Willard’s progressive programs and the corporate culture that they molded suffered further erosion in the years following his semireirement and subsequent death. Given the low likelihood of finding a successor of equal stature, that should not be unanticipated. What is remarkable is not the continuing decline of the programs and culture, but their continuing strength. They declined, they stabilized, they declined some more: they lingered for a very long time before they died. The CTP and at least the partial shell of the Cooperative Plan outlived Willard by two decades, and traces of the B&O spirit were detectable even longer. In light of the various stresses to which they were subjected, their staying power was singular, and an impressive testimony to the depth of Willard’s imprint upon the company.

An overview of that imprint is presented at the beginning of this chapter, with particular attention to its similarity to the postwar management practices of the typical large Japanese corporation. Then the administrations of Willard’s successors are discussed, with respect to leadership character, state of the Willard programs, and general company performance. Finally, the end of the B&O is briefly chronicled, from its acquisition by the Chesapeake & Ohio in 1963 to its official disappearance into CSX Corporation in 1987.

Daniel Willard celebrated his eightieth birthday and the beginning of his thirty-second year as president of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad in January 1941. It was time for the board of directors to entertain seriously his offer to resign. A special committee of the board was named to conduct a search for a new president; in April they settled upon Roy B. White, the president of West-
Daniel Willard receiving an honorary doctor of laws degree from Isaiah Bowman, president of Johns Hopkins University, June 3, 1941. (Courtesy of the B&O Railroad Museum)

ern Union Telegraph Company and a former B&O official. On June 1 Willard assumed the newly created position of chairman of the board, and White succeeded him as president.¹

Willard was characteristically gracious in giving way to his successor, but to be so must have required some effort at times. He continued daily to go to the office—now a much smaller and less elegant office than his old one—to answer his mail and to confer occasionally with officers and visitors, but he was no longer at the center of the action. The situation caused him considerable sadness and frustration; more than once he quietly complained to friends and long-time colleagues of how disappointing it was to be “on the shelf.”²

As confined as his new job was, he still preferred it to ten more years of life with no job at all. That was the choice that his doctor laid before him seven months into his chairmanship. His heart condition was worsening; essentially, his alternatives were to retire altogether or to die. Willard chose
spending a short time handling his correspondence and talking to people at his
plain little office over spending a long time staring out the window at his Con-
necticut farmhouse. Four and a half months later he was hospitalized by an-
other heart attack, and six weeks after that, on July 6, 1942, he passed away.³

Daniel Willard had been brought to Baltimore in 1910 as an operating
man, to build up the property and to run it efficiently. In that regard he did not
disappoint the directors who hired him, or their successors. The railroad that
he turned over to Roy White was, despite the depredations of the Depression,
in far better shape physically than it was when he arrived. The B&O was still
the third-place eastern railroad, but it ran a considerably closer third than it
had three decades before. By some measures of operating efficiency, it ran
first. Among the eastern Big Three, the B&O had the best transportation ratio
(transportation expenses divided by railway operating revenues) in 77 of the
120 months of the 1930s; the Pennsylvania's ratio was best for 29 months, and
the New York Central's for only 14. In 1939 the B&O recorded a transpor-
tation ratio of just 35.40 percent, compared to 36.00 percent for the PRR and
37.27 percent for the NYC.⁴ The B&O's reputation for gracious passenger
service, noted in the preceding chapter, was firmly established; its punctuality
was exemplary. The company even had acquired a bit of reputation as an inno-
vator, having been a pioneer among eastern roads in air-conditioning, stream-
lining, and dieselizeation of passenger trains.⁵

Nonetheless, it was in the realm of human relations that Willard's legacy
was most significant and enduring. Nearly five decades after his death, retired
B&O employees vigorously and almost unanimously insist that their company
enjoyed better labor-management relations and greater general camaraderie
throughout their careers than did competing lines, and they trace this phe-
nomenon to the presidency of Daniel Willard.

Why is this the case? What was the essence of his approach to his people,
the defining quality of his management style that his counterparts on other
railroads could not or would not match? Scholars in the field of comparative
management systems would note in Willard's approach a substantial measure
of the Japanese concept of wa, the company as harmonious community. Dif-
fences between that important governing principle of the typical postwar
Japanese corporation and Willard's abiding concern for the development of
B&O family spirit are difficult to distinguish. Similarities between Japanese
and Willardian approaches to management can be perceived as well at more
specific levels; the parallel between Japanese quality circles and B&O Co-
operative Plan committees already has been discussed. Even some of the
smallest details of the way things were done on Willard's B&O, such as the
use of a company song at employee gatherings, are characteristic of corporate
Japan.
Prompted by the preoccupation of the American business community during the 1980s with Japanese managerial success, one might ask how closely Willard's philosophies and actions correspond to a comprehensive list of the basic qualities of "the Japanese management system." That term is itself problematic; there is no one management system followed by all Japanese business. The term as it is understood in the United States refers to qualities that for the most part are found only among large Japanese corporations, not among small businesses. Even in the corporate sector, those cited qualities do not apply to the management of most women and part-time employees, and the strength of adherence to particular principles varies somewhat from company to company. So "Japanese management" is not a unitary concept. That point being understood, it is still an interesting concept, and the question remains worth asking: To what degree were there parallels between this postwar Japanese "system" and the prewar B&O?

As the concept of the system itself is somewhat abstracted and idealized, it is reasonable to work from an idealized list of its qualities. The best known of such lists, overstated as to degree but substantively correct, is that of William Ouchi. According to Ouchi, the typical Japanese corporation is governed by the following principles:

1. Lifetime employment
2. Slow evaluation and promotion
3. Nonspecialized career paths
4. Little emphasis on detailed, quantifiable, short-run objectives
5. Collective decision making
6. Collective responsibility
7. Concern for total well-being of the employee

The record of Willard's B&O with respect to some of these points does not consist of extensive and compelling evidence, but it suggests some similar tendencies. Lifetime employment, albeit with frequent layoffs among junior blue-collar workers, was the norm on the B&O; this was true of other railroads, but Willard made efforts to minimize layoffs that exceeded those of his competitors. Evaluation and promotion of employees inevitably were slow, as a result of the combination of lifetime employment and the lack of significant long-term company growth, as well as Willard's personal caution; Arthur Thompson was much more the exception than the rule. With respect to Ouchi's third point, nonspecialized career paths, the pattern of similarity is broken. Again as on other railroads, the typical B&O employee worked his way upward in the department in which he was hired; the careers of C. N. Fullerton, Helen Foreman, and G. P. Grimsley were unusual. Similarity
seems to reappear on the fourth point: the B&O’s only detailed and clearly stated quantitative objectives or constraints were in the form of departmental budgets, but detailed objectives were not much in vogue across American industry before World War II anyway.

