Notes

Chapter 1  Editing and Annotating the Biographia Literaria

1. Biographia Literaria, ed. Henry Nelson Coleridge and Sara Coleridge (London: William Pickering, 1847), 1:xv. All references to editions of the Biographia will be cited in the text by volume and page number, with the date of publication.
4. Quoted from James Thorpe, Principles of Textual Criticism (San Marino: Huntington Library, 1972), viii.

Chapter 2 Coleridge's Book of Moonlight

1. It may also be a direct parody of Coleridge: "My walks therefore were almost daily on the top of Quantock, and among its sloping coombs. With my pencil and memorandum book in my hand, I was making studies, as the artists call them, and often moulding my thoughts into verse, with the objects and imagery immediately before my senses. Many circumstances, evil and good, intervened to prevent the completion of the poem...." (1:196).

2. Wordsworth repeatedly emphasizes the importance of the "meditated arrangement of my minor Poems" (1815 Preface 140), in the service of a two-fold order: "as composing an entire work within themselves, and as adjuncts to the philosophical Poem, 'The Recluse.' This arrangement has long presented itself habitually to my own mind. Nevertheless, I should have preferred to scatter the contents of these volumes at random, if I had been persuaded that, by the plan adopted, any thing material would be taken from the natural effect of the pieces, individually" (143). There is a useful discussion of some of the connections between Wordsworth's preface and the *Biographia* in Johnston.

3. Jerome Christensen, building on observations made by Thomas McFarland, and making use of some Derridean insights, has made some interesting observations on the way Coleridge's writing can be seen as taking place in a marginal space, dependent on the existence of a prior text. My views can readily be seen to overlap with his in places, while disagreeing in others. Lawrence Lipking considers the question of "marginalia" (a word apparently invented by Coleridge) in a broad nineteenth-twentieth-century context.

4. In a July letter to R. H. Brabant, Coleridge claims to have written "One long passage—a disquisition on the powers of association, with the History of the Opinions on this subject from Aristotle to Hartley, and on the generic difference between the faculties of Fancy and Imagination... as laying the foundation Stones of the Constructive or Dynamic Philosophy in opposition to the merely mechanic—" (CL 4:579).

5. The same split impulse hovered over Wordsworth's attempts to write *The Recluse*. As early as 1798 he could posit both "action" and "the excursive power / Of Intellect and thought" as the essential support and ground of "The being that we are" (MS 16, Gill 676-79). As with all projects like *The Prelude* and the *Biographia*, a unified identity is both the base assumption that makes subjective narration possible and that which can only be produced through narration, as demonstrated by the completion of a coherent narrative.

7. "Our language is full of indirect presentations of this sort, in which the expression does not contain the proper schema for the concept, but merely a symbol for reflection. Thus the words ground (support, basis), to depend (to be held up from above), to flow from something (instead of, to follow), substance (as Locke expresses it, the support of accidents), and countless others are not schematical but symbolical hypotyposes and expressions for concepts, not by means of a direct intuition, but only by analogy with it, i.e. by the transference of reflection upon an object of intuition to a quite different concept to which perhaps an intuition can never directly correspond" (Judgment 198).


10. In this they follow Fogle's "Compositional History," showing how conveniently it can be used to "explain" the formal and philosophical shortcomings of the work. In his "Review Essay" Fruman has argued convincingly that these "Philosophical chapters"—and in particular chapter 13—might well have been written earlier and under less trying circumstances than those imagined by Fogle, Engell, and Bate.

11. In giving cumulative page numbers I shall use the Shawcross edition, where the editor's own notes are placed at the end of the text.

12. See David Simpson, in Irony and Authority: "What the artist in the primary, authoritarian sense cannot do is presented to the reader as an invitation or temptation, an empty space which he must fill for himself in the cause of kindling his own torch. The central chapters of Biographia Literaria seem to me to make some sense in this context" (95).

13. In the year following the publication of the Biographia, in his lecture on "Wit and Humour" for the Philosophical Society in London, Coleridge expressed his pleasure in reading Tristram Shandy, and his own "acknowledgment of the hollowness and farce of the world." He also challenged the notion that the novel is chaotic, urging that "the digressive spirit [is] not wantonness, but the very form of his genius (CH 353–56).

14. Cervantes is invoked directly in chapter 21, in the extravaganza where Coleridge develops the image of a "critical machine" which is like the windmills in Don Quixote: "Should any literary Quixote find himself provoked by its sounds and regular movements, I should admonish him with Sancho Panza, that it is no giant but a windmill" (2:111).

15. See Brisman (33–37) and Christensen (169–75). The fictitious friend is remarkably like Carlyle's "English Editor" who provides the essential ballast for Teufelsdröckh. Closer to home, he resembles John Morgan conducting his correspondence in furtherance of Coleridge's Biographia project. "I am no dreamer, my facts are not ideas you know" (2:289). "I am no poet no daydreamer you know" (2:285).

16. "Thus Fontanier in his Figures du discours: 'But what can give rise to apostrophe? It can only be feeling, and only the feeling stirred up within the heart
until it breaks out and spreads itself about on the outside, as if acting on its own . . . [as if it were] the spontaneous impulse of a powerfully moved soul!" (Culler 138).

17. "Substance" here translates Paul's hypostasis ("that which stands under"). The meaning seems to be either that things without reality in themselves are made real (given "substance") by faith, or that there are realities for which we have no material evidence, whose real existence we can only know through faith.

18. The effect can be strong enough to provoke assertions of actual existence. Johnston argues that The Recluse really does exist as "twenty thousand lines of poetry susceptible of constructive reading," making it as real as works like The Canterbury Tales and The Faerie Queene. McFarland has argued that Coleridge's magnum opus was "not merely a concrete plan dating from a certain period around the year 1815, but an omnipresent reality, even when imperfectly expressed" (Pantheist, 194). My own sense of the way these works "existed" is best expressed by Melville's description of Pierre's double writing: "Two books are being writ; of which the world shall only see one, and that the bungled one. The larger book, and the infinitely better, is for Pierre's own private shelf. That it is, whose unfathomable cravings drink his blood; the other only demands his ink. But circumstances have so decreed, that the one can not be composed on the paper, but only as the other is writ down in his soul" (304).

Chapter 3 The Besetting Sins of Coleridge's Prose

2. Biographia Literaria, ed. J. Shawcross, 2 vols (London: Oxford University Press, 1907). Subsequent references to the Biographia will be to this edition except where noted, and will be identified by volume and page number only.
3. I document this claim in The Design of 'Biographia Literaria.' See note 1, above.
Chapter 4: Coleridge and the Language of Adam

1. A view succinctly set forth by Agrippa von Nettesheim ("as [Adam] named any thing, so the name of it was, which names indeed contain in them wonderfull powers of the things signified," 153), by Kircher (see esp. p. 145 on the unity of Adamic names and the nature of the things they refer to), by Vico ("the sacred language invented by Adam, to whom God granted divine onomathea­sia, the giving of names to things according to the nature of each," 127), and by Warburton ("the most generally received [reading of Genesis 2:19–20], th'o', perhaps, as groundless as any, is, that Adam gave every Creature a Name expressive of its Nature," 2:82). Foucault (36) offers similar observations on theories about the original "transparency" of language and its division into many tongues incompatible with one another "only in so far as they had previously lost this original resemblance to the things that had been the prime reason for the existence of language. All the languages known to us are now spoken only against the background of this lost similitude and in the space that it left vacant."

2. Cohen (21) proposes a similar division, but based on slightly different criteria. The distinction I adopt follows Todorov's differentiation of "the motivated (natural)" sign from the "unmotivated" (228). This distinction between the two schools is of course not absolute, as demonstrated by Webster's praise of Boehme's theory of divine "signatures" linking Adam's language to creation (26). For good historical surveys of the idea of linguistic motivation, see Genette, who concentrates on French texts, and McKusick (4–13).

3. The study of Egyptian hieroglyphics as motivated pictographs (for example in Warburton) is another manifestation of the same interest in ideal modes of signification.

4. Derrida has characterized the "épistémi" of this kind of "science" as "an alge­brizing, de-poetizing formulation whose operation is to repress—in order to master it better—the charged [i.e., motivated or polysemous?] signifier or the linked hieroglyph" (Of Grammatology 285).

5. Land's study documents this shift from a concentration on the structure of individual signs to the structure of sentences in the eighteenth century.
Slaughter convincingly demonstrates the importance of taxonomy to rationalist linguistics. Hers is the most philosophically perceptive study of seventeenth-century language theories. Perhaps the first to see the basic thrust of Wilkins' system was Jones, who in 1769 criticized "the arbitrary, real characters of Dr. Wilkins and others" (11) as part of his argument for English as a universal language.

