IV
Threshold

The symmetry of Emile and the Contract in the third part of each is as transparent and enlightening as it is in the two previous parts. As before, many an obstinate problem of the treatise on citizenship finds in a collation with the novel a simple, lucid solution. The confrontation and correlation of parallel currents of thought in both works and their transfer in the Socratic manner from the sphere of the one into that of the other have the effect that might be produced by fitting some hitherto half-understood abstract into its proper context.¹

PREPARATIONS FOR KINGSHIP

In Emile the author begins by considering the boy's strength and the use to which it is to be directed. At the age of twelve to fifteen years—the period covered in this part—he has, we are told, for the one and only stage in life a surplus of physical and mental energy in excess of the amount required to provide for his limited needs. As a man he "is," or rather "would be," very weak but as a child he is relatively strong. Rousseau changes "is" to "would be." The fact that he at first used the simple present indicates that he is thinking of a man too. Emile's energy, bred of his friendship with Jean-Jacques largely through the restriction of needs to narrow natural bounds, is invested in work, instruction, and study. The author almost quotes from the Sermon on the Mount when he explains that the disciple will use his strength to lay up treasure for himself, not in coffers where thieves break through and steal, nor in barns like men who forget that life is more than meat, but in his person and mind, which are

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most truly himself.

To what studies are his energies directed? This is tantamount to asking again: "Where is wisdom? Where is happiness?" For, in Rousseau's view, the only pursuits worthy of a child and the sage he is to become are those that convey a knowledge of what is really useful for human happiness and his own, that knowledge being wisdom. Childish reason must therefore be changed into common sense and adult reason, which order and adjust all faculties of soul in accordance with the constitution of the whole being and all its parts, and its place in the order of things. The governor will reduce Emile's inquiries to what is useful for this purpose and accessible at his age, namely, natural knowledge about things, their existence, and essential relations to himself. With this in mind Jean-Jacques prepares to dispel "the darkness of human understanding" by drawing aside the veil from the face of nature. In other words, the disciple is now to be led further away from the "darkness" of the Socratic den into the light by means of work and study, "the steep and rugged ascent" to which I alluded in my second chapter when I spoke of the evolutionary process that is the theme of Rousseau's two books.

First the governor measures Emile's intelligence according to his progress in geometry, with which, after the fashion of Socrates at the same stage, this part of the novel begins and ends. The moment the boy can discern what is "useful" and what is not, he is artfully led to speculative studies and induced, for example, to find a "mean proportional" between two lines, or so we are told. Indeed, the author uses the term twice to convince us that the child can be impelled by some strange need to discover the solution. Then, after proposing the curious mathematical problem, he exclaims mysteriously: "See how we are gradually approaching moral ideas that discern good from evil!" He adds that until now we have known no law but necessity, whereas at present we are consid-
ering what is "useful." Here the notion of the "useful" appears to be obscured by the terminology, which is at first sight dismaying. It is elucidated by the initial chapter of the matching part of the Contract where he twice describes government as "a mean proportional" between subjects and sovereign. If, authorized by that text, we replace the geometrical terms in Emile by the idea of government or kingship whose proper role in moral life they symbolize, we may infer that the useful knowledge the boy is about to acquire relates to the governing function of reason, the art of kings and sages, or philosopher-kings. He is to be initiated into the vocation of Jean-Jacques, who professes to confine his teaching to what leads to wisdom and happiness. Such is the real theme of the third part as revealed by this collation and confirmed by the context of the passage on geometry in the novel.

With a view to instruction in good government the governor stimulates natural human curiosity to train the boy's reason to embrace all that contributes to his own well-being or felicity. Such curiosity is, we are told, the kind that might move a philosopher, if relegated alone to a desert island for life, to visit his earthly habitation. This image that dominates the whole third part of Emile is interpreted by Rousseau himself. The island of the human race is the earth. In that case the solitary philosopher or "lover of Sophia" is an image of the race itself or abstract man, Emile, in search of what is useful for his happiness. Indeed, the lad is about to be transformed into a new avatar of Robinson Crusoe, and at his time of life he judges all things by the usefulness they might have for that hero of childhood whose happiness is as simple as his own.

Of course, the child's concept of the "useful" will fall far short of the governor's. Yet there is no discrepancy between them. Emile, limited to what is of "real utility," has a childish, Robinsonian idea of it since he is confined to the narrowest sphere in material life, but that is the very condition of the greatest possible spiritual expansion.
The harsh discipline that subjects him to necessity from the first still prevails under the law of expediency and liberates the spirit to prepare him for his destined place as sage and ruler in the world within. Hence the governor employs what is useful in the boy's eyes to train him for an understanding of what is useful to achieve wisdom and happiness through self-government, a process that depends for its success upon that narrow view of expediency in physical life.

The writer is here inspired not only by the Sermon on the Mount but also by the teachings of Socrates. For example, Jean-Jacques calls the useful "noble" and "sacred." So does the Greek master, who explains that all things become useful only by their use of the idea of good. For him what is useful is wisdom turned toward moral truth or, as he says, whatever draws the soul toward true being or the good. This is the very sense in which Emile's governor uses the term when he proposes as his object the felicity of the sage and defines the useful as whatever is conducive to that end. In fact, the useful studies ultimately recommended in this part match the Socratic ones, which, as the master admits, are commonly called "useless" but which in his eyes are "useful" if sought after with a view to the beautiful and the good; but if pursued in any other spirit (for example, that of the shopkeeper), they are quite useless. The same beliefs determine Emile's studies at this stage and the use to which his reason is put. If, in the words of the Greek thinker, "the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure... and of every action of man is relative to the use for which nature or the artist has intended them," then the excellence of reason is relative to its use for purposes of government and the enforcement of law for which nature has designed it, rather than for shopkeeping.² And so Emile is initiated into its real use.

The idea that the sum of physical and spiritual strength fostered in soul or city by the society of friends must be governed and directed to whatever is useful for the happi-
ness of the moral being enunciated in the laws is the theme of the third part of the *Contract*. Like the matching third part of *Emile* it contains a study of government. The first chapter deals with the subject in general. It begins significantly with a comparison between the relationship of body and soul in a man and the operations of government and sovereignty in a city. "Every free act," says the writer, "has two causes... one moral; the will that determines the act; the other physical: the strength that executes it." In like manner the "moral person" of the city possesses both strength and will. These are the legislative power belonging to the sovereign people, whose acts are general principles providing for common utility, and the executive power, consisting of specific deeds delegated to an agent. The agent performs the function of the brain or reason in the soul by moving all forces to do the bidding of the will so that desires may not exceed strength and body and spirit may be brought into unison. That is precisely the role of Jean-Jacques' reason in the novel, and it is also the art he teaches. In the *Contract* the agent of the sovereign, its minister so to speak, is termed "government," considered from the point of view of its function as the lawful exercise of executive power. The body in which it is vested is called the "prince," and its members bear the name of "magistrates," "kings," or "governors." The language and the mentality are both biblical and Socratic. The idea that reason must rule or, as the Greek sage phrases it, that philosophers must be kings, is the third great "wave" that he must overcome before he can found his city. His rulers, like Rousseau's, are called "kings," "ministers of justice," "governors," or "magistrates." As in *Emile* and the *Contract*, they guide the resources born of the city toward the happiness that is its object, implying at once the narrowest material limits and the largest spiritual growth.

In the same chapter of the *Contract*, on government in general, this agent of the supreme power, who is as it were
a bond between body and soul, is accordingly defined as intermediary between subjects and sovereign, or, if we wish, between desires and will combined in the same persons. Since the latter are subject only to the law of their own highest faculty, the government of reason is subject to the same law and rules in obedience to it to maintain freedom. For Rousseau as for Socrates, Christ, and the biblical writers too, true kingship or government is in the nature of a service, a ministry to others and sacrifice of self. He therefore rejects the idea accepted by his contemporaries that its institution is a covenant like that which establishes the sovereign power. This idea is all the more preposterous in his eyes since the ruling faculty is prone to be seduced by the blandishments of wayward desires. And so he considers it as subordinate to the constant will that remains an infallible guide to judge the use or abuse of reason in the executive power. To represent the latter as he sees it, he twice calls it by the mathematical term used as often in *Emile*, a “mean proportional” between sovereign and state, since it receives from the former both the directions it gives to the people and the force of which it disposes and which it may not exceed. This is in accordance with his Socratic vision of a well-ordered and harmonious constitution wherein all parts do their own work without interfering with others, the will being in high command, the governing power of reason ruling in obedience “in the form of a servant,” and the subject desires or gainful faculties taking their natural place in submission.

It is to accentuate the value of objectivity in acts of government that Rousseau, like Socrates, has recourse to the language of mathematics in both books. But the Greek philosopher uses it to measure the happiness of the true governor or king, who is king of self, and to compare that sum of felicity with the misery of the tyrant. To describe the interrelationships of spiritual forces, he favors musical terminology, likening the three powers in soul or city—reason, spirit, and desire—to the higher, lower, and mid-
middle notes of the scale and the intermediate intervals, which must be harmonized into one. This idea is akin to that of the "mean proportional." But Rousseau prefers the mathematical term and shows how appropriate it is to express his meaning. For example, in a city the ratio or relationship of subjects or desires to the sovereign will, a ratio that determines the strength and integrity of the governing faculty, depends upon many factors, including the size of the city or "moral person." In a large one, where the temptations of prestige and wealth are numerous and persuasive and the individual shares less in sovereignty, there is need for a stronger governing power, which in turn must be controlled by greater "will power." Since the process is endless, the author disapproves of large cities. Analogously in *Emile* he counsels all men not to extend their being through space and time in pursuit of power and wealth until their lives are at the discretion of events essentially foreign to themselves and causing disorder within them. In that case "imaginary" desires increase and multiply to deceive and enslave the proper agent of the sovereign will.

