Defining a Civic Vision

Steve Minter seized the occasion of a fall Distribution Committee/staff retreat to place the issue of a principal distribution on the upcoming year's agenda. The retreat took place on the last Saturday in October 1987 in the community room at Lexington Village (a location chosen in part for its symbolism of the advantages of thinking big). Minter’s presentation on “Management Strategy for Cleveland Foundation Resources” came at 2:45 in the afternoon, the last session of a day devoted to briefings by the leaders of three prominent civic enterprises on the challenges facing their institutions or projects.

“Homer Wadsworth instituted retreats for the Distribution Committee in order to bring in big outside thinkers and talk about cosmic future trends,” noted Mary Louise Hahn, the Foundation’s special projects officer, during a break between the briefings. She generalized in order to make a point. “Steve is more concerned that the Distribution Committee has a better understanding of the realities of the community in which they are making decisions.”

For Minter, the pressing business of the day was to impress upon the committee the fact that, as he stated in his presentation, “our activities have created rising expectations about our capacity to fund many projects at substantial dollar levels.” The squeeze could be seen in the present docket, he noted. With only $1.6 million in unrestricted funds at its disposal, the Foundation had been presented with no fewer than nine proposals for $150,000 or more that, if granted, would consume $5.5 million in unrestricted dollars. “We’re trying to whittle that down to $900,000,” Minter said optimistically.

The process of tempering grantees’ expectations, Minter reported,
would be ongoing (and inevitable, given the fact that the Foundation expected to have 1.7 million fewer unrestricted dollars to distribute in 1988 than it had in 1987). But he also recommended taking several other aggressive actions, if possible, by the end of the calendar year. These included establishing for each program area two-year target allocations of unrestricted dollars; developing a new investment policy to ensure an acceptable total rate of return and predictable enhancement of income; and assessing the feasibility of a one-time principal distribution.

The Distribution Committee greeted the recommendations with little comment. The first hurdle in winning approval for a one-time invasion of principal to enable the Foundation to continue and perhaps expand its high-risk, high-impact Special Initiatives program was now cleared.

Not coincidentally, the retreat speakers had been useful in sealing the committee's agreement to consider a principal distribution. All came looking for multimillion-dollar assistance. Agnar Pytte, the new president of Case Western Reserve University, informed the group of his belief that "we really can build an absolutely first-rate university here," an important key, he argued, to Cleveland's economic revitalization. Ticking off a list of four areas of the university that needed strengthening—undergraduate education, research facilities, campus-wide computerization and business-university collaborations—he added: "I have lots of ideas about how to get these initiatives rolling, but I don't have any money."

The president of North Coast Development Corporation reported that downtown Cleveland's new Inner Harbor would be completed by Labor Day 1988, fulfilling the first phase of the Foundation-underwritten master plan for the redevelopment of the lakefront; and that planning was under way for Phase II and III construction, which called for the private development of one or two hotels, office buildings and retail facilities on land surrounding the newly created seven-acre harbor. "The commercial development is dependent on the presence of an aquarium and maritime center," Gary N. Conley observed, "and what we need from The Cleveland Foundation is a clear signal of support for these two projects [which the master plan envisioned would have to be publicly owned and operated], a signal that we can take to the other necessary participants in this urban revitalization strategy." Conley suggested that if the Foun-
oration were to award $5 million or so to predevelopment planning for these two amenities, it could leverage $900 million in total project investments.

"Thank you very much," Foundation chairperson Dick Pogue said when Conley completed his presentation, adding only semi-facetiously: "I'm glad you only asked for half a percent [of the project's total cost]."

The Distribution Committee also heard from Richard H. Shatten, the executive director of Cleveland Tomorrow, who provided an overview of his organization's second five-year strategic plan, which had recently been completed. After assessing what Cleveland CEOs could do to improve the quality of life in the region (a study component that had been underwritten by the Foundation), Cleveland Tomorrow had reaffirmed its commitment to supporting physical development efforts, Shatten reported. The upshot was a decision to create the Cleveland Development Partnership, a $50 million equity pool designed to serve as a private-sector catalyst for high-priority projects consistent with the recommendations in Civic Vision, the master redevelopment plan for downtown Cleveland and the neighborhoods that both The Cleveland Foundation and Cleveland Tomorrow had helped to fund in the mid-eighties to replace the City Planning Commission's outdated General Plan of 1949.

During the Distribution Committee retreat, Shatten called the Development Partnership "Cleveland's happy bank," because Cleveland Tomorrow privately conceived of it in terms of a tax-exempt corporation that had the wherewithal to purchase land, undertake necessary site improvements, take equity positions in specific projects or provide guarantees and, if necessary, serve as the developer of last resort. And the association of CEOs was already laying plans to ask The Cleveland Foundation to provide a good chunk of the equity in the form of a $5 million investment. "We believe Cleveland has an opportunity to remake itself into a different city—both downtown and in the neighborhoods—by focusing on a limited number of high potential projects that might include downtown sports facilities, hotels and housing and neighborhood commercial and housing developments," James M. Biggar, chairperson of Cleveland Tomorrow's physical development subcommittee, would assert in a March 1988 letter to Minter and Pogue that suggested the investment.

Once before, Cleveland's business community had committed to an
ambitious plan to "remake" Cleveland in a manner that The Cleveland Foundation had helped to shape. The year was 1968, and Carl B. Stokes had just been elected mayor.

All eyes had focused on Cleveland throughout the summer leading up to the mayoral elections of 1967. While some observers had waited edgily to see whether Hough would once again erupt, others had taken an interest in a political contest that seemed destined to make international headlines. For the first time in history it looked as if a major American city might elect a black mayor.

Realizing that the future of the city depended on inspired, perhaps even heroic, political leadership, the heads of the newly combined Cleveland and Associated Foundations were not content merely to watch the drama unfold. Smith, Sherwin and Norton all played active, if behind-the-scenes, roles in the mayoral campaign to ensure that whoever emerged victorious, he would not be another caretaker mayor. Once the outcome of the race had been decided, however, they laid aside partisan differences and placed the full resources of the two foundations at the disposal of the winning administration. Whatever the new mayor needed in the way of supplementary personnel, discretionary funds, advice or connections to heal the social and economic wounds of the city, they stood ready to provide. Carl Stokes called on all these proffered resources in conceiving and attempting to implement his civic vision, a $1.5 billion master plan called Cleveland: NOW! that was conceived in the wake of the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., and subsequently adopted by the corporate community as its strategy for rebuilding the city.

Had not a black nationalist manqué by the name of Ahmed Evans used monies he earned in running a NOW!-sponsored youth program to buy guns, the public-private partnership that the Foundations helped to assemble around NOW! might indeed have set into motion elements of Cleveland's physical and social revival. But when, in the summer of 1969, Ahmed (formerly Fred) Evans and his followers engaged in a gun battle with police, during which three officers were slain, they also killed prospects for the success of Cleveland: NOW!

Given the disastrous outcome of one of their many collaborations with the Stokes administration, some might call the Foundations' willingness to go out on a limb in support of a politician injudicious at best. Others might find, in the perilousness of the times, ample justification for the philanthropies' decision to work arm-in-arm not only with Cleveland's
political leadership, but also with the city's militants. However, there is no disputing the fact that by attempting to find a useful role for the Foundations in improving the city's governance, the staff and trustees renewed the precedent for involvement in public affairs on which successive generations of Foundation leadership, operating in a less volatile atmosphere, could build more lastingy.

The 1967 campaign marked the second time that Stokes, the grandson of a slave, had run for Cleveland mayor. Two years before, the Democratic state legislator had come very close to being elected, losing a four-way race (in which Stokes had campaigned as an independent) to the Democratic incumbent Ralph Locher by 2,548 votes. The election had dashed the mayoral ambitions of the inflammatory school board president, Ralph McAllister, and it had brought about the demise of the United Freedom Movement, which had splintered over a debate about whether to endorse a mayoral candidate. But it had also demonstrated to Stokes that he could be elected mayor the next time out if he could combine his strong base in the black community with support from white voters, only 3 percent of whom had voted for him in 1965. To increase the white vote, Stokes had decided to run in 1967 as a Democrat rather than an independent.

The city's painful memory of the Hough riots gave Stokes's second race a further boost, propelling him forward as the only mayoral aspirant who might have the answers to the causes of inner-city violence. In the eyes of certain powerful members of the white establishment who had come to know him fairly well from their mutual involvement in BICCA, Carl Stokes represented the city's best hope for racial peace. The private blessing of his candidacy by Jones, Day managing partner Jack Reavis, Stokes would later agree, had been the key that opened the door to other conservative white businessmen's support.

Although federal tax laws prohibited the Cleveland and Associated Foundations from playing a direct role in political activities, their officers and trustees were not constrained from doing so as private citizens, and several were to figure importantly in Stokes's campaign.

Having recently poured hundreds of thousands of dollars into an exhaustive study of the management of city hall that had exposed all sorts of inadequacies, the business and philanthropic communities had lost faith in Mayor Ralph Locher. In an apparent effort to siphon votes from the incumbent in his Democratic primary battle against Stokes, both
John Sherwin and Kent Smith made contributions to the campaign of a third Democratic candidate, Frank Celeste, the former mayor of the West Side suburb of Lakewood, whom pundits believed unlikely to win. When Stokes, whose campaign was being managed by Foundations board member Kenneth Clement, emerged victorious from the October 1967 primary, local Democratic party regulars rushed to endorse him in a tightly contested runoff against Republican Seth Taft, whose grandfather had been the 27th President of the United States.

Having helped to ensure the city an acceptable mayor, no matter who won, Smith backed Taft, becoming one of the Republican challenger's two main financial supporters. Sherwin stood behind Stokes, cohosting a luncheon at which the heads of many of the city's major corporations, banks and department stores were introduced to and allowed to question the Democratic contender. Campaign contributions from those attending the gathering averaged $500 per giver, Sherwin's cohost reported, adding: "I could not get that much money for the Boy Scouts." Such new backing permitted Stokes to quintuple the expenditures of his previous race.

Another boost to Stokes's campaign came that summer from a voter registration drive conducted in three Glenville wards by the Cleveland chapter of CORE (Congress of Racial Equality). The drive and several other local CORE initiatives to develop leadership abilities among black youth and adults had been underwritten by a $175,000 grant from the Ford Foundation at the recommendation of several consultants, including Dolph Norton. Although no less a civil rights activist than Martin Luther King, Jr., spent week after week in Cleveland during the summer organizing the city's East Side neighborhoods (as did scores of Stokes's campaign workers), it would be the Ford-underwritten CORE drive that would gain national notoriety as the contributing factor in Stokes's victory over Taft by fewer than 2,500 votes that fall.

The CORE grant had been part of a new $4.7 million Ford program to "support . . . national organizations dedicated to the improvement of the status of Negroes through positive action programs." National CORE's proposal to make Cleveland its summer of 1967 "Target City" had originated with Ruth Turner, who had left the city in 1966 to work in the organization's national headquarters in New York City and was looking for a way to revitalize the Cleveland chapter (which had dwindled
to fewer than a dozen members), as well as to help Cleveland's black "residents to act for change and help solve their own critical problems."

Intrigued, the Ford Foundation had in the spring sent Dolph Norton and two other consultants to Baltimore, which had been CORE's 1966 Target City, to evaluate the organization's activities there. Ford also sent a consultant to investigate racial problems in Cleveland, where, according to the national news magazines, summer was expected to bring another outburst of violence. In mid-May 1967, Norton drafted his report to the Ford Foundation, declaring that "on balance, the 'target city' proposal would be valuable [although] this judgment does not find unanimous support either in the facts or with the public." To head off potential local criticism of the national foundation's involvement with perceived militants, Norton recommended that Ford consider expanding its grant to include "a responsible bi-racial organization . . . [to] add stature to the CORE project . . . [and] give a picture of leadership support" for it.

