CHAPTER 1

1. In her detailed discussion of the drawbacks inherent in structuralist and formalist systems which, like Genette's, omit "questions of value and context," Susan Sniader Lanser has pointed out "the complete disregard of gender in the formalist study of narrative voice" (The Narrative Act 39, 46). According to Lanser, "Nowhere in modern narrative theory is there mention of the author's or narrator's gender as a significant variable . . . [but] surely the sex of a narrator is at least as significant a factor in literary communication as the narrator's grammatical person, the presence or absence of direct address to a reader, or narrative temporality" (46-47). In her more recent work, Lanser has begun to rectify the situation she describes, asking "whether feminist criticism, and particularly the study of narratives by women, might benefit from the methods and insights of narratology and whether narratology, in turn, might be altered by the understandings of feminist criticism and women's texts" ("Toward a Feminist Narratology" 342). Lanser's article also addresses the reasons why feminists have avoided narratological research in the past.

2. See, for instance, Bal's recent work on the Bible, e.g., "Sexuality, Sin, and Sorrow: The Emergence of Female Character (A Reading of Genesis 1–3)" and "The Rape of Narrative and the Narrative of Rape."

3. Miller borrows the terms for her two types of novel—"euphoric" and "dysphoric"—from the work of male writers in French semiotics, particularly Greimas. Miller herself correctly observes, however, that the terms are not restrictive, but flexible in her hands: "This distinction [between "euphoric" and "dysphoric" texts] is primarily a heuristic device meant to serve as a frame of reference within which individual narratives can be delineated in their specificities" (xi).

4. Meese outlines her position on Eagleton's formulation of the relation between feminism and literary theory in her chapter "In/Conclusion" (136–140).

5. According to Culler, "In recent French writing 'woman' has come to stand for any radical force that subverts the concepts, assumptions, and structures of traditional male discourse" (On Deconstruction 61).
6. Genette has acknowledged, for example, that the emphasis on temporal structures in his *Narrative Discourse* arises from Proust's preoccupation with time; he confesses, too, to being biased in that his "curiosity and predilection went regularly to the most deviant aspects of Proustian narrative, the specific transgressions or beginnings of a future development" (265). Suleiman recognizes that "the danger that the cases chosen may be too 'special' to be generalizable always haunts the enterprise of the structural anthropologist [and] . . . the theorist of genres who works on a limited corpus" (*Authoritarian Fictions* 16). Fish (who, like the structuralists, insists that his methods are "oriented away from evaluation and toward description") admits that "this is not to say that I do not evaluate. The selection of texts for analysis is itself an indication of a hierarchy in my own tastes" (51).

7. Genette illustrates this idea with reference to Proustian narrative's specificity (22–23).

8. Brownmiller's history of body hair occurs in her chapter on "Skin" (138–148); Ronald Peaseall, illustrating his assertion that "the Victorians were transfixed by feminine beauty" (141), mentions that William Etty (a "great and underestimated . . . painter of womanly flesh") "conformed to the unwritten code that specified no pubic hair . . . [the delineation of which] was the prerogative of the artists who specialized in pornography" (142).

9. For linguistic studies of differences in men's and women's language, see Hiatt, Henley and Thorne, Thorne and Henley, and Jarrard and Randall.

10. Lanser investigates gendered implications of "public" and "private" narration, proposing to add them to Genette's model for narrative situations. Her emphasis upon "the difference between purely formal and contextual approaches to meaning in narrative" ("Toward a Feminist Narratology" 354) points to the new emphasis on context in the recent work of narratologists such as Suleiman (*Authoritarian Fictions*) and Prince ("Narrative Pragmatics").

11. I borrow the sense of this phrase from Suleiman, who has used it to refer to acts of enunciation that make serious referential or didactic claims.

12. As Culler points out, this kind of reading does not require biological womanhood, but rather what Showalter has called a "hypothesis of a female reader" (*On Deconstruction* 50). This approach has been pursued in recent studies of gender and reading; see especially Flynn and Schweikart.

13. In addition to feminist studies of deconstruction's notion of differance, studies of sexual difference based in psychology have led to fruitful literary applications, e.g., Chodorow's theory of object relations, Dinnerstein's model of male and female children's relations to the mother, Gilligan's distinctions between male and female constructions of morality and maturity, and Keller's recent moves toward transforming traditional gender categories. See also Miller (*Poetics of Gender*) and Abel.
CHAPTER 2

1. Tompkins observes that "Reading, for [Prince] . . . consists of discovering what is already there on the page. His narratees, like Wayne Booth's narrators, belong to the text" (Reader-Response Criticism xii).

2. I am thinking of the kind of reading Barthes performs on brief literary passages in A Lover's Discourse, where he strikes a pose of personal response to the affective implications of texts.

