I
Introduction

By neglecting the language of symbolic expression that speaks to the imagination we have lost the most energetic of languages.¹—“Emile”

A CAUSE CÉLÈBRE

After two centuries of constant subjection to the tireless scrutiny and merciless probing of scholars, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who discloses the intimacies of his life so freely, still hides the secret of his thought. For unlike most of his contemporaries he understood the value of mystery and of poetry, not only to express more effectively the intricacies of his own personal apprehension of truth, but also to allure the minds and souls of his readers. He hints that his reticence is intentional when he says: “I do not write for those who must be told everything.” Again he adds significantly: “He who tells all tells little, for in the end no one is listening.”² He consciously declines to lend himself to a neat positivistic interpretation that simplifies the critic’s task.

Yet his purpose is clear enough, and it never varies. In all his works the same question is raised over and over again. “Where is wisdom? Where is happiness?” is the Sphinx-like riddle propounded by him from the beginning of his career when the Discourse upon Arts and Sciences won him fame in Paris and all Europe in his fortieth year. Precisely the same question provides the major theme of a decade of writing including other pieces written in the French capital, like his Discourse upon Inequality and the article on Political Economy, as well as famous books composed at Montmorency, such as the letter to d’Alembert on the theater, the novel Julie, and the political and peda-
gogical treatises of the *Social Contract* and *Emile* that were supposed to bring his literary career to a virtual close at the age of fifty.\(^3\)

In each work in turn the author asks: Is it the lover of knowledge who possesses the secret of happiness? Is it the worshiper of Mammon, or the devotee of power and glory? Or is it the man committed to some indescribable pleasure of the body? By merely posing such problems, he unsettled people and cast doubt upon common assumptions that lie at the foundations of a materialistic society. As he pondered these assumptions in his mind, his own view of life slowly took shape as the very antithesis of current beliefs about the value of power, wealth, and self-indulgence for the attainment of felicity. His ideas are quite fully defined in *Julie*, which, as I have shown, synthesizes the content of all his previous publications.\(^4\) But his philosophy is best expressed in the two works intended to be his last, especially *Emile*, to which the *Contract*, or treatise on citizenship (a summary of a projected work on *Political Institutions*) is by his own admission a sort of appendix. He wished the latter to precede the main volume in the bookshops, although it actually followed. His desire was that *Emile*, a production of the first magnitude, might appear as his definitive answer to the problem of happiness, to be succeeded only by memoirs reserved for retirement and posthumous publication.\(^5\)

But *Emile* and the *Contract* shattered his dream of repose and brought in their train a host of other works that he felt obliged to write "to defend his honor and ideas." For he found to his dismay that to stir the conscience of the age is a dangerous undertaking, as many another imprudent idealist has also discovered from the time of Socrates or Christ down to our own day. In Rousseau's case persecution and exile immediately followed the publication of the two treatises. A Parisian decree of 9 May 1762, directed against the author of *Emile* and especially the unorthodox profession of religious faith contained therein,
and an analogous Genevan decree directed a week later against the writer of both books made him into a religious and political martyr at once. Yet only a few months after the blow had fallen and while wounds were still fresh, he wrote to a correspondent thus: "It mattered little that a band of children should not act out their tawdry comedy, but it mattered greatly that what I have said should be said. Thank heaven, my task is done. I shall have no more anxiety on that score." Here he alludes particularly to Emile, which touched off the disaster. Apparently his distress did not preclude a sense of relief since his book had gone abroad with its message to the world.

Rousseau pleads on his own behalf nowhere more fervently than in the hitherto neglected Levite of Ephraim. Except for the ending, it was written in the coach as he took leave of his adopted land and fled to the Swiss countryside north of Geneva. It is important because of the light it sheds upon the author of Emile's attitude toward his own work.

The brief prose-poem in four cantos is partly inspired by the concluding chapters of the Book of Judges in the Old Testament, but mainly by the circumstances of its composition. The writer turns the biblical narrative into a myth to adapt it to his true theme, which is the story of his own spiritual life, and tells how the culminating achievement of his career brought persecution and the threat of death upon him. Moved by these iniquities, he begins the poem by denouncing "crimes" that God's people must avenge and from which the enemies of inhumanity, however "debonair," may not avert their eyes without deserting the cause of justice. The biblical theme becomes Rousseauist.

Indeed, the Levite in the poem is Rousseau. The latter endues himself with the office and garb of a minister of the Lord who is dedicated to the service of a spiritual temple. Elsewhere too he is similarly arrayed. For example, in Emile he assumes the vestments of a Savoyard vicar.
Moreover, at the moment when he completed the poem, he donned the Armenian costume, popular a century earlier. It appears as a sort of pilgrim’s cloak or philosophic pall, reminiscent of the robes of Socrates, or perhaps of Christ, or the medieval monk, as well as the Levite whose role he borrows in the poem. Rousseau's Levite, like the one in Judges, belongs to the tribe of Ephraim. Now Ephraim is used in the Old Testament as a synonym for the twelve tribes of Israel, which in the poem typify Christendom. Like the ancient Levite, the modern one leaves the hillsides of his own country and finds a bride in Bethlehem-Judah. But she is not a “concubine” as in the sacred text. The reader who is on intimate terms with the writer already begins to see in her a reincarnation of the Rousseauist “Sophia,” or wisdom, a new vision of divine wisdom born in the city of Christ two thousand years ago and comparable to the image of the Solomonic bride in the Book of Wisdom or the Socratic Lady Philosophy in Plato’s Republic. At once the Levite’s soul is knit with hers. But, since she is not of his tribe, he may not marry her according to God’s law. This impediment in the poem has no equivalent in the biblical source, and Rousseau admits it in a footnote, as if he considered the innovation significant. The note reads: “I know that the children of Levi were free to marry in all tribes, but not in the case supposed here.” He forbears to explain further, but his thought is not unintelligible. If the bride of the poem is indeed a concept of divine wisdom, no man may lay exclusive claim upon her. The mystic union is consummated nonetheless. The fruits of this union in Rousseau's life would presumably be his early discourses, which, together with Emile, he esteemed as his finest productions. In the poem, as in the biblical verses, the Levite then conducts his lady to his mountain home, where he remains for four months. Similarly the writer of the second Discourse, after professing to woo wisdom in his work, journeyed to his native land, to which he dedicated
the piece, and there he remained for the same space of time.

But the Levite of the poem finds the soil of that country inhospitable to his bride. She sighs for Bethlehem-Juda, or the city on high that is her birthplace and proper abode. Unlike her biblical analogue—and henceforth I shall refer to the sacred text only in the case of deviations from it—she does not "play the whore against her lord." The bride in the new version tires of him who has allegedly renounced all else to follow her, and finally eludes him. Here the writer betrays disenchantment with his native Geneva and Calvinist faith and perhaps personal remorse as well. For after his return to France he became enamoured of a worldly "Sophia" in the person of Sophie d'Houdetot. At that moment in time he was faithless to the real one, like Socrates' errant philosopher who is led astray from his calling and abandons his lady. Rousseau's return to the cult of wisdom is also indicated in the poem where the Levite returns to Bethlehem to be reconciled with his bride, whom he woos and wins once again.

