THE SECOND EDITION of the Logique of Port-Royal, which appeared in 1664, includes an interesting discours. It is the second of two printed at the beginning of the volume. In this very substantial essay the authors—Arnauld and Nicole—undertake to defend their logic against objections aroused by the first edition of 1662. One of these criticisms takes as its point of departure that what is supposed to be a treatise on logic contains so many sallies into rhetoric, ethics, physics, metaphysics, and geometry. The authors give first a general answer: in these excursions they can demonstrate the applicability of their precepts. Instead of being an isolated exercise, logic moves into any and all discussions with its special help in the arts of knowing and judging. Then comes comment on several disciplines in particular; and rhetoric leads the list:

On a considéré, par exemple, en ce qui concerne la rhétorique, que le secours qu’on en pouvait tirer pour trouver des pensées, des expressions, et des embellissements, n’était pas si considérable. L’esprit fournit assez de pensées, l’usage donne les expressions; et pour les figures et les ornements, on n’en a toujours que trop.1

They refer, thus, immediately to invention and expression,
the principal moments of the rhetorical process, at least in its simplified form in which it concerns not oratory but communication in general; and they lose no time in revealing an attitude toward the art that is basically hostile.

They see no need for a method of invention and expression, since natural facility and usage are already more than sufficient. The addition of art leads one into bad ways of speaking and writing; it encourages false and hyperbolic thoughts, forced figures, and other vices of the "style rhétoricien." The real need is for a restraining force. One should not give free rein to thought in an inventive phase, and then, at the moment of expression, look about for elaborate ways of saying what one has found. Thought is supposed to be adequate to its object, not abundant; words are supposed to be a medium, not an element that attracts attention to itself thanks to decoration. These Jansenist minds know where to locate the restraining force—in their logic: "Or l'on trouvera peut-être autant de choses utiles dans cette logique pour connaître et pour éviter ces défauts que dans les livres qui en traitent expressément" (Logique, p. 28).

I think it easy to see the reason for conflict and competition between these two arts. When thought and expression are removed from their full rhetorical and practical context (we have seen an outstanding example of this typical trend in Rapin's theory), there is nothing to separate the art which had traditionally regulated them from l'art de penser, the discipline of thought wherever it is exercised, in practice or in theory. The increasing prestige of mathematics and physics had a part in this process of comparison and interference. The partisans of the sciences generalized their techniques and sought new applications for them in a way that reminds one very much of the expansionist tendencies of the rhetoricians. And so, with the Cartesian sureness and consistency that is
so remarkable in the *Logique*, Arnauld and Nicole report at the outset on those areas where their art has met and purified rhetoric. In the last chapter of Part I, for example, they have defined the proper role of the figured style and given the "true rule" for distinguishing the good figures from the bad ones. In the chapter on *lieux*, or commonplaces, they have proposed ways of avoiding the empty *copia* that rhetoricians usually admire. In the chapter on errors in reasoning, they have insisted that the false can never be beautiful:

L'article où l'on parle des mauvais raisonnements où l'Eloquence engage insensiblement, en apprenant à ne prendre jamais pour beau ce qui est faux, propose en passant une des plus importantes règles de la véritable rhétorique, et qui peut plus que toute autre former l'esprit à une manière d'écrire simple, naturelle et judicieuse. [*Logique*, pp. 28–29.]

As Boileau was to say, eleven years later, "Rien n'est beau que le vrai. . . ." Finally, in this same chapter, they have stressed the care one should take not to irritate those to whom one speaks: one thus avoids "... un très grand nombre de défauts d'autant plus dangereux, qu'ils sont difficiles à remarquer" (*Logique*, p. 29). On that point the gentlemen of Port-Royal spoke from experience!

Such are the points where the authors turn explicitly to rhetoric and use on it the astringent power of logic. In reality the implications of what they do are even more radical. The section on method (Part IV), one of the innovations in this logic, contains a latent mine of arguments against eloquence and its devices; and beyond that, the narrow conception of thought itself taken by Arnauld and Nicole as their starting point can never be reconciled, in any real sense of the word, with the liberal notion of elements or factors of persuasion on which the ancients had based their *scientia bene dicendi*.  

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The first passage relevant to the theory of rhetoric comes in the discussion of the meanings of words. After examining the way words signify, the authors of the Logique conclude that words have principal and accessory meanings. They consequently recognize two degrees of expression. The first of these is aimed at when we try, by strict attention to the meanings of words, to utter or write "la vérité toute nue" (Logique, p. 128). The second degree is sought when, in addition to telling the truth about things, we wish to convey the emotions we experience in conceiving or speaking of them. Such speech has the curious property of arousing feelings similar to ours in other people: whoever uses the figured style—the technical term for the second degree of expression—will be more moving to his listeners or readers, because the soul, though instructed by images of truths, is affected mainly by images of feelings ("mouvements"). Arnauld and Nicole quote the inevitable maxim from Horace: "Si vis me fleere, dolendum est / Primum ipsi tibi" ("If you wish me to weep, you must first grieve yourself.")

Something of what they mean by figure is clear from the example they give, part of a line from Virgil: "Usque adeone morti miserum est?" ("Is it, then, so painful to die?") In other words, the line would have been much less moving had it been merely a declaration, with the words arranged in the normal order for such a case. I infer, therefore, that the turns in question are what are traditionally called figures of thought, as opposed to figures of words or speech. A discussion such as the present one, located in the part of logic that deals with thought, conception, and definition, emphasizes predictably the kind of figurative expression which bears on what is said and on emotion rather than on word patterns as such.

One may use language, then, for the exact rendering of thought or for communicating feelings as well. The problem
is to decide when each of these styles is appropriate. As for the "style figuré":

Il est visible qu'il est ridicule de s'en servir dans les matières purement spéculatives, que l'on regarde d'un œil tranquille, et qui ne produisent aucun mouvement dans l'esprit. Car puisque les figures expriment les mouvements de notre âme, celles que l'on mêle en des sujets où l'âme ne s'émeut point, sont des mouvements contre la nature, et des espèces de convulsions. [Logique, p. 129.]

