In *Emile* and the *Social Contract* the same meticulous preparations are made before the temple or citadel begins to take shape. Just as the genesis of both structures can be traced to a single commitment, so the foundations of both are laid in an identical rigorously disciplined formation, subject to the same canons or laws for the ultimate fulfilment of that engagement. The evolutionary character of the *Contract*, hitherto unrecognized, is heavily emphasized in the second part. One of the advantages of a collation with *Emile* is to accentuate this. The term *stylobate* is suited to convey the idea of an evolutionary process, and in fact might well be applied to the first three parts of both works. It is properly used of the triple-tiered foundation from which the pillars of the Greek temple arise. Since it comes from two Greek words meaning "pillar" and "to walk," it is suggestive of the stability of eternal principles and the progressive dynamic movement of life toward their fulfillment.

The second part of both books is devoted to the relationship of happiness to wisdom and law. We have not previously seen that such is the theme of this part of *Emile*, but a collation of this kind leaves no room for doubt on the subject. It shows that there the novel has two main divisions and it reveals clearly the real nature of each. It proves that the first division sets forth the basic principles of Rousseauist education, the virtues to be fostered in the soul and the laws needed to ensure them, and it discloses thereby that this section of the book contains the substance of the entire second part of the *Contract* and for that reason is necessarily the most theoretical. It
ROUSSEAU'S SOCRATIC AEMILIAN MYTHS

proves further that the second division of the same part of the novel depicts a type of education governed by the laws of the first and calculated to produce the virtues defined therein. Indeed, the great value of a collation here is that it leads to an understanding of the plan and purpose of the pedagogical work at this critical point and a realization that the second part of both treatises, and not merely the Contract, is in fact the book of the law.

IN SEARCH OF SOPHIA OR THE LAWS OF WISDOM

This part of Emile traces the child's development from the moment he becomes conscious of his own identity until he reaches the age of ten or twelve years. When it opens, he has just learned to speak and walk, at the cost of a few bruises and as many tears that provide lessons in courage. As soon as a sense of self awakens, the child becomes a moral being capable of happiness or unhappiness, whereupon Jean-Jacques phrases the familiar questions raised repeatedly throughout the book: “What then is human wisdom? Where is the path of true happiness?” Here as in all his work Rousseau links the pursuit of wisdom and felicity. The “wisdom” he professes to “love”—these two words being English equivalents of “philosophos”—can alone bestow that bounty in his eyes. This means that the governor is already in search of “Sophia,” or wisdom, who is to become the bride of Emile and to whom the temple of the soul is dedicated.

The bliss promised in Emile and the Contract is a state, both present and permanent. In the author's opinion, as expressed in the novel, to sacrifice the here and now to some receding future is as much a travesty of wisdom as to jeopardize the future for the sake of some fleeting pleasure of the moment. Hence Emile's governor protests against contemporary teachers of youth who fix their eyes always on the morrow, crushing boyish spirits with an intolerable yoke of tasks and duties that cast a shadow over the lighthearted world of childhood and may turn out to
be either useless or harmful. He denounces the "false wisdom" of men who ignore the present for the sake of what may never be in the event of changing circumstances or premature death. On the other hand, he makes it clear that the happiness for which he pleads precludes a licentious and spoiled child. Obviously in *Emile*, as in the appendix, he envisages the greatest possible felicity that the present moment holds in store for the future.

In his view the nature of happiness depends upon the nature of the being destined to enjoy it, which is the "Emile" within us or human self more or less intensely felt in the hearts of all men. He explains: "Let us not forget what suits our human condition. Humanity has its place in the order of things; childhood has its place in the order of human life; the man must be treated as a man and the child as a child. Give to each one his place and keep him there. Control human passions according to man's constitution. That is all we can do for his happiness." In other words, the natural organization of the human constitution and faculties must be respected and taken as the boundary of a man's life at each phase in his growth. More precisely, the writer exhorts men to restrain desires that exceed their real faculties, and are therefore "imaginary" or unreasonable, and to maintain a balance between the two. The object of this rule of conduct is to activate the will that matches human powers and is therefore reasonable, and to give it mastery over the soul so that the latter may be "rightly ordered" and "at peace" with itself. For such is the author's concept of the normal hierarchy existing within us. Rousseauist happiness is consequently achieved by establishing well-balanced moral relationships among the component parts of a man's nature as he evolves in the process of formation, thereby bringing him into ever closer conformity with the perfect human prototype of us all. As we were told in the beginning that felicity demands the fulfillment of the natural constitution, taking account of the gradual expansion of forces called into play in three
successive stages marked respectively by the need for what pleases, suits, and perfects us. It connotes a general completeness of life—what Socrates calls "the fullness of all that life needs"—regarded as the aim of all true education and legislation.

Yet the author defines happiness here and throughout the book with Stoic or Spartan austerity as health, strength, and a good conscience, all of which are to be found within the self. Fortunately he explains what these ingredients entail for one who, in his search for felicity, refuses to separate it from wisdom and professes to be concerned only with the duties of man. Strength is for him the ability to exercise our resources in order to provide for true needs without being tormented by useless cravings that ultimately lead us far beyond our reach. Health is not simply physical well-being as "false wisdom" teaches, but moral and spiritual well-being as well, including the ability to accept pain and death with equanimity by making good use of our faculties in dealing with the here and now. In Socratic terms it is the institution of a natural order and government in the various parts of both body and soul to ensure a well-ordered life in the present that is also a promise for the future. As for conscience, he sets the matter aside for the moment. But the definition of health and strength already encompasses man's total being that is necessarily the rampart and rule of his life.

Using Stoical language, Rousseau calls his rule the "harsh law of necessity," as he did in Julie; but, since obedience and consent are correlatives, it inevitably leads him into a discussion of freedom implied in the definition of happiness. For harsh though it is, it liberates the human will and reason and all human powers necessary for the preservation of life both physical and moral. This perpetual liberation of the faculties that enables them to do what is considered to be their own natural work and act harmoniously in constant adjustment to each other unimpeded by slavish desire is precisely what he means by
freedom. The man who does his will, says he, is the one who can do it without making claims upon others and thereby enjoys freedom, the first of all life's goods without which happiness as already defined is impossible. Consequently the author formulates his fundamental principle of education, or, if we wish, legislation, in these terms: "The really free man wills only what he can do and does what he pleases." This maxim anticipates the law of freedom that is a correlative of the law of necessity. He adds that all other rules flow from it. Of course this must be so, since like the other it is the law of the human constitution, which for him is that of happiness. It reappears in similar words in a defense of the *Contract* contained in the *Letters from the Mount*, where it is adapted to the city-state, "the sovereign nation that wills of its own accord and of its own accord performs its will." The implication is that such a nation is happy. Here as in *Emile* felicity consists in the exercise of freedom of spirit, the free interplay of human endowments however confined, employed according to their natural hierarchy under the rule of the enlightened will, or rather, under the law of necessity.

Rousseau's obsession with the disciplined human will as the secret of wisdom and happiness in the novel is, of course, matched in the *Social Contract*. The importance attributed to the development of that faculty in the child so that he can ultimately participate in moral life is reflected in the first three chapters of the analogous part of the handbook on citizenship, where the Socratic similitude of city and soul becomes increasingly visible. The first chapter contends "that sovereignty is inalienable." Since the general will alone, as opposed to wayward desire, can direct the strength of the state toward a common happiness, sovereignty, says the author, resides only in the exercise of the will thus defined and can never be alienated; and the sovereign, who is a composite moral being, can be represented only by himself. Power can be transferred but not will. He explains why. A "private"
will, or that of an individual, naturally has exclusive preferences; but the general will always tends to equality, since by definition it seeks the happiness of the entire moral person in which all parts share alike, according to their nature. That happiness is threatened by tendencies to partiality that indulge one part at the expense of another. In Rousseau’s view such tendencies are fostered by the modern political idea of representatives and contemporary theories of monarchy that he regards as immoral because they deprive the composite person of freedom of will and self-mastery. A nation, he concludes, that promises unconditional obedience loses its moral life and ceases to be a nation. In that case it is like the soul of a man who, by surrendering his moral freedom, divests himself of inner life. For as we have seen, within the composite creation of the soul the enlightened will must continually guard against individualist desires that would enslave it. The chapter on the inalienability of sovereignty is full of spiritual implications. So is the next one, which is closely related to it and is entitled “That the Sovereignty Is Indivisible.” Again alluding to kings and representatives, he explains that sovereignty cannot be divided into individual rights and powers, whether they are vested in a single person or body, or in several. The reason given is that all powers are subordinate to the one they serve to consummate. And since that is a moral one, it may not be divided any more than it may be alienated, although it may, of course, be shared.

It might be useful to show briefly how these ideas are applied in *Emile*. There sovereignty belongs to the moral being formed by the two characters. It is visible in the friendship of reason for human nature, which is nothing else but the enlightened will. Until Emile’s formation is complete, the governor enforces that will which favors the human constitution and he opposes the private and personal interests of one or another part that wars against it. But the power assigned to him as governor is not for
that reason a portion of sovereignty, even though its bearer also shares in the supreme authority. It is a ruling power used to nurture the sovereign faculty in the disciple and bind him to an ideal communion of men who know what sovereignty is and how to wield it.

Rousseau reaffirms his faith in human nature when he discusses the object of the will in the next chapter of the Contract, entitled "Whether the General Will Can Err." He begins by asserting that it is "always right" and always aspires to the common happiness, although his ultimate intention is to show that unfortunately the deliberations of men do not necessarily possess the same rectitude. "We always will our good," says he alluding to the supreme faculty, "but we do not always see it." In defending man's essential integrity, he is not thinking exclusively of distinguished spirits consciously pledged to his own city or to the pursuit of perfection, an ideal present in mankind in varying degrees of intensity. He believes that all men without exception naturally will their "good," which is, as he has said, what suits the orderly human constitution, its powers, their proper functions, and balanced relationships. Curiously enough the idea has been translated into the doctrine of the natural or spontaneous goodness of man, which has, by some strange twist of fate, become associated with the name of Rousseau. I say "strange" even though he obviously rejects the dogma of original sin, which, he says, does not explain the sin of Adam. But even so, he does not believe in spontaneous goodness. In his eyes, as we know, primitive man is amoral, and his modern counterpart is immoral and the cause of all evil. It was other eighteenth-century authors who imagined that men were spontaneously good and needed only to follow their instincts to live rightly even in our society. Rousseau's idea of natural goodness is rather akin to that of Socrates and the Stoics, who also teach that moral goodness conforms with human nature in its pristine purity, although it would be impossible for modern men with their distorted
instincts to attain to the fulfillment of the human constitution without the strenuous and harmonious concurrence of all faculties both physical and spiritual and their careful and constant adjustment to each other and to the whole. That is why the author of *Emile* begins education by providing for the training of the will through the guidance of reason.

In the chapter of the *Contract* under consideration the threat of capricious desires and illusions is treated in the same manner as it is in the novel. According to the writer men who naturally will the good are led astray both by faulty judgement and the seductions of private affections. The result is that the general will may conceivably not be the will of all. But he is convinced that in the case of "citizens," the enlightened will emerges from a conflict of personal preferences and passions balanced against each other. However, he admits that this would not be so in the case of members of disordered states where partial interests are collective and can hardly be counterbalanced by individuals. Indeed, he warns that such tyrannical elements, particularly those that are akin to one another, if allowed to grow numerous and powerful, soon overthrow the moral person. The only solution he feels is to weaken their influence by preventing them from uniting with one another. In the eighth and ninth books of the *Republic* Socrates utters the same warning against the complicity of tyrannical elements in a disordered city or soul and proposes the same solution. Moreover, in the case of "citizens," he too recommends the ordering and harmonizing of irrational principles to release human powers. That is the educator's great problem in *Emile*.

The chapter just discussed has provoked the wrath of Rousseau's critics, and in a sense understandably so. They protest that his unanimous, harmonious being is a product of intolerance, and they suspect that his real purpose is to subdue opponents of majority rule and get rid of political parties. However, he does not say that he trusts the majority or even unanimity in any society
indiscriminately, any more than he would trust good to prevail in any man. He made that clear at the beginning of the chapter. Of course, he would do so in a well-ordered city made up of “citizens” of well-ordered life as long as they remain true to themselves so that good and necessary feelings directed by reason prevail over all others. But in a disordered anti-society like ours made up mainly of disordered men, he says that the majority would inevitably overthrow the moral being, in which case he would be intolerant of the multitude and sympathize with the wise man who takes refuge from its madness. Moreover, he knows as well as anyone that if his own city were indeed a political entity, virtue would be, as Socrates says, a matter of habit or necessity, and this he neither expects nor desires. He is simply describing an ideal order to be taken as a rule of life, and the issues at stake are moral and spiritual rather than “political” in the sense in which his critics use the term. In the present instance he throws light upon the proper or normal organization of the human constitution as he sees it and illustrates the action of the supreme will for the good that is supposed to foster and cultivate simple moderate desires and prevent the others from growing. The will can perform this function in a well-ordered life, but in any other it can hardly tame the wildness of passion. In its action it may well be guilty of intolerance. But the intolerance favored is that of a man who insists upon allaying inferior elements within himself and mastering them in order that they may be ruled by the naturally superior ones. Any other interpretation would be contrary to the spirit of Rousseau’s work.

