Strategic Developments

In addition to recognizing the "transformation from financial default and chaos in municipal government" that had taken place in Cleveland, the National Municipal League singled out for praise efforts to rebuild Cleveland's housing stock and renovate the Playhouse Square theaters. Under Wadsworth's direction, The Cleveland Foundation had played catalytic roles in both endeavors, further enhancing its stature as a civic leader and problem solver.

While the Playhouse Square project was already under way when Wadsworth arrived in Cleveland, the Foundation's neighborhood redevelopment program had fallen into disarray. With the collapse of PACE and the Cleveland Housing Corporation, the Foundation's initiatives in the neighborhoods consisted largely of "talk," as Wadsworth remembered it. As always, when attempting to come to grips with any given program area, Wadsworth decided to find for the Foundation an expert in the field—a precaution that became, for him, a matter of self-defense in the case of neighborhood affairs. "Those neighborhood things can be fly-by-night operations," Wadsworth believed. "You are asking people to undertake responsibilities in areas in which they have no prior experience. One has to be cautious."

When Patrick J. Henry, then director of the community development department of the city of Cleveland, was appointed civic affairs program officer in 1976, Wadsworth believed he had found someone who could show the Foundation the ropes. Having set up the city's end of the new federal community block grant program, which provided technical assistance and project monies to local merchant groups who had banded
into not-for-profit corporations to plan retail site improvements, "Henry was well wired in and knew the people in the neighborhoods who were doing some things," according to colleague Steve Minter. Not surprisingly, Henry encouraged the Foundation to provide operating support to the half-dozen or so community development corporations that the block grant program had spawned—a tidy stratagem given the fact that in order to receive federal technical-assistance funds to hire a full-time director, groups were required to raise a dollar-for-dollar match.

In funding community development corporations (CDCs) the Foundation reforged a precious link with the city's community development department. But the narrow gauge of the Foundation's interests exposed it to criticism behind certain doors. Because the CDCs concentrated primarily on rehabilitating commercial strips with new benches, street lighting, plantings and the like, the Foundation's neighborhood program took on a decided bricks-and-mortar cast—much to the dismay of Harry A. Fagan, the architect of a burgeoning if loose confederation of neighborhood advocacy groups, whose activities The Cleveland Foundation seldom funded.

Executive director of the Commission on Catholic Community Action, the social-action arm of the Cleveland diocese, Fagan found the Foundation's neighborhood program shortsighted and incomplete. "Any strategy that develops physical structures without developing people will fail," he believed. "The Foundation never understood that you've got to help moms and dads take responsibility for their neighborhood." Formed in 1969 to seek creative responses to the problems of racism, discrimination and poverty, the commission had itself "backed into" grass-roots organizing, Fagan admitted, when a woman from Cleveland's Hungarian enclave on Buckeye Road came to him in the early seventies with a neighborhood problem.

As Fagan saw it: "In the old neighborhoods, parishes and neighborhoods are damn near the same thing. As the neighborhood goes, so goes the parish. At the end of the Mass the priest says: 'Go in peace.' But people can't go in peace if there's no water pressure for the fire hydrants, if the stray dogs are so bad their kids can't go to school, if they're afraid the abandoned house next door is going to catch fire."

When the woman, who had heard Fagan give a speech about applying the principles of the Gospel to the solution of social problems, demanded to know what Fagan was going to do about her needs, he responded passionately: "We don't do things for people, but with them."
Not knowing exactly how next to proceed, Fagan decided "we'd start a committee. We'd help 8 or 10 women get something done, like getting city hall to tow a junked car. Then once they got that accomplished, we'd move on to something else. This is how the Buckeye group got going; and then the Slovenians figured, if the Hungarians could find a way to deal with the lack of city services in their neighborhood, they ought to be able to, too." By the end of the decade the Commission on Catholic Community Action had helped to launch 14 neighborhood or special-interest advocacy groups, employing 55 full-time organizers supported by more than $1 million a year in grants from the diocese, the LEAA and the George Gund Foundation. Without actually intending to, the commission had built a network in the neighborhoods that the diocese would employ "to keep the lid from blowing on desegregation. Because of our organizing efforts," Fagan recalled, "people weren't as panicked about the future of their neighborhoods, so they could discuss desegregation reasonably. Because they knew how to problem-solve, they didn't have the feeling of helplessness that caused the rocks to fly in Boston."

If advocacy groups in the city's ethnic neighborhoods assisted the diocese in spreading the word to keep peace in the schools, it was not because they were unfamiliar with confrontation tactics. Indeed, many Cleveland residents had come to believe protest to be their most effective problem-solving tool. The mayoral administration of self-described urban populist Dennis Kucinich had especially drawn public ire because he made a lot of campaign promises that proved impossible to keep, according to Fagan. The first signs of the ethnic residents' dissatisfaction with their champion came in October 1978, when the Citizens to Bring Broadway Back assembled outside the apartment of Kucinich's community development director to demand that she discuss the construction of a new fire station in their neighborhood. She called the police instead. The following May the St. Clair-Superior Coalition demonstrated its unhappiness with refuse collection in its neighborhood by leaving bags of garbage in the office of Kucinich's service director. The same month 500 members of the Senior Citizens' Coalition marched on city hall, demanding that the mayor form a police unit to fight crimes against the elderly. Kucinich escaped through a back door, but a few days later he complied with the senior citizens' demands.

Cleveland's banks also came under attack from the neighborhood
groups for alleged redlining (the practice of automatically turning down loan requests that originated in declining areas of the city). "That was the issue that really radicalized the neighborhood movement," Fagan explained. As the city's largest bank, Cleveland Trust became an obvious target. "We did a lot of demonstrating at Cleveland Trust, singing, praying, depositing thousands of pennies at a single time," Fagan said. While Fagan appreciated that supporting such activities was obviously "risky," The Cleveland Foundation's lack of interest in funding neighborhood advocacy nonetheless disappointed him: "They didn't get into it very fully because they had a different agenda and they were chicken."

Steve Minter, who took over as civic affairs program officer after Pat Henry resigned in late 1978, would describe the Foundation's perspective somewhat differently. "I think there is no question that we leaned more toward what I guess would be physical renewal type of organizations," he explained, adding,

It had been pretty difficult to measure progress in supporting basic community organizing. I think that the Gund Foundation was able to fund more community organizing because that is something conceptually that their trustees were able to feel okay in doing. In point of fact there were only one or two Gund trustees who lived in the Cleveland area. There was some distance from some of the things that went on.

In hindsight, the divergent interests of the Cleveland and Gund foundations may have worked to the advantage of the neighborhoods, whose varying degrees of decline called for homegrown strategies rather than cookie-cutter remedies. No matter what its tactics, a group that boasted committed leadership, a strong understanding of the particular needs of its district and the backing of area residents was likely to win financial support from one foundation or the other. Consequently, a mix of activities bubbled in the neighborhoods from which formulas for further experimentation could and would later be brewed. Harry Fagan would acknowledge that "Cleveland's neighborhood movement in the seventies was incredibly sophisticated and large compared to most other cities. The Cleveland Foundation was a tough organization to deal with, but we wouldn't have had this scale of activity and creativity without them." But others, such as Cleveland's gadfly journalist Roldo Bartimole, ascribed darker motivations to the two foundations' encouragement of the growth of the neighborhood movement. In the June 23, 1979, edition
of his *Point of View* newsletter, Bartimole observed that the record of philanthropic efforts to help improve conditions in the inner city has been a dismal one, pockmarked by self-interest, response to crisis and short-lived commitment.

In many ways foundations—led by the big Cleveland and Gund Foundations—are the firefighters of the Establishment, funding programs when a certain segment of the community becomes restless or a certain issue becomes too hot to ignore.

Kucinich now represents, in the eyes of the Establishment, an equal threat. . . . The only answer is to get rid of him.

. . . Politically, the foundations will attempt to draw the neighborhood groups close to them and their point of view and away from Kucinich in hopes that they can influence the upcoming election. . . .

Foundations have another strong purpose in moving to become the allies of neighborhood groups. They are closely allied with Cleveland banks, which certainly will be under more and more pressure to finance city housing.

If the Distribution Committee had such an agenda for the Foundation's neighborhood program, Steve Minter did not discern it. Rather, he expected that someday committee members would begin questioning exactly what the Foundation was trying to accomplish by supporting so many different neighborhood groups. These were the kinds of questions he anticipated would be raised: "How many of these projects are we going to fund? Is there some kind of strategy that we are trying to pursue?" When, as he had expected, the committee requested a mid-course evaluation of the Foundation's neighborhood work in 1979, Minter seized the occasion as an opportunity to broaden the organization's program and perspective.

In partnership with consultant Susan Lajoie, a Ph.D. from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, whom Wadsworth would shortly thereafter hire as a full-time program analyst, Minter conducted assessments of eight community development corporations the Foundation had funded over the years, as well as a half-dozen other organizations that had recently submitted neighborhood development proposals. "The environment in which these groups operate changes . . . rapidly and unpredictably," Minter and Lajoie concluded. "This necessitates . . . making . . . *ad hoc* changes in program emphases. There are no 'tried and true' formulas at this point, and no two neighborhood groups are identical. In short, the name of the game is entrepreneurship. . . ."
Arguing that the Foundation should be similarly flexible, Minter and Lajoie recommended several broad guidelines for evaluating future proposals, the most important of which were new concepts that funding should not be limited to one particular type of neighborhood organization nor restricted to one year in duration.