6. Compare, for example, the views of de Mott and the reactions to them in Salmon, esp. p. 153 note 4.

7. *Aids to Reflection*, 168–69. See also Coleridge's comment of March 13, 1827, that "a Fun will sometimes facilitate explanation," which he then exemplifies with an English pun and a Hebrew etymology (*Table Talk* 49). In Coleridge's day, etymological studies consisted mainly of strings of puns directed by some *a priori* notion of the origin of language—see, for example, Jacob Bryant's *A New System, or, An Analysis of Ancient Mythology* (1774–76), and Horne Tooke, *The Diversions of Purley* (1786–1805). For the latter's influence on Coleridge, see McKusick, p. 33–52.

8. See Coleridge's letter to James Gillman of October 22, 1826: "For (as I have long ago observed to you) it is the fundamental Mistake of Grammarians and Writers on the philosophy of Grammar and Language [to assume] that words and their syntaxis are the immediate representatives of Things, or that they correspond to Things. Words correspond to thoughts; and the legitimate Order & Connection of words to the Laws of Thinking and to the acts and affections of the Thinker's mind" (*Letters* 6:60; see also 6:817). The Lockean view, however, does not answer the question of how reference comes into being within the internal dynamics of the sign and makes no distinction, of the sort Coleridge found so essential, between lower (arbitrary) and higher (motivated) modes of referentiality.


10. See for example Wellek (*History* 2:175): "In his practical criticism Coleridge rarely uses the term 'symbol.'" The point has been most recently reiterated by Milner (21–22), who summarizes de Man's view (the validity of which I argue for herein) that there are no true symbols in "any actual act of Romantic figuration," but (quite rightly) questions de Man's conclusion that "the notion of the symbol was a self-deceiving mystification." McKusick's fine general study of Coleridge's linguistic concepts makes only passing references to the idea of symbol.

11. *CN* 3:3587. Christensen (*Blessed Machine* 19) further defines and uses the term as "the necessary artifice" and "enabling figure that makes fiction as well as philosophy conceivable."

12. Wellek (*History* 174) suggests that Coleridge's "sail" example is fallacious, but does not say why. Culler (263) quite correctly calls Coleridge's symbol a "motivated sign," but then equates this with "a synecdoche."

13. Todorov (137–45, 177–83) briefly summarizes the theories of motivated figu-
ration and "imitation" in Lessing, Herder, A. W. Schlegel, and Friedrich Ast (whose notion of charged and spiritualized synecdoche, published in 1808, bears some interesting similarities to Coleridge's symbol).

14. For Coleridge's distinction between "copy" and "imitation," see Biographia 1:cv–vi, 2:72 and note 4. His somewhat scattered definitions of the latter term indicate that it is yet another variant on the attempt to claim a motivated relationship between poetry and nature, but one which takes cognizance of inescapable differences between them.

15. See particularly the note Coleridge added in 1829: "What is an Idea in the Subject, i.e., in the Mind, is a Law in the Object, i.e., in Nature" (Friend 1:497).

16. See Exodus 3:13–14 and Byron's play on these words in Don Juan canto 1, stanza 14.

17. See also Coleridge's letter of September 16, 1829, to Hyman Hurwitz: "Prothesis [,] i.e. the identity or co-inherence of Act and Being of which there is and there can be but one perfect Instance—viz. The Eternal I AM, who is by his own act—who affirms himself to be in that he is; and who is, in that he affirms himself to be. But the Image & Representative of himself is the personal Identity, the 'I am' of every self-conscious Spirit" (CL 6:816—17).

18. See for example the selections from Vico, Herder, and Karl Moritz in Feldman and Richardson 58, 229, 264–65. The theory was perpetuated into the nineteenth century by eclectic mythographers such as Davies, who mixed together his primitivist notions about Celtic bards and Druids with a reading of Genesis 2:19 and a belief (somewhat like Boehme's) that fragments of original, motivated language lie hidden in modern tongues. He claims, for example, that "all expressions of the human voice . . . are not, therefore, as many have supposed, mere imitations of that which has been heard,—or unconnected with ideas of things, and of their natural affinities" (368).

19. 1:160. Wordsworth repeats this motivated/arbitrary distinction in the "Essay on Epitaphs" when he contrasts words which are "an incarnation of the thought" and those which are "only a clothing for it" (2:84).

20. Mysterium Magnum; Boehme 3:204. See also Coleridge's warnings about the burial of "faith . . . in the dead letter" in comments prelusive to his definition of "symbol" (Statesman's Manual 30).

Chapter 6 Coleridge, Habit, and the Politics of Vision


2. Shelley, Bate and Engell note, employs a similar image in "The Defense of Poetry": "Poetry . . . purges from our inward sight the film of familiarity which obscures from us the wonder of being."

3. Wordsworth repeatedly speaks in The Prelude of the "despotism," the "tyranny" of eye, like Coleridge responding against the inescapable materialism and
empiricism of optics. "We are restless," writes Coleridge, "because invisible things are not the objects of vision" (1:107).


5. James Beattie in "Of Imagination," in The Elements of Moral Science from The Philosophical and Critical Works (New York: G. Olms Verlag, 1974), 3:110, writes, "Custom or habit is a very extensive principle of association..." He then goes on to discuss the obvious virtues of custom, but is also interested in the ossification of habits which originate in "some perverse association": "It should be our care to guard against these and the like absurd habits, and to be very thankful to those who caution us against them..." (3:113). Beattie, it may be noted, like Hume, also uses "habit" and "custom" interchangeably.


9. There may be another reason behind Locke's "no": a "yes" raises the specter of an innate idea, some common proto-idea that bridges visual and tactual ideas and precedes the sense data of each. J. L. Mackie's Problems from Locke (London: Oxford, 1976), 30, discusses this possibility, and Michael J. Morgan, Molyneux's Question (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 7, takes Locke's "no" as a defense of his position against innate ideas. Fraser's note refers to Reid and Leibniz. The latter disagrees with Locke's solution, and "concludes that if the born-blind man had known beforehand, by touch only, that the cube and the globe were there, he could at once, when he recovered sight, distinguish them by reason, in combination with the sensuous data of touch; because otherwise a born-blind man could not learn the rudiments of geometry by touch only, as he is able to do" (1:186—87).

10. For a brief account of those experiments, such as the Cheselden experiment, see for instance M. J. Morgan, Molyneux's Question (1977). The effect upon the newly sighted person of suddenly being able to see was often anything but happy. To the contrary he or she was bewildered and depressed (Addison has an account of one such person) because the neurological pathways that had been established by the blind person have now become a mass of confusion owing to the addition of sight. J. Z. Young, a contemporary neurologist, offers in Doubt and Certainty an excellent explanation of the physiological disruption.

11. One wonders if Locke did not possess some uncanny ability to visualize abstractions. Berkeley, in addition to Hume, taxes Locke with the fantasy of his abstractions: how is it possible, Berkeley wonders, for us to picture as Locke insists we can a triangle that is not equilateral, scalene, or isosceles—yet still a triangle?

12. Berkeley would argue that our saying, "I hear a garbage truck," is utterly false
to the actual experience. In reality I hear the roar of a large motor (a sound which in itself is not necessarily an engine, but a deep-throated sound that resembles what I know to be that emitted by engines), I hear the whining groan of something I associate with the sound garbage trucks make as they pick up and then press down the rubbish, etc. But perhaps most important, it happens that the trash collectors are regular. This is Wednesday, 5:30 A.M., the very hour and day I am accustomed to hearing the garbage truck. Were I near the Indianapolis Speedway and hearing the same sounds, I would not suppose I was about to watch a garbage truck race.


16. This is a most important concept to Locke—that of "assent" or "consent" to reasonable ideas—and appears throughout the early chapters of the Essay. In its broad inclusiveness and general optimism, it has obvious political implications.

17. Hume writes: "Our imagination has a great authority over our ideas; and there are no ideas that are different from each other, which it cannot separate, and join, and compose into all varieties of fiction. But notwithstanding the empire of the imagination, there is a secret tie or union among particular ideas, which causes the mind to conjoin them more frequently together, and makes the one, upon its appearance, introduce the other... hence the connection of writing; and hence that thread or chain of thought." The "secret tie" is association, consisting of resemblance, contiguity, and causation: "... as these are the only ties of our thoughts, they are really to us the cement of the universe..." (662). The emphasis here upon a universe of unrelated particulars ("everything that exists, is particular") that the mind must "compose" has an obvious bearing not only each act of perception, which insists upon composition, but upon poetry as an extension of perception. Coleridge's position is in some ways contradictory. Although inalterably opposed to Locke and Hume, he yet sharply—and I think unfairly—criticizes Wordsworth for claiming in the Intimations Ode that the child is an eye among the blind, a great seer—in both senses—and a prophet. To Coleridge this is an egregious instance of "thoughts and images too great for the subject... an approximation to what might be called mental bombast..." (2:136ff). Coleridge seems coyly unknowing here: "In what sense is a child of that age a philosopher? In what sense does he read "the eternal deep"?... Children at this age give us no information of themselves; and at what time were we dipt in the Lethe, which has
produced utter oblivion of a state so godlike?” Coleridge seems to play the philosophical redneck here, forgetting his own strictures about the relation between childhood vision and poetic genius.

