In the fourth part of the novel and its appendix, Emile and his counterpart in the Contract are finally impelled to assume the social obligations that constitute the very fabric of the work in both cases. The moral person then comes to the birth, and the temple of the soul and citadel of the city become an identical reality.

This part of the novel has a tripartite form. The shape and proportions recall the main enclosure or cella of the Greek temple where the cult image stood. In the ancient prototype the great rectangular chamber was divided by colonnades into three naves, the central one being the broadest and containing the likeness of the Godhead. Rousseau adheres strictly to that pattern in his spiritual shrine—where the creed stands in the midst of the mythical cella—but not, of course, in the fortress of the Contract, where, however, the themes are the same. In both cases they parallel those of the second part.

SAVING POWERS

In Emile the hero’s progress is traced between the ages of fifteen and twenty. At the outset the moral being’s forthcoming birth into life stands in counterpoise to the child’s birth into consciousness in the earlier analogous part. Both events are the occasion for similar reflections upon the brevity of existence. In the present case the passive sensitiveness of the child is replaced by the active moral or social sensitiveness of the youth that radiates beyond the individual. The passions, against which the governor’s precautions were hitherto effective, inevitably wax strong at the advent of adolescence, says the writer, thereby underlining
himself the symmetry of the two parts. The approaching crisis is indicated by a storm-tossed agitated spirit compared to a ship at the mercy of the waves. The Socratic allegory of the ship of the soul or ship of state, artistically used from the beginning, recurs again. The governor, we are told, dares not leave the helm or all is lost. He appears in the shape of the wise Ulysses, whose name befits Jean-Jacques since he is the spiritual father of Emile, the 'new Telemachus' of an imaginary city in the fifth part, as Ulysses was the father of the old. But before the youth can play his proper role, he too must, of course, become a helmsman and skilled in the art of steering his course through the passions. At this point where most educations end, Emile's positive education begins since Rousseau intends, as he says, to consider the whole of life.

The feelings play a much more important part in the Aemilian shrine than they do in a Greek temple in the pure Dorian style. The author discriminates between good feelings and bad in the same way that Socrates discriminates between good or necessary desires and evil or unnecessary ones. In Rousseau's reasoning the passions in their primal form are the work of God, whose name appears for the first time here at the very entrance to the sanctuary. They are considered to be the ministrants of our freedom and preservation. Their origin and principle is identified as the natural feeling of self-love, or love of the true self in its original purity. This self, or 'real Emile,' is distinguished from another one that, according to the writer, is born in our society and wars against the true one to enslave and destroy it by the perversion of self-love into selfishness. Self-love is said to be good on the grounds that it provides for our safety, leads us to love those who are well disposed in our favor and is content with the bare necessities of life. But selfishness is said to breed discontent, dissension, and enmity by leading us to compare ourselves with others in a conflict of interests with them and to expect to be preferred at their expense. Consequently, at the birth of moral and
social consciousness in the disciple, the Rousseauist governor's great task is to prevent the vitiation of self-love and anticipate the cleavage between the true man and the false. And so, at the portal of the Aemilian temple, we may fancy that we read a Rousseauist and emotional version of the inscription of the Delphic shrine, whose legend "know thyself" is combined with the precept "love thyself." Since the writer regards knowledge as essentially an awareness of relationships, he is convinced that to know and love one's true self is to know and feel one's real relationships. Emile is therefore now to study his moral being by studying his spiritual affinities with others for the purpose of perceptively practicing self-love in its original form in order to contribute actively and effectively to moral and social order.

At this juncture the author reflects upon the earliest of these conscious and emotional affinities in human life that largely determine its direction. He contends that they do not naturally take the form of passionate love. He denies that a child, emerging from the solitude of Robinson Crusoe, begins by experiencing either moral love, which springs from intuitive knowledge foreign to him, or the less noble counterpart of that sentiment. In his view the senses are not naturally stirred until much later than is the case with precocious children today, whose curiosity about procreation is prematurely aroused. But he feels that, even under the most adverse circumstances, education can retard the first explosions of the most combustible temperament. Now since he is persuaded that delay increases vigor of body, of heart, and of soul, and in addition gives nature time to order and regulate the slowly evolving passions, he greatly favors it, as he did when he recommended the negative approach in the second part. It permits the child to feel what are considered to be his real affinities with others and enables the governor to direct the affections accordingly.

Seeking to define the nature and origin of these affinities, Rousseau rivets his attention on the moment when the
pupil, who has been placed in carefully chosen circumstances, begins to show signs of expanding sensitiveness and betrays feelings enlightened enough to tell good from evil. He observes that the youth's first feeling is an incipient sense of friendship. This was anticipated, of course, in the parable of Montmorency forest, in the hero's childish exclamation "My good friend!" It is friendship, we are told, that brings him into conscious contact with his fellow creatures and sows in his heart the seeds of humanitarian feeling by cultivating natural compassion, mercy, and generosity.

For in Rousseau's view sympathy is the source of friendship and is the fountainhead and archetype of all love. This sentiment represents to his mind the deeper motives that bring men to unite with one another in society. He sees them moved by pity for common frailties and sufferings that identify them with each other through the action of the imagination. Indeed, he considers pity to be as natural as self-love and he does so both in the present context and in his evocation of the primitive state of the second Discourse where, moreover, it replaces laws, morals, and all virtue. Consequently, in his opinion a child must be induced at this stage in his progress to behold our poor humanity as it intrinsically is, and to feel that he is a part of others so that he might be disposed by self-pity to tenderness on their behalf. Accordingly Emile is made to see suffering mankind in his parents "or ailing governor," for whom he feels the pang of compassion. This, we are now told, is "the first relative sentiment to touch the human heart in the order of nature." It transports him beyond himself and brings him at last into real communion with men, channeling the currents of sensibility into a broad sea of "goodness, humanitarian feeling, mercy and benevolence." Nevertheless, it is first generated in him in the form of a friendship that symbolizes an ideal social bond and as such is henceforth developed into a vast allegory in the book.
The author further reveals the value of his appeal to pity and its politico-moral implications by imagining a possible exception to the rule that we are touched by the grief of others rather than their bliss. For example, he admits that we are moved by the spectacle of a quiet scene of pastoral life, but explains the reason: it is because nothing prevents us from condescending to enjoy the same peace and innocence that are a man’s proper resources and true wealth. That is precisely the way of life promised by the order of friendship in the book and its appendix. On the other hand, he argues, if we disclose to a youth the sad fate of most men whose lives are disordered, then he will see at once that he must blaze a path to happiness where no one’s footsteps lead. That is the path wherein Emile is now being guided. He is to be induced to follow it by being made to pity those who do not and to fear their fate and the loss of his own austere happiness. To this end he learns ultimately to identify himself not merely with his governor but with the common people as well, and to love and pity all mankind as he does himself.

In accordance with these precepts Jean-Jacques as “observer and philosopher” or rather, psychologist, probes and guides the boy’s heart and stirs natural emotions to nerve and sustain the will, directing it toward a felicity compatible with that of other men and consistent with human sympathy. In discussing the value of insight into pain as a principle of moral excellence, Rousseau reflects upon the differences in men’s capacity for sorrow, which depends upon the degree of spiritual or intuitive perfection they have attained. He doubts whether insensitive souls who lack mercy, generosity, and pity can ever possess righteousness. Compassion is therefore indispensable to the whole purpose of education and legislation in both books.

At this point in the argument he asks again, as he did in the second part, whether these precautions against pas-
sion are not jeopardizing Emile's happiness. The negative reply is the same as it is there, and the artistic parallelism with "the book of the law" intensifies the politico-moral overtones of the present part. For example, to show real unhappiness he imagines a youth of fifteen who scales "Mount Olympus" all at once to enter the brilliant society of the gods of this world and is doomed to disenchantment like the child victim of indulgence in the former part. Moreover, the same three proofs, advanced there to show that Emile was happy in his ascetic life, reappear here. For instance, although he now shares the pangs of others, such participation is, we are assured, voluntary and sweet. This view was foreshadowed in the second part where we were told that under natural conditions happiness includes pain, disposing us to pity. Besides, the youth allegedly enjoys not things but himself, like the child who, even while enduring pain, found delight in the free play of his faculties that made him, at least in his own eyes, master of himself. Moreover, the signs of his contentment in the present case, says the author, are the serenity of his countenance and also his enjoyment of the esteem and confidence of others. That observation calls to mind the earlier part where indulgence was depicted as leading to the alienation of others and a life of misery. Throughout this discussion of happiness Rousseau is therefore mindful of "the book of the law." The literary device of symmetry is intended to express artistically the idea that fulfillment belongs only to those who walk in its decrees. To ensure that Emile does so at this turning-point in his life and that his happiness incurs no risks, he is restored to his country garden.

These arguments in defense of the hero's felicity are, like the ones in the pendant part, reminiscent of Socrates. So great is the latter's influence here that I must stop and explain it. As I said in the previous chapter, this part of the novel is closely related to Plato's fifth and sixth books, in that order. There Socrates anticipates the formation of
kings, whose preamble is contained in the seventh. For the moment I am concerned with the fifth book, where he is forced by his listeners to speak of the family life of his citizens—"how they will bring children into the world"—and what their relations with women will be. The sage then agrees to "begin again at the very foundations," exactly like his modern disciple, for he too considers "the whole of life." He recognizes that this is a critical moment in the formation of his city and threatens its very existence. Thus he is induced to discuss the education of women and the problems of love and marriage, which Rousseau insists upon deferring until later, as the sage would fain have done. In this context he broaches the problem of evil, and he does so in the same manner as the writer of *Emile* and the *Contract*. For him too evil arises from a perversion of desire that causes dualism and discord within a man or a city. On the other hand, his chief aim as legislator is to secure the bond of unity, which he conceives as the greatest good of the moral being. This is, of course, Rousseau's aim in the pages on sympathy. The sage solves the problem of unity of feeling and discord in three ways, and here lies a difference between the two thinkers. First, unlike the author of *Emile* as we shall see, he educates women in the same way as men on the grounds that they have the same moral duties. Next he executes a law, much favored later by his disciple, whereby marriages are arranged between men and women of like nature. Finally he removes the family as he did property from the control of private interest or desire, whereas Rousseau, though likewise subjecting it to higher powers, still clings to an emotional image of it. But Socrates' intention is akin to Rousseau's: to foster sympathy among his citizens or, as he says, to produce "common pleasures and pains," common feelings rather than exclusive private ones, and to remove disagreement about the use of the terms *mine* and *not mine*. The best-ordered state, says he, "most nearly approaches to the condition of the individual; as in the body, when but
a finger of one of us is hurt, the whole frame, drawn toward the soul as a center and forming one kingdom under the ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes all together with the part affected." This may also be said of moral afflictions in a well-ordered soul that has the same common feeling and is not at variance with itself so that, as the sage says, all powers speak "the language of harmony and concord." He thereby achieves peace in the moral being, which is further protected by two guardians "shame and fear" that reappear later in *Emile*. After speaking of the value of sympathy, Socrates next considers its effects upon felicity and again raises the question of happiness in the same way as he did earlier and as Rousseau does in identical contexts in each case. And his answer is the same: the felicity sought is that of the entire moral being as it is naturally constituted rather than that of any particular class or part at the expense of the rest. He also recalls what he said earlier about the happiness of his guardians, which is, he says, greater than that of the Olympic victors. It is surely significant that at the corresponding point in *Emile* the author shows the hero sharing the pains of others and yet happier by far than the child who scales Olympus. The relationship of the two texts is undeniable.

Rousseau takes up the Socratic image of sympathy, although he ultimately uses it in a much broader way as we have seen. However, he begins by following the master, fostering pity as the basis of ideal friendship and thereby deepening the latter with a view to leading Emile from the law of necessity and utility to the law of love. The well-ordered relations of the two protagonists become a pattern to enlighten the youth about all aspects of Rousseauist moral or social bonds and the "rights of humanity" that they are intended to secure.

A literary interpretation brings this out. Jean-Jacques, we are told, uses the fire of adolescence as an instrument of education by acquiring for himself first of all a hold over
his pupil's affections. This hold, says the writer, is all the more powerful to curb him since it is natural that the first bonds uniting him to mankind should embrace humanity in those nearby, particularly his governor, who shares with himself "common thoughts and feelings, common pleasures and pains." The very words of the Greek sage resound in the Aemilian text. As Emile becomes capable of affection, he allegedly grows sensitive to that of Jean-Jacques, which is akin to his own. Since their friendship, far from becoming exclusive, always remains an image of the ideal order and human rights, Rousseau now calls it "the most sacred of covenants," adding that it will not go unrequited. We know, of course, that the covenant so described is that of a man with his own sovereign will, and that friendship in the book expresses the same moral commitment. But Emile has yet to learn that. When the youth becomes aware of reciprocity, the governor, we are told, acquires a fresh hold upon him, "having long since bound his heart with bands." These bands of the law that bind the heart instead of the body take effect quite naturally as he reflects how richly endowed his life has been. But, in the writer's opinion, such will be the case only on condition that the governor does not claim obedience in return for his pains; for then the disciple, taken by surprise, would feel that he has been "bound by a contract without his consent." Again the terminology of the appendix recurs, and the symbolism of the covenant of friendship rises to the surface.

Jean-Jacques woos the youth's consent by speaking to him only of his duties to himself. Emile is thereby moved spontaneously to acknowledge a debt of gratitude to friendship and respond to it. For, says the author: "There is nothing that carries so much weight with the human heart as the voice of friendship recognized as such, since we know that it speaks to us only on behalf of our own interest." This phrase is obviously a Rousseauist version of a favorite Socratic one that anticipates the education of
kings and to which I alluded in discussing the myth of Montmorency forest where it was also echoed in Emile's expression of gratitude to his friend. In the *Republic* the master, having said that the most potent education of all is that which makes a man love the good and hate the bad even before he knows the reason why, concludes: "When reason comes, he will recognize and salute the friend with whom his education has made him long familiar." In the case of *Emile* this recognition, says the author, introduces the hero into the true moral and social order where justice and goodness are not abstract words or pure moral beings formed by the understanding but real affections of the soul enlightened by reason. Here he hints that he is translating the Socratic abstractions into more human terms. But to do so, he uses the sage's own images and ideas. Emile's grateful "recognition" of his friend conveys in an artistic form the first flutter of conscience, an acknowledgment of the duties or debts of social man, who is bidden by the precept of justice to render unto each what belongs to each so that, as Socrates says, everyone may have and do what is his own. The Aemilian hero now has an intuitive glimpse of that law which he already unconsciously obeys.

In his broader use of sympathy Rousseau takes leave of Socrates, and, as we shall see, there is evidence that he does so deliberately. Having begun like the Greek thinker by arousing sympathy between kindred souls like Jean-Jacques and his ward, he thenceforth transcends the master in his appeal to that feeling by carrying out his intention of extending it to all mankind including men of evil life, much as he enlarged justice to include mercy in "the book of the law." Socrates opposes the idea of pitying the wicked in many contexts, including Plato's fifth book where, after the passage on procreation and sympathy, he makes children "spectators of war" in real life and shows them how heroes fight against their "enemies"—which typify evil passions in themselves and in others—lest they become "prisoners" of "barbarians." Emile emulates
those heroes later on when the same enemies threaten him personally. But meanwhile, he learns to pity all men without exception. Here the author is inspired by his divine master, whose precept of love is expanded to include both "friends" and "enemies," according to the Sermon on the Mount.

But thus far Emile, in pitying suffering humanity indiscriminately, is blind to distinctions between men and does not even recognize the wicked as such. His next step is to do so. The author explains why. Since the youth's social contacts are about to expand and he will be comparing himself with others in his search for a place among them and run the risk of being victimized by them, he must be prepared in advance for that experience by the sight of natural and civil inequalities and the social evils that we call "order." He must study society in men and men in society, combining politics and ethics as Rousseau himself does. The writer uses Socratic terms to describe our anarchic world whose "false" notions of justice moved him to write both Emile and the Contract as they moved Plato to write the Republic. In all three the point of departure, now redefined in Emile, is to discredit such notions and the "law of the stronger" that favor private interests at the expense of the public good, and to honor true justice that consummates human aspirations and fulfills the promises of "the book of the law." The Rousseauist hero is about to look upon the fierce opposition of good and evil in the world about him without yet feeling it in himself, and to see it as the cause of suffering in most men without withdrawing his sympathy from any.

To achieve this double purpose, Jean-Jacques would have him read the human heart and see that it is naturally good, that men are perverted by the prejudices of our society, unhappy in their iniquities and therefore worthy of his compassion. But lest the lad be led astray by them or fall a prey to them himself and hate instead of pity them, the governor briefly abandons his experimental method

[205]
and makes him a mere "spectator" of men's doings, like the Socratic children. The drama he beholds is compared to the pageantry of the Olympic games. In this chaotic contest, says the writer, men athirst for glory seek a perishable crown of bay; others engage in shopkeeping for the sake of gold; but the wisest of all are content to observe. The miniature Olympics of the second part come to mind to bring the artistic symmetry to the surface again and throw into new perspective the author's intentions. The implication is that in childhood Emile ran for cakes but in so doing acquired judgment enough to disdain to contend for foolish prizes. His object now is to acquire a sympathetic understanding of human nature and its weaknesses.

However, to avoid too close a proximity to the vices of men, he does not observe them in real life, like the Socratic children. Jean-Jacques finally has recourse to literary education, to history and later to fables rejected before but now considered morally invaluable to show the youth the human heart, its folly and its misery, not in the present moment but in other times and places so that he might see the stage without ever taking part in the play. In a series of historical dramas that replace the parables in action, he is, as it were, led through the realms of the dead and thereby gazes upon the living and the unborn future too, "which are necessarily of like nature with the past." In fine, by observing the heart of men in this way he becomes, in Socratic speech, "a spectator of all time and all existence," like the Greek heroes described at the beginning of the sixth book of the Republic, in spite of certain differences of approach.

Emile's governor uses discrimination in the selection of his histories and renounces those that portray evil exclusively or that fail to tell the truth, since the matter at stake is the discernment of good and evil. He finds his ideal in biography on the grounds that by knowing the inclinations of individuals, one can see their combined effects in society, and he thereby executes the author's intention of deal-
ing with both together. He favors the faithful biographies of antiquity, particularly those of the Greek writer Plutarch, who lays bare the human heart without regard for the empty rules of neoclassical decorum. In those lifelike portraits Aemilius, an ancient Roman reborn in the world today but a stranger to it, is enlightened by a Greek artist of 2,000 years ago who testifies to the state of the human heart in our society and whose testimony is true. Rousseau could hardly pay a more impressive tribute to one to whom he is as indebted as Emile is. The hero is especially sensitive, not to models of virtue like himself that made the writer into an imaginary Aemilius at the age of six, but to the so-called slaves of passion that, thanks to the biographer's art, appear in the same truth as the martyrs of pain in life.

The experience is narrated in dramatic terms. The youth, looking through the eyes of Plutarch as "the curtain rises" upon "the stage of the world," contemplates the spectacle of vice and suffering there presented to public view. He takes his place in "the wings of the theater," or rather, behind the "scenes," and "watches the actors don and doff their costumes," observing "the play of cords and pulleys" that deceives "spectators" unlike himself. He derives from this spectacle the initial impression that he has fallen among "wild beasts" with whom he has no kinship. Yet the governor knows better for, we are told, Plutarch offers a whole "course of practical philosophy"—meaning psychology—and teaches a man "to know himself and grow wise at the expense of the dead." And so, although Emile hardly recognizes himself or his place in the "mad" multitude of an alien world since for him happiness is as simple and nearby as health, freedom and the necessities of life, yet he has reflected enough upon human errors to pity all the tortured hearts of men, even his enemies, who are enemies of the good and whose malice only betrays their misery. Or so the author would have us believe.

[207]
In these pages upon Plutarch he is fully aware of straying from the advice of his Greek master by bringing Emile to pity men of evil life whose pleasures and pains are not his own, but with whom he is somehow identified in sorrow. Rousseau reveals this awareness by his use of terms borrowed from the stage. For the sage’s protest against appeals to pity for disordered souls is contained not merely in his discussion of “warfare” in Plato’s fifth book but elsewhere, too, and especially at the end, in his renewed indictment of the theater and the tragic poets who portray lawless tyrannical feelings, “the creations of men themselves,” not of God, and who are therefore “thrice removed from truth.” By so doing, they cater, says he, to false opinion and to passions that impair the reason and pose a threat to virtue and happiness. He warns his disciples against them and their works, convinced that “from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves.” Rousseau, of course, knew these passages well. His essay upon theatrical imitation, written while he was working on Emile, is partly taken from them and, to some degree at least, so is the Letter to d’Alembert. His allusions to the theater in the section on Plutarch in the novel show that he has in mind the same Socratic text and that he is wilfully violating its precepts by favoring compassion for evil men.

But the Aemilian text also suggests that Socrates’ objections to sympathy for the wicked are not valid in the present case. For example, we are told that Emile beholds not illusion, “thrice removed from truth,” but truth itself. Moreover, the hero’s impressions of the “madness of the multitude” and the image of “wild beasts”—the beast-like nature in man that needs taming—are conveyed in phrases borrowed from the Republic, indicating the writer’s sympathy for the Greek philosopher’s viewpoint at the very moment when he disregards his admonitions. There can be no doubt at all that he has Socrates in mind since, in order to convince us that Emile, in pitying the
wicked, will not be tempted to imitate them, he takes the trouble to say that the youth will not imitate anyone, "not even Socrates or Cato... for a man who is alienated from himself soon forgets himself altogether." All this evidence combines to support the contention that Rousseau's thought on the educational value of pity on behalf of vicious men takes account of the sage's protests.

