Why did the duel in France die out? Was it "ridicule," as V. G. Kiernan suggests: the accretion of incidents imposing risible conditions and little danger, motivated less by outrage than by the thirst for publicity, living on in a national myth cut off from social reality? The duelist of the fin de siècle, writes Kiernan in a pungent metaphor, "was coming to resemble a dog scratching a street pavement with its hind paws."¹

There is certainly some truth in this judgment, which I will acknowledge in what follows, but the principal reason for the abrupt disappearance of the duel was not the consequence of a long history of decline rooted in social or cultural evolution, or the emergence of growing moral disapproval of the sort that culminated in the outlawing of slavery, torture, or, in recent times, capital punishment. The duel was still in robust health in 1914; a final attempt to outlaw the duel in the parliament of 1921 failed as miserably as the previous ones of 1819, 1829, 1848, 1851, 1877, 1888, 1892, and 1895. What killed the duel, I will argue, was not its vestigial inefficacy but its pretention, not its failure to enlist devotees loyal to...
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The ancient code of honor but its claim to be the only remaining civil rite in which modern men could face death squarely and measure their courage against peers.

Together with a million and a half Frenchmen, the duel perished in the bloody trenches of the western front. Although the legal right to duel was spared by a parliament of war veterans and seasoned politicians, many of whom had defended their personal honor in the golden years of the pre-war dueling craze, only a handful of duels were consummated after November 1918. The last of these took place, incredibly, in 1967 between Gaston Defere and a Gaullist parliamentary deputy named René Ribièrè. Press coverage was respectful of this travesty in the time-honored tradition of such reportage, but formal duels had long since fallen into the category of curiosities in which no one imagined anything more than amour-propre to be at stake. The duel had received its true coup de grâce in the Great War from the dramatic contrast between the glorious metaphysics of courage and death invoked by prewar duelists and the cruel wages of courage exacted on the killing fields of the war.

The Persistence of Dueling

For many centuries the duel was one of the few civil rites to escape the state’s growing monopoly on violence. No amount of official disapproval or repression, including exile or death, could deter duelists from what they regarded as a natural right; death brought by the sword of the king’s executioner or by a noble peer was infinitely preferable to a life lived in the shame of a just challenge dishonorably evaded. State-building monarchs were justly concerned that well-armed vassals might challenge their dearly won authority, but their truculent nobles stood to lose far more by surrendering their cherished duel: their identity as a privileged class, to be sure, but also as men. The cream of the French nobility—perhaps ten thousand men—perished in duels in the last decade of the sixteenth and first decade of the seventeenth centuries.

The blood that coursed through a nobleman’s veins was the sign and guarantee of his superiority as a natural being, distinguishing him from the low-born and the vile. But to retain that distinction for himself and his heirs he was obliged to shed that blood negligently in war or in personal combat. Though noblemen were born with a set of unique virtues, these had to be actualized in deeds so that the myth of nobility as a vocation
could be maintained. Thus the courage that a man displayed in the violent moments incidental to his rank was both merited and natural, a personal quality that was nonetheless in constant danger of forfeit. A nobleman in early modern France who avoided the duties of his rank could therefore suffer a total derogation, not only of his social status but of his very existence as a social being, experiencing a kind of "civil death." This obliteration encompassed his whole identity as a man: in his capacity as a noble warrior, born to exercise a soldier's vocation, and as a progenitor, whose "noble" qualities were passed through his blood to his heirs.

As I have argued elsewhere, the personal qualities prized by early modern noblemen—courage, loyalty, frankness—were first imitated and later adopted by wealthy commoners who entertained some hope of gaining access to power and joining the highest ranks of society. It was ordinary for the men of this new elite to lay claim to the quality of personal honor possessed "naturally" by nobles and to defend it at the same risk of derogation, although in the course of the eighteenth century, while this process of assimilation was taking place, affairs of honor were far less frequent than in the reign of Louis XIII.

