Wartime Service in Ohio

The drift toward war, which Worthington so strenuously opposed, had been watched by the people of Ohio with mixed emotions. Four attitudes apparently predominated in the winter of 1811-12: there was a minority group which shared the chauvinistic spirit of the War Hawks; another which was torn between the very real dangers and the glorious possibilities involved in the conquest of Canada; a third which shared Worthington's conviction that a declaration of war would be premature; and a fourth which opposed the conflict at any cost. A plebiscite would probably have shown that a decided majority of the people were against hostilities.¹

Of course, the proponents of war did most of the talking. The officers of the militia and the genuine War Hawks, who looked for glory and honor in a conflict to defend the "independence achieved in the Revolution," constantly encouraged Madison to declare war. There was a feeling that an Indian uprising was the greatest danger to be apprehended—the British could do nothing to the interior of the country. The exaggerated reports of Harrison's "victory" at Tippecanoe in November, 1811, occasioned many demonstrations of pride and patriotism, and were cited as proof that nothing except the wilderness prevented the acquisition of Canada. The militia in cooperation with a small body of regulars could sweep to certain victory. James Caldwell wrote Worthington, December 14, 1811,

In the event of a war with England, I think with you that the Indians would be troublesome, considering the defenseless situation of our frontiers, but I trust that with the assistance of arms from the Genl. Government and the aid of volunteers from Kentucky we shall have nothing to fear—and in the event of an army of the United States being sent to affect [sic] the conquest of Cannady we wont have no invasion to apprehend from the British on that quarter, indeed from every view I can take of the subject I have been unable to discover on what quarter the British could do the U. S. any material injury and we would attack & conquer Cannady & humble their overbearing pride.²

Adjutant General Isaac Van Horne wrote Worthington the same month that war was already considered unavoidable: "Tod and

¹ John F. Cady, "Western Opinion and the War of 1812," Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly, XXXIII (1924), 427-505.
² In WMOsl.
McArthur seem now to vie with each other which shall dispense the most patriotism.” By the following spring, militia officers, newspaper editors, and the community braggarts agreed that it was time to strike for their “beloved country.” “In Ohio the public mind (not being cankered with mercantile cupidity) is prepared for war,” wrote Levi Barbour, a staunch Marietta Republican.

When the publication of the Henry Papers in March, 1812, discredited the Federalists nationally, some of the party in Ohio, perhaps in self-defense, denounced their New England leaders and asserted their loyalty. Being a cautious man, Madison had not hesitated to pay $50,000 to John Henry for the letters which exposed the major details of his effort to separate New England from the Union in 1809. The majority of the Federalists were very critical of Madison for wasting public funds for a batch of letters, maintaining that the Federalists as a group were as patriotic as the Republicans. John Kerr wrote Worthington, May 12, “The spirit of Patriotism and love of Country is high with us,” but he warned that in his opinion war would ruin business.

In spite of the high tide of patriotism, there were those who realized Ohio’s vulnerability to attack from the north. Fear for the state’s safety was undoubtedly increased by distrust of William Hull, governor of the Michigan Territory, who was regarded by many as a politician rather than a soldier. Some claimed that he did not have the confidence of his officers or men at Detroit; others believed that neither his officers nor his men were to be depended on. Lewis Bond of Detroit had counseled Hull’s removal as early as January; he accused him of putting men in civil office who were un-American and pro-British—“not to be depended on in War.” These appointments had been made, Bond realized, to make a favorable impression on the Canadians, but he was confident that very few of the men could be brought to fight either the British or the Indians. He further charged that some of Hull’s officers and privates had actually changed sides in recent skirmishes. He was sure that if war were declared Detroit would be in great danger; with that frontier outpost captured, practically nothing would stand between Ohio and an invader.

Newspaper editors were not consistent: one week they admitted

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5 December 19, 1811, in WMOSL.
6 R. D. Richardson, Circleville editor, to Worthington, March 18, 1812, in WMOSL.
7 Barbour to Worthington, May 17, 1812, in WMOSL.
8 In WM.
a dangerous unpreparedness and the next week asked for war.\footnote{Cf. editorials of March 16 and 27 in the \textit{Fredonian}. See two columns against war by "Leonidas" in the March 11 issue.} Contributed articles showed no great preponderance of sentiment for the precipitation of hostilities. Even General Van Horne admitted the "deficiency of arms and accoutrements" and stated that the militia would "present an indifferent barrier to an invading army."\footnote{Van Horne to Worthington, February 24, 1813, in WMOSL.}

The declaration of war was hailed with general joy at Zanesville and "was signalized by 18 discharges from a Six pounder." At Worthington, on the Fourth of July, the proclamation was celebrated by toasts and resolutions, and Congressman Morrow was commended for his vote in favor of war, having "done honor to his own character and his state . . . meriting the highest confidence of his constituents."\footnote{\textit{Western Intelligencer} (Worthington), July 10, 1812.} The Circleville \textit{Fredonian}, August 25, 1812, trumpeted a warning: "This western section of our country stands ready at the signal of her Government to retrieve her dignity or CRIMSON the surface with a sluice of blood, rather than submit to the indignities offered her flag by the Tory advocates of England, that sink of perdition."