That he has the sage in mind is further indicated in the next development of the novel where he deals in his own way with Socratic warfare. There Jean-Jacques reverts to the experimental method to teach Emile the art of "war," not to combat passions still foreign to himself, but to guard against the errors of pride and false opinion that supposedly generate them. For example, in order to persuade him that if he is happier than others it is by virtue of the governor's reason and not his own, for he is a man and subject to weaknesses and errors like the rest of us, Jean-Jacques, who is "more than a man," provides him with experience of the world and purposely exposes him to humiliating accidents, as he did in the myth of the conjuror Socrates. However, he avoids perilous situations and at the same time imposes two other rules upon himself: he guards against assuming airs of false dignity and remains always at the youth's side, whatever happens. He is compared to a Roman captain, not of a ship but of a warrior who is Aemilius and whom he leads as a captain does his soldiers, even in retreat. In this role he strengthens the youth's earlier sentimental "recognition" of his friend, based upon self-love and sympathy, and wins new confidence based upon the authority of reason and superiority of knowledge, which belong to the "leader" (conducteur) whose wisdom serves the interests of human happiness. He achieves this by warning Emile beforehand against the perils with which he himself has secretly contrived to surround him in the war of life, but without yet giving him "orders." If his ward persists in running a risk, he "follows" him "gaily" to share in silence the inevitable mortifications as in the con-
juror story, or else to lead him away to escape possible disaster if the risk becomes too great. As a veteran captain he will know in advance which expeditions are safe and which are hazardous, and the youth will in the end recognize this knowledge.

Once more Rousseau's symbols betray him. By resorting to images with military overtones, he again calls to mind Socrates, to whom he alludes in this context and whose advice about warfare is everywhere implicit in his words. As I have said, that advice is to be found mainly in Plato's fifth book, although throughout the dialogue life is described in military terms. In the fifth book, as we know, Socrates makes young persons view the war of human passions, not on the stage or in books that naturally arouse pity for the victims, but in real life, which is less likely to flatter that sentiment. But he takes certain precautions that have left their mark upon Rousseau. For example, the children are "taken to see the battle" as "spectators," are placed "under the command of experienced veterans... their leaders and teachers," are mounted on horseback and, if there is no danger, are "brought close up"; but if there is, "they have only to follow their elder leaders," who know how to anticipate peril and conduct them away to escape in time of need. In this way they witness the merciless and pitiless treatment dealt out to "enemies." The Socratic text proves how closely the author of *Emile* follows the master to show his hero confronted by a misguided world with which he must, however, sympathize.

In combatting errors, the Aemilian governor has recourse to the enactment of more parables, in this case inspired by La Fontaine's fables. Prompted by the latter, he secretly contrives appropriate situations, and later has the unsuspecting Emile read apologues to generalize his experiences. The author hints that much art and subterfuge are employed in these myths, but advises us that he does not intend to tell us everything, for, in that event,
we should stop listening. If we were to accuse him of deception, he would probably reply with Socrates that "lies in words" are not "true lies" and are useful "in dealing with enemies," or as "a sort of medicine or preventive" to save our friends, and are also valuable "in the tales of mythology." In fact, all three functions are combined in the present instance. Thus the hero learns the danger of flattery and pride from myths like "The Fox and the Crow" or "The Frog and the Ox," and acquires a gradually dawning recognition of reason as a friend to man and a bulwark against error.

Pages like those reminiscent of Socratic "warfare" might lead us to question Rousseau's originality, especially after the provocative statement that Emile does not imitate anyone, not even Socrates. Emile may not but the author surely does, although he does so in an original manner. Otherwise we should long since have discovered the close affinities of Emile and the Contract with the Republic. Like many great writers, including La Fontaine, he is deeply indebted to his classical and Christian inheritance, but skillfully changes the substance of his models into his own. For example, in the present instance it assumes an almost commonplace cast that is typical of him. If I point out resemblances, it is simply to throw new light on his work and thought, rather than to discredit or extol them.

The foregoing phase of the novel, where the governor anticipates passions and errors by having recourse to history and real-life fables, is closely allied to the first two chapters of the fourth part of the Contract. These chapters also deal with the problems of passions and errors and the value of bonds of friendship to solve them, although, of course, Emile's pity for the wicked, necessary for one who lives in a disordered world, is invisible in an exteriorized image of the perfect city. Indeed, the writer of the novel almost refers us to the matching phase of the appendix. For example, his above-mentioned observations about the connection of politics and morals, and about the character of a society
being visible in the men composing it, link the whole context clearly with the said chapters where the Socratic author shows how passions that oppress the will and errors that deceive it are as much a threat to the birth of the moral person or city outside as they are to that of the one within. He also shows how those impediments of heart or mind from which Emile is saved through Plutarch and the fables may be overcome to make the moral person a reality. He is moving toward that goal at the same pace in both books. Again we become keenly sensitive to the evolutionary character of the Contract.

It is further underlined by a comparison of the present context with the second part. For by virtue of the same literary symmetry observable in the pendant parts of Emile, the fourth part of the appendix refers back to “the book of the law.” It begins with chapters on the indestructible will and its manifestations, corresponding to the earlier opening chapters on the inalienable, indivisible, and unerring will. But whereas in the earlier ones the writer was concerned with proving that the sovereign faculty can and must be fostered to function autonomously in the moral being, and that it can and must be brought to emerge through all the conflict therein, here he shifts the emphasis to prove that no passion can destroy it or error delude it in a well-ordered life.

In the first chapter, entitled “That the General Will Is Indestructible,” Rousseau begins by exemplifying that power in men like the Swiss peasants of the rural cantons, united together in a single body and animated by a common spirit to preserve and prosper the ideal community. The prosperity sought is not overshadowed by conflicting interests and is defined quite simply as “peace, union, and equality,” to show that in such a society few laws are necessary, in fact, only those whose necessity is felt by all. At this point, like Socrates in Plato’s sixth book, the author faces the incredulity of his hearers, who refuse to believe his words because they have never witnessed the truth of them. That
truth is illustrated in the novel, of course, by the friendship of Jean-Jacques and Emile, who are soon to settle their affairs in the manner described in the *Contract*. As we have seen, they too are linked together by feelings shared in common and by singleness of purpose to preserve and prosper the reasonable constitution of man’s entire nature supposedly seen in their relationship. And their laws are the “peace, union, and equality” mentioned above. The law of equality forbids both wealth and poverty; the law of union enacts that the city be one and self-sufficing; and the law of peace bids each one do and have what is his own and refrain from meddling with others. These laws, which correspond respectively to those of necessity, freedom and natural aptitude, suffice to achieve the main purpose of the covenant or law of friendship and therefore of man’s sovereign will.

The author of the *Contract* next contrasts his ideal with a “false” society wherein exclusive private interests such as the greed for gain and power conspire against the moral being or human creature to destroy its unanimity and divide its kingdom into incompatible shreds by subjugating the will, as he warned in “the book of the law.” If they prevail, “the social [and moral] bond is broken in all hearts.” As we were told in *Emile* and are told again here, the public good is then sacrificed to shameful passions that muffle the will and dethrone it to sit in its place, fabricating their own unjust decrees, which are, of course, those of the strongest. This is the chaos that was disclosed to Aemilius by Plutarch and that Socrates describes in a similar vein. As in the *Republic*, every word here is as relevant to the inner man as it is to the condition of social affairs outside.

Regarding the anti-society Rousseau concludes Socratically that the sovereign will though mute therein is not destroyed but remains “constant, unalterable and pure,” like conscience, whose voice is its own voice, as we are later told. According to him and his master, senseless covetous and concupiscent desires, as distinguished from necessary
ones that are the Socratic "maintainers" of life, cannot quench the longing for good that somehow survives in men's hearts, however they may try to elude it. To achieve an ideal order, it is therefore essential to elicit their will as citizens, says he, by which he means men of integrity, and to take account of the right to "opine, propose, divide and discuss" that the governing agency of reason always takes care to reserve for itself.

Some of us have in the past inferred from the text here summarized that Rousseau means to divest the sovereign will of the right to propose new laws and intends to reserve that privilege for the governing faculty or government. The eighth and ninth of the Letters from the Mount are usually cited to support this contention. But they fail to do so. In the eighth he is speaking of the status quo in Geneva and suggesting a change. In the ninth he merely says that the legislative power in a city may not be activated by any one of those composing it, which seems fair enough. But in the seventh he openly complains that the sovereign people have been deprived of the right to initiate legislation in his native city or to control the government that does. Even in the passage of the Contract under discussion, he obviously means to complain that the governing power "always takes care" to reserve such rights for itself. On the other hand, he demands that the will or "inner feeling" of conscience be elicited, as well as common sense, in the proposal and discussion of laws. Emile is trained to find necessary ones for himself, and with him, as with the Swiss peasants mentioned above, their necessity is always felt as well as seen.

The main idea of the chapter, namely that man's will for the good is indestructible, is also Socratic, as we know. For instance, Socrates sees the soul of the tyrant as unhappy, for, being a victim of passion, "she is least capable of doing what she desires." and the good self is tyrannized by the bad. But the good self and its aspirations remain intact. Consequently he speaks of the good "which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all his actions," even though
we may not know its nature or true scope.\footnote{22}

The question of knowledge of the good and errors in judgment about the will's intent, posed in \textit{Emile} through the enactment of fables is treated in the next chapter of the \textit{Contract}, "Concerning Suffrage." Rousseau begins by reminding us once again that "will power" in a city is manifested by a healthful unanimous and harmonious agreement of all the various parts, resulting in a consensus of opinion in popular assemblies, unless, of course, men are unanimously dehumanized. But he admits that the actual falls short of the ideal, for the true self is led astray by the false. Hence he asks what degree of assent is required for the sovereign will to obtain in the moral person. That depends, he says, upon the seriousness of the matter at issue. The law of the covenant is the only one requiring total commitment in soul or city. We saw this in the case of Emile, who must himself consent to the covenant of friendship. In the city of the \textit{Contract} dissenters who refuse to adjust themselves to the supposed reasonable constitution of nature and the ideal commonwealth and who reject the covenant are called "strangers." Socrates in the passage on "warfare" calls them "barbarians." They are excluded, or rather, they alienate themselves from the state that promises happiness. In less august matters in the Rousseauist city of the covenant, the opinion of the majority of its inhabitants suffices for the "constant will" of all "citizens"—including the dissenting minority—to prevail.\footnote{23} The writer maintains that in the case of committed men those who opine otherwise err; and that if they were to follow their own false opinions, they would violate their true will and be at issue with themselves quite as much as the victims of passion in an anti-society. Dissent, discord, and error inevitably exist within the self, however committed. But if the general will does not prevail in the majority, says Rousseau—and of course it would not do so in a disordered society like ours—then there is no more freedom. This applies not only to a state but to elements within the soul since moral and civil
liberty are equally impossible when superior powers are enslaved by inferior ones. His thought here echoes the later books of the Republic where the soul or city is betrayed into slavery by the sophisms of tyrannical desires. But he is persuaded that in his own city such abuses can be prevented: just as passions can be tamed by the human spirit, so errors can be rectified by common sense. Witness the case of Emile. The fables in action that served to correct him were designed to teach him the proper role of reason as faithful ministrant and friend to his own indestructible will for lasting happiness.

A few critics feel that there is a certain ambiguity about Rousseau's "retreat" to majority vote after the demand for unanimity. The matter was raised in the third chapter above. Some people realize that the so-called retreat is an attempt to translate the will into practical terms. But even so, the author does not say here any more than in the second part that the general will prevails in the majority or even in unanimity. On the contrary, he says that it may not. It would do so only among moral beings who make the positive act of commitment to it, and only as long as they are mindful of their vows. Otherwise, sophisms carry the day.

That is what Emile's governor has sought to prevent. Henceforward, from the part on "warfare" to the creed, he carries forward his task of stimulating the reasonable will and making the youth into a "lover of wisdom." That is also Socrates' object as seen at the end of Plato's fifth book and pursued throughout the sixth. The latter now becomes Rousseau's main inspiration to such an extent that I must deal with the two texts together. In the ancient one the speaker describes the philosophic nature, deplores its fate in our society, and examines the form of government adapted to it or education of philosopher-kings.

Of course, the Socratic concept of the philosophic nature with which Plato's sixth book opens has already served for the presentation of Jean-Jacques, since only a philosopher-king can "beget" one. For instance, he who was able to
distinguish between the true man and the false must presumably possess his model's perfect vision of the reasonable and divine pattern of human life and like the model know how to order and preserve the laws of beauty, goodness, and justice in accordance with that vision. His friendship with Emile is supposed to exemplify this. And when in the present crisis he rescues the youth from the enemies surrounding him, he again resembles the Socratic "friend of truth and all the virtues" whose enemies are the ones kept at bay in Emile and the Contract: the passions of mutinous men who try to prevent the "true steersman" from steering; and the sophisms of the great throng who fashion people to their taste in assemblies, courts of law, theaters, and camps, and whose prejudices and passions are called "justice" and "injustice," "good" and "evil." Rousseau almost quotes the master's words in Emile. In the face of such enemies the saving power of the Rousseauist ruler is that of the Socratic one in the same context, the "divine power" of reason that the hero has just recognized as a friend to man. And so, as both thinkers phrase it, he may safely descend into the den of human affairs to fight in courts of justice and public places, and partake of labors, lessons, and dangers therein. He now does precisely that.

Rousseau defines the object and method of this descent. The object is to perfect his knowledge of mankind and himself and teach him to deal with men and calculate the effect of private interests in civic affairs. As for the method employed, he makes his way into society by practicing beneficence under the guidance of a sage. In dispensing his lessons, Jean-Jacques imitates the Socratic kings in the corresponding Greek text and makes his disciple into a "living authority" to perpetuate the idea of the constitution that guided the legislator in laying down his laws. For, after their example, he draws the youth to share in the same social virtues of charity and humanitarianism that he himself practiced in the "book of the law," still visible here. Both heroes thereby deepen their love of mankind, as do the Socratic
Rousseau's Socratic Aemilian Myths

Rousseau is walking in the very footsteps of the master at the same time as he passes beyond him. For in Socrates' case the multitude is an orderly one, corresponding to necessary desires within the moral person or city, whereas the modern disciple, under the influence of Christian charity, appeals on behalf of the "indigent," "oppressed," and "unfortunate" amid a dusty and sordid humanity. Indeed, Rousseau virtually says that Christian and classical traditions are herein intermingled by comparing his hero at this stage both to medieval knights-errant and illustrious young Romans "who spent their youth bringing criminals to justice and protecting the innocent." After their example and that of the Socratic kings, Emile takes care not to alienate people or cause contention among them, for he loves peace and harmony that are implicit in the common good. Gradually, his active compassion lavished upon all alike reveals to his mind what makes or mars the happiness of men, including his own felicity as a man of virtue. The love of humanity that results from his beneficence is identified as the love of justice, although he practices it only externally and is not yet obliged to "set in order his own inner life." The same qualities would be essential for the formation of the society of friends described in the Contract.

Rousseau warns that such good works permit no acceptance of persons. Like his masters he pleads strongly against partiality in soul or city. As we know, in both his books the sovereign will that favors justice has no particular object. Unlike those whom Socrates, in the very context here used by his disciple, styles "false philosophers" or "pretenders," the hero of the novel is concerned not with personalities but with principles. He is taught that justice is the virtue most conducive to the common good of all men equally, for it secures the bond of peace and unity among them. Since the same bond is symbolized by his friendship with Jean-Jacques, their fellowship is obviously not an ex-
inclusive one. As we saw long ago, it is open to everyone, springing as it does from general concepts that lie at the basis of Rousseauist and Socratic order. Even in his personal life, the writer professed to be a friend of all men, however disordered, as well as a citizen of the new Geneva, although he understood too well the discipline required to reconcile one's private affections with a generous fairness to mankind as a whole. The warnings against partiality in *Emile*, paralleled by those in the *Contract*, are prompted by personal experience as well as Socratic and biblical models.

Rousseau stops at this point to admire the effects of Emile's formation and in doing so, continues to follow the sixth book of the *Republic* so closely that I must continue to handle the two together. The youth, with a heart free of exclusive inclinations and a mind absorbed by inner truth, beholds a Socratic ideal world "fixed and immutable," the true principles of justice, the real prototypes of beauty all moral relationships of beings, and the orderly disposition of things. Conversing with a reasonable and sublime order within the Aemilian city and practicing virtue in a chaotic world outside, he becomes orderly and sublime as far as the nature of man allows. These are the very terms in which Socrates too in the corresponding text describes his future philosopher-kings. Next Rousseau, again like the Greek sage and in the same context and similar words, faces the incredulity of his readers, as he also did in the *Contract*. He suspects that we have long since relegated him to the land of chimeras in company with his master. People are skeptical, says he, because Emile is the man of nature and not of man. Once more he is almost quoting the sage, who admits that by comparison with his ideal "all other things whether natures of men or institutions are but human," "conventional imitations," whereas he is molding "a human being" into the "proportion and likeness of virtue." Rousseau does the same. In doing so, he professes, with his master, to be adhering faithfully to his vision of human
nature sanctified by its divine origin. In the Greek text here reflected in Emile, Socrates explains further that he is fashioning his "image of a man... according to... the form and likeness of God," or according to the truth that is akin to the highest good as he sees it. Rousseau hardly strays from the model that culminates with the great similitude of the sun or vision of the idea of good now matched in the creed of Emile contained in the "Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar."

The author finally has recourse to the saving power of religion when the hero is eighteen years of age. Before doing so, he remarks meaningfully that Emile is no longer one of the "vulgar herd," although he started as one. The point is that his religion will exceed theirs.

According to the writer, most men are unable to commune with the Supreme Being, even in our confined degree. Consequently he would not have them study the catechism or Christian mysteries, which allegedly mean nothing to them. If we protest that one must believe in God to be "saved," he agrees, on condition that the precept does not imply the notion "outside of the church no salvation." He believes that religion is necessary, at least for men living within the fabric of the social order. But he draws a distinction between the religion of the thinker or leader like Emile and the coarser instruction of the common people, who are so engrossed in physical needs that they hardly think at all. He does so even in his ideal order since many men are insensitive to the harmony of the universe that now enchants and mystifies Emile. For this reason he would instruct them in religion all the sooner, as he does in his dream of a perfect city that comes to the birth at the end of both books.

The distinction between the faith of leaders and that of followers brings to the surface the functions of Rousseauist religion. The latter provides further against sophisms and passions that were the themes of the previous pages of Emile and the Contract. For example, we are told that, as the hero's mind becomes more cultivated, religion
would in the end be an intellectual necessity for him. That is one of its functions in the lives of leaders. But Rousseau is convinced that nature is slow to stir curiosity about the deity even in their case. Jean-Jacques, we are told, anticipates the moment slightly since he must impart instruction early enough to arm the will against the passions, accelerated by society, and maintain a balance among the faculties. The flames of passion constitute the sacrificial fire of the temple, offered to the Godhead to purify the soul. Religion serves this need for purification in the lives of both leaders and followers. It therefore has a double purpose for leaders, though not for most men. At last Emile is to know the great lawgiver, whose sacred laws are already the substance of his childish faith. He is to acquire the essential elements of all religions without being associated with any particular one until he can choose for himself.

These views that scandalized Rousseau’s contemporaries are far from new. One might cite the example of the Republic. From their earliest childhood Socrates’ guardians are taught what is called a popular version of religion that is quite simply the practice of the virtues under the aegis of Apollo. But the reason of philosopher-kings is not even oriented toward the study of “true being” and the idea of good until after they are twenty years old, and only at fifty do they attain to the sight of God. In addition, the sage formulates a practical profession of faith as a guide to conduct for all men in Plato’s last book. Thus he too sees religion as fulfilling a double role. Rousseau, in his view of the subject as everywhere else, remains close to the master without, however, forgetting the founder of Christianity, even though he remains skeptical about Christian dogmas and mysteries.

One need not conclude that the religion of leaders and that of followers are incompatible, any more than the faith of guardians and kings in the Republic is incompatible with the practical religious dogmas formulated at the end of the great dialogue. The articles of popular faith in the Rous-
Rousseauist city are likewise defined at the end of *Emile* and the *Contract*, and identically so in both cases. Later I shall compare them with *Emile*’s. The latter is now presented in a long profession of faith that has no corresponding chapter at this point in the appendix. It prepares for an inner adjustment that is not included in an exteriorized version of the nascent city, upon which religious dogmas are superimposed after birth as the coping-stone of social order as in the case of the *Republic*.

The Aemilian creed has an apparently objective form. The writer professes to transcribe a document composed by a fellow-citizen who recounts the adventures and religious instruction of his youth. To see the reason for the change in form, one must examine the introductory narrative.

In the latter as in the creed itself there are two figures, just as there are in the rest of the book. But they are not the same ones. Rousseau suddenly abandons the ethereal Emile and the mysterious Jean-Jacques and replaces them by two very earthly human beings, a young exile who remains nameless and an equally nameless Savoyard vicar who becomes the youth’s mentor. In circumstances reminiscent of the vision of *Er* at the end of the *Republic*, two pilgrims ascend from the earth “dusty and worn with travel” and confront two other souls who have come down to our midst by the heavenly way, “clean and bright.” The vicar and his protégé, who are obviously exiles from the blessed city or sphere of absolute beauty to which Emile and Jean-Jacques belong, are meant to exemplify the safest course open to men who must live in a world not their own.

The events of the introduction serve to show how enlightening an interpretation of art forms can be. Thirty years ago, we are told, a young Calvinist exile reduced to poverty became a fugitive in Italy, where he changed his religion for a morsel of bread. He was admitted to a hostel for converts, where controversy raised doubts in an unsus-
pecting mind and evil was made known to an innocent heart. He longed to escape but was locked up. In the course of time he contrived to consult privately a poor but worthy visiting “ecclesiastic” who favored his escape at the risk of creating a dangerous enemy. Thereafter a little good fortune led him to forget his benefactor. But his hopes for the future soon vanished with romantic illusions. At last without food or shelter, he returned to the priest, who welcomed and comforted him.