Historians now appreciate that the duel continued to play an important role in the social, political, and cultural life of several European countries throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and up to and in some places beyond the First World War. Until recently, however, the memory of the duel was kept alive largely in the writing and collections of antiquarians, armorers, and eccentrics. It was treated as an anomaly by mainstream historians and explained as an absurd atavism sustained by an aristocracy in its death throes. Even recently, when dueling has been acknowledged by historians, which has seldom been the case, the favored explanation has been that it was because the European nobility had managed to survive in a few institutional domains where they took shelter from the instrumentalism and pacifism of bourgeois society, and where dueling operated to remind them and their social inferiors of the supremacy of those whose forbears exercised the military arts and for whom gallantry came naturally.

In point of fact, however, by the end of the eighteenth century, the old nobility no longer had a monopoly on the use of the sword; indeed, virtually everywhere in the West the duel was an engine for the integration of bourgeois and aristocrat. Members of the upper middle classes intermarried with old nobles, laid claim to equal political and social status, and
marked out new barriers to guarantee the exclusiveness of this new alliance of notables.\textsuperscript{3} The duel was one of many ways this exclusiveness could be preserved; men without the leisure to practice weapons or learn the etiquette of the point d'honneur could not hope to rub shoulders with the elite. In the striking image of Edmond Goblot, however, behind the ramparts of class a level democratic "plain" ensured the solidarity and sense of distinctiveness of the well-born and the well-endowed, for whom the duel served as the warrant and symbol of their superiority, both socially and as men.\textsuperscript{9}

Within the ranks of this composite elite, the point d'honneur was not a thing apart, a set piece of rules governing combat; it was wholly integrated into a code of honor that regulated relations between upper-class males throughout the public sphere. The duel was the capstone and final court of appeal, so to speak, in a system of etiquette whose chief aim was the modest goal of not giving offense, whether in matters of salon politesse, in parliamentary decorum, or in the growing domain of publicity and letters. Men used the duel to test the integrity and sincerity of others, to display their own, and to distinguish between inadvertent and intended offenses to their personal and family honor. In effect, a ritual that had been in early modern times a monopoly of men of noble birth became in the modern class system a rite of social standing.

But the duel was still, as it had always been, an occasion to publicly demonstrate the personal courage that testified to the qualities of a man. By giving or accepting challenge, a man not born to the military vocation could unambiguously display his masculinity in a moment of (admittedly risky) action that it might otherwise take a lifetime of resolute but peaceful activity to attain. Virtually everywhere in nineteenth-century European society, as Ute Frevert has written about the German example, "the duel was the embodiment of bravery, courage, strength, skill, toughness, consistency, and self-discipline — virtues that were considered to belong to the inventory of every man's personality."\textsuperscript{10} Indeed, for men engaged in the hurly-burly of public life in the first decades of the century, the duel established a framework and the limits for personal interaction in a new public sphere that had not yet constructed its own rules and traditions and for which the rule of law was still a relative historical novelty.\textsuperscript{11}

I have argued that France was the country where the civilian duel flourished as nowhere else. In the German lands, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and even England, the duel was closely linked to military milieus, so that
access to its mysteries often took place in the regimental reserves where aristocratic and bourgeois officers submitted alike to a common ethos, military usages, and the weapons unique to soldiers: the saber and the pistol. Thus, though the Italian duel was similar socially to the French in terms of its largely bourgeois participation, duelers favored the battlefield panache of the saber, and German duelers preferred the sidearms worn by officers. In nineteenth-century France a national myth gradually emerged which emphasized the anteriority, the historicity, and the universality of the French duel, and which favored the épée, the weapon of good King Louis's musketeers. Although the officer corps was dominated by aristocrats in France as elsewhere, the duel did not flourish there but in civil society, where the sword as an instrument of justice and the duel as a mode of social advancement ensured its enduring popularity.