To revert to the corresponding context of Emile, he there proceeds to wrestle with the problem of the passions and illustrates the value of his “fundamental maxim” of necessity and freedom to cope with the great plagues of tyranny and slavery engendered by them. Returning to the themes that inspired him in the beginning, he again denounces the so-called law of the strongest and the warfare
that enslaves, and describes each of these within the state and the family in accordance with the analogy already drawn between them. First, society in its present form robs us of our strength and resources by subjecting us not to true laws, acts of the sovereign will and our own, but to the arbitrary decrees of powerful factions in our midst. Likewise, in the little society of the family, parents subject to their own petty whims the limited capacities of a child who can hardly fend for himself. Second, the great society in its present form, instead of taming men’s restless impulses, fosters and multiplies them, thereby weakening its victims still more, making them slaves of self as well as of others. Similarly, in family society, foolish and indulgent parents flatter the caprices of a child, making it as dependent as a slave and imperious as a tyrant, these being two faces of the same medallion, as we have seen. The remedy prescribed is simple enough. Society and family alike must ideally obey the fundamental rules of necessity and freedom, or the rule of the human constitution that nature herself imposes upon all and that alone can liberate the faculties. Both institutions must confine their services to a minimum, ministering exclusively to the real needs of man determined by his place in the order of things; and both must demand of him only what is really profitable by the same standard. No one, says Rousseau, not even the father, has a right to command a child to do what is useless to him. These rules would make both the child and the man dependent only upon the nature of things and of human faculties and would thereby release the sovereign will to pursue its lawful end. In the author’s view if this will were once enshrined in law, it would be armed with all the resources liberated with itself and would prevail in both family and state. Only under these conditions, says he, can the ordinances of men be made as inflexible as the laws of nature that are their proper pattern. Only thus can he visualize men enjoying the bounties of a hypothetical state of nature combined with those of social life
in the city. These blessings are freedom and morality as contrasted with tyranny and slavery, the evils of both states to which we are said to be presently exposed. The passage in *Emile* shows how he would achieve the purpose of the chapter of the *Contract* just discussed, namely, the gratification of man’s natural will for the good, by placing legislation and education beyond the reach of human or inhuman passions. He himself admits that such an enterprise is tantamount to “squaring a circle” and quite as realistic. Nevertheless, since for him it is the only remedy for our woes, he prescribes it as the impossible object toward which all moral effort must be directed.

He makes the same double plea in favor of freedom and morality in the *Letters from the Mount* and in the *Considerations* as well as in the *Social Contract*. In the *Letters* in question he pays tribute to a sublime concept of liberty and the creative exercise of will. Freedom, says he, consists of not being subject to the “will of others” that is not also our own and is therefore, by his standard, a form of lawlessness. Freedom consists further, says he, of forbearing to subject the will of others to our own that is not also theirs and is therefore, by the same token, equally lawless. From this two-edged definition, intended to outlaw tyranny and slavery, he reasons that there can be no liberty without justice to safeguard that of all men by subjecting them equally to the supreme rule of law. Accordingly freedom means obedience to the law and nothing but the law that imposes equal conditions upon all and so is burdensome or harmful to none. This is the Aemilian law of the nature of things or rather of the human constitution. The man who obeys it makes a virtue of necessity, although in the end the law of necessity is elevated into a law of love.

This dignified concept of freedom recurs in the *Considerations* on Poland. The author-legislator warns the Poles, most of whom lived in slavery, that the laws of freedom he enacts are more austere than the yoke of tyrants and

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are incompatible with slavish passions. Consequently, says he, the serfs cannot be freed until they have first been "educated," by which he means as usual that they must be taught to bear the yoke of true laws. The soul must be freed before the body, and then education or legislation will make every formal law superfluous. As in the case of Emile, the will must be trained before the fully formed man can be set free. In both books Doric or Stoic austerity—the rule of necessity entailing as it does that of liberty—makes possible the freedom that releases human powers and is the essence of happiness.

Rousseau's double plea on behalf of freedom and morality in the Contract occurs mainly in the fourth to the sixth chapters of the second part. These are key chapters in the book and the subject of most controversy. They are closely related to his protest against tyranny and slavery in Emile. Indeed, at this stage in the progress of his thought, the two texts are so conspicuously allied that the novelist himself directs the reader to the chapters in question, and so the parallelism here is generally recognized. The value of a collation appears nowhere more strikingly than in the case of critical issues like the integrity of the will and the measures proposed to anticipate abuses.

The object of the fourth chapter, "Concerning the Limits of the Sovereign Power," is to guard against the tyranny of arbitrary rule. Rousseau begins by reminding us that the city—and the same is true of the soul—is a moral person, or, if we wish, an active thinking being, whose life consists in the union of its members. Its first task is therefore, he explains, to preserve itself, its moral life, and hence its unity. In Christian terms, to draw a comparison, it must not be a kingdom divided against itself if it is to stand firm. Or in Socratic terms it must not be at war with itself, but must save its constitution by instituting a natural order and harmony in the use of all its parts. To fulfill this purpose, according to Rousseau, it must have absolute power over them, to move and dispose them in a
manner suited to maintain the life and unity of the whole. This "will power," directed by the righteous law-giving element, bears the name of sovereignty, as he has said. His statements, which sound logical enough in the context of a collation that brings out the mythical character of his city, have surprised many of us in the past, leading us to wonder whether he is advocating some form of unruly popular absolutism or totalitarianism. That would be true only in the case of an earthly city or if the idea of absolute power were applied to inferior elements producing a disordered state that is thereby reduced to slavery and is neither moral nor rational nor even a being in the strict sense, since it would lack unity, organization, and life.

The fact is that Rousseau's "absolute" power is far from arbitrary. It is circumscribed by the austere limits of the sovereign will and human resources, to secure men against the tyranny of passion. These limits are the very theme of the chapter. Each man, bound by the covenant, must of course obey the authority of the enlightened will. But in addition he possesses the natural rights of a private individual whose claims for freedom, gain, or honor may be vindicated on the condition that they do not violate the orderly disposition of the moral being but remain within the bounds of simple moderate desires that follow reason. Such claims are ensured by sovereignty. For the latter—subsequently manifested in conscience—is restricted by its own object described as "common utility," the "common interest" or happiness of the whole moral entity, and already recommended in Emile as a safeguard against tyranny. Consequently it may impose upon its subjects no privations of strength, wealth, or freedom that are not absolutely necessary or useful for the welfare of the entire moral person, and are not demanded of all in common. This rule, which determines in practice what the demands may be, reduces them to a minimum. Moreover, in the ideal order herein envisaged, the same rule ensures that a man who acts on behalf of others acts also for himself, motivating him to seek
his happiness in that of the community conceived as a single moral entity, or, if we wish, in that of the ideal man in whose essence each one of us shares. This proves, at least to the author's satisfaction, that equality before the law, and the notion of justice produced thereby, derives from natural self-interest. In saying so, he has in mind the promises of the preface, to combine what law permits and what interest prescribes so that justice and utility are not divided. In his favorite Socratic phrase, he is training men "for themselves and for others." He achieves this purpose, according to the present chapter, through the equality that the covenant establishes among the powers who share in it. An act of sovereignty, says he, is an engagement of the moral person with all its members but with none in particular, so that by submitting they obey only their own will. But the sovereign power may not exceed the general agreements relating to the common object, which is by definition a moral one. There is no question of tyrannical rule, at least on the part of that power which represents superior faculties of soul and their natural or normal relationship, whether it is shared by a communion of men or embodied in a single man who is ruler of self. The message of the chapter is that the higher faculties, rather than individualist desires, must decide what is necessary or useful to the whole, since it is desires that give rise to tyranny by exceeding lawful claims.

The rights that individuals retain in Rousseau's city are defined as the advantages of the covenant and are formulated at the end of the chapter, as they were in the previous part. They are said to be freedom and the security of strength and life, or Rousseauist "property." In the world about him as he sees it, these two rights are violated, and each man enjoys "natural independence," which, under social conditions, entails the power to dispossess others of both of them. That world is as alien to the city of the Contract as it is to the society of friends in Emile where the author takes the same precautions to maintain freedom and strength by confining his view to what is useful to the en-
tire moral person and suited to his place in the order of things and of human life.

Not surprisingly, this chapter of the *Contract* has stirred up a "hornet's nest of words." The statement at the beginning about the absolute power of the will over the moral person that has brought forth charges of authoritarianism and despotism is balanced, in the writer's eyes, by the defense of individual rights that follows. But this only brings fresh charges of duplicity upon his head. It must be said that, if the text is interpreted positivistically, it is easy to create an artificial cleavage between a doctrinaire version of Rousseau and the true spirit of his work. But to do so, we should be obliged, among other things, to ignore the fact that the individual rights he means to protect in his mythical realm are indeed defined in the last paragraph, however inconsiderable they may seem to our way of thinking. If on our part we undertake to defend the existing order against his ideal city and champion individualism against humanism, we must reply to his charges in that paragraph and show that men do not in fact enjoy natural independence in our society, or possess the power to harm others in their persons or their property. But it is impossible to prove this since our world is imperfect actuality. On the other hand, he has removed to some Aemilian realm where the greatest human attribute is enthroned as sovereign ruler to sanction the lawful claims of individuals for freedom and security, freedom being the power to exercise each faculty according to its proper purpose and security promising only the necessities of life and nothing more. His one preoccupation is, as he said at the beginning of the chapter, to save the constitution of the moral person, and he is convinced that this is possible only if the enlightened will assumes command and imposes upon all individual parts one and the same obligation to contribute in their own way to that end.

Before passing from the question of tyranny to that of slavery, he discusses the risk of death facing participants in the oath of the covenant and tries to show that such risk
does not imply either of those evils. He does so in the fifth chapter, "Concerning the Right of Life and of Death." Its theme, like that of the previous one, forces him to begin by recalling the purpose of the engagement. Previously he said that the pact envisages the preservation of the moral person. Now he declares that it envisages that of participants. If we fail to connect the two statements, we might be tempted to infer from the second one that for him as for Hobbes physical existence takes precedence over freedom, even though the latter is in his view the very condition of inner life. In point of fact, the sovereign will as guardian of the constitution or spiritual being of city and of soul is also guardian of all elements integrated into it, including subject desires that are, so to speak, its Socratic "maintainers."

In this chapter of the *Contract* Rousseau considers the possibility that men entering such a union may have to die for the values to which they are committed, either in warfare or as a punishment for crime. By warfare he does not mean that which enslaves, as in the previous part, but that which frees. He means the warfare of a life dedicated to the discipline of the spirit and the pursuit of an ideal communion of soul and of men, for there are supposedly no other wars in his city. When he comes to deal with the death penalty inflicted upon criminals, he says that a malefactor who betrays the city and makes war upon it must be exiled or put to death, not as a "citizen" but as an enemy. That is the treatment accorded by Socrates to "barbarians," who typify immoral passions in a passage discussed in my previous chapter. If we bear in mind the similitude of city and soul, Rousseau's words may be taken as metaphorically as those of the Greek master. They may also be taken as figuratively as those of Christ about the right eye plucked out and the right hand cut off, that one member should perish and the entire body be saved. But the militant spirit of the divine master in the New Testament is tempered by a peaceful soul that left a deep and lasting
impression upon his modern disciple. Consequently, even in the present context the latter does not betray uncompromising rigor, as we have sometimes believed.\textsuperscript{19} On the contrary, in his city there are no executioners at all since his government is presumed to make them superfluous. The writer of \textit{Emile} goes even further: if in other cities maladministration forces men to do wrong in order to live, then it is the magistrate or governor who ought to be hanged.\textsuperscript{20} But an evangelical spirit of mercy prevails in the end in the text of the \textit{Contract}: "Let us leave these questions to the just man who has never faltered and who never stood in need of grace." The phrase echoes that of the master: "Let him who is without sin cast the first stone." In fine, whether he is speaking of the warfare of life within the soul or outside, his main concern is the threat of spiritual death posed by the slavery of passion.

