The fifth part of *Emile* leads the reader into the innermost chamber\(^1\) of the mythical temple dedicated to divine wisdom. Although there is no corresponding part in the *Contract,\(^2\) the principles of the treatise on citizenship prevail throughout this section where they are also summarized. I shall therefore discuss the novel in the light of discoveries to which the collation of the two books has led. Indeed, here it affords a new vision of Rousseauist wisdom in its most intimate relations to the human spirit. In addition, the writer shows clearly enough to what degree he dared hope that the city of his creation might have real existence in some form of civil order or exclusive communion of men.

The inner sanctuary of the temple of the book matches the second chamber of the Greek pattern, adjacent to the other and somewhat smaller, but also divided by rows of columns into three symmetrical naves. In accordance with Rousseau’s consistent symbolic adherence to this architectural form, the last part of *Emile* is therefore a little smaller than the previous one and also has a tripartite shape, the three “naves” varying only slightly in magnitude.

It covers the hero’s life between the ages of twenty and twenty-five and contains the story of Emile and Sophia in three parts, the first and last being marked by titles, and the middle by the spacing of the text. They deal respectively with the nature and formation of woman and presentation of Sophia: the courtship of Emile and Sophia and the promise between them: and finally a comparison of the Rousseauist covenant with the historical one, culminating in Emile’s pledge to the former and marriage to Sophia. Henceforth the symbolism becomes increasingly obvious. Indeed, fail-

[305]
ure to cope with it and to take account of the literary—as well as literal—aspect of the work especially here is the reason for most of our misunderstandings in the past. Often we are so shocked by the “reactionary” or traditional character of Sophia’s formation that we can hardly see much else, or are tempted to pass lightly over the “storybook ending” as if the romance were simply that of a man’s love for a woman. It may indeed be that, but it also turns out to be much more. Rousseau himself has said so, as we know. In painting her portrait, the Aemelian govern­nor explained that the aesthetic and spiritual or social ideal existing in Emile’s mind and heart is embodied in her, and that his love for the moral truth and beauty of that order of wisdom assumes the form of love of Sophia, whose name befits her. That was the very reason for the portrait. This love supposedly makes autonomous action possible for a man and releases him from “his tutor the law,” to use the author’s Socratic and biblical phraseology. And so we need not protest, as we have done hitherto, that this part whose theme in the original plan of the work was to be wisdom is replaced by a love story. As in the case of friendship, Rousseau handles the theme of love as freely as he did before and no less freely than it is handled in the Platonic dialogues, particularly the Republic and Symposium. He uses it to dramatize the idea that wisdom is suited to the human spirit, and to exteriorize his thought in figures and events that may be taken literally but must be taken symbolically.

SOPHIA

In the first nave of the mythical inner shrine, where he begins with the nature and formation of woman, he makes statements that have a double meaning and hint at both a philosophical and love drama. For example, he quotes Genesis, “It is not good for man to be alone,” and then formulates a query that may have a much broader scope than we think, like the biblical text itself. It reads: “Where
is Sophia? What is she?’ These words conspicuously echo the oft-repeated phrase: ‘‘Where is wisdom? Where is happiness?’’

He considers first the nature of woman, since her formation must be suited to the constitution of her species and sex if she is to fulfill her role in life, which for him is that of wife and mother. He dwells especially upon the moral effects of the affinities and differences between men and women and the role of both in their union, wherein each concurs in the common object in a different way. His meditations run as follows. Man is active and strong, endowed with power and will, whereas woman is a passive being, made to please him and activate his strength. In their reciprocal reactions he is governed by the law of reason, which makes him free and master of himself. She is as subject to that law as she is to him, but is further restrained by the modesty imposed upon her by nature and also by a gradually acquired aesthetic taste for right conduct. Moreover, although the stronger of the two seems to be master, he really depends upon the weaker and must please her as much as she does him if he would woo her. In this way, according to the author, the moral aspects of their interrelationship give rise to ‘‘the sweet laws of love’’ and have consequences that influence the whole of life. By the power of love, says he, she binds men’s hearts to herself, educates her children, and is the link between them and their father. Her fidelity to the covenant from which the miniature society of the family springs is therefore more indispensable than man’s for the purpose of maintaining ‘‘the bonds of nature.’’ Again as in the first part of the book, he sees her faithlessness as the source of all evil. Indeed, in his view she must not merely be faithful and chaste, but deemed so by public opinion as well as by her husband. For Rousseau these are the moral effects of the peculiar place that nature herself assigns to women in regard to men.