The celebrations which took place were more than spontaneous exhibitions of patriotic enthusiasm; they were, at least in part, displays of shameless political incitement. John Hamm, Grand Sachem of the Tammanies at Zanesville, was convinced that a declaration of war was the only thing that could save the Republican ticket: without a bold and vigorous foreign policy, Madison's reelection would be impossible.\footnote{Hamm to Worthington, June 13, 1812, in WMOSL.}

On the other hand, the great silent majority of the Ohio people were opposed to the war. They realized that a conflict with Great Britain meant a war with the Indians. It was safe enough for the Kentucky papers and the politicians to urge war, for they were behind the frontier—Ohio was a part of it.\footnote{Pratt, \textit{Expansionists of 1812}, Preface and Chap. 1. Pratt indicates that there was a real popular sentiment for war in Ohio, but his proof is not convincing. Cf. Cady, "Western Opinion and the War of 1812," 27.} Both of Ohio's senators had opposed the declaration of war. Worthington believed that the "butchery" of war should be resorted to only as the "last means of redress." Senator Alexander Campbell was not present to vote against the declaration because of illness in his family, but he believed, and his constituents believed, that Congress had forced the Administration into the conflict. He would have preferred retaliatory measures.\footnote{Campbell to Worthington, May 24, June 17, 1812, and June 13, 1813, in WMOSL.}
When Worthington returned from Congress in July, 1812, he was much concerned about the reaction of the Ohio people to the declaration of war, especially since Abraham Shepherd had just written him that nine-tenths of the people in western Virginia were opposed to it. From contacts made as he traveled from Wheeling to Chillicothe he deduced that the people were divided in their sentiments, "those advocating it making much noise—those opposed more quiet." Certainly, much of the afflatus of patriotism subsided with the news of Hull's abject surrender at Detroit on August 16. The Fredonian, which had been so flamboyantly sanguine on August 25, characterized the capitulation in its next issue as "an act of treachery which has no parallel in the annals of human iniquity." Worthington's nephew William wrote him a few weeks later from Lexington that "the violent politicians of Kentuckey" are "pretty cule after being fanned for a month by the bleak winds of the north. . . . Most of the Democratic party have been disappointed, for instead of a frollicsome campain, they find themselves engaged in a tardy war."

It might be supposed that Worthington's vote against the war would have made him too unpopular among the pro-war groups to be eligible for service in Ohio on his return from Congress. This was far from the case. His previous experience with the militia and in negotiations with the Indians was too well known. He had served as adjutant general under Governors Kirker and Huntington between 1807 and 1809. In 1807, besides his regular duties, he had organized the state's detachment of militia, authorized by an act of Congress, April 18, 1806, which called for 2,443 men in Ohio. In 1809, he organized another detachment, authorized by the law of March 30, 1808, which set Ohio's share at 2,384 men.

Worthington was criticized by some of his associates for his tardiness in providing for the safety of the Ohio frontier. Judge William Creighton, Jr., a fellow Chillicothean, wrote Judge Samuel Huntington that "love of office and influence consequent thereon" were Worthington's chief interests. In anticipation of the need for armed forces in Ohio, Worthington had actually laid his plans to organize them immediately immediately

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14 Shepherd to Worthington, July 2, 1812, in WM.
15 Worthington's diary, July 13, 1812.
16 William Worthington to Worthington, December 6, 1812, in WM.
17 In the Huntington Papers, WHRS.
after the passage of the law of 1808. He knew, however, that militia could not be kept long in the field, and so he thought it unwise to call them out until they were needed. He believed that that time was approaching when he wrote General Gano early in 1809:

*Whether war will be the result or not is yet uncertain. It is however believed it will.... The General government seem to be taking with earnestness the steps preparatory to such an event, under these circumstances the important relations in which you stand to your fellow citizens & soldiers cannot escape your notice. On you will greatly, nay almost entirely depend the diffusion of orders & Military spirit throughout every inferior department of your division, your example will in a great measure give tone to every inferior officer.*

Worthington's ability to deal with the Indians had been demonstrated in 1807. In September of that year, a thousand Indians had assembled on the frontiers of Ohio, and rumors of an extensive Indian war had caused great uneasiness throughout most of the state. On Governor Kirker's orders that they act as Indian agents, Worthington and McArthur had conferred at Greenville with over five hundred Indians under Tecumseh and the Prophet, and had secured their pledge of neutrality in case of war with Great Britain. After the negotiations, Tecumseh, Blue Jacket, Roundhead, and Panther had returned to Chillicothe with them and had stayed a week at Worthington's home as guests of Governor Kirker and his ambassadors. Although he had fought against Wayne at Fallen Timbers in 1794, Blue Jacket was a trusted friend of the whites, and of Worthington in particular. Governor Hull regarded Blue Jacket as "the friend and principal adviser of the Prophet" and an unswerving advocate of peace. Through Blue Jacket, who often stopped at Adena with other friendly chiefs, Worthington exercised no little influence over the Indians.