I must pause here for a moment before concluding the story. The outcast is, of course, the young, unregenerate Rousseau. The same child we saw groping about in the darkness of a Calvinist temple in search of the holy book is still groping about at a critical point in the writer’s past, but this time in the Catholic church. The author here evokes the moment when, at the age of sixteen, he sold his Protestant birthright for a mouthful of food. The story is told in the second book of the Confessions; and if we compare the two accounts, we can easily see the symbolism of the one in Emile, which is usually taken for “romance.” In the autobiography the abandoned youth runs away from Calvinist Geneva and takes refuge in a Catholic hospice for converts in the city of Turin. The hospice is transformed in Emile into an image of the Catholic church, in whose bosom he saw nothing but moral and intellectual disorder. In that inn for the pilgrims of life he was morally a “prisoner” for about twenty-six years, from 1728 to 1754. Within its precincts, though only after he had left the building in Turin (where he probably remained no more than a few weeks at the most), he met a visiting priest, Father Gaime, who was one of the vicar’s two models in life. In the Confessions the vicar favors his escape from the mythical hostel by advising him to return to his own country and faith, advice which, as the autobiographer says, did not take effect until later. The youth’s fleeting happiness with its promise of deliverance is also narrated in the Confessions. After its eclipse he remembers the vi-
car's words and associates them with another voice heard a year later when, as a young seminarian at Annecy in Savoy, he receives guidance from Father Gâtier, the second model for the Aemilian vicar.38

In the rest of the story the vicar's life parallels the outcast's, and in the end the two are recognizable as one. A youthful adventure caused the priest to lose favor with his bishop, much as the exile's folly led him to break faith with the religion of Calvin. Consequently both are outcasts in Italy, where the vicar is almost as destitute as his protégé. From this point on his story identifies him not merely with the exile of the context but also with the hero of the Confessions and the writer of Emile. The priest was once tutor to the Count de Mellarède's son, as Rousseau later became tutor to the count's daughter. Moreover, he desires to be restored to favor with his church and retire to a parish in the mountains, like the writer who in 1754 resumed his Genevan religion and then made plans to withdraw to the Swiss mountains once Emile was complete. Besides, when the book was published he was the same age as the vicar he impersonates, the age of fifty when the Socratic philosopher finally attains to a beatific vision of God. The priest's method of reviving a youthful conscience is also the author's. He begins by arousing self-esteem in the embittered outcast to lead him to the practice of virtue. For instance, he refuses to give him a deposit of money entrusted to him "for the poor," even though the youth protests that he is one of their number, for, says the vicar, "we are brothers; you belong to me, and I may not touch this deposit for my own use." The two are one, and the writer identifies himself with both exactly as he does with their heavenly prototypes, Jean-Jacques and Emile. Moreover, like him the two exiles favor dogmas contrary to the Roman church, although they remain faithful to its rites. In the end both appear as disguised Protestants. When the vicar or "man of peace" finally succeeds in awakening the youth's reason and compassion for mankind, he
promises to confide to him the secret of happiness but warns him first that all is vanity under the sun and that peace of mind lies in detachment from the world. His secret entails that of “man’s fate and the true value of human life.” This is the Socratic theme of Emile, the Contract, and the Republic, which is now to be evolved in a religious context that adds power to the author’s philosophy. For the profession of faith is really a religious statement of the principles of his companion volumes.

The figures of Ecclesiastes and the outcast evoke the most decisive events in the writer’s religious experience. The voice that speaks in the creed is really that of his own conscience, which was once heard through the lips of two priests but was ignored. It is finally impelled to speak again by a consciousness of remorse embodied in the young scapegrace of thirty years before who still lives within him at this moment of truth. In other words, the voice is actually inspired by the mute presence of the hapless figure to whom it is ostensibly addressed. There can be no “revelation” until that voice is heard. It formulates a profession of faith that, like the whole of Emile, is really a conversation of a man with himself on the subject of good and evil. Mingled in its accents is that of Rousseau the grave Calvinist, the rebellious Catholic, the renegade “philosopher,” and the disciple of Christ and Socrates. All combine to plead on behalf of a vision of moral truth that springs from the writer’s deeper impressions of some of our oldest traditions.

If we still wonder why, in such an intensely subjective phase of the work, he declines to speak in his own person, we might suspect that, as I have shown elsewhere, the objective form lends itself better to a public confession of the kind. But why put on the person of a skeptical Catholic priest? There are several reasons why he dons the priestly mantle. One is that his theme is theology. Besides, he always longed for the life of a village curate although he was judged unsuited to that vocation after two months’
probation as a seminarian at the age of seventeen. There is still another reason. Since the voice that speaks is that of conscience, regarded as the spokesman of God, and since his conscience is unquestionably Christian, he quite naturally poses as a vicar of Christ, whose home is the promised land of Savoy, the scene of an idyllic phase in his life. We may infer that he himself presides as high priest in the temple of the soul where, in the life of Emile until the age of discretion, Jean-Jacques is ministrant or Levite in an office upon which his disciple's fate largely depends.40

As for his skepticism, Rousseau maintains that, unlike that of the young fugitive and the writer's contemporaries, it does not affect the essential truths of religion.41 Skeptics like those, he says, have more to gain than lose by adopting the vicar's views. Thus he uses his unregenerate and regenerate selves respectively as an image of the society of his day and its supposed hope of redemption.

But why choose a Catholic priest as spokesman instead of a Protestant, for whom doubts are permissible? He explains in the Letters from the Mount that the form of the work favors the Reformation, since a skeptical though pious Catholic priest advises a former Calvinist to return to the religion of his birth. However, according to a letter addressed to him by a friend after a long conversation together, the word Catholic is used in its etymological sense of universal.42 As has been suggested, he probably wished to underline the non-confessional character of his faith and its value for the safe conduct of human life wherever men may dwell.

The setting of the discourse is adapted to its ideological function. The author describes a gracious summer dawn, beheld from the heights of a hill that rises beyond the confines of the city of Turin and overlooks the long-drawn, gently sloping valleys of the Po. The scene is crowned in the distance by the immense chain of the Alps singularly clear in the transparency of the air and the flood of early morning sunshine. The aesthetic qualities of the description are heightened by symbolic implications that are intentional, for
the writer openly acknowledges the ideological value of suitable surroundings for any serious form of instruction.

The choice of a mountain scene is especially appropriate. The mountain represents the summit of his thought. In Socratic terms it is the highest sphere of knowledge in the ascent of the soul toward moral truth. But it has many other resonances in the traditions combined in the book. It might be Mount Sinai, where God spoke to Moses as he does to the exile in the vicar’s voice; or Mount Nebo, whence the prophet beheld the Promised Land here presented to our imagination; or even the hill of Sion, where Solomon paid homage to divine wisdom in the sanctuary of the Lord. On the other hand, it might also be some Greek acropolis or Mount Olympus itself, where the Delphic shrine now stands in ruins amid a landscape suggestive of the presence of the deity. But then again it may be that other mount in Galilee where Christ’s “finest discourse” was pronounced, for the Christian overtones of this new sermon on the mount were accentuated in the final revision of the work. In fact it is probably all of these, evocative of the various traditions that solicit the author’s thought.

The sun is also symbolic. Indeed, it corresponds, as I have said, to a Socratic similitude prefigured in the third part of Emile. In the image that occurs at the end of the sixth book of the Republic, the sage uses the sun to convey his idea of the goal of the education of kings: the supreme principle of the good whose light is moral truth and imparts visibility to the sight of reason. This idea dominates the Rousseauist text where however biblical reminiscences are also implicit. For example, in the apocryphal book of Ecclesiasticus, a favorite with the writer, Wisdom, having spoken of God’s covenant, the law of Moses, and its duties and promises, boasts: “Teaching is here like the dawn for brightness, shedding its rays afar.” The New Testament too is full of similar images of light to which Rousseau alludes elsewhere. In the brilliant mountain setting of Emile the blind boy of Bossey has come to be healed of his blindness.
The rays of light are a revelation illuminating reason and conscience that dawn like the sun upon the temple of the soul and lead man to an IDEA of good, which, for Rousseau, as for Socrates, is the "cause of knowledge and of truth."

The landscape confronting the vicar is also an inner one, representing in artistic form his own complex state of soul, both "romantic" and "classical" at once. The orderly cultivated valleys of the Po, remote from urban chaos, are an image of life as it has already been visualized, a well-organized, harmonious, largely "classical" vision. It is now superelevated by powerful lyrical aspirations that are bodied forth in the Alps in the background of the picture to form a "romantic" image of eternity and infinity, concepts that are also in the background of the speaker's mind. As the ultimate object of his thought, they poeticize it and sanctify it in his own eyes, thereby supposedly ensuring the safety of the simple order of life it propounds.

CREDO

"The Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar" is, so to speak, the tabernacle of the living God in the very heart, or central nave of the cella, of the mythical shrine, where it is set apart by its own superscription and the cunning use of spacing. Rousseau himself called it "the best and most useful piece of writing of the century," meaning "useful" in the Socratic sense. The work is indeed a landmark. For the first time in modern culture, the author of a literary masterpiece uses all the resources of his craft to handle his entire creed as a major theme of art.45

Throughout the piece the blending of Greek classical and Judeo-Christian elements is visible. Rousseau's own statement that his books were mere commentaries on the scriptures is to a fair degree applicable to the profession of faith. Apart from numerous biblical echoes in its content, the ideological framework closely resembles that of the Solomonic book of Ecclesiastes, beginning with the theme
"Vanity of vanities; all is vanity," and ending in much the same way as King Solomon in the sacred text which is paraphrased by Christ and his apostles: "Fear God, and keep his commandments: for this is the whole duty of man." The Old Testament book shows how far a man, richly endowed with knowledge and experience, may go by the light of natural revelation alone, and in this respect is related to Rousseau's purpose. But its conclusion leads straight into the New Testament, which also reverberates in the Aemilian creed. Rousseau acknowledges a special debt to Christ not merely by choosing a mountain setting but in other more convincing ways. For example, he calls his work a "discourse," the word applied in French to the Sermon on the Mount. Besides, he quotes from that and other of Christ's sayings. And in the central tableau of the piece he portrays the divine master towering far above Socrates. But in the same tableau and elsewhere, too, he hints at his indebtedness to the Greek master and to pagan tradition in general. Indeed, as I have said, he calls his creed a canticle or hymn of Orpheus. Whether or not the reference to the Greek musician was inserted at the last minute to accommodate an engraver as seems to be the case, it is a felicitous image nevertheless. Just as Orpheus, the son of the Delphic Apollo, was empowered to tame wild beasts with the music of his lyre, so the son of man, who in the creed is "lord of the earth and the beasts thereon," appears in the vicar's person as the new Orpheus taming what Socrates and his disciple call "the wild beast" or "multitudinous monster" within the soul or city; and he does so far more effectively than the Sophist lion tamer of the sixth book of the Republic, who flatters the beast instead of taming him. In fine, the writer is obviously conscious of fusing the great streams of our culture in his "hymn."

The creed is indeed a "hymn" as defined in the Dictionary of Music: a song in honor of gods or heroes. Moreover, just as a hymn is also a prayer, so is the whole profession
of faith: not a prayer in the sense of a petition but an act of worship, of admiration, contemplation, and submission, such as the writer favored in his personal life. It is a long meditative dialogue, or rather monologue, offered in homage to the divine prototype of justice and wisdom and therefore to the soul or city made in that likeness. This prayer, like many another, is filled with imagery that in the present case serves to illustrate the author’s philosophy of life, as is usual with him.

The profession of faith begins and ends, as does *Emile*, with a defense of the “true” laws of basic social institutions, like love and marriage, that respect the rights and duties of humanity and are rooted in the universal principles of nature, unlike the “false” decrees of existing man-made religious and political systems that allegedly shock her ordinances. Indeed, Rousseau says in his letter to the archbishop of Paris written to vindicate the book that that is the primary purpose of the vicar’s creed and of *Emile*. According to the writer of the epistle, existing institutions that tyrannize and mutilate nature force her to claim her rights by stealth and thereby create an abyss between reality and appearances. He exemplifies the strife between them by the contemporary laws of celibacy and marriage. The latter would be the laws whereby the French government refused to recognize the validity of Protestant marriages in France and also forbade the intermarriage of Catholics and Protestants. As we saw in the beginning of *Emile*, the author defends marriage as a civil contract upon which any society stands or falls. As such it wins the support of “enlightened” faith.

Accordingly, the spokesman of the Aemilian creed commences by confessing his own moral dilemma concerning marriage and celibacy. By virtue of a Freudian, or rather Platonic, method of using the sentiment of love to convey attitudes toward life, he expands his perplexity into a spiritual problem of good and evil. He begins with the reflection that he was destined by his estate to till the earth. This,
of course, is man's true vocation in the book and the one to which the author felt that he was born. The vicar's parents, however, decided to make him into a priest, much as Rousseau's resolved to "wed" him to an exclusive communion, without considering whether it respects the rights of humanity or does not. The "parents," in Socratic or Rousseauist language, are the country and its laws. This engagement is a false contract, corresponding to the falseness of a society that violates nature. The vicar is bound to it by a vow of celibacy whereby he promises "not to be a man." Again he is the writer pledging himself not to take any other "bride" outside the communion to which he is committed. This vow represents in the context a spurious rule, comparable with existing laws of marriage that cause a man to be at war with himself. The result of such rules is their inevitable infraction. In literary terms the vicar-writer is faithless to his "bride." He intuitively follows conscience and well-ordered nature, which disregard "false" man-made decrees and lend their support only to the laws of reality. The spokesman breaks his vow of chastity, as the writer strays from the faith of his fathers toward "natural religion."

But the priest, in taking to himself another "bride," reveres marriage as "the first and most sacred institution of nature." In other words, though violating the mythical marriage forced upon him, he remains deferent to the commitments of other people. He therefore forms a connection with an unmarried woman. She becomes for the author a biblical and Socratic symbol of the natural religion of man that is the vicar's faith, called "the pure Christianity of the Gospel." She is recognizable in the bride of the Levite of Ephraim, to whom Rousseau by his own free will is now espoused, at the same time as he professes to respect all established religions seen as private engagements like those honored by his spokesman in the Aemilian creed.

The consequences in both cases are the same. The vicar's infidelity to a "false law" leads to scandal, arrest, dis-
missal, and exile. This was the fate reserved for the author as a result of an analogous apostasy. His words here are prophetic and proved to be true enough. But worse disaster lay in store for both men who are one. The vicar explains that the enforced infraction of arbitrary laws that trouble the order of nature causes strife and disorder in the soul, to which he is remorsefully a prey. The disorder in question is typified by that of the senses and is said to impair the happiness of the human creature, which depends upon unity and harmony and can be assured only by a truly moral engagement and laws based upon man’s natural constitution, with its hierarchy of faculties. Such are the allegorical implications of the exordium of the Aemilian creed.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to consider it in the light of the *Contract* and other texts. The alleged violation of nature’s ordinances by our institutions is traced to its origin in a historical survey at the beginning of the chapter of the *Contract* “Concerning Civic Religion,” which practically concludes the book.49 The survey helps to underline the vicar’s plight. In pagan antiquity, says the writer, the gods were identified with the laws of the city, which were regarded as divine. For him, of course, this would be desirable only in a perfect social order governed by “true” laws. Then, he continues, Christ came—to a “degraded” society, as we see later—to establish upon earth a spiritual realm or kingdom of the other world. This realm, which puzzled the pagans, is the one to which the vicar withdraws; and so conceivably would Emile, but for an allegorical coup de théâtre at the end. The survey in the *Contract* ends with the advent of dogmatic Christianity that allegedly replaced the realm of the other world by a violent despotism in this, and caused a conflict of power between religious and political authorities. The conflict, as illustrated by the vicar, is due to the presence of the same tyrannical aspirations in both systems that Rousseau regards as equally arbitrary and hostile to human nature, creating victims of “false” laws like himself and his spokes-
man. The conclusion to be drawn from the passage of the *Contract* is that, although the social and politico-moral unity essential for a good constitution requires the support of religion, yet if the laws of society are not in fact "sacred," then the only solution is the spiritual kingdom proposed by Christ as a refuge from the world and at the same time a guide to life therein.

In these pages of the *Contract* and *Emile* where the writer is haunted by Christianity, he has not forgotten his Greek teacher. In his preoccupation with moral law, he approaches religion in the same way as Socrates approaches both his similitude and practical creed at the end. In the former case the sage proposes to show his student kings the virtues "in their perfect beauty" to make those heroes into true guardians of the laws, and lovers of the idea of good. In the final creed, he seeks a remedy to the evils of actuality described in the eighth and ninth books where he traces the process of decline from the ideal order of things to the tyranny of lust and lawlessness. In those books he shows how moral and social chaos arise when desires, instead of being tamed by true law, are constrained by necessity and fear until they create "war" in the soul and then escape control, and a master passion, concupiscence, becomes tyrant absolute. In the tenth and last book he finds a solution in a religious profession of faith. The spiritual disorders, in the context of which its doctrines evolve like the vicar's do, are in his view fostered by tragic poetry, which flatters and glorifies false opinion and tyrannical passion. He combats those exhibitions of evil by his own concept of the great artist and the divine plan of life. His avowed follower does likewise in the vicar's creed as well as in its popular version at the end. Presumably the Rousseauist "hymn" is meant to be an example of the only kind of poetry that the sage would admit to his city, the kind that honors gods and heroes and is "useful" to states and to human life.  

I come now to the creed itself. Although the vicar's at-
titude to speculative reason is far from Cartesian, he begins with what Descartes regards as a necessary first step in the way of truth: a denial of habitual impressions and a conscious opposition to the current mode of thinking. From that point he sets out to determine his bearings on the vast "sea of human opinions," without benefit of helm or compass and with no other guide but "an inexperienced pilot who does not know his way, who knows neither whence he comes nor whither he goes." Here the Socratic image of the ship of the soul recurs by implication. The pilot without helm or compass is the untrained intelligence visualized as such in a passage on the philosophical nature in Plato's sixth book, as we know. In the Socratic text he "is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is not much better." He is nevertheless the true helmsman and must attend to "what belongs to his art" if he means to be "qualified for the command of a ship." In conformity with this idea the Aemilian vicar searches about anxiously for some positive light of doctrine to guide him to "the cause of his being and the rule of his duties."

Bereft of the ancestral Roman religion as a guide, he contemplates the variations of philosophy and derives therefrom a renewed conviction that we know neither the first principle nor ultimate issue of things. He therefore disquiets himself only concerning those matters that it is important for him to know and reposes in profound ignorance as to all else beside, says he in the very words of the book of Ecclesiasticus. These limitations and the avowed weakness of reason envelop his creed in intellectual uncertainty and doubt.

In order to learn what concerns him, he takes as his guide "the inner light," called "inner feeling or persuasion." It is really insight or intuition regarding his own true interests, confirmed by reason and experience and expressed in conscience, which later appears as the voice of the enlightened human will. Consequently it is a moral and intellectual guide as well. Following this tutelary genius within, he is at
once led to reject materialism in favor of the "Being of beings and dispenser of things," honored by the theologian Clarke, who, like Socrates, rises to the idea of a Supreme Being. In other words, the vicar begins with an a priori choice in favor of God or Providence. By comparison with the rest of the book this choice is all that is ideologically new in the creed, but that is a great deal. The profession of faith proceeds like the convenant from a deliberate act of the will, as indeed it must do if, as we shall see, religion is to be a law in his city and invigorate all other laws. He defends his choice as being more consoling and presenting fewer difficulties and more proofs than any other system. But intellectually it still remains a hypothesis. It appears as a self-conscious assent to a presupposition without which life would be absurd as well as intolerable. He obviously finds sufficient ground of evidence in that very fact. Thus the will or inner feeling, used as an instrument of knowledge, provides him at the outset with a "reasonable" belief, tokens of which he now seeks in the world about him.

Next, after using inner feeling as a guide to discover God as the source of moral truth, he sets out on his search for that truth and examines the guide he follows. The feeling in question must be essentially love of self since it entails a consciousness of his own existence and regulates the use of the senses as organs of cognition to acquaint him with the outer world of beings and things insofar as the latter act upon him. Thus he relies heavily upon sensitiveness and impressions, and his knowledge is largely subjective.

Then he considers the structure of the intellect. He discovers within himself the active power to compare the objects of his sensations by "shifting" them, "transporting" them, and "superimposing" them upon one another to form judgments about their mutual relationships. The motive images convey the idea of activity on the part of the subject and imply both volition and intelligence. Accordingly he concludes that he is an active, thinking being, capable of attributing meaning to existence and judging it. He denies
that he is merely sensitive and passive, as the materialists say. He distinguishes between the sensible and visible on the one hand and the intelligible on the other. In doing so, he shows that comparative and numerical ideas belong to the sphere of the intelligible. He gives the examples of a big and a little stick and the fingers of the hand, which the eye may see without counting them or making relative estimates about size. Socrates, too, in proposing the great revelation for student kings in his own similitude of the sun, makes meticulous distinction between the visible and intelligible. Later he cites examples of impressions that stimulate the mind and invite thought as opposed to those that do not, and his examples are the very ones chosen by Rousseau, who also resembles him by claiming the freedom to respond or not to the stimulus. But the mind is subject to error. To train it, both thinkers favor the mathematical sciences, as we know. But Rousseau's vicar, unlike Socrates, refuses to renounce the senses in favor of speculative reason alone to attain to a vision of a reasonable order in human life. On the contrary, like Jean-Jacques hitherto, he corrects faulty apprehension of the outward world by having further recourse to them, for, says he, they never really deceive us about themselves, and we need no proof that we feel what we feel. We go astray, he explains, only when the judgment mingle its errors with the truth of sensations. The corrective proposed is to refine and perfect the instruments of intuition by passing from confused to unconfused sensation, as Emile did, always remembering that the truth is in things and not in the mind that judges them. He concludes that the rule to follow inner feeling instead of speculative reason when the two disagree is confirmed by reason itself, which for him is basically a reason of sense, or rather, common sense. The rule of insight thus confirmed is conceived as the bulwark of education and legislation.

After making the choice of God and analyzing the organs of knowledge, he uses the latter to search for clues to justify his faith and rescue him from chaos. Lost in a universe
whose bounds escape him and amid beings whose nature and relationships to himself mystify him, he suddenly realizes, by the grace of inner feeling alone, that whereas he is able to move his limbs spontaneously and at will, the sun rising in the Alpine sky before him in its regular progress through the heavens lacks that very power. It obeys fixed laws, even as a watch does. This is a wonderfully suggestive image, more Rousseauist than Cartesian or Voltairean, as it has been called, since the writer is the watch-maker’s son—and I am not referring to Isaac Rousseau, who was a master craftsman in that capacity. Inner persuasion tells the vicar that movement is foreign to matter and that the heavenly bodies are responding to some external first cause, comparable to the power felt within himself. There is, he concludes, a sovereign will diffusing itself through the world, whose action sets the universe in motion and gives life to nature. The vicar is convinced that there can be no action, as distinct from movement, without will. The argument is a traditional one, of course. But the point to observe is the literary parallel with man, who experiences the action of the will not merely in spontaneous bodily motions but in the covenant and its oath that give life and movement to the city or the soul. Indeed, we are obliged to see this since, according to Rousseau and in view of the exordium of the creed, such is the main point of his dogmas, which are intended to sanctify his whole philosophy.