To conclude his general chapter on government, Rousseau declares that this new "moral person," as he calls the governing power, who is active as participant in sovereignty and passive as subject to the laws it enforces, has only a borrowed and subordinate life. It is an artificial body that is the work of another artificial body, the sovereign. Of course, for reason is a product of art necessary to consummate the disciplined human will in the complex civilized soul. The author suggests that to prevent its abuse in morals or citizenship is practically impossible. But he also says that, apart from its "subordinate life," it must have a vitality of its own in order to perform its lawful functions, combine its resources, take counsel, deliberate, make resolutions, and enjoy the rights and privileges necessary to save the constitution. These are precisely the prerogatives of reason exemplified in Jean-Jacques' con-
cept of government in *Emile*, where the neophyte is gradually initiated into its mysteries.

Since the Rousseauist governor approaches his task in the manner of Socrates, I might profitably explain the author’s use of the *Republic* at this juncture. Whereas Emile’s early discipline as a Socratic guardian was the theme of the second part, his training as a philosopher-king is the theme of the rest of the book. The third part contains the preparation for the education of a king; the fourth is an exposition of the formation required; and the fifth offers a spectacle of the inner realm of the ruler. Socrates, who has a fancy for musical terms since his purpose is to create and maintain harmony in the soul, calls the present stage “the prelude to the chief strain,” coming after “the strain of necessity” and “the strain of freedom,” and leading to the chief strain of kingship. For Rousseau too this is the prelude to his own chief strain, which is the next part and especially the Song of Orpheus, as he calls his profession of faith therein. His prelude is inspired by the sage’s contained in the seventh book of Plato’s dialogue, upon which he draws heavily. In doing so, he takes the opposite course to the one he followed in the previous part. There he began by describing the principles and virtues of the moral being and the laws devised to shape it, and then depicted the discipline required, inverting the order of the first four books of the *Republic*. Here he begins with the process of education, or rather the content and method of the basic or preliminary training prescribed, and then in the fourth part proceeds to describe the nature and formation of the philosopher-king. But since in the case of kings Socrates follows a sequence that is the reverse of the previous one, Rousseau still inverts the order. I emphasize this because it is probably one reason why we have not previously recognized that *Emile* and the *Contract* are essentially a Rousseauist version of the *Republic*.
For greater clarity let me show briefly how Socrates handles the education of kings from the fifth to the seventh books. In the fifth, having discussed the role of women, which is the apparent theme of the Aemilian finale, he deals with the problem of evil and the value of sympathy to solve it, and finally discloses his ideal, which is to ensure that philosophers are kings, ideas that recur throughout the next part of Emile. The sixth book deals with the philosophic nature and its vocation and is also an important guide in the next part of Rousseau’s novel. The same sixth book culminates with a similitude of the sun that is matched by an analogous one in the midst of the corresponding Aemilian text in the profession of faith. In the seventh book the sage finally broaches his “prelude” and leads his prisoners away from the den into the light, but first redefines the happiness of kings and sages that he visualizes, exactly as Rousseau does in the present part. Socrates’ “prelude” consists of studies “useful” to that end, to prepare the reason for its proper role as ruler, not shopkeeper. It also specifies the qualities and age of student kings. The reader will see for himself how closely the author of Emile follows his pattern.

The Aemilian prelude is heralded by a little similitude of the sun foreshadowing the real one, and both reflect the Socratic imagery. The writer here sees the sunrise as an immense fire in the firmament scattering “the veil of darkness” and of night. The same veil covers what he called earlier the dark recesses of the mind, where he feared to light the torch of reason too soon. Like the Greek sage he thinks of the sun as linking sight and visibility, and in this respect it is the Socratic “author of sight,” which he has already called “the sense least separable from the judgments of the mind.” Hence we have his sanction to see in the sunrise a dramatization of the dawn of manly reason. The child now beholds the earth in the light of reason—a light that proceeds from truth, which is bound to
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turn out to be moral truth as is usual with Rousseau.

In the child's case, we are told, the light lacks warmth of feeling, since his heart is not yet stirred by the harmony of the universe. Besides, he contemplates the works of creation without seeing the "workman," whose absence is, however, rather obtrusive. In the next part when the great "artist" is at last revealed, Jean-Jacques exclaims how simple it is to rise from the study of nature to the search for its author, thereby confessing the reason for his present explorations of the "island" of the world. When Rousseau finally broaches the sublime theme and returns to the symbol of the sun, he uses it with very different effect in a new and fuller similitude in the profession of faith, where reason is by then perfected by feeling.

We come now to the "steep and rugged ascent" of the future Aemilian and Socratic king. It is designed to give him a taste for intellectual toil until his vision, still perplexed and weak, becomes accustomed to the brightness of reality, and he is able to rise to the upper levels of the higher intellect.

Among the "useful" studies of the spiritual ascent, geometry is employed both first and last to illustrate the proper and objective use of the speculative faculty in its role as ruler. But the boy's main study, which ultimately leads to the source and pattern of all kingship and sovereignty, is the exploration of the earth and the examination of the products of nature and of art in their relationships to himself. He thereby acquires a few elements of the Socratic natural sciences and of the industrial and mechanical arts. In recommending the arts and the sciences, he has not forgotten that he is the author of a Discourse contending that their restoration has helped "to corrupt morals," in the words of Fénelon. 6 But in his view morals are corrupted not by the proper use of the arts and the sciences but by their abuse in our society. For Emile the arts and the sciences are the preamble of the great revelations of the next part.

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He begins with astronomy, combined with a rather unconven­
tional kind of geography, for the purpose of learn­
ing how to orient himself in the world of things. His
 governor's laconic, or rather Socratic, questions stimu­
late him to solve problems relating to the heavens and the
earth and the laws that govern them. These researches
are complemented by a study of local topography and by
the making of maps of the immediate surroundings. Since
few of us at Emile's age have ever felt the "usefulness" of such knowledge to find our way about, it is log­
cical to suspect the presence of symbolism here.

It resides in the concept of "orientation." Here the word
means the ascertainment of the compass-bearings of the
soul on its journey toward the good represented by the
sun, whose light, as I have hinted, is that of moral truth.
The idea is Socratic, as we know. Rousseau himself sug­
gests the allegorical meaning. He does so by reminding us
in this very context that Emile already has "a compass in
his eyes" and then by teaching him soon after that the
mathematical instrument does not suffice and that he needs
a helmsman's compass, too, not in his eyes or in his hands
but in his soul. We shall come to that lesson in a moment.
Meanwhile we may observe that the author connects the
two compasses and intends a continuity of imagery, al­
though he uses a different word in each case. The magnet­
ized needle turning upon a pivot suggests to the mind a
relationship with the geometrical instrument. Both are used
in the novel as images of reason trained in the helmsman's
art, and the helm, as we know, is the law. The boy learns
to use his reason to "orient" his life toward the proper
object of the will. Meanwhile he is unwittingly guided by
his gouverneur. The allegory of the pilot that necessarily
runs throughout the book becomes almost obtrusive in this
part on government. That is as it should be.

The Socratic heroes undergo the same discipline. After
beginning with mathematics, considered "useful to draw
the soul toward being" or moral truth, they approach as-
As they do so, one of the sage’s youthful listeners, momentarily losing sight of the goal, remarks that this subject would be “useful” to a general, a farmer and a sailor (though he is not thinking of the “true pilot”) since it would help them orient themselves in a literal sense. The master in his reply expresses amusement at his young friend’s “fear of the world” and desire to “guard against the appearance of insisting upon useless studies” that “purify and re-illumine the eye of the soul” to reveal moral truth. The object of such studies is the spiritual orientation envisaged by Rousseau. The latter takes to heart the sage’s advice to the youth to face the fact that some persons will see “no sort of profit which is to be obtained” from his words, since the kind of profit desired has nothing to do with shopkeeping and lies beyond childish minds. Emile, though a child, is not one of them since Jean-Jacques uses his first lowly steps in the intellectual ascent to raise him at last to a loftier concept of what is useful for his happiness. That is because the governor follows Socrates’ advice to the letter. For example, he uses “the spangled heavens” as a pattern with a view to higher knowledge, for which he prepares his pupil by problems to exercise his reason and teach him to reflect, deliberate and resolve, and ultimately to govern and orient the soul toward what is regarded as its proper end, namely, the good. So does Socrates. Both quite obviously have in mind the great similitude of the sun to follow later.

Rousseau, like his model, is therefore mainly concerned here with the art of reasoning and of examining the truth of things. At this juncture, after the example of the master, he dwells upon the importance of that art. He warns that the child can acquire it only by using his reason independently. Accordingly, Jean-Jacques secretly induces him to learn alone, to discover his own mistakes and gather clear ideas instead of facts. Moreover, he refuses to be a slave to the boy’s questions, and answers them only enough to
stimulate curiosity but not enough to satiate it. In exactly the same context of the “prelude” Socrates too demands that his prospective rulers develop great skill in asking and answering questions, and advises against encouraging them to interrogate and argue for the sole purpose of refuting other people. Jean-Jacques also resembles the master—again in the same context—when he further arouses curiosity by connecting knowledge in a manner suited to a child, one object naturally suggesting another to the mind.