Over the course of the century, the number of men whose social station qualified them to send and receive dueling challenges increased, particularly in Paris, but also in most towns with rapidly growing middle classes. Fencing also experienced a revival in popularity after midcentury, for a mixture of social, aesthetic, and hygienic reasons, and served, as it had always done, as a preparatory school for would-be duelers. Because dueling was not banned in the criminal code, it is difficult to know for certain how many duels took place in a typical year during the first two-thirds of the century, but it was probably not more than one hundred. A duel usually reached the courts only in capital cases or where the acknowledged rules governing the point of honor had been breached.

The Third Republic

Beginning in the mid-1860s, however, the latent social potential that the duel had been slowly accumulating was effectively exploited by Napoleon's Republican opposition. Politicians and journalists were quick to take up pistols or, more commonly, swords in defense of person and cause, and fencing halls became popular Republican venues. This gallant temerity lent a certain force to Republican political rhetoric, but it also served to dramatize and symbolically represent the basic elements in Republican ideology—individual liberty and equality—and help set the foundations for the civic value system of the Third Republic. In principle, any man, no matter what his origins, could cultivate the art of fencing and engage in duels, because a Republican man was a free agent responsible for his
actions. A social universe of free agents was also a universe of equality, because no man could refuse to cross swords with a legitimate opponent at the risk of personal shame and public ridicule. There were still obvious limits to the democratization of the duel that confined its practice to the middle and upper reaches of the urban bourgeoisie, politicians, journalists, and men of letters, but by 1875 or so the duel was aligned firmly with generally progressive political forces in the new Republic.

An important collateral development to the democratization of the duel was the roughly contemporary elaboration in scientific and medical milieus of a standard anatomical and physiological model of masculinity. While it would be an overstatement to claim that doctors and biologists somehow invented masculinity in the course of the nineteenth century, they did identify what they believed to be its characteristic morphological, developmental, and functional features; these were regularly expressed as "hygienic" norms and eventually percolated through all the nation's social strata. Experts did this in the course of working out a modern notion of sex difference in which masculinity and femininity became virtual binary opposites in a hegemonic system of heterosexuality.

Inexorably, though at a glacial pace, a cultural concept of a "natural" and universal "male" emerged to replace the social, political, and cultural distinctions which had historically categorized men by class, birth, or geography as ontologically different (and unequal) beings. This development ensured that by the end of the nineteenth century a more or less standard cultural ideal of masculinity had emerged that was common to all men and was rooted in male sex and in the masculine behavior appropriate to it. Together with a number of cognitive elements that distinguished "rational" males from "emotional" females, the characteristic feature of modern masculinity was personal courage, which was believed, in the evolutionary schemata of the day, to have ensured the survival of individuals and societies alike. The duel lagged behind the creation of a "universal" masculinity, however, in admitting to its practice only the upper-class men who had mastered its elaborate ceremonies, and this, in effect, excluded the overwhelming majority from participation.

This "standard" masculinity took form, however, in a particular and contingent historical context. The circumstances which gave birth to the modern Republican movement meant that the progressive and democratic elements in dueling rhetoric were joined together with a vitriolic patriotism for which revenge against Germany was an inescapable theme for the
subsequent forty years. The shock of defeat in the war of 1870 produced ruminations of all kinds about the viability of French institutions, the quality of French honor, and the capacities of French men. There eventually developed a groundswell of idealized nostalgia for a heroic and chivalrous past in which Frenchmen had faced danger willingly for the “national” ideals of justice, frankness, and generosity, which was contrasted with the unmediated brutality, utilitarianism, and egoism of German “honor” and, willy-nilly, the lesser honor of other nations.

