All the myths of *Emile* have their origin in the opening part that contains the exposition of the novel and the first foundation of the mythical sanctuary therein. However, they are subtle and elusive since the writer’s artistry always remains unostentatious and even deliberately concealed until it becomes the quiet handmaid of ideas. His images, being quite suited to the task assigned to them, fulfill it almost self-effacingly. Yet if we ignore them, the words are paradoxical and perplexing. To some extent they must be. This is true not only because a certain ambiguity or mystery resides in all genuine art, but also because the symbols in *Emile* lend themselves to more than one meaning. They retain their natural, apparently obvious values at the same time as they transcend them to burst the bounds of literal interpretation and evolve into vast metaphors and allegories of much larger significance. The writer provides many hints of their presence along the way. However, in the more mystifying passages we are required to make that “willing suspense of disbelief” for which the poet pleaded and defer judgment until all available evidence has been pieced together. The main advantage of such effort is that in the end it affords a deeper and broader understanding of *Emile*, its appendix, and the sequels to both than might otherwise be possible.

**THE SOUL AND THE CITY**

The first pages of the novel have no specific equivalent in the appendix. After a brief introduction the book opens, like the second *Discourse*, with a moving dedication to the only mother the author ever knew, the city of Geneva,
which he always declared to be his model in the *Contract*. Although he had been disenchanted by his birthplace since 1754, nevertheless at least until 1762, when that city became for him the cruelest of stepmothers, she still remained in his mind a symbol of something far more than he had actually found there. And so *Emile* is dedicated to a new Geneva existing "in his heart," his own apprehension of a "wise order" of things that finally appears in the form of the eponymous hero’s bride, Sophia.

In the past, of course, we have interpreted the dedication only literally, without regard to the litterateur’s use of art forms. We have identified the mother in the dedication with another in the first phrase of the preface, the "good mother" for whom he began the pedagogical work as he says in that text and repeats in *Letters from the Mount* and whom he names in his memoirs as madame de Chenonceaux. But apart from the fact that the mother in the preface is not necessarily the one in the dedication, in the first page of *Emile* she is expanded into a symbol extending far beyond the proportions of an individual.

There is plenty of evidence to support this contention. The dedication, incorporated into the substance of the book, is introduced by a famous battle cry directed against our social or unsocial if not anti-social institutions. It reads thus: "Everything is good as it emerges from the hands of the creator of things: everything degenerates in the hands of man." It is man, we are told, that disfigures nature’s beauty, especially the soul, which, in the manner of Fénelon, Rousseau likens to a frail plant that must be lovingly tended. This image, dear to his "masters," recurs at intervals throughout the book. The plant must be hedged about, says he at this point, by the devoted mother, whom false laws rob of the authority that is rightfully hers. Just when the puzzled reader is beginning to wonder what meaning he is attaching to the term *mother*, he promises to explain it later. The mystery is less recondite than it appears to be. He loves to identify the motherland or

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city-state of his dreams with a vigilant and affectionate mother and frequently does so in other works, particularly political pieces of the 1750s. So do his masters and their followers. Take the example of Socrates, who teaches his heroes that their country is "their mother and their nurse." There is also the case of the Christian "Holy Mother Church" that in some respects is not unlike Rousseau's spiritual city. And so we may, if we choose, expand our view and see in the tender mother to whom *Emile* is addressed a new avatar of the Rousseauist city where the soul allegedly beholds herself as she really is and where the subjective and objective worlds meet in one. The book closes in a similar manner, with a sort of divinization of woman as the personification of the author's hopes for humanity visible in Sophia.

Before setting forth his aspirations, Rousseau sketches a curious image of the so-called zero degree of natural human ignorance, reminiscent of Condillac's statue of a man possessed only of disconnected sensations. It evokes an imbecilic creature unacquainted with his own powers and their uses and distinguished from a newborn child only by size and brute strength. He is therefore not a newborn child, nor yet the primitive man of finely trained instincts seen in the second *Discourse*. He is untrained and unintegrated man, even though he lives surrounded by others. He is therefore the soul of modern man, stripped of his seductive trappings. This is the starting point of the spiritual ascent that is the theme of *Emile*.

Rousseau next visualizes the ascent itself and discovers the range of his lofty ambitions in the book. Anyone who desires to leave that uncivilized state and make his way to the heights has a threefold need. He requires strength of faculties and organs; the society of others to teach him to use those resources; and enough experience of the world to form a mature, discriminating judgment. Now, if he is to enjoy the singleness of purpose necessary to progress, he must perforce be guided by the first of these, since it
is regulated by nature and lies beyond the scope of human power. He must be governed by the faculties of body and soul, which are latent in men at birth and which must grow and perform each one its proper function in relation to the others, according to the designs of nature herself. The author now describes her in the most engaging terms that strike an imposing contrast with the picture of the solitary brutish creature described above. It is she who bids us, untrammeled by false opinion or otherwise impeded, select among the objects round about us those that are agreeable in the first instance; then those that we deem suitable or meaningful for ourselves; and finally those that, in our considered judgment, promise us a happiness or perfection matching the idea of both furnished by reason. This view of nature unfolds before us a vast spiritual and aesthetic evolution leading from the lowest instincts to the highest intellectual ideals. The author’s ultimate goal is to minister to the full flowering and fruition of all potential faculties. Such are the perspectives suggested to the mind by his triple-tiered view of nature’s genuine tendencies that determine the whole course of Rousseauist education.

Having disclosed the infinite possibilities within man, he then hints in enigmatic terms that they can be fully realized only in his own idea of moral order, which corresponds to his own view of social and civil order since the one is born of the other. He does so by describing the perfect city or moral person of his fancy. But he sets it within the framework of contemporary society and immorality to provide an impressive contrast between them.

Thus he begins by denouncing our anti-society that molds a man not for himself but for “others” who are consequently opposed to himself and embody conflicting private interests prevailing in our midst. Like Socrates he despises such a society for shaping man to please the shifting tastes and tempers of the motley multitude, as he charged in the opening lines of the book. In his eyes a forced and false cleavage is thereby fostered between the
soul and the semblance of a city, man and the so-called citizen, the world of man and the world of men.

By way of antithesis to this state of affairs, he proceeds to define his dream. This freeman of the new Geneva assumes the person of an ancient Roman or Spartan to expound the inner, moral discipline that his concept of social life entails, as opposed to our presumably anti-social ways. The ideal Rousseauist moral being is painstakingly shaped by the lawful claims of others that are identical with his own and alone can call his entire nature into play and bring it to full growth. But that "larger growth," as Socrates also says, is possible only in "a State which is suitable to him" and in which he may find and recognize himself as he essentially is. This means that the city must be patterned after the human soul and become an integrated whole, as closely knit together as its spiritual prototype. In that case it excludes individualist eccentric instincts, considered by Rousseau as a perversion of nature but favored as a rule of life by many of his contemporaries. In his view, as we have seen, both city and soul are fashioned by the processes of art; and infinite skill, rather than spontaneous impulse, is necessary to preserve the true spirit and aspirations of natural man within the fabric of the social and civil order.

In a fresh antithesis with the ideal, Rousseau looks again at contemporary society. Warning anew that instinctive feelings cannot be trusted in a true civil order, he shows that if they are, as is the case in actuality, they are distorted into egoism and are at variance with the human will seen as an expression of nature's highest dispositions. The result is that the soul is a kingdom divided against itself, belying her own real nature and useless to the world as well. In his belief men can no longer be true to themselves and at the same time "citizens" of the earthly "cities" of their birth.

The conflict between an anti-society and our true nature that ought to find its plenitude in social life creates an
abyss between domestic education, such for example as a youth might receive in his father's house in some distant province, and public education, which is that of public opinion in the modern "city." Rousseau deplores the contradiction between the two types of formation, which ought ideally to be one. To give an idea of public education as it should be, he cites Plato's *Republic*, paying tribute to it in a passage that corresponds harmoniously to another in the last part of the book. In what is much more than a "passing greeting," as it is still being called, he describes the great classic as the finest treatise of education ever written rather than a political work in the usual sense. True, he goes on to say that the type of education of which he speaks as exemplified therein is no longer possible. But this does not mean that he takes leave of the book or his masters. For Socrates says the same thing: until the famous republic comes to the birth in objective reality—an assumption that has as little political validity as it does in the case of the *Contract*—the system of formation prescribed by the sage must be confined to the inner world or "city of just souls." Public education, successful in Sparta centuries before the age of the Greek philosophers, who took that example for their model as Rousseau himself did, was as pernicious and fatal in their time as it was in his. Socrates says so, warning continually against the evil effects of contemporary opinion incompatible with the ideal order he proposes as a spiritual entity. The author of *Emile* heeds the warning. He explains that since, in the actual chaotic state of human affairs, there exists and can no longer exist in the world of actuality either city or citizen as he has just defined them, public education or the education of public opinion is out of the question. He is therefore unable to have recourse to it to supplement that of the home as he does in the idyllic sphere of the *Letter to d'Alembert* or in his work on the government of Poland, where he is himself the chosen legislator. According to his correspondence, that was the kind of education by which
he had profited personally in the city of Geneva, consisting of traditions and maxims handed down from generation to generation. He adds that ideally he would favor a form of education midway between the Greek-Spartan public kind and the monarchic domestic type, combining the education of public opinion with that of the family. But in *Emile* he is obliged to reject prevailing opinion as false, and to resort to "domestic education" exclusively, which might turn out to be the kind of self-discipline to which Socrates has to resort in the end. In Rousseau's own words he proposes to form "natural man" for himself alone, that is, to fulfill and consummate his entire nature and thereby render him better prepared for life with others in their anti-social state than if he were fashioned according to their wayward hearts and fitful passions.