Regarding point five, collective decision making, the B&O did make a conscious and moderately successful effort that tended to correspond to the Japanese pattern. The Cooperative Plan entailed fairly broad-based group participation in lower-level decisions, subject to the ratification of upper management; at upper levels Willard himself evidently relied heavily on staff meetings and on the advice of subordinates to shape his decisions. These are not examples of “democratic” leadership in any sense, but neither is that of the Japanese corporation of which Ouchi writes. Both approaches might be called “group-centered, moderately authoritarian”; Ouchi well might have used such a term instead of collective, with its implication of communal participation in all decisions. On the other hand, collective accurately describes both the Japanese and Willardian notions of who is responsible for the performance of the company and its parts: every employee holds shared responsibility. A central element of both the Cooperative Plan and the CTP was the sharing of suggestions and mutual aid across departmental lines. In neither case was an individual incentive offered; all employees would benefit or none would. With respect to the seventh point, an all-encompassing concern for the employee, the B&O’s stance corresponded to the Ouchi model from the establishment of the Welfare Bureau in 1916.

In summary it might be concluded that Willard’s management style was at least for its time unusually close to Ouchi’s model of mid- to late-twentieth-century Japanese management along three of the seven dimensions (numbers 5, 6, and 7), close but not unusually so for its industry along another three (numbers 1, 2, and 4), and dissimilar along the remaining one (number 3). Such a record does not qualify Willard to be called the “first Japanese manager,” but it might add interesting information to the discussion of the real origins of an approach to management widely assumed to be essentially Oriental.

To Daniel Willard all of this would be somewhat bemusing and substantially beside the point. He did not consider himself a particularly creative thinker, and he never displayed any serious interest in grand and elaborate theories of management style. As he often stated, his notion of what constituted proper management was reducible to the eleven words of the Golden Rule. The term management style itself seems not to fit him; style is too shallow and artificial a concept to describe the way in which he led his company. He did not act as he did because, like many American managers today, he had heard that someone had come up with a great new theory that could be used to ma-
Resolution presented to Daniel Willard by the B&O General Chairmen's Association, Baltimore, October 30, 1941. (Courtesy of the B&O Railroad Museum)

nipulate workers into being more productive. He acted as he did because of what he believed to be right.

If Willard's philosophy of management can be summarized in a single maxim, then perhaps his day-to-day practice of management can be summarized in a single incident. The following story was told by Dr. Isaiah Bowman, president of Johns Hopkins University, at a testimonial dinner held in Willard's honor on December 4, 1941:

Years ago, one of his men was dismissed from his job of engine hostler in the B&O roundhouse at Frederick because it was alleged that he had burned out the crown sheet of an engine [a serious and dangerous act of negligence, causing
major damage to the firebox of a steam locomotive by allowing the water level in its boiler to fall too low]. Let the man himself tell the story as it was related to me by one of his employers who is here tonight.

"I didn't burn no crown sheet out of no damned engine, and I went home and told my old woman that I didn't burn no crown sheet out of no damned engine, and I says, 'It ain't fair,' and she says, 'Bill, 'tain't right, but there ain't no use your arguing about it. You go to Baltimore and see Mr. Willard and tell him what happened.'

"I was scared when I walked into that big office, and I says to myself, 'Bill, you're a damn fool. It won't do you no good to go in here.' But in I went, and there was Mr. Willard setting at a big desk. He knowed my name and he stood up and shook hands and said, 'Bill, have a seat, and tell me what's on your mind.'

"I sat down there and told him I was fired for burning the crown sheet out of an engine, and I said, 'Mr. Willard, that ain't right. I ain't never burned no crown sheet out of no engine, and there's politics in that shop. Another man burned the crown sheet out of that engine and I got fired for it, and it ain't fair.'

"Mr. Willard said, 'Bill, I think I see your point. Now you go back home, and I'll look into this matter.'

"I went back to Frederick feeling pretty blue, but at eight o'clock that night the call boy come for me and I went back where I was fired from that morning and hostled engines the same as I had always done. The man that burned the crown sheet out of the engine got fired, and so did the foreman that covered it up. No sir, there ain't nobody fooling Mr. Willard for very long."

The hostler and Dr. Bowman might have added, "There ain't nobody with a legitimate complaint being ignored by Mr. Willard for very long."

Willard's personnel programs—the safety campaign, the Welfare Bureau, the CTP and its predecessors, and especially the Cooperative Plan—may be understood simply as extensions of the basic moral principles evident in Bowman's story. Two such principles stand out: an uncompromising insistence upon thorough and conscientious work, and a deep respect and compassion for even the lowliest worker. Those two principles might seem to be in tension, with adherence to one limiting adherence to the other. But Willard, more than most men of his or any other time, was able to adhere firmly to both. In his funeral eulogy at the small community church in North Hartland, Alfred Rodman Hussey, Willard's long-time pastor at First Unitarian Church of Baltimore, referred to his ability to embrace both principles by calling him a "Puritan liberal." That is probably as good a two-word description of his moral philosophy as one can offer. And, to return to the original question of why he was able to leave such an enduring legacy of goodwill on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, that philosophy, rigorously practiced as a matter of
faith, was both the source of his vision and the determinant of his actions. Beyond his native intelligence and his broad experience, it was the reason for his success.

Having to go outside the company to find a new president is often an indication that something is amiss. At the least it suggests that the retiring president did not take care to groom an adequate successor. Willard may have been liable to such criticism; he may have been, despite his offers to resign, too reluctant to begin relinquishing his central position in the company. Still, it can be argued that Willard should not be judged too harshly in this matter. The logical internal successor to Willard, the person with the broadest experience and responsibility within the company, would have been operations vice president Charles Galloway, but Galloway had suffered a fatal heart attack in December 1940, at the age of seventy-two. Galloway’s successor, C. W. Van Horn, had barely settled into his new office when the search for a new president began; Van Horn was not really prepared for the presidency. Given the advanced age of other B&O officers—senior vice president and chief financial officer George M. Shriver was seventy-three in 1941—Willard may be faulted for allowing something of a gerontocracy to develop. But it would have been inappropriate for him to ask Galloway to step aside for a younger man; the company’s operating and transportation ratios indicate that Galloway was doing a fine job, and besides, Galloway was eight years Willard’s junior.