In the next chapter of the \textit{Contract}, "Concerning Law," he finally faces the problem of the liberation of the reasonable will from the midst of conflicting interests and dubious influences, and its ultimate emergence and consecration as law. This chapter is usually considered to be a repetition of the fourth,\textsuperscript{21} but though interrelated the two are as different as the rules of necessity and freedom or the two cases contemplated in \textit{Emile}: fathers may make no useless and tyrannical demands upon a child, nor yet foster slavish passion in its heart. Likewise in the \textit{Contract}, after a chapter on the limitations of sovereignty comes one on the absolute rule of law as the only effective safeguard against slavery.

Law, says the writer, is an expression of the voluntary engagements of the moral being and is necessary for the conduct of its life, to give it movement and will power to translate its integrity into action. The implication is that the only alternative is spiritual death. Here as in \textit{Emile} true law is said to conform with the nature of things,\textsuperscript{22} which is that of the constitution or moral person functioning according to the Creator's intentions. Consequently Rousseau

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adds that justice comes from God and emanates from reason alone. In other words, it is derived by reason from the nature of the spiritual being and therefore from the divine prototype. But, he reflects, if we knew how to receive it from that transcendental source, we should require no laws at all or government either. Now, to teach the art of dispensing with external ones in the case of both, since in our world we shall never have either, is precisely his purpose in the handbook on citizenship, designed for the freemen of a city that will never be seen. It is also his purpose in Emile, as he says in the book itself as well as in his letter to the archbishop of Paris. In the end the hero needs neither external law nor government, which, we are told, are necessary only for children or childish men who have never been taught. But there as in the present chapter of the Contract, the author admits that anyone who obeys the laws of justice does so at his own expense, unless positive enactments, however unworthy they may be of grown men, provide a sanction to save him from the lawless passions of other people, and in the world of actuality that will never be. It is only in the spiritual Socratic and Rousseauist order that positive laws preserve the complex moral person within the natural mold, and they do so only for those who choose to enter therein and who are not thereby protected from the passions of others in an alien society. Unlike some of his contemporaries, Rousseau does not even imagine that he can control the anarchist. His "just man," Emile, lives in our world where justice is reputedly obedience to the law of the strongest, or lawlessness, and where such a man faces the threat of martyrdom exactly as he does in the Republic or in the New Testament.

The main point of the chapter on law is that, although true laws are in the very nature of things and of man, yet there is a vast difference between natural law instinctively obeyed and moral law based upon a voluntary engagement and consciously embraced. The law of reason alone can provide against slavery by preserving the proper order and
balance of the faculties within the fabric of society where instinct cannot be trusted. It proclaims the sovereignty of the enlightened will of human beings over the slavish desires of individuals. Consequently Rousseau says that law, like the will it expresses, proceeds from the entire moral person, upon whom it is equally imposed; for it is simply a general principle whose object is as universal as its motive. In biblical terms, with the law as with God there is no acceptance of persons. In Socratic thought law is the spokesman of the divine wisdom of the true philosopher that advises about the whole and all its parts and is contrasted with the false wisdom of imposters who abuse mankind and "make persons instead of things the theme of their conversation." Rousseau has assimilated the lessons of his masters and made them his own. He believes that real laws are as impartial as the will of ideal man in the hearts of all men, and as impersonal as the mathematical abstractions of the Contract. He also believes that in a true city they alone rule over all, including the governor-prince, whose first task is to enforce them upon himself. Being acts of the human will, they ensure both justice and freedom of spirit, which are the conditions of physical and moral life, as we have seen. Indeed, the author's main object in proclaiming the absolute rule of law is to defend the rights and freedom of the human person within every one of us and to teach men the art of self-mastery as security against moral slavery.

In the chapter on law as in the earlier one on the pact, which is the first of all laws, the Aemilian city of the Contract is wistfully called a "republic," a word suggestive of Plato and Socrates, who apply it to the spiritual city or soul governed by law. In Rousseau's view, as we have seen, true politico-moral laws exist only in that visionary Socratic city, in the Bible, or in works like his own. For the city to materialize, the body of the nation would have to register the acts of its own will for the good, and thereby ensure its unity and moral life. But unfortunately individ-
ual judgments are obscured by "multitudinous desires"—
the "blind multitude" of undisciplined elements in the soul
that are like childish men in the city and foster tyranny
and slavery. Consequently a system of legislation poses
problems, which are, of course, those of education: "It is
necessary to show people things such as they must appear,
to discover for them the right path that they seek, to secure
them against the seductions of private wills ...." To ac­
complish this miracle, the author has recourse to a legis­
lator or educator who finds in ancient traditions the remedy
for the great plagues besetting mankind, and who is, of
course, himself.

It is necessary to pause here and dwell upon the rela­
tionship of the Contract and Emile with the Republic,
where Socrates, as the main speaker, plays the role of
legislator-educator exactly as Rousseau does in both his
books. From the part now under discussion to the end, a
consistent parallelism emerges between Rousseau’s works
and the ten books of the Greek classic. Much of the first
four of the latter is reflected in the present part of the for­
er, although the order in which ideas are presented is not
necessarily the same in each case. In the first book of the
Republic Socrates too begins by raising the question
"Where is wisdom? Where is happiness?"; and, convinced
that both are to be found in justice, he refuses to separate
them. He starts with a simple definition of happiness sim­
ilar to Rousseau’s, defining it as freedom from the passions
and possession of the necessities of life. Then he too faces
the problem of justice. Having said that the just man cannot
harm anyone, he launches forth, like his latter-day disciple,
on an attack upon contemporary laws of so-called justice
that cater to the interests of the stronger and lead not to
happiness but to misery. In the second book he embarks
upon a search for the laws of true justice that, according
to him, ensure virtue, strength, and happiness. When his
listeners protest that in actual society such laws as those
carry no sanction, with the result that the just man falls

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a prey to the wicked, he admits it but undertakes to disclose the advantages of justice in inner life, these being the fulfillment of all the deepest aspirations of the human soul. To clarify his meaning, he creates an ideal republic where the just man would be happy among his fellows. In doing so the master says clearly that his true purpose is to illustrate the aforesaid felicitous effects of justice within the soul by looking at that virtue on a large scale in the state where, being magnified, it is more easily detected. He broaches his sketch of that mythical order by saying that its origin is need; the real creator of the state is necessity. It is only when an interlocutor insists upon exceeding that rule and going beyond "the true and healthy constitution of the state" that the sage considers the problem of education or legislation in order to purge the luxurious one and restore it to health, whereupon there appears a blessed city that no man has ever before beheld, except perhaps in its spiritual prototype or Spartan counterpart, if we set aside biblical literature. The sketch he makes is closely matched in Rousseau's books, and the education he proposes is identical with Emile's. He begins by training the "guardians" of his city who embody spirit, akin to Rousseauist will. The content and method of their formation—corresponding to Emile's at the end of the present part—is described in the second and third books of the Republic. The fourth book is that of the law, which is the term I used to designate the second part of Rousseau's works. There Socrates depicts the character of the moral being that he is shaping. In the first half of the book he formulates the laws that govern the city and its heroes, and are in fact the principles of their life and education. In the second half he outlines the virtues begotten in the city and the soul by such laws. Rousseau in both his books begins with the laws and the virtues they engender, and, although in handling the material he inverts Socrates' order, he is profoundly indebted to the master.

For the purpose of explaining the relationship more
clearly and Rousseau’s use of the aforesaid books in the present case, I must recall that the second part of Emile is divided into two unmarked sections, and that the first of these contains all the material of the pendant part of the Contract. We are now in the midst of that section which is based mainly upon the fourth book of the Republic, although the author has begun by borrowing fundamental principles from the second and third books to which, as I have just said, he reverts a little later in Emile. Having begun in this way, he then defines the advantages of his principles, including the virtues of the moral person that are the ultimate goal, and in doing so adheres closely to the second half of Plato’s fourth book. As we shall see, the virtues he preaches—all implied in the rule of the enlightened will—are Socratic. The rest of this section of Emile and the corresponding chapters of the Contract formulate more specifically the laws of education or legislation that are intended to beget his Socratic virtues in the soul and the city. And his laws turn out to be no different from those of Socrates set forth in the first half of the same Platonic book. In the second and last section of the present part of Emile, he turns to Plato’s second and third books to deal with the content and method of the hero’s education at this stage, designed to enforce the laws and nourish the virtues extolled. The education prescribed is exactly the same as that of Socrates’ guardians in those books to which I shall be referring frequently in handling that theme. Such comparisons throw into relief the images that evolve in Emile once the principles have been clearly set forth in the first section now under study. Indeed, this is the most theoretical part of the book, as I have already warned.

I said above that in defining his principles and the virtues they foster as he has done up to this point in the second part of the masterwork and its appendix, Rousseau has at no time strayed from the Socratic teachings. I shall elaborate briefly before proceeding. In the second half of Plato’s fourth book Socrates begins by posing again the familiar
questions raised in the opening pages of the Republic: “Where is wisdom? Where is happiness?” He finds both in a rightly ordered constitution of city or soul. Such a one, says he, possesses all the virtues. It is endowed with wisdom that advises not about any particular thing but about the whole, and considers how it can best deal with itself and with others. This knowledge is that of the guardians of the city or Socratic spirit that guards the soul: “And so by reason of the smallest part or class, and of the knowledge which resides in this presiding and ruling part of itself, the whole State [and soul], being thus constituted according to nature, will be wise.” Moreover, it possesses courage, which is fear of nothing but a violation of the law and its commands implanted by education. It also has temperance, which is the virtue of a man or state that is “master of self,” and wherein all parts of the moral being are agreed that the naturally superior and smaller principle will rule the greater mass of the naturally inferior, that the few with moderate desires under the guidance of reason will control the meaner and manifold desires of the many. Such a man or state also exercises justice whereby each class or faculty does one thing only, the thing to which each is adapted and assigned by nature. By favor of these virtues, says Socrates, the soul or the city is “rightly ordered” and “at peace” with itself—words quoted textually in Emile. It is, he adds, free to act, to provide for its needs and the care of its person, and to perform its work in public or in private life. It is in a state of health and well-being. Rousseau is utterly imbued with these maxims in the work discussed in the foregoing pages. He now broaches the question of formally defining his laws and their implications in accordance with his fundamental principles, a problem which the sage handled first.

To return to the Contract, as I have said Rousseau is himself the lawgiver there as in Emile. The next chapter “Concerning the Legislator” brings this out. Admittedly he begins by saying that the lawgiver is quite outside the
constitution of the being he fashions, and shares neither in sovereignty nor in government, whereas in *Emile* he shares in both in the guise of Jean-Jacques. But as he frequently does in his writings, he plays more than one role in the novel, where, in his function as author, he is in truth legislator in his own city as he is in the *Contract*, quite as much as Socrates, who is not visible within the pale of the imaginary city of the *Republic*, is in fact its legislator as he himself says.\(^{27}\) In undertaking this function in the *Contract*, the writer fancies that he is generously endowed. For the lawgiver of that book, like the educator-author of *Emile*, is theoretically a sage possessed of superior intelligence who knows men and their passions without being blinded thereby and who serves the happiness of others hoping to win for himself only the favor of generations to come. Indeed, he is "divine" since he provides a pattern for Emile’s governor who, though a mere imitator, is himself "more than a man." This "divinity" proceeds from the wisdom that Socrates calls the divine in man and that Rousseau describes in this very chapter as belonging to "the gods" and "sublime." Later by implication he virtually admits having himself assumed the office of legislator, for he makes claims attributed to the wise lawgiver of the *Contract*, professing to have taught the duties of man for the happiness of others and asking in return only the honor he "has a right to expect from posterity."\(^{28}\)

His task in the *Contract* is depicted like that of the educator in *Emile*. It is to beget a moral person by transforming the instinctive physical individual into a harmoniously organized and highly complex set of disciplined spiritual relationships implicate in the cultivated human soul or in the city. And the results are the same: a man whose faculties are thus liberated, expanded, and integrated into a larger entity or Socratic "single human creature"\(^{29}\) gains in strength and perfection, even though the vaster being may not be visible to the eyes of flesh.

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The lawgiver, in performing this task of education, has the same limitations as the governor who follows his direction. He may resort neither to authority nor to reason to induce people to accept his laws. Reason, we are told, is the end product of his work as it is of the educator’s. According to Rousseau, that is why great lawgivers in the past, like Moses, Lycurgus, and Numa, have honored the “gods” with their own wisdom. If this is a lie, it is a Socratic “true lie,” since the legislator has already been compared with “the gods” and his “divine being” is really man’s. Through his “sublime reason” the laws of nations can allegedly be made as inflexible as those of nature, as the author of Emile enacted, so that people “may recognize the same power in the formation of man and the city.” In the light of my collation this last phrase is highly suggestive. It implies again that the city is made in the image of the soul. As there is a hierarchy in the one, so there is in the other, a fact that has surprised some of us in the past.

