarah as protagonist, citing the title of the novel as support for their position. From the vantage point provided by a concern with progression, however, that designation just will not hold up: Charles is the figure at the center of the instabilities; they all cluster around his life and his choices; the story of his progress in relation to Ernestina and Sarah is the story that takes the narrative and authorial audiences from the beginning to the end of the book. Hutcheon's discussion is in *Narcissistic Narrative* (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980), pp. 57–70.

2. Elizabeth D. Rankin, "Cryptic Coloration in *The French Lieutenant's Woman*," *Journal of Narrative Technique* 3 (1973): 193–207, has also noted the
connection between the metafictional Chapter 13 and the refusal to complete the portrait of Sarah. For other related discussions of Chapter 13 and the other metafictional elements of the narrative, see Hutcheon, Narcissistic Narrative cited above, and Philip Cohen, “Postmodernist Technique in The French Lieutenant’s Woman,” Western Humanities Review 38, 2 (1984): 148–61.


4. For a useful detailed discussion of the narrator’s temporal and spatial locations in the novel, see William Nelles, “Problems for Narrative Theory: The French Lieutenant’s Woman,” Style 18 (1984): 207–15. Nelles discusses the interesting combination of the narrator’s temporal distance and his occasional spatial proximity to the characters. In effect, Fowles extends along both the spatial and temporal axes the privilege of the omniscient narrator to know whatever he wants and to tell us whatever he thinks is relevant.


6. Most critics argue that the second ending is better because it is more in the spirit of the narrative’s emphasis on the evolution of both characters toward the twentieth century. But Charles Scruggs’s very fine defense of the plausibility of the first ending should, I think, make anyone who wants to reject it think twice. See his “The Two Endings of The French Lieutenant’s Woman,” Modern Fiction Studies 31 (1985): 95–113.

7. The next step for the rhetorical critic would be to ask about the possible sexist implications of Fowles’s subordinating Sarah to Charles here. This is a complicated question because one does not want to legislate a principle that narratives cannot make male characters the primary focalizers of the narration, while what Fowles does here seems connected with his assumption that one can tell the story of the shift from the Victorian Age to the modern by focusing on the experiences of a man. As I noted above, I will take up a similar issue more fully and directly in Part III when I consider the problems raised by Hemingway’s characterization of Catherine Barkley.


Chapter 4

1. Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative (New York: Knopf, 1984). Hereafter page numbers will be given in parentheses in the text.
2. Reader-response criticism that wants to locate the meaning of narrative not in the text but in the individual reader will of course challenge this basic assumption of my rhetorical theory—and of Brooks's psychoanalytically based one. But to argue whether the meaning of a narrative is really, finally, ultimately, in the text or in the individual reader is, I think, to engage in a fruitless debate. Worthwhile criticism of very different kinds can proceed from each of the two different first principles. To the charge that one cannot do worthwhile criticism proceeding from the principle that the text is the basis for a rhetorical transaction between author and reader, my only reply here can be this book itself. Brooks's model and my own can be fruitfully compared, however, because we share not only the assumption about the importance of the text but also the purpose of explaining the dynamics of reading narrative. For more on this problem of the relation of critical systems, see my "Data, Danda, and Disagreement," *Diacritics* 11 (Summer 1983), 39–50.

3. For a related discussion of the whole-part relationship in the processing of a text, see Chapter 3 of my *Worlds from Words* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

4. In this respect, the rhetorical framework that I am developing here rejects the formalist notion that the text is only its formal features. It seeks to combine an interest in those formal features with an interest in the way they reflect the shaping of an author and call for a response from a hypothetical reader. In that sense, the model is really triple-layered, but for most practical purposes, including doing criticism of the kind that the concept of progression invites, the distinction between the author's shaping of the formal features and the features themselves becomes unimportant.

5. In this respect progression leads beyond the story-discourse and fabula/sjuzet models of narrative structure. The idea of a synthesis between events, characters, setting, and the treatment of those events, as in Brooks's model, is not so much erroneous as incomplete. A narrative is a dynamic synthesis of all the materials of both story and discourse as well as the patterns of response built into the specific configuration of all those elements.


7. For a useful discussion of the motif of reading, see Max Byrd, "'Reading' in *Great Expectations*," *PMLA* 91 (1976): 259–65.

8. Byrd's essay, cited above, has called my attention to this feature of the passage.

9. But even before we go our separate ways, there are significant differences. Brooks's division of the narrative into four plots (the major difference between his division and mine is that he divides the Satis House plot into two) and his distinction between official and repressed plots already signal his tendency to convert reading for the plot into reading for the themes in motion. The difference between the two Satis House plots he identifies is not a difference based on instability but one based on theme: the second "plot" simply identifies the not very hidden underside of Satis House. Similarly, the division into official and repressed plots gives an odd prominence to "bringing up by hand" as an official plot, since Pip never clearly honors his sister's
efforts: its prominence seems motivated more by Brooks's desires for his quadripartite division that allows him to make his points about the theme of plotting than by the narrative itself.

