Few would deny that men and violence are closely related. In practically every historical setting, violent crime has been overwhelmingly a male enterprise, and today this is no different. Criminal violence, however, is only part of the story; not every act of aggression or bloodshed is always condemned. It is commonly known that, in various situations, violence may be honorable. Less clear, however, is the way in which aggressive behavior, or the abstention from aggressive behavior, can contribute to the construction of masculinity and male honor.

Our ignorance on such issues can be attributed in part to the evolution of gender studies, which have tended in the past to relegate men to the margins. When gender arose as an issue in the humanities and social sciences, women were the focus of attention, and practitioners of women's history tended to write individual or collective biographies of women. This descriptive orientation was an understandable reaction to a traditional historiography that implicitly was always about men. During the last ten years, however, the focus shifted: the production of narratives about women gave way to a more theoretical approach, problematizing
relations between women and men and their representation. In this new approach, gender is analyzed as a crucial factor in the historical process, next to such factors as social stratification or ethnic affiliation.\(^1\) Even more recently, it is acknowledged that studying gender also means posing the problem of male culture and masculinity.\(^2\) Men can be studied explicitly as men, the male gender, rather than implicitly as the merchants or politicians with whom historians happen to have dealt for so long.\(^3\) Presently, there is a growing international interest in the history of masculinity, to which this volume wants to contribute.

Masculinity is a very broad subject. This volume looks at it from one crucial angle: violence and honor, which have played a prominent role in male cultures. For one thing, in societies with pronounced notions of honor and shame, a person's reputation often depends on physical bravery and a forceful response to insults. Second, notions of honor and shame are characteristically gendered. In almost every society, male honor is considered to be quite different from female honor. Men may take pride in attacking fellow men, whether they use this force to protect women or for other reasons. Passivity, in violent and peaceful situations, is a cardinal feminine virtue. Anthropologists as well as historians have studied concepts of honor, including the changing interrelationships of male honor and violence.\(^4\) Of course, masculinity is not necessarily bound up with physical bravado in all societies at all times. An important research question precisely concerns the conditions under which male cultures may become less prone to violence.

To pose that question is to acknowledge that human behavior takes shape in social and cultural interaction and that it is not programmed by biological factors.\(^5\) The contributors to this volume all agree that the level of aggression and its changing nature have to be explained primarily with reference to the society in which they manifest themselves. This equally applies to conceptions of honor. Honor has at least three layers: a person's own feeling of self-worth, this person's assessment of his or her worth in the eyes of others, and the actual opinion of others about her or him.\(^6\) The criteria of judgment depend on the sociocultural context. The search for different standards of honor and masculinity, then, is a cross-cultural as well as a diachronic enterprise. This book makes a modest beginning with it. As it focuses on change over time, a few words about geographic scope are in order here.
The observation of a relationship between physical force and male honor primarily derives from the western experience. In some nonwestern cultures this link appears to be much weaker: honorable men do not react to insults with an aggressive response, and when they do, it is often viewed negatively. According to anthropologist Frank Henderson Stewart, the concepts of honor prevalent among the Bedouins, and possibly in the Arab world as a whole, are fundamentally different from the European model. In contemporary Bedouin societies no particular connection between male honor and violence exists. Among the Djuka from the Surinam rain forest it counts as a stain upon a man's honor if he fights out a conflict or reacts to an insult with violence. Only in the case of adultery is the aggrieved husband accorded a limited right to beat up his rival. All other conflicts have to be solved through the institution of the palaver. This attitude has characterized the Djuka for at least two hundred and fifty years, Thoden van Velzen argues, and it is connected to the uxoriloccal organization of their society. Conversely, in Japan the samurai have cherished a warrior ethos for centuries. A samurai's honor depended on his reputation for bloodshed and his aggressive lifestyle. Although this elite group was gradually pacified, as was the European aristocracy, in Japan the process of pacification took a longer time and it was half-hearted. To a much greater extent than among the early modern European aristocracy, the social identity of the Tokugawa samurai depended on their origins as a warrior caste. Thus, considerable differences exist between cultures. The contributions to this volume, however, deal exclusively with western Europe and the United States since the early modern era.

Even then, the range of questions is sufficiently broad, and no satisfactory answers can be given to all of them. What follows is a tentative review of the historical evidence on violence, notions of honor, the body, and gender in the western world since the late Middle Ages. To present this within the confines of an introductory chapter requires a solid framework. The review will be guided by a theoretical approach that proceeds from a long-term perspective. Its principal aim is to indicate the extent to which the individual essays of this volume inform us about elements or episodes of major historical developments. The basic framework of these developments is set out first; then the focus is on the volume's respective parts.
Violence does not stand by itself. Because of its physicality it belongs to the wider field of the history of the body and its symbolic representation. Insofar as honor relates to violence, it equally relates to this wider field. Honor originally depended on the body or, in Blok's words, the physical person. Appearance was crucial for one's reputation. Honorable men were symbolically associated with strong, awe-inspiring animals. So we have the body, honor, and gender, and they are all related. Bodies, being male or female with few exceptions, form the basis of gender; gender gives rise to a dual concept of honor; honor shapes the experience of the body. The inherent circularity ensures that no element of this triangle is the principal determinant. The relationship is one of interdependence: if there is a change in one element, the others are likely to change, too. Nevertheless, in order to come to grips with these complex interdependencies, we may break them down into developments in three areas: the body and gender, gender and honor, and honor and the body.

For the body and gender the crucial periods seem to have been the Middle Ages and the late eighteenth century. Important work has been done on the first period. Although the authors concerned criticize one another on points of detail, they agree that the medieval concept of sexual differences left room for much ambiguity. In the view of contemporaries, to be male or female largely depended on character and habits. In accordance with this, the process of generation did not just offer two possibilities. Human specimens such as a virago, an effeminate man, or a hermaphrodite could be born just as easily. The body's sexual identity had fluid boundaries. Christ's body in particular was often pictured as half female. His side wounds, a source of food, were likened to Mary's breasts. Thomas Laqueur offers a model to account for these observations: in this period, gender came first. In medieval people's minds, the sociocultural experience of being male or female, or anything in between, had primacy, and biological sex was made to fit it. Essentially, this concept of sexual differences persisted during the early modern period. From the middle of the eighteenth century onward, however, the relationship was reversed. Sex came first now. Biology was seen as the basis of character, and biology left room for just two sexes. Sexual identity and, as a consequence, gender identity became much more strictly demarcated. This new view was especially pronounced toward the end of the nineteenth
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century. As Robert Nye writes in this volume, doctors and biologists elaborated a standard anatomical and physiological model of masculinity, defining its features as hygienic norms to which all men should comply. Masculinity and femininity became binary opposites.