The genius of the French, it emerged, lay in a sense of honor that welcomed — indeed, courted — death in the defense of a set of civilizing ideals that ennobled and purified its champions. This paradoxical combination of bravado and spirituality circulated for the next half century in the form of rhetorical formulas celebrating the duel as a paradigmatic institution in civil life. In the absence of national wars, the duel was often characterized as a moral equivalent of combat, even as the very condition of civilization itself. As Anatole France wrote in 1886, the sword was “the first tool of civilization, the only means man has found to reconcile his brutal instincts and his ideal of justice.”

Edmond de Rostand, who gave the fin de siècle its most enduring dramatic hero, the swashbuckling poet Cyrano de Bergerac, spoke to the Académie Française in 1912 about the glories of French “panache,” which he called the “modesty of heroism,” “in which to make jokes in the face of danger is the supreme act of politeness, a delicate refusal to yield to the tragic.”

In part encouraged by this atmosphere of uplifting manliness, duels increased dramatically in number as did the social diversity of their participants. By the founding of the Third Republic the duel was a thoroughly accepted device at private law for regulating differences between gentlemen, and because affairs of honor began to receive an unprecedented degree of publicity from the printing of their official procès verbaux in the mass press, they are easier to trace and to count. I have estimated that between 1875 and 1900 there were at least two hundred duels each year, perhaps three hundred in certain years, and in periods of unusual political effervescence — as in the Boulanger and Dreyfus affairs — dozens of duels a week for weeks on end.

Fatalities were rare. Although there were scores of dangerous abdominal wounds, severed tendons, and damaged eyes, there were probably no more than two dozen deaths in duels in this era. Nevertheless, the risk of death haunted each duel; men were said to put their affairs in order and
settle gambling debts before an encounter. According to the journalist Félicien Pascal, a review of the fin de siècle dueling craze demonstrated that when the outcome of a duel goes against them, "The gentlemen and simple bourgeois of France know how to die correctly, gallantly, and without complaining." In the sporting and fencing press, death was a veritable school for character: when two men, "steel in hand," have risked their lives, the memory of these moments of danger provides a salutary steadiness for them in each crisis they face in later years. Thus, everyone was born with an instinctive horror of death, but a man could endure life only by exposing himself to danger, educating his nerves, and developing his sangfroid. As Adolphe Tavernier wrote in his dueling manual in 1885, the disagreeable emotion a men feels before a duel is "a concession we make to nature," the "beast" within us reacting against a danger that must be "conquered" by the will.

The numerous apologists for the duel denied it was a brutal and brutalizing ritual. The modern duel, they claimed, civilizes its participants in two fundamental ways. First, by giving men confidence in their personal force, the duel promotes mutual regard and "pacifies" relations between men. Second, fencing and the duel are disciplines of self-mastery and etiquette; they teach a man the forms to observe in his interactions with others and increase his stock of urbanity and wit. Unlike the rowdy quarrelers of yesteryear, it was precisely those men whose personal courage and skill with weapons was most developed who were the least likely to issue or provoke dueling challenges. According to an editorial of 1887 in Le Temps, France's leading opinion daily, the democratization of arms and the promotion of their skillful use that was taking place in the fin de siècle was a "work of humanity" that would lead to fewer, not more, bloody duels.

There were, however, some strains in the effort to portray the less dangerous modern duel as superior to its bloody ancestor. Looking back at the outmoded manners of the old regime, the journalist Hughes LeRoux wondered in 1888 if the turn of the nineteenth century might not bring "a few smiles at our expense." There were, to be sure, a lamentable number of duels that came off in inelegant fashion: gentlemen foiling their swords in their flowing chemises, getting entangled in one other's buttonhooks, falling unceremoniously in the mud after ungainly lunges, or, more seriously, committing breaches of etiquette in which seconds or principals had resort to underhanded methods or plebeian violence. The merciless
army of fin de siècle cartoonists had ample opportunity to ridicule the less dignified aspects of dueling.\textsuperscript{31} It is clear enough that dueling numbers dropped off a bit after 1900 to perhaps a hundred or so a year; it also seemed to some contemporaries that publicity had become the major if not the sole basis for challenges. Photographs began to appear in the papers, and an actor named Le Bargy, apparently hoping to land the lead role in a new production of \textit{Cyrano de Bergerac}, provoked duels on successive days with critics unappreciative of his talents.\textsuperscript{32}