In the second canto he sets out on his journey through life by her side, making his way "to the house of the Lord" and to his "mountain dwelling," where the writer of Émile professedly longed to withdraw. The Levite's lady newly recovered now appears as an image of that book where a definitive vision of Rousseauist wisdom is enshrined. On the road to his final resting-place the servant of the Lord taries awhile, not in a city of infidels, says the poet, but among God's people, his own brethren. There a kindred soul, a fellow Ephraimite, befriends him. But as darkness falls, fiendish men, reminiscent of the wild-beast natures from whom the Socratic philosopher takes refuge, demand that the stranger be delivered into their power. For, we are told in another passage unparalleled in the sacred text, he is an uninvited guest in their country. So was Rousseau in France. To humanize them, he offers them the bride for whom he had dispossessed himself of all else.
In the same spirit the author professes to have given *Emile* to the world. But the offering is vain. The diabolical men of the poem, suggestive of the “unworthy persons” who dishonor the Socratic Lady Philosophy, “tear her away from each other like beasts.” Rousseau’s words here represent a new departure from the biblical verse that reads: “They knew her, and abused her all night.” The modification lends further weight to my view of his theme, since evil men could hardly be said to “know” divine wisdom in any sense. According to the modern Levite, they cannot even dishonor her since her misfortunes only sanctify her. The writer said virtually the same thing of *Emile* in a defense of the work. At last the priest in the poem finds his bride lying lifeless on his path. In rage and despair the “barbarous” man takes her back to his home in the mountains, mutilates the body, and sends the flesh far and wide to all God’s people. Then he goes on his way to the “house of the Lord” and calls upon the justice of heaven. Again he appears as an image of the author pleading in favor of his crowning achievement.

In the third canto the chosen race gathers together before God, coming “from all the cantons,” says the Swiss writer, again taking leave of the scriptural text. In the divine presence they swear to avenge innocent blood, whereupon the new Levite, unlike the biblical prototype, dies. He therefore does not share in the ensuing vengeance. The story of revenge adheres quite closely to the Old Testament version. But it is employed by Rousseau to show the futility and tragedy of all religious conflict, considered as a form of fratricide.

The last canto, written at Môtiers in the Swiss mountains, is less inspired by the Old Testament than the New, and bears witness to a mitigation of bitterness wrought by the passage of time. It contains an incident of his own invention. A fresh generation of Ephraimites—evangelical Christians, if we wish—makes new sacrifices comparable to the Levite’s in an effort to redeem the brutish natures
of their fellows. The poem ends on a note of pardon and Christian charity, contrasting with the outcry of despair and demand for justice that precede. The ending is reminiscent of the Sermon on the Mount, where the writer frequently found images and ideas: “Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you....”

Of course, he never did witness a union of Christendom in his defense like the scene imagined in the *Levite*. But he could hardly have been surprised, since in the greater part of the poem he envisages his fate in a dramatically tragic light and emphasizes the curious cleavage between his own view of his life and that of his detractors. He does the same elsewhere. For example, on the eve of exile he wrote to a friend that “the only man in France who believes in God is doomed to be the victim of the defenders of Christianity.” A fortnight later he wrote to a Swiss journalist: “Sooner or later... reasonable men, perhaps finally Christians... will see with surprise and indignation that a disciple of their divine master is treated among them like a scoundrel.” Two months afterward when the archbishop of Paris condemned his book as the work of the Antichrist, he replied in the following vein: “The defender of the cause of God... (dishonored, exiled, driven from state to state without regard for his poverty or pity for his infirmity...) is forbidden fire and water in almost the whole of Europe.” In fine, telling the story years later in the *Confessions*, he speaks of the “outcry of malediction raised against me with unexampled fury in every part of Europe... I was impious, an atheist, a madman, a wild beast, a wolf.” In all these contexts he underlines the discrepancy between public reaction to himself and to his work, and the character of both as he sees it.

During his exile the discrepancy grew as fresh attacks were made upon him. It is true that, after he renounced his Geneva citizenship on 12 May 1763, his compatriots made formal representations on his behalf, but they were
easily silenced by the government of the city-state. In
the autumn of 1763 the latter published a book entitled
_Letters from the Country_ to justify itself against him. A
year later he replied in his _Letters from the Mount_, the very
title of which recalls what he terms Christ’s “greatest ser­
mon.”* In the letters he alludes to the evangelical saying
that “a prophet hath no honor in his own country.” He vin­
dicates himself as the apologist of religion, and calls the
Gospel “the rule of the master,” and his own works “the
commentaries of a scholar.” Why, he asks, is the former
“citizen of Geneva” now dubbed the destroyer of religion
and of all governments? He contends that it is the rulers of
the city itself who are overthrowing its constitution by their
arbitrary decrees.13 Inevitably public hostility overtook
him at his country retreat. Again he who saw himself as a
disciple of Christ was identified as Antichrist and used ac­
cordingly,14 being driven from place to place until persecu­
tion mania robbed him of peace of mind for the rest of his
days.

Throughout these vicissitudes Rousseau, posing as a
spokesman of religious and moral order, presents himself
personally and not merely ideologically as a follower of
Christ in the conduct of life, and at the same time evokes
memories of Socrates. As Malesherbes once observed, he
made a point of cherishing poverty and suffering like the
evangelical teacher. And again like the latter he proved, as
he says, that a prophet goes unrecognized at home. On the
other hand, his friends identified him with Socrates, who
also honored poverty and simplicity of life. The death of
the Greek sage, like that of the Son of man, occupied Rous­

*To be exact, one ought correctly to write “Jesus Christ,” since Rousseau
most frequently uses both names, as he does in the context to which I refer
here. Indeed, out of thirty-three references to the founder of Christianity in
“Emile” and related works in _O.C._, Pléiade, vol. 4, the author writes “Jesus
Christ” twenty-six times. However, for practical purposes I have decided
to use the shorter form “Christ,” since the meaning is always made clear by
the context. Regarding the expression “Son of Man” occurring below, I have
used the capital S, although Rousseau himself writes “son of man”: see “Morceau
alégorique,” _O.C._, 4:1053.
seau’s thoughts from the moment he achieved fame, as though he half expected to meet a similar fate. Five years before tragedy befell him, a young admirer of his compared the life of the new Socrates to that of the old. More than three years later, a friend warned him to prepare himself to drink the hemlock. When he was finally forced to do so figuratively speaking, the comparison was commonplace. Indeed, we ourselves, as we contemplate the role he plays in the Emile case, are reminded of the Socratic philosopher described in a passage of the Republic where the “wisest of the Greeks,” having deplored the grievous manner in which the best men are treated in their own states, enumerates those who, in spite of adverse circumstances, may yet become worthy disciples of philosophy. By some strange coincidence Rousseau fits into every category: the exile, the invalid, the man born in a mean city whose politics he contemns and neglects, one who leaves the industrial and mechanical arts in favor of philosophy, or, finally, one who is possessed of the inner sign of a genuine vocation. Such a man, says the sage, “holds his peace and goes his own way.” These very words recur at the end of the Letters from the Mount where Rousseau takes leave of Geneva for the last time. Whether or not, as he contends in Emile, he was not a man of his century—and he says the same of Socrates and Christ—his fate was not unlike that of the two figures in the past whose lives held most fascination for him. And it was brought upon him mainly by a work that, in his eyes apparently, was not unworthy of a professed disciple of both.