3. The assumption also pervades the Anglo-American tradition of rhetorical criticism, which treats "the reader" as a figure created by the text. As Walker Gibson put it in an influential 1955 essay, "There are two readers distinguishable in every literary experience. First, there is the "real" individual upon whose crossed knee rests the open volume, and whose personality is as complex and ultimately inexpressible as any dead poet's. Second, there is the fictitious reader—I shall call him the "mock reader"—whose mask and costume the individual takes on in order to experience the language. The mock reader is an artifact, controlled, simplified, abstracted out of the chaos of day-to-day sensation." (2) The idea of the mock reader survives in Booth's "implied reader" and in the reader that Ong asserts is "always a fiction," existing only as a persona that the writer imagines and the actual reader may or may not adopt. This critical tradition removes the "actual reader" from the discussion of literary works, avoiding the "affective fallacy" and focusing more or less exclusively on describing or interpreting the text. See Suleiman and Crosman; Tompkins, Introduction to Reader-Response Criticism; and W. Daniel Wilson.

4. Direct address to a narratee in a text where the narrative situation is intradiegetic (e.g. Wuthering Heights) or where the narrator is homodiegetic, that is, a character within the narrative (e.g., Jane Eyre or Great Expectations) has a different rhetorical effect because it mirrors what speech-act theorists call "the natural narrative situation" (see Pratt 45). For an insightful analysis of direct address that fits this category, see Monod ("Charlotte Brontë and the Thirty 'Readers').

5. Distancing and engaging are my terms. Very few critics have analyzed the effects of engaging intervention in fictional texts. For a debate that focuses on engaging technique without using the term narratee, see Gmelins, Auerbach's, and Spitzer's arguments about Dante's use of direct address in the Divine Comedy.

6. All three novelists make their intentions explicit, both within and outside their fictional texts. See Gaskell's Preface to Mary Barton (37); Stowe's "Concluding Remarks," in Uncle Tom's Cabin (618–629); Stowe's A Key; and Eliot's "In Which the Story Pauses a Little," Adam Bede (150).

7. Stang has shown that many mid-nineteenth-century critics and reviewers in England disapproved of narrative intervention; Baym (Novels, Readers, and Reviewers) makes the same observation about American critics. Novelists of the period would have been aware of the theoretical objections to the convention. Eliot,
in particular, was self-conscious about typical attitudes toward authorial commentary. See her observations on Sterne's narrative irregularities (Essays 446).

8. Tompkins identifies similarities between the forms of address in Uncle Tom and the Old Testament models for the American jeremiad (Sensational Designs 139–141).

9. I am grateful to Cynthia Bernstein for suggesting this example in her response to the first published version of this study.

10. Obviously not every reader can identify with the narratee. Evidence of the distanced response in hostile readers of Uncle Tom surfaces in reviews of the novel by Stowe's contemporaries; see Ammons.

11. See Conrad and Ford Madox Ford for further evidence that modern novelists, to avoid distancing effects, try to stay out of the text. As Ford puts it, they intend "to keep the reader entirely oblivious of the fact that the author exists—even of the fact that he is reading a book" (76). Ferguson demonstrates, however, that even the most scrupulous of the impressionists cannot avoid some narrative intervention.

CHAPTER 3

1. Wright, though eager to demonstrate that Gaskell "thought seriously about her work and was a conscious craftsman," nevertheless concedes that "she is not a literary critic, not much—in her surviving correspondence—of a self-critic" (8).

2. See Craik's assertion that in Gaskell's fiction "the circumstances and settings and details that attend them are vividly actual because they are those common to their kind. Her success in combining historical fact and documentary detail with her invented story is virtually complete" (18). David Smith, by contrast, has challenged the notion that social-problem novels can be evaluated according to their "accuracy... in particulars" (98).

3. Jordan has demonstrated "the irruption into the text of discourses other than that of sympathetic observing realism" (48). Gallagher, too, sees competing literary modes at work in Mary Barton, which she attributes to "an ambivalence about causality that finds its way into Gaskell's tragedy and creates an irresolvable paradox there," resulting in the introduction of "other narrative forms, primarily melodrama and domestic fiction" (Industrial Reformation 67). Lucas sees the too-easy solutions of the plot as interfering with the social-problem novel's goals; Ricchio has analyzed the role of utopian mythic patterning in realist novels as central to the formal problems Mary Barton raises.

4. Jordan points out that Gaskell's narrative is vague even about the details of Chartism (56).

6. This authorial insistence upon a personal, rather than an overtly political, interest in social unrest recalls the assertions of critics such as Tillotson and Wright who think of Gaskell as primarily a "Christian" novelist, proselytizing for a change of heart, a reborn sympathetic zeal, among her audience. See David Smith's refutation of Tillotson's suggestion that *Mary Barton*, in the universality of its theme, has no "social, extra-artistic purpose" (Tillotson 210, Smith 100); see also Wright's argument that the "particular aspect of the condition [she was] hoping to treat" was "the religious" (29).