Ford's National Affairs staff accepted Norton's advice. When the CORE grant was announced in July, Ford also made public an award of $127,500 to the Businessmen's Interracial Committee on Community Affairs in support of its programs to improve economic opportunities for blacks. "This committee of top business leaders and spokesmen from several segments of the Negro community has proved its worth as a place for direct confrontation . . . ," noted a Ford memo recommending the grant. The memo explained:

The . . . staff knows of no large city, with the possible exception of Chicago, where so many of the major businessmen meet on a regular basis with such a variety of Negro leaders. These businessmen may have been frightened into this activity in the first place by the apparent reluctance of the current mayor of Cleveland to move constructively on race issues; but, whatever their original motive, they have stayed on to build a modest record of progress. . . . Now they want to go further.

BICCA's employment subcommittee planned to use the Ford monies mainly to supplement federal support for an ambitious program, begun the previous month, to train and find jobs for 2,000 chronically unemployed black youths.

The campaign against central-city joblessness, grass-roots organizing
in the black neighborhoods and Stokes's growing viability as a candidate were all developments that leaders of The Cleveland and Associated Foundations had helped foster and that would contribute to Cleveland's exemption from the major disorders that rocked eight other cities in the summer of 1967. So the New York Times theorized in an analysis published in August. When Stokes was elected mayor two months later, many Clevelanders were convinced that racial disturbances would be a thing of the past, that now, as Dolph Norton would later describe the mood, there was a chance that the city's problems would at last be solved.

A letter that Paul Ylvisaker (who had resigned from Ford and was currently the Commissioner of Community Affairs for the State of New Jersey) sent to Norton shortly after Stokes's victory reflected Norton's excitement at the Foundations' being in an excellent position to help Stokes deal with the plight of the central city, where unemployment among blacks had climbed to 15.5 percent, the highest such statistic in the country:

Dear Dolph:

Great to hear from you, and I guessed that the election would spring you further loose. You may well have been created for this moment in history. The nation will be watching.

While Norton may have seen the election of a mayor well acquainted with the Foundations as an opportunity to work more closely with city hall on municipal problems, he did not assume that all the members of the Distribution Committee shared his understanding of the benefits of pursuing such a collaboration. In early January he took the precaution of sending each member a packet of reading materials on the history and philosophy of governmental-philanthropic partnerships. He convened a special Saturday session of the Distribution Committee to discuss the implications of the articles the members had read and to answer questions about the necessity or wisdom of supporting publicly funded institutions.

The discussion was a timely one, for the optimistic glow surrounding Stokes's ascension to power had already begun to dim, especially after the Cleveland newspapers published reports that a former political advisor to Stokes now working as one of his executive secretaries was involved in running an after-hours club. Earlier news stories had focused
on the new administration’s difficulty in clearing the streets after a violent snow storm (which occurred while Stokes was away on vacation for two weeks in the Virgin Islands). It seemed as if Stokes’s administration would be permanently damaged by this succession of mini-scandals before it was even 100 days old.

In a move that would have wide-ranging repercussions, Stokes decided to ask William Silverman to come to work as his public relations consultant. Stokes felt that he needed expert advice “in dealing with how public reaction to [his] conduct would be formed, since all of [his] actions would reach the public through the interpretative structure of the white media.” Silverman, a vice president of Edward Howard and Company and Seth Taft’s campaign manager, had impressed Stokes with his image-making abilities in turning a blue-blooded Republican suburbanite into a formidable political contender without resorting to mudslinging. But Silverman was not initially interested in the offer of employment. He finally relented on the condition that he be allowed to start his own firm and serve as a freelance consultant—an arrangement that would enable him to avoid political entanglements.

In forming his administration the previous fall, the mayor had often turned to Dolph Norton (among others) for personnel suggestions and program advice, and it was to Norton that he now went for help in paying for the arrangement with Silverman. Because the next Distribution Committee meeting was some time away, Norton made appointments with the individual members to discuss the possibility of a Foundations grant to Silverman. Norton would remember that Tom Patton had best expressed the members’ general feelings. After listening to Norton’s outline of the problem and its solution, Patton had said, simply: “We cannot afford to have this mayor fail. Do what you can to help.”

The Associated Foundation subsequently funnelled a grant for $68,100 through the Governmental Research Institute, the not-for-profit research arm of the Citizens League, to pay Silverman’s fees and expenses for one year. In words echoing a recommendation of the recently completed Little Hoover Commission study of city government, it was announced that Silverman would design a program to improve city hall’s communication with the neighborhoods and better the city’s image outside Cleveland. Although it would later appear to some observers as an act of political favoritism, the Associated Foundation’s grant derived from Norton’s long-standing dedication to strengthening the public-
service sector—an interest that had led the Foundations to provide direct assistance to Cleveland’s mayor once before by helping to underwrite the Little Hoover Commission.

Financed by the corporate and philanthropic communities (the Cleveland and Associated Foundations would contribute $181,000 of the approximately $500,000 total cost), the Little Hoover Commission had been established in December 1965 by Mayor Locher, at the suggestion of a group of businesspeople led by Jack Reavis. To be chaired by Reavis’s former partner, Carter Kissell, the commission had been created to study the city of Cleveland’s operations and make recommendations for improvements and financial savings in the wake of the defeat at the polls in May 1965 of a proposed municipal income tax, which, ironically, had been opposed by the commission’s principals—the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce (which Reavis chaired) and the Citizens League (whose executive director was named commission secretary). Cleveland’s civic and business leaders had wanted to see a county income tax enacted instead, basing their preference on the findings of “Time for Decisions,” the Governmental Research Institute’s tax policy study, which the Associated Foundation had underwritten in 1964 and then helped to publish and distribute in pamphlet form in the spring of 1965. They had worked to defeat the proposed municipal tax out of a conviction that the burden of municipal services ought to be shared on a regional basis, as well as out of fears that the city had not sufficiently explored other sources of revenue and cost-saving, had not considered the proposed tax’s impact on the pressing needs of other taxing entities (such as the Cleveland public schools) and would probably postpone needed personnel and policy changes if the tax were passed.

The defeat of the tax proposal, the business community had realized after the fact, did nothing to resolve the financial ailments of the city, which had “fallen behind its competitor central cities in the amount of tax support for local government services,” as “Time for Decisions” had framed it. Setting up the Little Hoover Commission had seemed an appropriate next step. In time the commission’s business leaders would come to see the wisdom of a city income tax. (A .5 percent tax was enacted by councilmanic action in the course of 1966.) However, they would argue publicly with Mayor Locher over many of the study’s other findings, including its conclusion that community relations was the city’s major problem. In the end, fewer than half of the commission’s 500-plus recommendations would be implemented, mostly during the
Stokes administration, which heeded the study’s call for such improvements as grouping the welter of 30 city divisions into 12 departments (with the director’s salary in certain instances to be set higher than the mayor’s); establishing a port authority; creating a police academy; and providing formal management training for the city’s 500 supervisory personnel—the latter two programs made possible with grants from the Foundations.

The Little Hoover report on city hall’s communications problems, one of 21 studies by professional analysts covering every aspect of the city’s operation from purchasing to the judiciary, had been written by Edward Howard and Company executive William Silverman. “The city has been under heavy attack from both the local and national news media for some time,” Silverman had noted in his report, citing unfavorable stories in publications as diverse as Time, the Saturday Evening Post and the Wall Street Journal. He added: “Favorite targets are race relations and urban renewal. The extent of negative publicity on the national scale has reached such proportions that many businessmen and civic leaders are concerned it might be seriously harming their ability to attract new industry and capable people to the area.” To combat the bad press, Silverman’s report had recommended the creation of a public relations department at city hall. “Traditionally, public relations in local government has been considered press agentry for the officials in power,” he had written prophetically. “This kind of personal public relations work is a questionable expenditure of public funds. [But] providing [that a city’s PR department] is established in good faith . . . this isn’t a legitimate reason to forego the public relations function.”

His position justified by a Little Hoover Commission recommendation he had coincidentally written, the Foundations-sponsored consultant to city hall would very shortly establish himself as more than a public relations expert. “. . . Bill [Silverman] went on to become close to me,” Stokes was to say. “He became, in fact, one of the handful of those I always called on to sit around and brainstorm when a particularly difficult situation arose.”

On April 5, 1968, the day after Martin Luther King had been assassinated, Bill Silverman received a call at his office from Carl Stokes, who had spent the previous night walking the streets, urging King’s mourners to keep the peace. Although blacks in other cities had exploded
in violent anger over the loss of the civil rights champion, so far Cleveland’s East Side residents had stayed relatively calm.

“Get over here immediately,” the mayor instructed Silverman, who had been on the job less than a month.

When Silverman arrived at Stokes’s inner office, the mayor asked his consultant to step into the next room, take a seat and listen. Gathered around the conference table in the adjacent Tapestry Room were 20 or so of the city’s most prominent corporate executives, among them Reavis, Sherwin and Patton. When the mayor was seated, William Adams II, the president of the Greater Cleveland Growth Association (formerly the Chamber of Commerce), stood up.

“Mr. Mayor, we’re completely behind you,” Silverman would recall Adams as saying. “Whatever you need to deal with this situation, you just call on us.”

“Is there anything else?” Stokes responded, somewhat abruptly, Silverman thought. When the businessmen replied no, the mayor immediately excused himself and left.

Joining Stokes back in his office, Silverman found the mayor hopping mad at the businessmen’s unspoken assumption that simply because Stokes’s skin was black, he should be able to prevent King’s mourners from rioting.

Silverman sized up the situation differently. What causes riots? he asked the mayor rhetorically: substandard housing, unemployment, poor police protection. “So let’s get the bastards back in here,” Silverman counseled Stokes, “and tell them there is something they can do.”

Thus was born the boldest initiative of the Stokes administration.

“$1.5 Billion Is Asked to Rebuild Cleveland,” read the 72-point-sized front-page headline in the Plain Dealer on May 2, 1968. For those who had missed Mayor Stokes’s half-hour broadcast on all three local television stations the previous night, the accompanying story broke the news of his ambitious plan to turn the city around in 10 years through new programs in the areas of employment, neighborhood rehabilitation, youth development, health and welfare and downtown revitalization. In its first phase, the plan called for the expenditure of $177 million on training 11,000 of the city’s hard-core unemployed; rehabilitating or building 4,600 low-income housing units; creating 10 new multiservice health centers, 10 new day-care centers, and a variety of summer youth programs; and pushing the completion of the city’s stalled urban renewal
NOW! monies at the recommendation of the MCYO was, fately, Project Afro. A proposal of the Hough Area Development Corporation (HADC), Project Afro must have seemed fairly innocuous. It sought to develop “self-identity, self-pride, self-respect and positive ambitions among youth in Negro poverty stricken areas” through a 12-week cultural and educational program offering courses in black history, art, creative writing, drama, Afro-American dance and music and even sewing and design. “For the Negro youngster to succeed, to discover and to express himself and to find black beauty and worth and freedom and recognition within the American way of life is the first and most crucial step in his mental preparation for a productive life in the American system,” the proposal argued. The total cost of the program was $31,000, to be used primarily to purchase art supplies and provide employment to 23 youths at $50 per week and 12 adults at pay ranging from $75 to $150 per week.