These opinions about the nature of women are as relevant to the ‘‘perfect city’’ or ‘‘wise order’’ of the covenant
as equivalent ones about a mother’s duties in the first part. And rightly so, since in the book it is through a man’s alliance with her that the city materializes. The special destiny attributed to her in the pursuit of that object proves to be that of the ideal state, passive as such, created to please him and impel him to moral action or obedience to the law of reason that is rooted in his noblest self and empowered to release it. A woman subject to such a man is, as it were, a “state” ruled by “true laws,” and a state ruled by true laws is the ideal city. The charm of its institutions is also hers, which he must honor. By her persuasive influence Jean-Jacques’ law of reason, of necessity and freedom, of utility or Socratic “usefulness,” and of the constitution—which is as subject to human nature as she is—becomes “the sweet law of love” that makes the city a reality. That law, like the one that takes the form of friendship, may also bring others into the fold and win their hearts to the Socratic “father.” Fidelity to the latter, who is the law, ensures peace and union—the blessings of the common good and of the covenant—by securing “the bonds of nature” that are the spirit of all law. Since the moral order that takes shape in this way and without which man is presumably lost is Rousseauist wisdom, public judgment that safeguards it is seen as true opinion, which prevails in the Aemilian city and whose approval the heroine must win while her lover, beset by the sophisms of false opinion, despises them in favor of her. These distinctions convey in an imaginative way the idea that she must move him to be what he essentially is and fulfill himself through her in the mythical city whose image she exteriorizes, however small or large it may be.

Before dealing with her formation, Rousseau himself draws attention to the symbolism of love and marriage in a passage in which he appears to part company with Socrates. He challenges the sage’s disregard of the family as an educational institution and repudiates his ideas on the education of women contained in Plato’s fifth book, from whose content the author of Emile nevertheless borrows
later on. As we know, the Greek sage allots the same exercises and duties to both sexes in the republic. His modern disciple protests that women are not made to go to "war," meaning that they cannot engage in active life in the world like men can. We may judge from the name of Sophia that for him their domain is "politics," or citizenship and education. He complains that the speaker in the Republic turns them into men because, having removed private families from his system of government, he has no place for women as such, and consequently no other alternative. This "civil promiscuity" leads, says he, to the subversion of the sweetest sentiments of nature, meaning family affections, which are sacrificed for the sake of an artificial sense of loyalty to an outward city that could exist only through their effectiveness. For him, as we saw in the first part, these bonds furnish a natural foundation for the conventional bonds of patriotism that they also serve to portray. It is "through the miniature city of the family that the heart grows attached to the large one." It is "the good son, the good husband, the good father who makes the good citizen." Accordingly, as before, the writer uses conjugal or family affection to allegorize the orderly disposition and felicitous expansion of the soul wedded to "wisdom" or the ideal city.

In that case his thought remains as Socratic as ever, whatever form it assumes, especially since he really has no more hope for the family than he or the Greek thinker has for the city. Consequently, even in this context the ideal probably remains as confined to the inner realm of the sage as it does in the Republic. The truth is that Rousseau does not take leave of his model at all. However much he makes an issue of disagreeing with the sage's views in Plato's fifth book on the nature and formation of woman—a real disagreement that we anticipated in the previous chapter—he nevertheless continues to be deeply indebted to the master in another context of the Greek classic for the image of Sophia or woman as the embodiment of wisdom and the
ideal state whose lover is a "philosopher" in the etymological sense. We saw this too in the previous chapter above, as well as in the second, where we studied the symbolism of the father, mother, and family. But in this respect, as we know, he is inspired by Plato's sixth book where woman plays a symbolic role and personifies the Muse of Philosophy or queen of the republic who has watched over the early education of its heroes and is finally revealed as the philosopher-king's destined bride. Indeed, that book, together with other Socratic recommendations at the end of the Republic dealing with the choice of wisdom in life, is one of Rousseau's two chief sources in his treatment of the formation of woman, which is not, however, Socrates' real theme therein. The other source is Plato's Symposium or Banquet to which he directed us earlier by including it in Emile's readings and which has no more to do with feminine education than the texts in the Republic. He appropriates the Socratic ideas and allegories of his models freely enough to show clearly that the main subject of the present part of his work is not what it appears to be. The reader is by now familiar with the symbolism of the first Platonic dialogue. I must briefly review the other before proceeding further.

The theme of the work is love. Socrates is again the chief speaker but takes his turn with others in discoursing upon that subject. In fact, it is the only one of which he professes to have any knowledge at all since, in his opinion, there is only one love and that is the love of wisdom, as Rousseau too implies by naming Emile's beloved "Sophia." I shall combine all the discourses into one except that of the sage, which I shall handle separately.