To ensure, however, that the young scholar understands the difference between the use of reason and its abuse, the Rousseauist governor devises a new parable that is, appropriately enough, a tribute to Socrates but has hitherto been ignored as such. In tracing meridians to make maps to find their way about, the friends are led to the study of the magnet and ultimately to the helmsman’s compass. One day they go to a fair where they watch a juggler using bread with a magnet hidden inside it to attract a wax duck floating upon water. On their arrival home they imitate him. The same evening again at the fair they confound the performer in the eyes of his audience and take pride in displaying their prowess at his expense. The following day they return to the scene of their triumph, only to be mortified in their turn by one failure after another, while the conjuror enthralls the spectators with his “miracles.” The moral so far is that reason has been put to the wrong use, resulting in vanity, error, and disgrace.

But there is more to the parable than that. The juggler, secretly prompted by Jean-Jacques, as we are told in a note testifying to the symbolism here, pays a visit to the friends and complaints that they had tried to rob an honest man of his livelihood, the only talent he has to earn his bread. Thereupon he discloses the secret of his exploits. When they offer him a gift, he refuses it: he takes no money in return for his teaching. Here he resembles not only the author, who earned his living copying music, not writing books, but also the two great masters, who took no fee
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for their lessons. He also resembles Jean-Jacques. Before taking his leave, he reproaches the latter for failing to counsel the child in his ignorance. The older man’s experience, says he, is the authority that must guide the other. At once the governor promises Emile to protect his interests in future by telling him of his mistakes beforehand. The reader is then informed that their relationship is about to change: Jean-Jacques is to be no longer an apparently complacent companion but a severe master. The change is anticipated by “our conjuror Socrates.” For so he is called in this simple humble tribute to the teacher who uses the art of conjuring in the Republic to illustrate the illusions of the mind and the need for reason to combat them. The scene closes with the words: “All this to make a compass to take the place of meridians” for purposes of orientation.

This part of the story requires commentary. The hero is being initiated into the notion of work as a means of earning bread, an idea vaguely present in the races for cakes or mimic Olympics. For Rousseau this notion implies a rudimentary form of justice in the Socratic sense, demanding, as we said above, that each class or faculty do its own work and refrain from meddling with others. The sage himself, that great magician, is brought into the story to teach a basic lesson in the specific virtue that was the whole object of his quest in life. Emile has just meddled with others, committing a real injustice and not an imaginary one as in the parable of the sower. Hence he is in need of positive government and the guidance of greater age and experience to teach him to practice true justice and prevent him from harming others and bringing misfortune upon himself, until he knows enough about the proper use of reason for these purposes. The conjuror performs a real miracle by preparing him to recognize the need for direction in due course, and in addition arms him against serious illusions and false miracles later on.

The compass that, according to the conclusion of the
parable, Emile has obtained must therefore be the one Jean-Jacques promises him therein, the ministry of his governor’s reason. Of course he possesses it already, but he is unaware of that until later when the myth of the magician takes effect. At no time does he have any other compass but a symbolic one. That is why the governor, having said that they now have a compass to replace meridians, proceeds to give his pupil a lesson in orienting himself by means of the sun. It is also why Emile later possesses no compass literally speaking when, lost in a wood, he stands urgently in need of one. Then it is the helmsman’s reason that becomes “that trembling vassal of the Pole, the feeling compass, navigation’s soul.” The pole would be divine wisdom, Sophia, toward which the pilot-governor’s course is oriented.\textsuperscript{15}

It is important to know what form of government Jean-Jacques embodies and teaches in \textit{Emile}. The answer is abundantly clear in the novel and is reflected in several chapters of the corresponding part of the \textit{Contract} dealing with different kinds of government. “The principle that constitutes various forms of government,” in the wording of the title of the second chapter, is the number of governors to whom the executive power is entrusted. Rousseau begins by establishing that the more governors there are, the less active the government is, even though it may be more righteous. He then considers two forms both of which he rejects. The first is the intensely active rule of one, who consolidates within himself the force of the entire association but uses it to serve his own private interests or desires. The second is the government of the whole moral being in which the legislative authority reposes, whose will is righteous but whose governing power lacks energy, since its preoccupation with general principles and abstract concepts makes it unable to cope with specific issues efficiently and expeditiously. The alternatives given only lead to an impasse and hardly correspond to the ideal situation in the novel.
In the third chapter, "Division of Governments," the author distinguishes three forms and emphasizes the role of the supreme command of will in their establishment: the democratic, suited to a small city, wherein the sovereign entrusts the administration to all or most of the people; the aristocratic, befitting a city of moderate size, wherein the sovereign confides it to less than half of them; and finally, the monarchy or rule of one man, expedient only for vast states. In all cases the difficulty of the subordination of powers accentuates the mythical nature of his city. And so he adds significantly that government is susceptible of as many forms as the state has citizens, suggesting that the only true one is self-government. This is the message of Emile too. Of course, one of the three forms or a modification of it must then be adapted to the direction of inner life.

The next (fourth) chapter of the Contract, "Concerning Democracy," deals with a form that Rousseau positively rejects as impossible. Yet many scholars today, like his contemporaries, see in the book a theory of democracy since he makes the king a mere governor to execute the sovereign will of the people. But a constitution of that kind would, in his Socratic terminology, be called not a democracy but a republic or ideal city. He has already said that for him a democracy is a city wherein the administration is assigned to the whole nation and that the latter cannot cope with practical problems posed by the intrigues of private passions in particular acts, a truth that is also illustrated in the Republic. According to the present chapter, a city that would never face such problems would not need to be governed at all since it would be a minute epitome of the simplicity, equality, ascetism, and virtue of men so perfectly one that the execution of the laws would immediately follow from the sovereign will. He concludes that this form of government would be suited only to a nation of gods. He means, as we are told later in Emile, that the divine intelligence acts intuitively without reasoning and
the divine will takes effect without means.¹⁷ Men are otherwise, alas! And so the Rousseauist city is not democratic in the sense defined by the author, who in any case has long since rejected dwarf cities as he did giant ones in favor of those of moderate size.

Even if we confuse democracy with self-government, his ideal could hardly be called democratic in the Rousseauist view, since the term “self-government” suggests that there is a self to govern and another to be governed. But Rousseau does not confuse his terms. If, as democracy implies for him in any moral being whether city or soul, the resolutions of the will always remain the measure of the impulses of desire without the deliberations and guidance of reason, then as he has said the governing function, bestowed upon reason by nature herself, would not need to act at all to maintain a balance of powers and desires, and even self-government would be unnecessary. But that is impossible, even for Emile. He is being governed now as he is to be all his life long. Only he is not ruled democratically.

In the novel, as we know, Jean-Jacques’ rule represents that of a distinguished minority like that which governs the inner world of the soul where there is a hierarchy among the faculties. In him the power of reason follows its natural vocation and rules in the service of the sovereign will. The compass, the tiniest part of the soul obeying the human spirit’s deepest aspiration, rules the large part consisting of the great obscure and formless mass of multitudinous desires. Judgment and decision belong to the elite, for nature herself ordains it. The governor is at present teaching Emile that very lesson, and when the boy finally governs himself, he does so in the manner of Jean-Jacques.

In the Contract too Rousseau favors aristocratic rule. He does so in the fifth chapter, “Concerning Aristocracy.” But he begins by stipulating that governors, like Socratic kings, be servants of the nation, or rather, of
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the righteous will. He distinguishes three forms of aristocracy. The first is natural, based upon age and "the authority of experience," says he, quoting the conjuror's words in *Emile*. This kind of government befits a child or, if we wish, humanity in its childhood. Then there is the elective aristocracy seen in the next part of the novel where the hero, having learned the art of self-government, appoints Jean-Jacques to be his "minister of education," or "governor," until he can safely serve and rule himself aristocratically, as he must do in the inevitable absence of the ideal social order. Finally there is the hereditary aristocracy, dismissed by the author as the worst of all.

He prefers the elective by reason of its visible benefits. They include the separation of the supreme will and governing faculty, and also the advantage of being able to choose as governors, not people who embody the desire for wealth and power as has supposedly been done in the historical past, but distinguished men of integrity, enlightenment, and experience. The rulers of his own city are, as we know, men who have proven their superiority. And so in this chapter he favors "sage rulers" or "philosopher kings," providing they rule for the profit of all instead of their own private benefit, and begin by ruling themselves. It is useless to reproach him for controlling "individuals"—or individualist desires—by means of a small select leadership since that is admittedly what he intends to do. He concludes by saying that under such an administration rigorous equality is not necessary, since governors must of course have the means to exercise their function. He said the same in the penultimate chapter of the previous part. This is not a violation of the principle that property must be based upon need before it can become a legitimate right in any city, however governed. It simply means that the governing power in city or soul is supported by gainful faculties and is reduced to the necessities of its station in life, as are those faculties themselves. This is the case in *Emile*, where all the con-
ditions of good government are translated into the domain of private life.