The Project Afro proposal had been presented by Beach at an open meeting of the council on June 27 and approved on the strength of HADC’s reputation alone. The names of the three storefront operations that HADC had recommended for funding—African Cultural Center, African Cultural Shop and Afro Set—had been mentioned at the MCYO meeting. But their respective leaders—Boyd Roberts, Ahmed Evans and Harllee X Jones—were not identified. Evans’s name might have been recognized. An astrologer with a cult following known as the Black Nationalists of New Libya, Evans had come to the attention of the nation in a Wall Street Journal report on racial tensions in Cleveland that was published in the spring following the Hough riots. “To Ahmed, the high priest of Negro militancy here, the white man is the ‘beast’ to be overcome,” the story began. “He predicts May 9th will be the ‘terrible day’ that the anger of this city’s black ghetto erupts into violence—partly because, by his calculations, that will be the day when an eclipse of the sun darkens the sky. . . . Ahmed’s warnings that ‘blood must flow’ and ‘some must die’ are gospel to a small but growing number of followers. . . .”

In hindsight, some in the black nationalist movement, such as Harllee X Jones, came to regard Evans and his followers as immature: Black nationalism was dedicated to creating a viable black nation within a nation, Jones would later remark, not to astrology or violence. Carl Stokes would ultimately declare Evans a petty hustler who spouted rev-
volutionary nonsense in order to build a following. But at the time many saw Ahmed Evans more sympathetically; Seymour Slavin, for example, remembered him as a guy who let homeless kids sleep in his astrology shop at 1105 Superior Avenue.

Whatever the truth about Evans’s character, the police took his vague threats seriously, padlocking his storefront in early 1968 after it had been repeatedly cited for sanitary violations. When Project Afro was funded, DeForest Brown helped Evans locate a new shop at 6609 Hough Avenue. However, after the New Libyans had cleaned out the refuse littering the former tavern and painted its walls, the landlady reneged on her verbal agreement to rent the place. (Jones, for one, believed that the police had poisoned her thinking.) In the meantime, acting on a tip that Evans was stockpiling arms, the police began a surveillance of an apartment building on Auburndale Avenue in Glenville where the New Libyans had barricaded themselves.

During the evening of July 23, shots rang out on Auburndale Avenue. When Ahmed Evans surrendered at 12:30 A.M., four hours after the shoot-out between the police and the New Libyans had begun, seven persons lay dead, including three policemen, and 15 individuals had been wounded. Although it never would be established who had fired the first shot, Evans was tried for murder the following spring, found guilty and sentenced to life in prison (where he would die of cancer in 1978). The four days of arson and looting that followed the shoot-out, during which time Stokes removed all white policemen from Glenville for 24 hours, fearing that they might cause mayhem, caused $2.6 million in damages.

The Glenville shoot-out also fatally wounded Cleveland: NOW! During his questioning by police following his arrest, Evans mentioned that he and his associates had used monies from the $6,000 they had earned for their participation in Project Afro to purchase guns. When news of this connection leaked to the newspapers, donations to Cleveland: NOW! dried up immediately. “The businessmen, against my constant reminder that I was no insurance against violence, had continued to believe it anyway. Glenville was their rude awakening,” Stokes later observed, “and when they found out that they had risked an independent mayor as an insurance policy to no avail, they turned away. . . . Many businessmen who had made pledges to the Cleveland: NOW! program quietly turned their backs, and we could see that there would be no support for its continuance.”
projects. While Stokes envisioned that the federal government would pick up most of the tab, he had explained to the television audience that he expected Clevelanders to contribute $11.25 million in seed money.

"To stop the downhill slide, to start the city moving forward, to create a climate in which our city can become someday a great one, we must take that first difficult step," Stokes had apprised his constituents. "I am going to ask you to join me in making that step by participating in a program that has been developed to meet the urgent needs of the city. . . . Each one of you will have to play a key role. I am serious about this. This is not an idle request. We must all participate or we will not succeed."

To underline the urgency of the massive redevelopment task, the plan had been called Cleveland: NOW!

In its broad conception and shrewd mass marketing, Cleveland: NOW! had been Silverman's brainchild; but to lead the impromptu task force charged with developing the specifics of the plan in the frantic days following King's death, Stokes had picked Irving Kriegsfeld, the former head of community relations for the city of San Francisco's urban renewal department. Kriegsfeld had moved to Cleveland the previous summer to become executive director of the Greater Cleveland Associated Foundation's program advisory committee on housing, the PATH Association, and had soon favorably impressed the Stokes administration. In a series of crash meetings, Kriegsfeld, working with some of Stokes' cabinet officers and other knowledgeable Clevelanders, had thrashed out the details of Cleveland: NOW! in 96 hours.

On April 12, with the city safely out of danger thanks to Stokes's coolheaded decision to enlist an army of influential black Clevelanders to join him night after night in the neighborhoods to talk with potential troublemakers, the white businessmen had been reassembled in the Tapestry Room. After the details of Cleveland: NOW! had been presented, the mayor informed the gathering that he would like the business community to contribute $10 million. Bill Adams, John Sherwin and George S. Dively, the chairman of the board of Harris-Intertype Corporation, went into a huddle and emerged with an agreement to make that commitment. Sherwin and Dively were put in charge of the corporate fund-raising drive.

The response to the challenge the mayor issued on May 1 was immediate. While corporate fund-raisers laid plans to make calls to 4,000
greater Cleveland businesses, schoolchildren sent in nickels and dimes, unions solicited their members to donate "an hour's pay for a better day," and seven major banks agreed to accept contributions from the public at any one of 200 participating branch offices. By fall, $5.2 million had been pledged to Cleveland: NOW!, which had been incorporated in June as a not-for-profit Ohio corporation. Its trustees, Reavis, Sherwin, Patton, Dively, George J. Grabner (president of the Weatherhead Company and chairman of the board of the Growth Association), and Richard T. Baker (managing partner of Ernst and Ernst, the city's largest accounting firm), were charged with approving all disbursements recommended by the mayor, who would confess that even he had been surprised by the outpouring of enthusiasm.

But the hopes for a better day that Silverman's plan had inspired in the hearts of black and white Clevelanders alike were to be quickly and brutally dashed. Cleveland: NOW! self-destructed within 90 days, the victim of good intentions gone haywire in the playing out of its first major grant. Yet the beneficiary of the grant—a comprehensive program of summer jobs, recreational activities and free entertainment for central-city kids coordinated by the Associated Foundation—had seemed as wholesome as milk.

It was at the request of the Businessmen's Interracial Committee on Community Affairs that the Associated Foundation had first become involved in early 1966 in planning summer youth programs, then typically organized on a scattershot basis by branch libraries, settlement houses or "rec" centers for the residents of their neighborhoods. Fearful of the consequences of the "long, hot summer" ahead, BICCA had asked GCAF to underwrite the assembling of an inventory of activities available to teenagers in five impoverished sections of the city. Findings from the $5,000 study conducted by Welfare Federation planner Seymour Slavin had been used by Cleveland's antipoverty organization, the Council for Economic Opportunities, in attracting almost $1 million in federal funding for new summer recreation and employment programs.

In the wake of the Hough riots, Slavin, who had worked primarily with settlement houses in his seven years with the Federation, had become convinced that existing youth services were no longer adequate to the needs of the times. He sensed he could be a catalyst for change through the Associated Foundation, where he had accepted an appointment as a staff associate. There, with Norton's encouragement to be
creative, he had hatched the idea of sharing with the neighborhoods the city’s much-vaunted cultural riches (chief among them the world-renowned Cleveland Orchestra and Cleveland Museum of Art). Slavin had traveled to New York City to confer with director Joseph Papp about his popular Shakespeare in Central Park series and had enlisted the assistance of Howard Whittaker, director of the Cleveland Music School Settlement, in planning an elaborate outdoor arts festival for Cleveland.

Launched on June 19, 1967, with $130,000 in donations of in-kind services and facilities from the city and contributions of $230,000 solicited by the Associated Foundation from local businesses and philanthropies, the Cleveland Summer Arts Festival was a 10-week extravaganza. It featured workshops during the day and, staged at 10 locations throughout the city, free orchestra and jazz performances, light opera, ballet and modern dance concerts and drama productions at night. Attendance had reached 120,000 during the first year and soared to nearly 300,000 in 1969, when, to assuage criticism that the festival’s fare was elitist, 33 neighborhood arts committees were formed to produce their own shows as a supplement to regular programming. Before the festival (which the Associated Foundation had spun off as a separate entity in its second year) was abandoned in 1971 as the result of monetary and managerial disputes between its private-sector and government sponsors, it had spawned similar programs in 60 cities throughout the country.

Watching the community start from scratch each winter to pull together that summer’s youth programs had opened Norton’s eyes to the need for a central body to coordinate planning and fund raising year-round. With a new mayor in office who was receptive to innovative ideas, Norton was able to “loan” Slavin to Stokes to set up such a body within city hall. By the end of 1967, Slavin had assembled the Mayor’s Council on Youth Opportunity (MCYO), whose 53 members representing a cross section of the city were to review all proposals for summer youth programs and recommend those to be funded from a pool of corporate donations, foundation grants and government monies administered by the Associated Foundation. The pool was dramatically enlarged when the mayor awarded $344,436 in Cleveland: NOW! funds to MCYO for the summer of 1968, assigning former Cleveland Browns defensive back Walter Beach III to replace Slavin as staff coordinator and field investigator.

Among the 37 summer programs funded in 1968 with Cleveland:
Fallout from the tragedy also splattered the Associated Foundation. Several news stories on Evans’s arrest implied that GCAF had authorized the grant to Project Afro. Norton promptly released to the press a statement that he believed successfully distanced the Associated Foundation from anything more than a technical relationship with Ahmed Evans. “The Associated Foundation has served as a banking agent for funds used in the summer program, accepting donations and disbursing them under the direction of the Mayor’s Council on Youth Opportunity, which determined priorities among the many summer youth service programs submitted by agencies and individuals in Cleveland,” it said.  

Because it had been designed to head off criticism of the Associated Foundation, Norton’s press release was less than forthcoming. It did not point out that the authorizer of the Project Afro grant, the Mayor’s Council on Youth Opportunity, was an invention of the Associated Foundation. Nor did it mention the Foundations’ traditional role in actively soliciting funds for summer youth programming. It also neglected to acknowledge that, philosophically, the Foundations were in favor of supporting efforts to provide constructive programs for the most severely alienated elements of the black community.

In fact, while the Associated Foundation may not have put any money directly into Project Afro, it had been the originator and cosponsor of an even more ambitious outreach program called PRIDE, which had employed 700 so-called “hard-core” teenagers during the summer that the shoot-out occurred. For having the conviction to work with Cleveland’s most disaffected (and, consequently, most volatile) residents, the Foundations would periodically be flayed during PRIDE’s two-year life span and for some years thereafter. The public attacks would come both from those who saw summer youth employment programs as attempts to co-opt the most militant members of the civil rights movement and from those who viewed them as empowering rabble-rousers. But only after the Glenville crisis had cooled would Dolph Norton feel free to respond to such criticism forthrightly.

The idea for PRIDE had actually been a matter of serendipity. During Norton’s 1967 trip to Washington, D.C., to discuss launching AIMJOBS, BICCA’s proposed youth employment initiative, Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz had mentioned that he was surprised that no other city had applied for federal funding to start a program similar to one in the capital called Pride, which was begun by a former national chairman
of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee named Marion Barry to channel the energies of some of Washington's most intractable militants. "We took Secretary Wirtz's remarks as an opportunity," Norton would explain in a memo to the Distribution Committee recommending the creation of a Cleveland PRIDE.

Upon his return Norton had discussed Barry's program with members of the employment subcommittee of BICCA, out of which conversations the name of Cleveland CORE member Baxter Hill had emerged as a possible director for the program. A former grocery clerk turned Baptist street preacher, Hill had worked for the Inner City Action Committee, a small action team assembled by BICCA education subcommittee member (and Cleveland Electric Illuminating chairman) Ralph Besse two weeks after the Hough riots in July 1966.