Subtle though they may have seemed, these changes in neighborhood policy gradually redirected the Foundation’s resources and energies away from a single focus and toward a comprehensive program of enhancing the technical expertise and financial resources of promising neighborhood groups of all kinds.

At the same time, the George Gund Foundation began to expand its neighborhood interests to include physical redevelopment. In the early eighties Gund program officer Henry C. (Hank) Doll convened an informal group of neighborhood funders and activists to kick around ideas about how to increase the number of older houses being rehabilitated for occupancy by low-income families each year, which then hovered around the 30-unit mark citywide. Minter would trace the philosophical lineage of such watershed projects as Lexington Village and such important capacity-building tools as the Cleveland Neighborhood Partnership Program to these brainstorming sessions, in which he had been a participant. “This is the first time that we looked at the scope of what needed to be done,” he said. “This began to plant the seeds of the idea that we really needed to do something on a much larger scale if we were going to make a dent.”

Specifically, the discussion group kept returning to the question, “How do we manage to establish some links between groups?” Out of these conversations emerged the idea for the Cleveland Housing Network (CHN), a cooperative begun in 1981 under the auspices of the Famicos Foundation to train other groups to replicate its housing rehabilitation program and at the same time lower their costs and increase their productivity by pooling technical expertise and financial resources. “The affiliation which became the Cleveland Housing Network was really the first big step in terms of connection between neighborhood groups and funders,” Minter said. “As some of these groups got started doing low-income housing, they needed a place to turn for help. [Famicos’ director] Bob Wölf was a part of the discussion group, and this is where the Housing Network was put together.”

The Cleveland Foundation alone poured nearly $500,000 into the cooperative’s start-up, and by 1986 CHN had established ties with nine
neighborhood groups and rehabilitated more than 220 units of housing. Perhaps more important, working with the cooperative had served to spur the interest of the Standard Oil Company (now BP America) in neighborhood affairs.

Today one of Cleveland's philanthropic "Big Three" in the fields of housing and neighborhood development, Standard Oil had entered the picture as a relative latecomer in 1981 when its top executives, flush with earnings from the recent opening of a trans-Alaskan pipeline, decided to expand the parameters of the corporation's then fairly traditional charitable contributions program. As the inaugural project in its newly established program area of urban development, Standard Oil cosponsored, along with the Cleveland and Gund foundations and others, a $2.25 million energy conservation campaign, one component of which (a program to weatherize older homes) CHN helped to implement. "The energy conservation program was our learning curve about working in the neighborhoods," recalled Lance Buhl, who had been brought in to oversee the corporation's philanthropic activities in this program area. "I thought the whole thing would be blown apart in the spring of '82 when Gale Cincotta [president of National Peoples Action, a coalition of neighborhood activists in 100 cities] got a group together here [to protest the high cost of energy, especially relative to the incomes of the elderly and poor]. They disrupted our annual shareholders meeting, picketed the home of the president and then disrupted the chairman's Saturday lunch at the Hunt Club."

Although the incidents permanently put an end, Buhl believed, to local philanthropic funding of neighborhood advocacy, they did not extinguish Standard Oil's newfound commitment to supporting neighborhood redevelopment. When Bob Wolf approached Standard Oil some months thereafter with information about an Indiana insurance company that was writing off the losses from a wholly owned subsidiary devoted to rehabilitating housing, Buhl asked the corporation's law department to figure out if and how the program could be adapted to Cleveland Housing Network's use. His colleagues' research of federal tax laws resulted in the creation in 1984 of a prototype real estate syndication utilizing an allowed five-year write-off of rehabilitation expenses.

Two years later President Reagan's Tax Reform Act made possible the expansion of the prototype program into a multimillion-dollar equity fund called the Cleveland Housing Partnership (CHP). Administered
by the local office of the Enterprise Foundation, CHP allowed limited-partner corporate investors in low-income housing projects to take advantage of newly created tax credits. In addition to handling the legal work, Standard Oil helped in “pushing” the Cleveland Tomorrow association to encourage its CEO members to participate in both the syndication and the equity fund, according to Buhl. Finding the appeal to their profit-mindedness both innovative and persuasive, local corporations would invest nearly $4 million by 1989, making possible the rehabilitation of more than 400 units of low-income housing in three years, which was better than double the annual production rate of the formerly equity-strapped Cleveland Housing Network, the primary beneficiary of the fund.

Despite signs of an increasing commitment to the neighborhoods on the part of Cleveland’s corporate and philanthropic communities (which would ultimately lead to the creation of the super-support agency Neighborhood Progress, Incorporated), certain grass-roots leaders remained envious of the energy and resources also being devoted to what they saw as an elitist campaign to restore three old theaters downtown. Harry Fagan, for one, interpreted The Cleveland Foundation’s decision to become a major supporter of Playhouse Square Center and its performing arts occupants as placing downtown interests ahead of those of the neighborhoods. “I just about died when Homer went into Playhouse Square,” Fagan said. “But his agenda and mine were different. Homer was going to rebuild this town, goddammit! You just felt it!”

The Cleveland Foundation had indeed recognized that the Playhouse Square project had the potential to spur downtown revitalization long before most Clevelanders appreciated that fact. Distribution Committee member Gwill York and interim director Barbara Rawson were among the earliest supporters of the efforts of Ray Shepardson, a young assistant to the superintendent of Cleveland public schools who launched a grass-roots campaign to save the theaters after he had “discovered” them while looking for a downtown space in which to hold a teachers’ meeting. The Foundation had played no direct role in preventing the theaters from being torn down to make way for a parking lot in 1972—a rescue mission abetted by a $25,000 grant from the Junior League of Cleveland (of which York was immediate past president) that allowed Shepardson’s followers to lease the Loew’s Building housing the State and Ohio
Theatres only days before a permit was to be issued to demolish it. But the Distribution Committee had, under Rawson’s guidance, provided the monies (from the Hanna Community Development Fund) to pay for a master redevelopment plan of the “superblock” on which the theaters were located. “Barbara’s initial questions represented the attitude of the business community in general: The hard-headed realists in town thought the theaters had no utility,” explained Oliver C. (Pudge) Henkel, Jr., the founding president of Playhouse Square Foundation, the theaters’ not-for-profit management arm. “But Barbara is zealous in her pursuit of things to benefit the community. She hung in there and persuaded the Distribution Committee.”

The request for funding for the master plan had originated with Playhouse Square Associates, a limited partnership of a small band of civic-minded visionaries (including York) seeking to buy and redevelop key real estate in the area in order to produce profits that would subsidize the operation of the theaters; but the Foundation staff’s argument for taking the extraordinary step of supporting a for-profit venture was shrewdly couched in broader economic terms:

Playhouse Square is an “anchor” at the east end of Euclid Avenue. The redevelopment of the area, it is theorized, will benefit the entire end of Euclid, east of East 9th Street.

It would be an activity area that would boost the “gateway to Cleveland State University” idea.

It has more immediacy than any of the other two major downtown redevelopment packages (Tower City and the Higbee Company’s Flats project).

Lastly . . . there is the notion of preserving these old historic buildings. That idea by itself is not worth the investment; but only in combination with the above factors is it important. . . .

The Foundation’s foresight became clearer when contrasted with the chorus of ho hums that greeted the unveiling of Cleveland architect Peter van Dijk’s master plan in 1974. Having worked on the design of the Vivian Beaumont theater for Eero Saarinen, van Dijk had witnessed firsthand how Lincoln Center helped to stimulate the redevelopment of New York City’s West Side, and he believed a similar revival could take place on Playhouse Square. His plan envisioned a tree-lined shopping arcade running the length of Dodge Court, a cobblestone alley behind the theaters, with the streets in front closed off to traffic to create a pedestrian mall around which would be grouped a new hotel, office building and
a museum of light (commemorating Clevelander Charles Brush’s invention of the arc light), whose dazzling neon displays would transform the entire district into a wonderland at night. For a year or so following its completion van Dijk explained his scale model and presented his concepts to a “parade” of Cleveland bankers and corporate leaders. “I felt like a fool,” he recalled. “I would stand up and give my spiel and the reaction was a lot of blank faces.”

In the audience at one of the presentations was Homer Wadsworth, though van Dijk was not aware of the presence of the new director of The Cleveland Foundation “because he was so quiet.” Wadsworth had already formed a mixed impression of the theater restoration project. “About the time I came here they were struggling in a variety of ways to raise enough money to restore the buildings and to operate them,” he said. “It was a highly worthy effort, although it had all the earmarks of what might be thought of as cocktail-party planning. That’s where you talk about large ideas but the practical matter of putting it together wasn’t exactly in place.” But van Dijk’s imaginative model touched a responsive chord in the former city planner, who was concerned about the fact that downtown Cleveland died after dark. “When I first caught sight of what Peter saw as possibilities,” Wadsworth said, “I was instantly caught up with the fact that if you were to do something important here, this was the way to go about doing it. Otherwise if you’re not very careful and don’t do something about it, you can close the town down at six P.M. daily.” When the cultural affairs program officer, Pat Doyle, joined the staff in January 1975, the Foundation found itself in a better position to appraise the project’s possibilities.

On the surface it seemed that Shepardson’s Playhouse Square Foundation (PSF) was nursing the theaters back to life. Volunteers armed with paintbrushes worked during the day repainting their cavernous auditoriums, while at night their marble lobbies rang with the sounds of popular entertainment. The organization’s first production, Jacques Brel Is Alive and Well and Living in Paris, ran for more than two years; its second offering, a musical revue called Alice at the Palace! that was based on the story Alice in Wonderland, was attended by 6,000 persons for free—thanks to underwriting from The Cleveland Foundation. While PSF’s stratagem of offering low-cost or free popular entertainment proved that Clevelanders could indeed be lured downtown after dark, the operating losses each succeeding production incurred slowly mounted to a $1 mil-
lion deficit. And, according to Pat Doyle, the rush of enthusiasm for the theaters disguised PSF’s lack of a compelling plan for their restoration and use.