There is nothing less agreeable than certain sermons where the prédicateurs exclaim indifferently about everything and are just as agitated in moments of philosophical reasoning as in what they say of the most striking and necessary truths of salvation. As faults go, improper presence of figures is matched by improper absence of them. Here the Port-Royalists criticize the scholastics for the bareness of their style. Their manner of expression is less capable of arousing feelings of respect and love for Christian truth, and also less agreeable because, for the listener, pleasure comes more from feeling than from pure learning.

The position of the Logique is now clear: not elimination of a favorite rhetorical device, but restriction in the use of it, restriction so severe that it calls into question the place of emotion as a persuasive force of which a speaker may avail himself. One may agree with Port-Royal that preaching is an essential activity and still go on to ask what consequences this doctrine of levels of expression will have for the large number of people who are not involved directly in the saving of souls but who do care about method and good judgment in secular affairs. There the problem of using rhetoric as an art of thought and expression (and even of behavior) becomes acute. On good classical precedent it claimed to be a universal technique; in what appears to be
merely a brief discussion of figures, Arnauld and Nicole are actually challenging the structure of rhetorical discipline. For they are cutting out, in everything except sacred oratory, most of the third link in the rhetorical chain of invention, arrangement, and elocution. Their attitude represents, in the first place, a tremendous change in emphasis. With the authority of Cicero behind him, Quintilian speaks of elocution as the hardest part of rhetoric: "Plus exigunt laboris et curae quae sequuntur. Hinc enim jam elocutionis rationem tractabimus, partem operis, ut inter omnes oratores convenit, difficillimam." ("More work and diligence are required in what follows. For now we shall discuss the theory of elocution or style, which is the most difficult part of the art, as all orators agree.") (De institutione oratoria VIII. proemium. 13.) It is the process in which art shows itself most clearly, invention and arrangement being within the capacity of any intelligent man. "Et Marcus Tullius inventionem quidem ac dispositionem prudentis hominis putat, eloquentiam oratoris, ideoque praecepice circa praecepta partis hujus laboravit." ("Cicero, too, believes that any intelligent man is capable of invention and arrangement, but elocution belongs to the orator alone, and consequently he gave particular care to the rules for this part of the art.") (Ibid., 14.) The real orator comes into his own at this point.

In the next place, the very nature of the expressive process, as viewed by the rhetorician, is bound to conflict with the assumptions and special interests of the logician. The former sees that process as a movement from correctness ("latinitas") to clarity and order ("perspicuitas" and "collocatio") to elegance ("ornatus," "figurae"). Thus Quintilian: "Igitur, quam Graeci φράσις vocant, latine dicimus elocutionem. Ea spectatur verbis aut singulis aut conjunctis. In singulis intuendum est ut sint latina, perspicua, ornata, ad id quod efficere volumus accommodata; in conjunctis, ut emendata, ut collocata, ut
"What the Greeks call *phrasis*, we name in Latin elocution or style. It may be considered in individual words or in groups of words. Where they are taken singly, we must be sure that they are Latin, clear, elegant and appropriate to the desired effect; where they are joined together, we must see to it that they are correct, well-placed, and adorned with figures." (De *institutione oratoria* VIII. i. 1.) In other words, in its last and most important stage, expression necessarily tends away from the simple to the complex, from the usual to the rare. The emphasis on tropes and figures, the subtleties, the numerous and overlapping definitions—to the logician all of these are clearly extravagant. To him the art of eloquence serves mainly to complicate gratuitously the problem of expressing and conveying truth.

Finally, in the third place, the Port-Royalists distrust in a basic way the power that obviously lies in speech fashioned by this art. The affirmations of Cicero and Quintilian concerning the admiration for the speaker and the sympathy for his cause which are aroused by rhetorical devices easily seem to ally themselves with duplicity, with insincerity, with willingness to *faire flèche de tout bois*, so long as the end is achieved. Rien n'est beau que le vrai as a principle is undermined by any such pragmatism (and I believe that rhetoric is definitely a species of pragmatism); it is in danger of becoming rien n'est vrai que l'utile, and beauty need not necessarily belong to or result from a true demonstration, since it is something that has been added to thought.

And so the Port-Royalists solve the problem by distinguishing firmly between the language of *matières purement spéculatives* and discourse on religious matters. Instead of pages and pages of turns and figures of speech and thought, with comments and examples of their power, use, and misuse, we have a short treatment of the way words signify. In addition to their principal references, they have accessory meanings, that is,
indexes of feeling. A figurative style, such as one sees in the church fathers and in the practice of those who preach well, may properly work with these accessory meanings.

The extreme reduction worked on the topics of figures and elocution is matched by another and more explicit attack—the word is not too strong—on traditional rhetorical theory. It occurs in chapter XVI of Part 3 of the Logique ("Du raisonnement"). The heading of the chapter reads tendentiously, "Des lieux ou de la méthode de trouver des arguments. Com- bien cette méthode est de peu d'usage" (p. 290). The first thing to note is the point in their treatise at which the Port-Royalists choose to discuss the commonplaces or starting points of rhetorical reasoning. That choice gives right away an idea of the revolution in intellectual style at which the Logique aims. In Aristotle, in Cicero, in Quintilian, invention comes first, before all matters of arrangement and expression; in this work Arnauld and Nicole do not approach the subject until they have first considered problems of ideas or conceptions and problems of judgment (that is, of combining ideas), until in fact they have almost reached the end of the treatment of reasoning (that is, of combining judgments). To be precise, we hear nothing of invention until the doctrine of Port-Royal has been expounded in its positive phase and the moment for critical or polemic conclusions is at hand.

The authors know exactly what they are doing; their position strikes directly at a key point of ancient theory: "Il est donc assez inutile de se mettre en peine en quel ordre on doit traiter des lieux, puisque c'est une chose à peu pres indifférente. Mais il serait peut-être plus utile d'examiner s'il ne serait point plus à propos de n'en traiter point du tout" (Logique, p. 291). They realize that the ancients had a high
esteem for this subject which may be treated in any order and which may indeed be skipped altogether.