ENIGMAS AND CLUES

Emile has emerged as one of the milestones of Western culture. With more insight than authors usually have in the appraisal of their own compositions, Rousseau saw it from first to last as his “most useful, best,” and “most important” work, the one “most worthy” of himself, by compar-
ison with which all his other works are mere pamphlets. He was hardly mistaken. In spite of the reservations of many modern readers, it is recognized by our best critics as his most complete book and one of the major productions of our civilization. Small wonder if he was at a loss to explain public response to it.

He was all the more bewildered since, in his words, all his works convey the same message, though they are variously interpreted. *Emile* and its "appendix," the *Contract*, which is cited and abridged in the pedagogical treatise, form according to his letters a complete whole. So do *Emile* and the *Discourses*, which he calls "inseparable." In the *Confessions* he pleads further that everything daring in the *Contract* was already said in the *Discourse upon Inequality*. Thus he joins together in a single body of thought *Emile*, the *Contract*, and the *Discourses*, as he also does *Emile* and *Julie*. Yet he lived in comparative tranquillity in France until his masterwork made its appearance to rock the foundations of Europe, whereas the *Contract* created hardly more than a few slight tremors, except in Geneva. Why? If his ideas are dangerous, are they not just as dangerous in one book as in another? Perhaps so in their quality as ideas, provided we succeed in recognizing them as the same. Nevertheless, there is a vast difference. *Emile* possesses a power to which the reader responds in a way that sets it apart from the *Contract* and from all Rousseau's previous writings with the exception of *Julie*. That power lies less in the ideological content than in the attractive form of the work that gives potency to ideas. Although the subtitle of *Emile, Concerning Education*, suggests a philosophical study and is analogous to the title of the appendix, *Concerning the Social Contract*, yet the main title of the pedagogical treatise is that of a literary work wherein abstract concepts are presented by way of myths or images. The latter make it far more readable and hence more liable to criticism than the companion volume and are far more provocative than the ones in *Julie*. 

[12]
Emile, as opposed to the Contract, abounds in highly expressive visual imagery that serves a serious intellectual and spiritual purpose. I am not speaking of a few metaphors scattered here and there to illustrate a point in the story. I am referring to vast symbols and allegories that spring from the book itself and are an intrinsic part of it as they are of all great literature. They constitute an important aspect of the content of the work and not merely the form. But here let me explain my use of these terms that are by no means inflexible. The form may be conceived as the measure of the artist's craftsmanship, his patience, his command of his medium, his knowledge of technique, stylistics, and syntax. The content may be seen as the measure of his imagination and vision and may be said to consist of both body and soul, a material content and a spiritual one that correspond intimately to each other. The visionary and imaginative aspect of literature provides a fine clue to meaning in a book like Emile and hence is of primary concern here.

In the past the images therein have been accorded one of two varieties of treatment on the part of critics. Either they have been regarded as whimsical and childish, absurd and insipid, with the result that the writer often emerges as an incredibly stupid and boring pedant. Or else they have been altogether ignored in an attempt to go directly to the ideological core of the work. This method can foster the impression that the book is full of sophisms and contradictions and that, in spite of some valuable contributions to knowledge, it has serious flaws that make it hardly more than a document. Such attitudes are decried by monsieur Burgelin in his introduction to the Pléiade edition.

Fortunately, today some critics are beginning to suspect the presence of at least two or three weighty symbols in its pages, and their attitude toward it is therefore more sympathetic. Nevertheless, they still confine their investigations mainly to historical research or moral and philosophic speculation. Their work is extremely valuable, but it does not exclude the need for a thorough examination of the author's
use of imagery and its implications.

This is all the more true since the meaning of the most fundamental literary motifs of the book still remains strangely enigmatic. Rousseauist criticism includes serious studies of other literary problems, and even of this one in the case of works like Julie or the autobiographical writings. But it has not yet scratched the surface of the emblematic conveyance of ideas in Emile, as compared with the abstractions of the so-called appendix. My purpose here is simply to set out in this new direction with the conviction that it is a valid one. I shall do so by inquiring into the mythical expression of thought in Emile in the same way as critics have done, for instance, in the case of Plato. Without hoping to exhaust the theme, I shall attempt to come to grips with the writer’s artistic imagery as well as his ideology and then face the double challenge of aesthetic appreciation and philosophic interpretation at once. Thus I shall consider Emile as the work of a thinker whose methods are essentially artistic rather than philosophical.

An exploration of the myths of Emile proves to be vastly rewarding aesthetically and ideologically too. When the images are penetrated and relieved of their spiritual content, the book turns out to be a concrete allegorical presentation of doctrines communicated in a more theoretical way in the Contract as well as in the sequels of both and in earlier works. The discovery of this fact makes it possible to shed fresh light upon the ideas of the two books in question. In order to accomplish this purpose while examining the myths of Emile, I have chosen to give to my study the form of a collation of the masterwork and its appendix. The collation testifies to the truth of Rousseau’s own judgment about their essential identity and shows that they evolve according to one and the same plan. By virtue of a penetration of symbols, the relationship of texts rises to the surface quite naturally and easily.

This aspect of my work is also admittedly unconventional. Many commentators see a serious cleavage between
Emile and the Contract. They believe that the one sets forth the philosophy of individualism and the other that of collectivism, that the one represents solitary, isolated man whereas the other defines social man, integrated into an ideal community. However, there are exceptions among critics, especially recently. Some writers now believe that the two works complement each other and that Emile describes an artifically produced “natural” man to match the city of the Contract. They recall that for Rousseau true pedagogy implies politics—etymologically, “citizenship”—just as, according to the Confessions, politics implies pedagogy. However, they visualize the political ideal as the theoretical and rather irrelevant culmination of education in Emile instead of its very essence from the beginning. They therefore conclude that the author temporarily isolates pedagogy and politics, especially since in his view society that ought ideally to perfect man’s nature actually corrupts and destroys it. Yet it is conceivable that the mythical Emile does indeed abide in the imaginary city from the moment of his birth and that training in citizenship is the real theme of both books. This idea springs from a collation of the two, which in turn is made possible by a study of the allegorical forms of the pedagogical treatise actually reflected in the appendix.

However subtle he may be, Rousseau confesses in Emile that he is not overlooking the resources of art. He admits that, like Julie, the book is a novel, though a pedagogical one, and he is not speaking only of the so-called storybook ending. This is true whether or not he planned it as such in the beginning and whatever conclusions we may deduce from the first version extant in the so-called Favre manuscript. The definitive Emile is the story of human nature, the romance of the soul that, according to the author, ought to be the record of the race. He draws attention to the literary nature of his work by providing therein a thorough and methodical exposition of his literary profession of faith. This aesthetic doctrine, supplemented
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by reflections contained in the Essay upon the Origin of Languages, the Dictionary of Music, and books 9 and 11 of the Confessions, furnishes a key to the secrets of his art.