Funded by the Associated Foundation and charged with finding "ways and means of preventing a recurrence" of such violence, as Mayor Locher described its mission in announcing the group's formation, the Inner City Action Committee had immediately gone to work on eliminating two vexations of ghetto life. It had persuaded the banks to cash welfare checks without charge, and it had launched a rat extermination program in Hough (city hall having had no funds for rodenticide). In addition, Ralph Besse had arranged for an extension of the federal government's summer employment program, which kept 250 central-city youths and supervisors on the payroll through the spring of 1967. Then he had personally raised $40,000 to continue employment of a number of teenagers and young adults for another 10 weeks under the auspices of a program called Peace in Cleveland that was administered by Baxter Hill, who moved easily among the dozen or so black nationalist groups operating on the East Side.

In 1968, in Point of View, his biweekly newsletter of media criticism and political commentary, Cleveland journalist Roldo Bartimole would excoriate Peace in Cleveland as a "social control" mechanism—a charge he would often level against neighborhood programs supported by the Foundations over the course of the next decade. The way Bartimole saw it:

Cleveland business leaders last summer "bought peace" in the ghetto by paying some black activists about $40,000 in a 10-week period to do what they had decided to do already—keep it cool.
Obviously, to topple Mr. Locher, a peaceful summer was essential.

Black activists too saw peace necessary to elect a black mayor.

The program ended, predictably, the weekend of the Democratic primary.

The autumn of the 1967 primary, BICCA had sent Baxter Hill to Washington to observe the Pride operation there; afterward, a proposal for a similar effort in Cleveland had been prepared, a board assembled (among whose members were DeForest Brown, Walter Beach and Harllee X Jones) and the program launched with $250,000 funneled from Cleveland's Council for Economic Opportunity and additional grants from the Associated Foundation and Cleveland: NOW! According to the proposal, PRIDE would be a vehicle for "grass root leaders to assume their role of leadership by recruiting grass root hard core men to clean up and maintain their neighborhoods, learn a trade (skill), or be put into existing [job] programs."

PRIDE's first-year performance was reviewed by the Council for Economic Opportunity (CEO), which uncovered some bookkeeping irregularities. After all program expenditures had been placed under CEO's direct fiscal control, PRIDE's three cosponsors refunded its operation for 1969. CEO's second-year review of the program, whose enrollees sodded front yards and tree lawns in the burned-out central city, set traps for rodents and built playgrounds, would praise its substantive nature. "Many of these [summer youth employment programs] were too often hastily planned, utilizing make-work... with little provision for their continuance beyond the summer period," the reviewers would observe. As a result, summer employment programs "were often seen as 'buy offs' by the young people, who felt that such programs were not really concerned with their own self-improvement... but... rather with 'keeping the summer cool.' Cleveland PRIDE provided the framework to facilitate the development and operation of youth initiative in planning and implementing employment programs."

In the late summer of 1969 PRIDE would display some initiative that met with considerably less applause. Observing the parade of white suburbanites who drove into the central city on the weekends to patronize black streetwalkers, the Reverend Hill decided to turn his uniformed recruits into vigilantes. On Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights, PRIDE members would patrol Euclid Avenue until dawn, writing down the license-plate numbers and taking photographs of white
johns, whom they regarded as exploiters of the neighborhood women. The patrols made headlines, prompting councilman Leo Jackson, who had questioned the Associated Foundation privately about its support of PRIDE, to more vigorous action.

That fall Jackson (in whose Glenville neighborhood one of PRIDE's four centers was headquartered) took his criticism public. In a speech accepting the 1969 Brother's Keeper Award from Cleveland's Jewish Community Federation, Jackson expressed his fierce disagreement with what he saw as the white community's ill-considered peacekeeping strategy following the Hough riots. "The establishment then began pouring torrents of money into a hectic effort to douse the fires," the councilman stated.

But instead of making these resources available to the genuine and dedicated leadership of the Negro community, they decided to pay what amounted to blackmail to a new breed of fanatical black racists. They poured money into the pockets of rabble-rousers and charlatans who were more interested in fomenting hatred and disunity than in building a better community—or, for that matter, in building anything. It has been the white establishment which has been feeding the fires of hatred and potential violence in the black community. [And] the principal victims of this policy have been . . . the [black] men and women who are willing to work hard for everything they get, the people who go to church, who believe in brotherhood and decency.

Norton had responded to Jackson's initial questioning with a ringing defense of PRIDE (a passionate statement of the Foundations' philosophy that could have applied equally to Project Afro). "I recognize that not everyone understands the problem in reaching the young people with whom PRIDE works," he had stated in a letter to Jackson in June of 1969, "and that there may be certain risks in supporting [such] projects . . . but I strongly [believe] . . . that we must attempt to reach the militant elements and introduce them to constructive effort within the American framework. To exclude them entirely from such support is, in effect, ostracizing them and driving them farther out of society."

Twenty years later Seymour Slavin could still tick off with ease a list of the benefits—some admittedly intangible—that he believed PRIDE and other Foundations-supported youth employment programs had provided. "How many kids went back to school with some money in their pockets, a preliminary orientation to the world of work and some meaningful mentoring?" he enumerated. "More importantly, the programs
created a sense that these young people wanted to work, that the stereotypes were not accurate. This raised the consciousness of business and political leaders that the community had to do more planning for young peoples' occupational futures." Indeed, the person who replaced Slavin as the Foundations' liaison with the Mayor's Council on Youth Opportunity persuaded the Distribution Committee to fund a two-year demonstration project aimed at coordinating the programs and resources of all the community's youth service agencies on a year-round basis—an experiment that led to the establishment of a formal (but short-lived) Youth Planning and Development Commission.

Though significant additional funding would not be forthcoming after Glenville, Cleveland: NOW! had raised sufficient monies to allow the mayor to pursue some of its announced programs vigorously. None was more important to Carl Stokes, who had grown up in a public housing project on Cleveland's East Side, than providing decent shelter for his constituents who lived in substandard dwellings (an estimated one of every four city residents). In its first two years, Cleveland: NOW! made good on its promise to stimulate the construction or rehabilitation of at least 4,600 housing units.

The period between 1968 and 1970 was a frenzy of activity. More than 4,100 new units of public housing were added to the 7,500 units extant, compared to the 1,500 units that had been created in the preceding seven years. The last two years of the decade also saw the private sector produce 1,309 new and 927 rehabilitated units, a record that bested its performance in any of the preceding 19 years. Although the total production of 6,400-plus new units did not come close to being sufficient to replace the 50,000 homes believed to be substandard, Cleveland: NOW!'s record of solid accomplishment proved that the mechanisms were in place to meet the challenge of providing decent, affordable housing for every Cleveland family—a goal that had been rearticulated for the community by the "Plan of Action for Tomorrow's Housing," a report issued in March 1967 by the Associated Foundation's so-named program advisory committee. Unfortunately, it would also become clear that the mechanisms worked only as long as they were fueled by a driving will. While Carl Stokes was in office, he provided the intense determination, if not always the necessary political clout, to work on remediating the city's shortage of low-income housing.
Stokes's way in improving housing conditions had been smoothed by various initiatives of the Associated and Cleveland Foundations.

Both foundations had first become involved in housing issues in the early sixties, making grants to support the Ludlow and Moreland community associations that sprang up to encourage the integration of neighborhoods straddling the boundaries of Cleveland and suburban Shaker Heights that were on the verge of becoming all-black. Less successful in their concrete results were a series of grants the Associated Foundation made starting in 1965 to a housing rehabilitation demonstration in Mt. Pleasant, a lower-middle-class black Cleveland neighborhood that the foundation hoped to prevent from becoming another ghetto like Hough. Despite the foundation's having poured $65,000 into the operation of a program designed to tackle the maintenance problems of absentee-owned apartment buildings, an economic analysis of the neighborhood in 1969 found "a spiralling trend of . . . deterioration coupled with an increasing business mortality rate." Something intangible had been gained, however: a precedent for hands-on involvement by the corporate community. With the assistance of Carter Kissell, who at the time chaired both the BICCA subcommittee on housing and the Cleveland Development Foundation (which had also provided the rehab program with operating support), the Associated Foundation had been able to persuade six Cleveland corporations to contribute a total of $200,000 to a revolving fund to help finance the necessary maintenance work.

When the Cleveland Development Foundation in 1966 decided to start the Hough Housing Corporation to rehabilitate 10 apartment buildings on both sides of a two-block stretch of East 90th Street in Hough, it approached the Associated Foundation for a grant to provide the future tenants with the services of their own social worker. The first significant housing rehabilitation project in Hough, the corporation eventually ran into difficulties meeting its Federal Housing Administration (FHA) subsidized mortgage. Yet something intangible had again been gained: knowledge that educating low-income tenants about their responsibilities as renters and assisting them in solving their problems could help to reduce the number of move-ins and -outs, vandalism and maintenance and utility costs.

Not everyone in Hough welcomed the involvement of the white business community in its redevelopment. The Hough Area Development
Corporation had been the residents' way of placing control of the neighborhood's economic revitalization in their own hands. For a time it looked as if the stratagem would succeed and succeed big. Between 1968 and 1972 HADC received more than $5 million in federal funding, as well as $100,000 in operating support from the Associated and Cleveland Foundations, allowing it to buy or start three minority-owned businesses, develop 600 low-income housing units and build a $3.2 million shopping center that it claimed was the first enclosed mall to be constructed in any inner city in the country.

With the exception of the housing, all of HADC's projects proved in the end to be financially unprofitable, and the community development corporation itself never succeeded in raising the local funding required to match federal support. HADC lingered on into the eighties, concentrating on two undertakings of significance: Crawford Estates and Midtown Industrial Park. A small subdivision of single-family homes that sold for $35,000 to $68,000, Crawford Estates paved the way for Lexington Village by demonstrating that there was a market for new housing in Hough, according to its project director, Hunter Morrison, who went on to become director of Cleveland's planning commission. Midtown Industrial Park, for which HADC assembled 10.5 acres of land that it was never able to develop, became the impetus for the previously mentioned MidTown Commerce Park, which was conceived in the late eighties.

Still, HADC's initial success had encouraged imitators. By the time Irving Kriegsfeld arrived to take up the reins of the PATH Association in August 1967, there were some 20 or so community development organizations in varying stages of sophistication at work on solving the housing problem in Cleveland.

With its operating expenses covered for three years by a $210,000 grant from the Cleveland and Associated Foundations, the PATH Association had opened its doors in May 1967. In its original incarnation as the PATH Committee, the organization had been asked by the Associated Foundation to "determine the nature and extent of housing problems in the . . . area; determine to what extent those problems were being met by the public, private or nonprofit sectors of the community; establish goals for Greater Cleveland in the field of housing; [and] recommend how those goals can be effectively implemented." Now it
was up to Kriegsfeld and his board to implement the 46 recommendations of the PATH Committee.

Recommendation 22 had called for the Cleveland Development Foundation to assume a leadership role in stimulating production of housing for low- and moderate-income families. When Carl Stokes had asked for Kriegsfeld's help in designing Cleveland: NOW!'s housing program, Kriegsfeld had decided to build Recommendation 22 into the plan, calling for the creation of a Community Housing Corporation to provide technical and financial assistance to neighborhood housing groups.

After the Cleveland Development Foundation (the initial repository of all Cleveland: NOW! funds) had made a commitment in 1968 to raise a total of $6 million for the Community Housing Corporation (CHC), the organization was established a year later with $1.2 million in NOW! monies. Among the services it planned to offer Cleveland's low-income housing providers were assistance with site selection, financial planning and FHA paperwork; land banking; and access to a revolving loan fund. Within a year CHC had opened a subsidiary: the Cleveland Design Center, whose operation was underwritten by a $74,000 grant from The Cleveland Foundation. In its first 18 months the center would provide $1 million worth of free architectural advice and blueprints to individuals and groups. Also in 1970, with the support of a $225,000 grant from the Ford Foundation, the PATH Association established the Cleveland Contractors Assistance Corporation to supply construction experience, accounting services, estimating assistance and bond guarantees to minority-owned contracting firms, who it envisioned would work synergistically with Cleveland's neighborhood housing groups.