“They were not seeing the theaters necessarily as theaters,” she recalled. “They were going to draw up a 10-year lease to rent the State Theatre to a Spaghetti Factory [restaurant]. They drew up plans for the Ohio Theatre—which had been somewhat damaged by fire—to cut it up into shops and restaurants. The leadership wasn’t considering the use of these theaters for the arts.”

When Playhouse Square Foundation approached The Cleveland Foundation in January 1976 with a request for $189,000 in operating support, the Distribution Committee deferred action on the proposal and instead decided to obtain an outside evaluation of the organization. In September, James Costin, the head of the performing arts center at the University of Missouri in Kansas City and an acquaintance of both Wadsworth and Doyle, spent three days in Cleveland before issuing what proved to be a pivotal report in terms of shaping the theaters’ destiny. “A decision must be made,” Costin insisted. “Are the theaters to be used as rentable spaces for any enterprise that will not destroy their restored interiors, or, are they to be used as performance spaces? . . . If space is to be committed to performance . . . one obvious approach would be to examine the possibilities of establishing a multi-theater performing arts center.”

Costin’s report may have served to confirm a concept for the theaters’ reuse that the Foundation staff had already begun to formulate. Yet, even though Wadsworth and Doyle may have realized that (in Wadsworth’s words) “if you wanted to preserve these theaters, you had to integrate them into the life of this community,” the means for doing so was not yet clear. As a first step, the Foundation awarded PSF in December 1976 a $20,000 grant that enabled the organization to hire its first full-time executive director, Gordon E. Bell.

A friend of Shepardson’s from the time they both lived in Seattle, Bell had a background in school administration and urban planning. He “understood how to deal with politicians,” said Doyle. This skill would soon prove invaluable. While Shepardson continued to focus on programming (of the 13 commercial theater productions he mounted by the end of 1976, only Brel turned a profit), Bell turned his attention to surmounting a major obstacle to the theaters’ successful reuse: PSF’s
tenuous control of the properties—a problem that Costin had been among the first to point out. When it became clear that the organization would not be able to raise the $475,000 needed to exercise its option to purchase the Loew's Building housing the Ohio and State when it expired on December 31, 1977, Bell persuaded the Cuyahoga County commissioners to acquire the property, renovate its 30,000 square feet of office space for government use and lease the theaters back to Playhouse Square Foundation at no initial charge. The following year PSF secured a long-term lease on the Palace Theatre, which Shepardson had been using as venue for big-name entertainment, thereby bringing the management of all three theaters under its auspices.

As Gordon Bell scrambled to put together the eleventh-hour deal with the county, The Cleveland Foundation embarked on a related effort to secure the financial futures and continued artistic development of Cleveland's major preforming arts organizations that would contribute to the making of Playhouse Square Center as well. Concerned that the proposals the Foundation was receiving from the city's new ballet and opera companies and its more established theater groups were all built on the assumption of ever-increasing governmental funding at a time when the Foundation's research for the Brookings Institute predicted a leveling off of federal support in general, the Distribution Committee decided in June 1977 to allocate funds for six local performing arts companies and the Playhouse Square Foundation to conduct long-range planning.2

"Recognizing that their constant reliance on government money was going to be a wrong strategy and that they had no corporate support at all and they were just beginning to get private foundation support, we said in the letter of invitation to participate that if the long-range plans are good, it should help them find more support," Doyle said in explaining the Foundation's original objectives.

That November, when the Foundation convened a meeting of selected staff and trustees of the participating arts organizations to meet consultant Lawrence Reger, a former director of planning and development for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), whom the Foundation had hired to coordinate the project, these objectives expanded, serendipitously. "We asked each person what they were most concerned about personally," Doyle said. "As they went around the room, they all mentioned a facilities need. Even the orchestra [enthroned in University Circle's magnificent Severance Hall] said that they wanted other places to
perform. After the meeting was over, Larry [Reger] made the comment that we have six organizations looking for performance space and one organization with a surplus of performance space." The leap from Reger's cogent observation to the previously advanced concept of housing the city's performing arts companies under one roof at Playhouse Square was made in short order.

With a technical assistance grant from the NEA, The Cleveland Foundation hired architect van Dijk and two nationally known consultants, an acoustician and a theater/lighting designer, to work with the groups to determine what would be needed to transform the existing Playhouse Square facilities into suitable homes for theater, opera and ballet. At the same time Doyle encouraged the groups to continue working on individual five-year plans, for the Foundation staff had already conceived the idea of inviting six of the participants to form a consortium to pursue a joint $2 million challenge grant from the National Endowment. (Since the Cleveland Orchestra had recently been a beneficiary of an NEA challenge grant, it was not asked to participate.) Doyle also began assembling a committee of business leaders to review and critique the groups' plans, with an eye toward nurturing the interest of local corporations in supporting the arts.

Chaired by Jones, Day's managing partner, Allen C. Holmes, the committee "came in being very negative about Playhouse Square Foundation," according to Doyle. To counter the CEOs' skepticism about the stability of an organization key to the Foundation's hopes of transforming Cleveland into a national center of the arts, Doyle kept them informed of the progress of an economic feasibility study of van Dijk's master plan that the Foundation had commissioned in 1976. Conducted by American City Corporation, a research subsidiary of the Rouse Company, the developer who had revived Boston's Faneuil Hall and built Baltimore's Inner Harbor, the study when completed in April 1979 validated van Dijk's vision. Although the desired involvement of the Rouse Company in the redevelopment of the superblock did not occur, the developer's vote of confidence that the project was feasible proved helpful in persuading the 11-member Holmes committee of Playhouse Square's importance to downtown Cleveland's revitalization. By the time a Foundation contingent hand-delivered the challenge grant application in late 1978, Holmes felt so committed to the arts consortium's plans that he informed NEA officials that the $6 million the groups needed to raise
to meet the NEA’s required three-to-one match was not “very much money.”

In October 1979 the National Endowment awarded the Cleveland Consortium of the Performing Arts a $1.75 million grant. That spring the Holmes committee sent a letter to 180 corporate executives, urging that “special consideration” be given to the requests now flooding into their offices from the city’s cultural organizations. “The challenge offers an extraordinary opportunity to maintain and enhance this civic asset,” the letter argued. Cleveland corporations eventually donated in excess of $2.5 million, funds which constituted 33 percent of the organizations’ contributed income during the three-year challenge period, as compared to only 9 percent raised from corporations during the year preceding the challenge. The participating art organizations raised nearly $13 million, all told, in new and increased donations from corporations and individuals, with each dramatically enlarging its base of support, making it possible for all to expand their artistic horizons.

The Cleveland Foundation’s behind-the-scenes leadership of the city’s cultural affairs also benefitted Playhouse Square Foundation. PSF’s share of the challenge grant was $500,000, some of which it used to eliminate part of its deficit. More important to the organization’s future, the long-range planning process prompted PSF’s first serious capital campaign and provided the leadership to manage it. Because of his positive experiences with the Holmes committee, Joseph H. Keller, the chief operating officer of Ernst and Whinney accountants, agreed to lead a drive to raise $18 million. The monies would be committed to restoring the Palace Theatre for use by touring productions and constructing a new state-of-the-art stagehouse for the State Theatre so that it could become the permanent home of the Cleveland Opera and the Cleveland Ballet. The Cleveland Foundation provided a leadership grant of $710,000—at the time the largest single grant from unrestricted funds in its history—to help launch the capital campaign in 1980. In 1983, it awarded $500,000 to help kick off the campaign’s second phase, for in the meantime costs had escalated to an estimated $27 million, in part due to the Ohio Theatre’s rehabilitation—a fortuitous change in plans that the Foundation had also helped to set in motion.

Restoration of the Ohio had originally been put on hold because PSF had no foreseeable occupant. The situation changed when the board of trustees of the Great Lakes Shakespeare Festival (GLSF) decided not to
proceed with plans to build a new lakefront facility in Edgewater Park. A concept that had originated with GLSF managing director Mary Bill, who fondly remembered attending Cleveland Orchestra concerts in Edgewater Park as a child, the theater had been formally proposed as part of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources' master plan for the lakefront parks. (Department director Robert W. Teater had been much impressed by a similar facility he saw in Helsinki on a Cleveland Foundation sponsored tour of Northern European urban parks.) In spite of the fact that the state had already allocated some $10 million to build the facility, Bill later explained, GLSF's trustees eventually concluded that they would have a difficult time mounting a successful capital campaign for a new theater, given the community's growing determination to restore those already in existence on Playhouse Square.

Learning of the board's decision, Pat Doyle inquired of GLSF president Natalie Epstein the next time she chanced to encounter her whether Great Lakes had ever considered the Ohio as a possible home. "Natalie fell in love with the place as soon as she saw it and ran with the ball," Doyle recalled. With a long-term lease of the Ohio in the offing, Playhouse Square Foundation rethought its construction plans; and in July 1982, the 1,000-seat Ohio reopened as the magnificently restored home of the Great Lakes Shakespeare Festival. Its eight-hour production of Nicholas Nickleby, made possible in part by a $125,000 Foundation grant, attracted national attention that summer.