18. Thomas Burnet, *The Sacred Theory of the Earth* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1965), 15. This is not the work by Burnet from which Coleridge takes the motto (which comes from *Archaeologiae Philosophicae*), but one Coleridge so admired he once contemplated making of it some sort of verse translation.


21. It should be said in regard to my point about individual or particular as opposed to class or mass that Coleridge takes for a moment a different view at the end of chapter 7 of the *Biographia*. There, arguing for how one might achieve a proper memory without resorting to *memoria technica* or artificial memory, he suggests a temperamental disposition of mind: “Sound logic, as the habitual subordination of the individual to the species, and of the species to the genus...” is the first recommendation he makes for the intellect. Although Bate and Engell suggest this notion of subordination of the individual to the species is by then “a leitmotif in German philosophy” and that Coleridge is aligning himself with the notion that “when the individual becomes truly aware and creative he submerges himself in the species,” I suspect that Coleridge is here thinking less in the grand political and cultural terms Bate and Engell suggest than in merely logical and mechanical ones. His use of “habitual,” normally not a positive word, would support the point. Also, he concludes his recipe for a good memory with some physiological recommendations, “sound health, and above all (as far as this relates to passive remembrance) a healthy digestion; these are the best, these are the only arts of memory” (1:128).

22. Perkins, 491. Coleridge says in “On Poesy or Art,” “The primary art is writing... First, there is mere gesticulation; then rosaries or *wampum*; then picture-language; then hieroglyphics, and finally alphabetic letters.”

23. Perkins, 495.

24. Perkins, 492. In a formulation reminiscent of Berkeley, Coleridge writes: “nature itself is to a religious observer the art of God... Hence nature itself would give us the impression of a work of art, if we could see the thought which is present at once in the whole and in every part; and a work of art will be just in proportion as it adequately conveys the thought, and rich in proportion to the variety of parts it holds in unity.”


Ruskin goes on about our mind's groaning beneath the weight of "thoughts . . . brittle, obstinate, and icy, which can neither bend nor grow. . . . All men are liable in some degree to be frost-bitten . . . have no clear consciousness of what is around them, or with them; blind to the one, insensible to the other. . . . I would not press the definition into its darker application to the dull heart and heavy ear; I have to do with it only as it refers to the too frequent condition of rural existence, whether of nations or of individuals, settling commonly upon them in proportion to their age."


Chapter 7: Coleridge and Energy


3. Sir Philip Sidney, *Defense of Poesy*, ed. Lewis Soens (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), 10, provides a context for Coleridge’s idea. Sidney enjoins his reader to give “right honor to the heavenly Maker of that maker [i.e., poet], who, having made man to his own likeness, set him beyond and over all the works of that second [i.e., postlapsarian] nature, which in nothing he shows so much as in poetry. . . .”


5. *The Table Talk and Omniana of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. T. Ashe (London: George Bell and Sons, 1888). I have followed the convention of citing this edition for the convenience of the users of other editions—i.e., by date of entry rather than by page.

6. Ibid.


10. Thomas Carlyle, "Signs of the Times," in Thomas Carlyle: Sartor Resartus and Selected Prose, ed. Herbert Sussman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 16. Plate 4 of Blake's The Marriage of Heaven and Hell (1790—93) concludes with the observation that "Energy is Eternal Delight." In Book I of The Prelude (1805), Wordsworth expresses concern that an access of authentic inspiration has turned into "A tempest, a redundant energy / Vexing its own creation" (ll. 46—47). In "On Locke's 'Essay of the Human Understanding'" (1810—11?), Hazlitt talks of "the pervading and elastic energy" of the mind. In the Essay on Christianity (1815—19?), Shelley describes God as "the overruling Spirit of the collective energy of the moral and material world," Shelley's Prose in the Bodleian Manuscripts, 17. Keats argues, in the long letter of February 14—May 3, 1819, to his brother and sister-in-law in America, that "though a quarrel in the streets is a thing to be hated, the energies displayed in it are fine...." If the word energy is not found in Byron, the concept most certainly is.


12. Thomas Young, A Course of Lectures on Natural Philosophy and the Mechanical Arts, 2 vols. (1807; rpt. London: Taylor and Walton, 1845), 1:59—60. "The term energy may be applied ... to the product of the mass or weight of a body, into the square of the number expressing its velocity. This product has been denominated by the living or ascending force [the vis viva], since the height of a body's vertical ascent is in proportion to it ... but although this opinion has been very universally rejected, yet the force thus estimated well deserves a distinct denomination."


15. Loyd S. Swenson, The Genesis of Relativity: Einstein in Context (New York: Burt Franklin, 1979); and Stephen J. Gould, Ontogeny and Phylogeny (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1977), are exemplary for their insightful analysis of the politics that distort both the development of science and the history of that development in the fields of physical theory and genetic theory, respectively.

16. I am, of course, summarizing the scenario developed by Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). Fritjof Capra, The Turning-Point: Science, Society and the Rising Culture (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), argues that it is only in the twentieth century—and especially in the second half of the century—that the Newtonian paradigms that have ruled scientific disciplines and technologies, other than physics have been replaced by more nearly Einsteinian paradigms.

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19. Abraham Rees, *The Cyclopaedia; or, Universal Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and Literature*, 45 vols. (London: Longman, Hurst Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1819–20), 29, s. v. *Quakers*. Rees accounts Quakerism "remarkable for asserting the continuance, up to the present time, of immediate revelation, or the communication of divine instruction to the mind, by the testimony of the Spirit of God. This revelation . . . neither does nor can contradict the outward testimony of the scriptures, or right and sound reason."


24. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 131, argues for these assumptions, as philosophical assumptions, originating with Hobbes and Descartes, who "were fighting (albeit discreetly) to make the intellectual world safe for Copernicus and Galileo. They did not think of themselves as offering 'philosophical systems,' but as contributing to the efflorescence of research in mathematics and mechanics, as well as liberating intellectual life from ecclesiastical institutions." Paul Magnuson, *Coleridge’s Nightmare Poetry* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1974), 27, discusses the impact of Berkeley’s *Siris* on Coleridge in 1796. Magnuson argues that Coleridge’s self-proclaimed Berkeleian sympathies are for Berkeley’s belief in the priority of soul or mind over body as a condition of ontology and epistemology alike. McFarland, *The Pantheist Tradition*, ch. 2 ("The Spinozistic Crescendo"), 53–106, elaborates the distinction between the “I am” and the “it is.”


26. Lvs. 8r–8v. 11.342–78 (Bodleian Library Copy).


through in an exchange between Myope and Vallaton, the former playing Pangloss to the latter's Candide: "Happy it had been for the world, if not only your arm, but every bone in your body had been broken, so that it had been the means of furnishing mankind with a proof of the perfectibility of philosophical energy!") For more on Hamilton, see DNB 24:147-48.


34. M. H. Abrams, "Coleridge's 'A Light in Sound': Science, Metascience, and Poetic Imagination," PAPS 116 (1972), 458-75, esp. pp. 459-60. Speaking of "The Eolian Harp," with its idea of "the one Life within us and abroad" (CPW, 1, 101, 1.26), Abrams notes that "Coleridge suggested in several other poems written at the time of 'The Eolian Harp' that there is in nature an indwelling cause of the organization and consciousness of all individual existents."

35. "Dear Reynolds, as Last Night I Lay in Bed" ("Epistle to John Hamilton Reynolds"), 11. 76—77, in John Keats: Complete Poems, ed. Jack Stillinger (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1982), 181. Timothy Corrigan, Coleridge, Language, and Criticism (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1982), 169, notes that "the function of the will in both its divine and human forms" is a salient concern for Coleridge in the 1820's. Jean-Pierre Mileur, Vision and Revision: Coleridge's Art of Immanence (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), 20—21, discusses the tendency of the creative will, acting through the medium of the symbol to produce allegory, towards self-abstraction and meanings "not of this world."


37. Rorty, Philosophy, 17—69, esp. p. 35 ("The Invention of the Mind"), focuses on the problem of consciousness. His list, on p. 35, of the "features which philosophers have, at one time or another, taken as marks of the mental," contains several that were also of importance to Coleridge. These include "ability to know itself incorrigibly ('privileged access')," "ability to grasp universals," "ability to sustain relations to the inexistent ('intentionality')," and "ability to act freely."