It was perhaps the echo of mocking laughter in their heads that moved the authors of dueling apologetics to indicate the continuity in early modern and modern duels and to regularly link the duel with skill at arms and war. As one dueling enthusiast wrote, "If they do not pretend to equal, much less surpass the mad audacity and heroic valiance of men at arms, gallant knights, gentlemen of noble race and proud aspect, with their hot blood and impatient alacrity, whose deeds illuminate each page of our history, our end-of-the-century bourgeois have by compensation reason to think that in the matter of the point of honor they are superior to their ancestors in courtesy, correction, and probity."\textsuperscript{33} One could also contrast the honor of rival nations invidiously with the French variant. German honor was notoriously brutal and given to ruse, the \textit{point d’honneur} in Austria and Spain rewarded bullying and provocation, and the British, to their eternal shame, loved their vulgar pugilism and blood sport and had transformed matters of honor into sordid calculations of pecuniary interest.\textsuperscript{34}

However, the most convincing way to bring credibility to the duel in this era of nationalism was to link it directly to war. Thus we hear, "The battlefield is like the dueling ground, war like the duel, in the sense that all the courage in the world will shatter against ramparts built on twenty solid years in a fencing hall."\textsuperscript{35} The encouragement that the duel provided for expertise in arms and for the cultivation of the personal qualities of temerity and sangfroid were regarded as strong advantages indeed. Should war come, the discipline of the point of honor will "remind the soldier that he is a man, not just a cog in the great military machine, that he has not only to spill his blood for the fatherland, but also for his own dignity and personal honor."\textsuperscript{36} These themes were taught systematically in the schools of the Third Republic, with the aim of breeding a taste for heroism and self-sacrifice in the future warriors of France.\textsuperscript{37} In both its historic and modern forms, the duel played no small role in this educative process by serving as an exemplar of the courage required in personal combat.
However, the modern duel entered the first decades of the twentieth century with an increasingly unmanageable number of ideological contradictions. It civilized and pacified its practitioners, but embraced a metaphysics of death. It proclaimed a democracy of male courage and virtue, but based much of its appeal on its aristocratic history and social connections. It trusted the deterrent effects of personal and national strength, but invoked the certainty of war. The tension in these contradictions were in delicate equilibrium, as the writer Jules Claretie understood. One must resist making a question of honor out of every conflict that arises, he warned, for "the day the last shred of chivalry is torn away from the duel, we will see it for what it is in reality: a butchery that is occasionally heroic and nearly always stupid, but perhaps inevitable, like war." 38

The First World War

When war finally came it brought less glory than gore, a savage conclusion to gallantry, and the eclipse of hopes that national strength and audacity alone might prolong Europe's long season of peace. On the very eve of the war, Georges Breittmayer, a Parisian socialite and fencer, was putting the finishing touches on what was destined to be the last dueling manual published in France. The manuscript gathered dust until Breittmayer's own military obligations permitted him to return to his work in the winter of 1917-18, but so much had changed that in order to rehabilitate the duel, which had languished during the war, he was obliged to completely recast his book. He knew that after the sacrifices and horror of the war, the duel must be serious or forfeit its right to arbitrate differences between men, so he adopted as his motto, "Lutter jusqu'au bout" [struggle to the end]. 39

From now on, sword duels would be conducted with gauntlets to prevent the scratches on hand and wrist that had ended many prewar duels. The extent of the terrain would be severely limited to exclude elaborate defensive parades, and a man had to be seriously disabled before any thought could be given to stopping. In the case of pistol duels, four balls must be exchanged (two were sufficient before 1914); if this brought no result, the duel must continue with swords until blood flowed. The war introduced two new weapons to the French duel once regarded as alien or unthinkable: the revolver, which had been the side arm of wartime officers, and the bayonet, which Breittmayer called the new "French arm par excellence." 40
To cut down on the pages of legalistic procedural detail common in prewar manuals, Breittmayer tried to keep his to a minimum. He forbade publicity, honor juries, and all but the most perfunctory arbitration in the interests of making affairs of honor private, abrupt, and final. Unbidden, neither the director of combat nor the doctor could intervene on the dueling ground, he wrote, because “war has leveled those utopias.” Men must fight until they choose to fight no longer.