The tribute to the *Republic* is only a harbinger of things to come. Indeed, there is a constant and consistent parallelism between Rousseau's two works and the Platonic dialogue of which he provides a complete personal interpretation. However, the parallelism emerges only from the second part onward where he deals with the formation of the self-conscious being. Yet the first part of both works contains many allusions to the *Republic*, which, together with the Bible, was clearly his *vademecum*.

In undertaking to form natural man for life in our society, he describes his task in Socratic terms. He must, he says, emulate the pilot who casts anchor in order to hold firm and avoid being carried away by the high seas. The image conveys an idea of the overwhelming flood of popular opinion that he, like another Socrates, is compelled to resist. The symbol of the pilot is an ever recurring one in the novel and is linked with a famous allegory in the *Republic*, that of the "true pilot" or governor, reason, who rules over city and soul and who "must and will be the steerer whether other people like it or not." Similarly Rousseau would stem the tide of prejudice in his book by means of reason. He adds the image of the anchor
ROUSSEAU'S SOCRATIC AEMILIAN MYTHS

to suggest further that he will do so by having recourse to the stability and permanence of basic principles.

This idea leads to the next. His "natural man" will, says he, be formed to endure the good and evil of the "human condition" from which none of us is dispensed, whatever our rank may be. He confesses that for him "natural man" is "abstract man" whose entire being must grow and mature in an ever more precise adjustment to reality in the pursuit of life's loftiest aims. In other words, he proposes to create, in the Socratic manner, an IDEA of man corresponding to the IDEA of the city in the Contract and sometimes called Socratically the "real" one. It is intended as an absolute prototype of which all individuals are mere counterparts and, by comparison, mere semblances of men, but which as an inextinguishable, unalterable essence survives in each one of them. For he believes with Montaigne that "each man bears within himself the whole form of the human condition." Thus he visualizes as the object of his work the human self as distinguished from a disordered one. His "man" is intended to be timeless and no more a man of his century than the portraitist who paints him. In him we are expected to find a common denominator and a promise of fulfillment as we do in humanity or, better still, as the Spartan did in Sparta or the Roman did in Rome. Indeed, he is later compared to both. Even though he has been modernized and christianized, he is reminiscent of the generalized man of humanistic art who belongs to a race of beings finer than the ones we know, and who is visible in the noble archaic statues of Greece or the classical carvings of Phideias, the "canon" of Polykleitos or the gentle forms of Praxiteles to whom the author of the first Discourse pays tribute. Since Socrates compares his "heroes" to those serene beings, so unlike the passionate souls of Greek tragedy, it is not improbable that his disciple was thinking of the same sculptures as contrasted with Condillac's statue evoked above. Emile is his own
"canon." Like the ideal state of nature of the Discourses and the ideal city of the Contract, the ideal man of the novel portrays a hypothetical state that, even if it never existed and even if we can never attain it, is still proposed as a criterion for comparison and judgment. This portrayal, based partly upon abstract reason and partly upon observation of our deformities, constitutes the main value of the book.

The author mentioned that he would fashion his model by means of domestic or natural education. Resorting to artistic methods, he next evolves the symbol of the home to express his views about the role of society in man's formation, its actual and ideal relationships to the human spirit. Significantly enough, it is precisely at this point that the Contract joins company with Emile, and the two books then proceed according to an identical pattern throughout the four parts, the fifth part of the novel being a synthesis or culmination of all that precedes.

The same fifth part, anticipated in the first, throws light upon the present context. There family society is ideally pictured as a "little city" or homeland, a reflection of the political order of the Rousseauist city-state symbolized in the mother whose sanctuary is the home and who is therefore the link between the miniature city and its larger counterpart. This symbol was present in the dedication. Family affection, he explains in the end, must be the natural ground and motive of all conventional bonds and love of state, and that first of all societies is the basis of the other, on condition that it is held together as it should be, not merely by natural instinct but also by just such conventional bonds. That being the case, the city of his desires will materialize only if the family is first akin to the soul, and results from the happy self-expansion of human nature fully consummated by art. He did not think so in his earlier years when, under the influence of Socrates, he excluded the family as an educational institution. But now he passes beyond his Greek masters and the
whole classical world, including his revered Spartans, through the profound influence of a Christian ideal of the home and family life, conceived as securing and enhancing the ancient model of ideal human formation. For in the mythical fifth part he allows himself to fancy that the "little city" of the family may, if dreams come true as they do therein, not merely exteriorize an inner life of exquisite order but also expand beyond its natural bounds through some unlikely communion of men of good will until the blessed "city" enshrined in the hearts of its free-men is born. Then that city would be, as it were, an expansion of the home and of all the sentiments of home, its intimacy, dignity, and security translated into unity, freedom, and equality. The vision of the last part is anticipated at the juncture we have now reached in the first where contemporary actuality is juxtaposed with the ideal and belies it.

There is an abyss between them. The author, contemplating what he regards as the shaky foundations of our weary world slowly sinking into the mire of human error and vanity, suddenly bursts forth in a famous outcry: "Civilized man is born, lives and dies in slavery; at his birth he is bound in swaddling clothes; at his death he is nailed down in a coffin; all his life long he is imprisoned by our institutions." These words have a matching pendant in the vigorous beginning of the Contract where the subject is defined: "Man is born free and everywhere he is in fetters." What, asks the writer, could possibly justify such a scandalous mutilation of human nature on the part of brute force? Yet in the same text he adds that in his system there is no question of resorting to force to oppose force. On the contrary, says he, he intends to show how submission to constraints may be lawful and indeed the only way to social order—an orderly life in society—that is men's "sacred right" and consummates nature's best intentions by means of social conventions. He does so in both books.
In actual society, however, submission always appears as a form of slavery. It is betokened in the novel by a vivid literary image, that of swaddling clothes which allegedly impede physical and spiritual growth. Rousseau knows full well that this is not the logical place to deal with the question, to which he reverts later to treat it in its proper sequence. In the present passage he uses the "barbarous" custom of swaddling an infant as a concrete portrayal of social duress, in a manner somewhat similar to Locke, who, however, approves of such constraint as protecting rather than increasing the child's weakness. Rousseau is also familiar with an impressive allegory in the Republic of a comparable nature. There Socrates, who is as I have said the chief speaker, sees men who are ignorant and require to be educated as prisoners in a den where they are confined from their childhood and have their legs and necks chained so that they are unable to move or turn their heads toward the light. The metaphor in Emile, though more familiar and domestic, is quite as effective as the ancient one. It serves to project artistically the wretched state of those who are victims of both ignorance and social oppression. This symbolic interpretation finds support in Rousseau's article on political economy where he deplores the condition of men whose life and liberty are reportedly at the discretion of powerful overlords with the result that they cannot even use their own strength to defend themselves. In the same context he protests that the members of a state should be treated with the same honor as the limbs of a man's body. Here domestic images illustrate political views exactly as in Emile.

In the latter he pursues further the allegory of the miniature city in its present state of decline. Reflecting upon the modern family where the mother is replaced by hirelings, he constantly alludes to the larger counterpart of the home in the great society. The child's bands, he observes, are a contrivance of paid nurses whose sole inter-
est is mercenary and who seek only to spare their own pains and live in peace. He says the same of modern laws and rulers whose object is the peace that safeguards property instead of virtue that is the aegis of the soul.\textsuperscript{17} He adds that nurses resort to the expedient of bands on the pretext that an unfettered child may in some way injure itself. In a similar vein, in the \textit{Letters from the Mount}, he accuses the despotic Genevan government of fettering the nation under the same pretext. The juxtaposition of texts gives to \textit{Emile} a new breadth of meaning hitherto unsuspected.