By 1811, then, Worthington was recognized as a leader in matters dealing with the Ohio militia and with Indian negotiations. He was fully aware of the inefficiency of the troops and the justifiable wrath of the Indians over the alienation of their lands by the treaties negoti-

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19 Benjamin Drake, *Life of Tecumseh and His Brother the Prophet* (Cincinnati, 1852), 94-97; *Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Mercury*, October 13, 1807.
20 Hull to Eustis, September 9, 1807, and July 14, 1812, in *Documents Relating to Detroit and Vicinity, 1805-1815* (Michigan Historical Collections, XL, 1929), 198.
ated by Indiana Territory’s Governor Harrison. With impatience and misgivings, he watched Harrison’s foolhardy expedition of November, 1811, and expressed profound regret at the news of Tippecanoe, for he believed the grievances resulting from encroachments on the Indian boundary could be settled permanently only by negotiation and the maintenance of amicable relations. He made this clear in a letter to Governor Meigs written from Washington:

The situation of our common country is becoming daily more serious and requires of those to whom the people have confided trust the exercise of their united exertions to manage the public affairs to the best advantage. . . . The late unfortunate occurrence on the Wabash I fear will be the means of exciting the greatest alarm on the frontiers of Ohio and if it ends in alarm only I shall feel thankful. So soon as an account of this affair reached this place the delegation from Ohio called on the president, stated the exposed situation of our frontier and recommended in the strongest terms, 1st that you should be immediately authorized to call out as many companies of militia volunteers as should be considered necessary to be armed, equipped & paid by the states who should act as rangers along our frontiers and protect the settlements. 2nd That a loan of arms should be immediately made by the U states to the state of Ohio. 3rd That the president should immediately appoint 3 commissioners who should go into the Indian country learn the causes of discontent of the Indians and if practicable, settle the differences without further bloodshed—whether this course will be adopted or not I cannot tell. I have thought it proper that you should be acquainted with what has been considered best under existing circumstances. You will in the event of an Indian war have the most arduous task to perform and I trust will not fail to attribute to me the proper motives in addressing you thus frankly for be assured sir whilst I do not mean to say anything which may have a tendency to offend, I can with great sincerity say that I have nothing to ask, hope or fear. At the same time it would give me the most sincere pleasure to live in peace and friendship with the whole circle of my acquaintances.21

There was, indeed, sound reason for taking steps to prepare the militia and pacify the Indians of the Northwest. It was very fortunate that Tecumseh, at least for the time being, favored peace—unless the Americans got into a war with Great Britain—and did not plan immediate retaliation for the Tippecanoe insult. The Ohio-Indiana people who lived far from the frontier rejoiced at the blow Harrison had dealt the Indians; but the inhabitants on or near it shuddered for months in the expectation of a general attack. John Johnston, Indian agent at Piqua, wrote Meigs that “if war with the British is inevitable, the Government cannot take their measures with regard to the Indians too soon. It ought never to be forgotten that fear alone keeps the Indians quiet.”22

21 November 30, 1811, in WMOSL.
22 Meigs to Worthington, February 5, 1812, quoting Johnston’s letter of January 23, in WMOSL. Johnston set the number of Indians in Ohio at two thousand.
Meigs wrote Worthington on January 23, 1812, that the people on the frontier were uneasy, and suggested that a general treaty be made with the Indians before the British approached them. As a result, President Madison appointed Senator Worthington, Congressman Morrow, and Governor Meigs to negotiate with the tribes at Piqua, August 1.

Meanwhile, Congress had ordered the organization of twelve hundred militiamen and appointed Governor Hull to command them. They were to reinforce Detroit and be prepared for an invasion of Canada. They assembled at Dayton and started northward on the first of June. At Urbana they were joined by Lieutenant Colonel James Miller’s regiment of regulars, the 4th Infantry from Vincennes. This motley, half-armed, ill-provisioned army took over a month to reach Detroit through the wilderness. The declaration of war alerted the British at Malden in time for them to capture the baggage of Hull’s army (July 3), which he had foolishly sent by boat down the Maumee. This loss inaugurated a series of disasters for the American forces.

In the course of his Fabian maneuvers about Detroit, Hull managed to hold a council with the Indians at Brownstown during the second week of July. After explaining the situation, he felt he had convinced them that they should remain neutral or join the American forces. He wrote Eustis on July 21 that only Tecumseh and Marpot had joined the British and that he had sent the rest to the council at Piqua.