Much space had been devoted in prewar manuals to who was qualified to duel with whom, who was “indigne” and therefore an unsuitable opponent to anyone, and how one recognized such distinctions.41 Breittmayer cut through all the talk of certain men’s “nervous sensibilities” and keen “susceptibility” to offense. He decreed that anyone of draft age, which was then nineteen, could duel. The only disqualification applied to men who had avoided war service or engaged in dishonorable wartime activity.42 Breittmayer thus acknowledged in his new code what emerged as the most important distinction among men in the postwar era. As a writer for one of the frontline trench newspapers put it in August 1918, “France will find among us men tested by war, soldiers who, having learned how to die, will know how to live and who will break with the past. The future is ours. We must seize it from the cowards, from the fainthearts, from the traitors and shirkers, from people who don’t know what war means.”43 In effect, the social distinctiveness of the duel, which had marked the whole of its history from medieval times, had finally evolved to a point where it was isomorphic with all mankind, at least those able-bodied enough to serve in an army of mass conscription. There is a certain irony in the fact that the duel lost the last shreds of its appeal at the precise moment that all men qualified to participate.

The war did not teach to the veterans who survived it many positive lessons on which they could agree. Some concluded for pacifism, others for eternal military readiness. Some wanted their suffering in the war memorialized for all time; others wanted to erase its memory in the forgetfulness of civilian life. But the war did teach these men a certain “modest pride” in what they were not. Antoine Prost has summarized this sentiment: “It was an entirely personal feeling, something intimate, an inner confidence, an esteem which one could bestow on oneself. Veterans knew now that they were not cowards. They did not think of themselves as heroes, and they would have gladly been spared the ordeal; but, after all, they had had this unique experience and had not failed to rise to it.”44
Breittmayer's new code probably went as far as it could to eliminate the frivolous aspects of the duel, but the twenty-five paces separating men holding single-shot dueling pistols made a ludicrous contrast with the deadly terrors of no-man's land; the spectacle of an unpolished poilu brandishing his army-issue bayonet eliminated the aristocratic cachet of the ritual; and Breittmayer's decree of silence banned a host of motives that had once inspired men to seek a reputation for bravery in personal combat. There is also the matter of the heightened danger of Breittmayer's duels. The men who had fought in the war had proven their courage in the face of far greater dangers, and those who had avoided service, or were too young to fight, could not hope to equal their ordeals in dueling-ground heroics.

In the course of the war a new standard of masculine courage surfaced that made the courage required in a duel—even Breittmayer's "reformed" duel—into a Tinkertoy version of the real article. A duel in the years after 1918 might have gained some notoriety for the men who engaged in it, but it could no longer sustain a reputation for bravery or rehabilitate sullied honor. This does not mean that personal honor and its particular exigencies disappeared altogether in the postwar world, but men of honor lost the desire, or perhaps the right, to arrogate to themselves the violence of personal combat to protect it. Though it would have happened soon enough anyway, the outbreak of the First World War transformed the duel in a matter of days, unequivocally and forever, from a magnificent gesture to a forlorn imposture. Considerations of personal honor did not suddenly disappear from social life after 1918, but took new forms consistent with the conditions of modern life. Legal recourse to offenses against family and personal honor became more acceptable, as had been the case in England and North America for half a century. The ideal of the amateur athlete subsumed part of the ethos of the duel in the figure of the modern Olympic competitor who cares less about winning (or losing) than in how he plays the game. Perhaps most important, the demonstration of courage took both more exotic and more institutionalized forms. Aviators, explorers, and mountain climbers became icons of modern masculinity for certain rare individuals, while frontline service in war provided a set of credentials that confirmed the manliness of those who survived it and haunted the generations of men who were too old, too young, or too infirm to fight. Finally, honor and its rhetoric continue to express the struggles of religious, racial, and sexual minorities in
the West in their quest for legal and civil equality. Honor has outlived the ritual that was once its last and proudest expression.

