Notes

Introduction

1. In his preface to *The Order of Things*, Foucault suggests the episteme of a culture is expressed in “the fundamental codes of a culture—those governing its language, its schemas of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its practices—[which] establish for every man, from the very first, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at home” (xx).


3. Arguing that Locke is a “covert Platonist,” A. D. Nuttall in *A Common Sky: Philosophy and the Literary Imagination* suggests that the English empiricists are really hostile to experience as a mode of knowledge (13–23) and thus are part of the idealist philosophy they ostensibly reject.

5. Foucault suggests that the classical episteme was based on elements of "resemblance" or "similitude" like the mimetic poesis of Aristotle. That concept of order, Foucault argues, disappeared in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and was replaced by the ordering concept of "difference" (46–77) which defines reality not through ordered resemblance but rather through dissociation.

6. For the standard discussions, see Robert Langbaum’s introduction to The Poetry of Experience, especially 24–28, and M. H. Abrams’s The Mirror and the Lamp.


8. In The Milk of Paradise, M. H. Abrams suggests that opium “may intensify or distort sense perception, especially audition and the visual apprehension of space, structure, light and color” (ix). Clinical studies such as The Opium Problem (Terry and Pellens 1928) suggest that the physiological and hallucinogenic effects of opium vary among individuals.

9. Aristotle argues in De Sensu that synesthesia is impossible because physiological perception is in essence a sensation within the context of time. He admits to the possibility of fused sensations, but no genuine synesthesia takes place “for the fusion will form a unity and a single sense can perceive a single thing and the single sensation is a chronological unit” (187). He concludes that “when the sensations are not fused, they are two,” thereby precluding the possibility of simultaneous perception. Augustine echoes this attitude, suggesting “we can not perceive colors by hearing nor voices by sight” (72). It is not until Locke that synesthesia becomes an accepted mode of perception. Arguing that we have simple and complex ideas, Locke asserts that a kind of synesthesia occurs (Ayer 47) when we apprehend compound sensations from a single object (e.g., ice is sensed as both cold and hard).

One

1. Coleridge’s heretical poesy can be distinguished from matters of personal faith. The question of Coleridge’s religious development, or rather his vacillation between religious orthodoxy, skepticism, and Unitarianism, has been explored in Barth’s Coleridge and Christian Doctrine (1969). Abrams (Natural Supernaturalism 67) suggests that “Coleridge, who from the time of his maturity was a professing Chris-
tian, carried on a lifetime's struggle to save what seemed to him the irreducible minimum of the Christian creed within an essentially secular metaphysical system." The heresy of Coleridge's poesy exists in his celebration of the human imagination, imagery, and symbolism which explore states of mind that depart from the Christian episteme.

2. Concerning Coleridge as a symbolist, Abrams (Natural Supernaturalism 272) quickly dismisses any possibility of "The Ancient Mariner" being a symbolist poem, in part because of the explicitly Christian theme of the poem, but others, such as Daniel Schneider, have suggested that Coleridge is among the first in the symbolist tradition.

3. Abrams, in The Mirror and the Lamp, has noted Coleridge's desire to create "'an involution of the universal in the individual'; the imagination acts by reconciling the opposites of 'the general, with the concrete . . . the individual, with the representative; the sense of novelty and freshness, with old and familiar objects'; and, he says, 'that just proportion, that union and interpenetration of the universal and the particular'" (56). This statement, from the Biographia Literaria, suggests the importance of the individual, symbol-making mind.

4. See "The Coalescence of Subject and Object" in I. A. Richards's Coleridge on Imagination (44-71).

5. Blake is a mental traveler throughout his career; Byron's central figures, Childe Harold and Juan, make pilgrimages; Shelley's Alastor, Keats's Endymion, and Coleridge's Mariner are all questers.

6. Mircea Eliade in The Sacred and the Profane contrasts the concepts of sacred space (within the temple) and profane space (outside of the temple).

7. For the usual (and opposite) archetypal significance of the refusal of return, see Campbell (1949, 193ff.).

8. For the classic treatment of the archetypal significance of descent and cessation of movement, see Maud Bodkin's chapter on "The Ancient Mariner" in Archetypal Patterns in Poetry; Frye offers a more recent examination of similar structuralist theories in The Secular Scripture.

9. Both Lowes (414ff.) and Daniel Schneider (62) hesitate to identify precisely when Coleridge came under the heavy use of opium. Hayter, however, is more specific, suggesting that Coleridge had used opium during at least four periods between 1791 and the writing of "The Ancient Mariner" (191) and that some of those periods were for
several weeks. All three writers agree that Coleridge was not addicted to opium at the time he wrote "The Ancient Mariner."