The nature of good government is further elucidated in the novel by another parable, that of Montmorency forest. Before dealing with it, I must explain the context in which it occurs. Like the myth of the conjuror, this one too is connected with the study of the so-called natural sciences. The acquisition of the "compass" leads the friends into the vast domain of systematic physics. They create their own instruments to perform experiments in the world of nature in such a manner that the reason is slowly enlightened by clear, well-related ideas. Rousseau comments that among the many fine shortcuts to knowledge, we sorely need someone to teach us the art of learning with difficulty. Here he is still inspired by Socrates, who in the same context describes the attributes necessary to profit by his teaching and demands that his future kings be able to endure the severity of study, that they be sound in body and mind and lovers of the labor of both. Emile's "laborious researches" are dictated by the same considerations. They allegedly combine the gymnastic of the athlete with the intellectual discipline of the sage and raise him at last "from the amusements of philosophy... to the true function of a man." Now a man's true function, still unknown to the boy, is philosophy, but not in the sense understood by the writer's contemporaries who discredited the term in his eyes, nor even in the sense of the study of science as some of us have recently supposed, but in the Socratic sense of the practice of wisdom for the sake of felicity. In order that the hero may practice it without compulsion as the Greek sage advises, he is taught that wisdom suits his nature and is useful for his happiness. For example, we are told that he is learning to exercise enough reason and foresight to see the value of work and submit to the law of necessity with a view to providing for the modest needs and simple happiness of natural man, in accordance with the Socratic law of justice herewith presented in a form slightly
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more refined than before. But Emile is not yet a moral being since his virtues are practiced unconsciously and are still only "images of virtue." Jean-Jacques is preparing him for that higher vocation and training his reason for its proper role therein, simply by confining him to activities conforming with his childish notion of present utility. "What is the use of that?" becomes a phrase as "sacred" for Rousseau as it is for his Greek master, since it signifies what is useful to the boy in the present to pave the way for the happiness of the sage, as we were informed earlier. With that phrase the governor quells his ward's inquiries and teaches him "to interrogate like Socrates," says the writer, referring openly to the very context of the Republic by which he is here inspired. If Emile in his turn responds to his governor's rare queries in like manner, Jean-Jacques in his reply never loses sight of the double meaning of what is useful for his pupil's happiness, implying both limited material bounds and unlimited spiritual scope. This brings us to the parable of Montmorency forest.

In the midst of conversations about orienting oneself by the sun and observations about the position of the forest north of the village, Emile suddenly asks: "What is the use of that?" Jean-Jacques simply abandons the subject. But next morning he contrives to see that they go astray in those very woods, though, of course, he himself is far from lost. The boy sheds tears of despair though "the real Emile" never weeps. He is famished, and, to make matters worse, it is noon and dinnertime. After a while Jean-Jacques like another Socrates suddenly recalls the previous day's discussion. At midday they can find the north judging by the direction of the shadows. To make their way toward the village, they need only take the opposite course from the darkness toward the light. For the first time in his life the happy Emile addresses his governor as his "good friend" while they follow the path leading out of the woods. The new Robinson Crusoe at last discovers "the footprints in the sand," an awareness of others that will
conduct him to the desired goal.

This parable, presented as a dramatic dialogue like that of the sower, clothes the author's ideas in visible imagery essential to the literary art. Here Emile appears as an image of natural man who is already unconsciously prepared for integration, since he sees that if he does not find his way out of the forest, he will starve. He is to become aware of the necessity for entering society in order to provide for the needs of life, the first and greatest of which is food, the very condition of existence. He must go forth to procure what is "useful" for his well-being as simply as he conceives it. In fact, he is about to be transplanted from his country garden to the city of Paris in the second part of this phase of his training.

But other elements of symbolism in the myth show that the idea of usefulness extends much further than the boy can see. He not only moves from the woods to the social order to provide for his needs, but at the same time emerges from the shadows into the light, from the semidarkness of mental dawn toward the radiance of "truth." Now, as we have observed, that truth, born in society, is less intellectual than moral. Here it implies the idea of work as a form of Socratic justice for which the boy is being prepared. The parable contributes to lead him thither by way of spiritual "orientation"—the pilot's art—again suggested by the problems of astronomy with their allegorical overtones. Accordingly, almost immediately after the miniature drama, the writer again refers to the ultimate goal of Rousseauist and Socratic reason, unknown, of course, to the child: "the happiness of the sage and the glory of paradise." The author has this in mind, therefore, in the parable itself. He virtually says so in an allusion to it in the sequel to Emile—also inspired by The Republic—where it is interpreted symbolically. In an ethical situation in that fragmentary work, Emile says: "I took the direction contrary to the object that I was morally obliged to avoid, in the same way that I followed the opposite of the shadow
years ago in Montmorency forest." In a sense the whole allegory is a new appeal to men to find their way out of the woods and their amoral or immoral plight, and to orient their lives toward justice and spiritual values already roughly sketched in the apologue of the conjuror Socrates.

Of course, the hero is not led from the woods by his own reason. He is guided by the light of the sun and the compass that he discovered as a result of his encounter with the conjuror, namely, reason in the gouverneur and the truth that lights its way. What is important here is that he feels this personally to the point of calling Jean-Jacques his "good friend." The phrase is suggestive of a Socratic utterance in Plato's third book where the sage, forming his guardians, anticipates the training of kings in words that resound throughout Emile, as we shall see: "When reason comes, he [the pupil] will recognize and salute the friend with whom his education has made him long familiar." The reason that is friendly to nature must finally appear to him as such. But until it does and he has a "compass" of his own, he is brought to feel more and more deeply the need for Jean-Jacques' rule and is even led to implore it as a grace.

There is an allegory in the fourth book of the Republic that combines most of the elements of the myth of Montmorency forest and casts light upon the moral function of reason therein. Socrates and his friends appear as huntsmen in a forest in search of game, reminiscent of Emile's dinner. But the Greek master, like Jean-Jacques, has something else in mind, and the real object of his search is justice. His young friends, like Emile, "have just eyes enough to see what the master shows them." And although Socrates remarks, "Here is no path and the wood is dark and perplexing," yet we have the feeling that he is no more lost than the Rousseauist governor, for he suddenly finds the quarry as close by as the village in Emile. Rousseau is fascinated with the story. He returns to it in the fourth part where the lad goes hunting just before he discovers
true justice, and again in the fifth where the two friends lose their way thrice in the woods in their search for Sophia, who turns out to be close by. And so the Socratic symbolism of the hunt for wisdom employed in the third part is rich in potential reverberations and becomes, as it were, a recurrent motif or musical phrase sustained throughout the harmonious temple of the soul.

IMAGES OF JUSTICE

Emile is at last transplanted to the French capital to study the arts after exploring the sciences. To represent the spiritual isolation of natural man in a strange setting before he becomes active as social or moral man, to prepare him for that vocation, and to initiate him into society, the author has recourse to the allegory of Robinson Crusoe to which he alluded at the beginning of this part. The narrative becomes very personal here, for, in his autobiography and Dialogues, he is himself the “new Robinson Crusoe.” So is Emile. This is another confession that in the novel Rousseau is really telling the tale of his own spiritual aspirations. The allegory opens with a violent diatribe against “bookish learning,” which has nothing to do with them. The fact is that Emile does not confine himself to reading the story of Robinson but acts it out in real life as in the case of previous myths. Indeed, this is the first one not invented by Jean-Jacques, although all are at least partially inspired by outside sources, especially the Republic and later La Fontaine’s fables. The eponymous hero, like another Robinson Crusoe, learns to provide alone for the needs of natural man, which are those of his own life and happiness, beginning with the need for bread glimpsed in the conjuror’s complaints and personally felt in the forest. He does so by means of the natural arts that a man may practice by himself and that afford no other felicity but freedom of spirit and the bare necessities of life. However, by favor of those very assets, he is soon to become an active moral being, “king of himself” as Robinson was
king of his island and Adam king of his. Indeed, Jean-Jacques uses the myth of the great hero of childhood to make his ward into a Socratic king or governor like himself by teaching him to use his own reason to serve his needs and those of others too, while making as few claims as possible upon his fellows.

Emile's kingship, anticipated here, raises problems posed in the *Contract*, particularly in the sixth chapter, “Concerning Monarchy.” It is inspired by this part of the novel but deals largely with the world of actuality, which is contrasted with the ideal. Rousseau, moved by the spectacle of eighteenth-century despotism, has already shown the disadvantages of royal government in its contemporary form, and he does so again in the present context. This does not alter the fact that his own governors are called “kings,” that Jean-Jacques is one of them and Emile destined to become one. The author never loses sight of the Socratic or evangelical kingdom within. His aristocratic governors and sages of the previous chapter are kings like those of Socrates, who makes no distinction at all between the royal and aristocratic forms of government and calls his rulers both “aristocratical men” and “philosopher-kings.” When Rousseau comes to speak of royal government in the *Contract*, he simply reverses his own idea of kingship and shows the latter in practice as opposed to what it essentially is in his view. The whole chapter is a paradox. The kings evoked therein are imposters whose passions enslave them to the lowest elements and tyrannize the highest in themselves and in all those upon whom they depend. In its illuminating conclusion the writer actually refers back to the beginning of the *Contract* where he defends the kingship of man in Adam, “sovereign king of the world as Robinson was of his island.” The heir of both is Emile, whose entire education is conceived to preserve his lofty birthright even when he is no longer alone.

According to the chapter in question, the kings of this world do not pursue the common felicity that is a powerful
incentive for the "sages" of the previous chapter and the heroes of the novel. On the contrary, they flatter their own desire for gain and prestige as individuals, at the expense of human aspirations and the strength of the kingdom that is their birthright. They thereby sacrifice the true king's interest to tyrannical and slavish passions. In the author's opinion no government is so ruinous to freedom and the needs of the constitution.

It is not by accident that the rest of the chapter is devoted to the education of true kings. To "beget" them, we are told, we should have to do the antithesis of what we now do. Rarely, says the writer, do men "born to govern" or "steer" take the "helm" in a monarchy. Observe how the Aemilian myth recurs. He implies that those who presume to steer are not kings at all, but travesties of kings whose faculties are no more suited to the task than their training is. For, unlike his own "kings," they are taught to rule other people instead of themselves. That produces tyrants, not kings who know how to submit to the law of reason for the sake of wisdom, the discernment of good and evil. The idea is as old as King Solomon and a good deal older. As I have just said, Rousseau ends the chapter by referring back to the beginning of the book where, in addition to establishing the kingship of humanity in the person of Adam or Robinson Crusoe, he declares that a city suffering from serious disorders at the hands of charlatans has a right to have recourse to the services of a true physician, meaning a real statesman, governor, or king. The tyrants portrayed in the Contract as slaves are just such charlatans, and are the reverse of Socratic and Rousseauist kingship visualized in the sages of the previous chapter and in the heroes of Emile. The collaboration with the novel gives to the chapter on the monarchy a new breadth of meaning hitherto unsuspected, at least for some of us.