On paper it seemed that at last the city boasted all the not-for-profit programs necessary to rehab or replace its aging private housing stock. Unfortunately, the director of the Cleveland Housing Corporation expended so much energy fighting with the neighborhood groups over resources, strategies and turf that the entire support system collapsed within two years. "These agencies . . . have not viewed themselves as part of a total delivery system. All . . . need to work more effectively at coordinating the housing development process," the Foundations staff concluded in 1971.

The mild tone of the criticism masked the Foundations' considerable disenchantedment, which quickly spread by means of the Distribution
Committee to the business community. In 1971 the Foundations declined to authorize second-round funding for the Design Center, which, the staff decided, had, "as a reaction to the Community Housing Corporation's lack of involvement with community groups . . ., acted as a sponge, absorbing many requests from the community with little regard to organizational priorities." The staff concluded, "This may have diluted its strength and potential effectiveness." The Foundation urged the center to merge operations with CHC.

But within six months the Greater Cleveland Growth Association (which had taken over responsibility for fund raising for CHC) had pulled the plug on that operation, too. Point of View's Roldo Bartimole would later charge that the business community "reneged" on its promised $6 million commitment to building low-income housing because it didn't want to turn control of CHC over to a more broadly representative board. CHC's indifferent record, on the other hand, had hardly inspired confidence. According to the Foundations' 1971 review of CHC's performance, its "sponsorship of housing . . . [had] been limited to a very costly program of moving 32 housing units from the City of Shaker Heights to the City of Cleveland and to the construction of six units in a small experimental modular housing program. . . . Through the use of a portion of its funds a number of loans and grants were made to community-based nonprofit sponsors which facilitated the construction of an additional 250 units."

Kenneth W. McGovern, a planner in Stokes's community development department, who was to help found Doan Center Incorporated in the eighties to carry on redevelopment activities in Hough and Glenville, viewed the demise of the top-down housing delivery system as inevitable, given the ticklish dynamics of neighborhood politics in the sixties. "There was a naivete on the part of those who set up Community Housing Corporation," he observed. "They didn't have the ability to say no to the black community, and this was a time when every third block club was going to be a CDC and there was a lot of Mau-Mauing going on. Community Housing Corporation was nailed from day one."

In the arena of public housing, the key to success had been a lot simpler. Stokes's strategy was simply to turn loose Irving Kriegsfeld, the energetic executive director of PATH, whose appointment as director of the Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA)—the city's public housing authority—the Stokes administration had engineered in
May 1968. (Ernie Bohn, CMHA's previous director for 35 years, had pioneered in creating the first public housing authority in the country in 1937, but by the late sixties he had, in Stokes's eyes, outlived his effectiveness. Bohn's decision to retire was facilitated by a timely appointment as a lecturer at Case Western Reserve University—an opportunity that the PATH Association and Dolph Norton helped to arrange.) Unlike his predecessor, Kriegsfeld was willing to commit political suicide, he would later confide, if that's what it took to get more public housing built. The new director soon discovered that CMHA had received authorizations from the city council for 4,000 units that had never been built because of what Kriegsfeld believed had been the council's quid pro quo: CMHA's tacit agreement not to erect public housing in a ward without the councilor's permission. Determined to remove the logjam, Kriegsfeld was assisted by the Johnson administration's Housing Act of 1968, which called for the federal government to build an unprecedented six million public housing units within 10 years. When a panicked official from the regional HUD office called Kriegsfeld to offer funding for as many units as he could handle, Kriegsfeld had said: "I'll take 4,000."

The $88 million commitment from HUD had given the Stokes administration a big stick with which to persuade the council to honor its prior commitments. Kriegsfeld then proceeded to buy entire apartment buildings to be used primarily as high-rises for the elderly, as well as beginning construction on such new multifamily housing projects as the King-Kennedy estates built on urban renewal wasteland in Cleveland's Central neighborhood. By shrewdly picking sites or occupants that were the least likely to upset councilors' sensibilities, Kriegsfeld had been able to meet his Cleveland: NOW! quotas.

It was when he began talking about locating public housing in middle-class wards that he ran into heated opposition. The flames of controversy that Kriegsfeld ignited would singe Dolph Norton.

Acting in compliance with a 1968 rewrite of HUD regulations that forbade new large-scale construction in areas of "racial concentration" and, instead, mandated that all future projects consist of small numbers of units dispersed on scattered sites throughout the community, Kriegsfeld proposed that low-income town houses be built in, among other neighborhoods, a middle-class black district on Cleveland's East Side called Lee-Seville and two white West Side wards, including that of city
council president James V. Stanton. (Although he was a Democrat, Stanton was no ally of Stokes, who had blocked the council president's own path to the mayor's office.) Even in Lee-Seville, "'homeowner's' and 'taxpayer's' associations sprang up with the announcement of new units planned under the scattered-site concept," a PATH Association newsletter reported. "Confrontations occurred at CMHA board meetings, at city council meetings, at the building sites themselves." Once Kriegsfeld let the construction contract for the last remaining units Cleveland's city council had authorized (or would authorize, Kriegsfeld believed, for the foreseeable future), he asked the CMHA board for a vote of confidence on his continuing the fight for scattered-site housing, but in the suburbs. It did not surprise the CHMA director when the vote came back three to two to fire him. He cleaned out his office and left the same day, January 4, 1971.

The PATH Association carried on the battle. To combat the fact that "public housing has become the most incendiary, communitywide racial and political issue in Greater Cleveland," PATH in March 1971 filed a federal lawsuit against the Cleveland suburbs of Euclid, Garfield Heights, Parma Solon and Westlake for allegedly refusing to enter into public housing agreements with CMHA. A second PATH lawsuit filed in federal court in early 1972 challenged the constitutionality of a HUD provision requiring cooperative agreements between public housing authorities and municipalities before public housing could be built in those municipalities. Pursuing the lawsuits would exhaust PATH's remaining resources, and in July 1974, when a federal appellate court reversed a previous district court ruling that the five suburbs had violated the civil rights of blacks, PATH closed its doors.

The issue of scattered-site housing also led to an ugly showdown between the mayor and Stanton, who had broken publicly with Stokes over his decision to remove white policemen from Glenville in the wake of the shoot-out. The showdown centered on the passage of zoning legislation needed by the proposed Lee-Seville project, for each man saw Lee-Seville as a test of his political clout. Not surprisingly, Stokes was finally unable to persuade eight white councilors to join their nine black colleagues in voting for the legislation's passage. But Stanton had been sufficiently scared by Stokes's challenge to his authority in council that he had lashed out in a way no one could have predicted. His target was the Associated Foundation's renewal of its grant to support the work of
Bill Silverman, a $72,000 award that had been announced by Stokes on May 19, 1969, at the same time that the mayor had been intensely lobbying the white council members.

On May 23, Stanton held a press conference to announce that he had sent telegrams to the Internal Revenue Service and to U.S. congressman Wright Patman requesting a federal investigation into the tax-exempt status of the Greater Cleveland Associated Foundation. He had asked the IRS and Patman, an outspoken critic of foundations as tax dodges for the rich, to look into why taxpayers' dollars were paying the salary of a known political operative. "It is a well-known fact that Mr. Silverman is and has been functioning as a speechwriter, publicity man and political adviser for Mayor Carl B. Stokes," Stanton said. On May 26 the Plain Dealer reported that Patman had said he would ask the House Ways and Means Committee to launch a probe.4

Little could have concerned the Distribution Committee more than the thought of the Foundations' losing their tax-exempt status. Since February the House Ways and Means Committee had been conducting hearings on tax reform, the focus of which had been to close loopholes for the wealthy. That the kickoff witness had been none other than Wright Patman signaled to some observers that the continued operation of American foundations could be at stake. A populist Texan, Patman had made a national reputation railing about self-dealing transactions between private foundations and their donor families or associated companies, as well as criticizing insufficient charitable disbursements by private foundations that he claimed had been created solely to avoid paying taxes. At the 1969 hearings Patman had also introduced the topic of improper philanthropic involvement in political activities, citing the example of the Ford Foundation's grant to CORE to support a voter registration drive in Cleveland. "Have the giant foundations made or do they plan to make grants that will aid certain candidates to run for national, state and local office?" he had questioned. "Does the Ford Foundation have a grandiose design to bring vast political, economic and social changes to the nation in the 1970s?"

Given their heightened awareness of the vulnerability of foundations to federal control, it is perhaps understandable why the Associated Foundation board considered withdrawing the Silverman grant—a development Norton shared with Mayor Stokes after the brouhaha began. Norton also contacted Silverman to ask him to turn over his files for the
foundation staff to inspect. In them was a 20-page report that Silverman had prepared on his first-year’s performance. “Cleveland is the first major city to use . . . a public relations firm to help keep the public informed,” the report noted, “and Cleveland has never been better informed.” In addition to his role in formulating Cleveland: NOW!, Silverman had by his own count assisted the mayor in preparing for 50 press conferences, organized eight town hall meetings in various neighborhoods at which the mayor had spoken, helped to convince city council of the need for a .5 percent increase in the city income tax and served as part of Stokes’s crisis-management team in the aftermaths of King’s assassination and the Glenville shoot-out. He had accompanied the mayor not only to the U.S. Conference of Mayors, but also, somewhat more questionably, to the 1968 Democratic National Convention. In the crush of all this activity, the report concluded, “very little was done toward the accomplishment of one goal. This was to develop a program to inform Cleveland’s 12,000 municipal employees about the administration’s programs and involve them as a knowledgeable, positive communications force within the community.”

Although he believed the mayor would be much less effective without his assistance, Silverman decided to spare the Associated Foundation the embarrassment of asking for its money back. At a press conference on May 27 he announced that he was returning the grant and leaving the city’s employ. He had made the decision of his own volition, but would later come to regret it as having been tantamount to admitting that he had something to hide. At the time of his departure Silverman said he was leaving largely to protect Dolph Norton and the Associated Foundation. “So long as I continue to work on behalf of the city, the attacks will continue—politically motivated attacks—against the Stokes administration and more specifically against the Greater Cleveland Associated Foundation,” Silverman explained at the press conference. “I cannot allow this to happen because it is tearing down one of the most constructive forces that is working on behalf of the city.”

While accepting Silverman’s resignation with relief, Norton remained convinced about the wisdom of the grant. In private he confessed that his only mistake had been in not awarding it for two years in the first place. In public he was even more assertive, telling reporters: “Foundations must continue to make such grants. If we do not do so, we will fall back into an old-fashioned kind of philanthropy in which we aren’t
able to explore the causes of urban problems. We cannot succumb to the charges now being leveled against us by the local politicians and members of Congress."

Indeed, Norton had been among the first to act to counter the damaging testimony presented by Patman and other unfriendly early witnesses at the tax reform hearings. The director of The Cleveland Foundation had appeared before the Ways and Means Committee as early as February 19, 1969, to make clear the distinction between community foundations and certain private philanthropies. "In our operations we have not been worried with some of the abuses reported . . . ," Norton had stated. "The public character of our board of trustees and our operation probably has been the reason for this. As a foundation we deeply regret the abuses that do occur. . . . Indeed, we are indignant with those who abuse the privileges of foundations not only because of the moral lapses, but also because of the very practical concern that foundation philanthropy may be injured with restrictions intended merely to correct abuses."