On sait que les Anciens ont fait un grand mystère de cette méthode, et que Cicéron la préfère même à toute la dialectique, telle qu'elle était enseignée par les Stoïciens, parce qu'ils ne parlaient point des lieux... Quintilien et tous les autres rhétoriciens, Aristote et tous les philosophes, en parlent de même; de sorte que l'on aurait peine à n'être pas de leur sentiment, si l'expérience générale n'y paraissait entièrement opposée. [Logique, pp. 291-92.]

One winces to see the juxtapositions and mixings made so readily in that passage. In a train of sweeping formulas Cicero, "Quintilien et tous les autres rhétoriciens, Aristote et tous les philosophes..." are presented as saying essentially the same things. Arnauld and Nicole do not bother to discriminate between the thorough pedagogy of Quintilian and the urbane discretion of Cicero—but I suppose that that difference is not, after all, a basic one. More striking is that they obviously fail to keep separate what Aristotle said in his theory and what later happened to rhetoric when it was turned into a method applicable everywhere. For Aristotle, rhetoric was one art among many arts and sciences, having its specific purpose (persuasion) and its subject matter (questions not susceptible of a scientific treatment that arise in particular circumstances before a particular audience); whereas for Cicero and Quintilian, it is the art, the science; in fact, for them it is co-extensive with philosophy. It even improves on philosophy by virtue of its technique of expression, which makes wisdom easier to communicate and to practice than would otherwise be possible. These differences in ways of defining the art are not casual but pervasive, so that invention or the use of commonplaces can never refer to the same thing in Aristotle and in the two others.
Niceties of historical semantics do not interest the authors of the Logique. They have evidently taken as their basic text something like the enthusiastic chapters in Book II of Cicero's De oratore. For example, one reads there: "His igitur locis in mente et cognitione defixis et in omni re ad dicendum posita excitatis, nihil erit quod oratorem effugere possit, non modo in forensibus disceptationibus, sed omnino in ullo genere dicendi." 5 ("With these commonplaces fixed in one's mind and memory and called up with every subject proposed for discussion, there is nothing that can escape the orator, not only in matters debated in the forum, but in any kind of eloquence.") But general experience, the experience of almost all those who have studied the "méthode des lieux" belies this optimistic view. Is there a single one, the authors go on to ask, who learned this technique in the collèges and who can really say that, when he came to treat some subject, he reflected on the commonplaces and that he found there the principles he needed? However, there are more fundamental objections, theoretical ones this time, to the use of this method. Here the Port-Royalists turn to St. Augustine:

De sorte que l'on peut dire véritablement des lieux ce que Saint Augustin dit en général des préceptes de la rhétorique. On trouve, dit-il, que les règles de l'éloquence sont observées dans les discours des personnes éloquentes, quoi qu'ils n'y pensent pas en les faisant, soit qu'ils les sachent, soit qu'ils les ignorent. Ils pratiquent ces règles, parce qu'ils sont éloquents; mais ils ne s'en servent pas pour être éloquents. Implet quippe illa quia sunt eloquentes, non adhibent ut sint eloquentes. L'on marche naturellement, comme ce même père le remarque en un autre endroit. [Logique, p. 293.]

It is the same judgment that they offered in the second preliminary discourse. Natural powers and their operations suffice in knowing and speaking. Nature has no real need of an art to perfect it, and so, as an immediate consequence,
rules and commonplaces are denied the fertility that Cicero had seen in them. Instead of helping in a situation where one must find suitable things to say, they merely describe what expert speakers did in the past. Their status is almost, if not entirely, speculative rather than productive. Cicero had objected to the dialectic of the Stoics because it was of no use in finding arguments but limited itself to criticizing and analyzing them once they are found. The Port-Royalists are, in effect, reducing his method of the loci argumentorum to the impotence he had hoped to avoid.

Since an inventive art is not necessary, we are not surprised to be told that if we impose and apply one anyway, it may actually hinder and corrupt the operations of the natural powers. The commonplaces, by their very nature, enter into all discourse, "... mais ce n'est pas en y faisant une réflexion expresse que l'on produit ces pensées: cette réflexion ne pouvant servir qu'à ralentir la chaleur de l'esprit, et à l'empêcher de trouver les raisons vives et naturelles qui sont les vrais ornements de toutes sortes de discours."

Something even more pernicious, a bad mental disposition, arises from the application of the method. It encourages a facility that is only too common anyway, a readiness to "discourir de tout à perte de vue" (Logique, p. 296), and a taste for the copia rhetorum; and it discourages willingness to make the effort needed for accurate thought. The Port-Royalists want to lead us away from habits of judgment that depend finally on the audience; the ideal image of people surrendering to the flow of eloquent language has no appeal for them. We should respond instead to the call of the object being known, to the demands of the subject matter. True thought does not invent according to arbitrary recipes; it discovers. The full force of the term "commonplace" is felt here, and that of its antonym, the proper place. When one applies a stock of generalities to all objects of inquiry and discussion,
distinctions become vague and differences fade into a more or less spurious unity. "L'esprit s'accoutume à cette facilité, et ne fait plus d'effort pour trouver les raisons propres, particulières et naturelles, qui ne se découvrent que dans la considération attentive de son sujet" (Logique, p. 295).

