THE STATE is a major factor in violence per definition. The final three essays discuss the state's role in curbing male aggression and the partial tolerance of aggression by persons in authority. Whether curbing or condoning prevails in a particular society is largely determined by the extent to which the state is able to maintain a monopoly on violence. In a society where such a monopoly has developed only weakly, ruling elites themselves partake of a culture of violence, being likely to appreciate certain forms of private aggression. On this point, the contrast between the centralized United Kingdom and most of the southern United States is obvious: a contrast exacerbated by the issue of race. Acting in an increasingly pacified society, British courts were able to lead the way toward a change in concepts of masculinity; from a position of strength, they consciously strove to curb male violence, criminalizing it to a greater degree than ever before. In the American South, on the other hand, more traditional notions of private violence in defense of one's honor persisted, related to white racial hegemony. The result was a tension between upholding the law (i.e., state power) and condoning at least some forms of lynching. This tension was not fully resolved until after the First World War, which, incidentally, put an end to dueling on the other side of the Atlantic.

These two contrasting situations are studied according to different methods. Whereas the chapter on Britain is analytical and quantitative, the chapters on South Carolina are narrative, making use of case studies. Wiener analyzes the records of various institutions of social control in nineteenth-century Britain and attempts to trace changes in the way these institutions dealt with men and violence. He is able to document a process of change indeed. Typically male forms of behavior, in particular those involving violence, were increasingly proscribed by law. Consequently, a growing proportion of serious criminal prosecutions and punishments were aimed at men. The net result was an increasing criminalization of men. In other words, a new masculinity was created, at the expense of a masculinization of crime.

In the southern United States, old masculinity continued to prevail. The narrative approach of chapters 8 and 9 suits their particular subject. Although they both deal with South Carolina,
the themes they discuss have ramifications for the postbellum South as a whole. Moreover, they introduce a new element not discussed so far, that of race. The factor of race not only influenced concepts of honor and masculinity but it also colored the relationships between the state and local communities. This is especially apparent in Kantrowitz's contribution. He pays ample attention to one lynching, a notorious case in the town of Denmark in 1893. The major issues of race, honor, and state control all came together in the Denmark lynching. The chain of events leading to it demonstrated the practical impossibility of Governor Tillman's attempt to reconcile white supremacist justice with the rule of law. Like many other white southern politicians, Tillman identified with the spokesmen for racial hegemony, but he wanted to remain in control of its implementation. In the end he had to cede some measure of control. The Denmark lynching was a clear-cut example of popular (or, rather, nonstate) justice (without the official requirements of due process). Tillman's own views on white supremacy and honor eventually led him to condone this act of nonstate justice.

Masculinity, rather than honor, is the principal issue in Finneghan's case study, dealing with a lynching in Abbeville County in 1916. The men who murdered Anthony Crawford felt that his behavior constituted a challenge to their own male pride. When African Americans aspired to an equality with whites, the existing patriarchal social order was perceived to be at stake. But of course white men's perceptions of their male pride and patriarchal authority were bound up with traditional notions of honor. So, the themes covered by Kantrowitz and Finneghan actually converge. More important, for the overall subject of violence and the state, they both show that lynching meant an encroachment by members of a local community upon state prerogatives, which did not prevent politicians from taking the community's side. The attorney Sam Adams, for example, who ran for the South Carolina legislature in 1916, took a leading role in Crawford's lynching. State control vs. private violence in local communities, then, is a prominent theme in both contributions on the South.
In a way, private justice by white supremacists in the American South resembled the drama of Mafia clan conflict in Sicily at about the same time. In both cases, local communities afterwards pleaded ignorance. When a Mafia hitman had tracked down his opponent, say, in a small-town square on a Sunday afternoon, the square would suddenly become empty. The townspeople knew what was going to happen, but they preferred not to see it. When a southern mob killed an African American, many people did watch, but the case was closed with the classic statement that the victim had met his death at the hands of parties unknown. Willful ignorance prevailed in both situations: in the first for fear of retaliation, and in the second because the witnesses approved of the act. The state's role also was slightly different. Sicilians preferred not knowing, because the Italian state at least had the power to start an investigation and interrogate witnesses. In America, federal institutions had no authority to interfere in individual states' judicial affairs. Southerners could afford to be witnesses, because they knew no one would come to ask them questions.

Based on the essays in part 3, we can formulate a general hypothesis: where state control is weak, older notions of masculinity and a forceful defense of one's honor tend to remain dominant; state strength facilitates the development of a new masculinity and spiritualized notions of honor.