With his early appearance before the Ways and Means Committee, Norton was rushing to fill a leadership vacuum created by the belief of many of his colleagues across the nation that the hearings would end up another failed federal attempt to regulate philanthropy—as had similar dog-and-pony shows put on by Congress in the past. Norton and his board, by contrast, had taken the latest threat to foundations' tax-exempt status so seriously that they had decided to lead the national fight against it. Norton had persuaded 10 other community foundations to join The Cleveland Foundation in employing counsel to represent the special needs of all community foundations before Congress. And Kent Smith, who had accepted the chairmanship of the board of the national Council on Foundations after his duties with the Foundations officially ended in 1969, had personally commissioned and underwritten the $14,000 study, "The Effects of Organized Philanthropy upon Educational Projects, Programs, Institutions and Systems in One Industrial-Commercial Metropolitan Area." Researched and written by Edward Howard and Company, it would be presented to Congress in July to rectify a lack of testimony from the not-for-profit sector about its growing reliance on foundation funding.

In spite of the thoughtful opposition that Norton, Smith and others had mobilized, Congress passed a tax reform act with teeth in December
1969. It required a privately held foundation to pay out annually the
greater of two alternatives: either all of the previous year's net income
on investments or 6 percent of the fair market value of its endowment.
It placed restrictions on the kinds of business investments a private foun-
dation could make and tightened the regulation of transactions among
donors, their families, foundation personnel and other related persons.
It forbade private foundations from engaging in activities that might
influence elections or legislation. And it assessed an annual tax of 4 per-
cent on the net investment incomes of private foundations in order to
raise monies for increased Internal Revenue Service surveillance of them.
The operation of community foundations such as Cleveland's, on the
other hand, was left pretty much as before, with the notable exception
of a provision requiring them to attract new financial support from the
public on a continuing basis.

In spite of their happy outcome for the Associated and Cleveland
Foundations, the hearings left a lasting scar on some Clevelanders who
had been caught in the line of fire. Bill Silverman would go on to build
a successful public relations company working for political and urban-
affairs clients, among the first of which was the Associated Foundation's
final program advisory group, called the Administration of Justice Com-
mittee. However, his firm would never make any significant inroads in
the lucrative field of corporate communications, Silverman believed, be-
cause of his connection with Cleveland: NOW!, the program that had
backfired so disastrously on its business supporters, and his association,
however slight, with the 1969 Congressional crackdown on tax advan-
tages for the well-to-do. Foundations staffers would later suspect that
Dolph Norton's stock had fallen in the eyes of the powers-that-be for the
same reasons.

The second-year Silverman grant had been part of a larger award of
$185,000 to the city of Cleveland from the Cleveland and Associated
Foundations to support continued improvements in municipal govern-
ance (a reflection of their abiding concern with the caliber of local gov-
ernment). In addition to communications, the monies were to be spent
on management training and new initiatives in the field of criminal jus-
tice. At long last the Foundations had found a way to work on the prob-
lem of the Cleveland police.

The opening had been provided by the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, spawned in 1967 by years of civil rights and antiwar demonstrations and domestic riots. The commission had reported that without federal help American cities would be hard-pressed to effect major reform of their criminal justice systems, prompting Congress to pass the Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Once again recognizing that new federal resources would soon be showered on those communities that had a jump on preparing plans to use them, Dolph Norton had recommended that the Distribution Committee create yet another program advisory committee to determine what should and could be done in the field.

Consisting of only eight citizens—three attorneys, four businesspeople and one educator—the Administration of Justice Advisory Committee (AJAC) had been formed in October 1968 under the full-time management of Bruce Newman, now the Foundations' assistant director. Its charge was threefold: to promote community support for coordination of and improvements in the system of criminal justice in Greater Cleveland, to undertake research and demonstration projects, and to provide consultation, upon request, to agencies working in the field. The Ford Foundation had provided an initial operating grant of $45,000, followed by a two-year commitment of more than $155,000 to pay for expanding the staff to four professionals and certain programs. And the Cleveland and Associated Foundations were to add another $150,000 in operational support over the course of the next three years.

Rather than issue a preliminary written report, Newman and AJAC chairman Thomas H. Roulston had decided that the best tactic for working with such an entrenched system was to be nonconfrontational. (Most of the deficiencies identified in the 1921 Frankfurter-Pound survey had still to be rectified more than 40 years later.) Newman and Roulston had begun by talking informally to representatives of the police department, the courts and the correctional institutions about their needs, no matter how small. The president of a Cleveland investment firm, Roulston had soon developed a rapport with Cleveland's new chief of police, Patrick L. Gerity. As luck would have it, both men were ex-military police, and they had enjoyed exchanging war stories at periodic lunches at the Hollenden House hotel downtown.

Deputy inspector Gerity had been promoted to chief of police shortly after the Glenville shoot-out. The mayor had given Gerity complete authority over the department in an attempt to counter police dissatisfac-
tion with Stokes's handling of the Glenville riots. The new chief was reported to have been eager to improve operations and to find the best possible recruits. According to Estelle Zannes in *Checkmate in Cleveland*, her history of the Stokes administration, Gerity "acknowledged that in previous years a policeman's shooting ability influenced his chances for promotion. 'We had some great shots,' he recalled, 'but not that great in the brain department.'" Gerity shared his interest in upgrading the caliber of his men with Roulston and Newman.

No project could have been more welcomed by Dolph Norton, who had become intensely aware of the failings of the police department when the Associated Foundation in 1966 had paid for an outside consultant to evaluate the police as part of the Little Hoover Commission's investigation of city government. George Eastman's subsequent report—the only one of 21 undertaken by the commission that had been deemed too complex to be handled by a volunteer local analyst—had criticized the Cleveland police on 65 counts. With the exception of a pointed emphasis on the need to improve the department's "meager" involvement in community relations, many of the report's recommendations had echoed those suggested 44 years earlier by Raymond Fosdick. Dealing with everything from recruitment and training practices to facilities and equipment, they had constituted a call for a complete reorganization of the department from the top down. The preferred plan was that these reforms should be brought about, when the old chief retired, by a new management team "to be recruited nationally for the purpose of revitalizing the department, making it into an efficient and effective agency, and training and indoctrinating personnel within it to again assume the reins when they have demonstrated their [competency]." The minutes of the meeting at which the report had been considered by the Hoover Commission board had noted that "the Police Report was unique as compared to other Commission reports in that it did not have [the] general agreement [of] the concerned city . . . personnel." In other words, the police had flatly rejected it.

Eager to capitalize on the new mood within the police department, the Foundations had inundated Gerity with monetary and technical assistance funneled through the Administration of Justice Advisory Committee. AJAC had brought in consultants to help the chief revamp recruitment and hiring procedures and design model new-recruit and in-service training programs. It had hired and paid for a coordinator of
police training and professional development. Newman had located and
rented a new facility for the police academy—what little ongoing train-
ing the department previously offered had been conducted in a single
room on the second floor of a district stationhouse—and had advised on
the selection of an entirely new academy staff. He had arranged to enroll
the department’s commanding officers in three two-week management
training seminars. AJAC had even picked up the tab for an administra-
tive assistant to the chief—the first ever in the department’s history—
and had launched an in-house newsletter to lift morale.

Only later would Newman understand the comment made by a po-
lician at the opening of the new training facility. “It’s not going to
work. It’s too nice. They’re not going to do this for us,” the officer had
said to Newman, implying that once the Foundations’ money dried up,
so would the splendid new police academy. The beat cops, Newman
would later realize, had seen well-intentioned police chiefs come and go,
but nothing ever really changed. Thus their attitude was: Let’s just try
to get through the day.

Lack of trust, energy and vision were not problems of the police alone.
A dank cloud of inertia hung over the entire system, the Administration
of Justice Advisory Committee had soon learned as it continued its round
of informal talks. A mechanism was needed to shake everybody up and,
as usual, Norton had something in mind.

“One day he showed me a New York Times article about something in
New York called the Vera Institute of Justice,” Newman was to recall.
“It wasn’t long before I was on a plane to New York, charged with finding
out more. . . .” Newman learned that Vera and also the Mayor’s Crim-
nal Justice Coordinating Council, two private-public partnerships sup-
ported by the Ford Foundation, were instigating and implementing
innovations throughout New York City’s criminal justice system. After
Newman reported back, Norton wondered whether Mayor Stokes would
be interested in leading a move to set up a similar coordinating body in
Cleveland. “This was Dolph’s way,” Newman would later explain. “He
was a master at seeing opportunity, convincing others, and using the
Foundation’s resources to bring the opportunity to fruition.”

Stokes’s response was positive. “It gave him a flag to wave,” Newman
would say. The beleaguered mayor, still smarting a year after Glenville
from the charge of being soft on rioters and looters, had immediately
recognized the public relations value of creating a high-profile crime
council. There was also the matter of greater Cleveland’s needing a coordinated plan to go after new federal crime monies—a carrot that had been used by the Administration of Justice Advisory Committee to bring the rest of the necessary players into line.

On July 23, 1969, Stokes, in conjunction with the presiding county commissioner and the chair of the Growth Association, announced the formation of the Greater Cleveland Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC). To be staffed initially by Newman and his AJAC team, the council consisted of business leaders and professionals representing all agencies involved in the administration of justice, who immediately set to work preparing a comprehensive 1970 Criminal Justice Plan for Cuyahoga County. The following March the plan was awarded $1.25 million from the new federal Law Enforcement Administration Agency (LEAA), which had been created by the Omnibus Crime Control act. These monies represented the first of nearly $50 million that the council would attract during the next decade as LEAA evolved into the federal government’s largest give-back program, thanks to the law-and-order stance of the Nixon administration. City hall under Stokes’s Republican successor, Ralph J. Perk, who won office in 1971 on a promise not to raise taxes, “lived off” these (and other) grants, as AJAC associate director Alan D. Wright would later observe.

A former prosecuting attorney in adjoining Lake County, Wright had an idiosyncratic view of the criminal justice system; he likened it to a garbage can. He saw AJAC’s job in similar terms: “You try to keep the lid on and sanitize enough to keep the stink from penetrating outside.” Aware, for example, that the system of manual record-keeping employed by the common pleas court contributed to the number of judges who felt free to play golf while their unresolved cases piled up unnoticed, Wright collaborated with the Bar Association of Greater Cleveland on a program to computerize the docket and otherwise improve efficiency. Underwritten by federal and Foundations funds, the Court Management Project proved a considerable boon to citizens desirous of a speedy trial. Now John V. Corrigan, the court’s chief justice, could ascertain a colleague’s timeliness in adjudicating his cases at the drop of a printout. With individual performance reviews now possible, Corrigan saw the common pleas caseload decrease by approximately 25 percent in the three years following the project’s announcement.

At the direction of the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, AJAC
staff members implemented a variety of other programs in the early seventies that went beyond mere sanitizing. To demonstrate the role a citizen could play in combating crime, CJCC's public education and information subcommittee launched with AJAC's assistance a community-wide assault on auto theft, a crime that had increased 100 percent in Cuyahoga County in only two years. The campaign, which was co-sponsored by the Associated Foundation and the insurance industry on a one-to-three matching basis, was called "Lock It or Lose It." By means of in-school seminars that eventually reached 200,000 students, as well as newspaper ads and billboards (even the Union Commerce Bank clock—a prominent downtown landmark—sprouted a cautionary sign), it mobilized awareness of the costs of carelessness. At the end of the campaign's first three years, the incidence of auto theft in the county had been reduced by 20 percent.

The Free Clinic of Greater Cleveland, a no-cost health center that would become a national model of indigent medical care, resulted from the advisory committee's research into the nature and extent of the local drug problem. Conducted at the behest of the criminal justice council's drug use and abuse subcommittee, the investigation took Bruce Newman on a fact-finding mission from San Francisco's hippie haven of Haight-Ashbury to Cleveland Heights. Along the way Newman made the surprising discovery that youthful drug users, out of a fear of being arrested, were avoiding seeking treatment not only for their habits, but for other ailments as well. He also learned that Clevelanders were unprepared to cope with the rising tide of drug use among suburban youth.