On July 25, Worthington started for Piqua to meet the Indians, but when he learned from the papers that the council had been postponed until August 15, he returned home, where he participated in several conferences of Ohio leaders called by Governor Meigs to consider raising more troops and to plan for negotiations with the Indians. The news of the fall of Fort Michilimackinac came on August 5, reinforcing the Ohioans’ fears concerning the fate of Detroit and impressing upon them the necessity for securing at least two thousand more troops and conducting a successful mission at Piqua.

On August 13, Worthington and Morrow reached Piqua, but no Indians had yet arrived. There they learned that Hull had invaded Canada, July 12, but that he had not yet struck the British. The Indians came in slowly and in nothing like the number expected. It became evident that Hull’s sluggishness and the intrigues of the British had led

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23 In WMOSL.
24 Fredonian, July 21, 1812; Robert B. McAfee, History of the Late War in the Western Country (Lexington, Ky., 1816), 111-12.
25 Hull to Eustis, July 21, 1812, in Documents Relating to Detroit, 419-21.
many of the Indians to believe that the United States had no chance of
winning the war and that if they placed themselves in the power of the
Americans they would probably be massacred. Some groups which had
halted near Fort Wayne joined in the siege of that post when they
heard of the fall of Michilimackinac on July 17.26 In spite of delays,
however, by August 16 there were over seven hundred Indians present
at Piqua to hear Worthington read the President’s message. Their
chiefs made appropriate replies.27

The Indians were sold large quantities of liquor by local dealers
and were uncontrollable. Worthington spent most of his time riding
about the camp quieting them and exhorting their chiefs to control
them. When news arrived on the nineteenth that Hull had retreated
from Malden, August 7-8, and had taken refuge in the fort at Detroit,
it was decided to hold the Indians as long as possible while Governor
Meigs left to raise more troops. Worthington and Morrow wrote Eustis,
August 20,

> You will have learned before this reaches you that the commencement of
the Indian council was postponed from the 1st to the 15th inst. when all the
commissioners attended. On the 15th and 16th insts. near 800 Indians (men
women and children) arrived composed of Shawanoes Delawares Wyandots
Taw-ways Kickepes. It appears pretty evident that British agents have used
every exertion to prevent the attendance of the Indians & not without success
to a certain extent. This together with the unfavourable state of our affairs
to the North has we apprehend had a considerable effect on the movements
of the Indians and will on our part require additional exertion and caution.
We deem it all important in the present critical situation of affairs to use
every means in our power to keep the Indians quiet either at their homes or
at the council until the re-enforcements get to Detroit and a favourable
change takes place. We have with a view to effect this sent confidential persons
out among them to watch them to hasten such as are on the way in and to
counteract the operations of the British.

You will perceive with this view of the subject that it will be necessary
to prolong the council to a period beyond what might otherwise have been
necessary. All is quiet at present on the frontier and we hope will continue
so th’s we acknowledge we shall not be entirely without fear at least until
this army gets on the frontier We have only to add that we shall do all in our
power to aid in the operations and effect the objects of the Government—
P.S. Govr Miegs left on the 18th and is now at Urbanna using every exertion
to start re-enforcements and supplies for this Army and [?] his return to the
council is uncertain.28

The same day Worthington sent Eustis a second letter:

> I wrote you to day jointly with Mr Morrow on the subject of our duties
here and now address you on several other subjects You will no doubt before
this reaches you have learned through many channels the reverse our affairs

26 McAfee, Late War, 111.
27 In general, the account of the Piqua council is taken from Worthington’s diary.
28 In Documents Relating to Detroit, 457.
to the north have taken. Be assured things are bad enough and I shall not be
surprised to hear of the loss of Hull’s army before he is re-enforced. The great
difficulty at present in carrying on our operations to the north is how to supply
the army with provisions. You may remember that I pointed out this as the
best route that is from this to Fort Defiance and then by water down the
Maima to the rapids & so on. I find on further examination—I was right and
am satisfied Govr Hull was wrong in taking another route. I should therefore
advise that in future this should be taken as safest and best. I have heard since
my arrival at this place that troops are about to be marched from Kentucky
to carry on an expedition against the Thousands of Indians which Govr
Edwards has been collecting in Illinois between Michigan & Missis for two
years past. How his great collection of Indians at Piora [sic] have been sup­
ported so long I cannot conceive. This man has excited more useless alarm in
the west than any other I know and I most heartily wish him some berth
where he will have less to fear.

If it be true this expedition is to be carried on if the Indians are about
to be attacked soon the assertions of the British to the Indians will be verified
to wit: That the Americans whilst they [the Indians] were attending the
council intend to destroy [sic] those of the Indians left at home about 30
Kecapoos from near Piora [sic] are here and wait for the rest of these chiefs
one principal chief is here. If the Govt intend to carry on war against the
Indians I trust it will be general at all events let us not be treating and fight­
ing at the same time. If the force about to be called out be to protect the
settlements it is all well but from the manner Govr Harrison writes us I
understand hostile operations are to be carried on I have only to add and it is
with reluctance & regret that Genl Hull I am satisfied has lost the confidence
of the troops under his command.  