In Emile the legislator-educator’s laws or rather the author’s are enforced by Jean-Jacques and are used to shape a moral being that answers to the Rousseauist city. Since those enactments are supposedly in the nature of things, which is the rule of life, the child’s caprices simply encounter physical obstacles or unhappy effects that perform the function of law. The author, who is about to frame his Socratic ordinances, everywhere betray the fact that he has the master in mind. For example, in recommending such stringent asceticism, he suddenly raises a question asked and answered by the Greek sage at exactly the same point in the argument, just before issuing his laws: Is he not defeating his own ends and losing the happiness he covets? He denies it, reasoning as follows. A child exposed to a few perils that are in the nature of his constitution can at least delight in his freedom. In any case, he could hardly find contentment outside his nature. Besides, if his weaknesses prove painful, they have the advantage of nurturing compassion in the heart. Moreover, they do not cause misery
unless they are accompanied by insatiate and insensate desires that also alienate others. These statements contain the substance of Socrates’ reply to the same question: the happiness contemplated is not the gratification of one or another of the faculties but the welfare of the entire human creature or composite being. The author of *Emile* agrees that this is attainable only under the laws of its constitution, whose rule serves to control the disorders of children and parents, too, to save young persons from slavery and tyranny in themselves or in others, and to postpone for them the yoke of existing civil bondage. His discussion about the disciple’s happiness is equivalent to that of Socrates at the same stage.\(^{30}\)

So is another such discussion in a chapter of the *Contract* where he reverts to the question of happiness but which I must examine a little later. It is preceded by three others wherein he defines his laws. Now, since their content belongs to a train of thought that runs through the following pages of *Emile*, I shall proceed with the latter. The theme is the nature of the laws, which is, of course, the nature of the being who is led toward wisdom and happiness by their persuasive power.

As we know, Rousseau’s only motive in the novel is to teach the laws that are intended to mold the soul and mythical city, or, as he said at the outset, to teach the duties of man and citizen. His laws, like those of Socrates, are really all one and the same, that being the law of the natural constitution. He begins by showing how the law of necessity, already formulated, takes the place of the laws of reason, which the child cannot know.\(^{31}\) But these laws that constitute the whole of education and that Emile consciously embraces much later are really no different from the other since, in the author’s opinion, true laws spring from necessity or need. However, at this stage he advises against reasoning about them since in his Socratic view the training of will takes precedence over that of a supposedly dormant reason. Consequently, his entire discussion of
law in the novel assumes the form of a protest against the use of reason to teach duties. Until the age of reason the child in the book, thanks to the governor's precautions, knows only necessity, impossibility, and constraint. In other words, he is made aware only of the physical world, and his virtue is a matter of necessity. In this context as well as in the Contract, Rousseau agrees with Socrates, that if children or nations either understood the language of reason, they would need neither education nor legislation to rule their lives. In Emile he also concludes with the master that to know good and evil, to feel the reason for a man's duties, is the study of a sage, not of a child of ten. A governor who is imprudent enough to reason with the latter must, we are told, resort in the end to threats or bribes that only encourage deceit. "The laws," says the author significantly, "use the same constraint with grown men." But he explains that such men are "children spoiled by education," for "the sage needs no laws." The child who is to become that sage is simply kept in the place to which his weakness and ignorance assign him. He submits happily to necessity, to the force of things as they are, which is the rule of law in the Contract being "engraved on the heart" and mind.

Rousseau's second law—called "the greatest, most important and most useful rule"—is that of so-called negative education, which is really that of freedom and implies the doctrine of natural goodness. Expounding that doctrine, he sees men endowed with a single natural feeling, self-love, that is good and useful in its original form. However, since in his view vicious habits and prejudices easily take root in what he calls the most dangerous interval of human life, from birth to the age of twelve, he has recourse to the principle of "negative education" that replaces instruction on the governor's part by strong negative action designed to secure the heart and mind against taint or flaw from without. But this principle has a positive value since it provides at the same time for the exercise of freedom, for the
natural growth of the future ministrants of reason, the body, organs, senses, and strength, while the action of the governor's reason keeps the feelings in check. The law of negative education is indeed that of freedom and has results as positive as the governor's ministry, which, however, is invisible to the child.

This law leads to the enactment of a third. Education must be adapted to the child's particular character or cast of mind, which must therefore be studied before any attempt is made to train it. Here Rousseau is mindful of Socrates' advice about the importance of finding out "the natural bent." The author of Emile professes to emulate the wise physician, who probes his patient's temperament before prescribing treatment. Again the image of the true physician, dear to both his masters, recurs. In that guise Jean-Jacques appears in the novel as the custodian of the laws of wisdom.

These deliberations of Emile are reflected in the aforementioned chapters of the Contract, all three bearing the same title: "Concerning the Nation." They are the eighth, ninth, and tenth chapters of the second part that contain a definition of the laws determined by the nature of the nation to be governed by them. Hence their title. These chapters have in the past been judged irrelevant. Yet their enormous value rises to the surface in a collation with Emile and comparison with the Republic. To dispense with them is to dispense with the author's laws, which are the same as they are in the novel although the order is reversed.

In framing the laws of the Contract, he actually invites an analogy with Emile by drawing parallels between a man about to be educated and a nation about to receive a system of legislation. For instance, in the first of the three chapters he says that nations like men are docile to law only when they are young, before evil customs and prejudices become so deep-rooted that people cannot bear the physician to treat their afflictions. Again the favored image recurs and in the same context as in Emile. The writer of
the Contract adds that a nation must possess the vigor and health of youth if its laws are to obtain any hold upon the heart. And yet he warns that the wise lawgiver or physician must not be in haste, as he said of the educator. Like the latter the legislator too must take time to prepare the ground first and examine the character or natural aptitudes of the nation that is to be disciplined, for "there is for nations as for men a time of maturity that one must await before giving laws." By this he means positive ones as opposed to negative, since natural aptitude is itself a law and can be observed through the period of waiting and watching or negative formation that is also a law in both books and not merely in Emile. The author of the Contract himself suggests the comparison with the law of negative education in the novel when he adds that a ruler who fails to exercise the restraint recommended is "like a French tutor who trains his pupil to shine a moment in childhood and then to be nothing at all forever afterward."

In the next chapter Rousseau carries on the analogy of a nation and a man, for both of whom the best constitution or finest formation is not that of nature's vagaries, like giants or dwarfs, but rather the natural canon or standard. Weighing the comparative disadvantages of gigantic nations and small cities, he still favors the city-state in the belief that it can develop resources to maintain itself against attacks from without by fostering a healthy and robust natural constitution that is well-governed, one with itself and united. In other words, it enjoys freedom. That is the very purpose of the negative formation prescribed.

The third in the sequence of chapters is just as clearly patterned after his view of the laws in Emile. In it he is concerned with finding a suitable proportion between the wealth of a city, its property so to speak, and the number of its inhabitants. The land must suffice to support them, and they must be as numerous as it can sustain, for the city must be neither rich nor poor, but one and self-sufficing. Here we recognize not only the author's views on
private property but especially the law of necessity, which protects the integrity of nature against inordinate desires. We must therefore face the fact that the laws of the city, formulated in the chapters just analyzed, are those of Rousseauist education. In the Contract the author concludes the discussion by echoing the very words of the novel, when he adds that the period of a nation’s “institution” is the most critical in its life since the constitution is likely to be overthrown by threats from without and ruinous repercussions within. These potential disorders parallel those in the domain of inner life at a comparable stage.

The next chapter of the treatise on citizenship is entitled “Concerning Various Systems of Legislation.” Its main theme is the common happiness, which, as I remarked above, is defined as it is in Emile and in the fourth book of the Republic. As usual the author reduces it essentially to freedom and equality. He does not dwell here upon the former since he has already said what he means by it. It proceeds from the law of negative formation that favors the orderly growth of natural resources and faculties. Reverting to the question of equality, he reconsiders the two aspects of power and wealth. Power must be exercised by virtue of rank and the laws, by which he presumably means that rank and power depend upon the law of natural aptitude, which is that of the constitution with its hierarchy of faculties. As for wealth, no one must be rich enough to buy another man or poor enough to have to sell himself. This is an effect of the law of necessity. In fine, he urges moderation of property and prestige in the great and of greed and covetousness in the others. Again the hierarchy in the city reflects the one in the soul. As Socrates says in the same context in a passage paraphrased earlier, the few superior powers with moderate desires led by reason must control the covetousness of the rest. Any truly moral person imposes appropriate restraints upon himself and avoids anything that threatens to disorder his life. In Emile the governor inconspicuously imposes them upon the child for
the sake of a happiness that depends upon just such measures of austerity. In the *Contract* as in the novel the educator-legislator finally secures that object by modifying his system according to natural and local conditions, or rather, "the nature of things." It is logical that throughout this chapter where the author discusses happiness, he continually alludes to the laws designed to guarantee it. Unless we see this, we can hardly understand the chapter heading.

As I have said, he frames his ordinances exactly as Socrates does in the first half of Plato's fourth book. The Greek master, whose first law is, of course, that of the covenant, also legislates against wealth and poverty, which divide a city or soul into two or more separate entities always at variance with each other. In addition he makes a law regulating the size of the city, which must, like Rousseau's, neither expand nor contract, being neither large nor small but one and self-sufficing. Another of his laws governs rank or function, which is determined by natural aptitude. According to this law every member of the city, or faculty in the soul, is put to the use intended by nature, each to one work, so that the moral person is never at issue with self, reason ruling, with spirit as guardian and the covetous principles subject to the others. These ordinances minister, of course, to all Rousseau's aspirations expressed in the law of necessity, which controls desires; that of negative education or freedom, which governs the growth of faculties; and the rule about following the natural bent to ensure that one does one's own proper work. In the same context Socrates adds that all his regulations are really just trifles of one great thing, education and nurture, whose main principle is that "friends have all things in common," this being the law of the contract, which is that of the constitution. To effect this principle is the second gigantic "wave" to be overcome in the founding of his city, so that the moral being may be one with all its parts, whether its kingdom lies within or outside. He conceives
the educational process as conducive to that end only if it safeguards and perfects the natural constitution, fulfills the latter by means of art, and keeps watch against lawlessness, which steals in first in the form of amusement, then penetrates into manners and customs, contracts, laws, and constitutions, to overthrow all rights in the end. In his view an effective educational process like this necessitates few laws, as Rousseau agrees. For example, in the present context the sage declines to legislate about other things that men, disciplined by laws like his, need not be told at all but that are the sole object of all our enactments. Among these he mentions markets, insults, lawsuits, taxes, police, and harbors. Statutes about matters of that kind simply try to patch up a constitution as disordered as that of intemperate invalids, and this the Greek teacher—and Christ too—refused to do.

It is worth observing again that Rousseau's laws favor the same virtues as Socrates': wisdom, fortitude, temperance, and justice. Yet in the case of Emile the child is as unaware of the virtues as he is of the laws. The law of necessity breeds courage by teaching him to fear nothing but its infraction; that of negative education or freedom imparts temperance by protecting him from vice and error through the sway of superior powers; and that of the natural bent teaches justice by inducing him to do his own proper work in life and use his faculties according to their normal functions. At the same time he unconsciously learns to submit to the law of reason, which cultivates wisdom in the Socratic sense and promises a happiness suited to the constitution of the entire moral being. He is thereby being educated for the practice of virtue, the virtue of one who is his own law and needs no other. But he knows nothing of all this. It is his governor who anticipates lawlessness, and he does so in the manner described by Socrates: by nurturing the constitution, guarding against lawless amusements, and fostering "the habit of good order" by way of manners and customs that replace laws.
We witness this in the second section of this part of the book.

The last chapter of the same part of the *Contract*, called "Division of the Laws," illustrates the importance of the Socratic method of education just described and provides a good transition to a study of Emile's formation at this stage. In that chapter the author begins by saying that the true theme of the treatise is the fundamental political laws derived from the "natural" constitution, these being rules of citizenship applicable anywhere rather than particular civil or criminal laws, since he makes no practical application of his general principles within a private society in the usual sense. That is also true of *Emile* in the first four parts. But in the same chapter of the appendix he confesses that his precepts really depend for their effectiveness upon other laws, those of custom and opinion that fix the constitution for all time. These laws are used to reinforce the rest, particularly those of necessity and freedom or negative education that govern Emile's training here and throughout the book.