When this stricter demarcation of the sexes and gender roles was elaborated, the contrast between male and female honor weakened. Since the early modern period, notions of female and male honor gradually converged. Of course, they remained distinct to some extent. The process of convergence had two main aspects: the active-passive contrast in gender roles became less pronounced and men, like women before them, had to take moral standards into account. Women's honor had always been based primarily on issues of morality. Foremost, it depended on a reputation of chastity, but in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a clean slate with respect to sorcery was important, too. A chaste woman was a modest woman, true to the demand of passivity. For men, on the other hand, the domain of sex originally meant activity: the protection of one's own womenfolk from predators and trying to seduce others' womenfolk. This attitude not only prevailed among elite men but also among men of lower social status. Popular customs testify to this at least until the sixteenth century. When a cuckolded husband was subjected to the ritual of charivari, for example, he was mocked as a loser by his fellow men rather than burdened with moral outrage. Attitudes slowly changed during the early modern period. Restrictive demands on men, especially from religious moralists, became stronger. Obviously, the male gender role continued to take a more active stance than the female, but the quest for sexual adventure was increasingly proscribed from it. By the nineteenth century, male honor, too, had become associated with sexual self-restraint, at least among the middle classes.

Thus, a shift in the way the body and gender were perceived was accompanied by a transformation in concepts of gender and honor. That transformation, however, seems to have come about more gradually, extending over a period roughly from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth. The two changes were loosely related rather than connected in a cause-and-effect relationship. In this complex web of interdependent developments, the third area to be reviewed, that of honor and the body, was involved, too. In that case, we are talking primarily, but not exclusively, of male culture.

Honor can be oriented inward or outward. Association with the body means being linked to the body's outer appearance in particular. The
outside is considered to reflect inner qualities, so appearance takes primacy. Conversely, in its spiritualized form, honor is linked primarily to inner virtues. It depends on an evaluation of a person's moral stature or psychological condition, in which outer appearance plays a much less significant part. Inward and outward are two end-poles of a continuum. The conceptions of honor prevailing in a particular society are never located completely at one end or the other, but always somewhere between these extremes. In western Europe over the last three hundred years or so, concepts of honor appear to have moved in the direction of spiritualization. By implication, their association with the body was strongest before this process of change set in. During most of the preindustrial period, male honor depended on a reputation for violence and bravery. An honorable man commanded respect; as a patron, he protected his clients and he dealt roughly with an enemy who dared to encroach upon his property. In the streets he kept rivals at a distance, at arm's length at least. When insulted, he was prepared to fight. Well into the seventeenth century, these attitudes were manifest in almost every European country where the subject has been investigated.

The gradual change in the direction of spiritualization did not just mean the reduction or removal of the element of force from the prevalent concept of honor. The change also had a positive side, in the sense that something else took the place of force. Thus, by the seventeenth century, economic solidity was a major supplementary source of honor for men. A reputation for engaging in sloppy affairs would greatly diminish a man's honor; thief was a common word of insult. Clearly, this implies the rise of a new ideal of masculine behavior. As Martin J. Wiener notes in this volume, the earliest attacks on "traditional manhood" can be traced back to the sixteenth century. For other historians, the decisive moment was at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, when a gentler and more domesticated type of man emerged; they speak of the breakthrough of a "new masculinity." It can be argued, however, that taking pride in not being considered a thief was the earliest manifestation of a "new masculinity." It preceded its later counterpart by some three centuries.

The concept of "new masculinity" helps us to avoid equating the spiritualization of honor with its feminization. That would be an unwarranted simplification. For one thing, female honor, too, once seems to have carried more explicitly physical connotations. Views of chastity and unchasteness
were suffused with bodily imagery. In sixteenth-century Italy, for example, a close analogy existed between the female body and the house. Forcing a stranger's door was the same, symbolically, as piercing a hymen. Women and men shared such images. An explicitly physical act of defamation was performed a couple of times in Nuremberg around 1500, when an unchaste woman stood the risk of having her nose injured or even cut off. In most cases, this was done by one woman to another woman who had had an affair with her husband. This custom was echoed in early seventeenth-century London: a few women threatened to slit the nose of their husbands' mistresses, but actual violence only amounted to a scratch on the face, called the whore's mark. In seventeenth-century Burgundy, a woman considered dishonorable might be robbed of her headdress by another woman: a symbolic act whose physical connotations are somewhat less explicit. A similar custom, knocking off an unchaste woman's cap, was practiced by women and men in the small coastal town of Wilster in Holstein in the early seventeenth century. So it is likely that, over time, notions of female chastity became more interiorized and less linked to the body. If that was the case, women were also involved, though to a lesser extent than men, in the process of spiritualization of honor.

This process was reinforced by the efforts of religious moralists, in Spain, Britain, and the Netherlands among other countries. As honor was gradually spiritualized, it came to be associated more firmly with what many people conceived to be the body politic. Next to the inward-outward dimension, long-term change involves the social hierarchy. A person's status usually matters for the type of honor he is able to acquire. To protect "his people" is a more obvious duty for a rural patron than for an urban artisan, who has no clients to protect in the first place. For this artisan, it is important to prevent any rumor of being a thief. On the other hand, economic solidity may be a less crucial value for men who occupy a still lower position in the social hierarchy, such as the journeymen of early modern Germany. Their honor primarily lay in generosity, bravery, and comradeliness.

Social Stratification and the Duel

Social stratification, then, is a crucial factor influencing concepts of honor as well as definitions of masculinity. Consequently, social stratification is a major theme in most of the essays that follow. The contributions to this
volume document the last few centuries of the very long term just sketched, with Ute Frevert's article and mine going back furthest in time. Frevert, especially, is concerned with the issue of stratification. It is her principal argument that, whereas the duel's association with masculine values is a historical constant, the social composition of the groups most apt to duel changed over time. In the early modern period, dueling flourished exclusively among the nobility, whether army officers or not. In the course of the nineteenth century, however, bourgeois men increasingly adopted this custom as a means of solving conflicts. Consequently, the bourgeoisie rejected its civilian origins to some extent. Frevert shows that academia played the role of intermediary. During the seventeenth century the universities were increasingly exposed to aristocratic influences. Students became eager duelists, hoping to challenge an army officer. The persistence of this student tradition and, later, the militarization of German culture go a long way to explain how it was possible that the bourgeoisie adopted the duel so easily as a habit of their own.

For Germany, Frevert describes this changing social recruitment of duelists as a more or less continuous process. Earlier historians spoke of the emergence of the bourgeois duel in terms of revival. Notably, this seems to be true for France. The duel became fashionable again among the country's elites by the mid-nineteenth century, following upon a phase of relative marginalization, marked by its retreat to the world of the military, at the end of the ancien régime. As Robert Nye points out, dueling was taken up by the Republican opposition in the Second Empire. In Italy, unification seems to have provided the custom with a new impulse, although we cannot underpin this with hard figures. Before 1870 there is nothing approaching the meticulous collection of statistics by Iacopo Gelli, which Steven Hughes uses as his main source. Whatever the frequency of dueling, however, there can be no doubt about the prominent participation of bourgeois men. In Italy journalists were eager participants, next to military men who were often of middle-class origin. In France, the military was much less involved. The officer corps, Robert Nye argues, hardly indulged in dueling; instead, the custom was favored among civilians, who preferred the sword as a weapon. They cherished a national myth according to which France was the home country of the duel and the épée was its weapon par excellence.