The month the Ohio reopened, the strength of the Foundation's commitment to the concept of a Playhouse Square performing arts center became evident even to those outside the tight-knit Cleveland cultural world. Days before PSF's option to purchase the nearby Bulkley and Selzer Buildings expired, the Distribution Committee approved the Foundation's acquisition of the option and purchase of the complex for $3.8 million as a program-related investment. In the opinion of the Foundation's counsel, Mal Bank, who had negotiated the purchase, the Foundation's first-ever PRI was made solely to acquire two small pieces of land needed to construct the State stagehouse. Without a new stagehouse, the State would not be suitable for professional ballet and opera productions, but the complex's owners had steadfastly refused to sell the parcels, which they also owned, as a separate transaction.

"The purchase of the Bulkley was a necessary evil in order to do the stagehouse," Bank explained. "That's the basis on which it was sold to
the Distribution Committee. There was no chance the Foundation would have ever bought the Bulkley if the land could have been eminent domained—no chance it would have ever been bought except out of absolute necessity.” Yet, after reselling the land to the county, which leased it back to PSF, The Cleveland Foundation found itself in the unusual role of owner and developer of real estate that everyone believed to be the key to the redevelopment of the Playhouse Square superblock.

The purchase of the Bulkley Building complex on Playhouse Square had been financed primarily by means of a principal distribution—a precedent that would be cited by the staff in 1988 in arguing the case for so funding the Foundation’s Special Initiatives in Education and Housing and Neighborhood Development. But the decision to invest assets for what would be only the third time in the Foundation’s history had not been reached with ease in 1982. “We didn’t know if we had the philosophical authority to purchase the Bulkley with our assets,” said Stanley Pace, the president and chief executive officer of TRW Incorporated, who was chairperson of the Distribution Committee at the time. “There was a certain amount of discomfort, but we so needed to start a positive momentum downtown.” The way Steve Minter had observed it from the sidelines, “there were a couple of people who had felt strongly about it and carried the ball—Pace, Pogue, Homer and Mal Bank.” Because the varying understandings of the parties to the transaction, which arose from the haste of its completion, would later hinder the Foundation’s ability to redevelop the complex—a turn of events that came as a personal disappointment to Wadsworth and Doyle, whose private dreams were to see the van Dijk master plan realized—it is helpful to reconstruct the steps leading to the purchase.

Negotiated five years earlier, Playhouse Square Foundation’s option to acquire the complex was due to expire on July 11, 1982. By early summer it had become clear that a syndicate of PSF supporters would not be able to raise the purchase price. Not only did PSF stand to forfeit $100,000 in option monies that had been donated by the Cleveland and George Gund foundations, but, worse still, it would also lose the $7 million it had raised to construct the State stagehouse. The funds, which consisted of a $3.5 million federal grant from the Economic Development Administration that the Cuyahoga County commissioners had agreed to match, were tied to the acquisition of the land beneath the
stagehouse, and, as mentioned before, only through the purchase of the Bulkley Building could those parcels be acquired. Time was also running out on plans for the stagehouse's construction; winter 1983 was the latest that work could begin if PSF was to honor its commitment to the Cleveland Ballet and the Cleveland Opera to open the State Theatre in the fall of 1984. Moreover, the leaders of both The Cleveland Foundation and Playhouse Square Foundation feared that if the Bulkley fell into the wrong hands, the new owners might not be sympathetic to their dreams of seeing the entire district redeveloped.

More than a year before the option was to expire, the PSF syndicate had approached The Cleveland Foundation with a request for a loan to assist in its purchase of the complex, which, in addition to the eight-and-a-half-story Bulkley office building and shopping arcade, consisted of the Selzer office building; the Bulkley garage and garage annex facing Chester Avenue behind the theaters; the two small parcels of land; and an unused fourth auditorium, the historic Allen movie theater. The request was denied because Foundation policy prohibits making loans to individuals. PSF's uncertain financial resources also affected the decision, according to cultural affairs program officer Pat Doyle, in whose bailiwick the proposal fell. "It wasn't just the matter of having the money to buy the Bulkley," she said, "but money would have to be constantly put into it, and that took people with deep pockets, and they didn't have those."

As the clock ticked closer to July 11, according to Doyle, Distribution Committee member Brock Weir had a brainstorm. Weir suggested that perhaps Ameritrust could purchase the complex as part of the Foundation's portfolio—an idea that never came to fruition because the head of the bank's trust department desired more documentation of the soundness of the investment than time permitted. To avoid the trust department's worries about violating its fiduciary responsibilities, the Foundation then considered financing the purchase on its own by means of a principal distribution.

Initially opposed to the idea, Ameritrust was persuaded to approve the distribution in principle when Dick Pogue set up a meeting with Brock Weir, National City Bank chair Julien C. McCall and representatives of the Foundation. Distribution Committee chairperson Stan Pace presided. A successful outcome was assured when McCall announced that National City, the trustee bank with the second largest
Foundation portfolio, was willing to go forward. In the meantime, outside appraisers had pronounced the acquisition a sound investment, projecting that the Bulkley alone, if renovated and then held for five years, could be sold for a profit equivalent to an annual rate of return of 15 percent.

After extensive debate at its quarterly meeting on June 22, the Distribution Committee authorized the transfer of $2.925 million in assets to a newly created subsidiary, Foundation Properties, Incorporated, for the purposes of buying and operating the Bulkley complex. The Gund Foundation had tentatively agreed to pick up the remainder of the purchase price, but the following week its trustees decided not to become co-owners. On June 29 the Distribution Committee was hastily reconvened to authorize a grant of $975,000 to Foundation Properties in order to seal the purchase.

Two days later Playhouse Square turned over its option to Foundation Properties, whose chairperson was Dick Pogue. John Lewis, Pogue's counterpart at PSF at the time, came away from the deal with the distinct impression that, despite the Foundation's ownership of the Bulkley-Selzer property, PSF still had a financial stake in the complex. "From my side of the street I never had any doubt that The Cleveland Foundation was in league with Playhouse Square so that one day we could get the Bulkley Building and derive income from its redevelopment," Lewis said. "It was known from day one that the theaters would not support themselves and that they needed income streams."

Lawrence J. Wilker, who had been hired as president of Playhouse Square Foundation in the spring of 1982, formed a similar understanding of The Cleveland Foundation's intentions. "The perception was that they were holding the building for future compatible development," said Wilker, a former director of properties for the Shubert Organization. "The hope was that they would hold it until we could buy it."

However, the Foundation's July 8 press release announcing and explaining the acquisition used words carefully selected, as Dick Pogue would recall, to address the Distribution Committee's internal questions about PSF's ability to carry out such a complex project. "The Cleveland Foundation's objective," the press release stated, "is to provide the Playhouse Square Foundation and other parties enough time to come up with development plans and funding strategies compatible with community goals for Playhouse Square." Issued the same day that the Foundation
exercised its option, the release "anticipated that the property will be held for from three to five years"—a deadline that had been suggested by Dick Pogue at the Distribution Committee meeting on June 22 in order to assuage the concerns of some of his colleagues about making such an uncharted investment. And the release was cautious in referring to any role for PSF in the redevelopment project. "Purchase of the Bulkley Complex will allow Playhouse Square and community leadership to address key property and facilities issues outlined in the area's master plan," it stated.6

Privately, Homer Wadsworth had his own ideas about the best way to see van Dijk's master plan fulfilled. "The Foundation intended to find a private developer for that property," he explained, "or develop it as a co-venture with a private developer, or—we didn't attempt to cross all the possible roads here. We did feel that we could encourage a developer by holding the building as part of what we were willing to invest." Doyle similarly described the Foundation's intentions: "We wanted to hold this building until such a time as it could be developed," she said. "PSF read that to mean something much more personally related to their advantage than people on our board meant it to be."

The lack of agreement about the Foundation's ultimate objectives in redeveloping the Bulkley complex complicated communications with Cranston Development Company, the private developer the Foundation and PSF jointly recruited after a national search. Best known for its redevelopment of Pittsburgh's old train terminal into a specialty retail and entertainment center complete with new hotel, office buildings and garage known as Station Square, the developer was prepared to be flexible in putting together the financing for a project it believed previous marketing studies had already proven to be feasible. Its stance landed it the job, but would later come to be perceived as waffling. "You have a choice as to whether you want us to develop the project on behalf of Playhouse Square Foundation for a fee only, whether you want us to own part of the project, or whether you want us to develop it entirely ourselves," Cranston president Arthur P. Ziegler, Jr., informed Doyle in March 1983, shortly after the Distribution Committee had authorized staff to negotiate a contract with the Pittsburgh firm. "... In any case, we'll take the responsibility to raise the equity if the project warrants that." Ziegler requested only that the Foundation cover Cranston's preconstruc-
tion costs, advising Doyle to think of the monies "as a loan to be repaid in the financing of the project, if at all possible."

In his enthusiasm to be part of Playhouse Square's rebirth, Ziegler seemed to have underplayed the need for The Cleveland Foundation's continued active participation and investment in the superblok's redevelopment. His casual attitude about the Foundation's financial commitment to the project certainly contrasted with his experience at Station Square, which had been made possible only because a local private foundation had been willing to pour more than $10 million in equity into the restoration of the historic train station. Later he would admit: "If the Bulkley project were feasible on a traditional private basis, The Cleveland Foundation wouldn't have been needed in the first place." But that understanding was never made plain to the Distribution Committee, who approved a contract with Cranston and authorized a grant of up to $378,208 for the firm's preconstruction expenses in September 1983. The blue sheet reported that the contract had been rewritten several times with an eye to "minimizing the Foundation's financial exposure [and] maximizing Cranston's participation. . . ."