The vicar confesses, however, that he knows neither the nature of the will nor how spirit acts upon matter. But to confuse the two substances as the materialists do, with their ideas of “blind force” or “necessary movement” in nature, is even more incomprehensible for him.

Proceeding with his meditation, he deduces from the laws of order imposed upon the world of matter that there is also a supreme intelligence, an active, thinking being like himself “behind this vain show of things,” an argument as old as the first. He sees this being in the harmony of nature to which he belongs and in the ordered relationships of things
that he perceives, even though their common purpose—of whose existence he feels inwardly assured—escapes him for the moment. He can do this just as a man who sees a watch for the first time can, without understanding its use, admire its mechanism and even see the workman therein. The familiar image recurs. In fine, the orderly spectacle before him discloses to the vicar’s mind the intelligence of a master craftsman comparable to the Socratic artist of artists. Again we must see a literary analogy with man. The divine intelligence and its laws are visualized as a pattern of the operations of the human spirit and acts of the reasonable will that impose laws upon the city or soul and order all parts of the whole in accordance with a common object. Here the vicar on the mountaintop receives the tablets of the law from the hands of God, and the law is the Rousseauist one, of course.

Once more he attacks materialists like Diderot, with their theories of chance combinations of atoms. How could nature and human life be the work of chance, he asks, any more than Virgil’s *Aeneid* could result from fortuitous combinations of printed characters? His arguments are as old as time. “No,” he cries, “the world is governed by a wise and powerful will: I see it, I feel it, and it concerns me.” It is a very personal intellectual and moral need for him.

He does not say here that the Being of Beings created matter, an idea unintelligible to him. However, he later uses the work *creator* to signify that the artist who formed and ordered all things is the creator of order and therefore of the idea of good in Socratic terms. What matters to him is that divine wisdom exists, one with nature and with man, disposing the system of creation in such a way that every part contributes to a common end. The purpose now described is the preservation of the whole in the established order. Since this is also man’s object in the disposition of city or soul, the aim of *Emile* and the *Contract* is herein hallowed. The vicar gives the name of God to this being whose will and
power are equally boundless and balanced and who is, he infers from the perfect order of his work, possessed of goodness too. For Socrates and many other thinkers goodness is the first attribute of the divinity. But Rousseau cares less to show that God is good than to show how he is good; what concerns him is that goodness results from a balance of power and will and is manifest in order, an idea applied to man in Emile and the Contract. Accordingly the vicar concludes that what really matters are God’s relations to him, and not a knowledge of the creator’s essence or that of the human spirit either. Thus his recognition of God takes the form of conscious effort on his part to order his own soul or city after the divine pattern. God is he in whose image man or the city is made.

This is confirmed when the speaker turns his attention directly to human beings. In lyrical passages of a biblical quality he proclaims the royalty of man, who is king of the earth like Adam and can tame the beasts at will. The new Orpheus uses words that hardly differ from those of the Psalmist or Socrates. His eulogy of human powers culminates in an angry apostrophe to the materialist Helvétius, who by establishing continuity between man and the animals is said to “liken himself to the beasts” instead of to God. By contrast, the vicar’s convictions result in a sense of human self-esteem that arouses gratitude to the deity. This acknowledgment implies a flutter of conscience analogous to Emile’s early gratitude to the “superhuman” Jean-Jacques, the recognition of a debt to be repaid according to the law of justice, which is, after all, Rousseau’s primary concern.

Thereupon the vicar looks about him to find his place among men. It is then that he discovers evil and disorder, as Emile did in the portraits of Plutarch, but here it appears as a violation of the divine order of the cosmos: “The beasts are happy. Their king alone is wretched! O wisdom where are thy laws? O Providence is this thy rule? I behold the earth and there is evil upon it.” The phraseology here re-
sembles that of the Pauline passage: "O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?" The resemblance is appropriate, since we are about to learn that despair is to give way to hope since the disorder here revealed is to be adjusted in death. That adjustment depends, of course, upon his concept of the soul, which he discusses next.

It is the discovery of evil that leads to the discovery of the soul, whose powers, according to Socratic doctrine, are called into play in the presence of evil. Thus the spokesman becomes aware of the soul when he observes and then personally experiences strife between two principles in our nature corresponding to the aforementioned active, thinking being and the sensitive, passive one. He discerns that the active principle conducts him to truth and justice, whereas the passive one, at issue with it, makes him a slave of the senses and passions. "the wild-beast nature" within, threatening to overthrow the balance of faculties. To describe the inner conflict, he follows Socrates but again borrows the language of the apostle Paul: "No, man is not one: I will and I will not; I feel myself at once a slave and a free man; I perceive what is right. I love it, and I do what is wrong: I am active when I listen to the voice of reason; I am passive when I am carried away by my passions; and when I succumb, my greatest agony is the feeling that I might have resisted." The opposition of apparently incompatible elements, felt with the birth of moral bonds and passions in society, convinces the vicar of the dualism of his nature arising from the coexistence of a material and spiritual substance within him.

Again he defies the materialists, who, in an effort to prove that there is only one substance, try to reconcile thought and feeling with qualities of matter like extent and divisibility. His arguments are less persuasive than the forms that clothe them. He accuses such men of being deaf to the hidden harmonies of the spirit that now reach a lyrical crescendo, not merely audible to the reader but also visible in that prospect toward the Alps: "Something within thee
strives to break the bonds that confine it; space is not thy measure; the whole universe does not suffice to contain thee..."\(^{59}\) The passage evokes many another in Rousseau's works. But as a poetic tribute to the vast harmonies of the inner world, it is also evocative of Socrates' discussion of harmony, wherein the sage disparages those who hear only with their ears and not with their understanding.

The vicar, attentive to the reverberations within, formally announces his belief in the soul. He declares his faith in the power of the human will to resist slavish passions and torment us if eluded. He further declares his faith in the ability of its ministrant, the active human intelligence, to formulate judgments and liberate the will, whose nature is to pursue the good of the entire moral person, and not to seek its harm. Man, he concludes, is free to act, animated by an "immaterial substance." This belief enables him to suggest a solution to the problem of death hereafter. But he does so in a new development in the creed, for the first series of dogmas ends at this point with the same emphasis on volition with which it began.

We come now to another class. The transition occurs when the vicar suddenly declines to enumerate his doctrines, as he has done hitherto. The pretext is that we can do so for ourselves. But we could also have counted the others. The real reason is that he is on less solid ground. This is also indicated by the presence of prayers. There are five in the creed if we include a footnote, and but for one at the end they all occur in the passages we are now approaching. Even though the whole creed is a prayer, the prayer form here assumes great artistic value to express the writer's timorous "hope against hope." So does his increasing recourse to scripture to justify his persuasions.

Since man is active and free, he alone is held responsible for evil. The greatest ills he endures, we are told, are moral ones and are his own doing in a supposedly enlightened social state since he abuses the freedom and intelligence that dignify him and enable him to scale the heights of virtue.
and wisdom. The antithesis drawn in the text between the excellence of man's nature on the one hand and the responsibility for evil on the other is suggestive of a certain vexation of spirit that deters many a man from belief. But the vicar rises above his difficulties in a first prayer and thereby testifies that he does so by virtue of a conscious act of the will: "God of my soul, I will never reproach thee that thou hast created me in thine own likeness to be free, good and happy as thou art." In these words the spokesman renews his vow of faith in the very presence of evil and in spite of his awareness of a certain inherent desolation in things, caused not only by the wicked deeds of men but also by the presence of death that he now faces.

To show that life is prolonged after death, he quotes the words of Christ to the Sadducees, who say there is no resurrection, and declares that "God is not the God of the dead." In his own reasoning the Omnipotent, whose goodness imposes the laws of order, will in his justice restore order in death by bestowing happiness upon the virtuous man whose heart reassures him with the words: "Be just and you will be happy." Here the vicar deliberately rejects any suspense of judgment regarding further stages of being possible for the soul. But to proclaim his faith in a future life, he breaks free of dialectic to take refuge in artistic imagery by fancying a speech of God with the soul of Brutus, who cried out upon the plains of Philippi where he lay dying, "Virtue, thou art only a name." The image is momentous since here for the first time we behold a personal deity who intervenes in human life. In spite of the charming image of the watchmaker, God seemed until now more like the eternal reason of the Greeks than the Judeo-Christian Father of men. Suddenly the latter stands compassionately over pagan humanity in the person of Brutus and promises new life to the dead. "O Brutus! O my son!", says he, "why dost thou say, 'Virtue is naught,' when thou art about to taste its reward? Thou shalt die? Nay, thou shalt live! And thus my promise is fulfilled!" In this context
the writer appropriately cites Plutarch, who uses the allegory of the races to explain that we must finish the course before we can win the crown of victory. The apostle Paul says the same and so does Socrates. This is a race in which Emile must be an active participant and not a mere spectator. The prize this time is life after death, in which the vicar professes to believe.

"If the immaterial soul survives the body," says he, "providence is justified." On this condition, he adds, the appalling discord in the universal harmony, the triumph of evil over good, is resolved. At death, he reasons, when the two substances in man's nature are separated, the true life of the liberated soul begins. But, as someone has observed, he defends the idea negatively; for he explains that although he does not know the soul's essence, he cannot imagine how it could die, and so his reason assumes for moral purposes that it lives, not merely until order is restored, but forever. The life he anticipates is a consciousness of his own identity prolonged by memory, a Fénelonian notion favored by Rousseau, who took pleasure in recollection. Our suffering or our joy, we are told, will be born of the remembrance of our deeds upon earth, contemplated in the light of God, truth, and the beauty of order. At this point the author adds a pious supplication hidden away in a footnote that again betrays the role of will in his creed. It is taken from a translation of Psalm 115 in the Genevan Psalter of 1698 and reads: "Not for us, not for us, O Lord./ But for thy name, for thine own honor,/ O God! may we live again." Reflecting upon that life, the vicar frames another prayer to express his doubts that the torments of the wicked never come to an end. But if the future life consists of a new vision of the present one upon earth, logic is again threatened by an effort of volition to behold perfect harmony beyond the grave, at least ultimately if not immediately, although in the end he suspends judgment on the subject.

In these reflections upon the origins and consequences of
evil, pagan images are intermingled with Judeo-Christian. Indeed, quite apart from Plutarch, pagan antiquity can hardly be ignored in the context. Socrates teaches his guardians from the beginning that God is the author of the good only and not of the evils that occur to men, and in addition he commends to them "the world below." Later in his great similitude he proposes to lead his student kings to see the divine as the idea of good. Moreover in the creed at the end he presents the great artist or workman as the creator of real things existing in nature, especially justice and virtue or rather order. In the same context he also teaches the immortality of the soul and the rewards of justice here and hereafter, comparing life again to the sacred games wherein the true runner wins the prize and is crowned—even by men and upon earth, at least in his ideal order. When he shows the meed of virtue in another life, in the culminating vision of Er, Socrates, who professes to believe in hell as well as heaven, declares that such rewards and punishments are just, since men choose their own life and their own destiny: "Virtue is free," says he, "the responsibility is with the chooser. God is justified." These are Rousseau's very words. The sage concludes: if we discern well between good and evil and choose ever the better life that suits the nature of the soul and makes her just, then we shall be happy here and in another state of existence when, "like conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward." The passages in the vicar's creed, inspired by the spectacle of evil and the mystery of death into which it plunges him, turns out to be a fusion of biblical texts, Plutarch, and the Socratic myths.

We are now approaching the high point in the canticle of Orpheus. After the "monument to the unknown God" whose presence is seen in the eternal processes of nature and especially in the life of man, the vicar still disclaims any knowledge of the divine essence or even of our own, and in a fourth prayer surrenders his reason before the mystery of the deity. Yet for him the mystery is partly unveiled when
he goes in search of rules of conduct and finds them written in his heart and uttered by his conscience. For him conscience implies consciousness of a power outside the self that approves or disapproves of our conduct. It is in a sense the oracle of God testifying to the Socratic idea of good and the laws that it ordains. In the imagery of *Emile* it is the Pythian oracle in the midst of the mythical temple that again recalls the shrine of the Delphic Apollo. There stood the tripod at the navel of the earth where the divine voice spoke to men, as it allegedly does in the vicar’s creed. According to the latter, it addresses each one of them and affords the only revelation that the speaker accepts unreservedly.

The vicar defines conscience as a natural feeling of good and evil that bids men seek their own good but not at the expense of others. For him it is generated by the antagonism of bodily passions in inner life that made him first conscious of the soul. Indeed, he calls it “the voice of the soul,” which is the enlightened will as we know. It is therefore the voice of that “inner feeling” or insight that formulates the creed as it does the rule of life in *Emile* and the *Contract*. The speaker regards it as a kind of moral instinct that is as natural to the heart as reason is to the mind, and as “normal” as the law of Rousseauist society, which of course does not mean that it is a spontaneous, subjective, and arbitrary moral sense. On the contrary, he calls its enlightened feelings “judgments,” which are always on the side of justice. Hence he infers that justice suits the nature of man and reflects a state of health in the soul. Socrates said as much, and Rousseau did too when he spoke of the reasonable will that favors the virtue of justice. The vicar undertakes to prove it in literary terms. For example, he imagines men’s reactions to the spectacle of good and evil in the situations of actual life, in the theater, or in the pages of Plutarch. What is the explanation, he asks, for their admiration of heroic deeds and their indignation at wickedness? “Why,” he inquires, “should I choose to be Cato dying by his own hand, rather than Caesar in his
triumphs?" And again: "What are the crimes of Catilina to me? I shall not be his victim." Incidentally, the example of the Roman conspirator also inspires the writer of the civic creed in the Contract when he comes to defend the dogma of a future life. The Aemilian vicar cites more instances of men's love of moral beauty and of its frustration in our society through the injustice of false laws. Even wicked souls, he adds, cannot entirely quench human feelings of mercy, loyalty, or friendship. He contrasts their remorse with the serenity of the sage who obeys nature's ordinances. Although most of the images here are selected from pagan antiquity, the writer obviously possesses a Christian conscience that throbs painfully before the spectacle of cruelty and suffering. Yet at the same time he contends that basically the precepts of good and evil are everywhere and always the same. He therefore concludes that men possess an innate sense of justice called conscience, even though it is felt only in a social and moral order that activates it in the presence of passion.

As usual at each stage in his meditation, he challenges his adversaries among the philosophers. This time they include a dissident friend, Montaigne, of whom he asks in Cicero-nian terms: Is it ever a crime to keep one's plighted word, to be merciful, beneficent, and generous? If not, then righteousness allegedly befits the nature of man.

If we ask whether he means that men are naturally selfless, or how he defines the principle of conscience or the will it expresses, he admits as usual that men must obey its laws for their own good. But he explains that there is a spiritual good to be found in virtue, the grace sought by men like Socrates and Regulus. The principle that bids us pursue moral order is, therefore, for him self-love, which, as we were told long since, impels us to seek what pleases, suits, or perfects our nature. In social life, however primitive, it is moderated by compassion for others: and with the rise of discernment it dawns upon us in the form of conscience, like the break of day that is the scene of this meditation.
Without that light, which is the light of moral truth, the rational power in social man is lost, in his Socratic view. The vicar bursts forth in oracular accents in a hymn to the unfailing monitor within, called "divine instinct," the "celestial voice," the guide of an intelligent and free being, "the infallible judge of good and evil, making man like unto God" and alone raising him above the beasts. This Socratic "divine wisdom within" supposedly dispenses us from metaphysical speculation and suffices to reveal the goodness that befits the human self, unless we wilfully suppress it.

In defining the principle of conscience, the spokesman has also suggested its aim. According to him, the moral good it favors by favoring our own "true" nature requites our natural love of beauty, justice and truth and thus entails pleasures of soul like those enjoyed by the Socratic heroes in the sixth book of the Republic. In fact, his ideas on conscience as the voice of the soul are reminiscent of the philosophic nature described at the beginning of that book. Finding wisdom and happiness close by, he asks what sweeter felicity there is than to obey the duties of the natural law ordained by God's justice and to acquiesce freely not merely in a love of order but in a love of the perfect order divinely established? The Rousseauist philosopher resembles the Socratic by imitating that "heavenly pattern" in his life, and he does so, we are told, by ruling over the passions of a body maimed by disorders and thereby rising to a sphere above the angels, in the words of the vicar and the apostle Paul as well. The happiness that results gratifies man's "first will," the constant and unalterable one that bids him be good and wise according to his nature. In brief, felicity implies the orderly action and interaction of human faculties working together in harmony according to their proper functions.

The Rousseauist order and its laws now consecrated are violated by the "false" law of celibacy, to which the vicar alludes again at the end of the first or affirmative part of his
creed. He does so by referring to the irregularities of his life, including an illusion of happiness supposedly bred in him by that law which allegedly reverses nature's decrees. He goes on to condemn all "rash vows" that aspire to trouble the order of nature, including prayers for special spiritual graces or miracles of any kind. He himself refrains from praying for bounties, and the last invocation of his faith is the Lord's Prayer: "Thy will be done." For him that will is best expressed in the human conscience and the laws of the constitution that is the great artist's handiwork. The choice of the prayer form here to protest against what he considers selfish supplication has great literary merit, as the author says in the *Letters from the Mount*. Moreover, the prayer selected is ideologically appropriate, for, however we choose to classify his philosophy, his conscience is essentially Christian and even transfigures his Socratic laws. The affirmative part of the meditation that ends here has amply demonstrated this. I shall come to the so-called negative part in a moment.

First it remains to be shown that the dogmas of civic faith stated in the penultimate chapter of the *Contract*, as they are at the end of *Emile* and the *Republic*, are wholly contained in the vicar's creed. I have commented upon the historical survey with which the chapter opens. When the author comes to formulate the faith of his citizens, he begins by considering the relationship of religion to both social and civil order and defining the virtues and flaws of the religion of man and that of the citizen, with a view to combining their resources and avoiding the pitfalls of each. The creed he proposes is thus designed, like the vicar's, for society in general as well as for an exclusive association. Consequently the popular idea that the Aemilian faith is the religion of man and is irreconcilable with the other casts doubt upon his success in carrying out his intentions.

The religion of man or of social order in general is, says he, true Christianity, not the dogmatic variety but the evangelical, which he identifies with the vicar's so-called
theism, or natural religion. He names it "natural divine law," meaning that it sanctifies the universal and eternal principles of natural and political law. It is confined to the inner cult of the heart and the moral duties of men, teaching them that they are all brothers. However, it adds no force to civil laws as we understand them, and even detaches men’s hearts from the earth. The attitude of detachment is that of the vicar and the one Emile would logically adopt in an alien society where, in Rousseau’s view, there is no other hope of happiness.

Next the writer considers religion in its relationship to civil order, whose laws it serves to consecrate as it does his own. Such is the citizen’s faith that he calls "positive divine law" since it adds divine authority to the positive laws of an established government. He favors the union of divine cult and love of the laws, providing, of course, that the laws are "true" ones based upon universal principles; but he fears superstitious ceremonial that disorders men and intolerance that destroys them. When he comes to define the civic creed of his own mythical city, he tries to avoid both perils by forbidding intolerance and recommending a simple cult reduced to public ceremonies that dignify the moral law. This religion would result from a sense of friendship, or fellow-citizenship, with others and would allegedly provide most men with a more powerful incentive for the performance of civic duty than the vicar’s "evangelical Christianity," whose principles are, however, basically its own but are directed to leaders and thinkers. In a provocative passage he shows how those lofty principles, which foster detachment in the anti-society of actuality, would among the common people of an imaginary, impossible ideal city, serve as a pretext for indifference to civic duty and submission to tyranny. Such men require only the practical dogmas derived therefrom.

His idea of using religion to hallow the general principles of natural and political law as well as positive civil laws has far-reaching implications. Religion, far from fabricating
arbitrary enactments like the contemporary laws of marriage and celibacy, which he regards as such, must be the strongest support of "true" ones presumably like his own, and for him as for Socrates it is itself one of them. Consequentely like all the laws of his city this one too is framed by the sovereign will of the people, which has no lawful superior, religious or political either. Moreover, since his laws envisage the common good and may require nothing useless or unessential to the entire moral being, the law of religion cannot evade or exceed these limits. It can sanctify only such commandments as those of Moses, Numa, or Lycurgus. And the vicar's "evangelical Christianity" provides for him a revelation of their source.

The articles of faith proposed in the Contract and later at the end of Emile are a popular exposition of the vicar's dogmas. The positive ones are briefly defined thus: "The existence of a powerful, intelligent, beneficent, foreseeing, and provident deity; the future life; the happiness of the just; the punishment of the wicked; the holiness of the social contract and the laws." There is also a negative dogma forbidding civil or theological intolerance of the kind exemplified in contemporary enforcement of the precept "Outside of the church, no salvation," which, so the writer declares in the Confessions, leads people to lie against the Holy Spirit." This precept is good, says the author of the Contract, only in a theocratic state that is in fact a church, whose pontiff is the prince. Yet like Socrates he himself applies it in his own city in the form "Outside of the city or temple of the soul, no salvation," meaning that the human constitution cannot otherwise be saved. In a word, he excludes dissenters who reject the faith, as they are free to do, just as he exiles those who repudiate the covenant. Men who profess to believe it and then behave as if they did not are punished with death. But he tolerates all religions that are tolerant of others and respect his own, even if the latter can never be an established faith any more than his city can see the light of day.