The next day a friendly Indian brought bad news from Captain
James Rhea at Fort Wayne: Fort Dearborn had fallen on August 15,
and the garrison had all been massacred by the Indians. Rhea sent the
following entreaty:

Do all you can to give us some assistance— from the best information I
can get they are determined on this place. . . . Everything appears to be
going against us—for God Sake call on Gov. Meigs for to assist us in sending
more men. . . . We shall start all our families from this [place] tomorrow. . . .
We are very scant of provisions here— for God Sake try in some way to get
some forwarded to us.  

At 11:00 P.M., August 21, 1812, news came of the capture of Detroit
on August 16. The Indians at Piqua were alarmed but friendly, and
actually seemed concerned for the safety of the whites. Worthington
moved among them and quieted their fears. He sat up until midnight
writing letters and dispatches urging the militia officers and civil officers
of the state to hasten troops to Fort Wayne. He enclosed Rhea’s mes­

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Ibid., 459.

80 Rhea to John Johnston for Governor Meigs, August 19, 1812, in the Ohio State
Archives, Executive Documents, 1810-12, OHS.
four regiments of militia, and importuned him to send as many volun-
teers as possible to Piqua.\footnote{Worthington to Payne, August 21, 1812, in Benson Lossing, ed., \textit{The American Historical Record} (3 vols., Philadelphia, 1871-73), I, 26. Lossing misdates the letter August 27.}

Worthington spent the next three days enrolling volunteers and col-
lecting provisions at Piqua. He wrote Meigs and Harrison to hurry
troops to Fort Wayne. He feared the whole frontier was “breaking up.”
His plan was to reinforce Fort Wayne immediately with four or five
companies from Urbana; to recondition and garrison Forts Loramie,
Murrys, St. Marys, and Adams; and to construct one other post between
Fort Adams and Fort Wayne, thus establishing a cordon of outposts to
guard the state’s northwest frontier against the British and Indians if
Fort Wayne fell and a general invasion of Ohio occurred.\footnote{Ohio State Archives, \textit{Executive Documents, 1810-12}, August 24.} Governor
Meigs coöperated by ordering Colonel Bay to occupy these forts with
his brigade and to protect the surrounding inhabitants. Worthington re-
corded in his diary, August 25, that “many troops arrive in consequence
of a report that the indians have murdered Mr. Morrow and myself and
seized the public property. My trials great, the people distracted and
confidence lost in a great measure—never had so many difficulties to
encounter.”

On August 25, Worthington took the liberty of ordering Colonel
Samuel Wells, in command of the 17th United States Regiment and a
detachment of Kentucky troops at Cincinnati (actually at Newport), to
march at once to the relief of Fort Wayne;\footnote{Trump of Fame (Warren), September 16, 1812.} and both he and Governor
Meigs urged Harrison, who awaited the arrival of four regiments from
Georgetown, Kentucky, to hasten his departure from Cincinnati to the
aid of that outpost. A majority of Harrison’s troops departed on the nine-
teenth, and he joined them on the thirty-first near Dayton. They
reached Piqua on the first of September, with the relief of Fort Wayne
their immediate objective.

Meanwhile, so great was the fright at Chillicothe that a mass meeting
was held on August 26 at which a committee was selected to see
Governor Meigs and insist that he exert greater effort in recruiting
troops. The committee was authorized to suggest to the Governor that
he offer two hundred acres of land to each recruit who would serve
twelve months and that he call to active duty every civil and military
officer of the state.\footnote{A copy of the mass meeting’s resolutions, dated August 26, 1812, is in RCHS.}

At the earnest suggestion of John Johnston, on August 26 and 27
Worthington organized seven mounted companies of forty men each and laid out a camp for them on the road to Fort Wayne, which was now reported besieged by six hundred Indians. The mounted companies were ordered to elect a commander, to hold themselves ready to march, and not to forage. Governor Meigs arrived in Piqua on the twenty-eighth with more troops and stores; the little army proceeded six miles to Fort Loramie the next day, and the following day marched to St. Marys. At this time it totaled some seven hundred mounted troops, temporarily commanded by “General Worthington, General Lytle, Col. Dunlap and Col. Adams.” On the night of the twenty-eighth, Colonel Adams was elected commander by the troops, most of which refused to go any farther, much to Worthington’s disgust, until General Harrison arrived.35

On the first of September, Worthington, with eight other whites dressed as Indians, set out with seven Indian guides to explore the country adjacent to Fort Wayne. They had covered thirty miles in two days without finding any sign of hostile Indians when a spy from Fort Wayne got through to them and reported that there were none farther east from the Fort than five miles. Nevertheless, the Indian guides refused to go farther and secretly returned to the army at St. Marys, much to Worthington’s chagrin. The guides reported that they had been chased by hostile Indians—manifestly untrue—and consequently Colonel Adams did not move his troops forward as Worthington had planned but instead sent an express asking for information and advice. Worthington scratched this entry in his diary, September 3:

The army do not march—the spies return to camp and we are 30 miles in advance in an enemy country. My plans completely defeated by the dastardly, cowardly conduct of a dozen cowardly scoundrels in camp, else we should have been able to have given the Indians round the fort a good flogging.