Notes

2. On this duel see Billacois 1986, 309–10. An earlier duel, with only aesthetic issues at stake, was consummated in 1958 between the dancer Serge Lifar and the marquis de Cuevas. Ibid., 314.
4. On the “myths” that surrounded noble race in the early modern era see Jouanna 1977; on the noble “vocation” see Schalk 1986; on the symbolism of blood in dueling see Billacois 1986, 332–37.
12. There is now a splendid history of the duel in imperial Germany: McAleer 1994. On dueling in nineteenth-century Italy, see the forthcoming work of Steven Hughes.
13. Occasionally the papers from the period report on duels, but duels were often private affairs about matters that both principals wished to hide from public scrutiny. I explain my reasons for arriving at the number of one hundred duels per year in Nye 1993, 136–37.
14. I have discussed these developments at length in Nye 1993, 164–69. On the desire of Republicans to shape a new “republican” man, trained in arms, protective of family and fatherland, and energetic in his own defense see Auspitz 1982.
15. I have discussed these developments for France in Nye 1993, 72–126.
17. The importance of these cultural debates is well known. They are summarized brilliantly in Digeon 1969. The most important postwar document of this kind was Ernest Renan’s (1871) La Réforme intellectuelle et morale.
18. See the editorials in the mass circulation Le Petit Journal of 1 January 1871, where these invidious comparisons were made for perhaps the first time, and also Nye 1993, 154–60, for evidence of the postwar interest in the culture of chivalry.
19. The formula of the critic and journalist Jules Janin, dating from the 1830s, was repeated ad nauseam in the fin de siècle, to wit, “The duel makes of each of us a strong and independent power; it makes of each life the life of the whole of society; it takes up the cause of justice the moment the law abandons it . . . . We are still a civilized people today because we have conserved the duel.” See the discussion in Nye 1993, 146.
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21. As quoted in Halkin 1949, 443.
22. I have consulted a number of well-known dueling inventories to arrive at these figures, notably Desjardins 1891; Tarde 1892; Thimm 1896. I have supplemented these inventories with copious selections from the mass press. See Nye 1993, 182–87.
27. Laborie 1906, 17; Villeneuve 1894, 26.
29. *Le Temps*, 3 February 1887; see also the editorial of 26 June 1887 insisting that the duel was not an "atavism" of barbarian times but a promoter of "exalted sentiments."
31. See the illustrations in Nye 1993 and my discussion of the "futile" duel, 210–15. Kevin McAleer (1994, 188–92) draws particular attention to French duels of this kind, in contrast with the more dangerous German duel.
32. *Le Journal*, 8 and 9 November 1911. For photographs from contemporary newspapers see McAleer 1994, 190–93.
33. Cloutier 1896, 74.
37. See Gerbod 1982. Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau has pointed out that the huge increase in school propaganda for the young in the years 1914–18 simply developed the models set in place in the 1880s. See Audoin-Rouzeau 1993, 154–56.
39. Breittmayer 1918, 6. To do less, he wrote, would be ridiculous (5).
40. Ibid., 13–16, 57, 75, 82.
41. See esp. Laborie 1906, 6–17; Croabbon 1894, 11–27.
42. Breittmayer 1918, 9.
44. Prost 1992, 15.
46. On this development see Macaloon 1981.
47. See Harris 1992.