More significantly, Roy White was not really an outsider. He came to the B&O presidency via the presidency of Western Union, but in fact he was a twenty-five-year B&O veteran. He began his career in 1900 as a telegraph operator at Dana, Illinois, on what later became the B&O’s Indianapolis Division. In 1901 he was promoted to the position of train dispatcher at Indianapolis; he then became, in succession, chief train dispatcher, chief clerk to the B&O general superintendent in Cincinnati, superintendent of the Illinois Division, superintendent of the Indiana Division, superintendent of the Philadelphia Division, and superintendent of the Baltimore Division. In 1921 he became general superintendent of the Maryland District, and in 1923 he was made general manager of the B&O’s New York properties. He ended his direct employment by the B&O when in 1926 he was elected senior vice president of the Central Railroad of New Jersey, the indirectly controlled (through the B&O’s partial ownership of the Reading Company) line over which the B&O’s trains entered the New York metropolitan area. Before the year was over, he was elected president of the Jersey Central. He held that position until 1933, when he assumed the Western Union presidency.10

Given his long familiarity with the B&O and the general reverence with which his predecessor was viewed around the company, White made no major
changes early in his administration. He professed himself a firm supporter of Willard’s labor policies, and “SUGGESTIONS ARE ALWAYS IN ORDER” continued to appear on the editorial page masthead of *Baltimore & Ohio Magazine* for a time. The Cooperative Plan actually underwent something of a revival, at least in terms of the companywide attention focused upon it. With wartime traffic pushing the limits of B&O capacity, the railroad’s rolling stock was subjected to a punishing rate of utilization, and the efficiency and creativity of shop forces once more became critical concerns. As a result, to publicize and to reinvigorate the Plan in the shops, beginning in November 1942 the company magazine began running a pictorial page featuring local cooperative committees and various innovations implemented as a result of their discussions.

The new “shop achievements” page tended to focus on relatively inventive time- and labor-saving devices suggested by individual workers through the committees, usually looking past matters of working conditions or of parts and materials availability. For example, the December 1942 page featured Glenwood machinist W. B. Gallegger and the fifty-ton hydraulic press that he had adapted for use in locomotive stoker maintenance, along with Mount Clare general foreman J. A. Finnegan and his portable link trunnion bracket boring machine. Similarly, the page in August 1943 pictured Cumberland Back Shop electrical foreman W. P. Yarnall and five devices that he had designed, one of which was a train control receiver ventilator; in addition, the Ivorydale cooperative committee was shown seated at their conference table.

In October 1943 the page contained photographs and descriptions of a vise bench fabricated from scrap superheater tubes by Clarksburg boilermaker A. W. Seward, an oil immersion tank for riveting hammers suggested by Glenwood general car foreman J. J. McGuirk, and a small swinging boom crane suggested by Tenth Street (Pittsburgh) electrician J. Ohara and carman C. Martin, primarily for use in loading used batteries onto trucks for disposal.

Despite his commendable showcasing of Cooperative Plan successes, though, there are grounds upon which one might question whether White’s commitment to the Plan and its underlying premises was as deep as Willard’s. For one thing, conspicuous support of the Plan was the politic posture for White to take, without respect to his attitude toward union men. Labor-management production committees were being touted by the War Production Drive headquarters as a vital means of ensuring proper patriotic efficiency in war-related industries. In August 1942, three months before the Plan page began appearing in *Baltimore & Ohio Magazine*, the *Saturday Evening Post* published a lengthy and laudatory article entitled “It Worked for the B&O,” describing the Cooperative Plan as a model for such committees, one that should be followed by all firms involved in the war effort. The article was
Mount Clare machinist W. E. Griffith and his improved journal polishing device. From *Baltimore & Ohio Magazine*, November 1942. (Courtesy of the B&O Railroad Museum)

reprinted by the U.S. Government Printing Office and given wide distribution beyond the Post's readership. Under the circumstances, for White not to publicize the program in-house might have seemed at least curious.¹³

Adding more substance to suspicions about White's commitment was his apparent reluctance to implement the Cooperative Plan when he was president of the Jersey Central. In December 1930, early in the discussion of setting up separate maintenance of way cooperative committees on the B&O, Bert Jewell wrote to Otto Beyer that after a preliminary conference with Willard, he should take up the matter with White, "looking toward the inauguration of this program on the C. R. of N.J." Jewell hoped to use a successful MW pilot program to entice White into support of a full Jersey Central version of the Cooperative Plan, and to increase the membership of the federated shopcrafts unions in the process: "[Inaugurating a cooperative program] would thus afford you an opportunity to make a demonstration to Mr. White of the advantages occurring to management from such cooperative relations with a bona
fide organization, and thus we [the Executive Council] hoped to secure his active cooperation, instead of just his policy of non-opposition in organizing those eligible to membership in these six federated trades.”14 There is no known evidence that White ever formally discussed the issue with Beyer or with any other union representative, or that the Cooperative Plan was ever formally extended to the CNJ—its partial ownership by the B&O notwithstanding.

Simply and obviously, Roy White was not Daniel Willard. Willard’s general image among his employees was that of kindly and gentle “Uncle Dan”; White generally was viewed as tougher, more intimidating, and less accessible.15 His approach to his job often seemed to reflect the quasi-military mindset of the traditional railroad officer. In fact, he pronounced himself entirely comfortable when opportunity arose for him to appear at the office in military uniform.16 He had several such opportunities, the first at the end of December 1943, when a threatened nationwide rail strike led to the temporary seizure of the railroads by the federal government;17 White and six other railroad presidents were given commissions as colonels in the army, with authority to run their own and neighboring roads as units of the War Department. Similar actions, in response to the increasingly militant stance of the national leadership of the operating brotherhoods, were taken by President Truman briefly in 1946 and for somewhat longer periods in 1948 and 1950. During at least three of the four periods (the record regarding the 1946 instance is not clear), Colonel White appeared in public only in his carefully tailored army uniform. Presumably such deference to military protocol was expected of him by the War Department. But the uniformed display was somewhat out of keeping with the established “B&O family” atmosphere—employees commonly responded by saluting each other and by indulging in other forms of light, good-natured mockery, such as chalking sergeant’s stripes on their coat sleeves—and White appeared to be not much concerned.18 He gave no noticeable indication that he was apprehensive about the impact of military administration, and the labor strife that prompted it, upon the B&O’s reservoir of internal goodwill. That reservoir was large, and it would not be drained by a few nationwide strikes or by a somewhat daunting president who was pleased to play colonel for a few weeks every two or three years. However, he personally added little goodwill to the reservoir; at his best he simply maintained what was already there. Not surprisingly, he was not widely known as “Uncle Roy.”