Whether or not the term "revival" is appropriate, the bourgeoisie embraced dueling throughout nineteenth-century Europe. Their acceptance may have been facilitated by a new legitimating argument. Against the
duel's critics, who found it a brutalizing ritual, the custom's defenders argued that, quite to the contrary, it was a civilizing force. Such arguments were elaborated notably in France, and Nye renders them thus: the modern duel civilizes its participants in two ways. First, it promotes mutual regard between men and pacifies interpersonal relations, by giving men confidence in their personal force. Second, the duel encourages self-mastery, teaching a man the forms to observe in his interactions with others. The men endowed with the greatest courage were regarded as the least likely to issue or provoke dueling challenges. This situation, still according to the French apologists, would lead to fewer rather than to more duels. Comparable arguments were heard in Italy. German protagonists added another nuance to this view. The duel, they argued, establishes a "fraternal bond" between its participants. Having experienced and survived it, former enemies are like brothers. Indeed, Frevert has found real-life examples of this sense of bonding. Especially in the nineteenth century, fighting out a conflict in a benign manner was supposed to bring people together. In this view, the civilizing element does not lie in any curbing of violence per se but in a decrease in the intensity of personal conflict.

Several qualifications can be made to the idea that the duel promoted civilized behavior. If we take it at face value, we must assume that the prospect of having to face an opponent in arms restrained men in social intercourse; they thought twice before they said a wrong word. With the advantage of historical hindsight, we can say that the idea takes for granted a measure of sensitization to violence. The implicit assumption is that honorable men actually do not want to fight at all and do everything they can to avoid it. In this way, the duel's defenders acknowledged that, deep in their hearts, they found the habit distasteful. In reality, therefore, the measure of civilization already reached affected contemporary views of dueling. A parallel situation prevailed some hundred years previously with attitudes toward judicial torture: even the conservatives, torture's defenders, took for granted that most people disliked the practice. They wanted to direct the public's compassion to the respectable citizenry who, in their view, would greatly suffer from crime if penal procedure were reformed. In both instances, in the late eighteenth century and the late nineteenth, people who tolerated a violent custom nevertheless recognized that this violence was intrinsically distasteful and should therefore be kept to a minimum.

A second qualification is that contemporary views about civilizing
forces are not necessarily in line with the technical sense in which Norbert Elias uses the term process of civilization. Yet, the development of dueling can be related to this process. Ute Frevert argues this explicitly, speaking of an increasing regulation and disciplining of the duel. Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries the duel changed from a relatively anarchic fight into a completely stylized ritual of violence, bound to exact rules and practiced with the consent of both parties. Although the contributions on Italy and France do not cover this very long term, they contain another important observation: dueling codes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were more genteel than their predecessors. The combatants usually were not expected to go on until the inevitable end. Frenchmen mostly fought “at first blood,” and in Italy duelist incurred relatively light wounds. This had been different still in England during the first half of the nineteenth century: Englishmen then fought with accurate pistols at short distance from each other, which resulted in a death rate of about 15 percent. Hence, the middle of the nineteenth century appears as the crucial moment of change. This also applies to the German-speaking countries. Although German dueling codes continued to stress that death must be an inherent risk, they no longer obliged the combatants passively to wait for each other’s shots. Willingness to risk one’s life was a more important element than a possible victory. In all three countries it mattered less who won than that honor was saved by shedding (some) blood. While Hughes and Nye are not dealing with the origins of this attitude, Frevert’s data suggest that it was new in the bourgeois period, having emerged in the middle of the eighteenth century. No doubt, the lesser violence of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century duels was a precondition for viewing them as promoters of civilization.

The conclusions about dueling and the bourgeoisie are relevant to a more general argument about honor and the social hierarchy. In a highly stratified society, the elite only acknowledges a claim to honor from its own (male) members. For a long time historians took this to imply that common people had no concept of honor, but this is questionable even for the feudal period. In preindustrial Europe, common people reflected about their reputations constantly, but higher groups had no interest in them. Conversely, lower groups usually recognized middle- and upper-class persons as honorable, but this had little relevance for their own honor games: a lower person could never hope to diminish (to “steal”) a higher person’s honor. The definition of who was honorable and how much so largely took place within one’s peer group.
This situation had partly changed in the second half of the nineteenth century. By that time, middle and upper classes shared a common honor code. Even in Germany, with its strong barriers between social groups, middle-class academics and army officers together belonged to the Satzungsfähige Gesellschaft. Integration of bourgeoisie and aristocracy went farthest in France, as Robert Nye makes clear. Members of the upper middle classes intermarried with old nobles and laid claim to equal political and social status. The honor attached to membership of this new alliance of notables was shared by all. Gelli, the Italian journalist, did not even identify nobles as a separate group in his statistics. In his view, a loosely defined class of “gentlemen” could lay claim to honor. At the same time, gentlemen were not prepared to grant “true honor” to mere shopkeepers or workers. Steven Hughes points out that the leniency of the courts toward duelists had an obvious class bias. When a peasant or an urban worker had killed an opponent in a fair fight, he was punished as severely as any killer. Recognition that such a conflict could be an affair of honor—which, according to Daniele Boschis data, it could very well be—would be scandalizing to elite values. Despite this, the merger of noble and bourgeois honor in the nineteenth century was a step in a gradual process of greater intergroup recognition of honor. Internationally, the exact trajectory of this process is little understood yet. It may have gone farthest in France, as exemplified by Georges Breittmayer’s new dueling code with which Nye’s essay concludes. Writing in the winter of 1917–18, Breittmayer decreed that anyone of draft age could duel and hence belonged to the same honor group. He only excluded men who had avoided military service or engaged in disreputable activities during the war. This was a more democratic code than ever adhered to in Italy, let alone Germany, but it came too late. It was overdue not only because the duel was about to die but also because society was changing. Ultimately, honor is exclusive by nature; it presupposes infamy or, at least, lesser honor. If all were honorable, no one would be really honorable. Democratization, then, may explain the lesser importance of honor codes in the twentieth century.