**THE FORMATION OF A SOCRATIC GUARDIAN**

The child's education as a conscious being begins at this point where Rousseau, having defined his principles and laws, sets out to depict the moral person and sketch his "city within," visualizing it externally as a society of friends to emphasize the importance of oneness. The education proposed is that of a Socratic guardian, to be followed later by that of a philosopher-king. Rousseau's debt to Socrates is so great in this section that he stops in the very midst to acknowledge it. Consequently I shall begin with an exposition of the plan of the model and then compare it to Rousseau's at this stage before embarking upon my rather unconventional interpretation of the Aemilian text, in order to prepare the reader for what follows. The source in this case is, as I have said, the second and third books of the *Republic*. There Socrates, in order to purge
an unhealthy state and form his own city, trains men to be skilled in "warfare," choosing natures fitted to guard the constitution, and hence called "guardians." I referred to them earlier as corresponding to "spirit," comparable to Rousseauist will, in the soul. Their training consists of "music," designed specifically for the discipline of the soul, and "gymnastic," designed apparently for that of the body but really for both. The great sage commences with music. In the Greek sense music means all the arts over which the Muses preside and which produce harmony in the soul by bringing its various elements into reciprocal accord. In the education of the Socratic heroes it includes stories in addition to melody and rhythm. For the moment I shall confine myself to stories and defer my discussion of melody and rhythm as well as gymnastic until I come to speak of Rousseau's treatment of them. My present purpose is simply to show that the general plan in both cases is the same.

In the second book of the Republic Socrates observes that the young must be trained by means of both true and false stories or myths, and he begins with false or fictitious ones. But he objects to harmful ones, casual tales devised by casual persons, even those of great storytellers like Homer and Hesiod. Indeed, he censors such writers. He charges them with giving an erroneous representation of the nature of heroes whom the young are supposed to emulate, with the result that the latter are led astray, especially since they cannot judge for themselves what is allegorical and what is literal. He alone, as founder and legislator of the new state, will dictate the form in which tales should be cast and the limits that must be observed. For example, he will not have poets telling his guardians that heroes hurt anyone, violate oaths and treaties, or indulge in lies and deception. This three-pronged attack upon harmful false myths and the three lessons implied therein continue to the end of the second book. In the third he passes on to what he calls true myths, melody, rhythm,
taste and gymnastic.

Emile’s education as a Socratic guardian is similarly structured. As I have said, it is governed by the Rousseauist and Socratic laws of necessity and freedom or negative education—which Socrates calls “the strain of necessity and the strain of freedom,” though the Greek word for “strain” also means “law”—and finally by the law of natural aptitude. The education of the Rousseauist guardian is also divided into music and gymnastic, and for him too music comes first. It includes what I shall call “parables in action,” harmony and song. The parables are the Socratic stories and myths that fashion Emile’s mind. But they are not recounted. They are played out in life. And, as in the case of the model, there are both false, though not harmful, ones and true ones. Rousseau, like the sage, begins with the former and uses them to illustrate his law of necessity. There are three of them and they are not devised by casual persons but by the governor himself or rather by the educator-legislator who, by the way, transmutes the substance of Socrates’ thought into his own. For example, the three false myths teach the same three lessons for heroes formulated negatively by the master and summarized above, and in exactly the same order, although, as we shall see, the images are more familiar. Before passing on to true myths to exemplify the law of freedom or negative education, the author makes a direct frontal attack upon “positive education” at this level, particularly our concept of the training of reason, and casts aside all studies and stories relating to an alien world such as the three R’s, geometry, languages, geography, history and fables. Again like the sage he refuses to have his “guardian” indoctrinated with erroneous conceptions of heroes and heroism. In such manner he handles the substance of Socratic education up to the end of the second book of the Republic. Next he turns to the third book, which is the source of inspiration for the rest of his hero’s formation at this stage. After covering gymnastic quite briefly, he dwells at length upon
true myths or parables, and then concludes with harmony, song, and taste, following the master step by step in every detail to the end of the present part. This general outline will serve to initiate the reader into the real spirit of Rousseau's text.

He begins his task in a Socratic manner by recognizing that Emile and his governor live in an unhealthy society even though they inhabit a peasant’s hut in Montmorency village. He admits that it is difficult to raise a child like an insensitive being, far from the sight of human passions. Nevertheless, he clings to his idealism since he is providing us with a pattern of perfection that may well lie beyond our grasp, as the great sage says, but still remains the goal. In an effort to reach it, the governor begins by transfiguring the surroundings, however superficially. He does so by having recourse to patriarchal and Christian charity, whose influence modifies that of the Greek model. He has a compassionate attitude not only toward Emile, or spirits akin to his own as do Socrates’ heroes, but also toward “spiritual valetudinarians” and “fierce natures” from which the academic philosopher takes cover “like a man who has fallen among wild beasts.” In fine, suffering humanity finds in him a father as it does in the missionary of the Gospel or in the person of Job, whose words are almost quoted in the text. He thereby wins the love and esteem of the villagers in order to become master of Emile’s surroundings as well as of the boy himself. He also implants in the little spectator of his actions lessons in morality that bear fruit years later when the temple of the soul is visibly transformed by clemency into a Judeo-Christian shrine. But he forbears as long as possible to speak of such things, for, says he, he will not play the tempter by letting the innocent taste the fruit of the tree that brings a knowledge of good and of evil. If the child chances to witness some vice, he is told that it is a disease, though he is ignorant of diseases of the spirit. But the word contributes to the image of Jean-Jacques as the good
physician going about with the boy beside him like the divine master with his disciples or Socrates with his, to heal the sick in an unhealthy world. That world is in the end the greatest bond of necessity to which the hero must submit since it can never be changed, but the providential governor never leaves his side lest lawlessness gain a footing within the invisible pale of a well-ordered life.

Under his direction the aforementioned myths are enacted. The first three, the fictitious or false ones relating to a false order of things, belong to "the strain of necessity," as I have said.

They begin with a Rousseauist parable of the sower presented in the form of a dramatic dialogue. It is designed to give the child some idea of morality before the age of twelve, but only in case of necessity to prevent him from harming others by instructing him in so-called justice and the origins of property in our anti-society. It is logical to begin with this since our laws are concerned primarily with property rather than propriety of life. The scene is set in a garden that is an earthly paradise until the child tastes of the fruit, which changes it into an image of the world as we know it. There he and his governor work together tilling the soil of which Emile finally takes possession by planting a bean, a possession more sacred and respectable, we are told, than that of explorers like Balboa, named here and in the Contract too. It is more sacred because this son of man rightfully possesses the earth that is indispensable to his livelihood. To till it is his natural and necessary vocation. The new Aemilius, like his Roman forebears, is born to be not only a patriot but a husbandman too, as he ideally is at the end of the book, and true to the name of "industrious." As the beans spring up, the governor explains: "That belongs to you." He is referring not to the earth but to its fruits, which are simple, necessary ones and upon which Emile has lavished his time, his labor, and his person. But soon the gardener Robert ploughs up the "wretched" beans, for he has already sown the earth
with Maltese melons, an exquisite delicacy. This, we are informed, is the child’s first experience of injustice.\(^43\) In spite of some ambiguity about the victim and villain of the piece and in spite of Jean-Jacques’ principles, which ought logically to favor lowly beans instead of Maltese melons, he nevertheless makes his apologies to Robert and admits that he ought properly to have inquired, before tilling the soil, whether it had already been ploughed by others. When Robert replies that there is no need to make such inquiries since the whole earth is already covered with “mine” and “thine,”\(^44\) Emile complains that he has no garden. The answer comes back: “What has that to do with me?” The implication is that the son of man has been defrauded of his birthright by greedy husbandmen who have cast out the heir and robbed him of the means of life. The drama is resolved when the kindly Robert, whose counterpart in the great world beyond may be less cordial, agrees to allow the friends to cultivate “a corner of his garden.” They offer him half the harvest in return to give the child an idea of property rights and the principle of exchange as they prevail in our disorderly state of life.

This myth shows clearly enough that the moral being shaped by the author exists only within the society of friends and not outside. For him Robert’s claims based exclusively upon work and first occupancy cannot, as we know, take precedence over need, as they do in actual society. His “moral being,” like that of Socrates,\(^45\) is subject to the law of necessity, which, in the alien world of the myth, is ignored, and so is the common happiness that is Emile’s. This is so in spite of the contrivance of exchange, effective enough to feed the poor, perhaps, but more so to fatten the rich, who, in Rousseau’s view, should possess only the ground that they need and that they can and do till by their own unaided efforts. Otherwise, humanity goes wanting. It is represented here in the person of the dispossessed Emile, who looks in vain for a “corner of the garden” of the world to be his own. At the end of
the book, where the little phrase thrice recurs, he has not yet found it and never will. The writer uses the same phrase in the second Discourse in his vigorous denunciation of property in its present form wherein the usurpations of the rich have been consolidated by a historical contract disastrous to the majority of mankind. That pact is the antithesis of his. It turns most men into orphans like Emile, bereft of their Socratic nurse and mother. Soon, says the author of the Discourse, looking back through ages past, "it was no longer possible to find a single corner of the universe where one could be free of the yoke." We see this in the parable of the sower in Emile that subtly foreshadows the dénouement of the story, accentuates the artistic balance of the book, and gives relief to its meaning.

The point of the myth was to teach the child the first Socratic lesson and prevent him from harming others. In the view of modern men he has done an injury to Robert and suffers the consequences. But if his pathetic protest seems to justify him, then he has learned that the just man is doomed to become the victim of our "laws," as Socrates' disciples protest and the sage admits. He has also discovered, like the Greek heroes, that he can possess and cultivate nothing except himself. For if he is to be a husbandman at all in our midst, it is a Socratic and Christian allegorical husbandman of the soul rather than of the soil, whose real vocation in life is not to earn bread. And so he will not covet his neighbor's ill-gotten goods but will render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, even if they are not rightfully his at all. In fine, he will bow to the law of necessity, including even an arbitrary yoke imposed upon him by others. And he will do so willingly, not resentfully. For he is also being taught that, regardless of adverse circumstances, the virtues born of his own law—the Socratic law of Jean-Jacques' city of the Contract—are by their very nature the greatest good of the soul, to whose essence they are intimately suited. The freedom he enjoys
in the exercise of his faculties supposedly compensates him for material privation. The author has devised the myth in such a way as to convey the main thesis of his work.

In the following myth, also fictitious, he creates other imageries to teach the sage's second lesson, that good men do not violate oaths and treaties. Here the child—surely a vulgar Emile belonging to a "false" order of things—breaks the windows of his chamber more than once, is then left to suffer the ill effects of cold, and is finally confined to some "windowless place" until it occurs to him to make an agreement with his governor whereby he may recover his freedom on condition that he respect the window panes. Indeed, he is forced to do so by the law of necessity, here presented in a fairer form than in the first myth. The governor accepts the proposal on the grounds that it offers advantages for everyone. His object is, of course, to encourage the child to keep faith with his engagements. This apparently trivial sequence of very ordinary events is employed to dramatize all the elements of a true covenant and to portray property in an equitable form in accordance with the principles of that covenant which lies at the basis of all moral engagements in the book. For example, the suggestion of a pact originates with the child, who is the weaker party, whereas in the historical order as depicted by Rousseau in the second *Discourse* the idea of a pact originates with the powerful rich. The child in *Emile* implicitly consents to renounce his natural independence, limited strength, and the power to harm others, for the sake of freedom from the nameless place; for his own safety, now obvious even to him; and for the protection of property in a just and reasonable form based upon need and the common welfare, including his own. The benefits of such an engagement are as conspicuously present here, even to the mind of a child, as they were absent in the parable of the sower. In fine, the agreement conforms with natural dispositions even if we are in the midst of a world that is the antithesis of Emile's.
This story too is full of symbolism. The author hints at the presence of symbolic elements in a concluding remark referring back to the previous tale: the little gardener, making a hole to plant his bean, did not dream that he was digging a dungeon where his knowledge would soon encompass him. The "windowless place" or dungeon in the present instance is therefore mythical. It could hardly be taken literally since a little later in this same part of Emile Rousseau beseeches us never to confine a child to a dungeon. It is as symbolic as the underground den in the Republic and has the same meaning. According to Socrates himself his prison house represents the lowest and darkest sphere in the world of sight, a world that typifies intellectual vision. In that sphere men are imprisoned in darkness and chains, which are an image of ignorance and slavery. This image is reflected in the story in Emile where the conscious being suddenly becomes aware of his plight and discovers a remedy. The windows therein are also symbolic and suggest light or the opposite of intellectual darkness. In the Moral Letters (1757-58) the writer says that the windows of the house of human understanding are the senses, the basis of elementary reason. In Emile they would represent for the child the most rudimentary reason that bids us, blind as we are, respect the windows of our friends so invaluable to ourselves. But for the governor they are the eyes of the soul, its wisdom and that of the law which belong to him against whom the child’s rebellion is directed. The little window-breaker is an image of the lawbreaker whose revolt is that of our "false" society against the precepts of justice and the first of all laws, which is the covenant.