Although in the two books of the autobiography he is really speaking of Julie, he invites a comparison with Emile, and so his words may be taken as applying to both. Besides, he confesses elsewhere that Emile like the romance of Julie is full of his usual daydreams and is the final outgrowth of his country walks of which the first fruits were the love story.23

The memorialist's description of the creation of Julie is well known. The writer, surrounded by the splendors of nature in Montmorency wood, weaves for his fancy an enchanted world of perfect beings, descending from the empyrean, or rather, constructed from within the self. Such are the "daydreams" that reappear in his work from Emile to the Dialogues, which by his own admission took shape, like the Discourses, in a similar manner. Those dreams are the substance of what Formey called, with more truth than he perhaps intended, the mythical "world of Emiles."24 And to borrow the autobiographer's words about Julie, the vision in Emile is the setting for a painstaking analysis of the human heart, intended to be comparable in psychological truth to great literature of the previous century, in spite of the "perfection" of his creatures. The characters are outwardly the same as in the love story, though fewer in number. Apart from the "divine Sophia," there is a tutor or governor and his disciple, both of whom like the corresponding characters in Julie mirror the author himself, at the same time as they represent sensitive, contemplative humanity in search of wisdom and happiness. Both works are therefore autobiographical novels used to convey ideas. The passages in the Confessions relating to the one are valid for the other.

Rousseau’s aesthetics set forth in Emile and the other works already mentioned shed light upon the creative
process described in the memoirs. In the educational treatise he defends the use of imagery and formally declines to communicate his thought by transporting us suddenly to the sphere of pure intellect. He censures his famous contemporaries for relying too much upon cold reason "as if we were all mind." He reproaches them for neglecting the most energetic of languages, that of signs which address themselves to the imagination and heart through the eyes. This language is also described in the Essay upon Languages. It is the utterance of "genius" conceived in the Dictionary of Music as rendering ideas through feelings, to convince the mind and sway the soul at once. He illustrates the point in Emile by taking examples from biblical and ancient Greek writers. He admires their skill in enduing reason with a body to make it felt. In his own words he too has recourse in his book to "the language of symbolic expression," that is, to parables, allegories, legends, and visible forms that are the hallmark of the artist.  

He goes still further to emphasize the importance of aesthetics and the value of taste to convey ideas. In the pedagogical novel and in the Dictionary too he defines taste as "the power to judge what is pleasing to most men." In Emile he recognizes that this power is indispensable to one like himself who hoped to be of service to others. But although he associates the two issues, he does not confuse them. He is careful to separate the agreeable, which is the realm of taste, from the useful, which is for him the domain of ethics, and takes pains to distinguish moral beauty from physical. But he also hints at a link between them. For instance, he says that taste opens the mind to all beauty including moral ideas. But, as was ever his wont, instead of theorizing about these affinities, he leaves us to discover them for ourselves in the figures and events of Emile. By doing so we can see how he, whose professed desire was to devote his life to spiritual truth, approaches his task by appealing to our love of beauty. If the appeal was less effective in Emile than it was in other books, it is because
of the gravity of the message entrusted to its myths.

The author has more to say about the matter of pleasing and about the form and content of beauty. All true models of taste, he warns, are to be found in nature and not in the whimsical imagination of extravagant artists. Nature is therefore the subject of the art he favors, as he says in the *Confessions* too. He adds that a knowledge of its ways and modifications is to be cultivated by the frequentation of refined society since social life develops an understanding of the heart and trains the thinking mind to make discriminating observations and judgments. This means that he appeals to reason and the intuitive imagination rather than to unbridled fancy as the appropriate faculty to explore the natural theme. It also confirms the fact that the nature he visualizes is that of man, to which his most ecstatic landscape pieces serve as a background, or whose moods they transcribe. In fine, his ideal is indeed the psychological truth of Boileau and the "classics," which incidentally provides a key to the riddle of wisdom and happiness.

The author of *Emile* is well aware that, by scrutinizing the intimacies of nature, he is walking in the footsteps not only of the great seventeenth-century French writers but of their immortal precursors of ancient Greece and Rome. The governor in the book chooses both Plutarch and La Fontaine to discover the secrets of men's hearts. But in general, like Boileau he favors the ancients as models in all genres. He mentions history, eloquence, and poetry both dramatic and lyric. To these we might add the "Socratic" variety, if we may so describe the prose dialogues of Plato, such as the *Symposium*, which is used for a study of aesthetics in the fourth part of *Emile* and is not indifferent for an understanding of the fifth.

Yet although Rousseau's aesthetic doctrine may be dubbed "classical," in actual practice he transcends Boileau and the ancient ideal of objective truth to favor the inward personal spirit of Christianity. In fact, medieval Christian tradition is the source of his so-called romantic tendencies
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to introspection and lyricism, and he deliberately brings it to terms with Greek culture of twenty-five hundred years ago. For example, in the *Discourses* he emphasizes the bonds between Platonic or Socratic philosophy and Christianity. These bonds can be seen throughout his work from his denunciation of the theater, as closely linked with Tertullian and Bossuet as it is with Plato or Socrates, to the later autobiographical writings like the *Confessions*, with its echoes of Saint Augustine in what is substantially a "classical" analysis of the human heart. To illustrate further, the heroine of *Julie*, whose creator openly professes to be a disciple of Plato and Socrates, is compared by the author of the *Confessions* to the seventeenth-century *Princesse de Clèves*, which conforms to the Greek ideal. Yet she is also "the new Heloïsa" whose prototype belongs to the Middle Ages and whose lover, Saint-Preux, bears a name synonymous with the chivalry and passionate dedication of the medieval knights-errant, to whom, incidentally, *Emile* is also compared. In the pedagogical novel and its appendix, Plato, or rather that old master of Plato, is still Rousseau's. For in *Emile* he as usual repairs mainly to the literature of thought for his ancient models. But they never stand alone. The whole of *Emile*, as well as the *Contract*, which is synthesized in the conclusion of the main work, is dominated by two figures, namely, Socrates as introduced by Plato, and Christ, whose evangelical image is set in the context of all biblical literature. The association of the two is discernible in the *Levite of Ephraim*. Besides I have already cited a passage in the *Letters from the Mount* wherein the author calls Christ his "master." He does the same in the letter to the archbishop of Paris. He accords this distinction to none but Christ and Socrates, however much he is indebted to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers whose influence only underlines his own originality. His chosen models are the two whom he represents as the leaders of his spirit.²⁷
Moreover, he achieves a certain success in reconciling them and in uniting Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian tradition in general. This was no easy task since the kingdom of Christ, which as we are reminded in the Contract is not of this world, had become falsely alienated from the kingdom of nature and natural man. Rousseau was well qualified to assume the delicate task of compromise by favor of his sympathetic attachment to the evangelical and biblical writings as well as to some of the best works of pagan philosophy. Of course, the idea that Christ has long been regarded as mystically foreshadowed by the Socratic picture of the "just man" in the Republic furnishes him with an initial link between the two. But he is chiefly enabled to bring them together by his very personal vision of the "divine" master whose "divinity" consists for him in what might be termed his divine humanity. He overlooks the ascetic and militant image of Christ against which he openly rebels in the Contract, and throws into relief the deeply human qualities of the Son of man. Thus he succeeds in accommodating the wisdom of Christ to humanistic and especially Socratic tradition.