Love, we are told in the Symposium, is a source of virtue and honor, since lovers would be pained to be dishonored in each other's eyes. Consequently, "if there were only some way of contriving that a state or an army should be made up of lovers and their loves, they would be the very best governors of their own city. . . . Love will make men dare to
die for their beloved." Such love is, however, far from common. It is love of the good, that of intelligent beings who "are a law unto themselves," and is incompatible with tyranny [a cipher of the power of evil passion]: "The interests of rulers [meaning tyrants or tyrannical passions] require . . . that there should be no strong bond of friendship or society among their subjects [corresponding to desires that ought to be harmonized by reason and true opinion] and love, above all other motives, is likely to inspire this." But such a bond can be formed only by "love of the noble mind," subject to law, as opposed to love of wealth and power. Now since both noble and ignoble love are to be found in all things, only a skillful physician or musician can discern the love that harmonizes temperate and intemperate elements, "is concerned with the good," "is perfected in company with . . . justice," and leads to happiness. This love that is "lord of the good" is every man's desire and so "if all of us obtained our love... then the human race would be happy at last." But under present circumstances, the nearest approach to consummate felicity would be the attainment of a congenial love. And that achievement depends upon ourselves, for acts of love must be distinguished from those of necessity: "all serve love of their own free will and where there is love as well as obedience [the Rousseauist correlatives too], there, as the laws which are the lords of the city say, is justice," and temperance, courage, wisdom, and poetic inspiration. The latter is included since love is love of the beautiful as well as the good.

Before dealing with Socrates' part in the dialogue, I might observe the relevance of these ideas to Rousseau's thought, even though the connection becomes clearer henceforward. Woman, as he has described her, inspires that love of the good which wins obedience to the laws, which is manifest in wisdom and all virtue, and tempers ignoble passions to create harmony and peace among the powers. Indeed, such a love which is that of the beauty of a divine order of things allegedly becomes the only law in the
end, making all other ordinances superfluous and creating a state where honor reigns and the lover knows "for whom he must die." So we are told later, as we shall see. The government of love or honor ultimately replaces that of reason, both being subject to the same law of the human constitution. The speakers of the Symposium help clarify the symbolic value of Rousseau's text.

But Socrates, who incidentally attributes his ideas to a "wise woman," Diotima, is the most enlightening of all. He explains that if love is defined as love of wisdom, truth, beauty, and goodness, to which he adds immortality, it is not because that all-powerful creature possesses them, but because he feels the need for them and hence pursues them for the sake of happiness, bearing fruit thereby in thought, word, and deed. Thus the sage sees love not as possession but as poverty or an awareness of need, and this leads him to emphasize the pursuits and labors of love to the same extent that he emphasizes those of study, which are identical. Creative souls, says he, who engage in an active spiritual life, are moved by love to beget wisdom and poetic fervor. "But," he adds, "the greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by far is that which is concerned with the ordering of states and families and which is called temperance and justice." That wisdom of the ideal city is not only Emile's whole quest in life but is the very essence of Rousseau's conception of the education of woman, since for him the ideal can materialize, if at all, only through a woman thus formed. And that miracle would be possible only if she won the love of a lover of wisdom like the hero, or the ones exemplified in the master's words in the Greek dialogue. Socrates adds that such a lover has in him the seed of temperance and justice, and in his maturity desires to generate both: "He wanders about seeking beauty that he may beget offspring [the aforementioned virtues]... and when he finds a fair and noble and well-nurtured soul, he gladly embraces that soul, and to such an one he is full of fair speech about virtue, and the nature and pursuits of a good man,
and he tries to educate his beloved; and, at the touch and presence of the beautiful, he brings forth the beautiful which he conceived long before... and they have a closer relationship than those who beget mortal children.” As we shall see, this is precisely the homage for which education is intended to prepare a woman in the Rousseauist order of things. The sage concludes by tracing the course of love from beautiful forms and fair thoughts to beauty of institutions and laws, culminating in the love of absolute beauty, which enables a man to bring forth not mere images of beauty but realities or true virtue and to become the “friend of God” and enjoy immortality. It is impossible to ignore the affinity of his words and of the whole work to the text of Émile where the author portrays his own view of the beauty of a wise order of life that wins love and moves a man to beget virtue.

The personification of wisdom and the ideal state in woman is, as I have previously remarked, Judeo-Christian as well as Socratic. Quite apart from the Solomonic personification of wisdom, or the idealization of chaste womanhood discussed earlier, other biblical imagery to which I alluded in speaking of the covenant is visible in Rousseau’s handling of the theme of Sophia and accentuates its symbolism. For example, in the Old Testament the covenant people Israel is represented as a spouse whose spiritual husband is God. In the New Testament the society of the church, Ecclesia, appears as the bride of Christ, united with him in a single “mystical body,” and again as the “holy city prepared as a bride adorned for her husband.” In both cases the city is ideally shaped by the laws of the mystical bridegroom. These ancient myths combine to cast light upon Rousseau’s miniature city of the fifth part that suddenly becomes accessible in woman.