10. In addition to Brooks, see Julian Moynahan, "The Hero's Guilt: The Case of Great Expectations," *Essays in Criticism* 10 (1960): 60–79; Lawrence Jay Dessner, "Great Expectations: 'the ghost of a man's own father,'” *PMLA* 91 (1976): 436–49; Michal Peled Ginsburg, "Dickens and the Uncanny: Repression and Displacement in Great Expectations," *Dickens Studies Annual* 13 (1984): 115–24; and James L. Spenko, "The Return of the Repressed in Great Expectations," *Literature and Psychology* 30, 3–4 (1980): 133–46. These accounts, especially Spenko's, do, I believe, capture elements of Pip's character that are not readily explainable otherwise. More generally, the usefulness of the psychoanalytic perspective here illustrates the relation between psychoanalytic reading and rhetorical interpretation: the psychoanalytic perspective can be subsumed under the rhetorical on a case by case basis. The same principle applies to marxist, existential, anthropological and other "perspectival" accounts of character: when the authorial audience needs the perspective to understand the nature of the character, the rhetorical critic will welcome the perspective. See my comment on this point in the introduction, pp. 11–12.

11. This guilt is of course partly a consequence of his identification with the convict. Thus, although Pip knows that his sister is unjust to him, he nevertheless feels guilty, just as his knowledge that he is not responsible for assaulting her does not prevent him from feeling somehow guilty for what happens to her.

12. Spenko, in the essay cited above, demonstrates these connections at some length.

13. Lawrence Jay Dessner, in a thoughtful study of Wemmick's psychology, "Great Expectations: The Tragic Comedy of John Wemmick," *Ariel* 6, 2 (1975): 65–79, argues that the division between the two sides of Wemmick is not as great as first appears. But Dessner also says that his analysis "does not often correspond with the aesthetic experience of the reader" (p. 78). I think that the authorial audience does see Wemmick as sharply divided but is able to accept the "integration" of his character that I describe below. For a brief but useful discussion of Wemmick, see also Mary Ann Kelly, "The Functions of Wemmick of Little Britain and Wemmick of Walworth," *Dickens Studies Newsletter* 14, 4 (1983): 145–49.


15. In this respect, I part company with Brooks, who sees the second ending as suggesting an unbinding of the material of the Satis House plot, an indication that it has not been truly mastered. My point is that if the ending shows that both characters have mastered that material in their own ways, then the very fact of their union is not itself an unbinding. See Brooks, pp. 137–39. At a more general level, Brooks and I are in agreement that "the
choice between the two endings is somewhat arbitrary and unimportant in that the decisive moment has already occurred before either of these finales begins" (p. 137).

Chapter 5


2. This differentiation of the flesh-and-blood reader from the “you” addressed in the sentence continues in the rest of the paragraph as that “you” begins to get located, however generally, in space: "Relax. Concentrate. Dispel every other thought. Let the world around you fade. Best to close the door; the TV is always on in the next room."


7. Since the characterized audience in the Sterne passage is clearly female and that in the Thackeray clearly male, they together raise the question of how the reader's own sex will influence his or her response to a characterized audience of a specific sex. To take just the most obvious question, will women have trouble accepting the use of the characterized audiences here since the first can be seen as employing a sexist stereotype and the second seems to relegate women to the secondary role of wife? Many women and some men will want to become what Judith Fetterley calls “resisting readers,” and speak out against the assumptions upon which the characterized audiences are constructed as well as the attitudes toward women that reading in the authorial audience asks them to adopt. Needless to say, this kind of criticism is extremely significant. At the same time, I think that such a criticism comes most appropriately after the sort of analysis I am proposing here, one which takes as its first step the understanding of the five-sided communicative situation among author, narrator, characterized audience, narrative audience, and authorial audience. For much more extended discussion of these and related issues, see the collection *Gender and Reading*, ed. Elizabeth Flynn and Patrocinio Schweikart (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).


9. For Wayne Booth, see the Afterword to the second edition of *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). For work on the narratee in addition to Prince's, see Mary Ann Piwowarczyk, "The Narratee


11. It is, I believe, for this reason that when Booth adopts Rabinowitz’s model he leaves the ideal narrative audience behind and that Rabinowitz himself has silently dropped it out of his analyses. He makes no significant use of it in *Before Reading*.

12. The phrase is used by Barbara Herrnstein Smith in *Poetic Closure: A Study of How Poems End* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968) to refer to the way new or surprising information in the later lines of a poem will cause its readers to revise their interpretations of earlier lines.

13. Most of the narrators of the other titled chapters do, however, comment on their own narration without raising questions of whether they are themselves metafictionists.

14. Interestingly, the last two sentences of the chapter, which are again in the narrator’s voice, are written not in second but in third person: “Actually, it seems the Reader really is about to leave. He will take with him *On the carpet of leaves illuminated by the moon* by Takakumi Ioka to read on his journey” (p.198).