To conclude, over the long term, the social hierarchy affects the degree of exclusiveness of the claim to possess honor. In addition, the social hierarchy affects honor in another fundamental way: the extent to which it is a personal or a collective attribute. In that case, the question is whether the actions of individual persons contribute to the honor of the group to which they belong. In a conflict between students and artisans in Göttingen in
1790, for example, the collective honor of both groups was at stake. The volunteer firemen whom Amy Greenberg depicts so vividly, whether fighting or not fighting, were upholding their company's honor. Nations are particularly large groups. A final observation from the contributions on dueling concerns the intimate association of honor codes with nationalism in the late nineteenth century. More than previously, honor was tied to the nation. The French fought duels to take revenge on the Germans who had defeated them in 1870–71, the Germans to assert their newly won national self-consciousness, and the unified Italians to show that the Ethiopians had better watch out next time. Conversely, nationalism could allow the Italians just as well to refrain from dueling: from 1914 to 1918 they postponed their personal grievances to concentrate on the war effort. It was not until the rise of the fascist regime that dueling was suppressed. Mussolini's men also struck against the Mafia, which cherished its own peculiar blend of honor and ritual violence. For the fascists, honor was tied solely to the nation.

Throughout Europe, honor had become less of a personal attribute by 1900. In earlier days, one person's actions had repercussions for the honor of his family at the most; now they had repercussions for a much larger group, the nation in particular. The duel's opponents, finally, saw honor as completely depersonalized: it was a kind of alien monster, preferably exacting the lives of both duelists. The nationalist concept of honor was echoed in America at the level of individual states. Stephen Kantrowitz points this out for South Carolina: in the 1890s, Governor Tillman wavered between condoning mob violence and insisting that the law should be in control. He and other whites realized that South Carolina's collective honor depended on a reputation for proper legal procedure, hoping to reassure either northern businessmen or possible political allies in the national arena. The theme of nationalism anticipates that of the state, discussed below. First, however, we have to take a closer look at the subject of ritual, which not only characterized the elite duel but also played a crucial role in popular practices.

**Ritual Violence: Popular and Elite Forms**

In recent historiography, ritual has been analyzed primarily with reference to the social world of villages and urban neighborhoods. It is an omnipresent theme in the literature on preindustrial local communities. As an
element of human behavior, ritual may be connected with all three areas discussed earlier: the body, honor and gender. Here we must concentrate on ritual's relation to violence. In earlier publications I have proposed a model that included the hypothesis that long-term trends moved in the direction of a marginalization of ritual aspects of violence and a growing prominence of instrumental aspects. Instrumental violence means violence used as a means to an end, as in robbery or rape. This is not the place to develop my model further; what ought to be discussed is the extent to which the contributions to the present volume shed light on the rituals of violence. An activity can be labeled as ritual according to various criteria. The ritual character may lie in a specific sequence of events while the activity is carried out; it may also lie, simultaneously or alternatively, in the particular time of the year when the activity takes place. Both criteria apply to violent activities just as much. A combat of one man against another, for example, may proceed according to a prearranged sequence of steps. Mock battles between the youths of neighboring villages, on the other hand, were usually connected to the seasonal calendar. The fighting of American volunteer firemen, too, was linked to specific events, notably fires. Ritual violence may even become a form of theater, as did the festive battles on the bridges of Venice in the seventeenth century.

Thus, the repertoire of ritual violence comprised different forms, not only over time but also synchronically. Even women partook of that repertoire. In male popular culture, two types of ritual violence were notorious: collective unarmed fights, settled by boxing and/or wrestling, and the armed "fair" combat. Both types are dealt with in this volume; the second, the popular duel, is a recent historical discovery.

In my essay I have identified a substantial number of the homicide cases tried by the Amsterdam court in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as popular duels. These cases involved an "honorable" combat of one knife fighter against another. Such a combat was a ritual event, started off by a challenge from the insulted party and fought according to a code of fairness. The fighters tested each other's strength and thus their manhood. Although not as stylized as the elite sword or pistol duel, the knife duel was its lower-class counterpart. The participants occupied a social position along the border of the "respectable" and the nonrespectable segment of the urban lower classes. People who considered themselves respectable did not use a knife as a weapon; they would ward off an attacker with a stick. After 1720 the popular duel with knives disappeared from
the Amsterdam court records, indicating its decline. In some rural areas of the Netherlands, on the other hand, knife fighting continued to be customary until the beginning of the nineteenth century.

No surprise for the Romans. As Daniele Boschi shows, a knife culture was alive and flourishing in Rome even around 1900. He observes that homicidal incidents frequently began for trivial reasons that often touched on matters of honor. Next to "classic" tavern conflicts and street brawls, Boschi's cases include homicidal incidents arising from tensions in the neighborhood, at the workplace, and within the family. Whatever the incident's origin, many offenders had either a previous criminal record or a reputation for easily losing self-control when drunk. The first characteristic also applied to a sizable minority of offenders in my file. The second, however, was a rare occurrence there: no particular character traits of Amsterdam killers around 1700 were recorded. Thus, whereas Amsterdam's popular duelists were a distinct group primarily in terms of their marginal social status, Rome's knife fighters were defined as a group partly in psychological terms. This suggests that, despite the similarity in knife cultures, the standards of acceptance of violence were different. In Rome around 1900, some measure of inner restraint on serious aggression must have been common among even the lowest social groups, so that individuals lacking these psychological restraints were branded as deviants. Indeed, Boschi observes that such violent men were ostracized within the working class: to associate with them was often a stain on the honor of more self-controlled working people. This implies a greater isolation than that experienced by Amsterdam knife fighters two centuries earlier.

Whereas Rome's rowdies were condemned as individuals, the riotous firemen of antebellum America, engaging in collective violence, received bad press as a group. Of course, knife fighters also constituted a group, but they were not organized as such. The knife culture's opponents had no other option than to suppress it: it would have been impossible to transform the concepts of honor of the bearers of that culture in the direction of greater peacefulness. Precisely that possibility was open in the case of the fire companies. At first, companies who considered themselves honorable freely attacked companies branded as dishonorable. But not everyone shared this attitude. Leading members as well as contemporary observers argued that a company's honor should be maintained by keeping up a reputation of orderliness, not violence. In St. Louis, for example, an entire company counted as dishonored if it accepted as a member a fireman ex-
pelled from another company for misconduct. Because of the firemen's obvious public task, demands to reform their manners from the middle classes may have had a stronger impact than similar appeals to knife fighters would have had. Indeed, Greenberg remarks that aspiring citizens of St. Louis wished their city to emulate the sphere of "gentility" which they felt characterized Boston and New York at the time. Despite such pressures, in the end the fire companies themselves, or their leaders, did not succeed in establishing a reputation for orderliness. So they were disbanded. Fire fighting without fighting was accomplished by replacing the volunteer companies with professional ones (where, presumably, the threat of dismissal was used to enforce peaceable behavior). It should be added that the establishment of professional companies cannot be explained solely as a reaction to the disorderliness of the volunteer firemen. This becomes clear from Amy Greenberg's account of the situation in San Francisco, whose volunteer company was quickly disbanded after just one riot. This was an obvious pretext, and more structural factors must have been involved in the shift to professional fire fighting throughout America.