After Worthington’s scouts had pushed forward another four miles, a runner brought news from Jeremiah Morrow that Governor Meigs had left Piqua for Urbana and that the Indians were threatening to leave if Worthington did not return. He went back, on the fourth, to St. Marys, where he found nine hundred of Harrison’s men, who had just arrived. On the fifth, he reached Piqua, where Harrison was encamped with 127 of his men. The next day Harrison pushed on toward St. Marys, picked up Colonel Adams’ mounted volunteers at Shane’s Crossing on the St. Marys River, and on the ninth, set out for Fort Wayne. One battalion of Colonel Adams’ cavalry constituted the right flank of Harrison’s army, and another rode a mile in advance of his

35 Worthington’s diary, August 31, 1812.
columns of infantry. Harrison's force now numbered about twenty-five hundred men. Fort Wayne was relieved on the twelfth, the Indians offering practically no opposition.

On the seventh, Worthington closed the Indian council and received from them "the most positive assurance of their determination to keep peace." The next day he arrived at Urbana, where Governor Meigs had assembled nine hundred volunteers. On the tenth, he reached Chillicothe and helped Samuel Finley prepare his men to march.

With their departure four days later, Worthington's military services for the summer were over, save as an adviser, and he returned to his farm and business interests for the short time remaining before he was to leave for his senatorial duties in Washington. During this interim of a month (he left for Washington on October 19), he served as acting president of the Bank of Chillicothe in General Finley's absence, milled three hundred barrels of flour for the army, had his corn harvested, surveyed a few tracts, closed several land deals, entertained Bishops Asbury and McKendree of the Methodist Church, and on October 17, dined "General Harrison, his aides & 20 others" who were on the way north.

It is interesting to note that the war, with its constant threat of British and Indian depredations, did not halt entertainment in Ohio's little capital. The *Fredonian* of September 30, 1812, announced the annual colt races for October 29; a circus played all week, September 28 to October 3, prices fifty and seventy-five cents; and a new dancing academy opened on September 29.

In Ohio the early enthusiasm for war was dispelled by the capture of Forts Michilimackinac, Dearborn, and Detroit. Mushroom patriotism and demagogic optimism wilted in the brilliant sun of criticism, pacifism, and recrudescent Federalist partisanship. Volunteering came to a standstill, and dissatisfaction and insubordination increased among the troops. Fear succeeded hopefulness: Harrison wrote Eustis, August 29, "The western country was never so agitated by alarm and mortification as at this time." 36 Adjutant General Van Horne complained because his men had lost the Spirit of '76: "Militia cannot march without a new blanket, a new gun & bayonet, shoes etc. and every company . . . must have a team of 4 horses to haul their baggage or they cannot

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march—if they are fifteen days out and no pay, damn the President."

Ignorant of discipline, poorly officered, inadequately equipped, and provided with unsatisfactory commissary service, the troops lost most of their martial spirit before the year was out. Many of General Harrison's men by Christmas time had advanced only as far north as Fort Loramie, where hungry, sick, and unpaid, they deserted in droves. The soldiers feared for their families and regretted their absence from home and business. Selfish politicians sowed dissension between commanders, encouraged desertion, and abused recruiting officers; some judges released recruits on writs of habeas corpus. The Ohio legislature and Congress were criticized for not safeguarding the frontier, and waves of panic swept the state from time to time. Tryal Tanner of Canfield wrote Worthington after the defeat of General Winchester's detachment at the River Raisin, January 22, 1813, "Have our War members & cabinet made no arrangements to defend the frontier . . . altho you are not considered a stickler for war we must look to our Senators for efficient War or Peace." The Northwestern Army dwindled to fifteen hundred men, and McArthur wrote Armstrong, March 30, 1813, that it would be five hundred in two weeks:

Some Persons have already been killed and scalped in the neighborhood of Piqua . . .
Great quantities of provisions and military stores are exposed at points far advanced in a wilderness . . . [those] at Sandusky are perhaps the most insecure. . . . The Indians . . . are almost daily visited by hostile Indians, who carry information to the British. . . . I understand . . . Genl Cass has returned to Zanesville. . . . Every day that the recruiting service is procrastinated will render it more difficult to obtain men. Very many . . . [once] sanguine of success, are now much discouraged; The constant inquiry is, "Why did not Genl Harrison make a requisition of men, in time to supply the places of those whose term of service had expired?" or, "Why is our frontier not guarded and the friendly Indians removed?"