Some interesting rapprochements with Descartes suggest themselves here. In the Discours de la méthode, his criticisms of scholastic logic and of its concern with the forms of the syllogism take at bottom the same form as those of the Port-Royalists as regards rhetoric and invention. The syllogism, says Descartes, is not a technique for finding the truth, though one may expound what one already knows in that form. The human mind is naturally capable of moving in an orderly fashion from principles to consequences, that is, of deduction. There is no need for it to learn how to go through this process; bringing in at this point a superfluous art, comparable in science to the method of commonplaces in rhetoric, merely invites trouble. Furthermore, the forms of reasoning are dangerous in application because they have a validity that does not depend on the truth of the materials cast in them. They tempt us to let perfection of form legitimize confused ideas and false principles, since the coherence of the argument may make it pass in spite of the content. Descartes, Arnauld, and Nicole obviously share the same confidence in nature and the same desire to set aside formalisms that interfere with the normal workings of human powers. But Descartes is involved also in the trend away from the use of the lieux communs. As Gilson points out, Descartes reduces scholastic logic to dialectic, and then dialectic, in turn, to the method of the commonplaces, as is clear from the Entretien avec Burman:

Ea potius est dialectica, cum doceat nos de omnibus rebus
disserere, quam logica, quae de omnibus rebus demonstrationes
dat. Et sic bonam mentem magis evertit quam adstruit, nam dum
nos divertit et digredi facit in hos locos communes et capita, quae
rei externa sunt, divertit nos ab ipsa rei natura.  

(“That is dialectic, when it teaches us to discourse on all
matters, rather than logic, which furnishes demonstrations in all
matters. And so it overturns good sense instead of building on it;
for, as it turns us aside and causes us to digress into common­
places and topics, which are external to the thing, it diverts us
from the nature itself of the thing.”)

Ever since Aristotle, rhetoric had been the counterpart in
practice of dialectic, and one of the resemblances had been
that both disciplines, being divorced from specific subject
matters, must appeal for principles to topics or distinctions
that are broadly applicable. And now, by a concurrence that
underlines once more the deep influence of Cartesianism on
Port-Royal, one sees Descartes defending his logic, that is,
his method, against dialectic—basically a theoretical rhetoric
—while Arnauld and Nicole defend essentially the same logic
against rhetoric—basically a practical dialectic. Each attacks
the method of commonplaces wherever he finds it, and for
essentially the same reasons.

Between the critical observations on rhetorical topics and
the next main section—on method—Arnauld and Nicole in­
sert two chapters on bad reasonings or “sophisms,” first in
science or theory, and then in civil life and ordinary discourse.
The second kind of error concerns us directly, because to
uncover certain sophisms is to see through the art of the
rhetorician.

Errors of judgment—for here, as always in this logic, the
real point of departure is the judgment—are analyzed accord­
ing to their origins. Some are due to causes within us, in
general to abuses of the will, where reasons reflect not the
true but the useful or what is advantageous for us. Others arise from the characteristics of things outside us; they deceive us because they appear to be, as well as are, and we take the appearances for the realities. With necessary cross-references for cases in which a mixing of sources of error occurs, the development follows the two lines indicated by the chapter titles: "Des sophismes d'amour propre, d'intérêt, et de passion" and "Des faux raisonnements qui naissent des objets mêmes."

We do not ordinarily adopt an opinion because of genuine reasons but because of some usefulness it has for us: that is the fundamental fact in this account of false reasoning. It turns almost imperceptibly into an account of how people are effectively persuaded.

Here the Port-Royalists take a characteristic turn. Instead of adjusting themselves to this disturbing personal factor, and exploiting it by the rules of an art, they decry it and their rules are designed to reduce or eliminate this factor. To them there is nothing less reasonable than to make our self-interest into a reason for believing something. All that our self-interest can properly do is to lead us to consider more attentively where the truth lies, and "... il n'y a que cette vérité, qui se doit trouver dans la chose même, indépendamment de nos désirs, qui nous doive persuader" (Logique, pp. 334–35).

Any attempt to teach or persuade another mind must reckon with this pessimistic view of the way persuasion takes
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place. According to the Jansenists, man is by nature self-centered, he naturally desires every advantage for himself, with the unavoidable corollary that every man is naturally jealous, envious, and ill-disposed whenever he sees some superiority in another. Here is the practical consequence:

La connaissance de cette disposition maligne et envieuse, qui réside dans le fond du cœur des hommes, nous fait voir qu'une des plus importantes règles qu'on puisse garder, pour n'engager pas dans l'erreur ceux à qui on parle, et ne leur donner point d'éloignement de la vérité qu'on leur veut persuader, est de n'irriter que le moins qu'on peut leur envie et leur jalousie en parlant de soi, et en leur présentant les objets auxquels elle [sic] se puisse attacher. [Logique, pp. 340-41.]

The wise man is careful to "se cacher dans la presse" and to hide any marks of personal advantage, lest distaste for his person spread to the opinions he wants to teach. Pascal had carried the rule to its logical conclusion:

Feu Mr. Pascal, qui savait autant de véritable rhétorique, que personne en ait jamais su, portait cette règle jusqu'à prétendre qu'un honnête homme devait éviter de se nommer, et même de se servir des mots de je et de moi, et il avait accoutumé de dire sur ce sujet, que la piété chrétienne anéantit le moi humain, et que la civilité humaine le cache et le supprime. [Logique, p. 341.]

This fascinating passage shows beyond a doubt the true intention of this section of the Logique. If the "genuine kind" of rhetoric tries to do away with all awareness of the speaker, what does that imply for the other kind of rhetoric? The first place to look for an answer, I think, is in the theory of Aristotle. In Book II of his Rhetoric, he examines through seventeen chapters the role of the speaker as a means or source of persuasion quite apart from his power of inventing arguments. For he takes his place as one of three causes leading to persuasion; the other two are the speech or proof and the dispositions of the hearers. It is essential for the orator to
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establish early in the game an impression of good sense, good character, and good will (Rhetoric II. i. 1378a. 6). He should, moreover, make the most of the possibility of exciting by knowledge and technique his hearer's feelings. At this point Aristotle enters on his famous and cold-blooded analysis of passions (considering the states of mind in which each is felt, the people toward whom each is felt, and the grounds on which it is felt) and of characters (considering the feelings and qualities that follow typically from various ages and degrees of fortune). He expects the orator to know all these things and to use his knowledge, especially in political oratory and in the law courts, where he will wish to influence juries and audiences by appeals to emotions and to accepted ideas as well as by proofs. Whereas the Port-Royalists see almost exclusively the negative possibilities introduced into the situation by feelings, Aristotle and other ancient theoreticians see both negative and positive possibilities. The emotional factor may work either way; it is, therefore, the business of the art to make this factor serve the advantage of the speaker.