Rousseau carries the myth further to teach the sage's third precept, that good men do not lie. If the little vandal fails to respond to the trust reposed in him and violates the promise volunteered by himself for his own immediate advantage, then he suffers the unhappy consequences of lying as a natural sequel, under the inflexible law of nec-
essity. For example, he is unjustly accused, or distrusted when he speaks the truth. But according to the text, he is not the real Emile. The latter is supposedly not tempted to lie since he is made to feel that it is in the interests of his happiness to be sure that those who supply his needs and whose friendship he enjoys see things as they really are, for fear they may err at his expense. And unlike the little lawbreaker, he has no occasion to break promises since he has none to make: having no reason to alienate others, he is not obliged to make terms with them. To harm no one, concludes the writer as he began, is the most important of all moral precepts. It is by no coincidence that, as we have observed, this is the precept that stands at the very beginning of the Republic.

After the three "false myths" with their Socratic messages meant as a safeguard against the evil ways of the false states of this world and before illustrating the law of freedom in an ideal world, Rousseau stops to acknowledge his debt to Plato as well as to the ancestors of Aemilius. Like the young Romans the disciple is astir and on foot from morning till night, and his childhood, like that of the Greek heroes in the Republic here actually named, is all festive games and music that replace schoolroom and books. This is confirmed hereafter. In the author's view, governors of small children ought to make a delight out of objects of instruction, for he is persuaded with Socrates that, at this early age, education should be an amusement suited to the blithe and sprightly nature of the child. He follows the master to the letter, as he himself implies, and does so with the most felicitious results.50

Before proceeding with this happy formation by way of true myths and music, he launches his attack upon the disastrous moral effects of modern "positive" education that appeals to a child's reason. For he is always inspired by the same preoccupation with the duties of man in the Aemilian city. Like another Socrates protesting against the injustice of a disordered society and its abuse of the
means of education to shape men in its image, he outlaws the studies normally prescribed at the present stage such as the three R’s, geometry, languages, geography, history and fables. He contends that, although they may prove valuable later, they are not only useless to a child under twelve but also, if taught at that age, may ultimately prove unfavorable to the acquisition of wisdom and happiness since they create in his mind a false impression that he knows something. Rousseau is convinced that he does not, that childhood is the sleep of reason, that children retain only sensations, images, and sounds rather than ideas, and consequently only seem to possess knowledge. Moreover, in his opinion most of the lessons assigned to them are better suited to adults. Young people conclude that study is reserved for childhood, as indeed it usually is, whereas the writer believes with Socrates that the pursuit of wisdom and knowledge should be the main business of grown men. For the time being, it is the occupation of the governor rather than Emile. Even later when the hero is initiated into traditional studies, he is simply given a taste for them, “for he has all his life long to learn.”

To prove his point, Rousseau comments upon the studies in question. For example, he denies that children can cope with the abstractions of geometry, or rather with what, in accord with Socrates, he calls “imaginative hypotheses.” However, as we shall see in a moment, Emile is early encouraged to observe and compare geometrical figures, as part of the training of a childish reason of sense. As for languages, at his age they allegedly serve to teach only useless words void of the subtle modifications of ideas that belong to the spirit of a race. As for geography and history, it is too soon in the author’s belief to transport the child to faraway places, which to a very young mind are mere names, or to carry him back into ages past even if he belongs there. History is not a catalogue of names, deeds, and dates, but an inquiry into moral issues and the human heart in every century and country. Knowl-
edge of that kind is considered perilous at present because the spectacle it offers is hardly more charming than the Rousseauist vision of the past in the second Discourse. It reflects our anti-society with its unseemliness magnified a thousandfold and reveals, so to speak, the skeleton in the closet of mankind. As Socrates would say, it teaches us that heroes do harm, violate oaths, and tell lies. In Emile’s case its ugliness is to be replaced by “fair sights and sounds” that are the acts and words of those about him, designed to turn his mind into “a goodly treasure-house” for the benefit of his conduct at all times.

The same happy experiences also replace La Fontaine’s fables, which contain images of moral deformity as noxious as those recorded in history. Rousseau attacks them as violently as Socrates condemns Homer and Hesiod. Like the master he will not have some poet or storyteller of dubious intentions interfering with his work. Yet he seriously doubts whether children really understand the fables since, like the Greek sage and in the same context, he says that young persons cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal. But if they can, then the apologues are considered quite as baneful as history since they give the same false account of heroes and heroism. They reflect a disordered world where the Rousseauist covenant and laws are eluded and the common happiness is ignored. The examples he chooses include the following: “The Fox and the Crow,” in whom he sees cunning knaves and simple fools; “The Cricket and the Ant,” who symbolize for him the greedy rich and suffering poor; “The Wolf and the Dog,” who in his eyes portray lawless independence making a mockery of moderation and docility, which, though exploited and abused, he considers preferable to a life of open warfare. He also cites fables showing powerful tyrants like the lion devouring the substance of the weak; and others representing satirists in the form of stinging gnats as powerful as the shafts of ridicule against which virtue itself is not secure. It is far too early for such lessons as these at
the present stage of Emile’s formation. And so Jean-Jacques excludes them for the moment. But as I suggested above, he does not do so definitively in the way that Socrates banishes Hesiod, Homer, and the tragedians; for unlike the academic philosopher the Rousseauist hero is not to withdraw from our midst altogether. Rather, he is to be a tower or temple of strength therein as we are told later.

In that case he must get wisdom, and the author is convinced that he will never do so at this age by way of books. At twelve Emile hardly knows what a book is, though, like the young Poles in the Considerations, he early learns to read and write for his real and present pleasure and advantage. But Rousseau declines to discuss such “nonsense” as the three R’s since his theme is education, and so far they have little to do with it. The governor’s purpose is not to impress people with the boy’s brightness, like the foolish tutor in the Contract, but to find the way of happiness for them both and for mankind. That is the whole scope of wisdom’s laws, which would now be imperiled by lessons in history, fables, geography, or languages. Those studies belong to another world that Emile must first be prepared to resist by a very different kind of discipline.

This discipline is governed by the law of negative education, the Socratic “strain of peace and freedom,” as opposed to the “warlike strain of necessity” that relates to an anti-society. As the legislator enacted, it is primarily directed to the expansion and refinement of the powers of reception, the skilled cultivation of human faculties and the early formation of sages through the negative element of purity from vice or error recommended to act as a positive influence. It was foreshadowed in the concluding pages of the first part. The body, organs, and senses grow and flower in an exquisite environment of natural charm and comely manners through the “music” and gymnastic prescribed by Socrates for his guardians in the third book of the Republic. There, as I have said, the sage deals
with true myths, melody, rhythm, and taste, accompanied by an austere form of gymnastic suited to train the spirit. Likewise in Emile, as I have also said, gymnastic is accompanied by more parables in action—true myths this time—as well as training in harmony and song. By exercising and perfecting his physical powers, the child learns to direct them independently and acquires skill in adjusting himself to all things about him in their relationships to him, while at the same time he develops enough reason to discover those relationships and discern what suits the nature of his being. Throughout this phase he therefore combines the operations of body and mind, the functions of athlete and sage, and in so doing he becomes as much of a Spartan as the Socratic guardians are.

But it is the governor’s duty to see that the boy uses his strength and reason without caprice or vanity. He performs this duty self-effacingly by ensuring that his ward remains subject to the law of the human constitution. Consequently he is the real master, though the boy thinks he is. As such, we are told, he captures the other’s will and maintains it at one with his own. The latter is, of course, the enlightened will of the society of friends represented by himself and his masters, a society into which Emile is being integrated. Within a necessarily limited scope the young hero is unconsciously formed physically, intellectually, and morally, simply by pursuing the object of the will in the simple elementary form of his own real present and concrete advantage and happiness. That is because the governor takes his proper place as “helmsman” or pilot, the helm being the law. He is also a seer possessed of intuitive vision that reveals to him the secrets of the heart. According to that vision, he continues to select all the circumstances of the boy’s life as he has done from the first, “paying attention to the year and seasons and sky and stars and wind,” like Socrates’ pilot of city or of soul. In this way he uses reason to serve the will and safeguard its integrity. It is idle to pro-
test that the child is being "indoctrinated" since he is merely an image of the morally committed man over whom the power of the reasonable will would have to exercise the same insight and vigilance if the ideal order were ever to become a reality.

To depict the governor's vocation, Rousseau tells a famous story inspired by personal experience. It is a parable of the finest order and is told in two parts to show Jean-Jacques' double action in negative education as both seer and steersman. In the first a spoiled child, who is, of course, not Emile, thrice startles his newly appointed governor from his couch at midnight for the sole purpose of forcing him to light a candle. The governor, unused to capricious behavior, confines his ward to a dark closet for the remainder of the night. The same child is as capricious by day as he is by night and insists upon being escorted on walks whenever he feels inclined. When the governor, still unsubdued, refuses to comply, the rebel wanders off alone but is secretly followed by one of his mentor's accomplices, who sees that the event is attended with much unpleasantness but no great danger.

The parable is transparent enough to be interpreted with a fair degree of certainty. In the first part a helpless child who lives and moves in a world of intellectual shadow, drenched though it is in material sunshine, would control the light that belongs to the seer and force him to be led by the blind. For the candle, like the windows earlier, represents the light of the mind, as Rousseau indicates later in another context and as he did in the case of the windows. Socrates uses the same image when he bids his disciples "light a candle" and search about for justice. And we may observe parenthetically that it is he who does the bidding and not they. In the Rousseauist text the darkness of the closet, like the windowless place in the former myth, symbolizes the opposite of intellectual light, the state to which the child's ignorance relegates him. In the last phase of the story he who meanders aimlessly abroad
in the world, a prey to his own vagaries, would nevertheless have the true “helmsman” follow him, instead of the reverse. He is like Socrates’ mutinous sailors in the aforementioned parable of the ship of the soul or city who insist upon steering though they are not steerers at all. The symbolism in Rousseau’s myth is simpler, and has the unobtrusiveness that we usually associate with the term classical, while at the same time it affords a powerful projection of his message.

Broaching the problems of negative education in the ideal Aemilian world, he begins with physical training corresponding to the Greek sage’s simple or military gymnastic in the third book of the Republic. This training envisages primarily the improvement of the soul, as the two philosophers phrase it, and is characterized by Stoicism and ascetism. All year long Emile goes clad in light gaily colored robes and walks unshod and bareheaded. Like the Socratic heroes he grows used to various changes of water, and like them is trained to abstain from excess in sleep and every sort of intemperance, and to avoid enslavement to all habit except that of order; for according to the ancients and Rousseau, too, habit soon becomes a second nature. Like the same Socratic heroes of the Greek classic, he is hardened to pain and death and, in the midst of his pleasures, is no more aware than they of the fasting, fatigue, and hardships he endures. He learns to swim the Hellespont “in his father’s canal” and to rejoice in all the elements, again like those young Greek athletes, called by Socrates wakeful, lean, and wiry dogs. By such means as these his soul is tempered and made invulnerable. For the object is to develop, not robust muscular strength, but a taste for fortitude and temperance, without ever calling them by their names. It is these two virtues combined that make him into a sage and athlete too by strengthening not only the will but the reason as well and nurturing them together to bring them into natural accord or friendship with each other. Gymnastic, by helping to foster them both
in the soul, plays no small part in the preparation of the Socratic and Rousseauist guardian. The author of *Emile* follows the master so closely here that to treat the latter’s ideas on the subject separately would be far too obviously repetitious.

In the last pages of this part of the novel Rousseau turns back again from gymnastic to music as already defined. True, he calls this phase the education of the senses, and in the past we have simply accepted it as such. On the surface he appears to present it in that form. But he does so in order to adhere at least externally to the fashion of the day and pay his respects to the sensationalist doctrines of his contemporaries. Nevertheless, his purpose is both broader and deeper than theirs. We can close our eyes to this if we choose, and confine ourselves to a literal reading of the text since it always lends itself to a double interpretation. But if we overlook the possibility of a literary reading too, then we ignore the fact that Rousseau is an artist as well as a thinker. As is usual with him, it is his art that betrays his real thought here, although the former remains as “classically” unostentatious as ever. That is one reason why his motives have previously eluded us. For example, in the so-called education of the senses, he follows a significant symbolic order, but always with the utmost discretion. While training the senses in the sequence in which they naturally take their place in human life, he uses that sequence to typify the gradual raising of the mind to moral truth by the cultivation of reason and will, for which this training like simple bodily exercise is really devised. To revert to the Socratic image of the ascent of the soul from the underground den or lowest sphere in the world of sight, Emile is gradually turned away from intellectual and spiritual darkness toward a childish wisdom that prefigures Sophia. The process is accomplished by true myths, harmony and song that are conveyed in the form of lighthearted games in the fairest of settings. It is true that the hero thereby learns to use his senses ju-
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diciously but he is also oriented toward the virtues, however unwittingly, for Jean Jacques never averts his eyes from the goal. However, it is only a penetration and elucidation of myths that can tell us so.