None of the preceding observations should be taken to mean that White was in any way hostile to Willard’s cooperative programs. The commentary devoted to them in the company’s 1948 annual report suggests that he was quite pleased with them. But it appears that he liked them simply because they worked, not because they were the right thing to do in any normative sense. White was a nominal Presbyterian, but evidence that religion had much of an
impact on the manner in which he managed his company is scarce. As long as
the Cooperative Plan improved efficiency in the shops and as long as the CTP
generated new traffic, they were fine with him.

And the two programs basically still were doing those things. The Co-
operative Plan had nowhere near the vitality that it had during its early years,
but it still was producing suggestions, at a slightly higher rate than it had in the
last years of Willard’s presidency. The average number of suggestions per
month had reached a low of fifty-two during the 1934–1937 period; for the
period beginning in January 1938 and ending in March 1942, the average in-
creased marginally to fifty-five. Presumably because of the Plan’s increased
visibility and the restoration of a full work force (total B&O employees—
excluding those of the Alton, which was lost to bankruptcy in 1942—exceeded
sixty-four thousand by 1944”), the average number of suggestions per month
rose a little more, to sixty-eight, during the period from April 1942 through
December 1948.”

The Cooperative Traffic Program could claim at least equal success. Di-
rect and immediate traffic solicitation was unnecessary while the war con-
tinued, but the sustenance of employee morale and the development of good-
will among future customers remained essential; in those realms the CTP did
its job well. Regular CTP meetings stressed hard work and conscientious ser-
vice as a matter of patriotic duty. Major CTP rallies and entertainment, such as the Baltimore committees' “Red, White and Blue Revue” of October 1943, helped in somewhat lighter fashion to sustain employee morale, patriotism, and pride in the company. \(^{21}\) CTP special representatives John Bliss, Mildred Drechsler, and C. N. Fullerton (who had returned to the B&O after a year of government service when "Doc" Grimsley retired early in 1940), almost continuously on the road, made themselves available for speaking at functions such as blood donor drives, war bond rallies, and Red Cross campaign meetings, as well as regular CTP gatherings. Members of the CTP women's division were prominently active in local hospitals, station canteens for military personnel, the USO, and the Red Cross.\(^{22}\) The CTP thus contributed substantially both to reinforcing employee enthusiasm and to polishing the B&O's image as a good corporate citizen—resources for the company to draw upon in the event that traffic levels should slacken.

Of course, traffic did drop off considerably after the end of the war. From their 1944 peak of $395 million, B&O revenues fell 7 percent in 1945 and another 15 percent, to $311 million, in 1946. The CTP was again needed to serve its original purpose of direct traffic solicitation. White committed himself to support of the program, issuing an appeal for renewed interest in the CTP and its business-generating function in November 1946.\(^{23}\) He became somewhat more visible at CTP events, and his statements about the program seemed increasingly to indicate an appreciation of the Willard-era view of its benefits. At the CTP dinner held as part of the B&O Day celebration in New Castle in June 1948, White (attired in his colonel's uniform) included in his speech the following comments:

> Important as the business solicitation objective of the Cooperative Traffic Program has been, however, it has had another important result. The CTP has been a most useful agency on our line for expanding and further developing the B&O family spirit.

> You employees have put in for the Company work that you have done, I believe, because you have liked to do it, and work that, therefore, reflects the good feeling that exists so generally among us. So, you see, this good feeling which is so manifest here tonight and also among the CTP as a whole, is an extremely valuable thing, to us as members of the railroad family and to all the other interests connected with the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. It is my hope that this good feeling will increase and become more and more real in coming years. It is fundamental in the satisfaction of working for the B&O, and in the success of our joint enterprise.\(^{24}\)

In the company's 1948 annual report, White devoted considerable space to describing and praising the CTP, the Cooperative Plan, and the various other employee-centered programs of the B&O. In that year, the eighth of his presi-
dency, an observer might have gained the impression that the B&O had shaped White more than White had shaped the B&O.

Although in some cases lower in vitality, all of the major elements of the Willard personnel policy and program were still in place in 1948. The Cooperative Plan and CTP were alive and well, and the safety committees had been successful in bringing under control an employee injury rate that had increased during the war. Activities begun by the Welfare Bureau remained at many locations, in particular the athletic and musical groups at the larger B&O centers of activity. The Mount Clare Band was gone, but the Men's Glee Club and the Women's Music Club were more successful than ever. Each numbered over one hundred voices, and in 1948 they gave separately or together over one hundred concerts, including two nationwide broadcasts over the ABC radio network. *Baltimore & Ohio Magazine* had been instrumental in starting the B&O Junior Railroaders Club for B&O children in 1945; by 1948 the club had sixteen hundred members. The magazine had been cut in half from its late-1920s peak, to sixty-four pages, but it still won first prize as the best human interest publication in a contest conducted by the American Railway Magazine Editors Association. The pre-Willard Veterans' Association and its Ladies' Auxiliary remained active and healthy. Professional women on the B&O still were a tiny minority, but there were more of them than on any other railroad in the country.

Roy White surely deserves some credit for knowing when not to mess up a good thing. He may not have understood fully the wellsprings of the Willard heritage, but he did respect it.