38. McFarland, The Pantheist Tradition, 32, quoting Collected Letters, 4. 792. dis-
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cusses the likelihood that Coleridge formed his opinions before reading the German philosophers, especially Fichte, Schelling, and their followers.


42. Rorty, Philosophy, 35.

44. See Rorty, Philosophy, 65; and E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), ch. 4, esp. p. 117. The Cartesian "move" is what Husserl objects to under the rubric of "the mathematization of nature."

47. Mileur, Vision and Revision, 5.

49. Levere, ibid., 154.
50. As cited in Levere, ibid. The shape of the pentad brings to mind Thomas Browne's discussion of the Quincunx and its significance in The Garden of Cyrus.


53. Julia L. Epstein and Mark L. Greenberg, "Decomposing Milton's Rainbow," JHI 45:1 (1984), 115–40, discuss the way that the poets appropriated the Newtonian account of the rainbow and turned it against Newton and Newtonian thought. The importance of the rainbow for the Wordsworth-Coleridge circle is suggested by a poem like Wordsworth's "My Heart Leaps Up" (1802).


Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of Eternity,
Until Death tramples it to fragments.

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59. See the "Prospectus" to The Excursion, as cited in note 32 above.

Chapter 8 Perception and "the heaven-descended KNOW-THYSELF"

6. Engell, Bate, BL 1:1191n, cite parallels to this statement on self-consciousness in CL 2:709, as well as in the subsequent discussion of the self in ch. 9:1:145–46, 158–60.
7. §17 "Der Grundsatz der synthetischen Einheit der Apperzeption ist das oberste Prinzip alles Verstandesgebrauchs." Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B136.
8. Orsini, 121.
9. Fichte, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre (Jena, Leipzig: 2nd ed. Christian Ernst Gabler, 1802), 153–85, appropriates the electric/magnetic/galvanic construction of Schelling's Naturphilosophie as principles of activity/permanence/change in the postulation of the "I" ("Das Ich . . . als sich setzend.")
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14. BL 1:251; SW 3:345. The parallel between these two passages has not been previously noted. At the fourth level of "inner sense," Coleridge says, a man "attains to a notion of his notions—he reflects on his own reflections"; Schelling asserts that "das transcendentale Denken . . . , indem es des Begriffs als Akts sich bewuβt wird, zum Begriff des Begriffs sich erhebt."

15. Schelling posits an "unauflösliche" or "unvermeidliche Cirkel" in his System (SW III, 359—360); in Vom Ich he employs the Fichteans opposition of center and circumference in defining "die Sphäre unsers Wissens" (SW I, 163—5). Engell, Bate, BL 1, 267n, also call attention to Fichte's "image of a circle used in a way similar to C's," in Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre (1793), Sämmliche Werke, 1:61—62.

16. Coleridge's regression from "the picture of the line," "the stoke thus drawn," and "the image," to "the original line generated by the act of the imagination" (BL 1, 250) is more precisely discriminated in the Logic, 73, as ἐγερματα θεωρητικη, ειδος, ειδωλον. Coleridge's terms are to be contrasted with Schelling's "Unterschied des Schema vom Bild und vom Symbol," SW 3:508—09.

17. Jackson, Logic, 75n, points to similar examples of this phenomena recorded in CN 1:549 ("Vortices of flies") and CL 2:974 ("whirling round a live Coal").

Chapter 9 Annotating the Annotations

1. I have argued elsewhere that both Hegel's and Derrida's tendency to isolate the difference entailed by expressed force begs the question on behalf of more or less developed appeal to "not-being." That is, when in the Phenomenology Hegel sublates the play of force to the "law of Force" as "universal difference," he effectively reduces relational difference to a unity that can only be founded on the "unity" of negation (see Hegel 90). Derrida, I believe, does the same thing, in his approving reference to the Nietzschean notion that "force itself is never present; it is only a play of differences and quantities"—explaining further,
by way of a Deleuzean citation, that the "'difference in quantity is the essence of force.'" (See Derrida 148). My argument is simply that relational force can be reduced neither to the unity of presence nor to the (albeit deferred) unity of its relational differences: hence my appeal to "power-and-difference."

Chapter 10 Coleridge and Milton


2. See Wordsworth's statement in his 1815 Preface that he had given as much evidence of the power of the imagination as Shakespeare, Spenser, and Milton, and therefore was entitled to expect that, like the works of his three distinguished predecessors, his own was "worthy to be held in undying remembrance." "Preface to Poems (1815)" in William Wordsworth, ed. Stephen Gill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 634-35. We can safely presume that this comment must have irritated Coleridge, primarily because Wordsworth reached this climax of self-regard by borrowing two important concepts he owed to Coleridge without any acknowledgment: the distinction between Shakespeare and Milton, which Coleridge discussed in his 1811-1812 course of lectures; and the difference between Greek and Christian religion (the former being characterized by "bondage of definite form," the latter by the indefiniteness of the sublime), which Coleridge had developed as early as 1799. I deal with Coleridge's response to Wordsworth's unacknowledged borrowings from him in "Coleridge and Wordsworth: The Ethics of Gift Exchange and Literary Ownership," forthcoming in Coleridge's Theory of the Imagination Today, ed. Christine Gallant (New York: AMS Press, 1989).


5. In Coleridge, Wordsworth and the Language of Allusion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), Lucy Newlyn points out that in The Prelude Wordsworth, while seeming to praise Coleridge, introduces an allusion to Sampson Agonistes which has "a jarring effect." It recalls, of course, the mood of dejection in which Coleridge had last echoed the same passage, and it highlights the ambiguity of Coleridge's status. On one level, he is a hero with the capacity of a God; on the other, he is a human being whose health and vision are frail" (176-77). On Coleridge's and Wordsworth's use of the reference to Sampson Agonistes see pp.
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68–69. Newlyn also shows that in Book 6 and 8 of The Prelude Wordsworth echoes Adam's theory of dreams in Book 5 of Paradise Lost in order to draw attention "to the anarchic potential of Coleridge's thought. . . . Milton's presence within the language not only sharpens the poet's meaning, it pinpoints an underlying aggression" (178–79).


11. Lucy Newlyn is one of the few critics who points out Coleridge's use of Milton as a weapon against Wordsworth. In referring to the letter to Southey, she argues that Coleridge quotes Milton's definition of poetry "in the context of his dissatisfaction with Wordsworth. One feels that he turns to Milton in reaction against Wordsworth, because Milton allows him to think in his customary symbolic terms" (96).

12. In other versions concerning Milton's definition of poetry, passion is usually defined by Coleridge as a counterforce to the objective dimension of poetry as constituted by sensory images, imbuing such images with "the spirit of the mind" or the "passio vera of humanity." See Coleridge on the Seventeenth Century, ed. Roberta Brinkley (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1955), 546–47.

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14. From Sir Joshua Reynolds’ second Discourse (1769) quoted by Coleridge in chapter 16, BL 2:35n. It is interesting to note that in the Advertisement to the 1798 edition of the Lyrical Ballads Wordsworth uses the same passage from Reynolds in order to encourage his readers to acquaint themselves patiently with his poetry through repeated readings rather than judge it rashly and erroneously. This is a rather conspicuously self-serving departure from Reynolds whose notion of good taste, as Coleridge adequately represented, involved not repeated exposure to the work of a contemporary, but to those works whose “reputation” had “matured into fame by the consent of ages” (BL 2:36n.).

15. Here Coleridge reprints the sonnet he had published in the Monthly Magazine under the pseudonym Nehemiah Higginbottom in which he satirized the use of “low, creeping language and thoughts, under the pretence of simplicity” (BL 1:27). As I argued in “Coleridge and Wordsworth. The Ethics of Gift Exchange and Literary Ownership,” the sonnets reprinted in chapter 1 are aimed at Wordsworth, even though originally they were directed against Charles Lamb and Charles Lloyd. For Wordsworth’s view that “humble subjects” written in “a naked and simple style” was one of his chief goals in the Lyrical Ballads poems, see his “Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1802),” esp. p. 609.

16. Although occasionally Coleridge used the term “simplicity” in a conventional sense, as unadorned diction, he characteristically linked it with high ideals, such as the ideal of organic unity. Thus in chapter 16, Coleridge shows how the elder writers attained simplicity in their poetry by avoiding words “which a gentleman would not use in dignified conversation” and by “the studied position of words and phrases, so that not only each part should be melodious in itself, but contribute to the harmony of the whole . . .” (BL 2:33). The covert critique of Wordsworth in this chapter is as pervasive as in his analysis of Shakespeare’s early writings in chapter 15. It is also important to note that in two alternative versions of Milton’s definition of poetry, Coleridge renders simplicity as either pointing to “the elements and the primary laws of our nature” (from the 1813 first lecture on Milton), or to singularity of conception (from Table Talk, May 8, 1824). See Coleridge on the Seventeenth Century, 546.