The discussion of πάθος and ḫθος is continued by Cicero and Quintilian, where the analysis becomes even more pragmatic and more sharply focussed on results than it had been in Aristotle. No one of the three functions of the orator (conciliare, docere, movere) is sufficient in itself to persuade, though in a particular case one or another of them may need more emphasis. But on the specific point of the need for a speaker to make himself acceptable and amiable to the audience, Antonius speaks with a bluntness that can hardly have escaped the authors of the Logique:

... Nihil est enim in dicendo, Catule, maius quam ut faveat oratori is qui audiet, utique ipse sic moveatur, ut impetu quodam animi et perturbatione magis quam iudicio aut consilio regatur. Plura enim multo homines iudicant odio aut amore aut cupiditate aut iracundia aut dolore aut laetitia aut spe aut timore aut errore

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aut aliqua permotione mentis quam veritate aut praescripto aut juris norma aliqua aut iudicii formula aut legibus. [De oratore II. xlii. 178.]

(“Now in speaking, Catulus, there is nothing more important than that the hearer be favorably inclined to the speaker and that he be so moved that he is swayed by some impulse or excitement of mind more than by judgment or deliberation. For men decide many more things by hate or love or desire or anger or grief or joy or hope or fear or error or some other inner affection than by truth or precept or legal principle or judicial form or laws.”)

So far the diagnosis reads very much like that of the Port-Royalists: men’s opinions depend more on passions than on truth. However, the orator accepts this as a fact and bases on it his effort to establish a favorable image of himself in the mind of the listener.

Valet igitur multum ad vincendum probari mores et instituta et facta et vitam eorum, qui agent causas, et eorum pro quibus, et item improbari adversariorum animosque eorum, apud quos age­tur, conciliari quam maxime ad benevolentiam quom erga orato­rem tum erga illum, pro quo dicet orator. [De oratore II. xliii. 182.]

(“It is very important to success that the morals, principles, deeds, and lives of those who plead cases and of their clients be approved, and that those of their adversaries be censured; and also that the minds of the judges be won over as much as possible to a favorable disposition both toward the speaker and toward the one on whose behalf he speaks.”)

When the topic of movere has its turn, we have an even clearer indication of the lengths to which the advocate will go in the manipulation of passions for the sake of his case. It is desirable, says Antonius, that the judge bring to the case a positive attitude toward the advocate; then the problem is merely to currentem incitare, to spur the galloping horse. If this starting advantage is lacking, the orator will know how
to proceed. Like a doctor studying a patient, he will use all his energy and thought to grasp the feelings, opinions, and expectations of the judge, in order to see from what standpoint he may persuade most easily; he will turn his sail to the point from which the breeze presents itself. If the judge has no passions or prejudices, the speaker will have to work harder, but the power of the word is such that he may work confidently:

Sin est integer quietusque iudex, plus est operis; sunt enim omnia dicendo excitanda, nihil adjuvante natura. Sed tantum vim habet illa, quae recte a bono poeta dicta est, flexanim atque omnium regina rerum oratio, ut non modo inclinantem excipere aut stantem inclinare, sed etiam adversantem ac repugnantem, ut imperator fortis ac bonus, capere possit. [De oratore II. xliiv. 187.]

("However, if the judge is unbiased, and free from passion, the task is harder; for everything must then be called forth by oratory, with no help from nature. But so great is the power of eloquence, which was rightly called by a good poet, 'Incliner of the soul, and queen of all things,' that it can not only make straight one who is biased or bias one who is upright, but can even, like a good and brave commander, make a prisoner of a resisting opponent."")

It will be noted that the appeal is to oratio, not to ratio.

But the emotions of love, hate, fear, or pity appropriate to the occasion must be somehow present in the speaker if he is to excite those emotions in the hearers. The demands made on him by his cases and subjects would seem to be so varied that he would have to study and practice the art of the actor. On the contrary, says Antonius, "... magna vis est earum sententiarum atque eorum locorum quos agas tractesque dicendo, nihil ut opus sit simulatione et fallaciis. Ipsa enim natura orationis eius, quae suscipitur ad aliorum animos permovendos, oratorem ipsum magis etiam, quam quemquam eorum qui audiant, permovet." ("So great is the force in those
thoughts and commonplaces which you handle and discuss in speaking that there is no need for pretense or deceit; for the very nature of the language which is adopted to move the passions of others moves the orator himself more than any one of his listeners.”)  

Quintilian’s views parallel those of Cicero. He recognizes the place of emotion in all parts of the speech; he emphasizes its importance in the exordium and in the peroration, two sections where conciliare and movere are especially to be sought. He stresses once more the decisive part played by feelings in persuasion, and pares down correspondingly the importance of proofs: to affect the judge or listener, to cause him to weep, “Huc igitur incumbat orator, hoc opus ejus, hic labor est, sine quo cetera nuda, jejuna, infirma, ingrata sunt, adeo velut spiritus operis hujus atque animus est in affectibus.” ("To this end, therefore, the orator must devote himself; this is his task and work; without this the rest is bare, spiritless, weak and unattractive; for the soul and the life, so to speak, of oratory are found in the emotions.")  

Finally, he asserts that one must feel the emotions to be communicated to one’s audience. Here he goes beyond Cicero and proposes a technique for arousing oneself. By the power of imagination an orator or advocate can represent so vividly to himself the issues and acts of which he speaks that he becomes in effect a spectator and reacts as a spectator would.

The contrast is total with Port-Royal. On the one hand, the speaker whose mind and efforts are based on imposing his truth by argument, yes, but especially by force of character and by manipulation of feelings, and, on the other hand, the speaker who effaces himself, who wants no coloring of the moi to deflect the judgment of the listener, who leaves all or as much as possible to the force of reasons springing from the nature of things. The classical theory apparently invites
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the audience to fall into and the speaker to bring about the very "sophismes d'amour propre, d'intérêt et de passion" against which the Logique supposedly gives protection.