An example both of the residual strength of that heritage and of White's somewhat passive willingness to let it to a certain point have its course was the "One Million New Customers" campaign. Begun in the summer of 1950 as a response to a 1949 traffic slump, it was essentially a direct-mail advertising campaign undertaken largely at employee expense. The company supplied postcards inviting prospective customers to try the B&O's services, and employees supplied postage and mailed the cards to friends and acquaintances. The campaign was proposed by Mount Clare machinist John A. Gribbin, who, interestingly, took the idea to his union lodge instead of the CTP or shops cooperative committee. The local machinists' chairman, W. E. Griffith, then took the proposal to shop superintendent C. H. Spence, who bounced it off his boss (A. K. Galloway, George Emerson's successor as superintendent of motive power and equipment) and J. W. Phipps, successor to O. S. Lewis as general freight traffic manager and official head of the CTP. Having secured management's blessing, Griffith presented the proposal successively to the local shopcrafts federation and to shopcrafts Federation No. 30, both of which endorsed it. The campaign was to be tested at Mount Clare; if successful, it
was to be passed to the CTP and the Veterans’ Association for systemwide implementation. Unfortunately, although more than seventy-five hundred postcards were mailed by Mount Clare employees during the first three weeks of the campaign, it did not spread. Primarily because traffic made a strong recovery on its own late in 1950 and through 1951, the campaign was shelved for three and a half years. Then in the spring of 1954, at the onset of a severe downturn in traffic, it was dusted off by John Bliss, run through channels again, and finally established across the railroad. More than sixty thousand postcards were distributed in roughly four months. The campaign, like the traffic solicitation postcard efforts of the 1920s, was a modest success—it was a good builder of B&O morale and public image—but machinist Gribbin never got his one million new customers.27

Roy White should be remembered as a fairly competent but generally uninspired administrator. Certainly he was not a leader of Daniel Willard’s stature. However, he did allow Willard’s personnel programs to continue, and he made some significant improvements to the B&O’s physical property. The company made money in every year of his presidency, albeit in some years not much. With the boom years of the war included, the B&O’s average annual return on equity during the White administration was 4.37 percent, somewhat better than the rate of return on a passbook savings account.28 When he retired at the age of seventy in August 1953, he passed on to his successor Howard Simpson a railroad that was reasonably sound, if not especially well prepared to cope with the increasing competitive pressures of subsidized highway and air transportation, and that still possessed an unusually loyal and conscientious work force.

Howard E. Simpson began his career in railroading at the age of fifteen, when he dropped out of school to become a clerk in the passenger department of the Central Railroad of New Jersey. By 1925, at the age of twenty-eight, he was the Jersey Central’s advertising agent. A year later he was division passenger agent at Newark, where he first came to the attention of Roy White. Simpson made a good impression, and by 1931 he was the road’s assistant general passenger agent. From that position he moved to the parent company, as B&O’s general passenger agent for New York and New England. He progressed upward through the B&O’s passenger department, finally becoming traffic vice president in 1947, upon the retirement of Golder Shumate.29

Simpson was a hearty, outgoing, affable man. By all indications he was well liked by everyone who knew him—a true member of the B&O family, his Jersey Central origins notwithstanding. Unfortunately, his geniality was probably by a wide margin his most outstanding quality. He was not notably visionary or innovative, and he was not a particularly dynamic leader. Like
White he did not dismantle any of the Willard personnel programs, but neither
did he add much to them, other than his occasional smiling presence. He
clearly loved his job, and he worked hard at it, but nothing much seemed to
happen under his direction. To the extent that good things were accomplished
on the B&O during his presidency, they are more likely traceable to the efforts
of his subordinates, and to remaining momentum from the Willard and White
eras, than to his leadership.

Of all the Willard programs, the CTP usually was given the most attention
during Simpson’s time as president. Its budget and staff, the former more
or less adjusted for inflation, stayed basically the same as they were in the late
1930s. The company continued to cover the costs of hall rental for major
rallies or meetings; otherwise, the local committees were financially on their
own. The program still had five full-time staff members: three special repre-
sentatives, a clerk, and a secretary.

The venerable C. N. Fullerton had immediate charge of the CTP as senior
special representative until his retirement, after fifty-two years of B&O ser-
vice, in January 1955. At that time Fullerton’s leadership role was assumed
by seventeen-year CTP veteran John Bliss, and William Howard moved over
from other traffic department responsibilities to help Bliss with the men’s divi-
sion. Mildred Drechsler, who had supervised the women’s division since
1943, continued to do so and to write the narrative for the “CTP Activities”
pages of B&O Magazine. Aided by their clerk, who prepared the monthly
CTP Bulletin from statistical summaries sent in by local committee chairmen,
and by their secretary, the triumvirate of Bliss, Drechsler, and Howard ran the
CTP for the remainder of its existence.

They spent most of their time on the road, especially during picnic season
in July and August and during Christmas party season in December. Their
itineraries usually were determined by a balancing of three needs: to respond
to local committee invitations, to visit each location with approximately equal
frequency, and to minimize travel time. For example, if the women’s commit-
tee in Flora wished Drechsler to attend their tea as guest and speaker, she
would arrange to do so if she had not been there for a few months and if she
could arrange to visit nearby points—perhaps St. Louis, or North Vernon or
Washington, Indiana—on the same trip. During their visits they conferred
with local committee officers and brought meeting attendees up to date, by
speech and occasionally by film, on what was happening around the railroad.
More broadly, they were cheerleaders, exhorting CTP participants to keep up
the good work.

And good work was generally what CTP participants were doing, al-
though it did not measure up well against the work that was done during the
program’s early years. Business reported through the CTP committees in 1955
amounted to 5,016 freight carloads, 12,315 LCL shipments, and 17,186 passengers. The numbers represented 23, 64, and 51 percent, respectively, of the annual averages for the years 1934 through 1938. The loss of the Alton might have caused a reduction in reported traffic of about 10 percent, but that loss would have been to some degree offset by higher employment on the B&O proper (despite productivity-related cuts in immediately preceding years, there were still 9 percent more B&O employees in 1955 than in 1937). The fact was that the CTP was still generating traffic, but the numbers were down in comparison to those of the Willard era. There was little chance of significant underreporting; if anything, some of the numbers might have been a bit overstated. All solicited traffic still was self-reported, by the employee or family member through the local committee to the CTP office in Baltimore. The potential for abuse remained, and occasionally it was realized. For example, the women’s chairman in Philadelphia was strongly suspected of routinely inflating her reported passenger traffic during this period. Neither Drechsler nor Bliss called her to account, though; it was considered critical to avoid embarrassing either the program or the chairman, given the outside possibility that her reports actually were accurate.

The essence of the decline in tangible success of the CTP was less a dearth of effort by CTP participants than a dearth of CTP participants. In January 1955, for example, only 515 employees or family members reported traffic—less than two-thirds of the number for January 1934, before the program was in full operation, and not much more than one-third of the 1934–1938 average. Meeting attendance was generally lower than it was in the early years. Fewer meetings were being held; only fifty-two committees gathered with their memberships in January 1955. The loyal and enthusiastic employees of the 1950s appear to have been a lesser percentage of the B&O family than they were in the 1930s. At some locations their number seems to have fallen below the critical mass necessary to make programs like the CTP work consistently and independently.