7. Wright has also noted that Gaskell's account of her decision shows that she "felt compelled to write of what was close to her and observable," which makes her "a social novelist" (11).

8. See treatments of allusion, quotation, and intertextuality in *Mary Barton* by Jordan, Wheeler, and Easson.

9. Whereas Lansbury argues that the narrative voice in Gaskell's novels probably reflects a projected idea of the middle-class reader's opinions rather than Gaskell's own, Fryckstedt identifies the narrator's views with those of Gaskell's Unitarian faith and shows the ways in which Gaskell's first two novels pose a challenge to received middle-class religious notions.

10. Furbank's essay concentrates on the narration of *North and South*, in which "the author allows herself for certain purposes to be a false witness" (53). Citing a passage that depicts the heroine's thoughts and behavior in one scene, Furbank remarks, "Now here we really cannot take Mrs. Gaskell literally, and must be meant to realise that she is telling a fib. Margaret's reason for standing still is clearly not just what we are told it is. What passes through her mind is something less simple, and more natural" (53). Furbank objects to Gaskell's "mendacity," attributing it to an excessive identification between author and heroine (51).

11. Wright points to Gaskell's "identifying herself with the reader, and both herself and the reader with humanity at large" as typifying the authorial stance in her "novels of religious and social purpose" (241).

12. I borrow the phrase from Meese, who applies it to Celie's last letter in Alice Walker's *The Color Purple*. Like engaging interventions, Celie's address to "dear everything" "opens the significance of the novel as it closes this particular fiction" (127).

13. Wright notes with particular relief the disappearance of direct address from Gaskell's later work. Listing some early examples in which Gaskell's narrative "I" addresses "you," Wright remarks, "This is probably the most naive form of narrative comment, and disappears from her work as she gains control of her medium" (242). In her enthusiastic defense of Gaskell's novels, Craik, too, concedes that Gaskell "sometimes over-exerts herself to make the way plain for the reader. . . . [S]ometimes she feels compelled to state her position—a dispassionate one . . . with unneeded emphasis" (10). Yet Craik concludes that Gaskell is "for her time and with her aims, very sparing of addresses to her reader." Given the sheer number of addresses to the reader in *Mary Barton* (of which I have quoted only
a portion), perhaps Craik's impression that Gaskell's narrator, "although not self-effacing," is "unobtrusive" (29) could be attributed to the engaging nature (rather than the frequency) of the narrative interventions.

CHAPTER 4

1. The phrase comes from Justin McCarthy's description of Charles Kingsley, which is on the whole a sneering one, and probably not a fair characterization. I use it merely to evoke Kingsley's image, not his real personality.

2. Gallagher links narrative technique in Alton Locke with Kingsley's "ambivalence about causality" and says that the novel "undermines faith in the possibility of referential, realistic fiction" (Industrial Reformation of English Fiction 89).

3. See, for example, Kestner, Cazamian, Hartley, and Uffelman. Recently, Alton Locke has been the subject of more literary consideration; see especially Gallagher's Industrial Reformation of English Fiction.

4. See Chitty (111) for an account of the reaction to Yeast among Kingsley's friends. His honored mentors, Ludlow and Mansfield, detested it. His wife, however, was so fond of her husband's first novel that she requested that a copy of it be buried with her. The parts that appealed to her were apparently those treating the love affair of Lancelot and Argemone, which was loosely based on the Kingsley's courtship. She, too, disapproved of the novel's political contents.

5. I take up this point in Chapter 7, where I look in more detail at direct address in nineteenth-century sermons.

6. Swanson locates the irony in a disjunction between the world the author has created and the comments the narrator makes on that world. He argues that Thackeray's irony can be decoded into a moral message: e.g., "It is the ambiguity of the narrator toward Becky that most clearly defines Thackeray's critical method: the narrator questions her innocence, but the author confirms her guilt, thereby condemning the narrator for judging by a false standard" (140). Rawlins, by contrast, sees no obvious way to decode the irony: "Thackeray undercuts his own rhetoric as well as the rhetoric of his characters, and in ways for which we cannot offer explanation except in the general terms of an habitual ironic perspective" (155).

7. Olmsted outlines this debate in the preface to his bibliography of twentieth-century Thackeray criticism. Segel ("Thackeray's Journalism") mentions "the characteristic bugaboo of Thackeray's readers— . . . the tendency to simply miss the presence of the persona or mask and to attribute both commentary and its implied values directly to Thackeray the author" (25).