15. In Chapter 1, the narrator summarizes the Reader’s preference for the kind of book he likes to read in a way that is analogous to, though not identical with, the Other Reader’s expression of her preferences: “you go on and you realize that the book is readable nevertheless, independently of what you expected of the author, it’s the book itself that arouses your curiosity; in fact, on sober reflection, you prefer it this way, confronting something and not quite knowing yet what it is” (p. 9).

16. For more on this point from somebody who finds tighter connections, see Marilyn Orr, “Beginning the Middle: The Story of Reading in Calvino’s *If on a winter’s night a traveler*,” *Papers on Language and Literature* 21 (1985): 210–19.

Chapter 6

1. I take the term from Wayne C. Booth, *Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), chap. 2 and passim. Booth, however, sometimes uses the term in a sense that I do not intend here: appropriating some one’s text for one’s own purposes. I use it to refer to a process that follows rather than supplants understanding. This activity of evaluation is similar to what Scholes calls “criticism” in *Textual Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).


3. The larger point here is that the same material can be the basis for many different narratives with many different effects. The Second City comedy troupe does a wonderful rendition of Hamlet as a farce. It would be easy to make The Ambassadors into a melodramatic soap opera, and so on. These claims are very different from ones which would say that the covert story of Hamlet is farce, that of The Ambassadors melodrama.

4. Fetterley's analysis on this particular point also depends on an assumption that the introduction of the other text allows the interpreter considerable room to infer the applications of that text to the one under primary consideration. Fetterley, it seems to me, takes advantage of that free rein in seeing Catherine's allusion as a sign of Frederic's feeling. The trouble with the founding assumption is that it usually leaves room for a contradictory interpretation. In this case, one might with equal justice argue that the allusion to Othello reminds us that Frederic and Catherine can be considered among the company of those who "loved not wisely but too well."

5. Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 3. Further references will be given in page numbers in parentheses in the text.


7. Spanier, "Catherine Barkley and the Hemingway Code."

8. Some critics see the Switzerland section not as an idyll but as a dead
end; Fetterley's comment that Catherine's death frees Frederic from the responsibilities of marriage, fatherhood, and family is related to this view. For the fullest articulation of it, see the essay by Bell cited in n. 2 above. I think that the progression both works against and leaves room for this view. In Switzerland, Frederic finally reaches the equivalent of the Abruzzi, the priest's homeland whose clear, cold, dry, and snow-covered landscapes are early set in opposition to the smoky cafes where Frederic spent most of his leave. But because Frederic and Catherine live there with the knowledge (on her part) and the feeling (on both of their parts) that they are living on borrowed time, there is something constrained and barren about the idyll. I think that Hemingway worked hard to have his readers sense Frederic and Catherine's own misgivings about their life with no future, but here his method of understatement finally does not serve him well. It works in the scene where Frederic and Catherine wake up and Frederic can't go back to sleep, but it does not work in many of their nonprogressive conversations.

11. See Gerry Brenner, Concealments in Hemingway's Fiction (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1983), pp. 30–31. As his characterization of these passages suggests, Brenner's reading of the whole narrative is very different from mine. He sees it as an expression of Hemingway's belief in the irrationality of existence, an expression made through the untrustworthy tale of a narrator who is on the verge of suicide.
12. Sexists of course would claim that they are not denying full humanity to women but simply recognizing differences between the sexes—in this way, they claim not to be sexist. If they could be convinced that they were denying women full humanity, then they would be more likely to reform: such is the power of the norm that all humans be granted their humanity.

Conclusion

2. Though developed independently and employing different terms, my analysis here is similar to that offered by Robert Merrill, Norman Mailer (New York: Twayne, 1978).
6. Such things would include accounting for Bulstrode's role in enhancing the power of the Lydgate plot, explaining the principles of Eliot's
interweaving—why she leaves off one story line and picks up another at any
given point—and analyzing Farebrother’s role as one who also contributes to
the growing good of the world. I have made a start on these matters in
“Elaboration and Economy in Middlemarch: Farebrother and the Final Para-
graph,” paper delivered at the International Conference on Narrative, Ann
Arbor, Michigan, April 1987. Among the many accounts of the relations
among the plots, most of which focus on the ideational similarities and con-
trasts, see especially Peter Garrett’s discussion in the Victorian Multiplot Novel

7. Virginia Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
1925), p. 3. Hereafter page numbers will be cited in parentheses in the text.

8. Although I would not push the point too hard, I also think that honor-
ing flexibility over predictive power is generally a methodological strength.
When theories honor prediction over flexibility, further inquiry can often be
short-circuited: the theory tells one in advance what the phenomena under
investigation must be, how they must work, etc. Honoring flexibility is a way
to privilege the a posteriori approach to new phenomena over the a priori (of
course even the a posteriori will depend on some a priori decisions such as
the categories for analyzing character, but these decisions are not conclusions
about what one must find).