In the next (seventh) chapter of the appendix, "Concerning Mixed Governments," the author emphasizes the
value of mixed forms, subdivided into parts handled differ­ently, for the purpose of maintaining the equilibrium of the rational "artificial body" as an intermediary faculty or "mean proportional" between sovereign will and sub­ject desires. He regards such inner adjustments as effec­tive to preserve the ideal relations between the highest and lowest principles of soul or city. In his eyes, if the balance were upset, the covetous and concupiscent ele­ments in the guise of powerful private interests would soon seduce the reason to tyrannize and overthrow the moral being.

The author of the Contract next turns his attention to factors determining the wealth of a city and affecting its form of government. These are also the topics of the fol­lowing pages of Emile, which begin with a discussion of the industrial arts and to which it is logical to revert be­fore considering the appendix. As usual I shall confine my­self to what is necessary to illustrate the interlocking of texts.

While practising the natural arts, the "new Robinson Crusoe" takes a step beyond them. Suddenly he is initia­t ed into the mechanical and industrial arts that are born of society and make it necessary through the sharing and distribution of work and the resulting production of sur­plus goods. He learns that those arts make men useful to one another and mutually dependent, but does not yet sus­pect that they entail moral or immoral relationships. The governor traces the arts to their origins as he did in the case of property because the evolution of the moral being—the theme of Emile, the Contract, and the Republic—is that of human institutions.

As is well known, Rousseau is here inspired by the be­ginning of the Republic where Socrates pictures the birth of our "luxurious" society and the conditions that neces­sitated the formation of his own austere one. In this in­stance the author of Emile violates the order of his model, since he uses the arts, as he did property, to bring the hero
into active contact with that luxurious state of which the Greek sage takes leave at the outset.

However, in dealing with the arts, he continues to shape the moral being or ideal order in the inner world or society of friends at the same time as he sketches it within an alien setting whose potential noxious effects, though hidden from the child, are visible to the reader. For example, under his governor's guidance Emile esteems the arts according to standards other than our own. He judges them not with an eye to opulence but by their use to Robinson Crusoe. If this rule seems to belong to "an imaginary order," as the writer admits, that order is the Rousseauist and Socratic one, reduced in the material sphere to necessity. The governor explains that his pupil, who is to be a sage, must know the truth of things before he knows men and their prejudices: for, he observes, "you do not lead a nation when you are like it." Here he hints at the kingly vocation for which Emile's judgment is being nurtured. Hence the boy knows nothing of our absurdities. Indeed, "he knows no other human being but himself," and he still has much to learn in that respect. He simply knows his own place in the order of things, being confined to it by the bonds of necessity or the law of his constitution instead of the laws of reason, which he does not yet recognize as such. He is therefore hardly more than a physical being. And so he esteems the arts by their usefulness to the simple happiness of a creature like himself or Robinson, and also by their independence of other crafts, which makes them easier to practice. For example, he values agriculture, metallurgy, and carpentry in that sequence, which is also the historical order of their development as traced in the second Discourse.

These studies serve as a preamble to lessons in political economy and considerations of wealth and its effects upon government. Emile cannot help but see that the surplus productions of the industrial arts lead men to exchange with one another for the purpose of supplying their
own needs. Indeed, he glimpsed something of the device of exchange in the parable of the sower, where, however, it was obvious that men had gone beyond the principle of need. He now proceeds to investigate the interplay of trade and commerce, studying the products of each country, the arts and sciences of navigation, and finally transportation problems arising through distance and the position of waterways. He learns that trade of every kind, including all social intercourse, depends upon conventional equality, which is therefore the first law of society. He also learns that, in the world of men, this law necessitates positive enactments and government, and that the same law, in the world of things, necessitates the invention of money to compare the value of goods of different kinds. These lessons, inspired by the Socratic text mentioned in the penultimate paragraph above, are limited to a consideration of economic relationships and exclude an explanation of their moral effects and abuses.

At this perilous juncture in Emile’s formation where he is brought into contact with an alien world, Rousseau faces the risks involved in the work of government. In doing so, he has recourse to a critical point in the same Socratic text, although this is not generally known. It is the point to which I referred earlier where the Greek master, in his sketch of society at its origins, is reproached by his listeners for failing to give his citizens “a relish to their meal,” whereupon he complies and then proceeds to purge away luxury with education and legislation. In Socratic phraseology, Emile is now to behold the unhealthy state of men who recline upon sofas and have sauces and sweets in the modern manner. Jean-Jacques escorts him to a sumptuous banquet but artfully contrives to turn it into a mimic symposium. Together they imagine the enormous resources called into play to supply the luxury surrounding them, reminiscent of the Parisian feasts of the baron d’Holbach. But soon afterward, to offset any false impressions that may have been created in the child’s mind, the
governor regales him with a simple rustic repast, seasoned with Socratic "necessary appetite," freedom of spirit, and delight in the society of good folk who are surely worthy of the Greek sage’s "true and healthy state." Emile, like the writer whose rural repasts in life are transformed into veritable idylls in the Confessions, finds more real pleasure in the country feast and is thus preserved from the seductions of luxury by good government.

The symbolism is as clear here as it was in the discussion of appetite hitherto. The banquet of life, suggestive of the Gospels as well as of the Republic and Symposium, is represented by two meals, each reflecting an entirely different mode of existence. The simple one is Jean-Jacques' well-governed Socratic or evangelical "imaginary order." The luxurious one is our own ill-governed intemperate society where Emile passes unscathed. He is saved by some "sublime power" vested in his governor that enables him to stand firm against false opinion and the prejudices of wealth and power.

Shielded by that "superhuman" presence, he is soon to be taught to earn his bread in an alien setting. But first he is trained in many different arts and crafts to inspire him with respect for other people's work as well as his own. The double purpose here defined evokes the two aspects of Socratic justice, which are to do one's own work, and not to meddle with others. Emile is to practise that virtue within the society of friends, but in a land foreign to himself and his own city.

These pages of the book are the source of a much debated chapter of the Contract (the eighth in this part) about the connections between wealth and government, to which I alluded above. It is entitled "That Every Form of Government Is Not Suited to Every Country." In the past we have supposed that it was added simply to fill out the book. But juxtaposition with the foregoing development of Emile disproves that. The author begins by saying that freedom is not the fruit of all climates. Hence it is
vital to know "in what corner of the world" a moral being might be free to exercise his faculties according to their proper functions and find happiness therein. In dealing with this question that is hardly beside the point, Rousseau continues to confine himself to general principles. In a city, he observes, the government is supplied with necessities from the surplus produced by subjects; in the soul, of course, the governing power is supported by desires or gainful faculties. That is why Socrates calls the latter "maintainers and foster-fathers": they keep body and soul together, while reason brings the two into unison. The amount of the surplus, as the author of the Contract remarks and as Emile now knows, depends upon three factors: fertility of climate, determining the kind of work and number of workers required to till the soil; the nature of the earth's productions; and the needs of men. This passage adheres closely to the order of Emile's lessons in political economy. So does the following. The factors influencing wealth, says the writer, in turn affect the form of government since some kinds of rule are costlier than others and even rob people of their contributions and make them miserable. He alludes to contemporary monarchs, meaning tyrants and despots. Free states, like a democracy or aristocracy, require moderate resources that are wholly used for the common happiness.

In the rest of the chapter he reflects further upon the three factors determining wealth. Fertile southern climes, says he, where the soil requires little work and fewer workers to yield succulent fruits, produce the luxury that fosters despotism, whereas temperate zones of moderate wealth are hospitable to good polity and suited to free men. This may be one reason why in the beginning of Emile he chose a temperate zone for the hero's life. Yet in doing so, he implied that the climate of the child's birth is as symbolic as his wealth (although both may also be taken literally) and that northerners dwelling on an ungrateful soil are simply an "image" of the poor, whereas
southerners living in a fertile land symbolize the rich. The same symbolism may be present in the text of the Contract, for there he discreetly admits that even if historically the reverse of his theory about southern and temperate zones were true, he would nevertheless adhere to it. In other words, if the ideal Greco-Roman city was born in the south that supposedly fosters despotism, it could be reborn anywhere on earth as it is in Emile, who though strong and free in a moderate clime lives in the midst of despotism. That is because what really determines wealth and freedom too is the third of the three factors mentioned in the Contract, the needs of men, to which the author reverts. He observes that if the south fosters wealth, it is also because southerners live on hardly more than air, with the result that a Spaniard could live for a week on a German's dinner, and "in Italy they regale you with sweets and with flowers." Austerity—the law of necessity—is the key to the author's ideal, which may easily come into being wherever the needs of men are few. The whole passage indirectly evokes Emile's two repasts, symbolic of two different societies in any geographical area. It condemns all luxury that breeds tyranny and slavery. The latter occur, says the author concluding the chapter, in any country that has fewer inhabitants than it can sustain and whose wealth therefore exceeds and increases its needs. He thereby exalts the Socratic Aemilian city, whose needs and resources are evenly balanced and whose life is secure from the disorders of passion.

To revert to the novel, the new Robinson, having explored his surroundings, comes back at last to himself and his own "habitation." Thereupon the governor exclaims on an evangelical note: "Happy are we if, returning home, we do not find it in possession of the enemy who is lying in wait to enter and dwell therein." He refers to the advisability of anticipating the "unclean spirit" of the Gospel. Such illuminating phrases and imagery associated with Christ or Socrates are designed to carry us beyond the

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child's point of view that is confined to material needs and reveal the vaster perspectives of the philosopher-king that depend upon the former for their realization.