The symbolism becomes more conspicuous as the writer proceeds. A true mother, he asserts, does not engage hirelings. She nurses her own children, not merely to provide them with material sustenance, but to give them the tender care to which their hearts cannot fail to respond throughout life. In the article on political economy and in various political fragments, he applies the same idea to the mother city, "the common mother of her citizens," who wins their love by watching over their constitution and keeping it intact. She rules their hearts, he says, not by indulging their whims for material goods that fix men's attachments on inanimate objects, but by devoting herself to their entire happiness, which does not come from bread alone though they may not live without it.\textsuperscript{18} Again, scenes of private life are used to express a political philosophy as in \textit{Emile}.

In the novel he carries forward the theme of maternal neglect in phrases with the same political overtones that shed further light upon the allegorical scope of the work. For example, he says that although mothers have the power to transform our world, they never will. Just as he said earlier that there no longer exists nor can ever again exist city or citizens, so now he mournfully prophesies that women will nevermore be mothers and that there can be no more children either in the true sense of the term, with its connotation of filial devotion present too
in his concept of the citizen. He also bewails the opposite excess that makes no less havoc of human life, maternal overindulgence that forbears to temper the soul by plunging it metaphorically in the waters of Styx to make it invulnerable. Sparta, of course, was in his view guilty of neither of these excesses. Their effect upon the child is said to be either tyranny or slavery, both of which grow into inhuman passions to starve and stifle the rich resources of his nature.

To make matters worse, says the writer, the woeful results of the mother's transgressions are intensified by those of the father, who, prompted by her example, fails to fulfill his office as true teacher. She alone, we are told, possesses the power to restore him to his duty as educator and legislator, or the embodiment of law that begets men and citizens. Rousseau warns of the remorse in store for the man who fails in his responsibility to train his children to be both. In fine, he declares that a new order can emerge only if both parents watch over the child from birth to manhood. Otherwise, in his belief, lawlessness steals into all hearts to make its way gradually into conduct and undermine at last the foundations of our world.

This dismal picture of the home is reportedly drawn from life and is the antithesis of the myth of the fifth part which is reminiscent of the Letter to d'Alembert and Julie. It is also the antithesis of a delightful evocation of the homeland in the first few chapters of the Considerations upon the Government of Poland, a work in which Rousseau displays considerable empirical skill in applying the principles of the Contract to a hypothetical constitution of Poland. This new tableau, by reflecting every trait of the somber one in reverse, underlines the symbolism of the home in Emile as an image of the city, both being an enlargement of the soul. In the text of the Considerations in question, he urges that order in human affairs can be secured against brutish passions only if it reigns supreme within the hearts of men who are their own most vigilant
watchmen. And it will reign in their hearts most effec­tively, he says, if it prevails in their homeland and if they find in her a good mother who dispenses the simple joys of life that can be shared with others. The order and har­mony he extols would emanate from institutions like those of Moses, the Spartan Lycurgus, and the venerable Numa, whose laws trained men—as does the ideal father in Emile—by creating bonds between them and the home­land. Such bonds included traditions and burdensome for­malities that were an inextricable part of the fiber and fabric of their lives. Those ancient symbolic usages were sanctified by religious associations, by reciprocal devo­tion and the charm of exclusiveness that set men apart and instilled in them a pious concern for the land of home as a prime motive in human behavior. That land, says the writer, christianizing the ideal with lyrical feeling, is like a good and true mother who watches over her children at work and at play and never leaves their side from birth to death, nursing them as a mother should and winning their love for herself and each other. This text with its constant but discreet allusions to Emile adds fresh jus­tification to the broader interpretation of that book openly suggested by Rousseau himself in the fifth part.

The imagery of parental authority in Emile is also So­cratic, even though the Greek sage excludes the image of the family. Speaking of his heroes, the citizens of the re­public, he refers quite freely throughout the book to their country as their “nurse and mother,” as I have said. He refers just as freely to “their father the law.”20 The dif­ference between the two thinkers is that Rousseau is swayed by his emotions and likes to imagine both country and laws as a material possibility—however unlikely—in his precarious dream of idyllic family life.

The parallel of the home or family and the homeland or city is also developed in the second chapter of the Con­tract, “Concerning the First Societies.” The author re­flects upon the family as the most ancient of all societies
and also the most natural in the sense that it is bound together by the natural authority of the father, at least during the minority of children. But even within the miniature city here as in *Emile*, he sees a father's sway restricted to the child's "preservation," which for him is that of the human constitution both physical and spiritual, and the advancement of what he called in the first chapter men's inalienable right to a well-ordered life in society. Moreover, he says clearly what he illustrates later in the novel, namely, that at the age of reason children are free, by the very nature of man, to pursue that goal for their own best advantage and that if they remain subject to the father, they do so voluntarily by some solemn though tacit agreement designed for the same purpose. The implication is that the father is morally bound by some such engagement from the first. The author then draws the obvious analogy: "The family is therefore... the first pattern of political societies: the ruler is the image of the father and the nation is the image of the children, and all born free and equal alienate their freedom only for their own good."²¹

Rousseau's view of paternal authority prevents him from assimilating it to arbitrary monarchical power as many monarchists have done.²² He opposes them in the same chapter of the *Contract*. His conception of a father's rule here as in *Emile* is closer to Socrates' thought and exemplifies the divine right of "natural and political law," which is that of man's entire constitution and lies at the basis of the philosophy of *Emile* and the *Contract*, supposedly ensuring human freedom. Paternal rule as he sees it has nothing in common with absolutism.

In a half facetious, half ironical passage at the end of the chapter he makes light of the pretensions of kings and monarchists. Since he is himself, so he says, a descendant of king Adam and of the emperor Noah, whose sons divided the universe among them, he has as much right as anyone to claim to be the legitimate monarch of the human race. We may infer that every descendant of our common sire
is sovereign and king like his father before him. But the writer adds that Adam was king of the world, as Robinson Crusoe was king of his island, as long as he was the only inhabitant. In that case, since he was king not of the race he was later to father but of the "world" where there was no other inhabitant but himself, he could hardly have exercised his kingship beyond the kingdom that lies within. We are supposed to conclude that his descendants, if they would preserve their birthright, must be rulers of self and make as few claims as possible upon others. If they fail to observe this discretion and self-discipline, the results are presumably such as we have seen in the home: disorders that breed tyranny and slavery first in the soul, then in the miniature city, and finally in the larger one.

According to Rousseau tyranny and slavery in public and private life thwart the best aspirations of nature as visualized in the perfect human pattern of us all. This is the theme of the next two chapters of the Contract, "Concerning the Law of the Strongest" and "Concerning Slavery."

The first one, like the whole treatise as he said at the outset, is directed against the so-called law of the strongest, the law that might is right, which he calls the "established one." In the second Discourse too he contends that it is the law of our society. He now warns that it is no law at all because it frustrates "lawful powers" or faculties that a man is morally bound to respect by the very nature of his being. To discredit it is also the object of Emile, where he rebels against violence masquerading as "justice" and "subordination" and denounces laws devised for the sake of the strong. Socrates' purpose as presented in the Republic is the same. The entire book grows out of his protest that a truly just man cannot harm others and that justice cannot be defined as obedience to laws made in the interests of the stronger. This thesis carries him through to the end where he shows that such "laws" are nothing but lawlessness, and make desire "lord of the
soul” so that individual men are robbed and oppressed and the best elements in them are enslaved to the worst.23

Rousseau’s chapter on slavery complements the other and betrays the same spiritual preoccupations. He begins by saying that all lawful authority (excluding none, not even a father’s) is established through agreements or moral engagements. In that case no such authority can be founded upon slavery—the basis of the anti-society in the second Discourse—since a man of sound mind could hardly consent to renounce everything in exchange for nothing and live in slavery that divests him even of the moral rights and duties belonging to humanity. A state of slavery is incompatible with his nature that endows him with the freedom of will necessary to morality, thereby enabling him to follow his preferences and judgments, make moral decisions, and assume responsibility for his acts. Rousseau denies that slavery can be lawfully established by war as his adversaries said.24 For him a state of war cannot exist among persons either in a hypothetical primitive condition where there is supposedly no reason for enmity or in a true social and moral order where law reigns. War, says he, can exist only among “states” or ideological entities. And in time of war a “just prince” does not rob “individuals” of physical existence or moral life, which depends upon freedom, unless they are caught, arms in hand, intent on robbing others of the same rights. Again he has taken leave of our familiar world where, in his opinion, men live in a perpetual state of war. His thought is akin to that of Socrates, for whom external “warfare” is a symbol of inner conflict. For the Greek sage the real problem is that man is at war with himself, the selfish desires of individuals within us being at strife with spirit and reason called the “guardian” and “just prince” of the soul. All faculties are personified. And his treatment of “individuals” is similar to that prescribed in the Contract. He distinguishes between lawful and lawless ones. The former, limited to necessary desires, must be not enslaved
or plundered but tamed by reason, and only the latter may be constrained by force and dealt with as "barbarians." Rousseau's concept of order is similar to the Socratic one and proceeds, like the master's, from some solemn commitment that can motivate men to cultivate their superior faculties and control the others, bringing all into a single harmony through the most attentive self-direction. The commitment can be no different from the one to which the father is morally bound in Emile as educator of "men and citizens."