In dealing with collective violence, Greenberg's contribution raises the question of numbers. How many people may legitimately participate in a violent encounter? With fistfights, which are relatively harmless, the number of participants does not matter too much. Even then, however, an affray between two parties of very unequal size would usually damage the honor of the larger group. So, what about more serious clashes? Ritual sequences and concepts of honor are often connected to a code of fairness. And again, exactly what we consider fair has changed over time. Throughout Europe, the codes of fairness underwent a diachronic development involving the lower classes as well as the elites. To illustrate this development, we must return to the duel.

In the duel, the number of participants is two by definition. This would be self-evident to a nineteenth-century bourgeois or his aristocratic predecessor a century earlier. Likewise, a one-on-one combat was required from honorable knife fighters in Amsterdam around 1700. However, as Frevert points out, in the early seventeenth century the seconds sometimes joined in the duel, despite its name. They were considered auxiliaries to the principals. Earlier still, some really unequal struggles had been within the domain of honor. The scene was that of the vendetta. The ritual revenge of one clan upon another precluded a concern for an equal
The Dutch province of Zeeland in the fifteenth century is a good example. In one incident, in 1498, two brothers and two of their cousins pursued just one man, named Hallinck Cornelis. Because Hallinck was armed with a pike, he managed to kill one of his assailants. Thereupon the other three went to the home of Hallinck’s aged father, broke down the door, dragged the old man from his bed, stabbed him seventeen times, and finished him off by smashing his head with a club. The same attitude prevailed among the regional elite of Friuli until the middle of the sixteenth century. Enemies from rival clans were butchered, as if they were prey in a hunting party. Ambushes were quite common. When the expelled leader of a once powerful faction was killed in Villach in 1512, ten men jumped on him from their hiding place, drove him to a corner, and offered his archenemy the opportunity to deal the final blow. From the 1560s onward the Friulian nobles preferred the duel when they were in conflict.

Ostensibly, notions of what is fair and honorable and what is not were changing. Possibly, the change can be explained by bringing in the family. In ancient Dutch and North Italian vendetta ritual, treacherous murders were considered excusable by the community as long as they served to vindicate the collective honor of the clan. When the motive was revenge, almost anything was allowed. Amsterdam knife fighters around 1700 usually had personal grudges only. They upheld their individual honor. This may be taken as running counter to the conclusion, reached above, that honor became less of a personal attribute over time. In the Middle Ages personal honor and family honor were one and the same. Perhaps the Amsterdam knife fights represented an intermediate phase in which the sense of honor was personal at its most extreme. On the other hand, the knife fighters may have been an exceptional group. They were lone rangers to some extent, who fought primarily for a reputation in their peer group. To their aristocratic contemporaries, on the other hand, personal honor was equally linked to family honor. This link is relatively constant over time. The longer process consisted of honor’s increasing association with larger social groups. So, if the code of fairness became stricter over time, the explanation must lie elsewhere. We must rather think of a “civilizing process” in Elias’s sense: the emergence of the aristocratic and the popular duel meant that fighting rituals became less “wild” and driven by emotional impulses.

We know that the aristocratic duel originated in Italy in the early six-
teenth century. For the popular duel, the Amsterdam evidence, from 1650 onward, is the oldest. Examples of peasants calling upon an enemy to leave his house and follow the challenger to the fields probably refer to less stylized fights. Although it is possible that knife fights bound to ritual codes were an independent tradition among the lower classes, they might actually have originated in imitation of the elite duel. Ute Frevert suggests the latter possibility, discussing a few cases of ordinary people challenging each other to a rapier combat in seventeenth-century Germany and a case of a guild member engaged in a duel with a Danish officer. While the popular duel's origins may not be that remote, the timing of its demise, on a European scale, varied from one place to another; indeed, it varied according to town, region, or country. Within the Netherlands, the custom of knife fighting had a longer life in rural Groningen and Brabant than in Amsterdam (and possibly in other towns in the western part of the country). In Rome and in most of Italy to the south of Lombardy, knife fights were still endemic by the late nineteenth century. It would be too simple, however, to say that the knife culture disappeared earlier in northern than in southern Europe. Some provinces of Finland in the nineteenth century were notorious for knife fighting.

Conversely, a traditional code of honor may be in operation without frequent recourse to violence. An early example is the verbal dueling practiced in Italy in the second half of the sixteenth century. A situation in which honor was combined with a low frequency of violence also has been observed in a study of loan-sharking in Philadelphia from the 1920s to the 1970s. Sharks and their clients inhabited a masculine world; they shared an honor code, in which trustfulness and keeping a man's word were central values. Appeals to that code were more frequent than violent coercion as means to get payment and for obvious reasons. In this business, too many broken limbs would serve as a counter-advertisement. It may be assumed, however, that clients under pressure of payment often sensed the threat of physical coercion. The potential for violence was greater than the actual recourse to it. This probably also applies to earlier historical situations that are less well documented. Among the dueling-prone groups of fin de siècle Europe as well as the people with knives in Amsterdam around 1700, a certain potential for violence and demanding satisfaction existed, but a greater or smaller part of this potential
remained submerged. Actual violence need not always ensue. When it did not, the available sources usually remain silent. Disagreements during drinking bouts that were laughed away did not make it to the courtroom. Newspapers seldom reported when a gentleman had decided that a particular insult was too minor to be taken as an encroachment upon his honor.

**Violent Men and the State**

So far, the role of the state has been underplayed. Political processes are a possible explanatory factor in any account of long-term cultural change. In most of the discussion up to now, the state was present already. Its leaders felt ambivalent toward the elite duel. At the same time, various courts were unequivocally bent on the suppression of knife fighting. Around 1860, American cities substituted professional for amateur fire brigades. The courts' concern extended to still other forms of "traditional" violence. In England, and probably in other European countries as well, these forms of violence were criminalized more intensely during the nineteenth century.

That is the subject of Martin Wiener's essay. The creation of a new standard of masculinity is his central problem, more so than that of honor codes. Taking a close look at the institutions of social control in nineteenth-century Britain, he finds that the end result of their activities was an increasing criminalization of men: "The early Victorian reconstruction of womanhood was paralleled and complemented by a much less well known reconstruction of manhood." Wiener emphasizes that his account of this process is not intended as a balanced one; rather, it functions as a complement to existing accounts focused on the treatment of women. He argues that the disappearance of female criminals in the nineteenth century, which other historians have noted as well, was largely an artefact of the increasing visibility of male criminals. Typically male forms of behavior, in particular those involving violence, were increasingly proscribed by law. Consequently, a growing proportion of serious criminal prosecutions and punishments were aimed at men.