Some formerly flourishing CTP groups failed to meet for months at a time, until they were rebuilt or reenergized by the special representatives from Baltimore. In Zanesville, for example, by late 1956 the CTP was moribund: meetings were not being held, and traffic was not being reported. Then early in 1957, Bliss prevailed upon newly transferred ticket agent Paul Mobus to take on the CTP men’s chairmanship and to engineer a turnaround. For four months, results were marginal. Then Mobus began offering small prizes for outstanding contributions, and posting lists of winners. Bliss helped by agreeing to have the CTP office pick up the cost of spouses’ meals at the reinstated annual dinners and dances. By the end of the year, the program was up and running again. B&O employment in Zanesville had dropped to about seventy
with the 1956 transfer of signal shop activities to Cumberland; of those seventy roughly fifty resumed some form of active or passive CTP involvement. A similar cycle of decline, intervention from Baltimore, and revival was typical of local CTP activity throughout the decade.

If fault for the CTP's decline is to be assigned, it likely should be placed some levels higher in the hierarchy than the level of the CTP office. Fullerton, Bliss, Drechsler, and Howard were all unusually energetic, positive, outgoing, articulate, and engaging people, possessing precisely the qualities necessary to enlist their peers in a volunteer effort. The problem is that many employees never bothered to meet them. During the Willard era, one might surmise that some skeptical employees were coaxed or led to their first CTP meetings by a combination of gentle coercion and moral suasion, as well as avuncular understanding, that emanated from the top of the company. Little of such qualities emanated from the president's chair when it was occupied by Howard Simpson. He was an affable fellow, but he lacked gravitas: confidence-inspiring weight and dignity and purposefulness. Moreover, what weight he did have, he did not much lend to the CTP. During his eight years as president, he appeared at two major CTP functions: the twentieth-anniversary
dinner held in Cumberland the month after he took office, and the Baltimore women's division dinner dance in January 1956, at which Maryland governor Theodore McKeldin was the principal speaker. Simpson had refused an invitation to speak at the latter meeting, but he was forced to attend anyway when McKeldin was invited in his place and accepted.

The CTP suffered decline during the Simpson years, but it was not just coasting by any means. CTP leadership was responsible for the reintroduction and distribution of reciprocity cards in the spring of 1956, an effort repeated in the spring of 1958. In the fall of 1958 a campaign to increase LCL freight traffic was launched through the CTP. As the decade ended, with the B&O's financial condition rapidly deteriorating, CTP meeting attendance generally stabilized, with major social events continuing to draw much larger crowds than regular business meetings. In one instance attendance reached a number characteristic of the Willard era: the picnic and railroad open house jointly sponsored by the men's and women's committees of Salamanca (New York) in August 1959 drew more than fifteen hundred employees, plus their family members, from points all over the B&O's former BR&P lines. More typically, the Martinsburg dinner meeting of April 1960 drew 144 people, the Cumberland dinner dance of June 1960 drew 220, and the Baltimore picnic at Kurtz Beach later that summer was attended by approximately 800. The Baltimore dinner dance in March 1960, at which an editor of Modern Railroads magazine was the principal speaker, was attended by 400 people, an improvement over the 300 who attended that event four years earlier to hear Simpson and Governor McKeldin.

Meanwhile, the Cooperative Plan had virtually disappeared from public view. The Cooperative Plan page had been dropped from Baltimore & Ohio Magazine in 1948, and the Plan was not mentioned in the company's annual report after that year. By the mid-1950s, people outside the company, and many of those inside, would not have known whether the Plan still existed without undertaking a pointed inquiry. A lengthy internal report on the organization and functions of the company's personnel department, issued the month that Simpson took office, made no reference to the Cooperative Plan. A booklet issued to participants in the B&O's technical graduate training course, also dating from the early part of the Simpson presidency, likewise said nothing of the Plan, although it did refer to quarterly systemwide motive power department management meetings. A page in the August 1956 company magazine, describing devices recently developed by Glenwood shop employees, contained no mention of the Cooperative Plan; neither did the record of a June 1956 luncheon conference between Simpson and the general chairmen of the various labor organizations on the B&O, including the shopcrafts unions. The 1958 edition of the company's new-employee handbook mentioned the CTP
and the Veterans’ Association, but not the Cooperative Plan. It contained instead a section on suggestions, headed by a cartoon showing an overalled employee and a business-suited manager in front of a sign reading “SUGGESTIONS ARE ALWAYS IN ORDER,” urging employees to send their suggestions to the corporate secretary in Baltimore, who would have them evaluated by a management suggestion committee.41

Invisible as it may have been outside the shops, the Cooperative Plan survived into the Simpson years in much of its original outward form. Local meetings were held monthly in most shops on company time; the top manager at the facility, a stores department employee, and a few foremen usually represented management, and one member of each of the shopcrafts unions usually represented labor. System meetings were held quarterly in Baltimore, most often over lunch at a downtown hotel; management normally was represented by the company’s chief mechanical officer, the car department superintendent, the regional motive power superintendents, one or two master mechanics, the purchasing agent, and the superintendent of the stores department.42

The matters under discussion likewise often bore some similarity to those of the program’s early years. Many items considered at local cooperative meetings were much like those listed in chapter 2: lack of proper tools, insufficient locker space, poor lighting, drafty conditions in winter, and lack of toilet paper, as well as supervisory complaints about poor quality of workmanship. However, in comparison to those of the 1920s, local meetings tended to have shorter agendas and to be oriented more heavily toward small gripes; truly innovative suggestions were rare. The typical quarterly system meeting was more a forum for general discussions of conditions around the railroad than a decision-making conference for resolution of suggestions or complaints not resolved at the local level.43

Without visible attention, support, or publicity from the top of the company, the conduct of the Plan in the field apparently was left increasingly to the discretion of local management. If the shop manager was a true disciple of the B&O way of doing things, then the program still functioned to some extent as originally intended. On the other hand, if the supervisor had drifted away from (or never accepted) the Willardian culture, then the program tended to become a mostly meaningless shell. By the late fifties, instances of the latter seem to have been fairly numerous. At some locations the program, such as it was, was not even generally known as the Cooperative Plan, for the very good reason that there was not much cooperative about it. Local meetings might consist simply of the superintendent’s calling the union people into his office, telling them what he wanted done, and then sending them out to do it.44 That was not what Willard, Beyer, and Johnston had in mind back in 1923.