The leading principle of the next discussion of sophisms is that one may take the appearance of the thing for the reality, the unimportant aspect of it for the essential part, the part which should motivate judgment. This brings us into a significant comparison of judgment in art and judgment in eloquence. "Aussi ceux qui sont intelligents dans la peinture estiment infiniment plus le dessein que le coloris ou la délicatesse du pinceau, néanmoins les plus ignorants sont plus touchés d'un tableau, dont les couleurs sont vives et éclatantes, que d'un autre plus sombre, qui serait admirable pour le dessein" (Logique, pp. 355-56). In passing, one should note the very strong preference implied in that "infiniment." The argument continues: in the judgment of paintings the ignorant are likely to defer to the expert, so the frequency of error is less notable than in other things where everyone feels free to judge, and such is the case with eloquence. "On appelle, par exemple, un prédicateur éloquent lorsque ses périodes dont bien justes, et qu'il ne dit point de mauvais mots; et sur ce fondement M. de Vaugelas dit en un endroit, qu'un mauvais mot fait plus de tort à un prédicateur ou un avocat qu'un mauvais raisonnement" (Logique, p. 556). The terms of the analogy begin to be clarified: drawing and color correspond to reasoning and words or expression.

But let us digress for a moment to note the reference to Vaugelas. His Remarques sur la langue française (of 1647, fifteen years before the first edition of the Port-Royal Logique) are obviously designed to fit into a rhetorical approach to language. He looks forward to the coming of a French Quintilian. In referring to Vaugelas, Arnauld and Nicole show us
indirectly the actuality of their treatment of rhetoric; they were not simply attacking ancient authorities; they had their sights on contemporary and official representatives of the classical point of view.

One must believe, they go on to say, that Vaugelas was speaking of a matter of fact, of a situation that exists, but of which he does not approve. It is true that there are people who judge sermons and legal arguments in this way, "... mais il est vrai aussi qu'il n'y a rien de moins raisonnable que ces jugements: car la pureté du langage, le nombre des figures sont tout au plus dans l'éloquence, ce que le coloris est dans la peinture, c'est-à-dire, que ce n'en est que la partie la plus basse et la plus matérielle ..." (*Logique*, p. 356).

What seemed to emerge in the discussion of figurative language—that the Port-Royalists would find little of interest in the part of rhetoric known as elocution—is confirmed here. Conceptions based on things, conceptions which speakers and writers transmit as they are, with all of their original liveliness—that is what Arnauld and Nicole want everyone to strive for, the one exception being religious truths. There the prédicateur should try to express and to communicate the feelings with which he conceives those truths. Once more we find ourselves returning to the point that an artistic theory of expression is unnecessary and pernicious. Both clear conception and moving language may be found in people who have no special interest in words. In fact those two virtues are rare among those who apply themselves consciously to such matters.

... C'est ce qui se peut rencontrer en des personnes peu exactes dans la langue, et peu justes dans le nombre, et qui se rencontrent même rarement dans ceux qui s'appliquent trop aux mots, et aux embellissements, parce que cette vue les détourne des choses, et affaiblit la vigueur de leurs pensées, comme les peintres remarquent que ceux qui excellent dans le coloris, n'excel-
The ornamented language and especially the eloquence Cicero calls *abundantem sonantibus verbis uberibusque sententiis* may conceal falsities. The decorations not only make it harder for the audience to discern the truth; they actually lead speakers astray: be on your guard, say the Port-Royalists, when you hear an orator begin a long gradation or an antithesis with several members; his figures will probably cause him to twist the truth in order to make it fit the "... vain ouvrage de paroles qu'il veut former" (Logique, p. 358). "Pointes," rhyme, Ciceronian expressions, allusions to pagan divinities (they ridicule Cardinal Bembo for saying that a pope had been elected by the favor of the immortal gods, *deorum immortalium beneficiis*)—all are sources of errors often unperceived by those who utter them, so dazzled are they by their own words.

It is here that the logicians make absolutely clear the aesthetic implications of their doctrine.

Les faux raisonnements de cette sorte que l'on rencontre si souvent dans les écrits de ceux qui affectent le plus d'être éloquents, font voir combien la plupart des personnes qui parlent, ou qui écrivent, auraient besoin d'être bien persuadées de cette excellente règle, qu'il n'y a rien de beau, que ce qui est vrai: ce qui retrancherait des discours une infinité de vains ornements et de pensées fausses. [Logique, p. 360.]

The argument for the "véritable rhétorique" reaches its climax at this point. It sets itself up in opposition to the theory of thought and expression that was at the same time being recovered and restated from the ancients. "Rien n'est beau que le vrai," the cardinal principle of French classicism, has one of its most vigorous expressions and justifications in this logic.
but the curious thing is that neither logic, as here conceived, nor rhetoric, as Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian conceived it, has a place for an independent beauty that is an end in itself. All concerned agree on that; they begin to differ when they say on what primary value beauty depends. With the Port-Royalists, it follows from truth; Quintilian represents the other side when he declares succinctly: "Numquam vera species ab utilitate dividitur." ("True beauty is never separate from utility.") (De institutione oratoria II. viii. 2.) With the former, truth is established by demonstration, with Quintilian by persuasion; and for both, beauty must be subordinate to the primary aim or technique. The overriding utilitas points to the heart of the matter for the rhetorician, who is basically skeptical. He is ready to make a case for either side of the question, and he is willing to consent to the verdict of a third party. For him truth comes out of a contest for someone's adherence to an opinion, and in that context what one decides to say is tested by the criterion of effectiveness in causing adherence. To the logician the nature of things and the nature of thought are decisive; truth emerges from the effort to bring the two into coincidence. Once achieved, the truth is laid before the third party, who is not expected to judge it, as though he stood above it, but rather to recognize it and to submit to it. The Port-Royalists are quite prepared to pay the price:

Il est vrai que cette exactitude rend le style plus sec et moins pompeux; mais elle le rend aussi plus vif, plus sérieux, plus clair, et plus digne d'un honnête homme: l'impression en est bien plus forte, et bien plus durable; au lieu que celle qui naît simplement de ces périodes si ajustées, est tellement superficielle, qu'elle s'évanouit presque aussitôt qu'on les a entendues. [Logique, p. 360.]