10. Abrams (Natural Supernaturalism 416–18) mentions Coleridge, De Quincey, and Rimbaud as examples of the modern Christian heretic and makes specific reference to their "heretical" use of drugs to distort the senses.

11. Jasper has suggested that "The Ancient Mariner" contains a duality based on a tension between "the two ontological bases of its form, the one resting upon an ultimate transcendent directing human life and society and the other concealing behind religious platitudes a belief in the self-supporting and sufficient nature of society and the individuals who compose it" (53).

Two

1. For the first substantial examination of De Quincey and the loss of faith, see the chapter on De Quincey in J. Hillis Miller's The Disappearance of God.

2. See n. 3, ch. 1.

3. For a discussion of the pictorial qualities of De Quincey's imagination, see Goldman (91).

4. In the revised version of this passage that appears in the "Affliction of Childhood" chapter of the autobiography (46), De Quincey eliminates the phrase "aided by a slight defect in the eyes." It would seem from this that De Quincey himself attached little importance to, or deliberately wished to play down, this physiological aspect of disorientation.

5. These two physiological explanations for De Quincey's "defect" are discussed by Eaton (179–80) and in a letter, 16 August 1809, from De Quincey to Dorothy Wordsworth (Jordan 243–44).

6. De Quincey's various selves and the discrepancy of understanding between them are discussed by Spector (501–20).

7. Referring to De Quincey's digressive wanderings, Miller remarks "to read an essay by De Quincey is to experience a strange and exasperating sense of disorientation, [a] kind of dizzy amazement" (28).

Three

1. Baudelaire's Catholicism is discussed by François Mauriac in "Charles Baudelaire, the Catholic" and Baudelaire's "immanent
Christianity” is explored by Charles Du Bois in “Meditation on the Life of Baudelaire.” Both essays are reprinted in *Baudelaire* (Peyre 1962).

2. In his *Confessions*, De Quincey asserts “whereas wine disorders the mental faculties, opium, on the contrary introduces amongst them the most exquisite order, legislation, and harmony. Wine robs a man of his self possession; opium sustains and reinforces it. Wine unsettles the judgment, and gives a preternatural brightness and a vivid exaltation to the contempts and the admirations, to the loves and the hatreds, of the drinker; opium, on the contrary, communicates serenity and equipoise to all the faculties” (3:383).

3. Goldman (1965) defines De Quincey’s rifacimento process as a “kind of rewriting, rearranging, and reimagining” (91).

4. Roger Forclaz has argued that through the scientific digressions in *Pym* “Poe separates us from the entire known world by leaving the terrain of scientific exactness in order to give free rein to his imagination. This [documentary] style facilitates the passage from the known to the unknown and renders the transition nearly imperceptible” (46).

5. Detailed analysis of Poe’s concern for epistemological questions in “The Fall of the House of Usher” may be found in G. R. Thompson’s “Poe and the Paradox of Terror: Structures of Heightened Consciousness in ‘The Fall of the House of Usher.’” Thompson’s essay, a rebuttal of Partick F. Quinn’s “A Misreading of Poe’s ‘The Fall of the House of Usher,’” is a close textual analysis of references to perception, particularly eyesight, in Poe’s tale. Both essays may be found in Thompson and Lokke’s *Ruined Eden of the Present*.

**Four**

1. The question of whether Stephen Dedalus is more influenced by Rimbaud or Baudelaire is addressed by David Weir in “Stephen Dedalus: Rimbaud or Baudelaire?” *JJQ* 18 (1981): 87. These issues are directly addressed by Baudelaire’s *Paradis Artificiel* and his 1851 essay “Du Vin et du Hachish” in which he celebrates the *profondes joies du vin.* Both wine and hashish “exaltent [la] personnalité,” but hashish is “antisocial” whereas “la vin est profondément humain.”

2. In his famous 1871 letter to Izambard, Rimbaud wrote that he was debauching himself as much as possible. He wanted to be poet by making himself a visionary: “Il s’agit d’arriver a l’inconnu par le dérèglement de tous les sens.”
3. De Quincey’s remark that his poor eyesight aids the visionary sense does not occur in the standard edition of De Quincey’s writing (Masson, 1889–90) but in an early version of Suspiria de Profundis that first appeared in Blackwood’s magazine.

4. Eliot’s comments on the association of sensibility sound remarkably like a gloss of Stephen’s opening lines in “Proteus,” which Eliot would have read, in draft form, as early as June 1915 during his stint as assistant editor of The Egoist (Ellmann 394; Sultan, 14).