The hero, all absorbed in arts and crafts and Robinson Crusoe, sees at length that he himself like other men will have to resort to an exchange of work and goods in order to live, and that society is therefore necessary to human life and in that sense natural. Since he is able to grasp the material side of social relationships before he can really become actively engaged, his governor's first task is to teach him to preserve life and to provide for his needs by means of those relationships. But again there are signs that the physical world of the child prefigures the moral one and that Jean-Jacques' real preoccupation is spiritual kingship, the training of reason to rule the gainful faculties and serve the sovereign soul of man. For example, the boy is compared to various kings in history who have "risen to man's estate" by learning to earn their daily bread. The son of man who is born a king must do the same. For "social man and the citizen," whose vocation is Emile's, must regard work as a debt to society that has to be repaid according to the law of justice. In Socratic terms there must be no drones in the hive of the city or the soul. The drones are "spendthrifts" full of "unnecessary or useless desires" bred in idleness, and are the governor's great foe in his work as guardian of the constitution. They are foreign to the hero, whose name is synonymous with industry and who will "do his own work," or, in other words, practice justice. The industrious man who works to supply the needs of life is an image of the just man. The author's thought transcends any literal interpretation as much as the governor's transcends Emile's.

The theme of this phase of education is that of the ninth chapter in the third part of the Contract, where the key idea is also the preservation of life including moral life that depends upon the free exercise of the faculties. It is entitled "Concerning the Signs of Good Government," and is com-
plementary to the previous one as freedom is a correlative of necessity. If the surplus wealth of gainful elements supports the governing power, the latter in its turn ensures the preservation and prosperity of those it governs. Rousseau begins the chapter by describing the blessings enjoyed by "citizens" as opposed to "subjects," meaning slaves. He mentions the freedom and security of the human person from crimes at home and wars abroad, and the circulation of bread instead of gold. These bounties are all that is necessary for the preservation and prosperity of men, which can be judged, says the author, by their number and population. It would be a mistake to conclude from this that he intends to ensure preservation at the cost of freedom, which is included in the bounties described. Obviously he is saying as clearly as he has done hitherto, that freedom is essential to life. He says so again in a note at the end of the chapter, declaring that the welfare of nations and the prosperity of the species depend upon liberty. Moreover, in Emile the governor's concept of necessity and freedom is regarded as salutary for the life of both body and soul since it provides for the needs of the entire human creature.

The next two chapters of the Contract (the tenth and eleventh) are a corollary of the previous one and confirm the importance of freedom to life. They show that if the governing authority fails to safeguard liberty, the result is death. The first of the two is entitled "Concerning the Abuse of Government and Its Inclination to Decline." Rousseau warns therein that if the governing power of reason is seduced by passions intense enough to resist and oppress the sovereign will and break the covenant, then the collective body dies like that of a man. He pursues the idea in the next chapter, "Concerning the Death of the Body Politic." There he prophesies that issue as inevitable since no state lasts forever. As Socrates phrases it: "Even a constitution such as ours will not last till the end of time." This means that even if it could materialize as a physical
entity in the objective world of actuality, it would not last as such. But Rousseau maintains that we possess the skill to make it last longer than most. Again drawing a comparison between the collective body and the body of a man, he explains that the human constitution is the work of nature and that our power over our life span is limited, but that the constitution of the state is a work of art whose life lies largely in our hands. But for Rousseau the human constitution includes not merely the physical life of the body but especially the sovereign powers of the moral person of soul or of city whose strength and growth depend as much upon art as does the state. But there is a difference. Although the passive being of a state dies like that of a man when its bonds with the sovereign or legislative power are severed, Rousseau could not say the same thing of sovereignty itself or the active being any more than he could say it of the human spirit, which is no different, for he professed to believe that it is indestructible and survives the body, as we shall see. That is why, to describe the life of the city, he uses the Socratic similitude of city and soul; but to describe the death of the state, he adopts the contemporary analogy of the collective and human body. The life of the passive being may be prolonged, says he—and incidentally this applies in a limited way to the human body—by strengthening the active being or sovereign will, wherein the principle of life resides and whose austere laws invigorate the body and the heart. In this context the sovereign power, identified with will in the soul, is linked with the heart, presumably as the seat of fortitude, while, as we know, the executive power answers to the brain. It is only when the heart dies that “the animal” expires, says the author in carefully chosen words, to avoid suggesting that sovereignty might be destroyed. In a well-constituted state, he adds, the latter manifests itself in respect for the most ancient laws, by which he means his own that are over 2,500 years old.

In the novel Jean-Jacques, like the sage governors of the
Contract, ensures the preservation and prosperity of the society of friends and therefore of Emile by fortifying the hero’s powers and anticipating the decline of the friendship of reason for nature. He does so, as we have seen, by teaching the boy the art of self-government or ministry of justice, the art of mastering the gainful faculties with a view to the pursuit of wisdom and lasting happiness.

These deeper intentions are further accentuated when the author speaks of a choice of work suitable for Emile. He prescribes manual labor on grounds that suggest his real purpose: the artisan is more independent of the caprices of fortune and of men, and hence more self-reliant than the husbandman. But at the same time he admits that husbandry is man’s first vocation and Emile’s, and he calls it, in the manner of the Greek master, “most useful and noble.” In recommending that it be supplemented by a trade, he hints that his words have spiritual implications, for he cites the evangelical saying that “the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life,” and explains that the object is less to teach a trade than to rise above the prejudices of men. He further suggests a moral motive by adding that the laborer, unlike the professional man, is exempt from dancing attendance upon scoundrels, courtesans, and the rich, and may therefore be a man of honor and justice. The governor’s goal always remains a moral one. Emile is to do “useful,” honorable work that is also compatible with humanitarian feeling. Nevertheless, he makes his own choice by following his personal idea of utility, selecting a trade of real value to the new Robinson Crusoe and adapted to his age, sex, and character. He chooses that of carpentry, and Jean-Jacques, who shares his entire life, serves an apprenticeship with him.

There is both internal and external evidence that the carpenter here is a mythical image of a man doing a man’s proper work by repaying his dept to society and thereby practicing justice, and that his object is not to pursue gain but to serve an apprenticeship in manhood. For example,
the friends spend only one or two days a week in the master’s workshop, and Emile never becomes a master carpenter. Moreover, the hero does not really earn his bread until he is twenty-five years of age, and then he would not ideally do so by carpentering. In the *Confessions* the writer, recounting the story of apprenticeships served by himself at the same age of twelve or thirteen, says he could not tolerate the idea of heaping up money by a mean employment, for, he adds, money never tempted him greatly. In the *Considerations* he utters biblical-like warnings against the worship of Mammon. In a word, he has a Socratic contempt for the money-making arts and earthly dross current among men, “the source of many unholy deeds.” Like his Greek master he associates the gainful faculties with illiberality and baseness, for they are concerned with desires “that maim and disfigure the soul with their meannesses.” In his view such faculties must remain subject to the higher ones that make a man sovereign ruler of self.

That supreme ruler and his work of ruling are foreshadowed by the Rousseauist carpenter, who is therefore the “maker of an image of justice” in Socratic terminology. He is as much a myth as the husbandman, who represents man’s true vocation as a Socratic and Christian cultivator of the soul. Thus Jean-Jacques uses the arts and crafts to take another step upward in the ascent of the soul toward wisdom.

In fact, the myth of the carpenter is evocative of both Christ and Socrates. The latter’s contempt for the money-making arts or faculties does not prevent him from bestowing upon the carpenter a distinguished place at the beginning and end of the *Republic*. In the third book, in the midst of the denunciation of physicians who remove men from society and their duties, the carpenter appears in the likeness of a man who refuses to “nurse disease” to the neglect of his customary employment, since then there would be no profit in his life. But his employment is not simply carpentering. It is what Socrates and Rousseau,
too, conceive to be every man's real work, which is the practice of virtue or true statesmanship. At the end of the Republic the sage, having spoken of God as "the maker of the works of all other workmen," visualizes the carpenter, the maker of tables and beds, as a "creator" made in the divine image. The carpenter is closer to truth and reality than the poet who depicts the carpenter's work and is consequently only an imitator, says Socrates, ignoring the meaning of "poet" as the Greek equivalent of "maker." After what we have already witnessed of Rousseau's affinities with the master, it is difficult not to suspect that Emile is meant to be a reflexion of that Socratic carpenter. Having beheld all the works of creation, he is now being prepared for a vision of the Socratic "great artist" or Pauline "Master-Builder" who is shadowed forth in his workmanship. The reason why the hero is not a master craftsman is probably that for Rousseau, as for Socrates, there is only one, and that is he in whose image man is formed. But the whole context suggests that a man molded in that divine likeness does not merely make tables or beds. Observe the moment chosen by Rousseau for the emergence of Emile as the carpenter-builder. We are precisely at that point in the book where the foundations of the temple are complete and the shrine itself about to be built. One is reminded of the carpenter of Galilee, the writer's divine master, who boasted that if the "temple" were destroyed he would build it up again in three days, meaning "the temple made without hands." Emile is a carpenter apprentice who, by making beds and tables, learns to practice justice and hence to build the temple of the soul or fortress of the city, guided by his governor and following the pattern provided by the master-craftsman, whom the Rousseauist legislator and educator professes to know. The Socratic and Christian imagery throws the meaning into relief.