The great virtue of such accommodation for the present purpose is that it furnishes valuable analogies to enhance our appreciation of Emile and the Contract. Both traditions are clearly visible in the imaginative and intellectual content of the pedagogical novel in particular. In fact, the author of the latter openly expresses his admiration for the Platonic dialogues, especially the Republic, which he regards as a pedagogical romance. There the chief speaker, who is Socrates, tells a "story" about "the education of heroes." The writer of Emile who tells a similar story is steeped in the ancient one. He is also steeped in the Bible, to which he repeatedly alludes. Since both abound in figurative imagery, parables, myths, and allegories used to convey thought, it is not surprising that he too has recourse to the same visual devices to shadow forth his ideas. In exploring these devices, I shall attempt to disclose the verifiable
affinities of the two works under discussion with the Pla­tonic dialogues and the Scriptures and to establish concrete corres­pondences between these great landmarks of our culture.

Indeed, the imagery of those ancient writings reflected in Rousseau provides a useful key to the relationship be­tween his pedagogical novel and its political appendix. For example, in the Republic, to which he compares the two books, we have a "pedagogical" and "political" treatise together. Socrates' object therein is to portray the nature and duty of a good and honorable man, to describe the es­sence of justice and injustice and their effects upon the soul, and to determine the rule of human life so that men may know the way of happiness. To achieve his purpose, he deals at one and the same time with the soul and the city. The two are fused into a single vision where the state is used as an external image of the inner man. With a view to seeing the nature of justice in the individual soul, he looks at it on a large scale in the city-state, which is his political ideal as it is Rousseau's and where, being magnified, that elusive virtue is more clearly seen. He makes no distinction be­tween the two entities, finding the same principles in both: the will, reason, and gainful faculties in man correspond to guardians, rulers, and people in the state. "The good and true City or State, and the good and true man" are "of the same pattern," says he; for cities are made out of the human natures in them, and governments vary as men’s dispositions vary. Conversely, "as the government is, so will the man be." Thus Socrates continually reverts to the soul, beginning with it and concluding with it. The reason is, he explains, that it is better to be ruled by divine wisdom dwelling within ourselves rather than by an external authority. But if this cannot be, then we must submit to the latter so that we may be all, as far as possible, under the same gov­ernment, "friends and equals." He observes that such is the intention of the law, as seen in the education of chil­dren, whom it refuses to set free "until we have established
in them a principle analogous to the constitution of the State, and... have set up in their hearts a guardian and ruler (Rousseau would say "sovereign and governor") like our own...,” meaning like those of his imaginary city. Then they may go their way. In other words, we must establish a "city within" them to be their own, one that fulfills in its ordered beauty the true nature of the soul in her original purity. The Socratic man of understanding is "statesman and ruler" in that mysterious city whose pattern, we are told, exists nowhere upon earth but is "laid up in heaven." Yet he succeeds in fixing his eyes upon it with a view to setting in order his own house and his own city and living after the manner of the celestial model in private and in public life called "politics" and the "warfare" of the spirit. In the opinion of the Greek sage true education must therefore reveal to us "the kingdom of God," which is not of this world but lies within us. Christ's teaching has no other object. The author of Emile and the Contract could hardly escape the effects of these doctrines whose themes and forms turn out to be his own.

Indeed, in both books he takes up the Socratic and Christian imagery of the soul and the city. We see this in many a passage of each where the nature and constitution of a city and a man are compared. Occasionally, it is true, he is led by the mode of the day to draw a parallel between the state and the human body. However, he does so mainly in his early article upon political economy, but never in Emile and only in a rare passage of the Contract when it suits his purpose. This occurs when he wishes to emphasize the difference between them or where the theme is death and the spiritual metaphor is inappropriate for a man like himself who believes in a future life. The distinction he makes between the body of a man and the state is that the former is the work of nature and the latter the work of art. He had shown this in 1756 in a fragment dealing with the state of war. There he also says that the body politic, unlike the human body, is not limited in size and strength. He says
the same thing of the mind and soul in Emile. In the past most of us, in discussing his similitude of individual and state, have simply affirmed or denied that he accepts the validity of the "organic" parallel in the Social Contract, but have failed to explain his special use of it. Nor have we discerned the Socratic and Christian spiritual metaphor that pervades both books throughout.

In the majority of cases this is the suitable one. In Pauline terms the city is a "mystical body" or, as Rousseau says, a rational, moral being. So is the soul. Of course both city and soul are based upon men's natural needs and relationships, as he never wearies of reminding us. But just as a rightly ordered city, in spite of its natural basis, is a work of art and not of nature, a creation of reason and not of instinct, so is a rightly ordered soul. This explains why Rousseau employs quite as much artifice in its formation as he does in that of the city. They are as equally "artificial" as they are "natural," art being for him a means to fulfill nature's purposes in civilized life. Like Socrates he poses as a sculptor, a painter of constitutions— in fine, an artist. His creative artistry is clearly visible in Emile, where we shall behold the human soul bearing an image of a celestial city or "order," to which she quite naturally responds and which is proposed as a pattern of life upon earth in any milieu, even the most disordered. He is also a creative artist, though to a lesser degree, in the Contract, which possesses the austere beauty of mathematics, closely related to the antique simplicity of Emile. The beautiful city is a counterpart of the beautiful soul. It is magnified into a faithful likeness of its spiritual prototype who must remain true to herself reflected therein and avoid all innovations, according to both Rousseau and Socrates. My collation serves to bring out this imagery.

In the light of it, both books turn out to be treatises of education or, if we wish, legislation, since all laws are but "trifles... of the one great thing, namely education and nurture." Moreover, both deal with "politics," or citizen-
ship, as a Socratic symbol of moral life. And both face the problem of spiritual "warfare" created by opposing forces within the world of man and outside. These three themes, "military tactics, politics, and education" that are the "chiefest and noblest subjects" of the Republic, are also those of Rousseau's two books. The "legislator's" aim in both is to discover a reasonable constitution of nature in the realm of the soul and of human affairs, and thus to bring man into harmony with himself and with the divine will manifest in him. As a result Emile turns out to contain all the laws of the Rousseauist city of the Contract. As the author explains in the former, the hero learns to rule himself without external laws and government, which will never exist in their "true" form in the objective world. To paraphrase a Pauline text favored by Rousseau, he replaces the written letter of ordinances carved upon stone by a spiritual rule engraved in the heart to release men from the external yoke of their "tutor the law."