8. This question arises particularly for Segel ("Thackeray's Journalism") and Maukopf, who analyze Thackeray's early journalism for his position on fiction.

9. The equation of Thackeray's techniques with realism can be traced back to
nineteenth-century critics of his novels (Flamm 3). As recently as 1983, Sinha was still arguing that Thackeray’s “excellence,” like Fielding’s, depends on “the authorial commentaries which go to establish an intimate relationship between the novelist and the reader” (233). Wilkinson sees the reader’s position as that of “accomplice” to the gossiping narrator (372–373). See also Polhemus on the intimacy between narrator and reader (152). Blodgett, in contrast, argues that “while Fielding’s narrator may deepen in intimacy with his reader, Thackeray’s narrator instead gives the sense of his own growth as he draws with anecdotal geniality . . . on various parts of his own history in order to associate himself with the tale” (214).

10. See Wilkenfeld for an analysis of “Before the Curtain” that differentiates some of the narrator’s roles in the preface, particularly those of “Manager” and “Man” (314). See also Stevens for questions about the audience’s position vis-à-vis the puppet stage, e.g., “Where, then, are we?” (394).

11. Sheets has catalogued half a dozen instances where the narrator claims authentic sources for his information, counterbalancing them with an equally long list of passages in which the narrator claims not to have been able to ascertain the pertinent facts. Sheets concludes that these inconsistencies leave “us with the question, ‘What after all, did happen?’” (426–427). Of course, literally nothing “did happen”: it is all invented, and—as Morton Bloomfield has pointed out—so many references to “authenticating devices” in the text merely call “attention to the need for authentication and hence to the inauthenticity of the work of art” (quoted in Segel, “Truth and Authenticity” 56).

12. The impulse behind some critics’ claims for *Vanity Fair*’s realism comes from a New Critical desire to find coherence and unity in any great novel. See, for example, Blodgett’s assertions that “*Vanity Fair* succeeds because of its narrator, not despite him” (211), that “the many roles of the narrator’s ‘pose’ interact harmoniously, making the novel coherent” (215), and that “what he claims is right for the novel and what he demonstrates through his novel constitute a unity” (217).

13. Praz treats Thackeray’s narrator as a preacher, emphasizing that he has in mind a kind of preaching which operates upon logic, rather than emotional appeal (49). Carlisle insists that “no matter how indirect, the role of the preacher, a voice expounding on our fallen human nature, is central to Thackeray’s fiction” (40). And Segel concludes her defense of *Vanity Fair*’s seriousness by arguing for Thackeray’s attempt “to bring together for the reader’s instruction the real world and the fictional world, so widely separated in conventional novels of his time” (“Truth and Authenticity” 58).

14. Ferris concludes that Thackeray “risks the entire narrative enterprise to assert—briefly and obliquely—a limited freedom for the human imagination” (303). Sheets says Thackeray came to realize that “the novelist can no longer be a historian or a preacher lecturing to his fellow citizens. He is a lonely man who sees himself in his novels, and he must therefore develop a subjective narrative technique that will acknowledge his imperfection and alienation” (430). Rawlins
decides that Thackeray "seems to have created a context for his fiction that allows the universal moral relevance that Richardson erroneously claims" (176).

15. My description of Thackeray's project as "play" draws upon Huizinga's definition of a "game," which Lynette Hunter summarizes: "First, it is a freedom and marked by voluntary activity; second, it lies outside real life in a disinterested world of its own; and third, it is secluded and limited, isolated from reality in fixed time and absolute order. Because of that isolation it denies any moral aspects, claiming neutrality not on the basis of truth but from its autonomy" (92—93).

CHAPTER 5

1. Traditional histories of the sentimental novel traced the genre's flowering to the romantic period; see Herbert Ross Brown, and Allen.

2. "Sentimentality" is one element in the Victorian domestic feminine ideal; see Parker. In "The Silence is Broken," (McConnell-Ginet, et al.), Donovan analyzes the rhetoric of women's sentimental novels. Some critics defend Uncle Tom as a "serious" women's novel which is not "sentimental" (see Zeman), but Tompkins shows that even on the level of plot, "the tears... which we find easy to ridicule are the sign of redemption in Uncle Tom's Cabin; not words, but the emotions of the heart bespeak a state of grace" in the story (Sensational Designs 131).

3. Gribble looks into the role of literary sentimentality in "the education of the emotions." Hardy (Forms of Feeling) discriminates among the particular emotional lessons that classic Victorian novels were meant to transmit.