Lacking places in town to turn for assistance, a white public health nurse named Jeanne H. Sonville and her black friend, registered nurse Elizabeth L. Reid, had begun sheltering freaked-out kids in Sonville's home and ministering to their medical needs. It was out of this relationship of trust that AJAC, in consultation with these two nonjudgmental care givers, constructed the Free Clinic. Staffed by volunteer medical personnel, the clinic opened in University Circle in June 1970 with the support of grants from The Cleveland Foundation and two other local philanthropies. The need for indigent health care on the East Side was so great that the Free Clinic soon began treating anyone who walked in—drug abuser or not. In its first six months it attracted more than 3,500 patients—and the attention of the Cleveland police, who took to parking in front of the clinic to scare off drug users until Newman
phoned his good friend Chief Gerity. The police cars disappeared, and 20 years later the Free Clinic would still be dispensing care to all who crossed its threshold, no questions asked.

Perhaps AJAC’s most important contribution arose from its behind-the-scenes work for CJCC’s criminal justice facilities subcommittee. Led by Jones, Day senior partner H. Chapman (Chappie) Rose, then president of the local bar association, the members of the subcommittee took on a task that had eluded all attempts at completion for better than 50 years. They would build a new justice center.

Provision for an adequate home for the county courts and jail had first been approved by Cleveland’s voters in 1917. The basement had already been excavated when the county commissioners had determined that the $1.25 million authorized was insufficient to complete the construction job and had thrown in the towel. With a push from the Frankfurter-Pound crime survey, centralized facilities had finally been built on East 21st Street in the twenties. By the seventies the county jail, which had been constructed to hold 300 inmates, warehoused double that number, mixing prisoners accused of vicious crimes with those serving for lesser offenses. Inhumane conditions at the county jail and a similar overcrowding of the courts notwithstanding, as recently as 1968 voters had defeated a proposed bond issue to build a new justice center—the sixteenth such proposal placed on the ballot since the end of World War II.

Formed nine months after the latest defeat, CJCC’s criminal justice facilities subcommittee had rushed to regroup the center’s proponents, persuading Stokes and the board of county commissioners to contribute $25,000 apiece to prepare an assessment of the system’s space needs through the year 2000 and the necessary downtown traffic study. In the interim, AJAC staff began laying the groundwork for a mass meeting of municipal and common pleas court judges, Cleveland and suburban police, the sheriff, the prosecutor’s and public defender’s offices, and even parole and probation functionaries to discuss the space consultants’ recommendations. More than 45 elected officials and countless civil servants had to be prodded into tentative agreement on the site and components of the new complex before a proposal on funding could again be taken to the voters.

Once again, AJAC’s strategy for winning over the politicians had been to befriend them. Special attention was paid to the county’s chief law enforcement officer, Sheriff Ralph E. Kreiger. The first Republican to
win county office in 42 years, Kreiger was in particular need of allies if he was ever going to improve working conditions for himself and his men. The votes had barely been counted in the 1968 election when The Cleveland Foundation awarded the new sheriff a $5,300 grant to visit Miami, Los Angeles, Chicago and Minneapolis to evaluate the country’s outstanding sheriff’s departments. “It is important that persons in the position to make vital public decisions have a clear understanding of the nature of the problem and the alternative approaches to solutions which are available,” the grant evaluation observed. “It is anticipated that this small expenditure will have a major long-term payoff.”

The trip bore fruit more quickly than anticipated. Kreiger returned so unhappy about his cramped and dingy administrative quarters that he pleaded with Alan Wright to find him a new office. Wright called CJCC cochairman Hugh A. Corrigan, the presiding county commissioner, who agreed that the sheriff could move into an unused suite in the board of election building—provided that Wright paid the rent. He and Newman decided to approach a well-known contributor to Republican causes and came away with a personal check for the needed amount from Kent Smith. The favor cemented AJAC’s relationship with Kreiger.

Conducted on a systemwide basis, this kind of hand-holding (as Newman would later call it) paid off. At a retreat held the first weekend in May, 1970 that representatives of all the requisite criminal justice agencies attended—a major accomplishment in itself—a consensus was reached that a state-of-the-art “corrections center” and courts tower should be built in the heart of downtown Cleveland, rather than on less-congested East 21st Street, as the suburban police would have preferred. A bond proposal was prepared for the general elections in November; factored into the cost estimate were both preliminary architectural drawings (underwritten by an Omnibus Crime grant) and the proponents’ perceptions of the figure the voters would tolerate. A construction cost of $61 million (which no one believed was truly adequate, according to Newman) had been settled upon. Voters were told the $61 million would buy a 2,000-bed jail. They were not told that the figure did not include land acquisition or building demolition costs.

With Chappie Rose rallying the support of the business community, AJAC orchestrated what Wright would later agree was a scare-tactics media campaign, the centerpiece of which was a 60-second TV spot showing a man emerging from the Terminal Tower only to be whacked
on the skull by a mugger, while the voice-over urged the bond's passage with the grim admonition: "Use your head before someone else does!" The hard-hitting ad—screened in advance by Stokes and other black leaders for potentially offensive racial overtones—may have accomplished what years of pleading for humane reform could not: The bond issue was passed.

Shortly after the first of the year, the Associated Foundation announced a $50,000 grant to establish the Cuyahoga County Corrections Program, to be operated under the auspices of the Administration of Justice Advisory Committee. Concerned that passage of the bond issue did not automatically guarantee that a satisfactory jail would be built, GCAF had decided it wise to assemble a panel of five national corrections experts to advise the county on state-of-the-art developments in jail management, design and programming. The press release announcing the program made clear the Foundations' high expectations for the new correctional facility, and also underscored a shift in priorities. "No problem is more central to our nation's urban crisis than crime and the apparent inability of our cities' criminal justice systems to control it," stated Chappie Rose, whom the county commissioners had appointed chair of a citizens' committee to advise them on the justice center. "This project could make Cleveland the first American city to resolve its basic prisoner rehabilitation crisis."

The experts who were hired (among them, a former director of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons and a former associate administrator of the Law Enforcement Administration Agency) would operate on a basic premise. "It would be a serious mistake to design the new facility around an ancient, time-discredited system," Serapio R. Zalba, who chaired the department of social services at Cleveland State University, had stated. By the end of the panel's first year of consultation, the experts' concept of what constituted a jail of the future could be partially discerned in changes made at the old facility, where the sheriff had willingly relinquished his old office suite and freed up some space to test out a few new programs. A legal census of the inmates had permitted the rehousing of prisoners according to the seriousness of their offenses and the speedier processing of those charged with minor crimes. Volunteer physicians had been brought in to assess and attend to the inmates' medical needs. The guards had been trained in new human relations skills. The chapel had been converted into a multipurpose recreation room, and
arts and crafts activities had been initiated in the women’s dorm. To allow sufficient space in the new jail for these and other improvements in rehabilitation programming, the panel had already determined that its inmate population must be limited to 1,200 persons, instead of the 2,000-bed capacity promised the voters. It was the first worrisome note in a planning process that would soon go seriously awry.

The design of the complex had been based on the assumption that the Cleveland municipal courts would be housed there, as promised by Stokes. But on April 17, 1971, at a private dinner party in his home to which 50 guests (John Sherwin, among them) had been invited, Carl Stokes had announced that he would not seek a third term. That November, he had been succeeded by Republican Perk, who immediately made clear that the city’s participation in the justice center would be contingent on a favorable negotiation of its share of the construction expenses, which had by now increased to $76 million as the cost of land acquisition became clear. Faced with a multimillion-dollar budget deficit inherited from Stokes, Perk proved a tough bargainer, as Wright and Rose discovered the day they met with the new mayor to propose the city’s acceptance of its fair share of the costs of maintaining the center’s common areas. In the middle of their presentation, Perk rose from his seat and began pacing around the room, all the while humming a tune that sounded to Wright as if it were “Whistle While You Work.” Rose and Wright took the hint and left. “Guess that’s one we didn’t win,” Rose deadpanned on the way out.

The on-again/off-again nature of the city’s participation further complicated a design process that saw Cleveland’s Fine Arts Advisory Committee reject the first architectural renderings on aesthetic grounds, necessitating the hiring of a second architect to beautify the proposed building. The second firm added an atrium lobby and replaced the proposed steel-and-glass facade with pink granite—changes that increased construction costs another $15 million. The city’s participation was finally won in April 1972, when the county commissioners promised to finance and build an $11 million parking garage behind the city hall and to allow the mayor a voice in the choosing of a general contractor for the project. Fast-track construction began a few days later, with the issue of whether the city would add a $25 million central police station to the complex still unresolved. (It was eventually built.) A month later the county commissioners, with the approval of the mayor, the city coun-
cil president and the council's majority leader, hired a New York contractor instead of the local firm favored by the justice center's citizens' advisory committee. According to Wright, the out-of-town firm, though beset at the time by $12 million in lawsuits, somehow provided "the glue that brought them all together."

Whether the Foundations' Cuyahoga County Corrections Program could have prevented the justice center (which came in $100 million over cost) from becoming a political football would, in retrospect, be debatable—especially since in the midst of the design process the program's leadership twice changed hands.

Two weeks before the Corrections Program was announced in mid-January 1971, Bruce Newman resigned. With Dolph Norton's blessings, Newman went to work for newly elected Democratic governor John J. Gilligan as director of the Ohio Department of Urban Affairs. Shortly thereafter the Foundations announced Alan Wright's promotion to director of the Administration of Justice Advisory Committee, the overseer of the Corrections Program. At the same time staff completed arrangements to transfer responsibility for overseeing AJAC to the Governmental Research Institute, providing a $167,000 grant to see the operation through to the end of 1973. Within 18 months of the organizational restructuring Wright, too, would move on. Although new leadership for AJAC was found, Wright's departure effectively left the quality control of the justice center in the politicians' hands.

The Foundations' staff had been looking for a new sponsor for AJAC (which was to be disbanded in 1975) for some time. Unlike the Foundations' other program advisory committees, which had been spun off as independent entities in their first 12 months, AJAC had continued to require Newman's full-time attention into its third year. "We are well aware that the Associated Foundation cannot go on forever operating the AJAC," staff reported to the Distribution Committee. "We must be free to work on the full range of urban problems."

The transfer was a bittersweet accomplishment for Norton. It momentarily reminded him of what had been lost—as well as won—in the alliance between the fast-moving Associated Foundation and the dignified Cleveland Foundation. After gaining responsibility for the older foundation's enviable resources, Norton had recognized the need to invent a formal bureaucracy to ensure their management on nothing less than, as he put it, a "Caesar's wife" basis. By 1971 he was supervising
a staff of nine. Most of the personnel gains had been on the administrative side, with the addition of an assistant director for administration (who, among other duties, compiled a reference manual on procedures and policies that went into a second printing to accommodate requests for copies from other foundations), a finance manager and an office manager. Barbara Rawson had now been designated assistant director for program affairs. (In the eyes of Gwill York, who had replaced Pamela Humphrey Firman in 1971 as the lone woman on the Distribution Committee, Rawson graciously played the role of “earth mother” to the Foundations’ four staff associates, four staff consultants and student intern—to say nothing of their 300-odd grantees.) For Norton personally, the management of all this growth had a downside: it had resulted in his inability to roll up his sleeves and dig into the latest municipal problem.