The "sophisme de l'autorité" and the "sophisme de la
"manière" belong also in the category of mistaking some appearance or external mark for the reality or the truth. In the first of these, age or piety or moderation or wealth or rank or erudition or some other quality of the author is taken as a sign of truth and a stimulus of judgment. Since the minds of men are ordinarily "faibles et obscurs, pleins de nuages et de faux jours" (Logique, p. 365), they usually accept the views held by people having some visible qualification or title to authority. Although there is no necessary connection between the truth and such marks, this "voie de persuader" often prevails. Of course, Arnauld and Nicole make a distinction between legitimate authority and the unimportant or misleading kind. One must respect that of the Church in matters of faith and the mysteries of salvation, but elsewhere intrusions of authority are often causes of error.

Mais dans les choses dont la connaissance n'est pas absolument nécessaire et que Dieu a laissées davantage au discernement de la raison de chacun en particulier l'autorité et la manière ne sont pas si considérables, et elles servent souvent à engager plusieurs personnes en des jugements contraires à la vérité. [Logique, p. 366.]

It will be readily noted that this treatment of authority is, from the point of view of rhetoric, another attack on the speaker as a means of persuasion. The suppression of the moi that, as we have seen, is required in argumentation for reasons of piety and honnêteté and the avoidance of authority in instances where such pressure is not called for: these two ideas complement and reinforce one another.

Actually the position of the Port-Royalists as regards the image and role of the speaker or writer has even a further nuance, one that allows them to assimilate as much as possible of the traditional concern for the sensibilities of the audience. Here I am thinking of their final chapter on the subject of
bad reasoning in which they treat what they call "manièreme." By this term they mean something other than signs like age or piety as the bases of authority, and, also, something distinct from style. They are referring to a man’s way of stating the truth, or, more specifically, to the moral attitude that underlies that way. For example, one is more inclined to believe the person who speaks easily, with gravity, moderation, and gentleness than to believe the person who shows anger, hostility, or presumption. Once more the authors of the Logique remind us that these external tokens may deceive; we in the audience must consider "manièreme" and "fond" separately.

Nevertheless, it is in connection with manner that Arnauld and Nicole enunciate what they call the greatest principle of rhetoric. One cannot but think that here they are drawing on bitter experience in the furore over Jansenius’ book on Augustine and Pascal’s Lettres provinciales. If it is reasonable to be on one’s guard against deciding an issue on the basis of the way it is proposed, it is equally reasonable for the persuader to seek to clothe the truth in “manières favorables,” that is, suitable for getting approval, and to avoid “manières odieuses” which would alienate men. Since no truth can be expounded without an accompanying manner, it cannot be neglected. I do not say that it should be exploited: for the Port-Royalists, one would then fall back into the habits of the Ciceronians. The aim must be to stay out of truth’s way.

S’ils honorent sérieusement la vérité, ils ne doivent pas la déshonorer en la couvrant des marques de la fausseté et du mensonge: et s’ils l’aiment sincèrement ils ne doivent pas attirer sur elle la haine et l’aversion des hommes par la manière choquante dont ils la proposent. C’est le plus grand précepte de la rhétorique, qui est d’autant plus utile qu’il sert à régler l’âme aussi bien que les paroles. [Logique, p. 374.]

For Port-Royal, rhetoric is not the method of truth, as it
tended to be in the tradition; it is only a means of easing the communication of truth once it has been found by another method. Aristotle's great achievement had been to formulate in his *Rhetoric* a dispassionate account of the means of persuasion that did not involve them in the requirements of scientific accuracy and in the commitment to any one truth. The Ciceronian tradition, though it insisted on an alliance of wisdom and eloquence in rhetoric, is ultimately skeptical or probabilistic on questions of truth. The Port-Royalists would have had a higher opinion of rhetoric if they had not held so high an opinion of truth, so firm a conviction of its attainability, and such confidence in its power to impose itself once grasped.

This *Logique* seriously intends, therefore, to improve and even replace rhetoric. The comments of its authors, made *en passant* as they develop their art of thought, have dealt so far with language (especially in its figurative uses), with commonplaces (as the principles with which invention begins), and with reasonings (insofar as they depend on things and on the manner and status of the speaker). Their manual appears at a time when seventeenth-century literary theory is beginning to crystallize into its clearest and, as we have come to say, its most obviously *classical* phase. The moment is well chosen for the kind of deliberate braking influence that this *Art de penser* seeks to exercise on the dominant Ciceronian trend. For the final implications of this attempt, we shall have to study the fourth and most original section of the work, the one entitled, “De la méthode.”

1. *La Logique ou l'art de penser* (Paris, 1664), p. 28. All references, unless otherwise noted, are to this edition.
2. As a matter of fact, Arnauld and Nicole could have been (and, perhaps, were) inspired in their criticism and in their remedy by Quintilian, who is perfectly aware of such excesses. Cf., for example: "... Resistant iis, qui, omissa rerum (qui nervi sunt in causis) diligentia, quodam inani circa voces studio senescunt, idque faciunt gratia decoris, qui est in dicendo mea quidem opinione pulcherrimus, sed cum sequitur non cum affecttatur." ("I must resist those who, failing to concern themselves with things and ideas, which are the sinews of pleadings, grow old in the futile study of words; they do so for the sake of elegance, which is, I agree, the most beautiful quality of style, but only when it is appropriate and not when it is affected.") (De institutione oratoria, VIII, proemium 18; the edition I am using is that of Henri Bornecque, in four volumes, Paris, n.d.) Or, again, at the end of the Proemium: "Sit igitur cura elocutionis quam maxima, dum sciamus tamen nihil verborum causa esse faciendum, cum verba ipsa rerum gratia sint reperta." ("Let us be as careful of form as possible, but let us recognize that one should do nothing merely for the sake of words, for the words themselves were invented for the sake of things to be expressed.") But we can be sure that the Port-Royalists did not share Quintilian's view of ornament ("... qui est in dicendo ... pulcherrimus"); nor would they have emphasized admiration and pleasure as rhetorical aims. Quintilian does just that in the lines that follow immediately the second passage quoted.