4. See Hirsch's account of Uncle Tom's public reception. For evidence of Eliot's unsentimental reputation, see Harvey's assertion in The Art of George Eliot that Eliot's "intrusive comments are generally neither dramatic gestures, [nor] rhetorical embellishments demanding an overwrought emotional response from the reader" (82—83). Not all critics agree that Eliot always rises above sentimentality; see Oldfield and Oldfield on the "flaw of sentimentality" in Scenes of Clerical Life (9—14). See also Mann, for a detailed analysis of the figurative language Eliot's narrators use to generate "laughter and tears in the reader," excluding direct address (168—199). Benson has shown that Eliot valued more highly reviews that showed emotional receptivity to her work than those praising her technique, and he does not respect her for it: "It is tempting to say that this emotionalism is a lapse, and that George Eliot knows better, but to do so would be a falsification" (440).

5. Hardy (Forms of Feeling) observes that Eliot's novels shift in their designs upon readers' sympathies, from a simple attempt to rouse pity in Scenes, to an effort to prompt readers to "particularize and analyze" their feelings (152). Later in her career Eliot was to become impatient "with the solicitations of text as well as the facile readiness of response" (155). Ermarth ("George Eliot's Conception of Sympathy") and Doyle have further elucidated Eliot's position on sympathetic response.

6. As Bell has argued, sentiment and realism are not mutually exclusive in nineteenth-century novels.
Notes to Pages 104–115

7. Ammons has collected some vehement examples: see “Anon.” (1852), Holmes (1852), Thompson (1852), and Woodward (1853) in Critical Essays.

8. Levin looks into the specific problems of trying to mine Uncle Tom for “historical evidence.”

9. Stowe’s biographer specifies that Stowe “invented the text” of at least one slave-advertisement in the Key, though “she had seen similar ones in Cincinnati” (Forrest Wilson 333).

10. Forrest Wilson lists half a dozen titles of these “counter propaganda” novels (325).

11. Holmes (see Ammons) was only one of many who assumed that Stowe derived her ideas from other novelists. Dickens himself believed Stowe had “appropriated” material from his novels and Gaskell’s (Leavis and Leavis 166). The persistence with which critics have always referred to “Little Eva,” as if in imitation of “Little Nell” (though the narrator calls the character only “Eva” or “Evangeline”) has perpetuated the idea that Stowe copied Dickens inordinately.

12. See, for instance, Moers (Harriet Beecher Stowe), Adams, Gillian Brown, Crumpacker (in Fleischmann), Fiedler, Joswick, Tompkins (Sensational Designs), and the essays by Yarborough, Yellin, Haltrunen, and Ammons in Sundquist.

13. Tompkins has observed that Uncle Tom resembles an American jeremiad (Sensational Designs 139). Stowe was to break with Calvinist doctrine later in her life (Forrest Wilson 435, 621), and she developed a critique of the Presbyterian church as an institution (see Hovet). I am tracing the Edwardsian influence upon the rhetoric of Stowe’s writing, rather than upon its theological content.

14. The plot provides models for individual upper- and middle-class bereaved mothers to see as mirrors for themselves (for example, Mrs. Bird).

15. Yellin (in Sundquist) emphasizes that Stowe seeks to inspire individual sympathetic responses to slaves, rather than collective public action (101). Alexander makes a similar point about the primacy of individual moral action in George Eliot’s fiction.

16. The classic study of Eliot’s early realism is Knoepflmacher’s (George Eliot’s Early Novels); Ermarth (Realism and Consensus) outlines the historical and philosophical “premises of realism” for Eliot and her contemporaries. Adam, Henberg, and Cotton each explicate Eliot’s conception of realism; Wittig-Davis and Mansell compare Eliot’s views with Ruskin’s. Examining limitations of and conflicts within Eliot’s realism, Levine (The Realistic Imagination) compares her ideas with Ruskin’s and looks into the problems of combining artistic and scientific notions of reality (255–274). For studies of Eliot’s changing conception of realism throughout her novelist career, see Levine (“Realism, or in Praise of Lying”), Laurence Lerner, McGowan, and Gallagher (“The Failure of Realism”).

17. Critics generally assume that the narrator of Adam Bede, like that of Scenes, is male. Hardy (The Novels of George Eliot, 155–157) cites passages in which the Scenes narrator refers to having been a “boy,” but gives no evidence for the Adam Bede narrator’s masculinity except that “he—though the sexual reminders have
ceased to be persistent—holds a conversation with Adam Bede about Mr. Irwine” (157). I see no reason to doubt that a female narrator could “hold” such a conversation.

Hayles identifies the narrative voice of Eliot's next novel, *The Mill on the Floss*, as feminine because it participates in Gilligan's "female ethic of care . . . and a habitual plea for tolerance" (26). Though Hayles accepts Hardy's characterization of the *Adam Bede* narrator as masculine, Hayles's description of the female-ethic-inspired narrative stance in *The Mill* describes the strategy in *Adam Bede* equally well: "The strategy is to invite judgment, then to forestall it by broadening the context so that we see the connection between our faults and those of the characters" (25).