There were signs that the Distribution Committee did not share Norton’s dissatisfaction with the lessening of the Foundations’ hands-on role in governmental affairs. That the Tax Reform Act of 1969 had had a chilling effect on their tolerance for risk-taking experiments in such a highly visible arena could be judged from an action Norton took in early 1971. Feeling a need to reaffirm the Associated Foundation’s proactive orientation, Norton suggested to John Sherwin that the Distribution Committee empanel a Visiting Committee of national and local philanthropoids to review the Foundations’ post-alliance performance. “Could you recruit one of the Rockefellers to be chairman? Several of them seem to be very thoughtful about philanthropy,” Norton hinted, looking for a leader whose likely stamp of approval of the Associated Foundation’s past work would be impressive. “Such a Visiting Committee might either help change directions of the foundation,” Norton concluded, “or, perhaps, give the Distribution Committee some confidence in its work.”

That the Distribution Committee’s uneasiness arose from the new atmosphere of tighter federal regulation could be surmised from the two men’s subsequent exchange. “I think we should be pretty specific in what we wish to ask the committee to cover and [question] really whether we should do this before we get through with the legal reviews that are being made currently,” Sherwin replied, resisting Norton’s attempt to bring a higher authority to bear on a determination of the Foundations’ mission. To which Norton countered: “I feel rather strongly that the Visiting Committee should review grant programs and should not be asked to concern itself with any questions connected with the
legal strictures within which the foundations operate." Rather, Norton suggested, the panelists should examine such questions as "Have the foundations worked well with ongoing institutions such as schools, voluntary agencies, and established governments?" and "What are the most significant opportunities the foundations have missed?"

Norton never received a go-ahead from Sherwin, and in the press of other business the idea was dropped. Had there been an outside review, however, it might have come to the same conclusions as the Ford Foundation's final evaluation of the Associated Foundation. The evaluator had compared the results of Ford's "experiments in shared philanthropy" in Cleveland and Kansas City:

Kansas City is the kind of place where if you are as skillful and resourceful as Homer Wadsworth, the pieces can be assembled to create impressive new community institutions and facilities. Cleveland is the kind of place where one has to scratch away merely to uncover a small glint of civic hope beneath the grime and decay. . . . Confrontations among groups always seem about to flare up.

[Undaunted] the new foundation plunged almost immediately into Cleveland's toughest issues. . . . Many of its forays repeated earlier efforts; some simply failed; some were counter-productive; some continued to feed and perpetuate the same ineffectual institutions that had been unable to deal with problems prior to [the creation of] GCAF. Nevertheless, and to its credit, most of GCAF's grants were at the cutting edge of contact with major social problems plaguing Cleveland and all cities. At the very least, GCAF has been in the forefront of concern and action, and it is possible that Cleveland would be even more enmeshed in social disarray were it not for GCAF.

Noting that only 16 percent of the grants made by The Cleveland Foundation since GCAF's creation had been awarded to action-research projects, Ford had predicted an erosion of the Associated Foundation's slight but salutary influence on the older organization. "Now that GCAF has run out of funds," the report concluded, ". . . the old Cleveland Foundation seems bound to lapse back into more routine giving. Continued presence of Dolph Norton at the helm should slow this process somewhat, but it seems inexorable."

Although the Distribution Committee's mood seemed to be one of retrenchment, the staff remained open to new possibilities. Yes, certain avenues of endeavor were now blocked. Further improvements in the caliber of city governance, for example, seemed unlikely—an unfortunate
development given the precipitous decline in Cleveland's tax base that had accompanied the previous decade's 16 percent drop in population. But the election of a white ethnic Republican as Cleveland's mayor in 1971 had signaled an end to the Foundations' close working relationship with city hall, at least until new lines of communication could be built. The Foundations' ability to make additional headway with the problems of the central-city poor also seemed limited, what with the Council for Economic Opportunity running out of federal funding, PATH wrapped up in its public housing lawsuits and even BICCA losing steam, now that Jack Reavis had resigned after seven years at its helm. As for the Cleveland schools, Norton had long ago decided that superintendent Briggs had calcified after his first five years in office and become an obstacle to meaningful change.

But, as Cleveland entered the seventies, the staff saw opportunities to focus on other objectives. The Foundations backed a number of innovative start-ups in fields where their involvement had previously been marked by more routine grantmaking, helping to create the Cleveland Area Arts Council (an effort to expand the average citizen's access to cultural experiences) in 1971, and the Women's Law Fund, a team of female attorneys dedicated to fighting for their gender's equal rights—in the courts if necessary—in 1972.

The start-up grant to the latter organization had been voted down by all the Distribution Committee members save Gwill York and Bob Gries the first time it was presented, although York had argued to no avail in its favor after one of the men had pointedly objected to it. York, a new-breed Junior Leaguer and emerging feminist for whose appointment to the Distribution Committee Norton had lobbied Mayor Stokes, had been prepared for this disappointment by Norton. Always the Southern gentleman, he had taken her out to lunch to break the news that some of her colleagues did not share her feminist philosophy. After the defeat York had asked Gries, whose sister had been one of the first Jews admitted to the Cleveland Junior League during York's presidency, to help her marshall a better case for making the grant. The second time it was presented, York and Gries had shrewdly couched their arguments for supporting the Women's Law Fund in terms of how it could assist their colleagues' daughters obtain credit or a well-deserved promotion. This line of reasoning had proved so persuasive that the grant's most vocif-
erous opponent (an industrialist whose company was then embroiled in a sex-discrimination lawsuit) ended up making the motion to approve it.

Not surprisingly, Norton encountered similar resistance when he stretched The Cleveland Foundation’s long-standing commitment to higher education to new heights by presenting an unprecedented proposal to help bail out Case Western Reserve University, then awash in red ink occasioned in part by the long-sought but unwieldy federation of Case Institute and Western Reserve in 1967. After being approached by his old friend, CWRU board chairman Ralph Besse, who was looking for a pool of discretionary funds with which to lure a new president to the floundering school, Norton asked the Distribution Committee to award the university a $1 million grant. The then mind-boggling sum would provide the new president with “a special developmental and improvement fund . . . to insure that the University continues to be a major educational institution,” as a Foundation newsletter described the grant’s loose purpose. (Perhaps too loose, it would later be learned).\(^6\)

Furthermore, Norton suggested that the funds be drawn not from income but from principal—a creative financing tool that The Cleveland Foundation’s 1914 charter gave the Distribution Committee (with the concurrence of two-thirds of the trustee banks), but one that had been employed only once before.\(^7\) That the Foundation’s money would, if forthcoming, serve as a magnet for a matching donation by an anonymous benefactor (Kent Smith) may have helped to counter objections to the thought of invading principal. Announced in the fall of 1971, the grant allowed the Foundation to flex new muscles in its ongoing development as a major force in shaping public affairs.

Another step in the Foundation’s evolution was taken when the philanthropy became involved in what in hindsight would be seen more clearly as the economic redevelopment of Cleveland—a new interest prompted by the assumption of control of the Leonard C. Hanna, Jr., Community Development Fund. The $6 million asset had been turned over to The Cleveland Foundation in 1972 by Tom Patton and Elmer Lindseth when they came to the conclusion that the Cleveland Development Foundation, whose operation the fund supported, had outlived its usefulness. Income from the fund was to continue to be directed toward the redevelopment of downtown (a cause which the Cleveland Development Foundation had experienced little success in advancing),
even though, as Norton admitted at the time, it was "extremely difficult to choose among proposals which [came] before the Foundation [because] . . . there is no general agreement on a strategy. . . ."

Fate soon handed the Foundation a plan for helping the community articulate a comprehensive strategy for downtown redevelopment. In the fall of 1972 Norton had participated in an annual gathering of a dozen or so members of the world's intelligentsia aboard the luxurious yacht of a Greek shipping magnate, Nicolas Doxiadis. There Norton met and was impressed by Lawrence A. Halprin, a noted urban planner whose redevelopment projects included Ghirardelli Square on San Francisco's waterfront and Nicollet Mall in downtown Minneapolis. The following February the Foundations invited Halprin to Cleveland for a two-day visit during which time he conducted what was dubbed an "urban diagnosis." Halprin's informal prescriptions for Cleveland's recovery were later turned into a slide presentation that the Foundations screened for the newly created Downtown Council of the Growth Association and other interested civic groups to spark further discussion. Pleased by the reception given Halprin's preliminary ideas, The Cleveland Foundation and the Growth Association commissioned his firm to conceive a master redevelopment plan for downtown Cleveland in 1975.

Halprin's first visit to Cleveland elicited excited attention from the media. The Plain Dealer sent a writer to follow Halprin and Norton around town, reporting that

Halprin said restoring the Playhouse Square area "seems a valid idea."

But when Halprin got to the Cuyahoga River [in the Flats], he was elated. "This is a tremendous resource," he said, taking pictures. "This is neat down here. If I had an office in Cleveland, this is where it would be."

(Halprin's enthusiasm for Cleveland's picturesque industrial valley would infect, among others, Herbert E. Strawbridge, the president of The Higbee Company, one of Cleveland's major department stores. In the mid-seventies Strawbridge persuaded his board of directors to embark on a proposed $40 million office-retail development called Settlers Landing to be located on the banks of the Cuyahoga River in the Flats and designed by Lawrence Halprin. As is so often the case with pioneering projects, Settlers Landing would not itself be a success, but it would inspire a renewed interest in this undervalued section of town that
led to the redevelopment of the Flats as a restaurant and nightclub district.)

The Plain Dealer ran two stories about Halprin's 1973 visit, and both featured Norton's name. One story told of Norton's escorting the California-based planner to meetings with the mayor, various private developers and officials of the Growth Association and to a private dinner with unnamed business leaders. A preview story mentioned that Halprin's visit had been underwritten by the Greater Cleveland Associated Foundation, which it described as a "community group . . . [that] last year . . . distributed $6.5 million." The story unfortunately read as if The Cleveland Foundation and its Distribution Committee did not exist.

Although Halprin's master plan ultimately remained unexecuted, the Californian's positive assessment of the city's potential served to uplift the spirits of Cleveland's business and civic leadership, which had been seriously demoralized by the many confrontations of the Stokes years culminating in the mayor's abrupt decision to abandon Cleveland for a new career as a television journalist in New York City. "Cleveland's whole image was just so rotten," Gwill York would later remember, "but now there was a sense that we could be a great city again."

The gift of hope would turn out to be Dolph Norton's last significant contribution to his adopted hometown. A month after Halprin's visit he announced his intention to accept Governor Gilligan's appointment to serve as chancellor of the Ohio Board of Regents. Norton would later attribute his decision to leave to his growing awareness that he was getting stale. "By 1973 I had been involved with foundations in Cleveland for almost 11 years, and I had begun to hear the same problems coming back," he recalled. "The one thing you have to be careful of when you're dealing with free money is getting to know too much. If you think you've heard it all before, and you don't have the curiosity, energy or motivation to pay real close attention, you ought to be out of the foundation business."

But Norton's young admirers on the Distribution Committee wondered whether the resignation had more to do with Norton's strained relationship with their older colleagues. Gwill York would later speculate that certain Distribution Committee members may have come to resent Norton's visibility as a civic leader, which in many cases outshone their own. Bob Gries, on the other hand, would suggest that Norton might have begun to take for granted the approval of the Distribution
Committee, now under the low-key leadership of Raymond Q. Armington, who had succeeded Sherwin in 1972. "It would be easy to read the merger as a mandate to go ahead and do all the things you want to do," Gries would surmise. "Dolph forgot you have to sit down with each of these board members and explain what you're trying to do."

For whatever combination of reasons, the Foundations had lost a dynamic and dedicated leader. On June 1, 1973, the date Norton's resignation took effect, the Distribution Committee installed Barbara Rawson as interim director (making her the first woman in the country to hold such a position at a community foundation) and began the search for a successor to Dolph Norton.