17. This gives weight to Lawrence Buell’s claim that there is a different principle operating in Biographia Literaria, at odds with Coleridge’s theory of organic unity. See “The Question of Form in Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria,” cited in n. 8 above.

18. As Norman Fruman points out, in Coleridge’s praise of Wordsworth’s virtues as a poet, we “hear nothing of organic unity, or of opposite or discordant qualities reconciled,” which represent Coleridge’s quintessential norms for good poetry. Coleridge, The Damaged Archangel, 198. Also, by resorting to a long list of quotations from Wordsworth’s poetry, as illustration of his gifts, Coleridge merely reinforces the charge previously made against Wordsworth that while
parts of the poems might be excellent, they do not merge well with other parts so as to constitute an organic whole.


22. Cf. Coleridge's statement in chapter 13 that "There is a philosophic, no less than a poetic genius, which is differenced from the highest perfection of talent, not by degree but by kind" (BL 1:299–300). While building upon the presuppositions of Schelling's system, which demonstrated the unity between philosophic and artistic consciousness, Coleridge reverses the direction of Schelling's arguments by privileging philosophy and not art, as Schelling did in the closing section of his System of Transcendental Idealism.

23. As I argued in "Coleridge and Wordsworth. The Ethics of Gift Exchange and Literary Ownership," in chapter 1 of Biographia Literaria Coleridge quotes Milton in order to reverse the implication of his apologetic statement concerning his presumably damaging interest in metaphysics as a young poet.

24. It is not fortuitous that chapter 13, which includes Coleridge's theory of the imagination, opens with a long quotation from Paradise Lost.

25. "Essay, Supplementary to the Preface (1815)," 640.


27. For the view that Biographia Literaria is a response to The Prelude see Lawrence Buell's article cited in n. 8 above.


29. In the Biographia every attack on Wordsworth is matched by a self-directed attack. Coleridge in fact violates almost every standard by which he achieves his victories over his friend. As several critics have noted, his critique of Wordsworth undermines the very standards of genial criticism that Coleridge sets up against the anonymous critics. Similarly, Coleridge does not maintain, as he claims, the indifference of genius in relation to public opinion. Rather, he displays fits of anger both against Wordsworth and the anonymous critics, to the point that Sara Coleridge found it necessary to suppress certain parts of the Biographia which she felt Coleridge himself would not have reprinted. See BL 2:156n.3. On Coleridge's dependence on Wordsworth in the Biographia see Jerome Christensen, "The Genius in Biographia Literaria," Studies in Roman-


32. I am indebted to Charles Altieri for drawing my attention to the impersonal nature of successful idealization and its theological underpinnings.


34. On the Trinity see Coleridge & the Concept of Nature, 186–203.

Chapter 11 "Like a Guilty Thing Surprised"


4. Lentricchia, Criticism, 51. Lentricchia displays a curious blindness to the problem of romanticism. He rightly observes that when in his essay "Literary History and Literary Modernity" de Man writes "literature," others might "say more modestly 'romantic literature'" (47). The same substitution might be performed on de Man's use of the word "modern." Lentricchia seems to think that pointing to the substitution discredits it, whereas it merely opens the question, surely in de Man's mind, of the possibility of rewriting all literary history since the end of the eighteenth century as an elaboration of a few central romantic preoccupations or tropes.


6. In an 1802 letter to William Sotheby, Coleridge writes "Εστήσε signifies—He hath stood—which in these times of apostacy from the principles of Freedom, or of Religion in this country, & from both by the same persons in France, is no unmeaning Signature, if subscribed with humility, & in the remembrance
of. Let him that stands take heed lest he fall—. However it is in truth no more than S. T. C. written in Greek. Es tē see—” In his note to this passage Earl Leslie Griggs observes that “Esôte see” signifies ‘he Hath placed’ not ‘He hath stood.’ The word should have been Esótēke, but then the play on Coleridge’s initials would have been lost. Elsewhere he called it ‘Punic Greek.’” (Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Earl Leslie Griggs, 6 vols. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956–71], 2:459.) Taking his stand on the etymon that is his proper signature requires Coleridge to put in place that which he is to stand on, to stand off his name in order that his name may be a standing place. That apostasis is simultaneously a theft (under the cover of resemblance) of the proper meaning of Esótēke and its surreptitious importation into Esótēke. The diachronic gesture serves a wholly anti-historical strategy. For Coleridge, the signature and the self which it underwrites are strategies.

7. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Watchman, ed. Lewis Patton, vol. 2 of The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, gen’l ed. Kathleen Coburn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 39 and 152. Burke was not the only person subjected to this sort of ideological critique by Coleridge. Like other charges, such as plagiarism, which Coleridge both feared and cherished, the tag of “apostate” was not frugally applied. For an early example, see his denunciation of Southey for the “Apostacy” of his decision to abandon pantisocracy for the bar (Collected Letters 1:162–73). A later and more indirect example would be the treatment of Wordsworth in the second volume of the Biographia, where, in effect, the poet is accused of apostasy from the divine truth of his genius.


9. Early versions of Coleridge’s “shaking off” occur in prose in his letters to his clerical brother George (see, especially, CL 1:125–27) and in poetry in the 1796 “Eolian Harp.” In its final, 1817 version, “The Eolian Harp” displays a double apostasy: a turn from connubial fidelity and the domestic “Cot” to an autoerotically charged fairy fancy and a turn from that scene, now characterized in speculative, pantheistic terms, to “pensive Sara.” The material artifact of the poem itself registers Coleridge’s retirement in the country, a turn away from political activism.

10. As the editor of the Marginalia indicates, these marginalia, comprising a long series of return engagements with Boehme’s texts, are difficult to date, although most fall within the period 1817–18. But the congruence of the language of those under consideration here with notebook entries of 1818 allows us to place them with some confidence near that year. (Marginalia, ed. George Whalley, vol. 12 of The Collected Coleridge [Princeton: Princeton University Press], 1:553–54. All subsequent references to Marginalia will appear by volume, entry, and page in the text.)


12. This is the crucial metaphysical problem for Coleridge. See Thomas McFar-


19. I stress English history to distinguish it, as does Burke, from French. In certain respects my commentary on Burke renders *Reflections* as akin to the paradoxical formulation of Rousseau in *The Social Contract*: “The people subject to the Law must be the authors of the Law.” De Man observes, “Only a subterfuge can put this paralysis in motion. Since the system itself had to be based on deceit, the mainspring of its movement has to be deceitful as well” (*Allegories of Reading*, 274). What is apt for Rousseau would be wrong for Burke just because the evaluative terms of subterfuge and deceit are inappropriate for an argument that embraces theatricality as a determinant of the English character and English history. For Burke it is because the French do not have either the English theater or the English common law tradition that they must resort to a deceit to motivate paralysis.


21. The editors’ translation of “nil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu . . . praeter ipsum intellectum” (*BL* 1:141 and n. 1).


27. *Blindness and Insight*, 162.

28. Evidence that this is de Man's *aim* would be the substitution in the late *Allegories of Reading* of the rhetorical categories "metonymy" and "metaphor" for the suspiciously intentional nouns "flight" and "return" used in the early *Blindness and Insight*.

29. N. B.: This must be not a complete cancellation of the more arbitrary terms: although it is by the necessity and purposiveness of our separation that we attest to poetry's merit, it is by the contingency and compulsiveness of that movement that the critic witnesses to poetry's "genuine power."


31. A full treatment of Coleridge's constitutionalism would have to consider in more detail the ramifications of professionalism in his argument. It is a fact that the professional groups that detached themselves from the clergy in the sixteenth century are not expected to return in the nineteenth. Call this realism or ostracism, it fits with the strong anti-professionalism that Coleridge displays in the *Biographia* where professionals and especially professional critics like Jeffrey are not exempted from the taint of trade. In terms of his relation to Burke, Coleridge was ready to accept the form of the constitutional argument but eager to rid it of all connection to the common-law tradition, which Coleridge could with considerable justice regard as being formulated in the Renaissance in order to justify legal detachment and aggrandize the legal profession. It is certainly a defensible interpretation of the remarks of Coke to James I that Pocock cites as his earliest example of mature ancient constitutionalism (*Politics. Language and Time*, 214). The demystification of the cognitive privileges of the law was already underway in Burke's *Reflections*, where veneration for English law was uneasily coupled with hatred of French lawyers. By regarding the historical act of separation under the idea of detachment and by abandoning particular professions for the general authority of the third estate, Coleridge was able to fulfill Burke's program and substitute newly invented English criticism for the law as the arbiter of all relations to precedent. It might be added that another precedent for the relations between detachment (in this case exile) and the formation of a privileged intellectual class in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, with which Coleridge would have been familiar, occurs in the experience of the Puritan saints (see Michael Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics* [1965; rept., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982], esp. pp. 114–47.).