18. Ermarth (Realism and Consensus) argues persuasively that Eliot's narrator is "a protean figure . . . [who] shuttles between extremes of personalization and abstraction" (237). Accepting her point that the narrator can speak sometimes as "nobody . . . a kind of generalized historical awareness hardly distinguishable from our own," I am concentrating—as did Ermarth in an earlier piece ("Method and Moral")—on the "personalized" aspect of Eliot's narrator and narratees.

19. As Hardy has pointed out, Eliot's novels changed over the course of her career in their conception of the narratee: "In the earlier novels, George Eliot’s narrator may imagine a reader below the reasonable level of expectation, flattering the sympathetic response by singling out an exemplary unexemplary reader in the manner of Sterne and Thackeray [i.e., distancing strategies], but in *Middlemarch* there is refusal to praise the average sympathetic reader" [i.e., a suspension even of engaging strategies] (Forms of Feeling 155).

20. Anderson demonstrates at length that Blackwood was the “reader” Eliot had in mind while composing chapter 17. Despite Knoepflmacher's dismissal of the idea as an "unlikely conjecture" ("George Eliot" 256), my reading of the chapter supports Anderson's thesis.

21. In the 1940s and 1950s this disruption of the illusion was the primary critical objection to Eliot's novels. See Bennett and Van Ghent, for examples. Harvey disputes the critics' theoretical biases, but assumes that disruption of illusion is a problem which the defender of Eliot's art must justify (Art of George Eliot 66–68).

22. Watson demonstrates Dinah's "authenticity" as a female Methodist preacher by comparing her language with that of Eliot's aunt, Mrs. Samuel Evans.

23. See Lee for an analysis of the similar role memory plays in reading *The Mill on the Floss*.

24. This is particularly true at the level of interpretation, as Holland and Bleich, among others, have shown.

25. See Alexander's analysis of the relation of Eliot's realism to her didactic, humanistic goals.

26. I take up this question in more detail in Chapter 7.
CHAPTER 6

1. Genette explores the paratext in Seuils.

2. One reviewer identified Trollope as the author of the anonymously published Nina Balatka because he had “found the repeated use of some special phrase which had rested upon his ear too frequently when reading . . . other works of mine” (Autobiography 205). More recently, Davies has noted Trollope’s stylistic habit of balancing two statements about a character on either side of a “but” or “still” (99). For an exhaustive analysis of Trollope’s characteristic language and style, see Clark.

3. Kendrick has tackled the question of Trollope’s narrators’ ambivalence toward the production of texts that can draw readers into an imaginative world but must simultaneously leave them outside (32).

4. McMaster has outlined the basic parallels among the novel’s subplots.

5. See especially Wijesinha, who claims that Trollope presents “a more realistic as well as a more sympathetic portrayal of the woman of the day” than do Dickens, Thackeray, and Kingsley (21, 338).

6. See Schlicke’s account of the element of “popular entertainment” in Dickens’s career; see Worth’s tracing of melodramatic influence upon the novels.

7. Rose focuses on this aspect of Dickens’s personality; see also Edgar Johnson.

8. See Green’s treatment of sermonic rhetoric in Hard Times.

9. For a more complete analysis of the sections not narrated by Esther, see Hough (who details the style of the “other narrator” 52–59) and Hornback. Hornback locates the novel’s “other portion” in the activity of the reader: “It is the portion that you and I, as Esther’s ‘unknown friend,’ have to write” (195). For recent discussions of the effect of the double-narrative in the novel, see Daldry; Blain; Moseley; Frazee; and Kearns.

10. The interventions made by the Fashionable Intelligence voice resemble those in the final chapter of Our Mutual Friend, the “Voice of Society.”

11. Horton has persuasively described Dickens’s rhetoric of uncertainty from a reader-response perspective.


13. For the standard argument about Esther’s femininity (and sentimentality), see Monod (“Esther Summerson”) and Dunn. More recent feminist-inspired readings see Esther’s position as a positive embodiment of Dickens’s feminine ideal; see Kennedy and, especially, Senf.
CHAPTER 7

1. Welter defines "The Cult of True Womanhood"; for recent discussions of domestic ideology, see Kelley (308) and Gallagher (The Industrial Reformation of English Fiction 118, 148).

2. The question is quoted anonymously by Taylor (220).

3. Eckhardt quotes this sketch in her biography of Wright to illustrate the abuse the speaker often received as her celebrity increased (249–250). Even women who spoke for temperance or abolition with the explicit or implicit sanction of the church, such as Abby Kelley or the Grimké sisters, were subject to criticism. For details on the careers of the Grimkés, who began lecturing nine years after Wright, see Gerda Lerner.