Indeed, he is well aware that he has no alternative but to spiritualize his city as his masters did their own. Its only hope of realization would be within the precincts of the heart through the action of the mind and will, or perhaps within the family through a process of outward diffusion. In both books he is therefore an explorer of the inner world and of human truth rather than a political or pedagogical theorist in the strict sense, whatever terminology he uses. That is why he places the Contract within the context of the soul in Emile. Moreover, even though his imaginary order will never materialize as a city in the usual meaning of the word, yet for him it still remains the pattern of both public and private life, "politics" and "warfare," the life of man and the citizen who is natural man in the social and civil state. For the principles at work in the inner world and in external conduct must be identical if men are to be consistent with themselves. Thus even in an anti-society the hero of Emile will live after the manner of the Rousseauist city and no other.
This view of Rousseau's two books is confirmed by a study of the preface to each. In what, to coin a word, I would call the Aemilian one, added at the last minute as prefaces usually are, the writer pledges himself to the art of forming men. This he calls the first of all public "utili­ties," using the word not in the usual pragmatic sense but in the Socratic one, with all its moral and spiritual over­tones. In the preface of the Contract he professes to seek a lawful and safe rule of administration to govern men. The purpose thus defined in both is the same, since "forma­tion," or education, is a kind of "government" or admin­istration by law. The point of departure in each case is that of Socrates; but it is also that of Christ, who in Rousseau's eyes is the archetype of the legislator-educator. To proceed with the preface of Emile, the author promises to accom­plish his purpose by studying the child and his growth to manhood and to adopt a method that follows the course of nature. In the preface to the appendix he proposes what amounts to the same thing, namely, to "take men as they are and the laws as they may be." The mode of procedure in both cases is Socratic. In the pedagogical preface he adds that, although his method is based upon the natural order of things, his readers will see in it nothing more than the dreams of a visionary. This idea recurs in Emile itself and in the Letters from the Mount, where it is also applied to the Contract. In the Letters he imagines the novel and its appendix relegated, together with the Republic, to the land of chimeras. Socrates had no illusions either about the judgment of his contemporaries who saw in him a "stargazer," a "dreamer," and a "visionary." And Christ too was so regarded by his own people. Thus in this aspect of the Aemilian preface, Rousseau joins company with his masters and faces the charges laid against them. He ex­plains why he takes the risk. It is allegedly because he is dealing with principles that determine the happiness or misery of the human race. This phrase is repeated in the autobiography, where it refers however to the Contract.
But, he asks in the same preface—and Socrates raises the question too—is his system really impracticable? Of course so, he replies, if we try to combine it with existing evil and create thereby dangerous inner tensions in man. That is why he would, in the familiar evangelical phrase, sweep the threshing-floor clean. Socrates does so by clearing the tablet of the mind before he begins his task of education. Christ likewise warns against putting a patch on our old habitual life and evil ways, or pouring the new wine of his wisdom into "the old Adam." The Rousseauist system is also chimerical if the will is weak, says the author of the preface to Emile, explaining that the will determines the feasibility and success of all spiritual effort. However, he adds, such practical applications of the pedagogical art are not his concern in the book, which sets forth an ideal rather than the actual conditions of life. The same is true of the Contract, which aims to define general principles. Since he is not a moralist as he is called, he does not deal with practical problems and specific cases. But whether his system is called feasible or fanciful, he defends it as suited to "men as they are"—the criterion in both texts—and well adapted to the human heart. These latter words, which occur in the Aemilian preface, are used in reference to the Contract in the Letters from the Mount and Considerations upon ... Poland. The conclusion of the two prefaces is also similar, and again recalls Christ and Socrates. It runs thus. What he suggests in Emile is "best for men themselves and for others too," a constantly recurring preoccupation in the Republic and also reminiscent of the Mosaical and Christian "Love thy neighbor as thyself." What he proposes in the Contract is the same: to ally what justice permits with what human interest prescribes. The two prefaces prove clearly that in both books Rousseau, like the masters of his choice, advocates a system or order of life designed to advance and enrich the nature of man and bring human beings into a truer communion with each other through the practice of justice. And like the same masters he is con-
vined that there is only one form of city or soul and that is his own. All others are “false.”

In fine, in both prefaces, as in both books, the author is asking the same questions that he had posed at the beginning of his career: “Where is wisdom? Where is happiness?” His reply, like Plato’s, is essentially an artistic and intellectual scheme of man and of the world in its relations to human conduct and to the question of justice and inner truth. Although that reply has a literal relevancy to the problems of politics or pedagogy—an aspect that has been repeatedly examined—it also constitutes a whole philosophy of life, a “theory” of reality in the etymological sense of “vision.” Some critics are beginning to realize that Emile at least is more than a pedagogical manual and that it is really a framework for philosophical research, although, of course, they confine their investigations to the development of human nature therein since their purpose is not to study allegorical figures or to trace the consistent parallelism between the novel and its appendix and their counterparts in antiquity. In truth, even though Emile was begun at the request of a mother, both it and the Contract are directed to the same audience as the Republic, which has the same theme and object as Rousseau’s books and is the fruit of the same passion for wisdom, conceived as the knowledge of good and evil.

That the subject of Emile is indeed wisdom as opposed to knowledge in general explains not merely the author’s delight in the conversation of Socrates and Christ or the teaching of Solomon but also the anti-intellectual tone of numerous passages in the book. Here we are confronted with a treatise of education written by an autodidact who, like Socrates, professes to be neither a scholar nor a philosopher, although he pretends to be “a friend of truth.” Yet he boasts of teaching “the art of being ignorant,” warns against “the perilous paths of vain knowledge,” and seems bent upon convincing men that they know nothing at all. Moreover, he advises against answering a child’s
questions and declines to discuss the teaching of reading or writing, for he is "ashamed to toy with such trifles in a treatise of education." He even declares that he hates books and brands them as "the scourge of childhood." Furthermore, he considers research in cosmography and physics as a form of "amusement," forbears to trace courses of study of any kind, and accuses speculative learning of preparing men for a "life of contemplation in a solitary cell." In fine, he regards only one book as indispensable, this being neither Plato nor the Bible but the "book of nature." Not that he excludes intellectual toil. But that is achieved, if at all, outside the philosophical framework. For him real education is not concerned with "such trivialities." He intimates as much in his prefaces. Indeed, in all his work, from his first youthful essays upon education and earliest *Discourse* onward, he is concerned exclusively with wisdom, the discernment of good and evil, as the only key to happiness. This concern underlies the intellectual humility he preaches, whether he practices it or not. He cites the example of Christ and especially of Socrates, the wisest of men who regarded himself as "a hesitating inquirer" in the search for wisdom.