A COVENANT OF FRIENDSHIP

Such an engagement is, in the author's belief, the only hope for those who would find happiness amid the vicissitudes of life as it is. He proposes the same solution in both Emile and the Contract.

The exposition of the novel leads very gradually to that solution. He finally introduces the characters, a governor and his disciple. They are not father and son in the biological sense in spite of those impassioned words about the vocation of a father as the child's true teacher. The governor is an ideal creation whose person the author assumes, calling himself Jean-Jacques. In this office he rises above himself, like one of the Socratic kings come to life at last. Possessed of their sublime virtues, he appears as the reason that is friendly to human nature and ministers to its needs. Like the same heroes who forgo all gold and silver for the sake of the diviner metal within, he takes no fee in return for his service. In this respect he also resembles the writer's two masters. Socrates despised contemporary philosophers for exchanging their wares for money, and the evangelical Good Shepherd would not be confused with the hireling. Yet the Rousseauist governor later seems well enough endowed with this world's goods. Small wonder if we are disposed to believe, as we are informed, that he is "more than a man."

[54]
We are further told that not only must he be formed especially for the disciple but so must the whole setting of the story. Thus the author combines the action of the milieu with that of reason to foster and serve human nature. In the sphere of “domestic” education, he is characteristically as preoccupied with the power of environment as Socrates is. The idea that society can make or mar the individual, lead him astray or redeem him, always appears in his work as a Socratic version of eighteenth-century determinism. It is presumably to save men from the fatal influence of contemporary life that Jean-Jacques descends from the famous republic, or Sparta or Rome or the new Geneva, to bring them a safe rule of life and restore them to themselves. But he assumes his task as reluctantly as the Socratic kings, for, like them and unlike the monarchs of this world, he is aware that kingship is a form of ministry to others.

His mission is defined in terms that suggest the conditions of success. He will “conduct” a creature of the writer’s fancy from birth to manhood when, at the end of the book, “the law” sets the hero free. The child, who remains anonymous in the first version until the third part, is now in the definitive version called Emile or Aemilius, a name hardly conferred upon him at random, for Rousseau was convinced with Plato that the name of a thing expresses its nature and may not be arbitrarily chosen. In this case it casts light upon the governor’s intentions. “Emile” means “industrious,” but for the author it has other associations too. He elsewhere conveys his veneration for the “tomb of Cato and the ashes of Aemilius,” the latter being identified as the son of the wise legislator of Rome, Numa Pompilius, from whom the family of the Aemilians, illustrious Roman patriots, was descended. Emile is to be one of them. The governor’s purpose is, we are told, best assured if he is as close as possible in age to his pupil. Moreover, the latter must be his only one and is yet to be born when the book opens. This fact assures Jean-Jacques of making a fresh start, to
build life anew and avoid the pitfalls of the preface in accordance with the teachings of Rousseau’s masters. The Greek sage erases the past and begins with a clean surface by taking only those of ten years of age or younger and training them in the habits and laws of his city. His professed disciple takes even less risk by seeing that Emile is trained from birth in the habits and laws of the Rousseauist order of things.

In fact, Jean-Jacques, like the author’s masters, aims, we are told, to teach nothing but the duties of man, and these include those of the citizen as he sees them, even in the midst of a chaotic world. This aim is closely allied to that of Socrates, who vows, according to the Platonic dialogue, to “leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only... to learn and discern between good and evil.” The Greek thinker ponders the effect of all worldly goods and natural and acquired gifts upon the soul, and selects or excludes them according to their bearing upon justice and virtue. Passages of that kind are akin to Rousseau’s text. So are similar ones from the Sermon on the Mount where the speaker urges his listeners thus: “Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you.” The latter phrase explains why, in spite of Rousseau’s exclusive preoccupation with moral rectitude, Emile is in the end culturally enriched beyond the average, although that is not the present theme. Since Jean-Jacques is, so to speak, the leader of his spirit, he is called his “governor,” and as such he conducts him without instructing him, in accordance with Socratic principles. The term governor is the one applied to Socrates’ noblest heroes, called philosopher-kings in the Republic because they embody man’s highest faculties. This fact adds weight to the suspicion that the Rousseauist ruler is one of them. The term has the added literary advantage of carrying forward the image of the pilot. This is the helmsman (gouverneur) who manages the helm (gouvernail) and steers the vessel of the soul on
its course toward wisdom and happiness. Again he calls
to mind the true steersman in Socrates’ allegory of the
ship of the soul in the guise of the ship of state, who is
guided by “the stars” and has the same goal as he has.

The presentation of Emile follows that of the governor.
He is natural, abstract man of whom we spoke before, ex­
isting within Jean-Jacques, the author himself, and sup­
posedly in all of us. He is said to possess a “common
mind” and to be a very ordinary human being, at least at
first, though not as he grows older and his differing edu­
cation takes effect. Nevertheless, his nature is the well­
favored, felicitous nature of man, instinct with all the
infinite possibilities of growth glimpsed earlier. The habi­
tation chosen for the child contributes to the symbolism of
the figure. This inhabitant of the earth lives in a tem­
perate zone, preferably in France, which Rousseau twice
called “the native land of the human race.” Less under­
standable perhaps than the choice of an abode is the infor­
mation that Emile is rich and highborn. But of course he
is a king, a descendant of king Adam and, as such, shares
in the sovereignty and kingship of the soul, though perhaps
not in the other sovereignty that rightfully belongs to the
common man, according to the author’s persuasions. If
“man is king of the earth,” as he is later called, he has
been divested of that kingship. He has also been defrauded
of his inheritance of which he nevertheless retains moral
possession in the book, even though that may not save
him from starvation. If he also has an inheritance in the
land of his fathers, as the author says of Emile, it would
conceivably be that land itself to which, however, he may
not lay claim. If we interpret the hero’s endowments other­
wise, Rousseau seems determined to bestow upon him all
the privileges that both his masters deemed perilous for
the conduct of human life. In that case he is resolved to
make the exercise of spiritual kingship as difficult as pos­
sible. For such is the destiny to which Rousseauist man is
called, as we have already seen.
At this juncture the nature of the curious society of characters is disclosed. Emile is called an “orphan” to indicate his rather detached relations to his parents according to the flesh, for we soon discover that they are alive. Whether or not he is an orphan in the literal sense is immaterial because he must obey only Jean-Jacques, who is gravely invested with all the rights and duties of the sire and his spouse. We are informed that this is the governor’s only “condition.” But for a man with Rousseau’s ideas on slavery, it necessarily implies volition. This implication is confirmed by the “essential clause” of their association specifying that they must never be separated except with their own consent. Obedience and consent are correlatives. But in the author’s conception Jean-Jacques and Emile regard themselves as so indivisible as to consider their happiness in life together as an object common to them both, providing them with a powerful motive for mutual affection and fidelity. The “essential clause” is therefore the one and only “clause” of the “treaty” that unites them in lifelong friendship.

The “treaty,” as it is specifically termed, gives rise to a number of problems. First, what is the real clue to the riddle of Emile’s orphanhood? Why is Jean-Jacques not his father in every sense rather than only spiritually as minister of the law? The truth is that the author means to accentuate artificial or conventional, social or moral rather than “natural” ties between them, and to portray in a mythical manner his idea of lawful authority, which originates in a spiritual commitment and not in nature even if it fulfills nature’s loftiest designs on man’s behalf. Some recent critics have seen this, but then they explain that the governor is thereby freer than the father would be. But this hardly accords with Rousseau’s view of paternal authority. For him that authority, if it is “lawful,” is no different from any other. From his standpoint Jean-Jacques might well have been the natural father and still served the author’s purpose. But this would have caused ambi-
guity, for many thinkers of the time, failing to understand the true nature of paternal authority, regarded it as the origin and image of monarchic absolutism, as we saw above. Consequently he decided in favor of a conventional relationship. However, Emile, like Socrates' citizens, comes to see himself as bearing a filial kinship to the Rousseauist city and its laws visible in the principles and powers under whose parental authority he is brought up. That is why he and his governor often address one another as "father" and "son." As for the orphan's "parents," they are probably the "semblance of order" and "false laws" of his birthplace, in accordance with the same Socratic image.