Consequently, Wiener rejects what he calls a "power essentialism": the assumption that gender relations are always and everywhere structured in such a way that men collectively exercise power and benefit from it, while women are its collective objects and victims. This is well taken: although
the objects of discipline were men, most of the agents of discipline were also men. Judges, journalists, members of Parliament, and doctors, though not all moral entrepreneurs, were male. The rejection of essentialism does not mean that power was absent in the process that Wiener describes. As a rule, the agents of discipline occupied a higher position in the social hierarchy than the objects of discipline. In the process that the former set in motion, they reconstructed their own and others' manhood. Social class, then, was another crucial factor. Wiener acknowledges this in his choice of words. Speaking of "the domestication of men into gentility and a culture of sensibility," he is referring implicitly to middle-class men, while elsewhere he speaks of "the civilization of the crowd." The criminalization of dueling is an example of discipline aimed at men from the upper echelons of society, and indeed the duel disappeared in England around the middle of the nineteenth century. Violence directed at women was increasingly criminalized as well. The member of Parliament who, in 1856, spoke of "unmanly assaults" in this connection and who wanted to reform "the character of our own sex" could hardly have said it more clearly: the issue was the creation of a new masculinity. It was created, Wiener concludes, at the expense of a masculinization of crime.

While the leaders of the British state, from a position of strength, self-consciously strove to curb male violence, a quite different situation prevailed around the turn of the century in South Carolina. The chapters written by Stephen Kantrowitz and Terence Finnegan both deal with this state, but the issues they raise are characteristic of the postbellum South as a whole. Foremost among these issues, evidently, is that of race. Reflections about masculinity were a key feature of race relations in the New South, although they were complicated by conflicts—couched in terms of honor—between state power and local justice.

Kantrowitz focuses on the period 1890–94 when Ben Tillman, a wealthy planter and dissident Democrat, served as governor. He was from Edgefield County, called "bloody Edgefield" by one historian because of its tradition of excessive violence. Indeed, before his election, Tillman and his ardent supporters had tried to accomplish their aim, the establishment of a white supremacist order, using intimidation and force. As governor, Tillman was torn between two loyalties: he remained committed to white supremacism, which might include condoning mob violence against black people, but at the same time he was obliged to show that South Carolinians respected the rule of law. That obligation made
him condemn lynching explicitly in his inaugural address. His subsequent confrontation with lynch-happy communities can be interpreted partly as a conflict between state power and local autonomy. Tillman's statist stance was far from principled. During his administration he took a step back, declaring that he approved of lynching, and was even prepared to take a leading role in it, when a man of any color had assaulted a virtuous woman of any color (and he and his supporters agreed that no black woman could ever be virtuous). On balance, then, Tillman steered a course between fighting the mob and leading the mob. He insisted that the state's power be respected, but he also made it clear to white men that the preservation of their honor had primacy over the formalities of the law.

Terence Finnegan's essay takes the story up to the 1910s. He offers a thick description of a notorious lynching incident, in which political antagonisms as well as racial psychology figured prominently. The racial hatred that Abbeville whites felt toward Anthony Crawford was due in large part to his remarkable material success. Crawford was a literate, fifty-six-year-old former slave, who owned over four hundred acres of cotton land west of the town of Abbeville. His prosperity was well known in the white community. On at least two occasions one of the local papers ran a story about the success of his farming operations. The immediate reason for his lynching was relatively trivial: a disagreement over the price of cotton-seed. Ultimately, however, the white men who murdered Crawford felt that this black man had challenged their manhood by his economic success. On a Saturday in October 1916 a mob heavily beat Crawford, ritually maltreated his body while he was lying on the ground, and finally hanged him after he was dead. If nothing else, the mob showed that those southerners, mentioned in Kantrowitz's essay, who advocated a "civilizing" of the lynching ritual, had not had much success yet. Crawford's lynching had far-reaching consequences for Abbeville County: whites were unable to stem the migratory flow of black labor out of the county, which increased greatly after the event.

Thus, the last two contributions do more than just discuss the role of the state. They raise crucial questions about the state, honor, and gender within the context of the history of the American South. It is worth looking at these three themes in greater detail, starting with gender.

A central argument in Stephen Kantrowitz's essay refers to what he calls the rape-lynch complex. The historical literature on the South has paid ample attention to white men's anxieties about black men ravishing
white women. The rape of a white woman, more often alleged than real, was an offense to her honor as well as to her husband's, and it challenged the honor and masculinity of all white men. The importance of this anxiety was greater than a mere statistical computation of reported motives for lynching would show. Kantrowitz argues that sexual fears were embedded in a more encompassing concern for white men's patriarchal authority. The rape-lynch complex certainly held sway over the minds of white southerners around 1900. It can hardly be a coincidence that Tillman considered the defense of a white woman's honor to be the only motive justifying an infringement upon the state's monopoly on punishment. And, as Finnegan mentions, critics of lynching feared that black men would take revenge for the violence done to them by raping white women. Yet, Finnegan is skeptical about a "psychosexual explanation" for lynching, as he calls it. In an earlier article, he argues that lynching functioned to deny political rights to blacks. Nevertheless, it is clear that feelings of injured manhood played a part in the murder of Anthony Crawford, who was considered "uppity" by white residents of Abbeville. Throughout the South, Terence Finnegan says, white men viewed "uppity" black men as contesting their own manhood; such blacks were successful, not servile.

Hence, even in cases in which female honor was not explicitly referred to, standards of masculinity were involved nonetheless. It may be questioned whether the frequency with which lynched black males were accused of having raped a white woman should be the decisive factor in assessing the value of a psychosexual explanation for the entire episode of lynching. To understand why it occurred at all, we probably have to take into account marital and male/female relations among southern whites. Did the marital life of the white middle classes change in a way parallel to marital changes among the European middle classes? If so, this may have caused unconscious tensions in southern white men, which they projected onto black men. This hypothesis requires further research on the family and marriage in the South.

Honor is an obvious theme in relation to southern culture. The South was a classical honor-and-shame society, particularly in the antebellum period. Of all such societies, the American South perhaps is the best documented. Moreover, the South's white elites were relatively violence-prone in a manner reminiscent of the medieval European aristocracy. Clearly, the process of spiritualization of honor had not taken root there. In the 1980s, two eminent historians, Bertram Wyatt-Brown and Edward
Ayers, have published about violence and honor in the antebellum South. Wytt-Brown explains that a strong association with the body underlay the prevailing concept of honor. The imperative of its violent defense pervaded southern life. Contemporaries were said to subscribe to the classical statement that it is better to die than to lose one's honor. It could be lost, for instance, by not reacting to a physical insult such as having one's nose pulled. White men of all social classes shared the honor-and-shame culture (and their women shared it by association, unless they were evangelicals). Whereas lower-class men might challenge each other to fistfights, ritual or not, elite men settled matters by way of a pistol duel. The planters were at least as violent as their social inferiors.