The first of the true ones is that of nighttime games. The pretext for these games is the training of touch to teach the child to walk in darkness like the blind, to see at night, and to have no fear. This idea implies that the governor is concerned not merely with the cultivation of touch but with that of reason and spirit too. The rest of the myth confirms our suspicions. Many people, says the author—and he was no exception—fear the dark, "even philosophers and soldiers" possessed of reason and courage, and Emile must be both. He explains that this fear is caused by ignorance of our surroundings, and he thereby suggests that the darkness of which he speaks is essentially that of the mind. To dispel both weaknesses, the governor imagines sprightly games at bedtime. It is in this context that we are warned never to confine a child to a dungeon, a word that inevitably suggests the symbolism of previous myths. To illustrate his meaning, Rousseau narrates a scene from his own childhood, one that has resonances in the profession of faith of the Savoyard vicar further on, but is not included in the Confessions. In the scene in question he appears as a boy of ten sent alone upon an errand at night to fetch a Bible from the pulpit of the unlighted temple of Bossey and stimulated to find his way and banish fear by the reassuring proximity of others. Engulfed in the darkness of that "vast place," he at last reaches the holy book that contains, says the vicar later, not one revelation but two. The priest makes this remark to his disciple, a young exile who appears groping through the obscurities of revelation and is comforted by his mentor's words: "The God whom I adore is not a God of darkness." These are signs enough that the exile is foreshadowed by the blind boy of Bossey striving to overcome his blindness. Emile is mystically present in that boy, as he allegedly is in
all of us; but the real one knows nothing of churches or revelation either, although he already possesses religion without professing it, like Socrates’ heroes whose early theology is a rudimentary sketch of the virtues. For although he plays in intellectual darkness, since such is the lot of childhood, in doing so he acquires not merely balanced bodily movement but a trace of the Socratic virtues as well, especially courage and a groping reason of sense.

Obviously darkness here is as symbolic as it is in the story of the little lawbreaker or that other child of midnight fantasies of whom I spoke before. Rousseau habitually used it to typify mental and spiritual obscurity in both Emile and the Contract. His divine master does the same, for example, in the Sermon on the Mount, where the light of the body is the eye corresponding to spiritual vision, and darkness is the reverse. And, as we know, so does Socrates, who often advises that his guardians must have eyes and not be blind or feel their way about, like men in the dark. His allegorical den where men grope about through “shadows of images of objects” is the real setting of the Aemilian myth. Even when the Greek heroes go forth from the den into the world of light as philosopher-kings and are sent back later to perform some duty among the blind, they must again get the habit of seeing in the dark, where most of us are content to pass our lives. In Rousseau’s view Emile must possess the same skill as the Socratic models if he is to fare well in the world as we know it since it is there that he must live.

The next of the true myths shows children running races for cakes in miniature Olympics, which appears as a violation of the author’s principles about the ill effects of competition only if we are unaware of the imagery, as we have hitherto been. The theme of the great games is a favorite motif in Emile as it is in the Republic where, in the very book of that dialogue echoed here, the Greek sage says that his guardians are in training to win a more glorious
victory than the Olympic conquerors. Rousseau, like the master, treats the games as a symbol of life, and it assumes immense proportions in the book. It recurs in several contexts where the only element that varies is the prize: first cakes, then honor, then the Pauline “crown that never fades,” and in the fifth “act,” wisdom herself in the person of Sophia.  

The pretext for the childish races is the training of the eye to take a firm hold upon things and guard against illusions. The boy learns to measure and compare the varying distances of several courses, one for each competitor, all leading like the radii of a misshapen circle to a single goal in the form of a cake. In time he learns to choose the shortest and most direct way to the goal, by making spontaneous estimates at a glance. Thus while he is thinking only of innocent pleasures and cakes, all his resources of mind and will are being called into play. But the will takes precedence over the reason. Jean-Jacques provides a hint of this in his reply to the child, who complains about the varying lengths of the courses: “In a gift I give of my own free will, am I not master of the conditions?” These words are reminiscent of the evangelical parable of the laborers in the vineyard where men, toiling for a material reward, are meant to portray souls in quest of the meed of virtue. The master who engages them claims the freedom to reward them as he sees fit and to do what he will with his own.  

The situation in Emile is comparable, including the master’s reply, since the cake, like the reward of the biblical laborers, is a result of the effort of will and mind and body necessary to obtain it. This story suggests a view of life that is realistic enough for a child. It projects a rudimentary form of justice and wisdom, and at this stage a cake is a suitable incentive. The implication of the book is however that our world is full of grown men running for cakes and that Emile is not to be one of them.

The writer also comments upon the discipline of reason in the mythical races. The child soon acquires a “visual
compass” to evaluate the courses, which are like so many roads leading through life, and to choose the shortest and simplest one to the goal. The compass that the governor “puts in his eyes,” as Rousseau phrases it later, represents childish reason based upon sense perception. For, says the writer, sight is the sense least separable from the judgments of the mind, and so later he uses it to represent the vast capacity of the systematic genius. Socrates does likewise, and so does Christ in various ways. In the Aemilian myth Jean-Jacques is therefore cultivating the judgment since he does not assume, as others do, that it already exists in the child. He forms the latter’s reason instead of reasoning with him. And he does so with a view to the moral function of reason as a spiritual director to serve the will and lead the boy to the practice of a childish image of virtue beyond which many men never advance. But for him the tiny drama of these boyish races is but “the mimic preliminary exercise for a larger contest,” the race for Sophia, that is the governor’s sole object, unseen by the child but visible enough to an attentive spectator. Jean-Jacques is gradually leading Emile from the mental and spiritual darkness of the Socratic den into the world of light.

Like Socrates, Rousseau passes next from stories and myths to harmony, rhythm, and taste. In approaching these, one must realize that the whole of musical education including what has preceded is intended to ensure a harmonious nature and the agreement of all faculties for the practice of virtue.

Still under the pretext of cultivating the sense of sight, Jean-Jacques gives lessons in drawing and painting, taking nature as a model to train the child to observe objects and their appearances and to see the real truth and beauty of things. He also provides instruction in the proportions and relationships of geometrical figures. But he uses these studies to prepare the eye, the reason, and spirit for the discernment and pursuit of order in human life and
ROUSSEAU'S SOCRATIC AEMILIAN MYTHS

to impart rhythm and harmony to the soul through a knowledge and appreciation of the rhythm and harmony of nature. And so the writer's enthusiasm for these occupations reflects his personal taste for the arts far less than it does his delight in the setting of his stories and its presumably felicitous moral effects upon the child. This motive that suffuses his text is accentuated in the light of the Platonic one he follows. There Socrates says that harmony and rhythm "depend on... the true simplicity of a rightly and nobly ordered mind and character." By this he means one in which there is a rhythmical interplay of faculties working in unison, with leaders leading and followers following. To foster such dispositions in his heroes, he too resorts to the painter's art and the study of beauty, convinced that grace and harmony are "the twin sisters of goodness and virtue." He ordains that artists "express the image of the good in their work" and avoid images of evil. In the Rousseauist text Jean-Jacques is supposed to be just such an artist, and his "work" is Emile, as he frequently says. To accomplish his purpose, he continues to follow the master, who insists that the young Greeks dwell not in some "noxious pasture" but "in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds," including the words and deeds they witness. This rule applies to Emile, as we know. So do the rest of the sage's comments in the same context. Adapted to the Rousseauist hero, they show that beauty, "the effluence of fair works," diffuses about him powerful influences to conform him to themselves and prepare him for the beauty that is spiritual. Emile therefore exemplifies Socrates' conclusion that rhythm and harmony of environment impart grace to inner life and teach the disciple to "perceive omissions or faults in art and nature" and make him love the good and hate the bad "even before he is able to know the reason why." Rousseau is utterly imbued with these maxims.

To complete his treatment of rhythm and harmony, he has recourse to the teaching of musical instruments, under
the pretext of refining the senses and training the ear, but obviously for the purpose of disciplining the spirit, as Socrates does by the same means. The boy is taught to hear well, especially at night since, like the Socratic guardians, he still dwells in partial darkness and must be as alert as they are. But as in their case the passive organ, the ear, is perfected by the active one, the voice, which is trained in speech and in song. The author’s recommendations about these matters reflect the convictions of the master regarding melody and song, the various modes of music and their effects upon the soul, contained in the very context of the Republic that is the model here. In melody and song the Socratic and Rousseauist “strain of necessity and strain of freedom” favor either the grave Dorian mode of the Greeks intended to bring the soul of the sage into harmony with the order of the universe, or the warlike Phrygian mode, becoming to the athlete. The same laws in both texts banish the relaxed Ionian manner and the sad pathos of the Lydian as being unsuited to a boy. Rousseau concludes by citing the very words of the Republic, that “all this must be simply an amusement” and nothing more, at least for the child. But for Jean-Jacques it is a serious business since the writer is obsessed by the Socratic affinity of beauty and moral order.

Next he turns his attention to taste, or appetite, treating it not merely literally but also in an allegorical manner to prefigure aesthetic judgment, which is already being prepared by the education of music and is, as we have seen, mystically linked with spiritual life. Indeed, there is a section on aesthetic taste and an essay summarizing its conclusions at the end of the fourth part that matches the passage on the present theme at the end of the second. The literary parallelism between physical and artistic taste is subtle and significant. For example, the writer says of the child’s appetites that the rule in the selection of food is what pleases the palate, while his definition of good taste in aesthetics is what pleases most men. Moreover, in both
cases he is at pains to explain that he is not speaking of what pleases because it is useful—in the matter of food “healthful”—but simply of what is pleasing in itself. And so the guide in the choice of Emile’s food is nature or natural taste, which is his own. It favors the most simple and universal tastes that are also regarded as best in the realm of aesthetics, where the guide is the same. In both areas Rousseau admits however that modifications occur through the influence of climate, manners, way of life, age, sex, character, and environment. There is another point not to be overlooked. Not only does he give us here a foretaste of his later reflections, but the essay that follows and synthesizes them itself combines the themes of aesthetic and physical taste, with moral overtones that are also present here.

In fact, there are definite proofs that the passage on appetite has figurative and spiritual implications in addition to the obvious literal meaning. For example, the author does not insert it in the part on gymnastic where he spoke of the drinking of water. He introduces it at the end of what Socrates calls musical education. The sage does likewise, using appetite as a transition from music to gymnastic since his order is the reverse of Rousseau’s. There Socrates treats the subject allegorically in the context of the views on aesthetic taste and spiritual beauty that I summarized above, and associates the sense of taste with both aesthetics and spirituality. In doing so, he warns that he will not have his guardians nourished with images of moral deformity, nor will he have them “browse in some noxious pasture, feeding upon many a baneful herb and flower day by day” and “gathering a festering mass of corruption in the soul.” Here as in Emile physical taste is an image of aesthetic taste regarded as the bulwark of the austerity disciplined city or soul. The passage in the Republic leads to a discussion of food and drink that opens the Socratic treatment of gymnastic. In the great classic, as I have said, gymnastic follows music since, in the speak-
er's view, "to the mind when adequately trained we shall be right in handing over the more particular care of the body," an idea confirming that his main preoccupation is always the formation of the soul. The same idea pervades the corresponding pages of *Emile* on appetite, where, moreover, Rousseau's Spartan prescriptions about physical taste echo the master's, since they are dictated by the same motives. For example, in the midst of them he refers us back to the mimic Olympics and to the cake that the boy earns by his own efforts of body and spirit and the practice of an elementary justice meant to foreshadow true wisdom. Strangely enough, in the same context of the *Republic*, in a passage to which I alluded in speaking of the races, Socrates too, recommending simplicity and temperance of appetite in his heroes, emphasizes the fact that the men are in training for a contest greater than the Olympic games, which is the pursuit of wisdom. This thought brings him to denounce "sweet sauces" and "unnecessary pleasures," which, as he reminds his listeners, corrupted the original healthy state of men and made education indispensable to purge away luxury. And so appetite is not morally inconsequential for him, any more than aesthetic taste is. A sophisticated appetite represents symbolically a harmful way of life that must be purged. But he will do the purging, not physicians, who are thereupon denounced in the famous passage to which I referred earlier. He concludes again that gymnastic, including the training of appetite, envisages chiefly the improvement of the soul. Rousseau obviously agrees.