At best the Cooperative Plan had become a matter of unremarked routine,
not only for management but also for the unions. In 1940 the Plan was a matter of some importance to shopcrafts labor; System Federation No. 30 had a standing committee on cooperation, and the 1940 biennial convention of the federation strongly endorsed both the Cooperative Plan and the CTP. Over the subsequent two decades, however, union interest in the Plan diminished considerably. This shift in attitude was not marked by any apparent sudden antipathy toward the notion of cooperation; the loss of union enthusiasm came gradually. At the 1950 convention of Federation No. 30, the committee on cooperation was no longer in existence, but addresses on cooperative matters by C. N. Fullerton and A. K. Galloway were generally well received, and the Gribbin One Million New Customer campaign was approved without major dissent. The 1952 convention was a shade more militant, pushing to impose more restrictive work rules on the company, but the assembly still voted to retain in the preamble to the federation bylaws a statement of intent to “bring about closer cooperation between management and employees.” By 1960 the stance of the federation was noticeably adversarial. That year’s convention accepted a revision of federation bylaws that removed the cooperation objective from the preamble, and the tone of some of the resolutions adopted by the body was distinctly hostile to management.\(^{45}\)

The deterioration of relations between the shopcrafts unions and the B&O was paralleled, and probably accelerated somewhat, by increasing acrimony in railroad labor-management relations in general. In particular the operating brotherhoods—those of the engineers, firemen, conductors, and trainmen—seem to have reached the conclusion that railroad management was their enemy. More than highway competition or inequitable government policy or their own highly restrictive contractual work rules, railroad managers were blamed by union officers for the failure of their memberships to improve their relative economic positions. Their actions consequently were not to cooperate with management against the forces threatening their industry, but to fight them tooth and nail for every last penny that would be taken from them.\(^{46}\)

By the liberal use of strikes or threats thereof, the brotherhoods were quite successful in their continuing battle. Wages of operating employees rose considerably faster in the postwar years than did railroad revenues. Perhaps more significantly, their militance enabled them to be amazingly successful at protecting their memberships against technological job loss. The diesel locomotive made the locomotive fireman obsolete, and radio communication reduced the need for a second brakeman on many freight trains. Nonetheless, the brotherhoods insisted, upon pain of strike, that those positions be maintained. At one point in 1950, the firemen’s brotherhood even demanded that a second fireman be required on diesels, as if one man staring at the scenery or sleeping the miles away were not enough. That demand was not met, but
smaller concessions on work rules were granted, in that instance and in others, and railroad payroll costs continued to spiral upward.\textsuperscript{47}

Management for its part was increasingly angered by the waste that all of this entailed. The combination of "featherbed" manning requirements and short, nineteenth-century crew districts created situations in which ten people (two crews of an engineer, a fireman, a conductor, and two brakemen) would have to be paid to make a two-hundred-mile run—work that often could be accomplished easily by three people. Such circumstances reinforced the positions of rail managers who had held that the unions were the enemy all along. With both sides thus convinced, more or less, that the other side was the enemy, labor-management relations on the operations side of railroading degenerated into trench warfare. The struggle's long-term costs to both sides were high, as competing modes of transportation were not beset by similar bloodletting. Still, the brotherhoods, their militance aided by greater political clout than they had possessed a generation earlier, were making appreciable short-run gains. Shopcrafts union leaders could not help but notice this, and their estimation of the benefits of cooperation thus presumably was adjusted downward a notch or two.

In this context a number of changes specific to the B&O take on added significance to the loss of shopcrafts enthusiasm for cooperation. One irritant to the shopmen, of increasing aggravation during postwar employment cutbacks, was outside purchasing of parts and subcontracting of equipment repair, a practice that they viewed with some justification as being in violation of the spirit of the Cooperative Plan. Then there was the apparently growing ineffectuality of the Plan as a means of accomplishing nonroutine working condition improvements that earlier in its life it would have addressed more satisfactorily. During the last years of the White presidency and on through the Simpson administration, matters that formerly would have been resolved within the cooperative committee structure were being raised before the federation convention as resolutions, to be handled as bargaining points in contract negotiations with the company. Heating of the Martinsburg wash and locker room, leather jackets for welders, asbestos gloves for boilermakers working with hot firebox components, better ventilation to remove diesel fumes from roundhouses: these and many similar requests were no longer being granted through the cooperative committees.\textsuperscript{48}

Compounding the unions' understandably negative response to such signs of management's diminished commitment to the Plan were changes in union organization and leadership. In 1948 the shopcrafts employees of the Western Maryland, like the Reading and the Jersey Central partially owned by the B&O but not participating in the Cooperative Plan, were folded into System Federation No. 30. By 1960 shopmen of the independent Akron, Canton, &
Youngstown had been added as well. The federation was no longer exclusively a part of the B&O family, and the Cooperative Plan no longer even nominally applied to all of its members. Of at least equal importance was the fact that none of the union leaders who had worked personally with Daniel Willard in the development of the Plan was still in office. Bert Jewell had left the presidency of the AFL’s Railway Employees’ Department in 1946, and Federation No. 30 president Harry Doyle, who had succeeded William McGee in 1932, had retired from his position in 1948.49 Their successors did not really know Daniel Willard, nor did they know William Johnston or Otto Beyer. They were acquainted with Roy White or Howard Simpson or both, and they knew the militant and powerful leaders of the operating brotherhoods. That they displayed an attitude toward union-management cooperation somewhat different from that of their predecessors is not surprising.

So through the 1950s and into the early 1960s, the Cooperative Plan was serving as little more than a means of limited labor-management communication, occasionally resolving local concerns of minor import. It was doing so without the active encouragement or hindrance of either the president of the B&O or the leadership of System Federation No. 30. By all indications the program simply was running on its own diminishing momentum.

To a degree the whole company was running on momentum established in prior years, and the results were not good. Jervis Langdon, who served as B&O general counsel under Simpson and became president when Simpson was eased out of office in 1961, observed that when he joined the company in December 1956, it was “a failing enterprise . . . [with] most of the top people waiting for retirement.”50 The consequence of this executive lassitude was a financial near-disaster. The railroad’s momentum carried it reasonably well through 1956; total revenues that year were a record $473 million, and return on equity was 4.40 percent. With the onset of recession late in 1957, though, top management’s inability to deal creatively with an increasingly hostile environment became progressively more obvious. Revenues fell to $392 million in 1958, recovered marginally in 1959 and 1960, and fell again to $357 million in 1961. The company turned less than 2 percent on equity in 1958 and 1959, barely broke even in 1960, and lost $31 million in 1961: a negative 5.53 percent ROE, leaving the company technically insolvent.51

Deferred maintenance on both road and rolling stock had been accumulating throughout the period; the property was in increasingly poor shape, and reliability was declining correspondingly. Symbolic of the company’s sad state, B&O Magazine was down to a mere twenty-four pages. The morale of even the most loyal employees was low and getting lower. The need for an executive change was abundantly clear. Simpson stepped aside as president in favor of Jervis Langdon on June 1, 1961; he thereupon became board chair-
man and chief executive officer, the former position being passed to him by the aging and ailing Roy White. In December he relinquished the CEO position as well, to Langdon.52 Retaining only the ceremonial chairmanship, Howard Simpson, a pleasant fellow who was promoted beyond his competence, was effectively removed from the management of the Baltimore & Ohio.