32. Coleridge vented his regrets over the first decision in chapter 11 of the *Biographia*, an extract of which was transposed to CCS 75–76. On the latter
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decision, Hazlitt’s narrative account in “My First Acquaintance with Poets” remains the *locus classicus.*


34. De Man, *Allegories of Reading,* 8.


Chapter 12 Coleridge and the Charge of Political Apostacy


3. Coleridge, “Mr. Southey and Wat Tyler, IV: Apostacy and Renegadoism” (2 April 1817), in *Essays on His Times,* 2:474.


9. For a single revealing example, John Thelwall commented, on Coleridge’s endorsement in the *Biographia* of “the existence of the Supreme Being,” that Coleridge “seems to have received some new light upon the signification of the syllable *ex,* since he talked to me at Keswick of his design of writing an elaborate demonstration of the truth of Christian revelation which should commence with a denial of the existence of god.” (Burton R. Pollin, assisted by Redmond Burke, “John Thelwall’s Marginalia in a Copy of Coleridge’s *Biographia Literaria*,” *Bulletin of the New York Public Library* 74 (1970): 88).


17. The Complete Poetical Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Ernest Hartley Cole-
of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 7 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1989), 1:184 and 59-67. One can, as this essay
will continue to attempt to show, accept Coleridge's claim that he was “never
at any period of my life a Convert to the System” of Jacobinism (184n), and
that friends could “bear witness for me, how opposite even then my principles
were to those of jacobinism” (184). The key word is “principles,” which for
Coleridge did not change; in the play of his mind and conversation, however,
it might be more accurate to say that he was in his early years both inclined
toward Jacobinism and inclined against it. A sonnet on Burke in 1794 exactly
expresses this characteristically antithetical approach. Burke, the archenemy
of Jacobinism, is hailed by “FREEDOM” as “Great Son of Genius!”, but then
blamed that “in an evil hour with alter’d voice / Thou bad’st Oppressions
hireling crew rejoice.” On the other hand, it is then said that “never, BURKE!
thou drankst Corruption’s bowl”; and the poem concludes by hailing Burke
as “Spirit pure” and wishing “That Error's mist had left thy purged eye: / So
might I clasp thee with a Mother's joy!” (Poetical Works 1:80-81). If Jacobin
sympathies here coexist with reverence for Burke, in The Fall of Robespierre,
written in collaboration with Southey in 1794, the same antithetical pattern
appears. As a commentator points out, “Its dedication, which is plainly un-
Jacobin in tone, speaks of Robespierre's 'great bad actions' and of the 'vast
stage of horrors' on which the two young poets have set the events of their
play. . . . But the play is as anti-monarchical as it is anti-Jacobiin” (George
Watson, “The Revolutionary Youth of Coleridge and Wordsworth,” Critical
Quarterly 18 (1976): 53). For a rebuttal to Watson's article see John Beer,
“The 'Revolutionary Youth' of Wordsworth and Coleridge: Another View,”
Critical Quarterly 19 (1977): 79–87, which argues for more consistency and less
prevarication in Coleridge's views than Watson concedes them.
19. “Coleridge's Literary Life,” Edinburgh Review 28 (August 1817), in Hazlitt,
16:120.
20. Ibid., 129.
21. Conciones ad Populum. Or Addresses to the People (February 1795), in Lectures
1795. On Politics and Religion, ed. Lewis Patton and Peter Mann, The Collected
Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Princeton:
22. Inquiring Spirit; A New Presentation of Coleridge from his Published and Unpublished
23. For general background on Jacobinism see Gérard Walter, Histoire des Jacobins
(Paris: Aimery Somogy, 1946). For an important source collection of docu-
ments see Alphonse Aulard, La Société des Jacobins. Recueil de documents pour

24. As Watt said, “I am filled with involuntary horror at the scenes which pass before me and wish they could have been avoided, but at the same time I allow the absolute necessity of them. In some instances the vengeance of the people has been savage & inhuman.” (David V. Erdman, Commerce des Lumières; John Oswald and the British in Paris, 1790—1793 [Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1986], 228—29.)


26. E.g., “... there was nothing systematic in the creation of the Revolutionary Government. Nearly all the facts hitherto related go to prove that this Government was not the application of any system or any preconceived idea, but that it formed itself empirically, from day to day, out of the elements imposed on it by the successive necessities of the national defences of a people at war with Europe; a people in arms for the defence of its existence, in a country which resembled a vast military camp. ... The Revolution ... strove to govern by law and liberty until August 10, 1792. Then, the resisting forces of the past having formed an alliance, having brought about a civil war and a war of invasion ... then the Revolution put away and suspended the principles of '89, and turned against its enemies ... the weapons with which it found itself attacked. The Terror consisted in the suspension of the principles of '89.” (A. Aulard, The French Revolution; A Political History 1789—1804, trans. Bernard Miall (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910), 2:278—79).

27. Taine finds that a “homicidal idea”—idée homicide—characterized Jacobinism from the first: “In his narrow brain, perverted and turned topsy-turvy by the disproportionate notions put into it, only one idea suited to his gross instincts and aptitudes finds a place, and that is the desire to kill his enemies; and these are also the State's enemies. ... He carries this savagery and bewilderment into politics, and hence the evil arising from his usurpation. ... As representing the State, he undertakes wholesale massacres, of which he has the means ready at hand. For he has not yet had time enough to take apart the old administrative implements; at all events the minor wheels, gendarmes, jailers, employees, book-keepers, and accountants, are always in their place and under control. There can be no resistance on the part of those arrested; accustomed to the protection of the laws and to peaceable ways and times, they have never relied on defending themselves nor ever could imagine that any one could be so summarily slain. As to the mass, rendered incapable of any effort of its own by ancient centralization, it remains inert and passive and lets things go their own way. Hence, during many long, successive days, without being hurried or impeded, with official papers quite correct and accounts in perfect order, a massacre can be carried out with the same impunity and as methodically as cleaning the streets or clubbing stray dogs. Let us trace

28. The cost was not alone in lives, as has so often been rehearsed (17,000 executed in the Terror, 2,000,000 more dead in the Napoleonic wars that erupted from the Revolution), but in wealth, goods, and national treasure—irrecoverably so (the destruction of Cluny alone makes one wonder what benefit could justify it). See René Sédillot, *Le Coût de la Révolution française* (Paris: Perrin, 1987).


32. Hazlitt, 16:130.


38. "Au nom de Vergniaud, les conversations cessèrent, les regards se portèrent sur lui seul. Il monta lentement les degrés de la tribune, se recueillit un moment, la paupière baissée sur les yeux, comme un homme qui réfléchit pour la dernière fois avant d’agir; puis, d’une voix sourde, et comme résistant dans son âme à la sensibilité qui criait en lui, il prononça: La mort.” (Lamartine, 2:210).


40. Ibid., 352.

41. Robinson, 1:183.

42. Ibid., 161.

43. Ibid., 164.

44. Ibid., 109.

45. Ibid., 127.

46. Ibid., 183.

47. Ibid., 171.

48. Ibid., 115.

52. Although Thelwall always remained true to his democratic principles, he did say later that "I no longer consider a stubborn consistency to two or three political dogmas, however excellent in themselves, as sufficient to atone for all deficiencies of heart and morals." (Life of Thelwall, 1:352). And he became uncomfortable about the name "Jacobin." By 1817 he would say that "Nothing betrays the destitution of principle more completely than the sophistical use of really unmeaning, but yet popular cant nick names. Thus Jacobin (a term of no definable signification, but conjuring up in the minds of alarmist & zealous royalists every emotion that belongs to the hatred of all crimes & enormites) is used by the consistent [Coleridge] in such way as to be apparently applicable to all reformers & incliners to republicanism—in short to all who are dissatisfied with the established systems of legitimate despotism" ("Thelwall's Marginalia in Biographia Literaria," 93). Coleridge had earlier made the same point in a fuller discussion: "What is a Jacobin. Perhaps the best answer to this question would be, that it is a term of abuse, the convenient watch-word of a faction"—and he goes on to speak brilliantly of various uses of the term. (Essays on His Times, 1:365).
53. Robinson, 1:183—84.
54. Ibid., 177.
69. "Character of Mr. Wordsworth's new poem, _The Excursion_" (The Examiner, August 21, August 28, and October 2, 1814), in Hazlitt, 4:119-20.
78. Hazlitt, 7:179. Again, "Many people laugh at him, some may blush for him, but nobody envies him." (89).
79. Ibid., 178.
80. Ibid., 11:82.
81. Ibid., 7:190, 199.
82. Robinson, 1:206.
83. Coleridge, "Mr. Southey and Wat Tyler" (Courier, March 17 and 18, 1817), in _Essays on His Times_, 2:449-60; Hazlitt, 7:176-86. Hazlitt says wickedly that "Instead of applying for an injunction against _Wat Tyler_, Mr. Southey would do well to apply for an injunction against Mr. Coleridge, who has undertaken his defence in _The Courier._" (176).
84. Though Thompson is apparently too intent on Coleridge's alleged apostasy to charge Wordsworth in the same way, Byron in 1818 is less benign, referring to Wordsworth's place "at Lord Lonsdale's table, where this poetical charlatan and political parasite licks up the crumbs with a hardened alacrity; the converted Jacobin having long subsided into the clownish sycophant of the worst prejudices of the aristocracy." (Note to the "Dedication" of _Don Juan_). In the "Preface" to _Don Juan_ Byron calls Southey "this Pantisocratic apostle of Apostacy."
85. "Thelwall's Marginalia in _Biographia Literaria_," 82, 81.