Having returned to the subject of dueling, we must take another look at Europe, where the history of the state's response to dueling was far from linear. France's rulers were bent on suppressing the custom from the beginning of the seventeenth century. Later, Louis XIV was the first monarch who consciously attempted to transform the nobility's conceptions of honor, maintaining that service to the king was the source of supreme honor. In several other countries of early modern Europe, ruling groups similarly attempted to get rid of the duel. They considered it a public infringement on the state's internal monopoly on violence. On the other hand, the authorities in the German lands, notably Prussia, were rather ambivalent. This emerges clearly from many of Frevert's quotations. Well into the nineteenth century, princely advisers wavered between condoning the duel as a necessary instrument to uphold a person's honor and condemning it as a form of private justice. They were conscious of belonging themselves to the elite "entitled to satisfaction." However, it will not do simply to consider the Prussian response to dueling as lagging behind that in western European states. The liberal elites of France and Italy in the second half of the nineteenth century again were in a position similar to that of the Prussian nobility. They were the ruling class, and yet they were positively inclined to this ritual of private settlement. They even saw it as a form of national duty. This poses a problem for any analysis of state formation processes.

As a way to circumvent the problem, it may be supposed that, say, in late nineteenth-century France the state's monopoly on violence was so firmly established that a duel a year or so could not jeopardize it. After all, "common" murders and assaults were more frequent; the monopoly is
never absolute. Another route toward explanation is to amend the theory of state formation processes, in order to make room for episodes of increased tolerance of violence. This is the solution adopted by Elias in his discussion of Germany's 

Sättigungsfähige Gesellschaft. A third possibility is to follow Hughes's argument that the revival of dueling in liberal Italy can be explained as a "normal" process, intimately related to the early stages of parliamentarism. The new, liberal elite used dueling as a means of setting limits on behavior and legitimizing their own status. He points out that in France, England, and the southern United States, too, the heyday of the modern duel coincided with nascent parliamentarism. As attractive as this argument sounds, the American South may have to be excluded from it.

Dueling in the southern United States formed part of an unbroken tradition of violence. This tradition persisted after 1865 in changed form. Some disagreement exists about whether the Civil War ended dueling. According to Dickson Bruce, the "hierarchical and carefully ordered world" from the antebellum period "had lost its strength." Therefore, sporadic attempts failed to revive the duel after the war. Ayers, on the other hand, says that the custom was still alive in the 1870s; only from the 1880s onward was dueling considered no longer honorable. In any case, intensified racial violence, notably lynching, took the duel's place after the Civil War. There is an intriguing similarity in the state of South Carolina's attitude toward lynching at the end of the nineteenth century and the state of Prussia's attitude toward dueling at the beginning. In both cases, the administration cherished a general principle (racial hegemony, an elitist honor code), which led it to favor a practice (lynching, dueling) which it had to condemn at the same time. In South Carolina, an obvious way to proceed was to promote the state's honor over the citizens' individual honor. As Stephen Kantrowitz shows, Tillman condemned local vigilante justice because it suggested that the state's protection was inadequate, which, by implication, meant a stain upon the state's honor.

The southern culture of violence and honor, then, must be related to the pace of state formation on the American continent. State formation processes in America were quite different from European developments. In America the process of monopolization of violence lagged behind, compared with Europe, and in its turn the South lagged behind the North. I made this point earlier with respect to punishment, but it is equally
relevant for attitudes toward violence. The crucial factor, as noted above, is the lack of pacification among the elites in the South, certainly in the antebellum period.

The pacification of the elites formed a major cornerstone of European state formation processes during the early modern period. Europe's aristocracies turned, in Elias's words, from a class of warriors into a class of courtiers. As just suggested, the later revival of dueling formed only a partial countervailing force to these early modern developments. In most of Europe, the elites were gradually pacified after the era of the vendetta. Although slower in areas such as Scotland, this process increasingly affected the upper and middle classes. The top groups usually led the way. Thus, Louis XIV had "tamed" the court nobility, but at the same time the older attitudes still prevailed in two provincial cities of southern France. There, young men from the local elite participated in violent clashes between rival bands. Pacification of the elites characterized the Dutch Republic from an early date. Its urban patriciates, certainly in the province of Holland, were not accustomed to engaging in violence. Dueling had never been very common among them. In Amsterdam around 1700, the notion that one's honor had to be defended violently was largely restricted to lower strata. By that time the Dutch elites and middle classes were pacified to a large extent. For the patrician judges it was self-evident, even without a written rule to that effect, that anyone who was attacked had to retreat first, before he could legitimately defend himself.

In the New World this was altogether different. The duty to retreat, inherited from British legal tradition, was gradually turned into its opposite in American law. That is the subject of Richard Maxwell Brown's recent book. Although the larger argument he builds upon his legal-historical exposition has been heavily criticized, this exposition itself has not been questioned. In a similar vein as Brown's critics, I am arguing that the law did not simply shape behavioral norms. The development that finally enthroned no-duty-to-retreat resulted from a complex interaction of ideological pressures, legal and administrative structures, and local circumstances. If a particular state was early in changing the law so as to do away with the British tradition, this does not necessarily mean that the body-associated concept of honor was particularly strong in that state. The overall trend toward no-duty-to-retreat, on the other hand, was certainly related to the peculiarly American trajectory of state formation processes. Monopolization of violence by a central authority was some-
thing first achieved in the Northeast toward the end of the eighteenth century. Before the Civil War this process hardly reached the Old South. Courts and juries routinely acquitted those accused of homicide; it was an act of self-defense to shoot your enemy when you saw him, because he might shoot you the next time. The fact that the antebellum South was an honor-and-shame society was related to the relative absence of a central monopoly on violence. Although dueling was imported there as a novel custom, the white elite adopted this custom in the context of an uninterrupted tradition of violent defense of their honor. By contrast, spiritualized concepts of honor, called gentility or dignity by historians, spread in the North in the course of the nineteenth century. A greater degree of pacification was a precondition for this. Still, in America as a whole the process of monopolization of violence remained a partial one in comparison with Europe. Tolerance of private violence was and is greater in American than in European society.

This explains the widespread acceptance of the no-duty-to-retreat principle.

A View on the Present

According to Ayers, after the Civil War a version of the old code of honor found its way to the South's black population. "Manhood came to be equated with the extralegal defense of one's honor, a manhood made manifest in control of one's woman and in unquestioning respect from one's peers." The code included a refusal to seek redress through the law, in case of conflicts within their own community, as whites had done earlier, but for different reasons. The antebellum white elite considered themselves above the law; all postwar black people knew they were outside the law. Ayers goes on to suggest, while not stating this explicitly, that the attitude of extralegal defense found its way to the North in the twentieth century, taking hold in urban lower-class neighborhoods irrespective of race or ethnicity. It should be added that the South-North trajectory probably was not the only one. Immigrants from southern Europe, for example, may have acted as cultural mediators in their turn.