4. Beecher was not always successful in avoiding censure: she inevitably suffered consequences for stepping outside the domestic realm. As Gossett puts it, "In spite of her taking the position that women ought not to agitate publicly the questions of the day, Catharine was obliged to some extent to do this herself. . . . In spite of her efforts to state her ideas modestly and to work through influential men, Catharine herself was often written off as a busybody and as a querulous old maid" (48). See Beecher's Essay on the Education of Female Teachers, Principles of Domestic Science, and The True Remedy for the Wrongs of Women for exposition of her views on women's proper sphere. For details of Beecher's life against an informative backdrop of domestic ideology, see Sklar.

5. Stowe's two tours and their reception have been detailed by Trautmann and Kirkham. Drawing on newspaper reviews and the Stowe family's correspondence, Kirkham traces the Midwestern tour. Trautmann's two articles report on that one and the previous tour of New England; his two essays, however, follow exactly the same outline and make precisely the same points, varying only in illustrative details.

6. For details of women's activity in the socialist movement, see Taylor. Smith-Rosenberg describes female participation in revivalist activities (130); Sweet depicts women speaking in Methodist congregations (115). Even in Protestant churches, however, women could face severe penalties for speaking "out of turn." The trial of Rhoda Bement, excommunicated from her Rochester, New York, Presbyterian congregation in 1843 for publicly criticizing her minister, illustrates the dangers. The historians who have recorded the case remark: "When women such as Abby Kelley, the Grimké sisters, and Rhoda Bement [all of them abolitionists] asserted their right to be heard and to act in public, they did violence to one of the most powerful traditions of their time. . . . However unarticulated or unconscious her acts, [Bement] stood for the right of women to be heard publicly, and thus ran athwart one of the strongest traditions of nineteenth-century society" (Altschuler and Saltzgaber 57, 18).

Some women nevertheless continued to participate in what Smith-Rosenberg calls "disorderly conduct." Hewitt provides a critical summary of historians' assumptions about the rise of female activism and its relation to the women's rights
movement (1–39). See Nestor (8–11) for a brief and specific survey of English women's collective activity in publishing and social reform; see Kanner for more detailed documentation and bibliographic references. For accounts of American women's efforts at mid-century, see especially Smith-Rosenberg (109–164), Ryan (83–98, 105–144), and Conway.

7. See Basch for a discussion of limitations on women's professional options (103–109).

8. Nestor (3) and Robert A. Colby (10) are among the critics who cite this passage from Mulock Craik's "To Novelists—and a Novelist," Macmillans Magazine, (April 1861): 442.

9. Kelley specifies that the female novelists she studies (the "literary domestics") "were women of the home who simultaneously came to assume the male roles of public figure, economic provider, and creator of culture" (111).

10. See, for instance, Kelley, Douglas, Basch, and Newton. According to Newton, even Gaskell's novels of protest reveal an implicit endorsement of the cult of true womanhood; in North and South Newton perceives an "acceptance of the ideology of woman's sphere" (165), which she attributes to Gaskell's "conservative relation to ideology" (168). In the novels of Burney, Austen, Charlotte Brontë, and Eliot, Newton sees a substitution of female "ability" for the dominant model of feminine "influence": "These novels delineate a line of covert, ambivalent, but finally radical resistance to the ideology of their day" (10). Gilbert and Gubar argue for a similar line of covert resistance in women's literature.

11. Blackwell was responding to explicit textual hints of masculinity in the narrative interventions in Scenes. Two of the specifically gendered self-references that the narrator of Scenes makes occur in "Janet's Repentance," where he recalls himself as a little boy, misbehaving in church, making his little sister cry by imitating a preacher's "yoaring" at her (292), and wearing coattails for the first time (256).

12. Dickens claimed that he immediately recognized a feminine eye for domestic detail in Scenes: "'If the tale were not by a woman,' he wrote, 'I believe no man ever before had the art of making himself, mentally, as like a woman, since the world began'" (Edgar Johnson 483). Stowe wrote to Eliot in 1869 that she had first read Eliot's work "supposing you man," but that she had based her final conviction that Eliot was a woman on "internal evidence": "No, my sister, there are things about us no man can know and consequently no man can write" (Kelley 252).

13. Peterson argues that evangelicalism was partly responsible for this emphasis on moral teaching in nineteenth-century novels (11).


15. See Vance for a recent history of this connection in Victorian literature and religious attitudes.

16. According to Buell, divinity school lectures on the art of preaching were increasingly common in America during the first half of the nineteenth century; they usually centered on strictly rhetorical or oratorical topics (172).
17. Muscular Christians were not the only Victorian group to fetishize the "healthy body"; see Haley.