The moral issues in the passage on physical taste in *Emile* emerge further into view when the author says that the child must be nourished, not by the flesh of animals, but by the fruits of the earth, which is "our nurse and mother." He is simply quoting Plutarch. But how curious that he contrives to bring to a close this interval in *Emile’s* education exactly as Socrates concludes that of his guardians by telling them that "the earth is their mother

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and their nurse” to whom they are forever bound! The object of the Greek philosopher’s so-called royal lie is to make them care more for the city and for one another. This intention is implicit in *Emile* where the author expresses the belief that a flesh diet leads men to live like wild beasts, fosters cruelty, and stifles pity in the soul. He is still concerned with the duties of man in the city of the *Contract*, even though in actuality its freemen are robbed of the fruits of the earth to which they are entitled.

The Socratic idea of purging away luxury is also present in Rousseau’s text when he affects to deal with the sense of smell. For example, having admitted that it is weak in a child, he says that he would not arbitrarily reduce the number of agreeable sensations in life by using pleasant aromatics to hide a dose of physic whose bitterness makes a child forever insensitive to their sweetness. The bitterness that purifies body and soul is as much a part of *Emile*’s training as it is of the training of Socrates’ guardians. Rousseau’s views on the “education of the senses,” which create the impression that he is adhering to the mode of the day, contain teachings at least 2,500 years older than contemporary sensationalist doctrines.

This part of the book ends with a portrait of the child as the embodiment of all principles set forth so far. His friend brings him forward into an assembly of scholars and invites them to question him, though he has only a childish sort of reason, formed as a basis for common sense. The scene is reminiscent of Christ at the same age sitting in the temple amid doctors of the law and astonishing them with his understanding and answers as he goes about the Father’s business. In *Emile*’s case the “father” is the law, visible as a friendly presence by his side. They depend not upon each other but upon the society of their friendship, for, we are told, they are always in agreement and find their greatest happiness together. In that society we have an image of the mythical city within whose bounds the hero’s portrait unfolds. He remains as subject
to the law of necessity and of freedom as Jean-Jacques
does to that of reason, these being one and the same law of
justice. But the child observes moral rules, without having
any knowledge of them, through the action of his governor
and by virtue of the laws of custom and true opinion that
prevail round about him and are the lawgiver's main con-
cern. What few moral ideas he has relate to the covenant,
property, and freedom. His reason has been taught not to
gather useless data but to rule his person, direct his
strength, and execute his will. Moreover, although he does
not know it, he is born to govern others too by his superior
talents and experience and may do so through the force of
his example, regarded as more persuasive than "all our dis-
courses." Only such men as this bear rule in the Rous-
seauist city, for, like his Greek master, the author does
not favor equality of equals and unequals alike, whether
they be men or faculties of soul. Equality of that kind
would not lead to the felicity he seeks within the nature
and limits of the human constitution.

The portrait of the child with Jean-Jacques recalls Socrates' conclusion to the education of his guardians or spirit.
For example, the best Socratic heroes—who alone are
chosen to become "rulers"—possess the power of com-
mand or self-mastery and a love of the city or brotherhood,
such as Jean-Jacques has been nurturing in Emile. These
qualities are bred in them by their education that humanizes
them in their relations to each other, which are those of the
Socratic and Rousseauist order of friendship. They too
obey the laws of necessity and freedom. They possess
nothing that may impair their virtue as guardians and men
of temperance and courage. For example, they have no
property of their own beyond what is absolutely necessary,
but live together like soldiers in a camp, as do Emile and
Jean-Jacques in their empty, austere rustic room. They are
ruled not by desire but by the highest human faculties and
forgo all riches for the sake of the diviner metal within, as
do their modern counterparts. For the Aemilian governor
or philosopher-king is himself presented as a good guardian of self and of others, of the reasonable will or law, and of the constitution of soul or of city that is its principle materialized in Emile. It is to loyalties like these that the covenant of friendship has committed him.

Emile is therefore drawn into the image and likeness of an ancient order of things exemplified in the friendly companionship of ideal beings that results from the covenant and executes its laws. That order is also the one in the Contract that springs from the same principles. The happiness it bestows is exemplified in Emile at the end of this part. Confined to the necessities of life, he enjoys freedom, the harmonious and voluntary direction of all his faculties in accordance with the aspirations of human nature and the proper exercise of human powers. Even though the hero is aware only of the rudimentary ideas of this philosophy, the author has already completely confided in his readers. The more we contemplate the two books together, the more they interlock and fuse into one.

1. A collation makes it clear that Rousseau is "laying the foundations" in the first three parts of the Contrat as well as Emile and that the moral being does not emerge until the fourth part in both cases. In the past most of us have thought of the city or moral person as being already formed in the first part of the appendix, whereas the oath proposed there is effective only in the fourth part.

2. See, for example, "Emile," pp. 304, 692. 814-20.

3. "... N’oublions pas ce qui convient à notre condition. L’humanité a sa place dans l’ordre des choses; l’enfance a la sienne dans l’ordre de la vie humaine; il faut considérer l’homme dans l’homme, et l’enfant dans l’enfant. Assigner à chacun sa place et l’y fixer, ordonner les passions humaines selon la constitution de l’homme est tout ce que nous pouvons faire pour son bien-être."

4. For the importance of the balance of powers to keep one’s place, see O.C., 4:303 n. 1 and 304 n. 1; cf. also P. Burgelin, "L’Idée de place dans l’Emile," Revue de littérature comparée (Paris) 35 (1961): 529-37. Regarding Rousseau’s distrust of imagination in this process, that faculty was, of course, a source of happiness for him personally, but there is a difference between imaginary desire for material things and imaginative insight that transports one beyond their sphere: see M. Raymond, J.-J. Rousseau: la quête de soi et la rêverie (Paris: Corti, 1962), pp. 81-83.

5. The Republic 5. 465.

6. Ibid., 4. 444. Rousseau’s definition of happiness does not change through-
out “Emile”: pp. 455, 512-16, 536, 678, 691. It always includes health, the necessities of life, and freedom to use the faculties. Cf. the profession of faith in chapter 5 below.

7. “Le Peuple Souverain veut par lui-même, et par lui-même il fait ce qu’il veut”: “Lettres de la montagne.” O.C., 3:815. Cf. Emile: “L’homme vraiment libre ne veut que ce qu’il peut et fait ce qu’il lui plaît.” Burgelin compares the free man and free city but declines to identify them on the grounds that the meaning in Emile is anthropological and not juridical: O.C., 4:309 n. 2. However, a collation forces one to identify them. Besides, Rousseauist law is based upon Rousseauist anthropology. Freedom as it is defined is enjoyed by Emile in slavery: “Emile et Sophie,” O.C., 4:916-17.


9. Rousseau’s harsh realism as opposed to the permissiveness of his contemporaries has aroused a great deal of criticism: e.g., Crocker. Rousseau’s Social Contract: An Interpretive Essay (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1968), pp. 50, 72, 80-89, 91, etc. Seillière is much closer to Rousseau than he imagines when he writes, “Je pense, moi aussi que la mystique naturiste—si elle est à temps ramenée vers la tradition stoïque et chrétienne en morale—pourra laisser quelque jour la condition humaine améliorée de façon durable” (E. Seillière, “Alain contre Emile,” Journal des débats, 40th year, no. 2029 (13 January 1933), pp. 73-76.

10. Burgelin sees that even in the child’s minority the father commands lawfully only for the good of his offspring: O.C., 4:310 n. 3.


15. Cf. The Republic 9, 591-92. The sage takes heed that no disorder occur in the city within, such as might arise from superfluity or want, or from private or public honors. The same may be said of Rousseau’s perfect man or human self as opposed to the disordered individual.

16. He is clearly referring to the state of affairs in actual society. See “Lettre à C. de Beaumont,” O.C., 4:937 ff., where, explaining the ideas of Emile, he depicts the third state in the evolution of humanity and refers to the second “Discours”; see loc. cit., pp. 173-76. He is opposing those of his contemporaries
who favored luxury, materialism, and benevolent despotism. Cf. Einaudi, 

17. *De Cive*, chap. 8 ("Du Droict des Maistres sur leurs Esclaves").

18. Emile is prepared for the supreme sacrifice: pp. 743, 745, 823.

19. See. for example, *O.C.*, 3:376 n. 1. In any case, criminal law is not 


21. See, for example *O.C.*, 3:378 n. 1.


anarchist, nihilist, or immoralist can be controlled only by himself and no one 
else, except in the case of children.

below, see chapter 4 of this study.


27. *The Republic* 6. 497. In the case of Rousseau some critics have recog-
nized him as the lawgiver, but then they do not distinguish between the law-
giver or educator on the one hand and, on the other, the governor, whom 
they call "tutor" in *Emile*.


ous l'avons lié des chaines de la nécessité." Cf. p. 311. Burgeles hints at the 
link between the bond of necessity and reasonable law: *O.C.*, 4:319 n. 2;

32. Of course, Emile's virtue later becomes an effect of love and discern-
ment: pp. 339-40; cf. p. 481; cf. *The Republic* books 1 and 2. Regarding the lack 
of reason in children see "Emile," p. 319; cf. *The Republic* 4. 441. Both Rou-
seau and Socrates warn against the abuse of dialectic on the part of children: 
ophy" is not the study of a child, but he defines it as ""the practice of virtue 
in the highest sense," that is, through the autonomous use of the faculties: 


35. *The Republic* 7. 537. Socrates insists upon this throughout: 2. 370, 374;
3. 394-97; 4. 419-23. The doctrine of natural goodness is, of course, Socratic.


40. For the importance of mercy in the practice of justice, see “Emile,” pp. 511-12. For the “valetudinarians” see The Republic 3. 405-6; 4. 425-26. For the idea that disordered souls are sick, see “Emile,” pp. 327-28. Rousseau’s text recommending charity and beneficence is very close to Job 29:12-17.

41. It was one of Rousseau’s favorites: “Emile,” pp. 331 ff., 461, 818, 834-35; C.C., 9:125, letter to Usteri, 13 September 1761.


45. *Contrat social*, pt. 1, chap. 9. Cf. The Republic 4. 443; 9. 571 ff., 581-82, 591. Again the sage limits gain and honor to necessity lest disorder occur in the soul. For the idea of property founded upon work, see chapter 2 above and note 54.


47. The Republic 9. 589 (the “good husbandman”). Cf. “Emile,” pp. 342 (after the garden scene Rousseau writes: “... Il n'y a point de propriété pour cet âge en aucun genre ...”); 467 and 469-70 (on the need to earn a living); 833 (the main business of life is not to earn bread); 856 (Emile can own nothing).


51. The Republic 6. 510; 7. 526-27. Cf. 533. 536-37 (where Socrates recommends geometry for children providing that “early education be a sort of amusement”). His complaint, mentioned above, about confining study to childhood is in 6. 498.

52. The Republic 2. 379 ff. Cf. 5. 450-51.

53. See above and cf. The Republic 2. 378. Burgelin sees Plato’s influence
Rousseau's apostrophe to La Fontaine is comparable to that of Socrates to Homer. He writes: "Monsieur de Lafontaine... pour mon élève, permettez que je ne lui en laisse pas étudier une seule (de vos fables), jusqu'à ce que vous m'ayez prouvé qu'il est bon pour lui d'apprendre des choses dont il ne comprendra pas le quart, que dans celles qu'il pourra comprendre il ne prendra jamais le change..." Cf. *The Republic* 10. 599: "Friend Homer... if you are able to discern what pursuits make men better or worse, tell us what State was ever better governed by your help... or if you were privately a guide or teacher of any..."


56. It is more profitable here to refer to Socrates than to Locke, Condillac, or Diderot.


58. For the symbolic use of darkness see "Emile," p. 323, and cf. p. 344; and "Contrat social," p. 456 n.


61. Matt. 20:15: "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?" Cf. "Dans un don que je veux bien faire, ne suis-je pas maitre de mes conditions?"


63. For Rousseau's personal taste for arithmetic and geometry, see "Confessions," loc. cit., pp. 179-80, 238. Regarding the notebooks in which he copied an elementary course in geometry, see *O.C.*, 4:399 n. 1.


65. See notes 50 and 51 above.


67. For this quotation and the one below regarding the great contest: *The Republic* 3. 403.

68. Rousseau mentions Jesus at the age of twelve in "Lettre à m. de Franquières," *O.C.*, 4:1146.