The "treaty" or "contract" upon which the governor's authority is based is that upon which the mythical temple of *Emile*, like any other structure, is to be built. This covenant takes the form of friendship that becomes an important leitmotiv in the book to symbolize the contractual quality of the union of the two characters. Indeed, their friendship is called "the most sacred of contracts" and is the foundation of the child's religious faith and the source of all grace in his life. The contract of friendship is also the one that unites Socrates' citizens, for whom "friends have all things in common" and whom he binds together under the guardian and ruler by giving the "wealth or power or persons of the one to the others" to create a "wise order" in "the greatest of states," however small. The Rousseauist covenant of friendship is the same, although the two have never before been compared. It may also be likened to that of the chosen people in the Old Testament. For example, Abraham, we are told, became God's friend by favor of a "covenant of promise" which is the law. The same covenant unites the members of the "mystical body" of Christ or society of the church. The engagement upon which Rousseau's whole novel is based is not unlike the sacred promises of Socratic and Judeo-Christian tradition and envisages an analogous simple,
patriarchal, or evangelical life, comparable to that of his imaginary city.

The comparison is far from inappropriate. There is a certain mysticism or religiosity in the Rousseauist or Aemilian covenant. Jean-Jacques does not contract with Emile as another person, or with Emile's "parents" as some of us have supposed in the past. There is no evidence at all to that effect. He enters the agreement at the moment of his ward's birth. This is a figurative or literary way of saying that the child is literally born of the covenant and is tacitly committed by his very nature to the law of reason that endows him with moral life and is indeed the Socratic father that begets him. Likewise the author in the person of the governor is morally born of the same vow made years before on the way to Vincennes and effective at Montmorency. By this vow he means to break away from a disordered past. The self that is "more than a man," or reasonable will, enters a bond of friendship and agrees to minister to the "Emile" or ideal human prototype within himself and presumably within us all. The fact that, as we were told, the two must be as close in age as is feasible means that this must occur as early as possible. Rousseau contracts with himself under two different forms that appeal to the imagination so that the characters are essentially though not artistically one. At the same time he identifies himself with all mankind and presents the story of his own supposed redemption as an ideal story of the race, since in his eyes the friendship of reason for human nature is the society into which we all are born without exception. Thus he proposes to provide for that self-culture which is the one truly effective force in the cultivation of the species, pledging his faith to a humanistic ideal whose obligations are mythically illustrated and fulfilled in Emile's education. In doing so, he enters into a spiritual communion with what he considers to be the best leaders of the human conscience, among whom he chose Socrates and Christ to be his own. At the
same time he intends to "hand down to posterity a Rousseauist way of life," as Socrates would phrase it; for in following the teaching of his masters, he fully appropriates it to himself.

At the end of *Emile*, Jean-Jacques describes his pledge to the hero: "My young friend, when at your birth I took you in my arms and called upon the Supreme Being to bear witness to the engagement that I dared to contract, and vowed to devote my life to your happiness, did I myself know what engagement I was assuming? No: I only knew that in rendering you happy, I was ensuring my own felicity. By making this useful inquiry for your sake, I made it common to us both." The results of the said inquiry are incorporated not merely into a summary of the *Contract*, which this very passage serves to introduce, but especially into the whole of *Emile* itself, as the wording clearly implies.

In fact, Jean-Jacques' oath in *Emile* is that of the *Social Contract*, with which it has previously been compared but never identified. The purpose of the pledge is stated in the fifth chapter of the *Contract*, entitled "That It Is Always Necessary to Go Back to a First [or fundamental] Covenant." There the author says that a true association of men is born of a common unifying interest to which they adhere freely by an act of total, unanimous commitment. This is exemplified by Emile's governor, who voluntarily takes as the law of his life what he believes to be the interests of human nature, which he regards as identical with his own. He thereby works diligently to win the conscious consent of Emile until the disciple enters the covenant as freely as himself and the two appear as a perfectly integrated whole. With the same idea in mind Socrates defines his object as the common happiness, before formulating the terms of the covenant of friendship.

The covenant is the theme of the sixth chapter of the *Contract*, "Concerning the Social Pact." Rousseau begins by observing once again that men who live according to
instinct find themselves in a state of warfare and that this "primitive state can no longer last," for the race would perish if it did not change its ways. Many political theorists see in his words an evocation of some chaotic prehistoric past. They protest that a contract can be effected only in civil society and that to use it as an explanation of society is to bring forward the effect as an explanation of its cause. This is, of course, true. In spite of his imagery, the author is not speaking of the past, and that is why he uses the present tense. He is referring to what he regards as the primitive ways of present-day anti-society and the prevailing state of civil war in which men actually live, and suggests a mode of deliverance. This interpretation emerges clearly in the light of literary symbols and a collation with Emile, which contrasts external anarchy with what is meant to be the inner harmony of a well-ordered life.

According to the chapter on the pact, men can "preserve themselves" or ensure the integrity of the human constitution by uniting together in peace and friendship and combining their strength to protect the person and property of everyone; but in so doing, each associate must "obey only himself" and remain as free as before. This latter stipulation poses a problem. It implies that there is a hierarchy within the self— that there is a self made to rule and another made to obey, and that their reciprocal action ensures freedom and must not be impeded by the proposed union of powers. The solution advocated by Rousseau is the social contract. Before defining its clauses, he says that they have "perhaps" never been enunciated, though of course they have, by Socrates and biblical writers. Nevertheless, in actuality they have in his view been replaced by the spurious historical contract of slavery regarded in the Discourses as the origin of existing political aggregations. If the lawful one exists, we see no trace of it. It is as much a myth as Socrates' "royal lie" designed to teach men that their country is their mother and their nurse, and that they are all brothers.
This famous ancient lie or "audacious fiction"—to which I alluded in discussing the symbolism of the family—immediately leads the sage to define his object as the common happiness and to formulate the covenant, and is the first of three "waves" that he must overcome to found his city. The author of the Contract, like that of Emile, having approached the pact in the manner of his master, formulates it after the same example. It demands, he says, the total commitment of every "associate" with all his rights, his person, and his power to the supreme direction of the sovereign will in an august communion of the just wherein each one consecrates himself to all as an indivisible part of the whole. The tempting idea that this is a doctrine of "extreme collectivism" simply vanishes in a psychological interpretation of the book, which its affinity with the novel and the Republic requires. It is the doctrine of humanism whereby a man obeys only his own reasonable will or human self instead of his senses and passions or those of other people. The act of association or Socratic friendship in the Contract, like the one in Emile, gives birth, says the writer, to a "moral, collective [or composite] body" and endows it with "unity, a sense of self, a life and a will of its own." The complex social person, visible in Emile in the friendship of its heroes, is here called a "city" or "republic" and "state" or "sovereign power."

According to Rousseau, the moral person, or active thinking being, can alone make men into "citizens" and restore them to their rightful "sovereignty," provided they "subject" themselves to its laws. Thus in the novel Jean-Jacques as citizen of this mythical society shares in its supreme power to whose will he subjects his relationship with Emile in order to play the role of a Socratic king and to secure man's original constitution by serving the true aspirations of nature with respect to the human person as well as property.

The seventh chapter of the Contract, "Concerning Sovereignty," contains more abstract reflections that also find
an outward equivalent in the society of friends in *Emile*. The author of the chapter shows that the act of association or friendship is a reciprocal pledge of the public or moral person with private individuals who do not contract with one another but with themselves, as members of the sovereign toward individuals, and as subjects toward the sovereign. If the sovereign is the enlightened will serving nature's ends, like the Socratic guardian and ruler, then individuals would correspond to individualist desires as they do in the *Republic*. This confirms again the spirituality of Jean-Jacques' engagement in the novel whereby the various elements within him are integrated under the rule of the best. The idea is entirely Socratic.