We may observe that in the myth of the carpenter the author simply amplifies all the principles set forth so far.
By practicing justice in this new form, the boy does not merely render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, as in the parable of the sower. He renders unto God the things that are God's, although he does not know it. He performs this office by applying his strength to do his will, or rather, the general will for the common good implied in the idea of exchange, which the industrial arts entail. To the same end he is learning to acquiesce in the author's three Socratic laws by remaining within the bounds of necessity, by being ever one with himself and self-sufficing, and by doing the work to which he is naturally disposed, all within the precincts of a society of friends.

But although he is being prepared in this way for his duties as sovereign ruler, he is unaware of it. In fact, he is still ignorant of the identity of his governor. This becomes obvious when, having cultivated a taste for reflection, he feels impelled to inquire about social inequalities and asks how Jean-Jacques, who is rich, earns his bread. Of course, we know that the prince or governor is supported by the people, that the ruling power is supported by gainful ones. But Emile's mentor forbears to explain this at present. He simply promises to reply later. What is noteworthy here is that he conceals his identity as long as possible. But he can hardly do so much longer since, as we are told, Emile's relations with others are soon to expand beyond the purely physical sphere. This "active, thinking being," as he is called, is approaching the age when reason is perfected by feeling to make him into a real philosopher or lover of Sophia. Only then can he recognize his governor as such and finally take his own place as sovereign ruler.

The real duties of man's estate, shown in his apprenticeship under the mysterious master and consisting of the practice of justice and acquiescence in ancient laws rather than the amassing of gold, are set forth in the related chapters of the Contract. There are three (twelve, thirteen,
In these chapters the author wrestles with the problem of securing the legislative power against the aberrations of the governing faculty, to preserve the life of the politico-moral body. He boldly asserts that the people must personally assemble to approve the constitution, sanction their own laws, and do their own work as they did 3,000 years ago. In contending that this is not impossible, he betrays his concern for spiritual values: "The limits of the possible in moral matters are less narrow than we think: it is our weaknesses, vices, and prejudices that contract them." He betrays the same concern when, after citing the example of the ancient Greeks and Romans to prove that his ideas are not the fanciful dreams of a visionary, he concludes: "What exists is therefore possible." The deft return to the present tense—"what exists"—shows that he is thinking mainly of the inner world. He adds that people must also assemble to govern themselves or else to provide for government by others in order that they may rule in obedience. For he still insists that the essence of the moral person consists of the harmonious correlation of obedience or necessity and freedom, subjects and sovereign being perfectly united in the citizen who binds himself to the law of his will and submits to be governed thereby. This ideal of the sovereignty and kingship of man being exercised in popular assemblies is possible in small rural societies protected from alien peril by federation with others akin to themselves, says the author, allowing his imagination to roam beyond the dim possibility of even one such city coming to the birth. In the less improbable case of the free soul, such protective federation would consist of bonds of friendship established with great spirits of the past and present. But since even well-trained governors are wont to impede the action of the sovereign power, he insists upon the regular manifestation and perpetual activity of the "constant will"
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(later identified with conscience) as the aegis of the politico-moral body. The latter may be preserved and prosper only if citizens avoid greed, cowardice, and idleness to activate and cultivate their noblest faculties. In that case they will do their own work like Aemilius, whose austerity of life, courage, and industry or justice are molding him to inherit the high office and ministry of his forbears.

The next chapter in the Contract (the fifteenth) deals with "Deputies or Representatives," of whom the author has already expressed disapproval in the beginning of the previous part. The chapter begins and ends with an evocation of men who shamefully pay others to do their work for them, unlike the apprentice builder of the novel. Indeed, its relevance to the masterwork is confirmed in the fifth part of the latter where Emile the carpenter refuses to pay anyone to do his carpentering in his place. There the novelist emphasizes the very point of the present chapter of the Contract. In the latter we are shown how modern men pay others to wage "war" in their stead and wield sovereignty on their behalf, or rather to enslave and betray them. In the Socratic view they enslave themselves to the greed for gain and the money-making arts. "The word finance," says Rousseau in this chapter, "is a slave's word; it is unknown in the city." In other words, the free man or city practices in person the wisdom that contributes most to the well-being of the whole and all its parts. An advantage of this course of action, according to the Contract, is that the various parts are not obliged to resort to particular remedies or "domestic cares" to patch up disorders or gratify humors. That is what the carpenter in the Republic declines to do, like the true statesman in the same context or Jean-Jacques in Emile. The author of the Contract adds that in the well-constituted entity therein envisaged, no part is indifferent to its life and happiness or dares to say: "What has that to do with me?" These are the words of men like Robert in the novel who dwell in "false" states and are heedless of the common
happiness. That world is alien to Emile, who is learning that the well-ordered polity of the soul is his main concern on earth.

On the grounds of the foregoing considerations Rousseau rejects once again the modern political idea that the sovereign will can be "alienated" and its activity assigned to deputies. True, he adapts the concept to modern cities in his Considerations. But he declines to make any such concession in the Contract, where he depicts a mythical city made in the likeness of the Rousseauist soul. In the chapter under discussion he honors the ideal order in a new tribute to ancient Greece and Rome. The Greeks, he says, did their own work because they preferred freedom, the free use of their highest faculties for the exercise of justice, rather than enslavement to the greed for gain. If we protest that slaves performed their menial tasks for them, a point raised by the author himself and used against him by his critics, he at once withdraws into the world of the spirit and admits that freedom is maintained only with the support of slavery or submission. Obviously this must be so if obedience and liberty are correlatives. He adds: "All that is not in nature has its disadvantages, and civil society more than anything else." Of course, since a true civil society implies morality and that freedom of spirit and ministry of reason which depend for their action upon the subjection of covetous desires. Modern men, concludes the writer, who cater to such desires do not have slaves, but they pay tyrannical masters to enslave them. As Socrates says: "The people who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen has fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves." In the Platonic text this is the fire of passion that threatens the souls of men who neglect their own proper work. Rousseau is saying the same thing in both the Contract and Emile.

The end of the third part of Emile, inspired mainly by the Socratic "prelude," is devoted to the further education of the ruler. The hero's ability to use his reason to compare
sensations and form ideas is perfected. Only the savage or solitary sage may be indifferent to the objects of our judgments and ask: "What has that to do with me?" So the author says in this context of the novel, in a passage reminiscent of another in the matching part of the *Contract* that refers to individuals who live exclusively for themselves alone. Emile the carpenter-builder, who is natural man living in the social and civil state, is to be otherwise and must perforce exercise judgment. He must therefore avoid error by verifying sensations.

Among common errors of judgment caused by contradictory impressions of the senses, Rousseau mentions two in particular to which he alludes more than once and which he takes the trouble to solve. The first is the case of a ball rolled between two crossed fingers that produces an impression of two objects instead of one. The second is the example of a stick submerged in water that appears broken. Jean-Jacques and Emile perform experiments to rectify the errors and generate in the boy a force of reason not easily led astray by the authority of others. There are three other alleged advantages of this method. First, he advances in proportion to his physical and mental strength, which, as we know, is born of the friendship of reason and is the sphere of its action. Second, he discovers the limits of human knowledge, especially his own. Third, he is taught how to learn, and will do so all his life long for love of the truth, or so the author says.

As usual, by "truth" Rousseau, like Socrates, means moral truth as he sees it, although Emile does not know it as such. The governor reveals his real motives when, after dealing with the correction of erroneous judgments, he describes the disciple's present formation in terms that have distinct moral overtones. Admittedly we are told that Emile possesses only natural physical knowledge and is ignorant of moral values or related matters. But this simply means that he does not know the name of the virtues he practices. Besides, the abstractions of geometry and al-
gebra, which he continues to study at this stage, are preparing him for the generalizations of the profession of faith in the next. Moreover, the Socratic "images of virtues" he displays, such as patience, industry, temperance, and courage, are preparing him for the social virtues of a man. To possess the latter in their truth, the new Robinson Crusoe has only to become aware of his moral relationships and sensitive to them.

As I remarked above, Rousseau is still inspired by Socrates' prelude to the education of kings. The sage, too, has recourse to the mathematical sciences to perfect reason and lead it to moral truth. But to reach his goal, he ultimately renounces the senses, which his modern disciple refuses to do; and there lies an important rift between them. Nevertheless, in dealing with errors the sage cites the same two examples as are given in Emile, the first one in the context of the prelude and the second at the end of the book. He is therefore a more likely source of inspiration than Descartes, who deals with one of the two cases, or the Logic of Port-Royal, which deals with the other. When, says he in the prelude, the sense furnishes contradictory impressions, he summons to his aid calculation and the arts of measuring and numbering—while Rousseau reverts to the senses themselves—to see whether the several objects "announced to the soul" are one or two. In Plato's last book he does likewise if the same objects appear straight when looked at out of water and crooked in it. Such errors, he says, are due to "that weakness of the human mind upon which the art of conjuring and... other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us like magic." This phrase probably suggested to Rousseau the figure of the "conjuror Socrates" as well. In addition to all these remarkable coincidences, the master's precautions against false impressions at the end of the Republic immediately follow the idealization of the carpenter exactly as in the case of the modern pedagogical novel. In fine, the Greek thinker's presence can hardly be
doubted in the concluding tableau of Emile's qualities, which foreshadow those of a Socratic king.

The last pages of this part of Emile relating to the establishment of reason as the governing power in man, and proposing precautions against its vagaries, are reflected in the last three chapters of the same part of the Contract. These chapters are intended to show the way in which that power is set up within the moral constitution and also the need for the sovereign will to control its abuses. Two of them (sixteen and seventeen) are in a sense one, since both treat of the establishment of government, the one negatively and the other affirmatively. They are entitled "That the Institution of Government Is Not a Contract" and "Concerning the Institution of Government."