After Stan Pace announced that Wadsworth would retire at the end of 1983 (the Distribution Committee having interpreted the commitment to give Wadsworth 10 years at the helm literally), Wadsworth's successor, Steve Minter, discovered that some members still remained unclear about the Foundation's proper role and objectives in redeveloping the property when he had begun paying them courtesy calls. "It wasn't that they didn't feel good about the Bulkley purchase or didn't believe that the Foundation had made a big step, because they did," Steve Minter said of these conversations. "But they also had ambivalent feelings. They felt like they were rubber stamps in the grandest tradition. And what really surprised me—they had a lot of questions: What are we going to do; how long are we going to be in there; what are the possible liabilities?"

Less than one month after Minter's appointment as director, a special meeting of the Distribution Committee was convened at his request for the express purpose of updating members on the project's progress and winning their approval to purchase several parcels of land on which Ziegler wanted to build a new parking garage for the Bulkley complex. At the February 2 meeting Dick Pogue "made a recommendation that
we create a Playhouse Square Development Subcommittee and that its five members would be the four directors of Foundation Properties and Stan Pace," Minter said. "That's how we got moving again." Yet, at the same time that the Distribution Committee became more actively interested and involved in Playhouse Square's redevelopment, it also approved a "Statement of Policy and Objectives for the Bulkley Complex" that would limit the Foundation's ability to see the superblock project through to completion. Although the statement rearticulated the Distribution Committee's desire to help assure the economic viability of Playhouse Square Center and stimulate the compatible redevelopment of the theater district, it also affirmed the committee's expectation of a reasonable return on its investment and its intention of holding the complex no longer than five years.

By the time Cranston presented a formal development plan at the Distribution Committee's annual retreat in February 1985, nearly three years had elapsed since the Bulkley was purchased. The Distribution Committee acted favorably on Cranston's recommendations that the Foundation acquire land on Chester Avenue for a 510-car parking garage and commission independent retail and hotel market studies to validate the firm's plans for creating 49,000 square feet of shops and restaurants in the Bulkley and building a 164-room luxury hotel. But members of the Playhouse Square subcommittee were growing impatient with the lack of tangible progress. Not only had Cranston and the Foundation been unable to formulate a financing plan for the $32 million project, they had still to reach agreement on the issue of the Bulkley's ultimate ownership, with neither side willing to be the first to lay its cards on the table about a purchase price.

The consultants hired to conduct the retail study, Zuchelli, Hunter and Associates (ZHA) of Maryland, completed a preliminary report that summer. Having found Cranston's plans workable, ZHA offered to assist the Foundation in devising a funding approach for the project, and the Foundation signed a contract hiring the firm as its owner-representative that fall.

ZHA's hiring prompted Cranston to make an oral offer to purchase the Bulkley for up to $5 million, but the move came too late. By November Zuchelli, Hunter had developed nine separate financing plans, none of which required a large Foundation subsidy and several of which promised a significant net return on the Foundation's initial investment.
In terms of net return Cranston’s offer was a wash, and ZHA recommended that the Foundation reopen the project to competitive bidding by other developers, which it did.

Late that spring the tenuous partnership between the Foundation, PSF and officials from the city’s economic development department, who had agreed in principle to apply for an Urban Action Development Grant on the project’s behalf, also unraveled—over the issue of the ownership of the parking garage. Since the summer of 1983, PSF had been pushing for the immediate construction of a garage to accommodate the expected onrush of State Theatre patrons. In fact, for better than six months PSF staff and trustees had seriously considered entering into a joint venture with a local parking lot operator to build a 1,000-car garage on East 17th Street, a north-south thoroughfare that constitutes Playhouse Square’s gateway to Cleveland State University. In addition to pointing out that such an arrangement did not make the best use of East 17th Street, the Foundation had argued that it would jeopardize the success of Cranston’s plans for the superblock, which were based on the assumption that profits from a Chester Avenue parking garage would subsidize early losses the developer expected to incur in reconfiguring the first two floors of the Bulkley as retail space. In August 1984, shortly after the Foundation’s Playhouse Square Development Subcommittee agreed to commission a marketing study for the Chester Avenue garage, PSF decided to suspend its discussions with the codevelopers of the proposed 17th Street garage.

When the study confirmed that a Chester Avenue garage could be operated at a profit, The Cleveland Foundation quietly began to acquire the necessary parcels at a cost of more than $700,000, fully expecting that Cranston Development Company would proceed with its plans to become the garage’s developer. But the acquisition process consumed a year, during which time Cranston had been relieved of its responsibilities. In the meantime, in their quest to find sources of income to subsidize Playhouse Square Center’s operation, PSF’s staff and trustees had persuaded the mayor of Cleveland that PSF should build and own the new Bulkley garage. “Actually, we had gone to the city to press for direct financial assistance,” Larry Wilker said of the events that led up to George Voinovich’s requesting that The Cleveland Foundation sell its Chester Avenue parcels to PSF. “The mayor said the city didn’t have any money, but he would assist in our applying for a UDAG [Urban Devel-
portun Action Grant] for the garage, which Playhouse Square should own. The Cleveland Foundation felt that, without the garage as part of the package, it would be difficult to attract a developer for the Bulkley Building. Playhouse Square felt differently; now a developer wouldn't have to front $8 million for a garage."

Realizing the counterproductivity of a dispute with city hall, the Foundation ultimately conceded to the mayor's request. The sale of the parcels prompted the Foundation to withdraw its request for proposals on the Bulkley, which Zuchelli, Hunter had issued in early 1986. "[Our] plan [for the Bulkley complex] was killed when the city made the decision that the parking garage was their best way of getting income for Playhouse Square Foundation," Minter would later acknowledge in the Plain Dealer.

Actually, the final blow was administered by PSF's request in 1987 for an easement that would allow it to snake an elevated pedestrian walkway from the parking garage through the Bulkley complex to the theaters. "That had us making a whole lot of decisions on how the complex was to be used . . . and nothing was there from a development standpoint," Minter told the Plain Dealer. "Maybe if the garage wasn't going up . . . maybe there might have been a lot more time to say: 'Let's figure it out and get a lot of proposals.'" But with the self-imposed deadline for disposing of the Bulkley complex at hand, the Foundation instead authorized attorney Mal Bank to find a buyer for the property. Having watched the Foundation dicker with real estate developers for some 60 months, the Thompson, Hine and Flory attorney decided to take a results-oriented approach. "I sent out letters to 15 local people looking for a sale, not a developer," Bank said. "I had prepared a contract, which I also sent out, saying: 'Fill in your price, no negotiating, take it or leave it.'"

Not surprisingly, Playhouse Square Foundation was the first to attempt to negotiate an acceptable bid, but in the end was unwilling to meet the minimum purchase price that the Playhouse Square Development Subcommittee had set. Instead the complex was sold for $6.1 million in September 1987 to a syndicate headed by William N. West, the president of a Cleveland real estate brokerage firm with headquarters located on Playhouse Square. To facilitate the sale the Foundation agreed to provide West with a three-year letter of credit for $1.6 million of the purchase price and committed to grants totaling $700,000 to assist in
the design of the walkway and the construction of a public park on the interior courtyard, which would be created by the long-planned demolition of the Selzer Building and old Bulkley garage. West’s anticipated redevelopment stalled, however, when the developer’s plans to demolish the 3,000-seat Allen Theatre to make way for the outdoor courtyard and a new restaurant were held up by local historic preservationists, who recruited Playhouse Square Foundation as an ally in their public demand for time to find a tenant for the old movie theater.

Whether the Foundation had lacked the skills, resources, patience or just plain luck needed to bring van Dijk’s vision of Playhouse Square to fruition, Homer Wadsworth, for one, would be able to find consolation in the fact that at least the Foundation had helped to create a performing arts facility “of which the town could be very proud.” Moreover, Playhouse Square Center had spurred revitalization of other parts of downtown. Besides, Wadsworth would observe philosophically, “you’d have to be a fool to expect 100 percent.”

Like the campaign to create Playhouse Square Center, the Foundation’s effort to revitalize Cleveland’s waterfront—its other major physical redevelopment project of the Wadsworth era—had sprung from the vision and passionate commitment of a single Clevelander.

As recently as the mid-seventies the underdevelopment of the lakefront had been of concern to only a few Clevelanders, among them landscape architect William A. Behnke. As a boy Behnke had swum at Gordon Park beach; he took it personally when a friend, the Cleveland commissioner of shade trees, had informed him that the Perk administration was looking the other way at illegal dumping of trash and refuse there. The dumping symbolized for Behnke a general pattern of neglect of Cleveland’s 3,000 acres of municipal parkland by an administration increasingly strapped for operating funds. First felt when Carl Stokes reduced property taxes in an unsuccessful gambit to induce voters to increase the municipal income tax, the city’s financial bind had tightened during the Perk administration because of its leader’s fealty to a campaign promise of no new taxes. Consequently, during Perk’s first two terms in office, the parks and recreation budget (among others) had been slashed by approximately 40 percent; and Behnke, in his outrage, had begun speaking to various community groups about the unfortunate results of these cutbacks.
In the Shaker Lakes Garden Center, and especially in club president Barbara K. Scovil, the landscape architect found a most responsive audience. Stirred by Behnke’s comments, the club decided to commission, as its project for America’s upcoming bicentennial, a study by Behnke’s firm of the ways the city could improve its park services. In the fall of 1974 Scovil approached The Cleveland Foundation with a request for funding “‘Project Pride—Toward the Goal of Restoring and Revitalizing Our City Parks.’” Former parks and recreation hand Wadsworth, with whom Scovil made her initial contact, recognized both the potential of the idea and the political problems inherent in its advocacy by a suburban ladies’ club, judging by a follow-up letter he received from Scovil reporting on the Greater Cleveland Growth Association’s willingness to become the study’s sponsor. “We see this as an important step since ultimate implementation and usage of the study will require cooperation of the city administration and city council,” she wrote on December 16. “... Since the name Shaker Lakes Garden Club seems at best a poor front for political bodies to accept, it seemed logical for us to ask the Growth Association to perhaps put the survey under the wing of [its] Cleveland Development Foundation.” On February 7, 1975, Scovil reported to Wadsworth that meetings had recently been held with Mayor Perk and city council president Forbes to secure their cooperation—the other requirement the Foundation needed to see fulfilled, according to Behnke, before it was to grant $40,000 for the study in March.