89. Coleridge, CL 1:339.

90. In 1818 Coleridge recalled that he told Thelwall what “he was so unwilling to believe—viz. that alike on the grounds of Taste, Morals, Politics, and Religion, he and I had no one point of coincidence” (CL 4:880).

91. Memories of course can play tricks after a certain amount of time has passed. For instance, in 1817 Thelwall at one point when Coleridge refers to Fichte as a disciple of Kant, recalls some details about Fichte. But then he says, “P. S. In the shadowy recollections of past times I have jumbled names—It was Knitch not Fichte—to whom the facts in the above note have reference.” (“Thelwall’s Marginalia in Biographia Literaria,” 92).


99. Ibid., 324.

100. Coleridge, CL 1:84.


120. Again: “If we are not greatly deceived we could point out more than one or two celebrated Anti-Jacobins who are not slightly infected with some of the worst symptoms of the madness against which they are raving; and one or two acts of parliament which are justifiable only upon Jacobin principles” (*Essays on His Times*, 1:370).


125. *Coleridge, Constitution of the Church and State*, Editor’s Introduction, xxxiii.


129. Lafayette, *Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen et ses antécédents américains*, August 26, 1789 (Washington, D. C., 1945); *Mémoires, correspondance*


133. Lefebvre, 2:119.


148. For Babeuf's centrality in the line leading from Jacobin principles to Russian communism, cf., e.g., R. B. Rose: "As the first revolutionary communist of modern times Gracchus Babeuf has been for many years a figure of considerable veneration for Marxists. In 1845 Marx and Engels paid their own tribute in *The Holy Family* to the rôle of Babeuf and the Conspiracy of Equals of 1796 in passing on the idea of communism from the utopians of the Enlightenment, through the mediation of Buonarotti, to the nineteenth century; in the *Communist Manifesto* Babeuf was recognized as the spokesman of the proletariat in the French Revolution. In 1919, on the morrow of the Bolshevik Revolution, Leon Trotsky proclaimed Babeuf the first of a long line of revolutionary heroes and martyrs whose struggle had prepared the way for the Communist International and the world proletarian revolution.” (R. B. Rose, *Gracchus Babeuf; The First Revolutionary Communist* [London: Edward Arnold, 1978], 1). Interestingly, Rose notes that “the great French Revolution scholar Albert Mathiez always obstinately refused to distinguish between the Jacobin tradition and the Babouvist tradition” (330).


151. “After the victorious first generation of Russian Jacobins had laid the foundation of their work, the master narrative has gradually become absorbed into their story of foundation. Lenin's, Trotsky's and Luxemburg's generation still knew by heart what had happened in Paris in those distant days.” (Ferenc Feher, *The Frozen Revolution: An Essay on Jacobinism* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1987], 153). For those who witnessed the “Jacobin mania” of our own recent decade of the 1960s, Feher's description of the character of the Jacobin will seem especially just: “The new French revolutionary . . . wanted only to live in social turbulence, promoting revolutions preferably from a position of power, but if things changed for the worse, then also to do so under persecution. These men shared three features in common. Firstly, they preferred process to consolidation. The term 'permanent revolution' was coined later, but the way of life pertaining to it had already been invented by the Jacobin militant . . . The second feature was the strong ideological motivation of the modern revolutionary . . . [T]he real life of human beings should cede to the imperatives of doctrine. Thirdly, the modern revolutionary was a professional: revolution was his métier. He lived from the revolution, mostly poorly but sometimes in a dandyish, well-provided manner” (125). What Feher calls “the strong ideological motivation” Taine stigmatizes as the “theorizing mania” that scrambled the brains of the ordi-
nary people who made up the Jacobins (Taine, 3:41). Again, Brinton says that "Of the very general truth that the Jacobins were thoroughly steeped in the writings of the eighteenth century philosophers there can be no doubt" (The Jacobins, 210).

152. "... when we conclude that no fewer than fourteen million odd peasants lost their lives as a result of the events recounted in this book we may well be understating." (Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivation and the Terror-Famine [New York: Oxford University Press, 1986], 305). Conquest emphasizes that the massacre was not a result of inadvertency or mismanagement, but was precisely a furtherance of Marxist doctrine as interpreted by Stalin: "In a more general sense, the responsibility for the massacre of the 'class enemy' and the crushing of 'bourgeois nationalism,' may be held to lie with the Marxist conceptions in the form given them by the Communist Party as accepted by Stalin" (328). "The main lesson seems to be that the Communist ideology provided the motivation for an unprecedented massacre of men, women, and children. And that this ideology, perhaps all set-piece theory, turned out to be a primitive and schematic approach to matters far too complex for it" (344).

155. As Saint Just said, "What constitutes the Republic is the destruction of everything opposed to it. A man is guilty against the Republic when he takes pity on prisoners: he is guilty because he has no desire for virtue: he is guilty because he is opposed to the Terror" (Madelin, 394).
158. Taine's fury against the Revolution predictably led to counterattacks by those historians who celebrated it as a great advance in human history. Aulard wrote an entire book in an attempt to discredit Taine: "Ainsi toute la Terreur s'explique (je ne dis pas: se justifie) par les circonstances de guerre civile et étrangère où se trouvait alors la France. Taine ne parle pas de ces circonstances ou n'y fait que d'insignifiantes allusions. Les moyens de violence que les Montagnards employèrent pour assurer la défense nationale contre les insurgés vendéens, contre les Autrichiens, les Anglais, les Espagnols, Taine ne les attribue qu'à un fanatisme philosophique." (A. Aulard, Taine; histoire de la révolution française [Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1907], 326). He attempts at great length but with indifferent success to impeach Taine's learning ("J'ai moins voulu critiquer les théories philosophico-historiques de Taine que son érudition, dont l'appareil, d'aspect si imposant, a donné crédit à ses théories et lui a valu, en France et à l'étranger, une grande réputation d'historien" [323]); and he concludes that Taine's "livre, tout compte fait, et en ses résultats généraux, me semble presque inutile à l'histoire. Il n'est vraiment utile qu'à la biographie intellectuelle de Taine lui-même ou à celle de quelques contemporains, ses disciples" (330). The majority of academic historians today (quite a few of whom are declared Marxists)
are content with Aulard's position, and reject Taine as intolerably biased. So far as I myself can judge, however, he is less biased than Michelet was as the extoller of Revolution, and no more biased than Aulard himself, or Lefebvre, or other academic apologists for the great upheaval. As a single random case in point, Cobb can quaintly accuse Taine of progressing "to pure insult" in his description of the personnel of the provincial armies, while Cobb himself is continually palliating their crimes. (Richard Cobb, *The People's Armies; The armées révolutionnaires; Instrument of the Terror in the Departments*; *April 1793 to Floréal Year II*, trans. Marianne Elliott [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987 (1961–63)], 5). After all, Brinton at one point finds it fitting to speak of "the madness of true Jacobinism" (*The Jacobins*, 240). "They were in the main ordinary, quite prosperous middle-class people. And yet they behaved like fanatics. The Reign of Terror was marked by cruelties and absurdities which the greatest of misanthropes will hardly maintain are characteristic of ordinary human beings" (232).

For those who, unlike Taine and Coleridge, did and do think that the Revolution justified its cost, the classic line of argument is that eloquently pleaded by Shelley: "The oppressors of mankind had enjoyed a long and undisturbed reign in France, and to the pining famine, the shelterless destitution of the inhabitants of that country had been added and heaped up insult harder to endure than misery. For the feudal system (the immediate causes and conditions of its institution having become obliterated) had degenerated into the instrument not only of oppression but of contumely, and both were unsparingly inflicted. Blind in the possession of strength, drunken as with the intoxication of ancestral greatness, the rulers perceived not that increase of knowledge in their subjects which made its exercise insecure. They called soldiers to hew down the people when their power was already past. The tyrants were, as usual, the aggressors. Then the oppressed, having been rendered brutal, ignorant, servile and bloody by long slavery, having had the intellectual thirst, excited in them by the progress of civilization, satiated from fountains of literature poisoned by the spirit and the form of monarchy, arose and took a dreadful revenge on their oppressors. Their desire to wreak revenge, to this extent, in itself a mistake, a crime, a calamity, arose from the same source as their other miseries and errors, and affords an additional proof of the necessity of that long-delayed change which it accompanied and disgraced" (Shelley, *Complete Works*, 7:13).