The litterateur approaching the text of *Emile* is puzzled by its strange proportions. The five component parts vary so greatly in length that it appears unbalanced, and especially by comparison with the author's other works. Without speaking of *Julie*, the six parts of which are symmetrical, consider the four parts of the *Contract*, the content of which corresponds to the first four of *Emile*. In the former Rousseau has even been suspected of inserting "irrelevant" material as a pretext for illustration but really to balance and "fill out" the treatise. In fact, balance is quite as significant in a book as it is in a building, and the arrangement of the inside ought to be visible from without. What then does the apparent imbalance of *Emile* mean? There are five parts in the definitive version, the first three being relatively short, even the rather
longer second one that originally included the first and was subsequently divided into two. These three parts cover the period from birth to fifteen years. Then come two massive ones that begin again from birth, but this time it is birth into "life," as opposed to "existence." The writer even says that everything previously treated was merely a preparation for education—presumably what Socrates calls the preamble. Indeed, as we shall see, the themes of the first three parts are closely related to three great "waves" that the Greek sage must overcome before he can establish his city. This would suggest an ideological reason for the separation of the first two parts and the curious formation of the whole. But anyone concerned with literary problems as a key to thought must look further, especially in view of the very different shape of the Contract, which nevertheless has essentially the same content according to the promises of the preface.

As I have said, the two books contain an ideal image of the human soul that is the prototype of the Rousseauist city. In one the city has the austere shape of a fortress or citadel. In the other the kingdom within is conceived as a tabernacle or temple of the divinity and is therefore designed as such with a triple approach to the main structure. In Rousseau's words the soul, or rather, the heart, that mainspring of the human spirit, is the only true temple of the Godhead. The imagery is biblical, by analogy with the body considered as the temple of the soul and consequently of the spirit of God. The scriptural figure makes the fabric of Emile intelligible. But although the temple of the book occasionally recalls the shrine of Solomon or of Justinian, it is basically of Greek design and resembles the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi with its harmonious natural setting, or else the Parthenon in Athens, a vision of ordered beauty amid the disorder of an anti-society. The first three parts are like the three steps of the raised foundation of a Greek temple. In Emile this threefold foundation, to which the first three parts of
the Contract will be seen to correspond, represents the main concepts suggested in the two prefaces: the nature of man, its lawful engagement, and the government of reason.

The temple proper of Emile, like that of Delphi or Athens, has Ionic elements inside but a Doric exterior, comparable in character to the citadel of the Contract. Indeed, in the Aemilian temple, as at the Delphic one, the Spartans that filled Rousseau with republican fervor at the age of six occupy a privileged place. At the threshold of both is inscribed the legend “Know thyself,” although in Emile it is gradually transmuted into the Christian “Forget thyself.” The main body of the book is also disposed like the Greek shrine. It is split into two unequal parts, the second rather smaller than the other. Passing through them, we make our way first into the ideal social order of the Contract; then into the equivalent civil order, which for Rousseau is a source of sanctifying grace and where all elements of the appendix are gathered together. Both parts, like those of the Greek temple, have three naves. And just as the main chamber of the ancient sanctuary contained an image of the godhead in its midst, and as Apollo the sun god of Delphi stands in the midst of the Republic, so the deity in whose likeness man is made occupies a similar place in Emile, in the profession of faith of the Savoyard vicar. Before it is a Rousseauist version of the Delphic sacrificial hearth where the eternal fire burned at the navel of the earth. In the pedagogical novel the sacrificial fire is the offering of the soul to the divinity by the purification of the passions. And as the Pythian oracle spoke from the innermost point of the Delphic shrine, so in Emile the oracular “celestial voice” of conscience or of law utters the dictates of wisdom in the secret places of the soul. Nearby rise two statues like those that once surrounded the figure of the god at Delphi. They are images of Socrates and Christ who dominate the world of the spirit, a world reflected in the city
of the *Contract*.

Finally, in the Aemilian temple we are admitted into the inner sanctum of the small room beyond, which has no corresponding part in the citadel. It is filled with treasures and votive offerings consecrated in honor of Sophia, priestess of the soul, as the heroine appears in the book and as she was reportedly conceived in its projected sequel.\(^5^8\) The Rousseauist tabernacle, like the Delphic shrine of the god of light and the Parthenon of Athena-Minerva, is dedicated to divine wisdom whose name Sophia bears. At this stage in the hero’s progress, the force of the emotions transforms what seemed like a pagan temple into a Christian church dedicated to Saint Sophia. The Parthenon itself underwent a similar change in the early Middle Ages before it became a mosque. But like it the fabric of *Emile* remains basically Greek as the shape suggests.

There are so many points of contact between Rousseau’s imagery and the Greek temple that there can be no doubt about the pattern of his work, which cannot be overlooked in a literary study. *Emile* heralds the neoclassical movement in art that was already under way when it appeared. The movement received impetus from the author’s thought that impelled France to seek in antiquity a new ideology and a new aesthetics through a fresh study of ancient literature and art. *Emile* and its appendix are among the most significant creations of that trend.

In my collation I shall follow the writer step by step while he constructs the temple or stronghold of the soul or city. Thus we shall see that the spiritual shrine of the novel is governed from the first by the same principles as the visionary fortress-like city of the *Contract*. In the larger work these principles are expressed in concrete forms to illustrate their nature and interrelationships until they are finally merged into a vast synthesis in the fifth part that emphasizes the artistic and philosophical unity of the whole and accentuates its fundamental idealism. In that part the temple appears as a living reality, the dwelling-place of Sophia,
through the ministry of one in whom we must recognize the Rousseauist Levite of Ephraim who finally withdraws in favor of the priestess herself. The same idealism is translated in the *Contract* into an austere architectural design.

1. "En négligeant la langue des signes qui parlent à l'imagination l'on a perdu le plus énergique des langages" (J.-J. Rousseau, *Emile*, *Oeuvres complètes*, 4 [Paris: Pléiade, 1969]: 645). Hereinafter, all references to the Pléiade edition of Rousseau's complete works will be indicated by *O.C.*; moreover, unless otherwise indicated, all references to the "*Contrat social*" and "*Emile*" are to volumes 3 and 4 respectively of that edition, and will contain only the page reference. For the sake of a homogeneous text, all quotations including those from Rousseau, Plato, and the Bible, are given in English. In the case of Rousseau, major quotations are also given in French in the footnotes. Those among the epigraphs of this book read: "C'est un assés beau roman que celui de la nature humaine. S'il ne se trouve que dans cet écrit, est-ce ma faute? Ce devroit etre l'histoire de mon espece..." And again: "Cet ouvrage (le traitte du contrat social), étant cite plusieurs fois et meme extrait dans le traitte de l'education en doit passer pour une espec d'appendice, et... les deux ensemble font un tout complet..."

2. "Mais combien de fois... ai-je déclaré que je n'écrivois point pour les gens à qui il faloit tout dire." Cf.: "... Il ne faut pas toujours tout dire; celui qui dit tout dit peu de choses, car à la fin on ne l'écoute plus" (*O.C.*, 4:437 n. [a] and 541).


5. J.-J. Rousseau, "Lettres à m. de Malesherbes," *O.C.*, 1:1136-37, 1144. The four famous letters are also to be found in *C.C.*, vol. 10. The reference given here is to letters of 12 and 28 January 1762, where Rousseau implies that *Emile* and the *Contrat* are his last works. Cf. n. 3 above. He wanted the *Contrat* to appear first, as he tells the publisher, Rey: *C.C*, 10:235, letter of 9 May 1762. Later he expressed pleasure at the proposal that the Parisian publisher, Duchesne, sell the two books together: ibid., p. 281, letter to Duchesne, 23 May 1762. For the *Contrat* as an "appendix," see ibid.