“This survey would seem to complement the Halprin study—indeed it answers the criticism by certain political groups ... in relation to Halprin’s development of a plan for the downtown core area only,” Scovil wrote of the meetings.

This survey will put special emphasis on the needs of the residential neighborhoods, their parks and recreation spaces. George Forbes in particular viewed this aspect of the Behnke survey [as] of utmost importance. ... One final thought—with the current exciting building in downtown Cleveland and with the completion of the Halprin study there is a possible dream of a ‘renaissance’ of Cleveland in future years. However, the inner city and ethnic neighborhoods encircling this downtown core cannot be allowed to decay from lack of concern. There seems to be no spokesman for the constituency of the parks in this relationship, and it would be our hope that the Behnke survey would act as a vehicle to bring in many forces from the private sector to fill this particular void.
From the outset Wadsworth, who acted as program officer for the study (to which the garden club contributed its own $10,000 grant), demonstrated an understanding of the tricky politics involved in what over time would turn into a full-blown lakefront redevelopment campaign serving both downtown and neighborhood interests. The "Cleveland Parks and Recreation Study," which found that the city's once nationally regarded park system had been allowed to fall into a "tragic state of disrepair," was the public support for which Cleveland city planning director Norman Krumholz had been searching to reverse the decline. In 1973, after Hurricane Agnes had severely damaged the lakefront parks, Krumholz had suggested to the city council that they be placed under the auspices of a broader taxing authority with the means to repair them, a concept that had made its way into an emergency resolution. But Perk had refused to approve the transfer out of fear that "a Democratic Council and a Democratic governor up for re-election would have been sure to inflate their role in any take-over of Cleveland's parks, and would have been likely to belabor the Republican mayor in the process," as Krumholz later explained. Now Krumholz used the Foundation-underwritten study to persuade Perk that the powers-that-be supported the appointment of a Lakefront Task Force charged with exploring various avenues for the development and maintenance of Edgewater Park on the west and Gordon Park on the east. "Perk appointed the task force because The Cleveland Foundation and Shaker Lakes wanted it; he never once said to me how important he thought the parks were," Behnke would claim.

On May 20, 1976, the mayor announced the creation of the task force at a press conference at which the study's findings were also released. Chaired by Krumholz, the seven-person committee included Distribution Committee member Tom Patton, the retired chairman of the board of Republic Steel, whose appointment Wadsworth had encouraged because "he was very much involved in shipping . . . and it was fairly clear that this had to be put together with some people involved who understood what the vested interests of the carriers and the port might be." In the end the lifelong Republican's political connections to Ohio governor Jim Rhodes (who had in 1974 staged a comeback in defeating Jack Gilligan, the Democrat who had temporarily retired him in 1970) would prove more valuable, however. At Krumholz's urging, Patton, the former head of a major bond campaign Rhodes had initiated to build
a state college within driving distance of every young Ohioan, traveled
to Columbus to persuade the governor of the sagacity of the task force's
foregone conclusion that the ownership of Cleveland's lakefront parks
should be transferred from the impecunious city to the state.

A tour of the parks cemented the governor's commitment to the idea,
in Bill Behnke's opinion. "The transfer looked good politically to Jim
Rhodes," Behnke speculated. "He saw it as a way of solidifying his
support in [heavily Democratic] Cuyahoga County. Dick ['New Gen-
eration' Democrat Richard F.] Celeste was running for governor at the
time, and he was trailing Rhodes around like a truth squad. Rhodes
picked up immediately on the heavy black usage of Gordon Park, es-
pecially after this woman came up to him and plead: 'If you could just
give us toilet facilities!'" (According to cultural affairs program officer
Pat Doyle, who had joined Wadsworth in working on the parks project
after the study's release, not a single toilet in any lakefront park worked
at the time of the transfer.)

Documents that led to the state's acquiring Edgewater, Gordon and
Wildwood Parks on a 50-year lease were signed by the mayor and gov-
ernor during Perk's last week in office. Wadsworth would later say that
he regarded the creation of the renamed Cleveland Lakefront State Park
as his most valuable accomplishment as director. However, at the time
of the transfer, he knew only too well from conversations with the head
of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR) that placing the
three parks under state control did not automatically guarantee their
improvement. ODNR director Bob Teater, frankly, had opposed the
move. "I was not for it on jurisdictional grounds because it violated our
policies about keeping parks only in rural areas," Teater said, adding
wryly, "but the governor resolved the question for me. Though I'm not
sure, after the governor told me we're going to develop the lakefront,
that I put my whole self into it." Teater's suspicions about the complex-
ities of operating urban parks had been confirmed at Cleveland city
council hearings about ODNR's initial plans for improving the parks.
"Several councilmen started accosting me about the things they wanted
in their wards," he said. "I remember George Forbes rapped on the table
and announced: 'If you want anything on the lakefront, you'll go through
me.'"

Toward the end of January 1978, as the details of the transfer were
being worked out with the administration of newly elected mayor Dennis
Kucinich, the president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States approached the Foundation. The Washington-based philanthropy (which had been created in 1972 by the West German government in appreciation of this country's decision to launch the Marshall Plan 25 years before) was seeking to develop collaborations with other American foundations in areas of mutual interest, and president Robert Gerald Livingston offered to provide European travel/study grants to Clevelanders recommended by The Cleveland Foundation. It soon occurred to Homer Wadsworth that here was a way to capture the imagination of Teater, "who had come from a professorship in agriculture and was not a big-city guy." Wadsworth "worked out a deal to send him to Europe to take a look at the stuff they did."

ODNR had already spent $7 million to clean up the garbage, restore the toilets to working order and beef up security in the parks. It had also commissioned William A. Behnke Associates to prepare a $250 million, 25-year master redevelopment plan, and the European fact-finding mission arranged by the Foundation with the support of a $10,000 grant from the German Marshall Fund helped to guarantee its enthusiastic implementation. In 1979 a contingent of Teater, Doyle, Behnke, Krumholz and Cleveland's Francine M. Panehal, Democratic majority whip in the Ohio House of Representatives and a member of its budget committee, toured mixed-use waterfronts in Switzerland and 13 Northern European port cities, where such public attractions as restaurants, marinas and housing added color and excitement to districts formerly reserved solely for the unloading of cargo ships. "Teater came back a real convert," Doyle would recall. So did Panehal, who helped smooth the way for $40 million in capital appropriations that has since been spent to outfit the Cleveland Lakefront State Park with new fishing piers, boat launches, marinas, bike and jogging paths, restrooms, picnic areas and a swimming beach on the East Side, where there was none. (Now called Euclid Beach, the 16-acre tract was purchased by the state in 1981 from its former commercial operator, with the assistance of matching funds from The Cleveland Foundation and other local foundations and corporations.)

The movement to revitalize the lakefront received another boost in the spring of 1981, when the Cleveland Museum of Natural History approached the Foundation with a request for $12,000 to fund a study of the advisability of moving the small aquarium it operated on inner-
city parkland to its headquarters in University Circle. Although he declined to say so publicly, Wadsworth believed the proposed new location to be inappropriate—a sentiment shared by the city's planning department, by then under the direction of Voinovich appointee Hunter Morrison, with whom Pat Doyle had conferred on the matter. In May the mayor sent Doyle a letter officially requesting that the lakefront be considered as a site for a new aquarium. "I would also ask the Foundation to consider supporting a broader planning effort . . . to develop an overall . . . strategy for the waterfront," Voinovich stated.

In light of the mayor's request, the Distribution Committee declined to act on the museum's proposal and instead appropriated $10,000 toward a comprehensive waterfront study. Also to be studied was the feasibility of relocating the Great Lakes Historical Society in Vermilion, Ohio, to Cleveland—a proposal then being considered by the trustees of the maritime museum. With Morrison's department preoccupied with planning for the new headquarters tower Standard Oil proposed to build on Public Square, two years would elapse before the city submitted a request for $100,000 to prepare a master redevelopment plan for a site it called the Stadium/Inner Harbor District. Consisting of 59 acres of city-owned land, Inner Harbor was bounded by Lake Erie on the north, downtown Cleveland on the south, Municipal Stadium on the west and Burke Lakefront Airport on the east; and it was here that the city envisioned the construction of an aquarium and a maritime museum, as well as new marinas, parks, a shopping pier, hotel and town houses.