6. For the fullest discussion of Joyce’s night world in Finnegans Wake, see John Bishop’s Joyce’s Book of the Dark (1987).

7. The following summary draws on material from both Tindall and Campbell (1944).

8. Roland McHugh defines sigla as “abbreviations for certain characters or conceptual patterns underlying the book’s fabric” (3).

**Five**

1. J. Hillis Miller (1965) reminds us that “instead of making everything an object for the self, the mind must efface itself before reality, or plunge into the density of an exterior world” (7–8). Similarly, Edward Said stresses that Conrad is interested in presenting the “overriding and immediate sensation of action” (87), and Ian Watt states that Conrad’s main objective is “to put us in intense sensory contact with events” (175).

2. Many able critics, following Ford Maddox Ford’s lead, have labeled Conrad “a writer who avowed himself impressionist” (Ford vii), but Conrad did not want to be known as “only an impressionist” (Garnett 107) and generally used the epithet “impressionistic” unfavorably, at least in a literary context. See Hay, “Joseph Conrad and Impressionism,” and Watt, “Impressionism and Symbolism in Heart of Darkness,” in Conrad in the Nineteenth Century.

3. See Adam Gillion, “Conrad as Painter.”

4. “Bodies do not produce sensations, but complexes of sensations (complexes of elements) make up bodies. If, to the physicist, bodies appear the real, abiding, existences, whilst sensations are regarded
merely as their evanescent, transitory show, the physicist forgets, in the assumption of such a view, that all bodies are but thought-symbols for complexes of sensations (complexes of elements). Here, too, the elements form the real, immediate, and ultimate foundation, which it is the task of physiological research to investigate.

For us, therefore, the world does not consist of mysterious entities, which by their interaction with another, equally mysterious entity, the ego, produce sensations, which alone are accessible. For us, colors, sounds, spaces, times, . . . are all ultimate elements, whose given connexion it is our business to investigate” (Mach 22–23).

5. A similar situation is Brown’s meeting with Lord Jim: “A shadow loomed up, moving in the greyness, solitary, very bulky, and yet constantly eluding the eye.” (21:398).

6. See, for instance, Baines (184), Guerard (24, 30, passim), Miller (14), and Ian Watt (358).

7. For a discussion of romantic defamiliarization, see Scholes (170–80).

Six

1. References to Lowry’s papers, housed in the University of British Columbia’s Special Collections, are given by box number, folder, and page reference. They are here quoted and reproduced courtesy of UBC Special Collections and by permission of Literistic Ltd., the literary agent for Lowry’s estate. For a bibliography of Lowry’s papers, though now somewhat outdated, see Judith O. Combs, Malcolm Lowry 1909–1957: An Inventory of his Papers in the Library of the University of British Columbia, Ref. Pub. No. 42 (Vancouver: Univ. of British Columbia Library, 1973).

2. Sherrill Grace in The Voyage That Never Ends (1–19) offers a useful synopsis of Lowry’s various conceptions of his cycle of novels as well as a detailed summary of how the various works in the cycle are related.

3. Although Lunar Caustic, first published by the Paris Review and subsequently by Jonathan Cape, is an unrelieved descent into the hellish wards of Bellevue Hospital in New York, Lowry had written several versions of the work, under the various titles of “Lunar Caustic,” “The Last Address,” and “Swinging the Maelstrom,” which present varying degrees of pessimism.

4. For a discussion of Lowry’s Eden, see Cross’s “Malcolm Lowry and the Columbian Eden.”
5. The Consul's mistranslation "You like this garden? Why is it yours? We evict those who destroy!" (128) is corrected later in the novel: "Do you like this garden . . . that is yours? See that your children do not destroy it!" (232). The Consul's misunderstanding at first obscures meaning but also adds an ironic reference to the novel's theme of exile. See Ackerley and Clipper (189–90, 311–12, 446).

6. Ackerley and Clipper discuss the significance of this phrase with regard to the philosophy of "la vida impersonal" in which all of humankind is thought to reside in individual Edens, for which each individual is responsible (12, 22–23).

7. Ouspensky discusses Mach's views on sensation in Tertium Organum (9, 62–63, 65) and A New Model of the Universe (85).

8. The nodes and nodal signifiers that contribute significantly to the fabric of Volcano are the luminous wheel, the inferno, Eden, the barranca, horses, the Day of the Dead, Indians and William Blackstone, pariah dogs and Parian, the Farolito, sexual imagery, the Faust legend, the volcanoes, the cinema, the phrase "no se puede vivir sin amar," the movie advertisement "Las Manos de Orlac. Con Peter Lorre," the approaching storm, the numbers 666 and 7, birds, insects, and, of course, alcohol and drinking.