[250]
The death of the apostate has aroused a great deal of controversy. To understand the writer’s thought, one must capture the spirit of the text, which reads: “Let him be punished with death; he has committed the greatest of crimes, he has lied before the laws.” Now to lie before the laws that proclaim the constant will as conscience does means, in the Aemilian faith and in the words of the Confessions, to “lie to the Holy Spirit” that speaks to men in that “celestial voice.” Such is Rousseau’s interpretation of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, called by Christ “the unpardonable sin.” This is “mortal” sin that brings death to the sinner, the spiritual death of one who is “cut off” from the moral person like the sacrilegious soul in the Mosaic law who is “cut off from among his people” as a limb is severed from the body. If life, freedom and salvation are to be found, as Rousseau says, only in his system, then to cut oneself off from it after being integrated in it is in his eyes spiritual death. We are reminded of the controversial “right of life and death” as applied to apostates of the covenant in an earlier chapter. The sentence of “death” is not only Judeo-Christian but Socratic too, as we know. In speaking of spiritual “warfare,” the Greek sage says: “And he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a present of to his enemies [meaning passions]; he is their lawful prey and let them do what they like with him.” Rousseau too means that such a man is doomed to die, which does not alter the fact that he teaches mercy and tolerance, as we have repeatedly seen.

But he knew well enough that legislation will never prevent intolerance, for human beings are always inclined to favor “friends” or kindred souls in preference to aliens or “strangers.” He betrayed this awareness when he spoke of the difficulty of reconciling “positive divine law” with “natural divine law.” He betrays the same awareness in the Letters from the Mount where, speaking of the problems of civic faith, he says that “patriotism,” or love of a man’s own city, and “humanitarianism,” favoring human rights, are
two virtues incompatible in their energy and especially in a whole nation. Many of us may be tempted to infer from this text that the popular antithesis between man in *Emile* and the citizen of the *Contract* actually exists. But we have already seen that the principles of both are the same, though they are not applied with the same "energy" in the great society as in a small one, except by a few lofty souls as opposed to "the body of a nation." Of course, in actuality the problem posed by patriotism is academic since for the author no authentic city exists anyway: there are only disordered states that foster nationalism or love of one's birthplace at the expense of human rights. However, he imagines the unlikely case of such a city existing, not only at the end of *Emile* as we shall see, but also in the *Letters from the Mount* where he evokes a society of the Savoyard vicar's Christians. They are surely freemen of the city of the *Contract* since, as he says, their creed—or, rather, the vicar's—"is affirmative and conclusive in all the main points of civic religion," which is that of his ideal citizens. He adds that it "contains all dogmas really useful to both universal and private [or exclusive] societies." Hence it teaches the duties of both man and citizen. The vicar's Christians are presumably both and so is Emile, as opposed to most men.

But some critics still contend that Rousseau fails to reconcile the two. They argue that he tries to do so by integrating the religion of both but that the civic creed has dogmas absent in the vicar's, these being the holiness of law and condemnation of intolerance. But these two articles are the very essence of the Aemilian faith. The affirmative part of it is nothing else but a vindication of the holiness of all "true" law. As to the negative part on revealed religion that we are now approaching, it is simply a denunciation of every kind of intolerance. The difference between the two creeds is more artistic than ideological, although the one explores principles and the other simply defines conclusions, as I have shown.
In the second part of his meditation Rousseau in the person of the vicar confides his doubts to a doubting world on the subject of dogmatic revelations. For him these are the "artificial" laws of established faiths that violate both "natural and positive divine law," including "evangelical Christianity." He speaks mainly of Judeo-Christian dogmatism and is inspired by personal experience. For example, his doubts are entrenched within the negative dogma of civic faith that condemns the maxim "Outside of the church, no salvation." This maxim vexes his conscience, audible in the vicar's voice and visible in the exile, who calls to mind a moment in the writer's conversion to Catholicism when he was allegedly asked whether, in his judgment, his deceased mother of the Protestant faith was damned. But although that memory never leaves his thoughts, his skepticism really extends far beyond the Roman church and embraces the whole of dogmatic Christianity, including Calvinism itself, as we saw in the story of the blind boy of Bossey groping through the darkness for the sacred text.

The attack upon dogmatism is banal in its argumentation but is presented in an original form. If the writer regards his own faith as "evangelical Christianity," then authentic Judeo-Christian revelation as he sees it is to be found in the affirmative part. It is his inheritance and has left its mark upon his conscience and in the qualities of his imagery. He cannot then intend it as the object of his rebellion, which is directed rather against so-called obscure dogmatic interpretations of its message. Consequently his art now consists in wresting it from the hands of sectarians and claiming it for himself by arraying on his side all the prophets of Judeo-Christian tradition, including Moses, Isaiah, John the Baptist, and the divine master himself. He does so by strengthening his arguments with words and phrases borrowed from their sayings.

In his view private esoteric or "artificial" dogmas, as opposed to true revelation, lead to abuses that cause strife
among men. To illustrate this, he uses the very words of Christ’s prophecy that his coming would bring not peace to the earth but fire and the sword. For Rousseau, who ignores the militant side of Christ, this is a warning that the spiritual kingdom of the divine missionary would turn into a violent despotism in the present world, as events proved according to the Contract. The vicar protests—again using the master’s words recorded in revelation—that the cult required of us is that of the heart and not simply the external formalities of a system of ritual. He adds that God wishes to be worshipped in spirit and in truth, thereby repeating the lesson of Christ to the Samaritan woman at the well: “God is a Spirit: and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth.” For the vicar these phrases from revelation prove that to exceed its literal teaching is to violate it. For him a doctrine that does so is not merely unnecessary but harmful since it disorders and divides men.

Looking about him at those who are eager for private supernatural enlightenment, he assumes a tone recognizable as that of Solomon in the book of Ecclesiastes, the preacher: “I beheld the multitude of sects that hold sway upon the earth.” He implies that sectarians use the supernatural to “hold sway over the earth.” Apart from this impropriety, the multiplicity of sects varying from country to country makes religion of that kind an effect of chance dependent upon one’s birthplace. If, says he, adopting a commonplace argument, there is only one of these churches outside of which there is no salvation, it possesses universal and eternal signs obvious to all men. This argument leads him into a discussion of miraculous signs and wonders used by dogmatizers to support their pretensions.

The prodigies in question, unlike those of the first part of the creed, are the kind that every man cannot verify for himself. They are discussed in three lively dialogues. Whether or not we share the writer’s views, we can still appreciate the mythical form with which he clothes them and acknowledge its suitability to impart his message.
The first dialogue presents Ecclesiastes and a so-called apostle of truth who seeks to prove his mission by portents and prophecies recorded in books by human beings. In a formula that most critics find the only original one here, the skeptical vicar protests: "How many men between God and me!" In a similar vein the author of *Emile* and the *Contract* virtually exclaims: "How many men between the law and me!" And again: "How many men between nature and me... and between the world and me!" In the same spirit he asked the archbishop of Paris whether it was natural for God to go looking for Moses in order to speak to Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The vicar demands to know how it is possible to verify ancient chronicles of prophecies and prodigies and to distinguish the latter from the unknown laws of nature that best reveals the Supreme Being. Nature itself is therefore the greatest of all miracles. Admittedly the writer contends in the *Letters from the Mount* that the marvels of chemistry and physics are not miracles, but he means in the usual sense of the word, a point of view already implied in the conjuror scene of *Emile.* The speaker of the creed suggests the paradox that the real miracles and true revelation are to be found in the affirmative part and that they support him against the dogmatizers.

In the next dialogue he converses with a real apostle and does not exclude the possibility of authentic miracles in the popular sense. But he uses revelation to contrast them with the supposed miracles of zealots. The envoy of the Most High comes forward to announce undeniable ones that bear a conspicuous resemblance to those of Joshua stopping the sun and Moses making the waters of the Red Sea part to let his people cross. They are also reminiscent of others in a passage of Isaiah applied to Christ by John the Baptist and describing the Messiah's coming and the supernatural phenomena to accompany it for "all flesh" to see. Such miracles, says the vicar, are decisive and are not to be confused with the fraudulent ones of false prophets. Discussing the latter, he again borrows freely from Judeo-Christian reve-
For example, he cites the testimony of Moses in Genesis and Deuteronomy that puts us on our guard against the wonders of magicians and strange prophets. Moreover, he expresses doubt about miracles wrought in deserts or chambers, alluding almost textually to the words of Christ: “If they say unto you, Behold he is in the desert, go not forth: behold he is in the secret chambers, believe it not.” Hence, Rousseau in the person of the vicar uses the words of the divine master himself to justify his incredulity. True miracles, he says in a note to the creed, must be evident even to the “poor in spirit” for whom the kingdom of heaven is reserved, according to the Sermon on the Mount, whose message he defends against the dogmatists. The vicar rebels against the alleged obscurities of the latter on the grounds that the God he adores is not a God of darkness. Consequently the speaker appears paradoxically as the defender of revelation against those who malign the “Great Being” by what Socrates calls unworthy representations of the Godhead. Such men are contrasted with the true apostle of the dialogue.

The third dialogue is between Inspiration and Reason, both of which are personified—or, as some people say, caricatured—although the two figures are evocative of Fragonard’s Inspiration and Study (circa 1769), which can hardly be so described. This dialogue differs from the others in that here the spokesman takes refuge in Socrates instead of revelation. Apparently hinting at the dogma of transubstantiation and other mystical beliefs, Reason challenges them with the mathematical axiom that the whole is greater than the part. By having recourse to mathematics to combat mysticism, Rousseau like the Greek master summons the arts of calculation to his aid to resolve the perplexities of the soul and virtually refers to a passage at the end of the Republic that I mentioned at the close of the previous chapter. In that passage the sage, speaking of optical illusions, observes that the confusion created within us is “that weakness of the human mind on which the art of con-
juring and... other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us like magic... and the arts of measuring and numbering... come to the rescue of the human understanding... and the apparent greater or less... no longer have the mastery over us, but give way before calculation... "

The germ of the dialogue of Inspiration and Reason can be found here and so can the whole attack upon so-called false miracles, as well as the conjuror scene. The same Socratic passage also deepens our appreciation of the myths of Emile. Although the author has recourse to abstract mathematical sciences as he does in the Contract to evade what he regards as obscurity and deception or pious illusion, yet he personifies ideas and uses figures and dialogue to animate sheer logic, however misplaced the latter may be in spiritual matters. The device is less subtle and more provocative than the paradox hitherto employed.

He returns to the miracles and his defense of revelation as he sees it in the second and third of the Letters from the Mount. Again he uses the Bible to find support for his view, but this time he does so even more openly. Like his vicar he refers to the Old Testament, especially Genesis, where the feats of Pharaoh's magicians are said to be the work of the devil who performs false miracles. He adds that in the New Testament the divine master not only warns against false signs but rejects miracles altogether as a proof of doctrine. Here he almost quotes Christ's words to the Pharisees: "A wicked and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign... ." Again the scriptures are on the writer's side against the dogmatizers. Although in his youth as a Catholic he once testified to a miracle, he now claims the right to personal interpretation of the sacred writings on that subject as on every other. This right, he says, was originally the cornerstone of the Reformation but was being demolished by his intolerant coreligionists. It was to them that he addressed the Letters. By what authority, he demands, do they deprive him of a liberty that they themselves have wrested from the mother church? But his main concern in the Letters, as in
Emile and the Contract, is not religion at all but a system of law to which it belongs. His attack upon dogmatizers is really an indictment of what he regards as arbitrary enactments like contemporary laws of celibacy and marriage or those threats of damnation against dissenters like himself.

The precept "Outside of the church no salvation" and its pendant the negative dogma of civic faith banning intolerance are still the prevailing ideas in the last part of the meditation. Rousseau's personal experience with the maxim, to which he twice alludes in these pages, lends warmth to his images and intensity to his thought.

Assuming the dogma to be valid, his spokesman confronts us with the perplexities and fanaticism generated by it. Like many another man before him, he argues as follows: If there is only one true religion that all must follow under pain of damnation, how can the "lover of truth," who knows that she is one and not many, make a perfectly safe choice, since there are many guides among men proposing an infinite variety of beliefs? He cannot study the doctrines of one sect without the others, for a judge may not listen to one party only but must hear them all. He must also read their writings. And if he decides to trust one of them, surely it must be one who has a thorough knowledge of all systems of thought, beginning with the three great European religious philosophies. Even so, what is the fate of those whose lives lie beyond the span of any of these? The vicar imagines a pagan listening to a missionary preaching mysteries that men must know unless they would "be damned." The pagan replies: "And my father is damned... he who was so good and kind..." The thought is hardly original, but the tone is very personal. This is a direct allusion to the question allegedly asked of the author in life at the moment of his conversion, a moment eternized in the homeless exile of Emile. The dismayed pagan decides that he must journey abroad to inquire about these mysteries. So, says the vicar, must all men. But since a lifetime would not suffice for such labor, he refuses to believe that it is necessary to be so learned "under pain of hell fire."
To resolve these perplexities, the vicar suddenly breaks free of theological erudition, scientific reason, and their inhuman demands to take refuge in the heart and plead in favor of evangelical Christianity. In a famous tableau of its founder he surpasses himself to portray the peaceful soul of Christ in life and in death that set him apart from the men of his time and our own. He compares him with the “statue” of the just man proposed as a type of the Socratic sage at the beginning of the Republic. But then he proceeds to draw an impressive contrast between the divine master and Socrates, who, we are told, found among the Greeks close by examples suggestive of his teaching, whereas Christ appears as an image of the “loftiest wisdom amid the fiercest fanaticism.” That wisdom is supposedly also the vicar’s since his song of Orpheus is designed to tame the wild natures of men, and he is therefore called “the man of peace.” Socrates, of course, sought to do the same by means of his laws and, although in the end he voluntarily submitted to “false” ones, died for the sake of the true; and so in the vicar’s eyes his death redeems him. Yet Rousseau draws a distinction between the Socratic ideal of justice and virtue practiced among friends and the Christian ideal of compassion and charity for the wicked, exemplified by its founder, who blesses those that persecute him. Moved by admiration for the latter, he calls him a “God” among men. It matters little whether this divinity is of a substance, an adoption or a function. What matters is that, in conformity with his stance as the defender of Judeo-Christian revelation, he identifies his faith as an evangelical one. I have already said much about his cult of Christ in his personal life and in his work, which moreover includes two other portraits of the divine master. In the vicar’s meditation he uses a mythical image born of great intimacy with the Gospels to convey his moral inclination toward Christian revelation in spite of his persistent doubts. In accordance with that inclination he is persuaded that true worship is indeed of the heart and is visible in propriety of life and virtue.
The vision of sublime charity amid the madness of the multitude is followed by a new protest against the excesses of intolerance. The vicar refuses to preach damnation “outside the church” on the grounds that to do so is to blaspheme the justice of God and lie against the Holy Spirit. Again he alludes to Christ’s words about the unpardonable sin and subtly uses revelation on his own behalf against its professed exponents. Moreover, the allusion, like the pagan’s words above, shows again that the writer is indeed moved by that moment in his life when he abjured Protestantism and “lied to the Holy Spirit” by violating his conscience.\textsuperscript{84} It is wrong, says the vicar, to ask anyone to leave the religion of his birth, not because it may after all be the true one, but because by doing so we ask him to disobey the laws of his country that prescribe a uniform cult for all. This association of religion and law—as forceful in \textit{Emile} as it is in the \textit{Contract}—is one reason why the writer opposes Diderot’s distinction between civil and ecclesiastical intolerance in both the Aemilian and civic faith where the language is the same in each case.\textsuperscript{85} It is also why the vicar, who has confided his faith to one who embodies a skeptical age, counsels him to return home and practice the ancestral cult prescribed by law in his own country, even though he may not share its beliefs. For, says he, quoting John the Baptist, “if God is able of the very stones to raise up children to Abraham, every man has a right to hope to be enlightened when he is worthy.”\textsuperscript{86} Again he appears as a defender of revelation, confident that doubts will be dispelled not by a miracle but by a man’s worthiness of enlightenment. And for him such worthiness can best be fostered by the faith of one’s fathers, to which the heart most naturally responds. This is a practical solution of the dilemma posed by the multiplicity of sects, any one of which a “man of peace” must somehow inwardly adjust to the principles of natural divine law. He may do so by using those principles to exercise his spiritual freedom and rise above intolerance and the external con-
formity prescribed by quite another law, as Emile does politically in the end.

In conclusion the vicar suggests, as he did in the beginning, that faith is at the outset an act of will or of hope or desire. He adds, quoting Seneca, that it springs from a righteous heart, which is the true temple of the Godhead. The temple is also that of Emile. The righteousness it safeguards is synthesized by the new Ecclesiastes in the words of the old, which are also those of Christ and his apostles: "To love God above all and one's neighbor as oneself is the summary of the law." 87

The meditation closes with a little colophon in the form of a literary paradox. It is a skeptic's protest against skeptics. The vicar, having condemned fanatical, intolerant believers, denounces fanatical, intolerant unbelievers, although he professes to reconcile the two and tame the fierce natures of both. Dogmatic atheists, says he, led on by their own wild imaginings, make a mockery of the old morality. In doing so, they exile themselves from the Aemilian city and that of the Contract. 88 By contrast with their "desolate" doctrines, his own moderate skepticism is intended to favor a decorous and venerable system of manners and morals that lends grace and harmony to human life. He sees it as the fruit of the human mind through the centuries, sanctioned by a great throng of distinguished spirits led by Christ and Socrates. But in his final words the Socratic "Know thyself" with which he commenced is transformed into the Christian "Forget thyself:" "When we forget ourselves," says he, "we are really working for ourselves."

THE OATH OF KINGS

The last "nave" of the vast temple chamber matches the first one and is the inspiration of the remainder of the Contract with the exception of the final brief chapter. In Emile the author now comes to closer grips with the problem of evil, this time not besieging the soul from without, as in the first "nave," but checked from within by Jean-Jacques. In
subtle ways the latter uses religion as an ally in his work of government.

Emile's faith is called natural religion or natural divine law; and although, like natural and political law, it will ideally guide him to favor its civic counterpart, namely the "positive divine law" of the citizen's creed, yet in practice he will presumably follow that of his birthplace and reconcile the two in the manner suggested above. Meanwhile, the governor takes advantage of the intellectual and moral value of religious studies and research on the author of nature to cultivate the youth's reason and moderate his sensitivity with a view to balancing the faculties, providing against inner strife and strengthening the ruler's hold upon the heart. As a result Emile is impelled to do good "without being forced by law," for love of God and himself or, if we wish, for love of the Rousseauist and Socratic divine order of things, so that he might one day enjoy lasting happiness in another state of existence reserved for the soul hereafter. For him the yoke of incipient reason is that of manhood, and its burden is no heavier than the cult of the heart upon which it rests.

For Emile is on the verge of manhood. The latter comes with the full awakening of reason as the light of conscience, and therefore with the consciousness of a root of evil within himself to be felt intuitively and averted through his own volition. We are prepared for this awakening by a discourse directed by Jean-Jacques to imaginary critics among us. The governor explains that only at that moment do his own rights, which are those of reason, begin for the youth since only then will the latter recognize them. Hitherto, the law of duty was imposed so unobtrusively that it was as unknown to him as passion in his person. So was the minister through whom he was subject to its rule. It seemed to be in the very nature of things, as indeed it is in Rousseau's view. But since Emile is to ratify and obey it consciously, he must feel the need to do so and be made aware of the mediatorial action of his governor in the past as executor of the law as well as a friend to man. This step in his progress will be
made simpler by the fact that, as we are told once again, Jean-Jacques has bound chains about the heart of his disciple. As we have seen, the chains are meant to be the lawful fetters of ideal social relationships. Their appeal to Emile is described thus: "Reason, friendship, recognition, a thousand bonds of affection speak to him in a tone that he cannot fail to acknowledge." Again the Socratic leitmotiv recurs in a fresh expansion of the basic theme. The idea is that, as reason sheds its light more brightly upon the bonds of friendship, his reaction will be the Socratic one anticipated in the first "nave." He will recognize and salute his familiar friend as the law of reason and duty incarnate. This means as before that he will acknowledge a social debt of gratitude to be repaid, a reaction that symbolizes the law of justice at work in the inner realm of conscience. His gratitude, says Jean-Jacques still preparing us for the crisis, is based upon natural self-love, regarded as the only permanent feeling (as opposed to the flux of vagrant desire) and recognizable as love of the human or higher self befriended by the governor.

Since the moral order thus visualized respects nature, when the youth's desires begin to expand, Jean-Jacques continues, they will not be treated as "crimes," even though they are of course potential "enemies," passion having already been defined as a perversion of natural feeling. The governor of the ideal city is nature's minister, not her "enemy." In this capacity he does not, however, favor an early marriage but reconciles nature's decrees with the law that ought ideally to "befriend" them, and employs "a great deal of art to prevent social man from being quite artificial." The paradox is by now familiar to the reader.

When nature's time comes, says Jean-Jacques in concluding his discourse, the governor must make the youth responsible for himself by enlightening him about their mutual relationships and moral engagements, the crisis he has reached, and the perils he must face. Whereas, hitherto, vicious passions seemed alien to him personally, he must
now face the threat of evil in himself, the "enemy" within, and he can do so only if the notion of evil developing with instinct is clear to him. Like the Socratic heroes, who in this respect are said to resemble a well-bred dog, he must know his "enemy" as well as his "friend" and be able to distinguish between them.\(^9\) In fact, that is all the Socratic and Rousseauist philosopher needs to know in life. Consequently, the Aemilian governor proposes to draw the youth into a larger consciousness of the spiritual obligations implicit in the order of friendship or moral order. In this wise we are led to the crisis.