While Simpson’s B&O was sliding toward insolvency, most of the rest of the railroad industry to one degree or another also was suffering financial difficulty. Largely because of truck competition, reinforced by the commencement of the Interstate Highway System in 1956, rails were battling a substantial and accelerating erosion of their freight market share. The loss of passenger market share to airlines and private automobiles was even greater; the passenger services of most railroads were failing by a fairly wide margin to cover their full costs. Under serious pressure from rising costs and apparently helpless to do much about stagnant or declining revenues, many railroads sought refuge in the economies derivable from consolidation of facilities and staff. The result was something of a scramble for merger partners, particularly in the railroad-saturated northeastern quadrant of the country.

The weakening B&O naturally was caught up in this activity. Early in 1959 Alfred Perlman, president of the similarly weakening New York Central, proposed to Simpson and officers of the still-strong Chesapeake & Ohio that the three roads be merged. Perlman’s thinking presumably was that the numerous parallel lines and duplicative terminals of the NYC and the B&O could be consolidated, with associated capital costs partially underwritten by the prosperous, coal-traffic-based C&O. The board chairman and president of the C&O, Cyrus Eaton and Walter Tuohy, respectively, were not enamored of the idea of bailing out two larger carriers and losing control of their own in the process, so they launched their own unilateral bid to acquire the B&O. In the subsequent war for the favor of B&O shareholders, the C&O beat the NYC fairly handily. In February 1961 Tuohy announced that his company held or controlled 61 percent of B&O common stock. Petition was made to the Interstate Commerce Commission to sanction officially the C&O’s acquisition of the B&O. After a year and a half of hearings and deliberations, the ICC in December 1962 announced its approval of the C&O petition. On February 4, 1963, the Chesapeake & Ohio officially took control of its older, larger neighbor.53

When Jervis Langdon assumed the B&O presidency in June 1961, then, he placed himself in a difficult position: he had to engineer a turnaround of a failing company under the scrutiny of a group of outsiders who at some time in the not-too-distant future might decide to replace him. By the end of the year, the company’s current liabilities exceeded current assets by over $24
million, and losses, although slowed somewhat, were continuing to mount. Langdon clearly had to cut costs substantially and promptly. He instituted a “strict, weekly mancount” in all departments, with the requirement that all nonessential positions be eliminated. It was Langdon's decision, but as he made it, he must have been aware that C&O officials in Cleveland were watching his performance.

Meanwhile, John Bliss had been invited in October 1961 to address the C&O's Better Service Conference (BSC) system meetings at that railroad's Greenbrier Hotel in West Virginia. Bliss assumed that his remarks on the CTP were to be the first step toward integrating his program with the acquiring company's BSC, a program of local meetings between shippers and traffic department employees that up to a point paralleled the CTP's traffic-generating function. He made his address and returned to Baltimore believing that the CTP would in some fashion survive the merger. Consequently, he was stunned when on March 9, 1962, Bliss's immediate superior in the traffic department, W. H. Schmidt, called him into his office and told him that he was dissolving the program. All local committees were to be disbanded, and any company funds that they held were to be returned by the end of the month. No more CTP events were to be held: Mildred Drechsler had to cancel the annual Baltimore dinner dance just three weeks before it was to take place. William Howard transferred to another job in the traffic department, and Bliss and Drechsler elected to take an early retirement. By April 1 the Cooperative Traffic Program no longer existed.

Officers and members of the 194 CTP committees (153 in the men's division and 41 in the women's) still active when the decision was made were generally surprised and distraught. As Bliss put it many years later, "They all felt we had a wonderful family spirit on the railroad, and felt something very close to them was being taken away." There was nothing they could do about it, though; the CTP was gone, the victim of departmental interpretation of Langdon's man count order. Langdon's recollection is that the issue of the CTP's termination never reached his office.

The story of the disposition of the Cooperative Plan is considerably murkier. The Plan during the 1950s and early 1960s was virtually invisible, and whatever internal documentation did exist apparently has been destroyed. Cooperative committee meetings were more a habit than part of a grand and purposeful scheme of union-management cooperation, and no one cared enough to make a fuss about them one way or another. As a result, the specifics of the Plan's demise are unclear; all that is clear is that the Cooperative Plan did not continue in any formal fashion after the C&O gained effective control.

The last vestiges of the programs that had shaped the B&O family, and
that set the stage for the real innovation of the Cooperative Plan, disappeared along with the company’s independence as the decade proceeded. The Glee Club managed to hang on into the C&O era, but not for long; most social and athletic events did not survive the death of the CTP. Langdon was able to run his own show for a time, but only for a time. In the fall of 1964 C&O management, possibly irritated by inroads made by a recovering and more aggressive B&O on the C&O’s coal traffic, denied the B&O’s request to build state-of-the-art coal dumpers at Baltimore and at Lorain, Ohio. Langdon resigned over the matter, and C&O president Walter Tuohy stepped into his position. From then on, except for a brief period in 1965–1966, the president of the C&O was also the president of the B&O.\textsuperscript{60}

Although retaining its original corporate charter, the B&O suffered further loss of its identity in 1972, when the parent company decided to adopt for marketing purposes the name “Chessie System” for itself, the B&O, and the B&O’s former partially owned subsidiary, the Western Maryland. Then in 1980 the Chessie System joined the Seaboard Coast Line rail system to form an entity called CSX Corporation, submerging the B&O even more deeply. Finally, on April 30, 1987, the B&O was officially consolidated into the parent corporate structure.\textsuperscript{61} Its charter relinquished, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company ceased to exist. Most of its trackage still was in place, some of it quite busy—but its name was gone, just as Daniel Willard, his personnel policies and programs, and his railroad family were gone.