Very likely, then, the ancient code of honor and its accompanying culture of violence have not disappeared entirely. This would be in accordance with Elias's theoretical approach. Elias always warned against any kind of teleological concept of long-term developments. They have no endpoint. Elements of earlier phases are observable in the present, though
often in a transformed manner. This raises the question to what extent and in what manner "traditional" notions of honor and ritual live on in present-day street violence. A recent book attempts to make precisely this link, tracing the history of one family from the late nineteenth-century South to the urban ghetto of the late twentieth century. It would be a worthwhile undertaking to study modern violent groups, in Europe and America, against the background of the evidence presented in this volume. It is my conviction that our understanding of today's gang cultures can be enhanced by the study of the culture of violence and honor in distant societies in the past.

Notes


2. Of the authors listed above, Wiesner (1993, 5) acknowledges this in her introduction, but the rest of her book is, as her title suggests, only about women and femininity. See, however, her earlier article (Wiesner 1991), which focuses on masculinity.

3. Peter Stearns (1979) must certainly be called a pioneer. On changing concepts of masculinity in nineteenth- and twentieth-century America see Carnes and Griffen 1990 and Rotundo 1993. On men in the Middle Ages see Lees 1994; the apologetic tone of the preface and the introduction to Lees's volume attest to the subject's novelty. The works of two contributors to the current volume, Frevert (1991) and Nye (1993), must also be mentioned here.

4. Important studies include Blok 1980; Bourdieu 1972; Dinges 1994; Muir 1993; Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers 1992; Schreiner and Schwerhoff 1995; and Wyatt-Brown 1982. See also Bennassar 1975, 167-84; and Spierenburg 1991a, 197-200.

5. See Shilling 1993 for a carefully argued assessment of the literature on the relationship between the body and society.

6. This tripartite scheme, in various wordings, is recurrent in the literature on honor. See, however, Stewart 1994, who argues that honor must be viewed primarily as a right.

7. Stewart 1994 (esp. 142). The word contemporary is essential, since Stewart presents no historical data for the Bedouins, as he does for Europe.


12. "Medieval" mainly stands for the period since about 1100. In fact, the ambiguity about sex and gender may have arisen with the increased emphasis on clerical celibacy in the early twelfth century. Cf. McNamara's contribution to Lees 1994.
15. Laqueur 1990. See also Laqueur's and Londa Schiebinger's contributions to Gal-
laghers and Laqueur 1987. Laqueur's approach differs from that of Foucault (1976) to the
extent that the former is concerned with views of what it is to be a man or a woman, rather
than with sexuality and the discourse about it. For long-term perspectives on the history of
the body generally, see Feher, Naddaff, and Tazi 1989 and Calianu 1991. It is intriguing to
realize that the medieval view, that not all bodies can be classified as either male or female,
is closer to modern biological knowledge than the view originating in the eighteenth cen-
16. Cohen and Cohen (1993, 24) consider women's role as slightly more active than
other scholars do: "by her beauty, clothing, industry, wit, modesty and social grace, a
woman could win honour for herself and for her menfolk." On different conceptions of
male and female honor, see also Koom 1987 and Cavallo and Cerutti 1990.
18. Herlihy (1985, 62) stresses that the Church advocated monogamy and sexual re-
straint from an early date and claims that the Church had some success in this already in the
Middle Ages. However, in the milieu of laymen the double standard continued to operate
for a long time.
20. This physical concept of honor and respect remained prevalent for a long time
in several social situations. It was a reality for German landlords and serfs around 1700
(Luebke 1995). It still prevailed around 1900 among Sicilian local elites (Blok 1974).
1984, 144–73.
was one, did it come from a new masculinity?" Paper presented at the nineteenth meeting of
the Social Science History Association, Atlanta 1994.
and seventeenth-century Italy, see also Burke 1987.
27. Gowing 1994, 32. The other cases discussed in this article contain no references to
such a close analogy of honor and the body.
30. Andrew 1980; K. Brown 1986, 184–207; Chauchadis 1984; my contribution to this
volume.
1991, a programmatic article about the history of the body, in which the subject of honor is
strangely absent.
33. Cf. Billacois 1986. Other recent works on dueling, not mentioned already, include
Kiernan 1988 and McAleer 1994. Kiernan, however, presents a very outdated, value-laden
approach, which seriously hampers his analysis. McAleer's work, largely based on literary
sources, deals with Wilhelmine Germany. While Frevert (note 51 of her contribution) is very critical of it, Nye (note 12 of his contribution) finds it a splendid history.

34. Spierenburg 1984, 189–90.
38. See the drawing by Jossot on the cover of Nye 1993.
40. See R. C. Davis 1994.
42. Muir 1993 (case in Villach on pp. 220–21). Among the English aristocracy, a parallel transition from attack with superior numbers to the duel occurred in the early seventeenth century. See Stone 1965, 225–27, 242–50, 770. Clearly, the exact timing of the change cannot be explained in terms of “modern” vs. “backward” regions; the Friulian chronology must be related to the fact that the duel originated in Italy.

43. In France this was still true for the provincial elites in the early eighteenth century and the lower middle classes in the early nineteenth. Cf. Daumas 1987 and Reddy 1993.
44. Muir (1993) explains the transition from the vendetta to the duel in Friuli along similar lines. By the eighteenth century, at least in England, even suicide was sometimes considered honorable. See Macdonald and Murphy 1990, 182–87.
52. There is an abundant literature on the family and marriage in early modern and nineteenth-century Europe focusing on emotional relations between spouses. For a synthetic overview, see Spierenburg 1991a, chap. 8. Comparable publications for the American South seem to be more scarce. V. E. Bynum 1992 makes a beginning, but she deals with the antebellum period and focuses on deviant women rather than on marital life among the majority of whites. Peter Bardaglio, *Reconstructing the Household: Families, Sex, and the Law in the Nineteenth-Century South* (Chapel Hill, 1995), came to my attention after I finished writing this introduction.
53. In their meticulous analysis of lynchings, Tolnay and Beck (1995) have no place for the gender dimension. They adopt a basically functionalist perspective, in which the relative frequency of lynching per county is the all-important variable.
54. With “classical honor-and-shame society” I mean that honor and shame played a large role in that society, not that a typological distinction can be made between shame and guilt cultures. Compare the introduction to Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers 1992.
57. According to Wyatt-Brown, southern men were hardly influenced at all by (evangelical) religion. See, however, Ownby 1990, who disputes this claim (esp. 12–18).
59. For the chronology of dueling in England, see Simpson 1988, 106–7 and passim.
60. Bruce 1979, 42–43.
62. With respect to punishment, see Spierenburg 1987.
64. On Scotland, see K. Brown 1986.
66. Van Weel (1977) suggests that the custom of dueling was largely restricted to some groups of students and to foreign soldiers.
68. Next to this, the type of relations between social classes influences notions of honor: as explained above, honor is exclusive by nature. The fact that the South was a slave society with a rigid hierarchy was an important factor, too.
70. Ayers 1984, 234–35.