159. Taine, 2:70.
160. Ibid., 65.
162. Ibid., 48–9.
163. Ibid., 4:159, 174.
164. Gaxotte argues interestingly that Robespierre's special kind of mediocrity was especially fitted to be empowered by the structure of the Jacobin Club. "Robespierre est l'homme de club par excellence. Tout ce qui le dessert dans
la vie réelle lui devient au club un gage de succès. Il a l'esprit peu fécond, peu d'idées, peu d'invention? Il est au niveau de son auditoire, il ne l'effraie pas, il n'excite pas sa jalousie. Sa personnalité est apparemment faible, indistincte? Il se fond dans la personnalité collective, il se plie sans effort à la discipline démocratique. Sa situation sociale est presque nulle? Le club est fondé sur l'égalité de tous ses membres et il supporte mal les supériorités extérieures de rang et d'argent. Ses affaires l'occupent peu? Il n'en sera que plus assidu aux séances. Il a peu vécu, son expérience des hommes et des choses est bornée. Le club est une société artificielle construite au rebours de la société véritable. Il a l'intelligence formaliste, sans grande prise sur le réel? Au club l'action ne compte pas, mais la parole. "Cet homme médiocre a le sens, ou, si l'on veut, le génie de la Révolution et de son mécanisme" (Gaxotte, 389-90, 391).

166. Ibid., 3:1-11.
167. Cf. Madelin: "The one and constant thought of that mediocre brain and narrow soul was to protect himself against 'his enemies.' These he discovered in every quarter; to destroy them he kept the guillotine permanently employed. . . . It was unsafe to look sad, or even thoughtful. Barras tells a story of one deputy who fancied Robespierre looked at him when he was in a dreamy mood, and exclaimed in alarm: 'He'll be supposing I was thinking about something!'" (Madelin, 402-03).
169. It detracts in no way from the magnificence and fittingness of Coleridge's metaphor to note that just as Robespierre was not actually the Emperor Caligula, so too in fact he was too much of a dandy to wear the cap of liberty. "All the same, he did not seem at all pleased that the general had arrived wearing a red cap. He never wore one himself, but only had a tricolour cockade in his buttonhole. How could he put such a covering over his powdered hair that was so carefully combed? . . . Even so, the cap had great success with the Parisians and members of the club, the majority of whom wore it. . . . At the end of the session one of those present tried to put one on Robespierre's head. No doubt he was an admirer and he did not want his idol to appear to disadvantage alongside Dumouriez. Robespierre immediately snatched it off and threw it to the ground. From anyone else but him the gesture would have seemed a sacrilege. Even so, no one protested. In fact, for a while fewer red caps were seen at the club" (Matrat, 144-45).

Chapter 13 The Biographia Literaria and the Contentions of English Romanticism

4. Lay Sermons, 114n.
7. Lay Sermons, 114n.
8. The Friend, 1:449.
13. Byron's Letters and Journals, ed. Leslie A. Marchand (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1973—82), 5:267. (References hereafter will be cited as BLJ). Byron had been instrumental in getting Drury Lane to produce Coleridge's Remorse in 1813, and he tried—unsuccessfully—to get Coleridge to write another play for the theater. He encouraged and praised Coleridge's poetry and also provided him with financial assistance. See BLJ 4:285—86, 318—19 and 5:16 and n.
15. For Byron's financial and literary help to Coleridge see above, n. 13, as well as BLJ 9:206—08.
16. Certain other small textual details illustrate Byron's recollection of Coleridge's text when he was writing Don Juan. For example, the unusual phrase "olla Podrida" appears in ch. 23 of the Biographia as well as in Byron's (later rejected) prose Preface to Don Juan (see Biographia, p. 211 and Lord Byron. The Complete Poetical Works, ed. Jerome J. McGann. Vol. 5 (Don Juan) (London: Oxford University Press 1986), 83. Similarly, the conclusion of stanza 2 of Byron's "Dedication" to Don Juan glances at Coleridge's defensive remarks about his
"metaphysics," especially in Biographia ch. 24. Compare also Biographia 2, pp. 126–35 with Byron's treatment of Wordsworth in the rejected prose preface to Don Juan. See the discussion by McGann, 5:668.


Chapter 14 Poetry and Barrel-Organs


2. Camilla, or A Picture of Youth, ed. by Edward A. Bloom and Lillian D. Bloom. Quoted in the introduction, xx.

3. Boswell's Life of Samuel Johnson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1933) 251. Johnson also is reported to have said that booksellers were "generous, liberal-minded men" (i,203) and that "there are few ways in which a man can be more innocently employed than in getting money" (ii,567), two opinions less and less common throughout the nineteenth century. For some useful essays on book publishing and reading in the eighteenth century, based on the most recent scholarship, see Books and Their Readers in Eighteenth-Century England, ed. Isabel Rivers (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982).

4. For an illuminating study of this subject see Jon Klancher, The Making of English Reading Audiences, 1790–1832 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987). Thomas McFarland, in Originality and Imagination (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), discusses the problem of aesthetic originality, genius, and imagination confronting the mass audience much as it must confront the endless universe. His point of view is decidedly Cole­ridgean, e. g. "it is against . . . encompassing darkness that originality and imagination hold aloft their flickering torches" (200). For a useful account of the self-consciousness of language and class in the works of Romantic writers and their contemporaries, see Olivia Smith, The Politics of Language, 1791–1819 (London: Oxford University Press, 1984).

5. Criticism of the ideas in the Biographia Literaria is much more abundant than criticism of it as a piece of writing. Most books devoted to it as a book follow the traditional critical line of looking for its "wholeness" or "unity"; they invoke Coleridge's critical ideas by which to search out some more or less hidden Coleridgean organic principle. See, for instance, Catherine Miles Wallace, The Design of Biographia Literaria (London and Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1983) and Lynn M. Grow, "The Consistency of the Biographia Literaria," in Wichita State University Bulletin, University Studies No. 95. 49.2 (May, 1973). There is a driving desire in both these studies to read the Biographia like a well-formed meditative whole, that is to say, like a poem. Kathleen M. Wheeler's Sources, Processes and Methods in Coleridge's Biographia Literaria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) presents a somewhat more distanced read.
ing of the process of "writing" in the *Biographia* and demonstrates some of its ironical method.

6. See also Wordsworth's famous letter to Charles James Fox of January 14th, 1801, in which he speaks of the "most sacred of all property . . . the property of the Poor."


9. One critic, as I have already suggested [see note 5] who does see the High Romantic Irony in the *Biographia* is Katherine M. Wheeler. Yet seeing the irony as a mode of high romanticism is a complicated ideological business. It allows the social antagonisms that preoccupied Coleridge into our reading only to smooth them out with one more admiring glance at the power of aesthetic order. This tendency in Romantic scholarship to turn historical and social antagonisms, sensed by Romantic writers, as nothing more or less than social, into neat aesthetic form is ubiquitous. Coleridge *does* employ an ironical mode here, but this is a stance taken towards a problem he sees unresolved, perplexing, and, above all, politically dangerous. Critics who show us the "unity" of the *Biographia Literaria* give at least the impression that something has been satisfied in a work that constantly registers serious disjunction and ideological discomfort. This critical line of "aesthetic unity" has been pushed as far as it can go by Donald Reiman, who asks us to see the *Biographia* as an epigone of *Tristam Shandy*; see "Coleridge and the Art of Equivocation," in *Studies in Romanticism* 25 (Fall 1986): 325–50.


12. *Commentary*, vol. 58, no. 6 (December, 1974): 35. Trilling's statement is part of a round-table discussion, whose other participants are Edward Grossman, Cynthia Ozick, Hilton Kramer, Norman Podhoretz, Michael Novak, and Jack Richardson. The entire discussion occurs at an important moment, when some American new conservative thinkers (old liberal modernists) were still staking out positions towards mass culture. There is much nostalgia in this discussion for the Coleridgian and the Arnoldian.

13. The influence of Gramsci, especially his idea of hegemony and of the intellectual class, is preeminent in all Marxist influence on American liberal and left academic cultural critics. For an example of that pervasive influence even in a critique of contemporary criticism, see Edward W. Said, *The World, the Text, and the Critic* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983).