3. Aeneid xii. 1. 646. But the authors of the Logique have before them, not Virgil, but Quintilian. In Book VIII, chap. v ("De generibus sententiarum"), we learn first that "Sententiam veteres, quod animo sensissent, vocaverunt." ("The ancients signified by the word sententia a feeling or opinion.") Later, in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the chapter, Quintilian offers two examples of plain declarations, one of which is: "Mors misera non est, aditus ad mortem est miser." He continues, "Sed majorem vim accipient et mutatione figurae, ut 'Usque adeone mon miserum est?' Acrius hoc enim quam per se: 'Mors misera non est!'" ("Death is not painful, but the approach to death."). But the ideas take on greater force by a change in the figure: 'Is it, then, so painful to die?'--a form that is more vigorous than the simple statement: 'Death is not painful.'"

4. "Sed ne causae quidem parum confert idem hie orationis ornatus. Nam qui libenter audient et magis attendunt et facilius credunt, plerumque ipsa delectatione capiuntur, nonnumquam admiratione auferunt." ("But the elegance of expression contributes also not a little to the success of the case. For those who listen with pleasure pay closer attention and believe us more easily; most of the time they are led along by this very pleasure; sometimes they are carried away by admiration.") (Bk. VIII, chap. iii, 5.)


6. Cicero's position is opposed to this, of course, but it does not lack nuances. Crassus is made to say in De oratore I. xxxii. 146. "Verum ego hanc vim intellego esse in praecipuis omnibus, non ut ea securi oratores eloquentiae laudem sint adepti, sed, quae sua sponte homines eloquentes facerent, ea quodam observasse atque collegisse; sic esse non eloquentiam ex artificio, sed artificium ex eloquentia natum. Quod tamen, ut ante dixi, non elicio; est enim, etiamsi minus necessarium ad bene dicendum, tamen ad cognoscendum non inliberale." ("But I consider the virtue and status of all rules to be this: not that orators by following them have won praise for eloquence, but that certain persons have noted and
collected what men of eloquence did of their own accord; so that eloquence has not sprung from art, but art from eloquence. However, as I said before, I do not reject art, for, though not necessary for oratory, it is still a liberal subject for study.

Antonius has similar things to say in Book II (e.g., in chap. vili. 32), and in both cases the reservations about the usefulness of the rules, especially in their more elaborate forms, make the factors of nature or original gift and practice more important in eloquence.

7. Logique, pp. 203–94. Here the authors of the Logique have very probably drawn their ammunition from Quintilian himself, as they had a few lines earlier, when they paraphrase and quote him as follows: “Aussi quoique Quintilien fasse paraître de l’estime pour cet art, il est obligé néanmoins de reconnaître qu’il ne faut pas, lorsqu’on traite une matière, aller frapper à la porte de tous les lieux pour en tirer des arguments et des preuves. Illud quoque studiosi eloquentiae cogitent, neque omnibus in causis ea, quae demonstravimus, cuncta posse reperiri, neque, cum proposita fuerit materia dicendi, scrutanda singula et velut estiatiim pulsanda, ut sciant, an ad probandum id, quod intendimus, forte respondeat; nisi cum discunt et adhuc usu carent” (p. 292). (“... Those who study eloquence should reflect on this fact, that they cannot find in all cases all of the forms of argument that we have indicated; and when a subject has been proposed for treatment, they should not examine all the headings successively and knock on every door, so to speak, to see whether they may give the proof that we seek—unless it be when they are learning and still lack practice.”)

The passage in Quintilian continues: “Infinitam enim faciat ista res dicendi tarditatem, si semper necessit sit ut tentantes unum quodque eorum, quod sit aptum et conveniens, experiendo noscamus; nescio an etiam impedimento futura sint, nisi et animi quaedam ingenita natura et studio exercitata velocitas recta nos ad ea, quae conveniunt causae, ferant.” (“Such a situation would make the process of speaking infinitely slow, if it were always necessary for us to try out every one of the arguments and thus to learn by experiment what is suitable and appropriate; I am not sure that it would not be an obstacle to progress, unless a certain natural talent and a facility acquired by study lead us directly to the arguments that suit the case.”) (De institutione oratoria V. x. 122–23.) From this it is clear that Quintilian’s views are more balanced than one might suppose from the account in the Logique.

8. Especially notable in these lines: “J’estimais fort l’éloquence, et j’étais amoureux la poésie; mais je pensais que l’une et l’autre étaient des dons de l’esprit plutôt que des fruits de l’étude. Ceux qui ont le raisonnement le plus fort, et qui digèrent le mieux leurs pensées, afin de les rendre claires et intelligibles, peuvent toujours le mieux persuader ce qu’ils proposent, encore qu’ils ne parlissent que bas breton, et qu’ils n’eussent jamais appris de Rhétorique. Et ceux qui ont les inventions les plus agréables, et qui les savent exprimer avec le plus d’ornement et de douceur, ne laisseraient pas d’être les meilleurs poètes, encore que l’art poétique leur fût inconnu.”—Discours de la méthode, ed. E. Gilson (Paris, 1947), p. 7.


10. Descartes and Port-Royal agree on a related point—the criticism of the Lullistes (the followers of Raymond Lull, 1235–1315), who aspired, with the help of Lull’s Ars brevis, to speak well on any and all subjects. Their starting points or “attributs généraux” were species of common-
places, according to the Logique. Descartes writes with scorn in the Discours of Lull’s art; it helps one, he says, to speak without judgment of things one knows nothing about. Gilson gathers the evidence showing that Descartes considered Lull’s method to be a scheme of reasoning based on commonplaces.

11. For this distinction, see, for example, Rhetoric I. ii. 1356a 1-14. References are to The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York, 1941).

12. See, e.g., in the De institutione oratoria IV, i, and VI, 1-11.

13. At least the only one noted in the context of logic.