The shift of moral responsibility from Jean-Jacques to Emile is inevitable since the autonomous action of the inalienable sovereign power is indispensable. In the author's eyes it is all the more so since the Rousseauist social order never has materialized and never will, and the hero is doomed to live in a disordered world. And, of course, even if the ideal order were to descend upon us from the empyrean, every human being must still consciously and voluntarily commit himself to the IDEA of man, whose essence is his own and upon which that order is supposedly founded. He must himself apply its laws as those of the human constitution and be governed by "divine wisdom within." The just society must first exist in the heart of man if it is to exist anywhere at all and if, as Socrates says and Rousseau teaches, true justice pertains not to the outward man but to the inward, "the true self and concernment of man." Now that Emile's passions are quickened, he who knows how to create order in the external world must be induced to prevent the elements within him from interfering with each other's work, to "set in order his own house," be his own master and his own law and at peace with himself. This is all the more true since he is presented as a leader who will hold sway over his fellows by the force of his example. In Rousseau's Socratic view men who are ruled by external authority and rely upon the enforcement of law by others as agents of an inactive will and dormant reason are childish
and could at best practice only "images of virtue" by force of habit or necessity like Emile heretofore. The youth later observes that they are like blocks of wood instead of men, and Socrates calls them "posts."\footnote{91}

Jean-Jacques makes meticulous preparations before awakening his ward to the real struggle between good and evil: "Before we sow," says he, "we must till the ground; the seed of virtue is hard to grow; a long period of preparation is required before it will take root." Indeed, he has been cultivating the soil from the first where the book opened with the same image, which then recurred in the myth of the Socratic and Christian husbandman.\footnote{92}

Before making the great disclosure, he wards off the imminent onslaught of passion. The youth is compared to a somnambulist who is led away from the brink of a precipice before being awakened. He is then briefly distracted from the presence of peril by the violent exercise of the chase popular among Genevans. In a new Socratic myth elucidated by the author himself, he becomes a huntsman, a follower of Diana, the chaste goddess of the hunt and enemy of love, and rides through woods and fields and rugged countryside. He was prefigured by the child astray in the shadows of Montmorency forest who exclaimed, "O my good friend!" when he was led forth into the light as the youth is about to be, only this time the light will be a brighter one. The myth of the hunter is, like that of the forest, evocative of the one in the fourth book of the\textit{ Republic} where Socrates and his friends go hunting for a quarry that is justice. Emile's quarry is the same.

The scene of his awakening to the true nature of justice in the form of spiritual order is also that of the governor's transfiguration before him. It is hardly less dramatic than Mentor's metamorphosis into the goddess Minerva in Fénelon's\textit{ Télémaque}. The setting is chosen in accordance with Rousseau's usual respect for the language of signs and is an impressive one of woods and rocks and mountain slopes. Like that of the vicar's creed it is symbolic of a state
of soul in the midst of the temple as much as it is a landscape outside. It is, we are informed, a place fit for solemn oaths and the recognition of ruling powers, since it suggests the presence of the deity as the judge of mankind who sanctifies "covenants," "alliances," and "promises." The writer recalls the awesome scenes of biblical oaths and sacred contracts. He also calls to mind the august signs of royal power that won men's allegiance in the past, and gives the example of the ancient Romans and their use of symbolic expression adopted in the Aemilian text. He admires the care with which they chose a suitable time and place for the great assemblies of the people, and ordained that candidates for government office go clad in appropriate robes. From all these observances he draws a lesson: "Clothe your reason with a body if you would make it felt" and let it speak the language of the heart. Indeed, the tableau in Emile is inspired by the solemn rites described, whose purpose was the same as that of Jean-Jacques.

The dramatic action follows. The governor, animating the voice of reason "with images and figures" to appeal to the emotions, speaks first about friendship and then about marriage, but his discourse is not verbally recorded as the vicar's was. In the light of this collation of texts and in view of the author's own warning about "images and figures," we might be justified in seeing in his handling of the two themes a portrayal of Rousseauist social and civil order, which does not, however, exclude the possibility of a literal interpretation as well.

The motif of friendship takes precedence, of course. The speaker finally reveals who he really is and shows Emile all that he has done for him but talks as though he had done it for himself, motivated by affection. Instead of appealing to the youth's interest as he did previously, he appeals to his own. Yet he is really identifying the two, if the common happiness is secured by the Socratic and Rousseauist law that "friends have all things in common," which is the law of the covenant. He explains: "I shall kindle in his young
heart all the sentiments of friendship, generosity, and recognition that I have already begotten." Again the famous words of Socrates are audible in the text that underlines the identity of thought between the two. Jean-Jacques concludes the first part of his discourse with more Socratic speech: "You are my wealth, my child, my handiwork, my only hope of happiness." He implies that the law of reason or its spokesman begets the nobly ordered soul or city and is a man's true father and friend, who are one as we were told at the beginning of the book.

Continuing the discourse, he allegorizes about marriage. He reveals both the natural laws and exclusive moral affection that consummate it, and depicts it as "the sweetest form of society" but also as a "sacred bond" and "the most holy and inviolable of covenants." He contrasts the horrors of debauchery with the blessings of chastity, which symbolizes purity of will or love of the law—as in the vicar's case—and promises health, strength, virtue, love, and all the true goods of humankind. In this way he associates the good with happiness and evil with misery, "enemies," and death in the mind of Emile.

This passage is full of allegorical elements. The bond of marriage, which for Rousseau as a Calvinist was, as we know, a civil contract, is "begotten" of the laws of nature and realized by love. Now he has already said that love in the civil order is an exclusive affection born with reason, and in this respect it resembles a man's devotion to his own city. Indeed, the conjugal ties that consummate it poeticize for him the conventional bonds of a private civil order that harmonizes with the natural one. Hence while the vicar called love and marriage "the most sacred institutions of nature," Jean-Jacques calls the conjugal bond "the most sacred of covenants." He used the same words to describe friendship, which binds a man to the laws of justice and social order and is here applied to an exclusive object. There is no contradiction between the two texts. For Rousseau the civil covenant is founded upon the universal and eternal

[267]
principles of the great covenant or social contract, which in his view are the laws of human nature. When they are observed in the intimacy of private life, intensity of affection gives powerful unity of motive to practical rectitude. Here as in the fifth part of the book, the primary institutions of love and marriage are used to portray the “wise order” of the Rousseauist city and its laws that are about to prevail in the innermost sphere of human action. The image is appropriate since in marriage love becomes a law. If the author here regards matrimonial ordinances as “sacred” and their violation as a crime, it is largely because for him they symbolize those of his own city and are the very reverse of the arbitrary decrees against which the creed was mainly directed. Again Freudian or Platonic methods serve to impart his thought.

Emile’s response is typically Socratic. The Rousseauist huntsman, like the child emerging from Montmorency wood, exclaims “O my friend!”—recognizing in reason or the light of the human will the Socratic “companion of his life and education” and discovering the law of justice as nearby as the Greek huntsmen found it. Aware of his responsibility, he pleads with his “master” to resume the authority that, endorsed by his own will, is now all the more sacred to him. “Defend me,” he implores, “from all the foes that besiege me and especially those I bear within myself.” His constant will, he says, is to obey Jean-Jacques’ laws, or rather the dictates of his own reason that alone can save him from the slavery of sense and make him master of himself. At this point the enlightened will is fully formed in him, and he sees his governor as an outward equivalent of that faculty whose voice, like the vicar’s, is heard in conscience. By promising obedience, he consents to share actively in the society of friends. He also performs an act of self-government by begging his friend to be what Socrates calls his “minister of education” or governor. He contends with evil autonomously in this way until he can finally cope with it alone. The pledge to which he proposes to subscribe
in this context is not merely a pedagogical contract that evokes the great covenant, as has been said, but actually translates that covenant into literary terms. 97

Jean-Jacques' reaction to the plea for his ministry is as typically Socratic as the plea itself. He hesitates. In a city of good men, says Socrates in Plato's first book, to avoid office would be an object of contention, for they would know—as Christ also teaches—that true kingship is of the nature of a service to others. Rousseau says the same in the Contract, as we know and shall again be reminded. To restrain the passions of men is no easy task. Emile, says Jean-Jacques, will be like Ulysses, who could hardly resist the singing of the sirens even by entrusting himself to another. But in this case the "other" is the wise Ulysses or great helmsman, to whom the speaker himself was formerly compared and whom the youth must ultimately become. Rousseau, by identifying each of his characters with the same hero, confesses that both are himself, not merely Jean-Jacques. The confession is made in a moment of crisis, as is also the case twice in the next part. Furthermore, the use of the image of Ulysses for the two shows that the man of nature, by recognizing and choosing Jean-Jacques as the true pilot, already becomes for a moment his own helmsman. The imagery represents concretely and in a literary manner the way in which a governing power is lawfully instituted according to the Contract. The two friends together momentarily symbolize a democratic governing body into which the sovereign or collective moral being temporarily transforms itself in order to decide upon a ruler. Jean-Jacques, in spite of his reluctance to guide Emile, to "forget himself" in devotion to his friend and wage unceasing war against the vagrant desires of both, accepts the double burden of the ruler who is also subject to the laws.

After the disciple has "signed the covenant" and the friends have reached an agreement that, throughout the crisis of expanding passions, the wiser of the two will execute the laws on behalf of both, Jean-Jacques at once takes precautions against acts of blind obedience. For instance, he
observes that Emile can understand his governor’s motives if he waits to be free of passion before judging. “Always obey me first,” says the ruler, “and then ask me to account for my commands.” Here the friends poeticize the ideal Rousseauist and Socratic relationship existing both within the sovereign people and between them and their rulers: real governors are always answerable to those whose felicity they serve. Jean-Jacques’ professed purpose is, as usual, to make Emile happy in the present as well as in the future, in accordance with nature’s designs. He does so by representing true love as the supreme happiness of life, but he uses it to symbolize the love of wisdom and win Emile to his side: “I shall make him into a sage,” says he, “by making him into a lover.”

These pages of the novel, where the sovereign appears in a quasi-religious atmosphere to accentuate the majesty of sovereignty, and where the governing power receives his mission at the hands of the moral being over which he is to preside, are closely allied to the corresponding ones of the Contract. They are the third, fourth, fifth and sixth chapters of the fourth part, and mainly the third and fourth.

The third chapter is entitled “Concerning Elections.” Here the idea that kingship is a form of self-sacrifice, already implied in the third book, recurs in a passage on election by lot. In a true democracy, says Rousseau, the magistracy is not an advantage but a burdensome office that cannot justly be imposed upon anyone, the difficulty being to prevent the government from changing form. He adds that the law alone can impose that burden upon the man on whom the lot falls. The outcome is allegedly indifferent in such a society since absolute equality is in its very nature and in fact the lot falls upon everyone. But he concludes that the matter is purely academic since he has already said that such a government is too precarious to exist unless people were gods, in which case they would not need to be governed at all.

In an aristocracy such as we see in Emile the writer prefers election by choice therein typified: “The Prince,” he
says "chooses the Prince." In the novel we have just beheld the prince in the union of Emile and his friend, deciding together upon Jean-Jacques as ruler, a choice favored by reason. The author of the Contract adds what the Aemilian governor also illustrates, namely the Socratic and Christian idea that in an aristocracy too magistracy or kingship is a ministry to others.

In the same context he artfully contrives a pretext for referring to the assemblies of the people where rulers are elected, and thereby prepares us for his treatment of that theme in the next chapter. But the assemblies here are very different from the idealized ones to follow. They are exemplified by Venice, which he says, however, is not an aristocracy at all but a republic, a term suggestive not only of the ideal city-state but also of his birthplace. Knowing full well that Venice was no such thing in his definition or any other, he proceeds to draw a parallel with Geneva. The irony lurking in the preposterous analogy was lost upon the world. We are right to question its validity, but the tragedy is that it was valid enough to convey his caustic criticism of the Genevan assemblies and the election of magistrates therein. The impoverished Venetian nobles, says he, excluded from the magistracy and possessing only the right to attend meetings of the great council, which he compares to the Genevan one, have no more privileges than his own fellow countrymen. Since the real theme of the chapter is elections, he clearly means to impugn the election of magistrates in the council of his native city and discredit the council's assemblies. Here we are very remote from the ideal relationships portrayed by Emile and his chosen "ruler."

The author of the Contract next turns his attention to utopian assemblies of the sovereign people, where social order is born and elections take place, as in the case of Emile and Jean-Jacques. They are the theme of the first of four chapters partly inspired by primitive Roman institutions. Political theorists object to them, alleging that they have only a remote connection with the principles of political law.
and are the work of a historian instead of a moralist, or rather, philosopher. They suspect the author of padding at the cost of a digression for the purpose of inserting the chapter on civic faith, drawn up at the last minute. The same charge of padding has been laid against the second and third parts of the work, where it has proved unfounded. In the present instance, quite apart from the fact that throughout the treatise he has consistently illustrated his ideas with historical examples and that the chapter on civic faith would probably have been inserted anyway in imitation of the Socratic model, a collation of texts shows that these chapters are as much an integral part of the book as the earlier ones that are also regarded as superfluous and yet define his laws. They are not a mere review of Roman institutions, and they bear a close affinity to the corresponding portions of Emile.

The first one is entitled “Concerning Roman Assemblies.” Rousseau was obliged to introduce a chapter here on popular assemblies to show how the moral being he has been carefully constructing ab ovo might finally come to the birth and enjoy the grace of life as in Emile. As he said in four chapters of the previous part, the realization of his system hinges upon the exercise of sovereignty that occurs only when the sovereign manifests itself. It is inconceivable that in the final book there would be no tableau of the society of his fancy and no picture of a popular convocation that alone could transform the dream into reality.

But he knew well enough that modern readers would regard popular assemblies as chimerical. To show that they are not, he affects to give a historical illustration instead of a purely imaginary one, although he virtually confesses that it is indeed mythical. If we failed to grasp the irony of the previous chapter directed against Geneva, we should expect him to cite the example of the general council there, especially since he professes to eternize that city in his book, at least as it existed in his heart. But a picture of the new Geneva would have been as disquieting here as it proved to be in the case of the dedication of the second Discourse.
Instead he chooses ancient Rome as an image of the ideal city and retires to the era of Aemilius to bring that city to life, for it does not belong to his century any more than the heroes of the novel do.

Before he broaches the subject, the author of the *Contract* inserts a note about the transition from the rule of force to the rule of law effected by such assemblies. It reads: "The name of Rome, said to derive from Romulus, is Greek and means ‘force’; the name of Numa is also Greek and means ‘law.’ Is it likely that the first two kings of the city bore in advance names so well suited to what they did?" Apart from providing new evidence of Rousseau’s interest in the symbolism of names, the note relates to the whole purpose of *Emile* and the *Contract*, which was to show how the prevailing rule of force can be replaced by that of law through the exercise of sovereignty. The idea does not merely apply to the existing order of things where anarchic individualism would have to give way to humanism. Even in the presumably lawful order of his books, until the awakening of reason as a moral guide, the educator-legislator was obliged to resort to force, necessity, or Socratic lies or myths to win obedience on behalf of that ideal, but henceforth the moral being is to be consciously and voluntarily governed by law. The writer of the *Contract* suspects that the evolution that presides at the birth of his own city also presided at the birth of Rome, whose traditions exemplify for him the proper handling of the sovereign power in solemn assemblies of the people. Many elements of the chapter inspired by those assemblies, the high point of the book, are also present in the scene where Emile’s reason is roused from sleep to enlighten the will.

The chapter is composed of two parts. In the first the author describes the character of the Roman people by recalling the various classifications into which they were divided: first the military tribal divisions of Romulus; then the many rustic tribes created by the legendary King Servius in the mid-sixth century B.C. He reflects that the rustic tribes far
outnumbered the urban ones and won honor by reason of the
predilection of the early Romans for country life, a taste
that they combined with their traditional dedication to the
duties of war. He then ponders upon a further partitioning
of the people by King Servius into centurial divisions graded
according to wealth. In Rousseau’s system these gradations
might correspond to the Socratic men of gold, of silver, of
brass, and of iron, answering to a natural hierarchy of human
faculties, especially since he shows how the simple man-
ners of the early Romans were effective security against the
seductions of riches. Such was the character of the nation
that he significantly studies first since, in his view, it deter-
mines the nature of the laws to be enacted for its moral and
spiritual life. The same rusticity and austerity of life char-
acterize the freemen of the Rousseauist city including Ae-
milius, who is later reminded by his governor that he must
always be ready to serve his country like the early Romans
who passed from the ploughshare to the consulate. Of
course, for he is their heir.

In the second part of the chapter the author imagines as-
semblies, corresponding to the various divisions, that met
to sanction laws, elect magistrates, and make the nation
truly sovereign. He dwells upon the careful choice of time
and place for solemn convocations, as he did in the awak-
ening scene in *Emile*. In spite of the imperfections of the
centurial divisions, he expresses admiration for their assem-
bly and uses them to show how aristocratic and democratic
elements, which after all exist in the human constitution,
can be balanced in practice to achieve a close approximation
of absolute justice. He concludes that they alone were en-
dowed with all the majesty of the Roman nation since no one
was excluded. On the other hand, he disapproves of the
tribal assemblies, called “the real council of the Roman
populace” (italics mine), since they were confined to the
commons, or “motley multitude” in Socratic speech, and
excluded the aristocracy. In spite of such abuses he is in-
spired by republican Rome to conceive of a sovereign nation
that not only exercises sovereignty in its own person but also assumes some of the powers of government that it has a right and duty to control. The same ideas are present in the monumental scene of *Emile* where the hero participates personally in both sovereignty and government, the latter by his choice of an agent whose conduct he is bidden to supervise. Such is the controversial chapter of the *Contract* whose principles belong to the Socratic city in that book as well as to the mythical Aemilian one.

It is followed by others equally controversial. One is entitled "Concerning the Tribunate" and the other "Concerning the Dictatorship." Both deal with powers related to government, but lying outside the constitution. The reason for the presence of these chapters is that the powers in question are extraordinary ones necessary for education, which is the real problem of the *Contract* and only true law.

The Rousseauist tribunate is not to be confused with the early Roman one, whose function is, however, included in its own. It is designed to maintain the proper balance of faculties and prevent them from meddling with one another's work. For instance, it serves to protect the sovereign against the encroachments of government and the government against the resistance of subjects, preserving the famous "mean proportional" between them. But it possesses neither legislative nor executive rights. As defender of the laws, its action is largely negative, like that of the educator-legislator hitherto, but it is the strongest support of a good constitution. These are the author's professed convictions. Yet in choosing examples from historical institutions to clarify his intentions, he illustrates intolerable abuses, instead of the uses just enumerated as one might have expected. The implication is that though the powers of any constitution must be balanced and harmonized, it is perilous to rely upon alien agents to do the work. This shows that he is thinking mainly of inner life and education, where the authority of the Rousseauist tribunate is indispensable. In the novel we see its action in the explicit provision made for

[275]
Emile to supervise Jean-Jacques’ government and for the governor to account for his commands, both of which tasks serve to maintain the balance of faculties threatened by the false opinions and evil passions of worldly society. The provision in question thereby ensures the safety of the constitution by training Emile to be detached enough from himself to scrutinize the inner workings of his own powers to that end.

The chapter on the dictatorship deals with the suspension of normal processes to save the city from disaster. The suspension is brought about by concentrating the governing power in fewer hands and thus intensifying it under the sway of the laws, or else by naming a supreme commander to suspend the laws and sovereign authority momentarily to meet the crisis. The writer shows how the institution was effective and without danger for the ancient Romans. But he also knows how hazardous it would be today. Again he betrays the fact that he is thinking of the law of education, which is suspended by this extraordinary device in the next part of Emile for the benefit of the human constitution.

The following chapter of the Contract, “Concerning the Censorship,” is the last of the chapters that are alleged to treat of Roman institutions but are really devoted to Rousseau’s own system, with the usual historical illustrations. Its theme is that of the remainder of the fourth part of Emile.

His censorship proclaims the “law of public opinion” and applies it to individual cases, in the same way as the governing power makes particular applications of the law of the general will. The law of opinion, says he, defines moral and aesthetic tastes and affections by formulating what we find pleasing or beautiful as well as honorable. Such beliefs are an outgrowth of the spiritual or “political” constitution, and are fostered by education or legislation. Once they are fully formed, the censorship can preserve them by making wise applications of them, or it can fix them while they are still faltering. But according to Rousseau this institution, like public opinion itself, admits of no constraint, and cen-
sors cannot do what legislation or education has failed to do. In both books the latter is presumed to have imparted the habit of order, true opinions, sane tastes, real pleasures, and lofty morals. Indeed, for Rousseau as for Socrates that is the main part of education or legislation, since both thinkers see men as products of the law of public opinion; and both regard lawful opinions, tastes, and pleasures as the source of all lawfulness. Consequently, the educator or legislator has sought from the first to provide for the cultivation of true opinion as opposed to false in the matter of what is pleasing. He was, we were told, “secretly” concerned with manners, customs, and opinion that are engraved on the heart to secure the habit of order and are therefore the “keystone of the vault” of fortress or temple. This was illustrated at the end of the second part of both books, which concluded exactly like this one does in each case. His work was even then seconded and safeguarded by a censorship of some kind as is the case in the Republic and as I remarked in the third chapter above. With the formation of the city the institution emerges into the light to save that work. In the novel this task too as well as government is delegated to Jean-Jacques, but in the end both will be Sophia’s—that of wisdom within Emile and perhaps also outside unless a combination of the two is impossible.

To revert to the context of the novel where the ideas of the chapter on censorship are finely illustrated, after the youth has pledged himself to the covenant, we are told that he is not made to live alone but to fulfill his duties as an active member of society. In other words, he is now to be prepared for the civil contract symbolized in marriage. He must therefore learn “the art most necessary to man and the citizen,” (italics mine) which is that of living with other people. Hence, he goes to reside for a year in the French capital.

Before exposing him to the ways of the world, Jean-Jacques in the censor’s role takes precautions to fix his
opinions of what is beautiful and honorable, Socratically bound together here as in the Contract. As I have said, these opinions, the fruits of his education, are assumed to be true since that education has bred in him an orderly constitution. The governor preserves them intact in the disciple's heart by molding them into the visible likeness of the future bride "who is suited to him," and proposes that they seek her out together. The verbal portrait he paints of her is designed to entrance Emile and secure him against danger. For the charms of the woman who is destined, through the efforts of his friend, to be his betrothed embody, we are told, all the qualities he must love and honor. Again, morals and aesthetics are linked.

Jean-Jacques' portrait of her is curiously enigmatic. She is "imaginary," for true love is all "fancy, falsehood, and illusion"; and we love only the image we create, clothed "in a veil of prestige." Yet she is not "a model of perfection that cannot exist," although he would not lie by saying that she really does. He calls her Sophia, meaning "wisdom," a name dear to the author in his life and work. In fine, Emile "thinks that his destined bride is purposely concealed from him and that he will see her in good time." Meanwhile, her image prepares him for his entrance into worldly society by protecting his taste and morals from defilement. Or so we are informed.