The author of the *Contract* says further that, although the covenant, including deliberation resulting therefrom, is binding upon individuals in their relations to the sovereign, it cannot bind the latter to himself and could therefore—at least theoretically—be dissolved by him. Consequently, in the novel Jean-Jacques, entering the friendship that unites him with Emile, acknowledges the freedom to dissolve it and thereby makes his act of commitment a truly moral one. But the possibility of dissolution is remote since he has totally identified his own happiness with Emile's, and pursues it as the object of the bond of friendship that he uses to vindicate the purposes of human nature as already defined. As long as he participates in sovereignty, he cannot do otherwise, according to the doctrine of the chapter of the *Contract* under discussion. There we are told that since members of the moral body cannot be hurt without injury to the whole, the sovereign who by definition seeks the latter's advantage can have no interest contrary to theirs. Consequently he need give no guarantee of his engagements toward "subjects." It is said to be impossible that a body would want to harm its own members. We may be tempted to question the logic here and imagine that the sovereign will may indeed choose to harm itself, since in the next part of the book we are told that "if it pleases a nation to hurt itself, who has the right to prevent it?" But in
fact, there is no contradiction between the two texts since a nation’s “pleasure” is not the sovereign will but the slavish caprice of individuals who stray from the pledge to Socratic “divine wisdom” in man and jeopardize the welfare of the entire moral person and human creature. In the novel such caprice is represented as alien to the idealized Jean-Jacques, who remains true to his role as minister or servant of the enlightened will of the society of friends.

The conclusion of the chapter in the *Contract* is consistent with his demand for obedience in the novel, a demand that is logical enough if indeed, in the words of Socrates, “the pilot must steer whether other people like it or not.” The writer declares that since the “private wills” of “individuals”—vagrant desires for gain or power—may conflict with a man’s own will as member of a moral person, whoever refuses to obey the latter will be “forced to be free.” This applies, of course, only to those who choose to honor the humanistic commitment. Thus Emile is constrained, by the persuasive power of friendship that favors his happiness, to obey the reasonable will, born of the promise as he, by his nature and destiny, also is. By learning to obey, he learns to reign in the future kingdom within. In both texts Rousseau teaches not the divine right of the people, as one might think, but the divine right of man, for in theory at least he is a genuine humanist.

The covenant of friendship in *Emile* presupposes, says Jean-Jacques, a “robust constitution.” Since he enters the engagement before the disciple’s birth, the constitution must be that of man, the potential powers of nature that are activated and fostered by the moral force of friendship, as the strength of the city made in man’s image is generated and intensified by a union of men. The stipulation of strength leads to a violent diatribe, comparable with others in the *Discourses*, against the art of medicine as practiced in contemporary society by charlatanical physicians. The outburst is inspired as critics are agreed, by Socrates in the *Republic*. The point we have hitherto over-
looked, however, is that Rousseau's text implies the same distinction between the good and bad physician as the ancient one, and is quite as symbolic as the other where the two are an image of the true and false statesman.\textsuperscript{50} Physicians, warns Jean-Jacques, who doctor disease, and are therefore imposters, make a man "useless to himself and to others," since excessive care of the body makes its demands tyrannical, and inimical to the cultivation of the soul. Like the Greek sage he would avoid doctors who allegedly turn men into cowards and remove them from society and their duties. He will permit no such people—or philosophers or priests either—"to spoil his work," says he, adding that the quest for truth is as fatal as the art of medicine. A man who heeds these warnings will, he affirms, "live more for himself and for others," a familiar phrase used by Socrates to define his object in the \textit{Republic}, as I have observed. The luminous language of this famous passage of \textit{Emile} betrays the underlying symbolism of the book. The protest against physicians, philosophers, and priests "meddling in his work" shows that Jean-Jacques, like both the author's masters, represents all three in another, "truer" form, and means to minister not to disease but to health of body and soul in the manner of the Socratic physician or statesman. His disciple will not go abroad for his law or physic, to cite the sage whose imagery Rousseau adopts not only here but in the \textit{Contract} too. In his opinion the true statesman is like a true physician and uses the most fundamental ordinance of all, that of the covenant, to preserve the human constitution, physical and spiritual, implanted in man at his birth and to prevent disorders from occurring to overthrow the delicate balance of powers. His thought is closely akin to that of Socrates in a passage following the oft-quoted diatribe and accentuating its symbolic value.\textsuperscript{51} The sage declares that it is only charlatans who go about making and mending peoples' laws and lives, doctoring and complicating disorders; whereas the true physician and statesman makes
men sound in body and mind through discipline and austerity of life, and guards against excesses that are the root of all evil in soul or city. In Emile Jean-Jacques, like the Greek master, undertakes to anticipate maladies of body and soul and ensure the robust constitution of faculties that is his primary concern.

With this in mind he transports the child to a country retreat at Montmorency village that was the author's own refuge from the world and whose simplicity and rusticity of character are comparable to those of his ideal city. Emile and his governor live there for a dozen years or more. Indeed, the setting of the whole work is rural life, except for the second half of the third part and the end of the fourth. The two friends reside in the cottage of a nurse who is intended to typify the blessings of that life still possible today. She is described as healthy in body and heart, a countrywoman of country-grown habits. At her side the "tender plant" springs up in a not unfavorable soil. True, we are still in actual society; but its flaws are less visible and more readily concealed by the governor, who constantly provides against the spectacle of coarseness and vulgarity.

The choice of a rustic scene represents a compromise for Rousseau, who is unwilling to withdraw the child altogether from our familiar world, as many of us in the past have thought that he did. To paraphrase his preface, the good he proposes is here allied, not with existing evil, but with whatever traces of beauty and goodness he is able to discover in the world about him. His reverence for the country and naïve faith in its felicitous moral effects are, of course, characteristic of the modern spirit. These qualities, which also link him with the pastoral poets of antiquity, distinguish him from his Greek master. Socrates had no illusions at all about the country. On the contrary, he sends all persons over ten years of age into that uncivilized place which matches their fierce natures, and then educates the remainder in his city. Jean-Jacques takes
the opposite course with Emile, for whom the country is the setting of an image of the Rousseauist city visible in the society of the hero and his governor.

In that simple bucolic scene the hero’s life unfolds, much as the author’s spiritual life unfolded in the same place, or so he says. In the book the governor, who has already professed to teach only the duties of man and citizen and nothing else, is solicitous for both physical strength and personal cleanliness, for he sees a moral and spiritual advantage in bodily health. Accordingly Rousseau protests once more, though in a less sweeping symbol, against swaddling clothes that trammel both body and soul. He would allow the organs and faculties to expand to the fullness of their powers as he enacted in the beginning, in order that nature’s highest purposes may be fulfilled in the disposition of human and social life.

Broaching the story of Emile’s evolution, he again visualizes the spiritual ascent that is the subject of the book as it is that of the Contract, and he does so in words that are echoed at this point in the latter. His object in the two cases is to describe the advantages of the covenant, and both texts are evocative of Socratic and Judeo-Christian tradition.

In Emile he proceeds from the aforementioned starting point, the monstrous image of unintegrated man, in order to trace in his own experience and allegorically in the hero’s the natural genesis of humanity gradually emerging from a “primitive state of ignorance and stupidity” toward a future full of unlimited possibilities for the liberation and expansion of human powers. In the Contract he contemplates the same spiritual ascent at the beginning of the penultimate chapter of the first part, “Concerning the Civil State.” He will show, he says, how a “stupid and ignorant animal” may be transformed into an intelligent being, a man, and he uses the language of the novel to describe the transition from instinct to morality and justice. He imagines how the impulses and appetites of an
unintegrated creature are gradually replaced by the voice of rights and duties through the counsel of reason guiding the inclinations, with the result that human faculties are exercised and developed, ideas are expanded, and feelings ennobled. This is also the theme of the Republic where Socrates' heroes are "compelled" to emerge from darkness and imprisonment (that is, ignorance and slavery) in an underground den, "reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent," and "forced into the presence of the sun himself" in "the upper world." The same theme is also biblical, suggestive of the chosen people led from the "house of bondage" toward the promised land under the guidance of great lawgivers and educators like Moses and Christ, whom Rousseau admired as such.

The idea that integration into a perfect moral and social framework can alone save the human constitution is entirely in accordance with the spirit of Rousseau. It is to be found even in the second Discourse, which contains the famous but enigmatic picture of the serene savage. In that work the life of hypothetical natural man in an indigenous state is called simply "amoral" and "not unhappy." This is in conformity with the Socratic idea that moral powers, pictured in the Republic as "soldiers" and "rulers," are called into action only to purge an unhealthy state, but not at the origins of society. Rousseau has the same idea in the Discourse. It must be admitted, of course, that in that work man's "amoral" and "not unhappy" condition appears idyllic by comparison with the author's tableau of modern anti-social and uncivil life wherein people are perpetually embroiled in a state of civil war. But in the dedication of that work as in Emile and the Contract, we are supposed to see how vastly superior to both is the life of natural man in the Rousseauist order of wisdom and happiness.