In March 1983 the Distribution Committee approved the grant request, contingent upon the creation of a mechanism to involve community leaders in the selection of consultants and upon the adoption of legislation by the city council authorizing the receipt and expenditure of the funds. The latter condition proved to be a sticking point when city council president George Forbes held up the legislation because Wadsworth had turned down a $5,000 grant request from an organization of black political and civic leaders to which Forbes belonged. (The black leaders had sought the Foundation's subsidy of a Christmas food-basket program that Wadsworth regarded as politically motivated.) By heeding the politician's summons to a private dressing-down, Wadsworth and Minter repaired the rift; and by the end of 1983 Wadsworth was able to report that the city had made some progress in meeting the
grant contingencies in a letter to a Foundation donor with a special interest in lakefront redevelopment:

Public business occasionally moves at a snail’s pace. . . . The City Council did accept our proposal, and with conditions [that the east-west boundaries of the study area be expanded to encompass the Cuyahoga River and East 55th Street] appended thereto, after many months of consideration of the subject and with the delay largely the result of quite irrelevant matters. The ball is now in the hands of Mayor Voinovich, who plans to appoint an advisory committee to work with the City Planning Commission in the development of future plans.

. . . My own sense is that some kind of development authority needs to be created to sponsor large-scale lakefront programs. . . . Public authorities have key programs to foster, but . . . it will be private interest in the subject and the use of private capital that will in the long run open up real prospects that many of us have seen in this poorly used frontage.

Nearly two more years elapsed before the mayor announced in late spring 1985 that he was forming the North Coast Development Corporation (NCDC), a not-for-profit authority charged with managing the Inner Harbor District’s redevelopment. Planting and nurturing the seeds for NCDC’s creation had been one of Wadsworth’s last contributions as director. After his retirement and up until 1990, Wadsworth would continue to participate in the lakefront redevelopment effort as a member of NCDC’s executive committee.

NCDC’s predecessor organization, the Mayor’s Waterfront Steering Committee, had unveiled the Foundation-sponsored master plan in March 1985. A collaboration between Zuchelli, Hunter and Associates and William A. Behnke Associates, the “Cleveland Waterfront Study” called for a Phase I investment of $103 million to dredge an “inner lake” at the foot of East 9th Street as the setting for a new aquarium, maritime museum, winter garden and public promenade, a 2,500-car parking garage and 120,000 square feet of festival retail space. Having been impressed with a private presentation of the plan at its February retreat, the Distribution Committee in March awarded the citizens’ committee an interim grant of $60,000 to enable it to set up NCDC, hire a director and begin fund raising.

Within weeks of its unveiling, the Inner Harbor was a done deal. By August the city’s congressional delegation had secured $36 million in new federal funds for Cleveland’s port, some of which would be diverted
to pay for bulkhead improvements and dredging for the new harbor. In October Ohio governor and Cleveland native Dick Celeste announced that the state would provide $8.4 million toward the construction of the Inner Harbor and a promenade around its circumference. (The funds came from monies allocated to the Ohio Department of Natural Resources to build Great Lakes Shakespeare Festival a theater in Edgewater Park, an idea adopted by ODNR after it participated in the Foundation-sponsored tour of Northern Europe, but abandoned after GLSF decided to move to Playhouse Square instead.) Using the state money as a carrot, the mayor's office then persuaded the city council to appropriate more than $1 million for street improvements at the site. By December NCDC had been launched to oversee the planning and implementation of the unfinished portion of the master plan, its operation assured for three years by the Cleveland and Gund foundations and Cleveland Tomorrow.

The only hitch had occurred in June, when city inspectors closed the old Cleveland Aquarium after declaring the roof unsafe. The Cleveland Museum of Natural History subsequently informed the city that it could not renew its contract to manage the aquarium unless outside sources covered anticipated future capital needs and operating shortfalls. With the community in danger of losing an experienced aquarium staff and valuable specimens, the mayor sought the assistance of the Cleveland and Gund foundations and Standard Oil, whose representatives decided as a first step to ask the museum to prepare a five-year operating plan—the estimated time it would take to build a new facility on the Inner Harbor. The funders also met with the director of the Cleveland Metroparks System, which operated the Cleveland zoo, to discuss his interest in taking over the management of the aquarium. After studying the museum's proposal, which they concluded was a holding action at best, the directors of the Cleveland and Gund foundations and Standard Oil's corporate contributions program advised the mayor to invite the Metroparks System, which had its own taxing authority, to assume responsibility for the aquarium. The transfer of responsibility subsequently took place with transitional operating support from the three funders.

The staff had acted so decisively because the Foundation believed a world-class aquarium to be the key to the lakefront's continued development. "[It is] the centerpiece of public amenities essential to transforming Cleveland's Inner Harbor into a mixed-used development encompassing retail, hotel, housing and office spaces," staff argued in
1988 in recommending a $150,000 grant to NCDC to undertake detailed concept planning, cost evaluation and marketing analysis for the proposed aquarium. More than half of the monies in a proposed third Special Initiative to support lakefront development would be earmarked for the aquarium's design and other start-up expenses, with capital underwriting expected to come from tax incremental financing (whereby the costs of public improvements built to attract commercial development are paid from the new tax revenues generated by the development). Although the maritime museum would also be slotted to receive Special Initiative monies, "The Cleveland Foundation . . . [is] convinced that [an aquarium] is likely to attract three to four times the attendance of a Great Lakes [maritime] Center and, therefore, [is] capable of leveraging far greater economic success for the entire Inner Harbor development," Pat Doyle, the program officer in charge, contended in 1988 in supporting a Special Initiative on Lakefront Development. Noting that "the Inner Harbor Project has grown in a short period of time into the largest development project being undertaken in downtown Cleveland," she explained its potential in graphic terms. "[NCDC president] Gary Conley has indicated that the project ultimately could result in capital investments . . . equivalent [to] four Tower Cities."

While the Foundation's interest in promoting Cleveland's physical redevelopment had evolved gradually out of other, more traditional program concerns, its entry into the related field of economic development had been precipitated by a sharp nudge from the Distribution Committee. Upon being named to succeed Foundation chairman Stu Harrison in the summer of 1979, Stan Pace decided to meet individually with Distribution Committee members to solicit their comments on the Foundation's current program. At a conference with Wadsworth on January 3, 1980, Pace reported that the Distribution Committee wanted the staff to devote more attention to "the conditions of our public school programs; the problems of the downtown area, including Playhouse Square; unemployment among black youth; [and] the marshalling of expert opinion on the northeast Ohio economy—the latter reflecting some disappointment with those now available in local universities as scholars in the economics area, and especially as their work relates to . . . Cleveland. . . ."

With nearly half its membership consisting of present or former chief
executive officers of major corporations, the committee's sensitivity to the decline in Cleveland's economic base could have been predicted. "The seventies were a difficult time for Cleveland," Pace later said, "one long, uncontrollable fall. The mass evacuation of manufacturing jobs had everyone concerned, and the Foundation was being prodded by a number of people, but especially the mayor, that we ought to be a player in this arena." Yet, given the scale of the problem and the national, and even international, pressures involved, the role the Foundation could play seemed less than obvious. Agreeing with the Distribution Committee that the reasons for the city's economic malaise remained clouded, the staff sought to provide a better understanding of the forces blasting the region before the Distribution Committee settled upon a course of action. Willis J. Winn, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, was subsequently invited to speak at the Distribution Committee's May 1980 retreat on the economic future of Cleveland.

"Winn's overview didn't crystallize a specific action," said Susan Lajoie, then the Foundation's program analyst, "but the staff did get a clear message from the Distribution Committee at the Winn retreat: Do something about economic development. It was on our minds, but we weren't doing anything proactive until the Rand Corporation approached the Foundation about the possibility of some sort of collaboration." Winn having stressed that inadequate data on the northeastern Ohio economy hampered the formulation of effective redevelopment strategies, the Foundation decided in September to commission the California-based think tank (best known for its studies of national defense) to conduct a year-long analysis of regional economic conditions and trends on an industry-by-industry basis. The resulting data base would become part of a permanent economic monitoring capability the Foundation hoped to establish in Cleveland to serve private and public policymakers.

Although Wadsworth would come to consider the Rand study to be as important as the landmark surveys of the Foundation's early years, "it was not a popular thing to do," said Lajoie, the staff member assigned to supervise the corporation's work. "There was a notion in the community that we had studied things to death." Disapproval grew in some quarters when the study's findings were published in March 1982. Even though the Foundation had assembled a blue-chip advisory panel chaired by Dick Pogue to review and question Rand's work-in-progress, the
$178,000 study would draw criticism from academics and business leaders alike. University professors (correctly) pointed out that Rand had relied on data several years old, while the fact that the study exploded several of their popular misconceptions did not sit well with various CEOs.

"The Rand study didn't automatically win acceptance, although in time its core assumptions came to be believed," Lajoie noted. She summarized some of these assumptions:

For example, Rand argued that the manufacturing sector was still critical to the Cleveland economy and that it needed to be nurtured, when popular wisdom held that the answer to our problems lay in expanding the service sector. Rand recognized that in our specialized manufacturing technology we had a comparative advantage and challenged the assumption that we had as strong a health care industry as everyone believed. They even questioned whether we had the demand to attract a major hotel, which was widely seen as a quick fix for the economy. Another controversial finding: Everyone felt that manufacturing jobs were leaving was because of high wages. Rand asserted that in many local industries wages were closer to the national average, a finding which was viewed as being pro-union.