Symbolism is suggested here by the mystery of the phraseology, which, however, in any case never excludes a literal reading. Since Sophia is able to safeguard Emile's ideas of what is pleasing and honorable, she must be Rousseauist wisdom, allegedly suited to the perfect man and belonging to the same ideal imaginary order that may conceivably exist, although in the case of both of them one may have to look here below for the nearest approach to the model. She crowns the whole purpose of the book, which was from the first to gratify nature's aspirations to what pleases, suits, delights, and perfects us, or rather, to find the wisdom that secures our happiness. At last Emile
understands how the “happiness of the sage is suited to the nature of his being.” He becomes thereby a philosopher, or “lover of Sophia,” and is impelled to go in search of her though the governor has long since found her. He must personally engage in the search, since by binding himself to the covenant that provides a basis for his love and promises to fulfill it, he has dedicated the mythical temple to her. Besides, his virtue must be autonomous. Small wonder if her portrait is perplexing.

Rousseau’s personification of wisdom is reminiscent of many another in biblical and Socratic tradition. Take, for example, his favorite Old Testament books like Wisdom, and especially Proverbs, which closely parallels Ecclesiastes and contains the passage: “Get wisdom... Forsake her not and she shall preserve thee: love her and she shall keep thee... she shall bring thee to honor when thou dost embrace her... Say unto wisdom, thou art my sister, and call understanding thy kinswoman: that they may keep thee from the strange woman... which flattereth with her words.” Finally wisdom herself speaks, promising “knowledge rather than choice gold... durable riches and righteousness.” This imagery is increasingly reflected in Rousseau’s text. So is the Socratic and medieval personification of the Muse of Philosophy and companion of reason, the queen of the republic who appears in Plato’s sixth book, for whom Socrates’ rulers have renounced all other wealth and to whom the sage is finally wedded. Following such examples as those, Sophia is to preserve intact Emile’s ideas of beauty, honor, and wisdom.

Jean-Jacques finally introduces the youth into society using the precautions he has taken in order to guard against the attacks of passion and error. His object is therefore the same as it was in the first “nave” of the temple chamber where he had recourse to Plutarch and the fables to achieve it. The themes are identical, but now temptations beset the inner man. In Socratic terms the governor henceforth relies upon “Sophia” to save Emile from sophists.
and their allies, lawless desires.

As in the earlier treatment of passion and error, Rousseau still has in mind Socrates’ warnings about the corruption of the philosophic nature in the sixth book of the *Republic*, but also alludes to the eighth and ninth where the sage describes the decline of the state. I might point out that in the central pages of this part he has shown more independence than usual in handling his material. This is true even though, as we have seen, the similitude of the sun and profession of faith are largely Socratic, as are the myth of the hunter, the covenant of friendship, and the personification of wisdom. He is perhaps slightly less original in dealing with the passions and sophisms that, according to Socrates, too, threaten the philosopher-king in our midst, but even here he draws heavily upon his own personal experience.

The problem of sophisms is handled first. The governor shows how an ideal love typifying the spirit of wisdom can preserve a man from false opinion and the proverbial "strange woman" who, under the pretext of teaching youths fine manners, dishonors them. The text is autobiographical as well as scriptural in inspiration. One of the victims of such women was the model of the Savoyard vicar’s protégé in life who was also the protégé of another Savoyarde, the Baroness de Warens. The young Rousseau’s love for her was allegedly a shield of virtue in his life until she decided "to make a man of him." Her contribution to his "education" was supplemented after 1742 by that of Parisian society, which also furnishes the writer of *Emile* with another example of the dangers against which the hero is protected. He describes a young man well raised in the provinces but transformed within six months in Paris by the distorted opinion of a disordered society that vitiates him and gives him "a second education the very reverse of the first." This is the education of the public who, in Rousseau’s Socratic terminology, fashion him according to their taste, discrediting his parents and teachers as dispensers
of pedantic jargon and childish morality, until he finally succumbs to their insidious sophistry.

In undertaking to save his disciple from that fate, Jean-Jacques takes up Socrates' challenge in the sixth book of the *Republic*, to which I have alluded. The sage avers that under alien conditions the finest natures become preeminently bad, "whereas weak natures are scarcely capable of any very great good or very great evil either." Of course, Emile has not been reared in a completely alien soil, and is to live in such a place only briefly. But for the Socratic thinker even transplantation for a year is not without danger in a city like Paris, where the public, "the greatest of all sophists," are always ready to educate him anew. The Greek sage is convinced that no private training can enable a young man "to stand firm against the overwhelming flood of popular opinion." Every type of character, says he, is formed by it. He adds that, in our present evil plight, whatever is saved is saved "by some divine power," which for Rousseau would be the reasonable will heard in the "cestial voice." But according to Socrates, few are ever redeemed. For most men, says he, wisdom consists of popular notions of good and evil, justice and injustice. It is quite simply the discernment of the tastes and tempers of the multitude, who do everything possible to prevent a well-endowed youth from "yielding to his better nature" and do even more "to render his teacher [reason] powerless by private intrigues and public prosecutions." Consequently "philosophy is left desolate with her marriage rite incomplete...." Such is Socrates' challenge to mankind, and Rousseau's is not very different.

Nevertheless, in *Emile* Jean-Jacques accepts it. As the youth goes abroad with his governor in the French capital, he is allegorically armed from head to foot. The word *armed* is used in the text, reminding us of the medieval knights-errant that he emulates, "girt about with truth and wearing the breastplate of righteousness." He is also shielded by the aegis of Minerva in the persons of Jean-
Jacques and Sophia. Moreover, he has two other "guardians" as well called "shame and fear," the very ones that watch over Socrates' citizens in the fifth book of the *Republic*. And so he is allegedly invulnerable to public opinion that is false and foreign to his nature. The future Ulysses is insensitive to the siren voices of the children of foolishness. According to the text, their call is muffled by the voice of a "faithful and true friend" whose attachment of twenty years' standing has already been revealed to him as the "sublime" and saving power of reason in the service of the human will.

That voice which is conscience makes an impassioned appeal to rescue him from provocative young sophists, foreshadowed by the flatterers and seducers of the earlier lessons of experience and fables in action who were reflected in the *Contract*. But here the tempters represent false opinion assailing the temple of the soul from within as well as without. They do the same in the sixth book of the *Republic*, in the passages on the corruption of the philosophic nature mentioned above, and again in the eighth. In the latter fierce natures beset the youth, oppose parental influence, and besiege "the citadel of the soul," driving away its best guardians, here identified as modesty, temperance, and moderation, and replacing them by a "rabble of evil appetites" such as insolence, anarchy, waste, and impudence that masquerade as "breeding," "liberty," "magnificence," and "courage." Emile finds himself in a similar plight. His governor pleads against such sophisms in the name of the hero's true interest that is his own and is alien to that of self-indulgent youths who seek only to control him, and have renounced the so-called prejudices of their fathers based upon love and experience to adopt those of other people. Thus Jean-Jacques carries on his task as the spokesman of reason and true opinion, of Emile's father the law, which begot him, appealing for discipline in the name of paternal affection seen as the truest image of friendship.
In Emile's response the haunting Socratic phrase from which the whole book sprang recurs like the fundamental theme of a great symphony: "He recognizes the voice of friendship, and knows how to obey reason." In doing so he obeys Jean-Jacques, who has the mastery of his will through the friendship of reason, and who governs him continually. So the text implies. Even when he leaves the youth among "strangers," he hints that he is mystically present within him. Emile, by heeding his governor, heeds his own conscience. In both plea and response, artistic and literary methods empower the author to make the inner workings of the human spirit both visible and audible to the reader.

Next the governor faces the problem of passion also beleaguering the inner world, instead of appearing only externally as in the pages on Plutarch and the related ones in the Contract. The presence of the inner foe is indicated by fresh precautions against the instinct of sense, "which cannot be trusted in the midst of social institutions." Guided by sad personal experience, Rousseau warns against the so-called dangerous supplement. If Emile is to be delivered up to a "tyrant," that tyrant will be women's wiles rather than himself. The image is well chosen to portray what Socrates calls the tyrannical soul in whom the best elements are enslaved to the beast within. The same image also conveys the idea that lawlessness does not necessarily have anything to do directly with other people. Here, for instance, it does not appear as a form of rebellion against external authority. That was the main concern in the first "nave" of the great chamber of the spirit, where the youth witnessed outward impropriety in ancient biographies without having any personal knowledge of inner disorder. Here lawlessness appears as a violation of the proper inward disposition of all faculties, a disposition that requires unlawful appetites to be allayed and better desires and rational or spiritual powers to prevail in a harmonious ordering of the entire person. In fine, as in the vicar's creed lawlessness is represented by sexual aberration, whereas
love of law, purity of will and self-mastery are symbolized by chastity and continence. Rousseau implies as much by saying that until twenty continence is in the order of nature, and after that it is a moral duty indispensable for one who would "rule over himself" and be "master of his appetites."

The precepts followed by the governor to combat error and evil within are the same as those employed hitherto in the external world. In both cases there are two. First, if the youth goes astray, his mentor remains at his side to guide him in his errors. The writer cites the historical case of a diplomat who became inebriated in the service of a prince. The example stands in counterpoise to that of the Roman captain in the first "nave" who, like the Socratic "leaders," led his army even in retreat. The second rule was also formulated there. The governor refrains from affected blindness or false dignity and feigned perfection that foster abuses and lead to "the overthrow of all order and contempt for every law." The law here is not merely that which governs external behavior in society but the one whereby the disciple's inner life is kept in order by Jean-Jacques. This interpretation, imposed by the context, is confirmed by an appeal to every governor to provide a model of one who must withstand his lower nature in order to remain "master of himself." The appeal accentuates the difference between the two "naves," for in the former he refrained from showing his weakness to the youth. The object here is professedly to save the latter from the fate of modern men whose shriveled souls and corrupt bodies allegedly make them incapable of any very great good or evil either, words echoing the Socratic ones quoted above. Emile is to be a good and temperate man who, if he chose, might like the child of the second part "become master of all with far less trouble than it cost him to become master of himself."

At this point the author sketches the hero's portrait as he did at the end of the second part, except that now the setting is worldly society. The one prefigures the other, as it
should. The emphasis is still on moral and spiritual qualities. Although at the age of twenty Emile is as ignorant of the formalities of politeness as he was at ten, his attitude toward others has deepened. He feels a common bond of sympathy and affection for them, which is the mainspring of his conduct in their regard. Yet the rule of his conversation has not essentially altered. The youth of twenty confines his words to what is “useful,” much as the child of ten uttered only the simple truth as far as he knew it. Emile does not cultivate eloquence until after he has entered society, when grace of speech results from a new desire to please that is the secret of his cordial ways. His bearing is “that of a citizen”; and his politeness, being a spontaneous manifestation of human feeling, likewise proclaims “the citizen.” Obviously this must be so since, as we were told, he is learning the art necessary to “man and the citizen.” In a word, he appears as an inhabitant of the city of the Contract. When the author adds, “All this demands... no great stock of precepts from me; it is all the result of his early education,” he reminds us again of Socrates, whose laws are as few as his own. In Plato’s fourth book the Greek sage too declined to legislate about such matters as the respect owed to elders, the honor due to parents, modes of dress, deportment, and manners in general, since “the direction in which education starts a man will determine his future life.” His very words are matched in the present context of Emile. Since the Aemilian city is hardly different from the ancient Greek one, it is not surprising to learn that the hero appears among men as an “agreeable foreigner.” His spiritual growth is shown in the qualities of his mind, whose former embryonic moral ideas have expanded to include all that is useful for his own happiness and that of others. It is also shown in the pleasure he finds in the company of those who possess his own taste in moral matters. Thus the association of taste with morals recurs as it did in the portrait of Sophia and the chapter on censorship, as well as in the second part of both books.

[285]
The last pages of this part of *Emile* are devoted to the further cultivation of good taste or true opinion that is to save the constitution according to the texts just enumerated, wherein beauty is conceived to operate as a moral influence. If I refer again to the said pages, already referred to in my first and third chapters, it is to accentuate further the linking of aesthetics and spirituality. For example, although Rousseau now defines taste as the power of judging what is pleasing to most men in matters indifferent or amusing, we know that he means materially but not Socratically indifferent since pleasures determine the fate of his city. Moreover, according to him "what is pleasing" is ascertained by "the majority of votes" if, as in an ideal order of things, each man expresses his real sentiment, which means that the canons of taste are formulated in the same way as the laws that govern the ordering of city or soul and that the same rule produces both virtue and the beauty of harmony. The affinity of taste and morals is everywhere implicit, even when he tries to distinguish between taste in moral and physical matters, for he observes that there is always a moral element present in everything involving imitation such as the plastic arts. Take for instance, traditional art, whose model is his own and which offers an idealization of nature such as we see in *Emile* or ancient Greek sculpture. For him the natural model constitutes a universal moral and aesthetic pattern. But he also says that taste is modified by local circumstances, as he said of laws as well. He adds that perfection of taste is the fruit of frequenting numerous societies of amusement on condition that they possess a fair degree of equality to moderate the influence of false opinion, a condition also required by his system of legislation and government. He goes further. Since good taste is in his eyes realizable in the company of the sexes wherever lofty moral standards intensify the desire to please, he concludes that good taste is related to good morals. He links the two again by observing that we must know
how to please others if we would do them service. In fine, in the present context he illustrates the idea of the Contract that aesthetic taste is connected with moral taste and motivates the conduct of human life, and that both are the main responsibility of education and legislation. Consequently Jean-Jacques, who professes to teach nothing but the duties of man, gives lessons in aesthetics. This makes the perfecting of taste a very serious business.

Rousseau’s ideas on the subject are expressed in Emile’s aesthetic training, which began with his education but which he now consciously pursues. The governor familiarizes him with models of taste in nature by training his judgment in Parisian society until he acquires a discriminating insight into the complexities of the heart. His knowledge and love of nature are further deepened by a study of ancient writings like Plato’s Symposium and Virgil’s Aeneid. Unlike the Socratic philosophers and contrary to Rousseau’s own teaching in the Letter to d’Alembert, Emile also frequents the theater and delights in all manner of beauty designed to please the heart and stir the feelings. For he is to be a sensitive man as well as a sage. Imaginative sympathy, Christian in its origin, lends a lyrical tinge to Rousseau’s basically “classical” tastes as it does to his moral convictions.

The avowed purpose of the hero’s aesthetic formation is to fix his affections and tastes and prevent the decline of natural inclinations so that he will seek his happiness not in wealth but in the good things of life that lie close by. This means that his felicity will depend largely upon his own personal resources. Rousseau suggests the extent of the hero’s inner wealth by sketching a great tableau of happiness and the good life that contrasts with the earlier spectacle of human suffering but matches the fair sights and sounds at the end of the second part. However, this tableau is supplied from the writer’s own experience, including biblical and Socratic readings, on the pretext that Emile’s pure
heart "can no longer serve as an example for anyone."

He calls the admittedly autobiographical conclusion an "essay." He imagines therein how he would enjoy all the truest pleasures of life if he were rich, although he has just said that happiness is not to be sought in wealth. Thus he appears to take up the challenge of his divine master, who, without excluding the rich from the heavenly paradise, teaches that "it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God." The self-styled Gospel commentator is perhaps emboldened by the master's subsequent reassurance that "with God all things are possible," as well as by Socrates' conviction that in an alien state "whatever is saved, is saved by the power of God,"119 which for Rousseau is expressed in conscience. However that may be, the rich man in the essay wins happiness, but the delights he enjoys have nothing to do with vanity and false opinion. They allegedly spring from realities.

In actual fact, although the writer is too much of an artist to say so bluntly, he indicates clearly enough that the wealth he possesses in the essay, far from being a threat to happiness, is paradoxically its source. It is the only kind he considers worthy of a disciple of Christ, or of Socrates and the Greek heroes, who were wedded to poverty as is he. In the language of his favorite "discourse," his coffers, like theirs and Emile's, are not laid up on earth but contain only the "gold" of spiritual and aesthetic experience that suffices to make felicity possible for a nature like his. That wealth is his concept of wisdom as it has been presented in both books.

Accordingly, the concluding tableau of wisdom and happiness synthesizes Rousseauist social and civil order beheld in the ideal city or moral being, and anticipates the enchanted world of the fifth part of Emile and of certain passages of the Confessions and Dialogues. That order is conceived as already existing within him, since he begets it in his work. The dream becomes reality. This interpretation is
suggested at once by the tone of the essay, which is that of the dedication of the second Discourse addressed to the new Geneva existing in his heart. There the motif "if I had had to choose my birthplace" serves as a pretext for sketching his "own city," much as the motif "if I were rich" serves as a pretext for depicting his own inner riches,¹²⁰ which are those of that mythical realm.

The essay is divided into two parts. The first contains a panorama of Rousseauist moral and social order. With Socratic sobriety and restraint the essayist depicts his idea of the outward fabric of a well-disposed life seen in the context of actuality and exemplifies the main principles governing the relationships of a spiritual being with the world as we know it. He follows the same sequence as Socrates does in the construction of his city, just as he did throughout the book. He begins by saying that if he were rich, he would first purchase freedom and then acquire health by the practice of temperance, since he still regards these two assets as the basic ingredients of happiness. In his appetites and tastes as well as in the adornment of his dwelling, he would take nature as his guide. Observe how he hardly distinguishes between physical and aesthetic taste. In all things he would favor simplicity of life. Like the Socratic kings who lived like servants in their own houses, he would have no footman stand between the world and himself. Nor would he dwell in a palace any more than they, for like any other traveler in life he needs, so he says, no more than a chamber at an inn. Besides, the world "is a palace fair enough for anyone." In that habitation and untrammeled by the furniture of other men's dwellings, he is as free as his thought. Ubi bene, ibi patria is his device, and for him both goods and city lie within the spirit that permits him to enjoy the true pleasures of mind and of heart. To prove that he is a lover of these rather than of wealth or power, he makes a sudden sally against gaming that, according to him, turns thought toward arid combinations. In other words, he would not resemble the lover of gain in the Republic who
compels reason to think only of how lesser sums may be turned into larger ones, and who forces the human spirit to be ambitious of nothing else but the amassing of gold. Indeed, Socrates can hardly be far from his mind since he depicts himself like a Socratic prince, professing to regulate bodily habit, property, and clothing in such a way as to remain, as he says, "master of his conduct" in all states and conditions of life and especially among the common people. In that case he does not covet power over others any more than wealth. This idea leads him to broach the theme of friendship and subsequently that of love, to which he accords the same symbolic values as he has done hitherto. His friends would be bound together not by dependence upon him but by mutual attachment and conformity of taste and character, in a relationship based upon freedom and equality. The main elements of the Aemilian city of the *Contract* and the Socratic one too are present in this first part of the essay.

The stark realism of the above tableau heightens the quasi-mystical "ravishing contemplations" that follow to provide a literary antithesis and foreshadow the dénouement. Significantly enough, they are introduced by a long discourse on love. Thereupon we are admitted to the "inner sanctum" of the mind, corresponding to the ideal civil order or private society that would presumably materialize if the general principles of the *Social Contract* were applied in the sphere of an exclusive alliance. The writer appears in an idyllic setting evoked in the most enchanting language. "On the slopes of some pleasant shady hill-side," he writes, "I should have a little country cottage, a white house with green shutters." There he would gather round him a chosen company of friends who know what pleasure is and how to enjoy it. Each meal would be a banquet of the simplest things served in careless array on the grass: "We should be our own servants, in order to be our own masters; each would be served by all." These inhabitants of the city of the blessed who live together in freedom and equality share the
fruits of the earth with one another and their neighbors and do no harm to any man. Although the writer imagines himself living like a "prince" on his little farm (métairie) with its white dwelling-place, yet he would not indulge in the pleasures of other princes who hunt upon their estates and destroy the work of defenseless peasants. In the society of his dream he would enjoy only pleasures accessible to all men.

Paradoxically he admits that, however mythical that society may seem, it is a reality for him and that he has simply portrayed therein the life he lives in poverty. That being the case, the essay swarms with symbols beginning with his imaginary "riches" as we foresaw. His wealth consists in his capacity to inherit the earth like the meek and take spiritual possession of it. That is how he possesses the white house with green shutters, the spectacle of which is set within the city of Paris and contains many allusions to it. Since he has just refused to occupy more than a chamber at an inn, one can only surmise that the mysterious abode with its nebulous inhabitants is a state of soul or philosophic mood and the visions that this mood induces. It is the house of the writer's thoughts and emotions, which he "sets in order" in the Socratic manner by bringing it into harmony with itself and the world round about. There he retires into what the Stoic philosopher calls "the little farm of his own mind," and ministers to the genius within him, taking advantage of its "princely" power over circumstance to foster fancies that express his idea of beauty, wisdom and happiness.

The high point of the ecstatic meditation is the banquet scene. The very theme is enough to bring to mind Plato's Symposium, whose repercussions in Rousseau's novel reach a crescendo in the next part prefigured here. Meanwhile we may observe that the host in that dialogue complains in a phrase echoed in the present text that on feast days his servants become his masters. But the same theme is also Judeo-Christian, as we shall see hereafter. The
Christian elements transform the idyll into something resembling an evangelical parable. Not only the meal on the grass but also the charity extended to others outside the fold have Christian overtones. As Rousseauist wisdom is both Christian and Socratic, so is the dream of happiness with which it culminates in the realm of the inner man.

In this part of the essay Socratic elements are not confined to reminiscences of the Symposium. If, as the Greek master says in the Republic, every genuine philosophy provides men with a better life than the one we know, the life of "beatific vision"; if, as he says, philosophy really "concludes in an ecstasy" that affords full fruition to all human faculties, then the essay in Emile foreshadows the fulfillment of Rousseauist wisdom in consummate happiness in the next part. That happiness is presumably born of a Socratic "knowledge of beauty and goodness" in the absolute sense, implying the sanctification of law and spiritual harmony transfigured by Christian influences. It crowns the author's philosophy in the same way that the blessed vision anticipated in Plato's sixth book and realized at the end of the seventh crowns Socratic education. And just as the latter inspired Emile's earlier formation set amid images of grace and harmony as counterparts of goodness and virtue, so it inspires his future progress that leads him beyond the "things of beauty" where he played in childhood to the ecstatic contemplation promised here. But for him those "things of beauty" will always be caught up into the larger vision whose object they reflect.