In the last two chapters of this part of the Contract, where the benefits of the covenant are more specifically set forth, the author acknowledges the difficulties of the projected ascent. In the penultimate one, which I broached
above, he warns that progress from the prevailing instinctive state to his ideal order that pretends to preserve intact the spirit of natural man in society is possible only if the two advantages implied in the covenant itself are in fact assured. They are freedom and property, and are intended to safeguard physical and moral life, which is the whole purpose of the pact. He explains that natural freedom, which is necessarily limited by an individual’s strength, must give place to civil liberty exercised under the direction of the sovereign will. He adds that the unlimited right to all a man covets and can get by force and first occupancy must be replaced by the ownership of what a man really possesses. The question of liberty is handled in this chapter, and property in the next.

In discussing the value of civil liberty, he observes that the civil state also affords moral freedom and that this alone makes one really “master of himself,” a phrase that occurs in the same context of Emile, as we shall see in a moment. Moral freedom, he says, is that of one “who obeys the law he has prescribed for himself,” meaning one in whom desire obeys the enlightened will. He calls this the “philosophical” or, as we say, psychological meaning of the word. But it is really a definition of civil freedom in his own city, where a man obeys only himself. In other words, the difference between civil and moral liberty is that the former would exist in the external world in an imaginary and impossible ideal order, whereas the latter would obtain exclusively in a just soul or communion of just souls and would be the only course open to men in our chaotic society. And so he says that moral freedom is not his subject in the Contract, where the city is figuratively or allegorically exteriorized. But in the same text he implies without any irony whatsoever that such freedom may compensate less fortunate men than the free men of his city for the loss of both natural and civil liberty too, since in actuality, as he sees it, both forms of freedom are replaced by civil servitude. His real preoccu-
pation is the moral or spiritual liberation of all potential faculties that enables men to perform their natural functions, overcome external obstacles, and reach the "rational idea of perfection and happiness" proposed at the outset.

In accordance with these principles, the training of Emile's will begins at birth with sensorial education. The experience he undergoes is reminiscent of that of Socrates' prisoners as they first appear in the lowest sphere of the underground den. The Rousseauist governor regulates the child's sensations of pleasure and pain with a view to preventing him from being fettered by habit or enslaved to new and false needs. He thereby follows the recommendations of the author's projected work on Sensitive Morality, described in the ninth book of the Confessions. He applies these rules to teach Emile to reign as "master of himself" and "to do his will as soon as he has one," fostering in his soul vague notions of the freedom and equality of the Aemilian city. Numerous and varied sense impressions of objects and animals too are used to make him intrepid in the presence of the unknown. The same sensations presented in a suitable, logical order also serve to cultivate his perceptive powers. For the early education of the senses anticipates, however remotely, not only the action of will but the exercise of reason too, long before either one has begun to wake from the drowsy sleep of childhood.

This education of the receptive and perceptive powers is accompanied by an awakening of the child's capacities for expression that grow in proportion as his needs increase. The delicate question of need brings us to the second advantage of the covenant without which the spiritual ascent of both books would be threatened. This is the one that safeguards physical life, substituting property, regulated by the sovereign will, for the lawlessness of desire. Property is the theme of the last chapter of the first part of the Contract, which can be best understood if it is read in the context of Emile.
The chapter on property is entitled "Concerning the Real Domain [or Property]," as opposed to the personal domain of freedom. It has shocked many of us. The same writer who fiercely vilifies private property in the second Discourse here gravely discusses it as a right, protected by the sovereignty. However, in all fairness we must admit that in the Discourse of 1754 he is attacking not the institution itself but what he considers to be a scandalous abuse of it. On the other hand, in the Contract he presents it in a fair and noble form, such as might exist in a perfect world of perfect beings or in the kingdom within some exalted spirit of well-ordered life. But even if we failed to understand the mythical character of his city, we should hardly be justified in concluding that he subjects property rights to the sovereign or enlightened will for the purpose of favoring a tyrannical form of collectivism. The very idea is contrary to the spirit of Rousseau and the Contract.

The property rights he defends are not, as some of us might think, based upon the "right" of first occupant authorized by work and cultivation. They are based upon the needs of life. Indeed, he shows the fallacy of the so-called right defined above when he says that the sovereign, in relation to other states, has no other claim over the territory it occupies except that of the first occupant. He intimates that this is no claim at all. He explains that it becomes one only through the establishment of property in its natural form based primarily upon need, a fundamental condition illustrated in Emile from the first and supplemented later by other conditions, especially work. A key passage in the Contract reads: "Every man has a natural right to what is necessary to him." Contrary to what we have long believed, property is indeed for Rousseau a natural right if the indispensable qualification is met. He adds that the positive act or law that makes a man the proprietor of such goods as he needs to live excludes him from all the rest. This, he says, is why the right of first occupant is honored in civilized society. The reason is that in such an
ideal society it is restricted to need. He adds: "The right of first occupant cannot be extended beyond need and work." In his view the claims of labor without need do not suffice. As he says in the second Discourse, why should a man appropriate the fruits of his efforts if he exceeds his needs at the expense of other people's? In that case the human race goes wanting, and men like Emile in the end are robbed of a dwelling place on earth and the blessings of the soil that nature bestows upon all. In his own city, on the other hand, property, based upon a natural right to the necessities of life, is subordinate to the sovereign will, which ensures the fidelity of subjects to their promises by confirming that right as lawful. To make his meaning doubly clear, he adds that, if men are in the process of forming a union (as in the case of the Aemilian city or that of the Contract), then they have a right to occupy only the amount of land sufficient to provide for the needs of all. He explains that property in this form replaces natural inequality of strength and intelligence by moral and lawful equality. But he admits in a footnote that the cities of the earth are otherwise. His meaning is further accentuated when he concludes by saying that the social state is advantageous to men only as long as all of them have something and no one has too much. Thus if property provides all men with the necessities of life, he regards it as a lawful institution endorsed by the enlightened will. So does Socrates, whose heroes are confined to need from the first and whose "man of understanding" finally regulates his own property to provide against disorder in the city within him, such as might arise either from superfluity or from want. But no nation will ever do likewise, and Rousseau knows it. His city is an allegorical one meant as a pattern of a harmonious life. Consequently in the Contract there is no question at all of distributive action on the part of an autocratic state, as one might imagine, but only of self-control in a few rare souls. In fine, in the matter of property he holds out no hope for the poor
and the oppressed, as he does in the case of liberty. Moral freedom is possible even under a despotism. So is moral equality, which does not, however, prevent a man from starving to death. To say this is to anticipate the conclusion of Emile where the hero, faced with a choice between freedom of spirit and the needs for which our society allegedly makes no provision, chooses liberty as the better part and is ready to die for it if he must.

The principles of the *Contract* providing for freedom and the necessities of life, or Rousseauist property, are those of Emile's governor in responding to the child's needs. The latter are expressed by cries and gestures, or tears if needs go unfulfilled. The author sees tears rather than cries of joy as "the first link in the long chain" of the social order since it is to the former that men respond most readily through pity or sympathy. If that order corresponds to the one illustrated in the relations of governor and child in the book, then the "chain" is regarded as a bond of friendship. Emile is gradually being enmeshed in it and prepared for the author's idea of a happily constituted life that later takes shape as a shrine of the soul or fortress of the city. That life is foreshadowed here. When the infant feels some need and pleads for help, the governor satisfies the need if possible; but if not, he forbears to brutalize the child and offend its inborn sense of justice or even to act at all, since in his opinion such is the way of nature and of order. Moreover, in providing for needs, he never exceeds the bounds of physical necessity or yields to unreasonable desires that would violate the same concept of order even before his ward is aware that it exists. He limits himself further by ministering only to needs with which the child cannot cope alone. The latter is left free to do so, in order that his physical strength may be as far as is possible the extent of his desires, and his claims upon others reduced to a minimum. These rules are elementary applications of what is meant by liberty.
and equality in the two chapters of the Contract just
discussed.

The governor adheres dispassionately to them even when
Emile develops facility of speech. Far from being solici-
tous, he attends only to words perfectly articulated and
responding to the restricted realities of a young life.
In doing so, he continues to confine his action to neces-
sity that gave birth to the Aemilian city and that of the
Contract. It is likewise the mother of Socrates' “inven-
tion,” as the great sage himself says.