The study's cool reception may have been exacerbated by a belief that Rand's analysis merely duplicated another recently completed economic study. Conducted by Cleveland management consultants McKinsey and Company and underwritten by the George Gund Foundation at the recommendation of its director, James S. Lipscomb, the second study had been commissioned by a handful of top corporate executives interested in devising achievable plans for the region's economic redevelopment. According to William R. Seelbach, who supervised the $650,000 study for McKinsey, Homer Wadsworth had declined to ask the Distribution Committee to participate in its funding when approached by the CEOs, and that decision may have contributed to the fact that, as Susan Lajoie put it, "McKinsey was perceived to be in competition with Rand." In any event, the two analyses produced distinctly different results. The McKinsey study would lead Gund to put up $200,000 to create the action organization Cleveland Tomorrow, while the Rand study resulted in a Cleveland Foundation investment of $407,000 in the design of a monitoring and research agency that would come to be called the Regional Economic Issues Program. Having started separately, the two new entities worked independently of one another for some time.
It was the foundering of the Playhouse Square theater restoration project that united these two important strands in the community’s new economic redevelopment movement.

On June 9, 1984, the State Theatre had opened to national acclaim. New York Post columnist Earl Wilson hailed the new facility, which boasted one of the world’s largest stages (65 feet deep and 10 stories high), state-of-the-art lighting and sound equipment and a huge dance surface, as “Cleveland’s super-rival to our Lincoln Center and Washington’s JFK Center . . . expected to help establish the Great Lakes city as a major show business venue. . . .” But behind the scenes Playhouse Square Foundation’s fund-raising campaign had stalled short of the monies needed to restore the Palace, the final theater of the Playhouse Square Center triad. “The question ‘Is the Palace really necessary?’ was widespread,” an in-house history of Playhouse Square Center noted. (Among the doubters: Homer Wadsworth, who didn’t believe there were sufficient high-quality touring productions to keep the Palace open year-round.)

Casting about for new funding sources, PSF chairperson John Lewis visited with Morton L. Mandel, who chaired Premier Industrial Corporation and was one of the eight founders of Cleveland Tomorrow. Prior to 1984, Cleveland Tomorrow had concentrated solely on projects related to job creation and retention, launching a manufacturing research center, a business incubator and a center for labor-management cooperation (all of which programs The Cleveland Foundation had supported with operating funds). Although Cleveland Tomorrow had displayed little interest in physical redevelopment projects as of yet, Mandel advised Lewis that the Playhouse Square Foundation might be able to reenlist corporate Cleveland’s support in finishing the Palace’s restoration if it commissioned an independent feasibility study of the project. In short order it was arranged for McKinsey to conduct the study on a pro bono basis.

Lewis also decided to place a call to Karen F. Horn, the new president of Cleveland’s Federal Reserve Bank, to request her help in analyzing the economic impact of Playhouse Square. Horn offered the services of the Regional Economic Issues (REI) Program, whose staff was being temporarily housed in the bank’s research department while a permanent headquarters for the monitoring agency was sought. (REI’s initial affiliation with Cleveland State University, made possible by a two-year operating grant of $425,000 from The Cleveland Foundation, had recently been terminated because of administrative conflicts.)
In the spring of 1985 REI issued its findings, which even PSF's supporters would describe as "surprising." In the five years since PSF's capital campaign had begun, the researchers reported, nearly 1,500 jobs had been created in the Playhouse Square area, which had also seen office occupancies rise from 75 to 89 percent. Since 1980 the district had enjoyed more than $100 million in new capital improvements—investments which were in turn generating $10 million in new tax revenues for the City of Cleveland annually. That revenue figure would jump to $16 million when and if the Palace opened—justification alone for raising the $12.4 million McKinsey had estimated would be needed to complete Playhouse Square Center.

"Our study was useful in getting Cleveland Tomorrow involved," said Michael S. Fogarty, REI's director. Indeed, the organization of CEOs agreed to take on responsibility for the Palace's capital campaign, which was successfully completed by the end of 1986. Cleveland Tomorrow's positive introduction to the field of physical redevelopment led directly to its later support of North Coast Development Corporation and Neighborhood Progress, Incorporated. The economic benefits study had happy repercussions as well for REI, which soon found a steady client. "Shortly after we completed the Playhouse Square study, Cleveland Tomorrow asked us to do all their economic analysis," Fogarty said. "This was a big step toward establishing our credibility and our self-sufficiency."

REI, which today has a new name (the Center for Regional Economic Issues) and a new home (at CWRU's Weatherhead School of Management), also went on to conduct applied research projects for the city's economic development and planning departments. These and other commissioned studies prompted Anita A. Summers, professor and associate chairperson of public management at the Wharton School of Business, to pronounce the agency "an invaluable asset to Cleveland—one that gives it an economic decision-making edge over . . . other comparable urban areas."  

Similarly, Cleveland Tomorrow director Richard Shatten, who had initially dismissed the Rand study as "data not connected to strategy," would in time come to regard REI as his association's "brains." "Corporate leadership organizations," he explained, "distinguish themselves by being right, not by being powerful. Power gets people's attention, but success comes from being right, and we're often right because we now have an interactive relationship with REI."
For example, in 1986 REI was commissioned to help assess the strength of the city's scientific and engineering research base as part of Cleveland Tomorrow's mid-course evaluation of where the organization should now concentrate its attention and investments. The resulting report found that, while university research contributes greatly to the economic performance of a region because universities provide business and industry with employees, consultants, training services and new technologies, Cleveland had slipped in its national ranking as a research center. With the assistance of grants from The Cleveland Foundation and BP America, Cleveland Tomorrow created the Technology Leadership Council in 1987 to develop a comprehensive strategy aimed at stimulating local research and development funding and expanding and invigorating university-industry partnerships. As REI's Fogarty later explained, "the technologically most innovative environments have more than one major research university. But 90 percent of the funded research here is done by Case Western Reserve University, and 60 percent of that is medical."

That Cleveland was able to boast of a medical research base of some stature could be attributed in part to The Cleveland Foundation's foresight in assisting the School of Medicine at Case Western Reserve University through a difficult transition in the early eighties, when the chairs of its departments of microbiology, anatomy, pathology and physiology all resigned or retired. How the vacancies were filled would affect the school's ability to compete for national science funding well into the next century. Determined to reposition the medical school, which had long enjoyed a reputation for excellence in teaching, by recruiting preeminent researchers in such fields as molecular biology, genetics, basic immunology and neurohormonal regulations—biomedical research being a field in which CWRU lagged—retiring dean Frederick C. Robbins encouraged his successor, Richard E. Behrman, to approach the Foundation in the fall of 1980 with a request for assistance in rebuilding the school's basic science departments. (Robbins had already broached the subject with Homer Wadsworth, who shared the Nobel Prize-winning physician's belief that the medical school was critical to the strength of Cleveland's health care industry.)

The Foundation was to give the proposal serious consideration, despite the fact that Behrman had asked for $3 million—three times the funding of the Foundation's largest previous grant. Behrman argued persua-
sively that the ability of many Cleveland hospitals to attract topflight physicians depended on the vigor and reputation of the school at which the recruits would hold joint appointments to the faculty. "The cornerstone of their recruitment is [our] strong basic science departments," Behrman contended, "... which provide the research and educational foundation for many of the clinical care and education programs and the applied clinical research activities at our hospitals." The dean also stressed that biomedical research could have important economic spin-offs locally—an argument that Wadsworth personally did not care to push very far because of the unpredictability of the results of scientific inquiry.

By January 1981 The Cleveland Foundation had assembled a team of 11 nationally known basic scientists to conduct a site visit at the school. Led by cardiovascular-pulmonary specialist Dr. Alfred P. Fishman of the University of Pennsylvania (a medical consultant on whom Wadsworth had relied heavily in Kansas City), the visitors had reviewed the proposal in three days of intensive meetings with school personnel. They later recommended that the Foundation support the program, suggesting the rebuilding of the departments one at a time, with a new site review to be conducted prior to releasing funding for each additional department. With an initial grant of $500,000 awarded in March, Behrman recruited a nationally recognized specialist in gene expression to chair the department of microbiology, provided the new chair with the financial means to make several important additions to the faculty and outfitted his laboratory. In 1983 an additional $500,000 grant allowed the anatomy department to be similarly strengthened. By the time work began on restaffing the fourth and final department in 1986, the Foundation had awarded more than $2 million to the medical school, with each grant contingent on the successful completion of an on-site review by Fishman and other appropriate experts.

In addition to solidifying Behrman's commitment to raise a $25 million endowment for the medical school, the long-range planning the Foundation encouraged as a condition of its grants ultimately prompted the university to announce plans for a $76 million biomedical research center to accommodate its expanding medical faculty. The grants also leveraged "maybe $20 million" in federal research funds by the end of 1989, according to senior program officer Robert E. Eckardt, who, having taken over responsibility for the Foundation's health program when
Rich Tompkins left in late 1981, had guided all of the medical school grants but the first. Indeed, by 1988, the combined total of national grants to medical school faculty had helped to propel CWRU back into the ranks of the top 20 private research universities nationally. Perhaps equally important for the city’s economic future, the State of Ohio decided in 1986 to capitalize on Cleveland’s emergence as a leader in the field of biomedicine by launching the Edison Biotechnology Center. Also financed by 28 charter members—local biotechnology companies who pay annual membership dues—the center undertook to encourage the commercial application of biomedical research conducted at the medical school, its affiliated University Hospitals and the Cleveland Clinic.

In reviewing the impact of the Foundation’s relatively modest grants to the $175 million operation that was then the medical school, the 1986 annual report aptly codified the unwritten strategy of the Wadsworth era. “Thoughtfully placed, such grants can sometimes provide, like a nudge from a tiny tugboat putting its shoulder to one of the great ore barges entering the Cuyahoga, the necessary leverage to help an important institutional effort gain momentum. . . .”