Rousseau concludes by affirming that the happiness just described is accessible to anyone in actual society possessed of freedom in the sense of self-mastery, health, and the necessities of life. Such a man, he adds, is rich in the gold of Horace's "aurea medocritas." He is rich because he finds within himself and round about him in the present moment some traces of the lost golden age of beauty that Emile recovers at the end of the book. Rousseau's thought has in fact led him to a vision of this perpetual "age of gold"
enshrined in the poetic essay. But the degree to which any man can attain to the same felicity depends upon poetic genius as well as the cultivation of powers of insight and volition necessary to transmute the dross of existence into gold and metamorphose ordinary human experience into an earthly paradise. Of course, the cultivation of such powers is the very object of the two books herein collated.

The finest passages of the essay are reflected in many of Rousseau’s works but nowhere better than in four letters written by him at Montmorency village to Malesherbes in January 1762 while the novel and its appendix were being printed.

In the letters he tells his correspondent of his search for happiness that led to the discovery of wisdom too. That search impelled him to abandon the French capital for the countryside, where he could indulge his love of solitude, freedom, and ideal companionship. He traces these inclinations to his earliest years when the disorders of actuality, including those of his own life, led him to escape to an imaginary world of his own creation. The same inclinations were further nurtured, he says, by a vision of spiritual “truth” vouchsafed to him in 1749 on the road to Vincennes when he beheld in a single revelation both the present evil plight of governments and the essential goodness of human nature. That experience, he explains, moved him to compose his major works and change his life. Seeing the root of all evil as false opinion about the “just and unjust,” the “honorable and dishonorable,” he fled its yoke and found in the solitude of Montmorency new wisdom and happiness for himself, without doing harm to others.

His solitary blessedness is that of the essayist in Emile. Asked by his correspondent what he enjoys, he replies “myself, the whole universe, everything beautiful in the visible world and everything imaginable in the intellectual world.” He delights in wild places where he can, so he says, be master of himself and where none can come between nature and him. He rejoices in the company of chim-
rical beings and creates for himself "a golden age" of his fancy not in the past or in the future but in the present. With a void still left in his soul, he strives to fill it by rising to enraptured contemplation of the universe and the "incomprehensible being who embraces all," until at last he reaches a state of ecstasy comparable to that of the "celestial intelligences." But he denies that his love for the good life is incompatible with the love of humanity. He professes to practice the "duties of man" toward his neighbors and to preach them in his writings for the happiness of mankind and his compatriots. In such terms he depicts his own personal discovery of wisdom and happiness, which is the real inspiration of Emile and the Contract.

And yet, according to the author, the felicity described in the essay of the novel is not Emile's nor is it comparable to his. The essayist, who poses as such in the whole book and not merely at the end of the fourth part, began by forbearing to define the ultimate ideal. Likewise at the same point in the Republic and in the similitude of the sun, Socrates pleads that "to reach what is now in my thought would be an effort too great for me." In Rousseau's case we may, however, consider the essay as a kind of prophetic dream of Emile's mythical happiness in the fifth part. It anticipates the imaginary civil order in the novel even if, as the author would have us believe, it provides only a shadowy image of the ecstasy that Sophia promises to those who live as closely with her as Emile does in the end.

Needless to say, the beatific vision has no place in the hypothetical exteriorized version of the city in the Contract, which is, however, patterned after its object as is the whole of Emile. We have seen that the entire fourth part of both books is essentially and substantially identical and that both echo faithfully the fifth and sixth books of the Republic. This is true throughout, beginning with the pages on sophisms and passions and the kind of "warfare" that must be waged against them until the "light of truth" dawns and the ideal moral being is born. It is also true of the measures
TEMPLE STRONGHOLD

prescribed to balance, control, and preserve the powers of that being and save the human constitution, whose nature always remains the criterion of Rousseauist and Socratic moral and social order.

1. I have chosen the chapter title to suggest the main body of the structure in both books. I am emboldened to use it by the thought of Romanesque churches, which were in fact medieval strongholds. It has the added advantage of combining the Socratic image of the "citadel of the Soul" and the Christian image of the spiritual temple.

2. For reflections on birth, the brevity of life, and the passions, see "Emile," pp. 301, 306-8, and cf. 489 and 495. The question of happiness is also raised in each part: pp. 313-16, 512-17. So is the matter of delay: pp. 323, 518-19. In both parts there is an alien society round about: pp 329 ff., 517 ff.

3. For the image see ibid., p. 388; cf. chap. 2, n. 10, above.

4. Cf. The Republic 5. 450. Burgelin sees that for Rousseau positive education begins here: O.C., 4:490 n. 3. For the allusion below to the "know thyself" of the Delphic shrine, see the first paragraph of the fourth promenade of Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire, where Rousseau refers to "le connois-toi-même du Temple de Delphes": O. C., 1:1024.


7. See note 2 above and chapter 3, note 30.

8. He does so since he is persuaded that the age of innocence can be prolonged.

9. See The Republic 5. 461, where Socrates speaks of a scheme whereby his guardians have their wives and families "in common," meaning that the latter are subject to universal human faculties rather than the lawless wild best nature.

10. Ibid. 5. 462.

11. They are defended in the "Contrat social": see "Emile," p. 837. To see that the friendship of Jean-Jacques and Emile does not represent an exclusive affection between individuals, see ibid., pp. 547-48. The symbolism of friendship and love has escaped our notice in the past.

12. The leitmotiv occurred in the previous chapter: see note 20. See also the covenant of friendship in chapter 2 above and note 35.

13. For the attitude of Socrates' heroes toward "enemies," see The Republic 2. 375-76; 5. 468-71. With the latter passage cf. 7. 537.
ROUSSEAU'S SOCRATIC AEMILIAN MYTHS


15. *The Republic* 10. 606. Cf. 3. 398 cited in Latin in the "Lettre à d'ALEMBERT," *O. C.*, Hachette, 1:259 n. 1 For Rousseau's images of the stage in this part, see "Emile," pp. 515, 525, 526, 527, 530, 532, 551. The work "De l'imitation théâtrale," which is also reminiscent of Plato's *Laws*, was undertaken in connection with the "Lettre à d'ALEMBERT" and was completed shortly afterward, though it was published only in 1764.

16. For these two expressions see "Emile," pp. 352 (men are changed into "bêtes féroces") and 535 ("vous êtes des fous"); cf. *The Republic* 6. 496 (regarding "the madness of the multitude" and "wild beasts").

17. Here the governor behaves exactly like Mentor in *Télémaque*, where the language is very similar, especially in book 1, pp. 14-15: "Le sage Mentor m'aima jusqu'à me suivre dans un voyage teméraire que j'entreprendais contre ses conseils. . . Une noire tempête déroba le ciel à nos yeux. . . Mentor parut, dans ce danger, non seulement ferme et intrepide, mais plus gai qu'à l'ordinaire: c'était lui qui m'encourageait." Burgelin implies that the governor symbolizes reason in the text of "Emile" to which I refer in this note: *O. C.*, 4:539 n. 1. Cf. chap 2 above, n. 28.


20. Ibid. 5. 463. For Rousseau's "constant will," applied both to the general will and to conscience, see "Contrat social," chapters 1 and 2; and "Emile," pp. 583-84, 594 ff., 652. Their identity is commonly recognized.

21. *O. C.*, 3:830. If some readers still protest that he does not give "the people" sufficient chance to debate proposals but only to ratify those of "leaders" who have "discovered" what the general will is, the misunderstanding would be due to his use of Socratic symbolism. For him the "people" or "subjects" represent desires to be disciplined by the rule of the enlightened human spirit, which leads man to "moral truth."


26. Cf. the present text of "Emile" and *The Republic* 6. 484-95 (definition of the philosophic nature and the dangers it faces); 503 (aspirant tested in labors and dangers); 7. 517 (fights in courts of law); 519 (partakes of labors and honors); 537 (trained in labors, lessons, dangers).


[296]

30. See, for example, C. C., 5:181 and 6:78; letters to mme de Créqui and T. Tronchin, 13 October 1758 and 28 April 1759.


32. For natural man in the civil order see chapter 4 above, note 40.


40. Cf. Exod. 19:6: "Any ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests and an holy nation." Cf. also Rev. 1:5 regarding Christ who "hath made us kings and priests unto God."


42. C. C., 16:75, letter from Usteri, 16 April 1763. For the "Lettres de la montagne," see loc. cit., pp. 719-20.

43. For Rousseau's revision briefly stated: O. C., 4:lxviii, lxxix-lxxx, cxxxvii.

44. Burgelin sees that the sun is symbolic but does not connect it with the Socratic similitude: ibid., p. 565 n. 1. and cf. p. 430 n. 1.

45. Rousseau believed that he had a mission as the only eloquent defender of God at the time, and sought to make religion attractive and speak of death with more hope than all the moralists: C. C., 15:305-6, letter from mme de Chenonceaux, 20 March 1763. For his judgment of the creed: "Lettre à C. de Beaumont," loc. cit., p. 960. Cf. C. C., 11:24-25, 36, 39, 44, letters to Néaulme, Moulou, mme de Créqui, and m de la Pouplinière, 5, 7, 8 June 1762.


[297]
ROUSSEAU’S SOCRATIC AEMILIAN MYTHS


48. See, for example, “Confessions,” loc. cit., pp. 277, 492; and “Dialogues,” ibid., p. 727.


50. The Republic 10. 607.

51. Ibid., 6. 488-89. Burgelin also identifies the inexperienced pilot as reason, but traces the image to Locke and Condillac without recalling the Platonic myth, where the language is much closer to Rousseau’s: O. C., 4:567 n. 1.

52. Ecclus. 3:22-26; “Seek not to know what is far above thee... beyond thy range... dwell upon duty... content to be ignorant of all God’s dealings besides... Leave off thy much questioning about things as little concern thee, and be content with thy ignorance... By such fancies, many have been led astray and their thoughts chained to folly.”


55. “Emile,” p. 593. Cf. “Lettre à C. de Beaumont,” loc. cit., p. 976, where he uses the word creator. He discusses the difficulties of the idea on pp. 956-57 in the same work. At the end of The Republic Socrates teaches that God or the idea of good is the great artist, maker, or creator “of all the works of all other workmen,” meaning that he is the creator of the idea of their works.

56. He does not name Helvétius or Voltaire: e.g., C. C., 13:37 and 191, letters to Comparet and De Luc, about 10 September and 10 October 1762.

57. 1 Cor. 15:55-56.

58. “... Non, l’homme n’est point un; je veux et je ne veux pas, je me sens à la fois esclave et libre; je vois le bien, je l’aime, et je fais le mal: je suis actif quand j’écoute la raison, passif quand mes passions m’entraînent, et mon pire tourment, quand je succombe, est de sentir que j’ai pu resister.” Cf. Rom. 7:15 and Gal. 5:17.

59. “Quelque chose en toi cherche à briser les liens qui le compriment. L’espace n’est pas ta mesure, l’univers entier n’est pas assés grand pour toi...” Cf. for example “Lettres à m. de Malesherbes,” loc. cit., p. 1141. For Socrates on harmony: The Republic 7. 531, the words of which are echoed in Rousseau’s text in the paragraph preceding the one quoted here.

60. “Non, Dieu de mon ame, je ne te reprocherai jamais de l’avoir faite a ton image afin que je pusse être libre, bon et heureux comme toi!”

61. 1 Cor. 9:24-27 and The Republic 10. 613, 621. Cf. 3. 403 and 5. 465-66.

62. Cf. “Confessions,” loc. cit., pp. 619-20: the first of the “Dialogues” and second and fifth of the “Rêveries.” For the psalm below see O. C., 4:591 n. 2. When Rousseau says later that death is the end of life for the wicked, he means that that is their opinion and that they live as if such were the case: ibid., p. 820.
63. *The Republic* 4. 444 (justice is as natural as health); 6. 505-6 (man's whole quest is the good); 10. 612 (justice in her own nature is best for the soul in her own nature). For the idea that feelings may be judgments see “Emile,” p. 484. Cf. *loc. cit.*, p. 584 n, where the same idea is suggested. It is obvious from the context that in the present case the subjectivity of conscience does not favor moral anarchy.


66. 1 Cor. 6:3; but cf. Psalm 8:5 cited in Heb. 2:7, where the apostle recalls that man was made lower than the angels but was raised above them by Christ.

67. “Emile,” p. 599, and cf. *loc. cit.*, p. 583, where the delights of the sage are compared with the torment of the man who succumbs.

68. See, for example, *O. C.*, 4. 614 n. 2 and 636 n. 1. According to these notes, natural religion is excluded from the city of the *Contract*.


73. *Ibid.*., pp. 695, 705.

74. See, for example, K. D. Erdmann, *Das Verhältnis von Staat und Religion nach des Sozialphilosophie Rousseaus* (Berlin: Verlag Dr. Emil Ebering, 1935). Boss (op. cit.) concludes that the vicar’s spirit of tolerance is violated in the civil creed. He allies himself with Bernard Groethuysen, *J.-J. Rousseau* (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), p. 259, and C. W. Hendel, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Moralist* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 243. Yet the idea of religion as law and of atheism as lawlessness and spiritually fatal is present in the vicar’s creed. Since law, like conscience, is conceived as the spokesman of the sovereign human will, a morally committed man submits because he wants to, whether he is a leader like the vicar or a follower like the citizens of the *Contract*, even though the laws to which he submits are those of a city that can never exist on earth.

75. His reply was that he would hope that she was not, and that God had been able to enlighten her at her last hour.

76. “Je considérais cette diversité de sectes qui régent sur la terre.”

ian raisonnable et morale étant tout pouvoir humain sur les consciences, ne laisse
plus de ressource aux arbitres de ce pouvoir." That is the object of law in Emile
and the Contract, which are supposed to defend "the rights of humanity."

78. Burgelin sees this: O.C., 4:611 n. 2.

79. In the "Lettres de la montagne," loc. cit., pp. 749-59, Rousseau maintains
that neither he nor the vicar approves of the "Raisonneur" but that the dialogue
shows the dangers of mysticism and its vulnerability at the hands of scientific
reason.

80. The Republic 10. 602. This is a likely source in spite of Voltaire's feeling
that the real one is his poem on natural religion and letter to Urania. See Bernard
Bouvier, "Notes inédites de Voltaire sur la Profession de foi du vicaire


p. 70; E. Ritter, La Famille et la jeunesse de J.-J. Rousseau (Paris: Hachette,

83. "Lettres de la montagne," loc. cit., pp. 753-54; "Lettre à m. de Fran­
C., 4:1053-54) where Rousseau (circa 1755) prefers Christ to Socrates, whose
submission to false laws after his revelation of true ones still puzzled him. I deal
with Rousseau's perplexity about Socrates in the next chapter where I handle the
famous comparison of Socrates and Cato.

Profession de foi (see note 46 above), p. 425.


Mark 9:24. The problem of adjusting theism and one's ancestral faith, to which I
propose a solution below, has been raised by various critics.

87. "Aimer Dieu par dessus tout et son prochain comme soi-même est le som­
maire de la loi...." Cf. Eccles. 12:13; Prov. 21:3; Matt. 22:37-39; 1 Cor. 13; Gal.
5:14. For faith as an act of the will, in addition to this context of "Emile," see
C.C., 9:342, letter to Moutltou, 23 December 1761.

88. For attacks upon "Philosophers" and materialists in the creed: "Emile,"
For the latter, refuting Bayle's idea of virtuous atheism, see Boss, op. cit., pp.
123 ff. The "philosophers" are also attacked elsewhere in "Emile": pp. 253, 256,
350 n.

89. "Mais voyez de combien de nouvelles chaînes vous avez environné son
coeur. La raison, l'amitié, la reconnoissance, mille affections lui parlent d'un ton
qu'il ne peut méconnaître." For the Socratic leitmotiv see note 11 above. The
phrase recurs often in "Emile": pp. 522. 539, 639, 648-49, 653, 660-61. For "law­
ful fetters" mentioned above, see "Contrat social," p. 351.

90. The Republic 2. 375-76.

91. Ibid., 7. 534. For virtue practiced by habit, force, or necessity: ibid., 2.

92. Ibid., 6. 491-92. Cf. 497 (Socratic parable of the sower). For the hus­
"Avant de semer il faut labourer la terre: la semence de la vertu lève difficilement,
il faut de longs apprêts pour lui faire prendre racine."

[300]
93. Cf. The Republic 7. 520 ("we have brought you into the world"); 8. 548 ("running away like children from the law, their father"). Rousseau writes: "... J'enflamerai son jeune cœur de tous les sentiments d’amitié, de générosité, de reconnaissance que j’ai déjà fait naître et qui sont si doux à nourrir... Je lui dirai: tu es mon bien, mon enfant, mon ouvrage: c’est de ton bonheur que j’attends le mien..." The Socratic leitmotiv is quoted above just before my discussion of Plutarch’s biographies and again a few pages later apropos of the so-called lessons of experience; see also the last section of this chapter, "The Oath of Kings."


95. "Emile," pp. 494, 764. For the distinction between what is natural in the savage state and civil order, see chapter 4 above, note 41. For the vicar’s words quoted below: "Emile," p. 566.

96. "Lettre à C. de Beaumont," loc. cit., p. 979 n, and see the fourth paragraph of the section of this chapter entitled "Credo." For the law of love that replaces the rule of necessity mentioned above, see Plato, The Symposium (Agathon’s speech).

97. Emile is asking to be "forced to be free." Failure to see the Socratic symbolism here leads to the impression that the hero, in order to be free of the slavery of sense, renounces his own free agency: David Cameron, The Social Thought of Rousseau and Burke (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), pp. 101-2. An awareness of symbols and literary correspondences shows that the "ordering agent" is in fact Emile himself, who is engaging a minister or servant to externalize the governing power existing within him until he can serve himself. He does so in the fifth part, whose ideological content we can no longer afford to ignore. See chapter 6 below.

98. O. C., 3:442 n. 4 (here we can see that even Voltaire missed the point) and 443 n. 1. With regard to elections it has been said that in Rousseau’s system magistrates are chosen by lot. But this would be so only in an impossible democracy where the lot falls upon all, not in the elective aristocracy that he prefers.

99. The chapters considered out of place are "Contrat social," part 2, chapters 8, 9, 10; part 3, chapter 8; part 4, chapters 4, 5, 6, 7; loc cit., pp. 384 n. 6; 414 n. 1; 444 n. 1; cf. 458 n. 1. See chapters 3 and 4 above and chapter 1, note 55. Many thinkers believe that the book contains confused historical discussions of institutions of little importance today.

100. In the opening words of the chapter he admits that all he knows about the origins of Rome are "fables," "conjectures," "traditions."

101. "Le nom de Rome qui prétend venir de Romulus est Grec, et signifie force; le nom de Numa est grec aussi, et signifie Loi. Quelle apparence que les deux premiers Rois de cette ville aient porté d’avance des noms si bien relatifs à ce qu’ils ont fait?"

102. The Republic 3. 415.

103. There Jean-Jacques exercises some mysterious power to force Emile to leave the beatific contemplation of wisdom for a time and engage in active life in the "false" kingdoms of this world.


105. The italics are mine. We were previously told that he was not "an active member of society": "Emile," pp. 421, 467. Even when his pity becomes "active," he is still a spectator: pp. 542 ff. The references to the "citizen" in this context are on pp. 655, 657 and note, 669. Cf. pp. 262, 469. It must be understood
Rousseau's Socratic Aemilian Myths

that when Emile enters our society, he is literally going down into the Socratic den, on a level far below the lofty idealism of the Contrat, which always remains within.

106. In addition to being mme d' Houdetot's name, it is also that of a character in his play "Les Prisonniers de guerre" and of one of the mendicanti orphans in "Confessions." Cf. the Princesse Raison in "La Reine fantasque," O. C., 2:1189-90.

107. He learns to seek what was beyond him in "Emile," p. 453: "On voit à quinze ans le bonheur d'un homme sage, comme à trente la gloire du paradis."

108. Prov. 4:5-8; 7:4-5; 8:10: 8:18. For the banquet of wisdom in 9:1-5 see chapter 6 below.


111. "Emile," p. 659: "... Tous deux [Emile and a young girl] auront au moins pour gardes la crainte et la honte...." Cf. The Republic 5. 465: "For there are two guardians, shame and fear, mighty to prevent him...." "Fear means fear of breaking the law bred in him by education.

112. The Republic 8. 560-61.

113. "... Il reconoit la voix de l'amitié et il sait obéir à la raison." "Emile," p. 661. See note 89 above.


115. The parallel passages are in "Emile," pp. 537-40, 663-64.

116. "Emile," p. 669, regarding manners, deportment, and taste in dress and concluding: "On voit que tout cela n'exige point de ma part un étaillage de préceptes, et n'est qu'un effet de sa première éducation." Cf. The Republic 4. 423-25. All Socrates' regulations are trifles of the one great thing, education. And he too declines to "legislate" about "when the young are to be silent before their elders; how they are to show respect to them by standing and making them sit; what honour is due to parents; what garments or shoes are to be worn; the mode of dressing the hair; deportment and manners in general." His heroes will discover these rules for themselves, through the force of their education. The same is true of laws about markets, police, harbors, law-suits, and so on. See chapter 3 above, note 39.

117. See above, pp. 16 ff. and 135 ff.

118. His taste is also shown in his admiration for Raphael that is characteristically combined with a love of the neo-classics of Bologna, who added emotion to Raphael's classical ideal: "Emile," p. 790. For the importance of amusements cf. The Republic 4. 424. Rousseau associates virtue and beauty as the object of laws in the "Fragments politiques" as well as in the chapter of the "Contrat" on the censorship.

119. For the evangelical challenge: Matt. 19:23-26. For the Socratic phrase corresponding to "with God all things are possible": The Republic 6. 492-93.

120. Cf. O. C., 3:111 n. 4.


122. See pp. 680, 683, 686, 691.

123. The Republic 3. 400-402. Burgelin notes the connection of taste and morals in Rousseau: O. C., 4:671 n. 2.

[302]
124. See pp. 782, 820, 859, 861. Observe that for Rousseau the golden age belongs neither to the past, as with the ancients, nor to the future, as with the moderns, but to the eternal present.

125. "Mais de quoy jouissois-je enfin quand j'étois seul? De moi, de l'univers entier, de tout ce qui est, de tout ce qui peut être, de tout ce qu'a de beau le monde sensible et d'imaginable le monde intellectuel..."