A year later, things were no better. General Edward Tupper, commanding the Ohio militia, reported that when his men reached Zanesville in February, 1814, "there was not a single article of camp equipment to be found at that place." There and elsewhere, he related, the soldiers were urged not to march without tents and other equipment, and efforts were made to prejudice their minds and "introduce insubordination in their ranks." The legislature, he declared, "aided by

37 Van Horne to Worthington, December 9, 1812, in WMOSL. Humphrey Fullerton wrote Worthington from Chillicothe, October 31, 1812, that two hundred Virginia troops had deserted and more were leaving daily. "Last night fifteen more . . . by the time they get to Detroit they will have few left." In WM.
38 James Manary to Worthington, December 22, 1812, in WM.
39 In Documents Relating to Detroit, 510-11.
two votes at one balloting from Charles Hammond," had displaced
him from his command in favor of Robert McConnels. "I have there­
fore hung up my sword," he concluded, "till the enemy arrives at
Chickamoga, that skirts the town of Gallipolis."40

The state of the war improved little the second year. Harrison was
criticized for moving so slowly to avenge Hull's dishonor. After Win­
chester's defeat and while Fort Meigs, the chief center of resistance
to the British, was being built, he even found time in March to visit
his family in North Bend and to tour Chillicothe and other towns in
the southwest quarter of the state in order to stimulate recruiting
and counteract personal animosity toward him and the anti-war propa­
ganda of the Federalists. Back at the defense of the fort in late April
and early May, he gallantly held it against a British and Indian force
twice the size of his own.

Between sessions of Congress, Worthington was useful in an advisory
capacity, and often entertained Harrison, Governor Meigs, and the
regimental commanders—Generals Cass, McArthur, and Findlay.
Otherwise, he was constantly engaged in business. His mills ground
steadily, and the contractors who had found it difficult to secure
rations in some parts of the state drew heavily on him. Any surplus
could be disposed of at a good price in New Orleans or in east-coast
towns. Thus Worthington inadvertently benefited by the war he had
opposed. In fact, the difficulty the sutlers had in securing grain for the
army was partly due to the high price being paid at New Orleans. As
early as July 8, 1812, D. C. Wallace of Cincinnati wrote Governor
Meigs that the firm of Baum and Perry had bought up all the grain
in that area for the New Orleans trade.41 The same was true of wool­
growers; they sold where the price was best. Abraham Shepherd of
Shepherdstown, Virginia, had opposed the war too, but he expressed
the general economic sentiment of the farmers when he wrote Worth­
ington, "I have a new hobby horse—that is to make Whiskey and raise
Moreno sheep—Peace or war people will drink Whiskey and ware
coats, I think my interest would be for the war to continue my life."42

Worthington was an ardent supporter of General Harrison even
though he often criticized him for being slow and overcautious, and
was inclined to agree with Charles Hammond that he was "little
superior to every third man you would meet in a days journey through

40 Tupper to Worthington, February 23, 1814, in WMOSL.
41 See the Ohio State Archives, Executive Documents, 1810-12.
42 December 10, 1813, in WM.
His confidence in Harrison was justified to a degree in 1813 by the General's first and second defenses of Fort Meigs and his victory at the Thames, October 5. Worthington had confidence in McArthur's ability, too, and was happy to have him placed in command of the Northwestern Army when Andrew Jackson succeeded to Harrison's major generalship on the latter's resignation in May, 1814. Harrison was severely criticized after he decided to rest on his honors during the winter of 1813-14, and was in disfavor with Secretary of War Armstrong. Worthington had recommended to Armstrong that McArthur be appointed in Harrison's place. Instead, Armstrong appointed Jackson and gave McArthur a brigadier generalship and the command of the Northwestern Army. McArthur was greatly displeased at not receiving the major generalship and the command of the district, and was very critical of Worthington for failing to secure him the desired appointment. His disgruntlement and lack of appreciation, perhaps added to the fact that he quartered a company of his troops on Worthington's estate without permission in January, 1815, led Worthington to note in his diary, January 28, that "McArthur [is] a most disagreeable neighbor." Worthington, who had never had much confidence in Lewis Cass as a military leader, welcomed his resignation to accept the governorship of Michigan Territory.

He was himself urged to secure the command of the 8th Military District but was not seriously tempted despite his conviction that he could have done no worse than those whom Madison had appointed. In the Ohio area, military leadership, from Hull to McArthur, had not proved very efficient, and an increase in the willingness of a majority of men to fight and die in defense of the region or for the conquest of Canada was no more discernible in 1814 than it had been in the two previous years.

Perry's victory on Lake Erie and Harrison's success on the Thames had caused rejoicing, but these victories were more than offset by defeats, the anti-war propaganda of the Federalists, petty politics, popular apathy, the greed and inefficiency of contractors, and the lack of cooperation between state and federal troops. By April, 1814,
McArthur was willing to concede that a defense of the northwestern frontier was about all he could promise. With the dispatch of Wellington's troops to Canada, affairs looked even darker.

In the East, the engagements at Chippewa, Lundy's Lane, and Lake Champlain raised the morale of the troops, but the burning of Washington in August, after a cowardly retreat at Bladensburg, took the heart out of the Administration. Worthington's years in the Senate ended in gloom. The prospect for Ohio was a little brighter, but for the nation the outlook was dark indeed.