18. Beecher's emphasis on extemporaneous sermonizing set him apart from the mainstream of Unitarian and Congregationalist preachers, whose sermons were usually more polished literary constructions; see Buell (179).

19. The minister's belief that he is a mouthpiece for the voice of God survives in fundamentalist sects, particularly in the tradition of orally composed sermons called "American spiritualist preaching," where the "preacher is only lending Him his mouth and lips and tongue" (Rosenberg 9).

CHAPTER 8

1. Sandy Petrey adapts J. L. Austin's theory of speech acts to develop a subtle approach to the problem of referentiality in realist fiction. Petrey's work exemplifies the way in which speech-act theorists can approach literary language without trying to differentiate it from language in general; it does not take up the referentiality of the reader-figure in realist texts.

2. A case in point: Boris Gasparov, modeling "The Narrative Text as an Act of Communication," proposes numerous formulas for "the connotative parameters" of narrative texts at a very high level of abstraction. His structures describe texts as utterances, or messages encoded by a sender; the only observation he makes about the receiver is that a sender's "attitude toward the addressee may either be 'familiar' (as is appropriate in 'practical discourse') or 'neutral' (as in 'official discourse')" (248). The literary narrative text "belongs to the neutral type. This feature results from the nonspecific and nondirect character of the addressee, by virtue of which familiar appellation is rendered impossible" (249). Gasparov focuses throughout on the encoding of the message, not its decoding, as though a literary act of communication in fact involved only an utterance, independent of a receiver.

3. Tompkins's tone, as usual, suggests that she is exaggerating. Her hyperbole not only amplifies her point, but also excludes from her narrative of modern criticism any movements which have—for instance—taken seriously the work of G. B. Shaw or Bertolt Brecht. Still, the phenomenon she describes certainly exists; moreover, it has extended beyond theories of literature to inspire theories of reading. Louise Rosenblatt, for example, has proposed a "Transactional Theory" that shifts the emphasis from dividing up literary and nonliterary texts to distinguishing between literary and nonliterary reading. For Rosenblatt, the "poem" is a function of a reader's interaction with a text: a reader produces a poem through "aesthetic" reading, in which "the reader's attention is centered directly on what he is living through during his relationship with that particular text" (24). "Efferent" reading, by contrast, is what a reader does to glean information. Appealing and effective as the theory is for describing readerly activity in encounters with lyric
poetry, it stops short of accounting for texts that are to be read simultaneously from aesthetic and efferent perspectives, such as the didactic novel or the roman à thèse.

4. Until recently, structuralist narratology has eschewed thematic interpretation of the texts it describes, and as a result has participated in perpetuating the boundaries between text and world. Lately narratologists have been calling for more attention to external context as being essential to describing narrative, as well as to interpreting it. See Prince, "Narrative Pragmatics, Message, and Point" and Lanser, "Toward a Feminist Narratology."

5. For documentation of nineteenth-century reviewers' disapproval of "preachy" authorial address, see Stang (for British examples) and Baym (Novels, Readers, and Reviewers, for American examples).

6. Jakobson concurs with Benveniste's analysis and employs the term "shifter" in his further elucidation of deixis (132).

7. I depart here from speech-act theories that propose universally applicable formulas for the truth status of literary discourse. Barbara Hernstein Smith and Richard Ohmann treat fictional discourse as a pretense of uttering real statements, whereas Mary Louise Pratt approaches fictive discourse as a real narration of fictive statements. According to Smith, "The essential fictiveness of novels . . . is not to be discovered in the unreality of characters, objects, and events alluded to, but in the unreality of the alluding themselves. . . . In a novel or tale, it is the act of reporting events, the act of describing persons and referring to places that is fictive" (29).

For Pratt, on the other hand, the "natural narrative" or real-life narrative situation and the situation of literary narration are exactly the same: both are real instances of articulating a "narrative display text," regardless of the "truth" of the events and circumstances they express. Pratt insists that literary and nonliterary discourse should be subjected to the same kind of linguistic analysis, since "fictive or 'imitation' speech acts are readily found in almost any realm of discourse, and our ability to produce and interpret them must be viewed as part of our normal linguistic and cognitive competence, not as some special by-product of it" or as "'poetic deviance'" (200).

Different kinds of novels, I think, make different kinds of claims; even among realist novels, actual narrative practices diverge. The distancing narrator, by continually drawing attention to the novel's textuality, points to the fictiveness of his utterance, supporting Smith's claim; the engaging narrator strains against that convention, however, by insisting upon the reality of the narrative situation, the communication between "I" and "you." Novels with engaging narrators provide strong supporting evidence, therefore, for Pratt's hypothesis.