6. "... Il importoit peu que ce tas d'enfant ne jouat pas sa petite comédie, mais il importoit beaucoup que ce que j'ai dit fût dit: grâce au ciel, ma Tache est faite: je n'aurai plus de souci sur ce point" (*C.C.*, 14:168, letter to Malesherbes, 7 December 1762. He here refers to court intrigues behind the Paris decree.

M.A. Simons remarks on the light treatment normally accorded to the poem, which she considers important for the evocation of a primitive society and of the origins of evil therein: *Amitié et passion: Rousseau et Sauttersheim* (Geneva: Droz, 1972), pp. 82-88.

8. "Lettres à m. de Malesherbes," loc. cit., p. 1136 and n.2.

9. Plato *The Republic* 6. 495. All references are to the Jowett translation.

10. "Lettre à C. de Beaumont," loc. cit., p. 1002. For the dishonoring of the Lady Philosophy, cf. the sequel to *Emile* and see Chapter 6, note 18, below.

11."... Le seul homme en France qui croie en Dieu doit être la victime des défenseurs du christianisme" (C.C., 11:36, letter to Moulton, 7 June 1762). For the other references in the paragraph, see ibid., p. 153, letter to Morancourt of Berne, 25 June 1762; "Lettre à C. de Beaumont," loc. cit., p. 931; "Confessions," loc. cit., p. 591. The French texts read as follows. To the journalist: "... Il [mon livre] sera là tôt ou tard par des hommes raisonnables, peut être enfin par des Chrétiens, qui verront avec surprise et sans doute avec indignation qu’un disciple de leur divin maître soit traité comme un Scélérat."

To the bishop: "... Le défenseur de la cause de Dieu, fréti, proscrit, poursuivi d’Etat en Etat... sans égard pour son indulgence, sans pitié pour ses infirmités... se voit interdire le feu et l’eau dans l’Europe presque entière....."

12. C.C., 16:164-68, letter to J. Favre, 12 May 1763 (rough draft and final version): cf. **Lettres écrites de la montagne**, 5, 8, and 9 (hereafter cited as **Lettres de la montagne**).


14. "Confessions," loc. cit., p. 634; cf. pp. 627-28; and J.-J. Rousseau, **Correspondance générale** (Paris: Colin, 1924-34), 14:85, letter to Du Peyrou, 8 August 1765. Hereinafter "C.G." with volume and page number refers to this edition of the correspondence, which must be used to supplement the other until the latter is complete. See also "Vision de Pierre de la Montagne," **O.C.**, 2:1233.


18. For Rousseau's first judgment see C.C., 9:311-12, letter to Moultoú, 12 December 1761; cf. letter to journalist of n. 11 above; "Lettre à C. de Beaumont," loc. cit., p. 960; "Emile," p. 859; and "Confessions," loc. cit., pp. 409-10, 566-68. Burgelin calls it Rousseau's most complete work and one of the key works of our civilization: O.C., 4:1xxix.


20. It was not condemned in Paris, Berne, Holland or Spain: O.C., 3:810 n. 2.


23. C.C., 7:332, letter to J. Vernet, 29 Nov. 1760.


27. Whenever I quote Socrates or speak of him as Rousseau's master, I mean Socrates as presented by Plato. I have used the name of Socrates for artistic reasons, adhering to the imagery of "Emile." Burgelin in his critical edition of "Emile" mentions Plato or Socrates thirty-one times, but of course he does not pretend to deal with interrelationships on a large scale. C.W. Hendel draws attention to Rousseau's platonism, especially in the "Lettres morales": *Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Moralist* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1934), pp. 298-316. For the reference to the letter to the archbishop see loc. cit., p. 960, where Rousseau calls Christ his master. For his personal attachment to Socrates see note 16 above. Trousson, mentioned therein, sees him as transferring his allegiance gradually from Socrates to Christ especially in *Emile*; but, of course, this idea does not affect the evidence of Socratic influence combined in the book with Judeo-Christian from beginning to end.


29. *The Republic* 2. 376. We shall see that *Emile* and the *Contrat* contain a very complete and personal commentary of *The Republic*, and that *Emile* also contains Rousseau's view of *The Symposium*. Both books have allusions to other Platonic dialogues. In order not to confuse the issue, I have in general refrained from
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giving references to the latter, which would also have had the effect of increasing the volume of the notes.
34. For the first case see ibid., pp. 361, 363, where Vaughan sees the "organic" comparison; for the second see pp. 421, 424. See J.-J. Rousseau, Du Contrat social, ed. C.E. Vaughan (Manchester: At the University Press; London and New York: Longmans, Green, 1918), p. xxvii; also J.-J. Rousseau, The Political Writings, ed. C.E. Vaughan (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1915), 1:70. For the article on political economy see O.C., 3:244. It dates from 1754-55.
38. For the role of art or artifice in the "Contrat social" see pp. 360, 424, 431; for "Emile" see pp. 311, 320-21, 325-26, 329-33, 437 ff. and n. (2) on 1420, 501-3, 663, 764-65, 773-78, 801-2. For the city as a set of moral relationships see C.C., 19:190, letter to Col. Pictet, 1 March 1764.
40. The Republic 10. 599. For the quotation at the beginning of the paragraph see ibid., 4. 423.
41. 2 Cor. 3:3 ff.; cf. "Emile," p. 454, 2 Cor. 3:6 and 17; cf. "Emile," p. 471. See also Gal. 3:24; cf. 5:14, 17, 22-23; cf. Rom. 7:14; 1 Tim. 1:9. For the statement that true laws will never exist in the external world see "Lettre à C. de Beaumont," loc. cit., pp. 941 ff. All biblical references are to the King James version except in the case of the so-called apocryphal books, where I refer to the Ronald Knox translation.
42. "Emile," pp. 469, 483-84, 662, 669, 763-64.
tinction superficial: "Emile," p. 248 n. 4. However, he retains it: 251 n. 3 and 324 n. 1. See chapters 5 and 6 below.


46. See "Mon portrait," O.C., 1:1120: "Je suis observateur et non moraliste."


48. The Republic 3, 407-8; 4, 428; 6, 496; 10, 619. These passages contain phrases obviously echoed in the Rousseauist "best for themselves and for others too."


50. For Solomon see 1 Kings, Prov., Eccles., and Wisdom.


53. "Mémoire présenté à m. de Mably sur l'éducation de son fils" and "Projet pour l'éducation de M. de Sainte-Marie." O.C., 4:3-32, 35-51. These date from 1740 and 1743.


55. O.C., 3:384 n. 6 (relating to part 2, chapters 8, 9, and 10); 414 n. 1 (relating to part 3, chapter 8); 444 n. 1 (relating to part 4, chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7).

56. Jimack, op. cit., p. 171. Regarding the divisions of the Favre manuscript and subsequent modifications see also O.C., 4:1xxxiv-1xxxvii, 298 n. 2 and 426 n. 1.