Worthington's popularity with his colleagues in Washington and with certain groups in Ohio suffered for a time as the result of his vote against war. A month before the declaration, May 15, Joseph Collins had written him from Chillicothe: "I rejoice, my dear Sir that if uncontradicted reports may be credited you are very popular in Ohio—That you richly merit the love and confidence of the people, every candid man must acknowledge." Two months later, July 14, sentiment had changed somewhat. Worthington's enemies seized the opportunity to attack him. William Creighton, a volatile patriot and Worthington's political adversary, wrote with considerable glee,

Our old friend Worthington is opposed it seems to the effusion of human blood, a perfect Quaker in disposition opposed to fighting. He went on with the administration voting all the war measures until he came to the pinch of the game and then turned tail to the government and his friends—his political days are numbered the people in every part of the State from which I have heard are pouring out their most precious curses on him for his vote—his vote is libel on the State—thank God friend we can wash our hands of the sin of sending him to the Senate.

It is scarcely necessary to say that Creighton's sentiments did not express the opinion of the state, yet Worthington was attacked severely by the anti-Tammany newspapers. The Fredonian in July promised that the legislature would be petitioned to request his resignation (and Campbell's) "for deserting his post in the hour of danger." "Publico," in the Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Mercury, also asked for Worthington's resignation, claiming he no longer represented the people. He was accused in the Fredonian of having been instru-

46 McArthur to Worthington, April 15, 1814, in WMOSL.
47 In WMOSL.
48 Creighton to George Tod, July 14, 1812, in the Tod Manuscripts, WRHS.
49 Fredonian, September 30. "Publico" was probably Jacob Burnet.
mental in the appointment of the "traitor" Hull; but that charge was easily refuted when Worthington showed the editor, Robert Richardson, a copy of the Senate Executive Journal. Richardson printed his documented denial "with sincere pleasure." \(^{50}\) "A Friend of Merit" defended Worthington ably in the Supporter on August 1:

> Before we condemn the opinion of those who opposed the immediate declaration of war, let us have a complete triumph, because we may, perhaps, need our united exertions before so desirable an event can be accomplished. . . .

> I am far from upholding Gen. Worthington as a perfect man; but where is the man who has encouraged population and manufactures more than he has done? Where is the man who has done more to encourage mechanics and to improve our country in general?\(^{51}\)

In short, criticism of Worthington was largely the expression of political animosity and cannot be taken as representative of the attitude of the people at large or even of his home community. Governor Meigs was, if anything, more viciously and legitimately criticized. General McArthur found fault with the Governor for his "milk and water politicks" and alleged that the people "would support almost any other decent [sic] man in preference to him"; he particularly censured Meigs for campaigning for reelection instead of raising troops, adding, "I suppose a company of rangers must be sent after him." \(^{51}\)

Edward Tiffin wrote Worthington, April 16, "The public will soon have a complete opportunity to observe we want a very different Man for Governor in [these] trying times—Volunteers I am informed cannot be obtained—no wonder." \(^{52}\) After Hull's defeat, Meigs was accused of having received half the price of the General's treason, of having conspired to split the profits from provisioning the army, and of having withheld aid from Detroit. \(^{63}\)

Worthington never had any occasion to regret his stand against the conflict. He wrote James Heaton of Hamilton, "I have often wished that there might be a state of things which would not justify my vote. I would willingly sacrifice selfishness to my love of country." \(^{54}\) As time passed, the soundness of his position in regard to the war became more and more evident. The series of disasters and disappointments which had taken place rapidly restored him to general favor and

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\(^{50}\) Ibid., September 16 and December 9; Senate Executive Journal, II, 243-45 (March 10, 1812).

\(^{51}\) McArthur to Worthington, March 23 and April 7, 1812, in WMOSL.

\(^{52}\) In WMOSL.

\(^{53}\) Joseph Willen (Marietta) to Meigs, September 14, in the Ohio State Archives, Executive Documents, 1810-12. See also the Trump of Fame, September 16, 23, 30, and Carlos Norton to Worthington, April 17, in the Meigs Papers.

\(^{54}\) January 22, 1813, in WMOSL.
justified the wisdom of his vote against the premature declaration of war. Even as early as November 23, 1812, John Kerr wrote him as follows:

I am much pleased to remark that the people are now not near so ready to burn your effigy . . . as they were in the summer. Consideration is always resumed by the multitude when it is of no great service to them. War is a pretty thing in theory, how it will terminate in practice is altogether a different consideration—If the people are heavily taxed for the support of the war, I wish it were a poll tax, the fever of war would be greatly reduced by such an application of the laws of Congress.55

55 In WMOSL. See the letters from Adjutant General Van Horne, December 9, in WMOSL, and from John Pollock (Milford, Clermont Co.), March 12, 1814, in the Meigs Papers, for an expression of the same sentiments.