Rousseau begins by reaffirming his belief that only after the lawful power of the will has been firmly secured can the executive power of the ruler be instituted in its turn. This is, of course, the Socratic sequence followed in Emile. It serves, says he in the Contract, to keep the two principles as separate as they naturally are, the one dealing with general concepts and the other with specific cases. The special right of the governing faculty or governor, he explains, is to ask that another do what he himself does not do. In the novel Jean-Jacques, instead of appropriating that privilege to himself, has personally shared in all Emile's activities and thereby trained the guardian will and ruling power in his ward to confer the right upon him. This motive explains his reticence about his identity. It also explains why the will has precedence over the reason in the formation of city or soul: in Rousseau's thought it is the "will power" that commits authority to the governor. But he denies again, as he did in the beginning of this part, that government is instituted through a contract of the people with their chosen leaders whereby the one pledges himself to command and the other to obey. There is only one covenant in the city, and it is that of the original association. In Emile the demand for obedience is
made by a servant of the sovereign and is conditional upon the consent of the will dedicated to the happiness of the moral person.

In that case how is the governing power set up? This is explained in the *Contract* and illustrated in *Emile*. According to the former, the law-giving element (visible in the society of friends in the novel) ordains that a ruling body be formed and then transform itself, by an act of the will, into a “democratic” governing power to consummate that ordinance and establish the government prescribed. For in the improbable world of the book, the entire city or moral person including sovereign and subjects must first learn the necessity and art of self-rule before it can execute an act of government by appointing others to do its will and then question their demands in the performance of that office. Accordingly, in the novel Emile is first initiated into the art of kings and then later induced to entrust himself in time of crisis to Jean-Jacques, whom he finally recognizes as skilled in that art. Indeed, the process described in the *Contract* is dramatically presented in the next part of the pedagogical work where the eponymous hero shares in the complex act of providing for government by voluntarily confiding the authority of governor to his “good friend” at a moment already prepared in this part of the book.

Rousseau’s conclusions on the subject of rulers are to be found in the last chapter of the third part of the *Contract*, entitled “Manner of Preventing the Usurpations of Government.” The statements contained therein led to the burning of the book in Geneva, for they had a much more revolutionary ring in the ears of his contemporaries than they do in ours. Governing powers, he says, are merely officers of the sovereign, whom they must obey as a matter of duty. If they fail to do so and if their rule is incompatible with the welfare of the whole, then they must be dismissed and replaced. Again, the idea is as old as Christ, who says that the “chiefest of all shall be the servant of
all,” or Socrates, who says that his philosopher-kings, though unpaid, must rule for the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic act, but simply as a matter of duty. Otherwise, says he, they will bring about the ruin of the city. Rousseau means to avert this disaster by subjecting them to the constant vigilance of the lawful will, solemnly and formally summoned to act. In a similar manner the acts and intentions of a rational soul are scrutinized by the human conscience, which decides whether or not it is pleased with its present form of government. If not, it must be replaced by another.

The two books, in company with one another, have led us to the same point. In the Contract Rousseau describes a gradually evolving process quite as much as he does in Emile, even though in the past the abstract, mathematical form of the work has made it seem static in our eyes. One of the advantages of a collation of the two is to show the value of the work as a complete philosophy of life slowly taking shape as it does in the novel, whether or not we agree personally with the author’s ideas. Another advantage is that the mythology of the pedagogical romance emerges more clearly by comparison with the appendix. Once the imagery is recognized as such it releases its meaning, as the body of a man expresses the soul. When it does, that mysterious essence proves to be no different from that of the companion volume, and in both cases the Republic is the model. These facts are even more strikingly visible henceforward. For the temple of Emile, like the fortress of the Contract, is only now about to rise from the foundations laid down in the first three parts of both works. From the “stylobate,” or threefold basement, the stately pillars of each one rise toward the empyrean where they belong like the “pattern” of the Socratic republic.

1. I say this without forgetting that, according to the author, the Contract is not only an appendix to Emile but also an epitome of a proposed work entitled
"Institutions politiques," fragments of which he destroyed. The latter statement
does not alter the former or affect the indisputable proof of its veracity furnished
by a collation of texts.

2. For all Socratic references in this paragraph see The Republic 5. 457, 458;
6. 505; 7. 523, 527, 531; 9. 589; 10. 601; cf. 621


4. See, for example, Mark 10:43-44.

5. For the analogy of the scale: The Republic 4. 443. In 9. 587 Socrates shows
that the true king is 729 times happier than the tyrant. Even studies on
Rousseau's mathematical language do not draw an analogy with Socrates. See,
for example, M. Françon, "Le Langage mathématique de J.-J. Rousseau,"
243-46.

Erechtheus, whom Télémaque sees in the Champs-Elysées, says: "Je prévois...  
qu'elle (la monnaie)... entretiendra une infinité d'arts pernicieux qui ne vont qu'à
amollir et à corrompre les moeurs... " F. Bouchardy does not mention Fenelon in
connection with the theme of the first "Discours": O.C., 3:5 n. 2. See "Confessions," O.C., 1:351, where Rousseau defines the theme thus: "Si le progrès
des sciences et des arts a contribué à corrompre ou à épurer les moeurs."

7. Rousseau speaks as if the sun moved around the earth: "Emile," p. 433.
Burgelin explains that he is probably interpreting the child's view: p. 431 n. 1.

8. All references in this paragraph are to The Republic 7.526-27.

436, and The Republic 7. 534, 537-39. For the connection of knowledge cf. the
same text of Plato and O.C., 4:436 n. 3. See also "Confessions," loc. cit., p. 234.
Of course, this was the whole idea of the Encyclopédie: See Diderot's article under
that heading and d'Alembert's "Discours préliminaire."

10. Rousseau discusses this incident in C.C., 9:125, letter to L. Usteri, 13
September 1761.


12. Burgelin poses the question of the connection between the story of the fair
and the tracing of meridians for maps, and finds the sequence of ideas "bizarre":
O.C., 4:441 n. 2.


14. See "Lettres de la montagne," O.C., 3:739, and cf. p. 744 where, in a dis-

cussion of miracles, the author warns that the marvels of chemistry and physics
are not miracles. Burgelin connects this text with the conjuror scene in "Emile":
p. 437 n. 2.

15. For the pilot see chapter 2 above and n. 10. The quotation is from the end of
Byron's poem "The Island."

16. This is so in spite of his rather loose use of the term "democracy" in the
"Lettre à d'Alembert," O.C., Hachette, 1:256.


18. The Republic 2. 369.

19. "Pour moi, je suivais la direction contraire à l'objet que j'avais à fuir,  
comme autrefois j'avais suivi l'opposé de l'ombre dans la forest de Montmorenci":
"Emile et Sophie," O.C., 4:912. For this work see chapter 6, note 18, below.


23. He says the same in part 1, chapter 3, at the end, apropos of the "law" of the stronger. The "true physician" would be the Rousseauist legislator who would "sweep the threshing-floor clean": second "Discours," loc. cit., p. 180. Cf. The Republic 3. 407 (the physician is called a statesman); 4. 425-26 (the statesman is likened to a physician). The image of the physician recurs throughout the dialogue.

24. Political theorists explain Rousseau's brevity on the subject by the distinction he makes between government and sovereign, which in their opinion reduces the importance of mixed forms. But on the other hand, the problem of balance is all the more complex by reason of this distinction. Burgein considers this to be one of the most important problems in "Emile," as indeed it is: O.C., p. 304 n. 1. He is speaking of equilibrium of soul, but that is the essential problem in the "Contrat" too.

25. It is a great mistake to fancy that Rousseau's sketch of the city begins here: O.C., 4:466 n. 2; cf. p. 467 n. 2, which refers to The Republic 2. 369. In a sense, as I have said, the child's active initiation into society does, but even that has long since been foreshadowed.


27. For example, Derathé feels that the chapter is out of place: O.C., 3:414 n. 1.

28. Cf. "Emile," p. 267. Beaulavon denies the possibility that a northern state could ever be as wealthy as a southern one since he takes the whole text exclusively literally: J.-J. Rousseau, Du Contrat social, ed. Georges Beaulavon, (Paris: Rieder, 1914), p. 249 n. 1. In fact, in the case of texts like the present one a collation with "Emile" is imperative. The novel is full of passages like the following:... La misère ne consiste pas dans la privation des choses, mais dans le besoin qui s'en fait sentir": p. 304.


30. Regarding preservation as an object, see chapter 3 above and cf. O.C., 3:420 n. 1. For the importance of freedom see "Contrat social," pp. 419, 420 n. Cf. C.C., 10:94, letter to Rey, 18 (11?) February 1762, where the author shows concern that the note at the end of the chapter be correctly printed.


32. When he speaks of slavery as a form of moral death in the midst of life, that must be taken as a figure of speech, since the will that frees is "indestructible," and so a man may be released from slavery and restored to life.

33. The Republic 5. 457 (the useful is the noble). For the biblical reference that follows: John 6:63; cf. 2 Cor. 3:6. Burgein, like Rousseau's contemporary Tronchin, and Montesquieu, too, see in technical training a departure from ancient education. But Rousseau, in the mythical figure of Emile the carpenter, is following Socrates and Plato to the letter.

35. For the carpenter see *The Republic* 3. 406; 10. 597.
39. Loc. cit., p. 979. He provides against corruption by frequent changes of deputies and by subjecting them to imperative mandates.
43. The example of the ball is proposed by Descartes, and that of the "broken" stick is in the *Logique* of Port-Royal (3:20); but neither gives both examples, as Plato does: *O.C.*, p. lxvii (refers to Descartes) and 486 n. 1 (refers to the *Logique*).
44. *The Republic* 7 540. Cf. Luke 17:10: "So likewise ye, when ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, say. We are unprofitable servants: we have done that which was our duty to do."