The reader is by now aware of the value of the Republic
for an understanding of the interrelationship of Rousseau’s
two books. The first part of both contains elements scat-
tered throughout the great classic from the beginning al-
most to the end. The author’s description of the ideal city
in the opening pages of Emile and his tribute to the Pla-
tonic dialogue were priceless clues. But even more reveali-
ing was the imagery: the image of the educator as hus-
bandman and pilot come to the aid of men hampered in
their growth and frustrated by currents contrary to their
nature: and the image of the bands from which he frees
them to place them under the parental care of their mother
who is the city and their father who is the law. For like
Socrates, Rousseau in both books is stirred to action by
“false” laws, made in the interests of the stronger and
creating tyranny and slavery, and is thereby motivated to
go in search of the true law of justice. Like the master he
finds it in the covenant of friendship that frees its par-
ticipants from charlatanical statesmen, portrayed as sham
physicians and philosophers, and that allows men to live
for themselves and for others as well. And again like the
sage he envisages a spiritual ascent made possible by
that law which bids a man obey his highest faculties and
confine the desires to bare necessities.

We are now prepared to move upward to the second part
of the temple foundation or understructure of the city. As
Socrates' prisoners rise from the lowest to the highest of four spheres of human knowledge, so do the friends of the Aemilian city or freemen of the Contract. And just as *Emile* and its appendix are linked and interlocked in the first phase, so they are in the second and its sequels. Both works are expressive of the same idealism in personal or social life. This parallelism is Rousseau's most powerful and eloquent plea against the alleged actual cleavage between man's inner disposition of himself and the conduct of his affairs in social and civil life. The same parallelism also brings out the distinguishing mark of *Emile* where an intellectual formula is translated into mythical terms through attractive situations and characters that make a powerful appeal to the mind through the medium of the imagination.

1. Although Rousseau calls the divisions of *Emile* and the *Contrat social* "books," I have found it easier to refer to them as "parts" in order to avoid ambiguity in my own text. Moreover, since the collation follows the order of Rousseau's text, page references to the two works are given only if passages are cited out of context.


7. Yet in his opinion a man must be a citizen: "Emile," pp. 262, 469, 655, 667, 669, and throughout the fifth part. For the "passing greeting," mentioned above, see J.S. Spink in *O.C.*, 4:lxxxiii.

8. *C.C.*, 5:241-42, letter to Tronchin, 26 November 1758 (reply to Tronchin's letter of 13 November, ibid., pp. 219-21). Cf. *O.C.*, 4:xlii-lxxviii, 248 n. 4. In "Considérations" he says that public education is possible only for free men. He means that in an ideal city, where laws would prevail instead of indi-
viduals, the education of public opinion could be combined with formation within the family since in such a case opinion would be true. But in his view this is not so in our society, whose public educational institutions he deplores. R. Grimsley suggests that he does so because he was deprived of “regular studies”: J.-J. Rousseau: A Study in Self-awareness (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1961), p. 39.

9. He promised in the preface to do what is best for men themselves and others too.


11. “Emile,” pp. 378-79, 459, 550, 762, 860. Rousseau differentiates between the natural object (the human constitution as it is organized) and the natural means (instinct that cannot be trusted in social life). He distinguishes between the instinctive individualist who must be disciplined and the human self which is his whole object and which, in the Socratic manner, he calls “divine” or “the divine in man.”


13. “Emile,” pp. 699-700. Cf. dedication of the second “Discours” and the text itself in O.C., 3:119-20, 168. For the influence of Christianity on Rousseau’s view of the family, see “Emile,” p. 739. Burgelin sees that the family is a little city founded upon a contract and having its own laws and moral code but without viewing it as an artistic image of its larger counterpart: O.C., 4:cl.

14. “L’homme est né libre, et par-tout il est dans les fers.” Cf. Emile: “L’homme civil nait, vit et meurt dans l’esclavage: à sa naissance on le coud dans un maillot; à sa mort on le cloue dans une bière: tant qu’il garde la figure humaine il est enchaine par nos institutions.” Broome and Burgelin connect the two outburst: J. H. Broome, op. cit., p. 81: Burgelin, O.C., 4:253 n.3. The latter also sees that swaddling clothes are a symbol of human destiny, but he expounds the whole passage literally rather than figuratively.

15. O.C., 3:352 n. 3. (erroneously marked n.2).


21. “La famille est donc... le premier modèle des sociétés politiques; le chef est l’image du père, le peuple est l’image des enfants, et tous étant nés égaux et libres n’aliènent leur liberté que pour leur utilité.”

ROUSSEAU'S SOCRATIC AEMILIAN MYTHS


24. For example, Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf. For Socrates' ideas on "warfare" described below, see The Republic 5.469-71. Cf. 8.554; 9.571-72, 575.
26. See chapter 1 above and The Republic 3. 405-8; 4. 426; 6. 501; 7. 540. For the reference to Aemilius, see "De la patrie," loc. cit., p. 535. For Rousseau's interest in names and their meaning see "Essai sur l'origine des langues," especially the end of chapter 4. There he refers to Plato's views on the subject in the dialogue, the Cratylus. For explanations of the hero's name see L.P. Shanks, "A Possible Source for Rousseau's name 'Emile.'" Modern Language Notes 17 (April 1927): 243-44; P.D. Jimack, La Genese et la redaction de l'Emile de J.-J. Rousseau (Geneva: Institut et musee Voltaire), p. 191; and Burgelin in O.C., 4:265 n. 1. Sources suggested are La Bruyère and Plutarch.
27. For the reference to Aemilius, see "De la patrie," loc. cit., p. 535. For Rousseau's interest in names and their meaning see "Essai sur l'origine des langues," especially the end of chapter 4. There he refers to Plato's views on the subject in the dialogue, the Cratylus. For explanations of the hero's name see L.P. Shanks, "A Possible Source for Rousseau's name 'Emile.'" Modern Language Notes 17 (April 1927): 243-44; P.D. Jimack, La Genese et la redaction de l'Emile de J.-J. Rousseau (Geneva: Institut et musee Voltaire), p. 191; and Burgelin in O.C., 4:265 n. 1. Sources suggested are La Bruyère and Plutarch.
29. The Republic 4. 445; 7. 520, 540. The Pléiade editor, who also compares Jean-Jacques with the Socartic philosophers, sees him as the embodiment of wisdom, of the impersonality of law and reason (4:263 n. 3) or the reasonable will (p. 319 n. 2); cf. p. 343 n. 1; see also pp. 362 n. 2, 539 n. 1, 639 n. 1, 652 n. 1, 661 n. 1, 789 n. 1, 1,866 n. 1. Cf. pp. cxii-cix, cxxvii, cxxx-cxxxi. However, he does not distinguish between the governor and the lawgiver as do Plato and Rousseau. Cf. Broome, op. cit., p. 95; and Crocker, Rousseau's Social Contract: An Interpretive Essay (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1968), p. 26.
30. "Lettre à m. Philopolis" (1755), O.C., 3:235; and "Les Prisonniers de guerre" (1743), O.C., 2:870.
31. Regarding the kingship of Emile or of man, see "Emile," pp. 423, 458, 469, 471, 582, 583, 665. For his wealth, p. 691.
32. See pp. 325-26, 358, 379, 434, 470, 505.
33. See, for example, O.C., 4:cxxx, 268 n. 1.
37. The Republic 2. 375-76; 3. 402; 4. 423. There Socrates conceives the contract exactly as Rousseau does.
39. See, for example, O.C., 4:lxxxvi-lxxxvii.
40. Rousseau insists that this agreement—the basis of self-education—occur as early as possible.

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41. The Republic 10. 600. For the identification of Jean-Jacques, Emile, and the author, see "Emile," pp. 633-34, 772, 820, 858. The book contains many traces of the author's own experiences and anticipates the "Confessions" in pages inspired by his life at Bossey and Turin; his pedestrian expeditions; his joy and disillusionment at Annecy and Chambéry; the idyll of the Charmettes, however chastened; his tutorships at Lyons and Paris; the Venetian interlude; the tragic events of his sojourn in the French capital; and his retreat to Montmorency.


43. See, for example, O.C., 4:649 n. 1.


50. O.C., 4:269 n. 3. For the parallel between Rousseau’s attack on doctors and Plato’s, see, for example, ibid., n. 2. The image of the physician-statesman recurs in "Contrat social," pt. 1, chap. 3 at end.

51. The Republic 4. 425-26, and cf. 7. 536; 8. 564, 567.

52. See, for example, O.C., Pléiade, 4:xciv-xcvi, cv-cvi, cix-cxi, 550 n. 1.


54. This has been suggested on the basis of the garden scene in "Emile," pt. 2. See O.C., 4:330 n. 1, and cf. 331 n. 1 and 688 n. 2. But the symbols
seem to indicate that there the child comes into brutal contact with the disorders of actuality, contrasted with the order and justice of the Aemilian city taking shape within the soul. See chapter 2 below.


56. Regarding “private” property, Socrates removes possession from the rule of desire and places it under that of the highest powers.