Broaching the question of her education, he defines first the principles of the process, that spring from the distinctive traits of her nature as analyzed at the beginning of this part, with their symbolic flavor. If she is to be suited to
man, to please him and direct his strength as she must in accordance with her alleged destiny, inclination, and duties as wife and mother, which are surely Sophia's, her education must be devised to that end. The writer sees no other possible vocation for her. He accentuates her dependence upon man but paradoxically admits that the latter depends upon her for everything: his education, morals, passions, tastes, and happiness throughout life. As we foresaw in the previous chapter in reference to Sophia, she is entrusted like Socrate's Muse with what Rousseau called, in the second and fourth parts of the *Contract*, the laws whose domain is the heart, which replace authority by manners, customs, and opinions and which determine the success of all other laws, shaping men's morals, tastes, and lives for all time. In that case Sophia has been mystically present in *Emile*, in company with Jean-Jacques, from the dedication onward.

The education of Rousseauist woman, which I shall trace briefly to show how the symbolism evolves, is both aesthetic and spiritual according to the character of Rousseauist wisdom, and, together with the story of Sophia that follows, is sketched within the bounds of Paris like the philosophic ecstasy induced by the same wisdom. In every phase of her evolution the model proposed is the example set by her sisters in the ancient cities of Sparta and Aemilian Rome, cities whose character is reflected in their noble women as it is in her. Moreover, the order of her formation is that of the "true" state ruled by the reasonable will or law of the constitution, which she must learn to activate and for which she must win obedience by the power of love alone. Thus as in the case of *Emile* provision is made for the training of physical attributes first of all, and then the will and the reason in that sequence.

In the first stage of her education the author directs his attention to the cultivation of personal charms and a strong constitution required for the fulfillment of her vocation as he sees it. He gives the example of Spartan maidens who
sang and danced at public fêtes and pious rites, which he elsewhere recommends for his own city. With that ideal in mind he begins by recommending outdoor games and amusements. He combines these with simple "useful" lessons in sewing and design, the physical side of the art of pleasing, and also in traditional studies like the three Rs. In prescribing the latter, which he ignored in the case of a leader like Emile, he applies to her the rule of the common people or ideal state. In this context he likens her to the goddess of wisdom, whose role she plays in the end as protectress of a supposedly wise order of human life symbolically identified with her.

There are further signs of the presence of symbolism in the treatment of her early moral formation. She is industrious like Emile, but always under constraint since all her life long she must submit to the will and judgments of men as to law. Such, of course, is the nature of Rousseauist and Socratic wisdom, as we have seen from the beginning. The author adds that she must be devoted to her duties and—like the Socratic muse, we may observe—must guard against lawlessness in amusements, although she is permitted to use her natural ingenuity to evade the rules in matters of indifference. She learns thereby to reign in obedience and make man's dwelling-place an abode of happiness. Jean-Jacques has done the same. The functions assigned to her in the most intimate sphere of life are those of wisdom or the imaginary city where the laws of reason prevail as they did in the order of friendship, and the laws are the same in both cases.

The second phase of her education is suggestive of the same symbolism. The new Minerva emulates Venus by favoring Spartan simplicity of adornment to accentuate her natural graces. Her charm is therefore that of the new Sparta. From the age of ten she also follows the example of Spartan maidens by acquiring talents already extolled in them, such as singing and dancing, that enhances private life. In Rousseau's view the lawful amusements of harmony
and rhythm are the palladium of marriage and the family as they are of the Aemilian city and Socratic republic. He never loses sight of the principle that the city stands or falls upon the nature of its pleasures, and greatly emphasizes it in the present context.

Obviously for him the art of pleasing extends far beyond the sphere of appearances. Taste, he says again, opens the mind to all beauty, including that of moral ideas. Accordingly he is led to speak of ethical instruction at this stage. It is largely imparted by way of conversations on moral themes that, besides teaching the art of polite speech, show the child "what qualities men esteem and what makes the true glory and felicity of a good woman." She learns, in fine, where wisdom and happiness lie.

To lead her thither and foster in her a growing "taste for good morals" that combines ethics and aesthetics, Rousseau borrows the support of religion when she is presumably ten or twelve years old. He explains that since the concepts of religion are beyond her reach, she must learn them all the sooner. Here, as in the case of the three Rs, he again applies to her the rule of the common people, which is that of the state subject to law. Before doing so, he defines her cast of mind. In his opinion it is practical, oriented toward human relationships, and it conducts her to the goal proposed by man, who in turn reaches that goal through her. The goal, as we know, is that wise order of things called the city. He admits it. The society of the sexes, says he, produces "a moral person of which woman is the eye and man the hand...." This idea brings into higher relief the symbolism of the text and of the names Aemilius and Sophia, "industry" and "wisdom," the latter conceived as pertaining to the sense of sight. The composite creature thus formed, upon which both are completely dependent, is an image of the rational being born of a man or association of men wedded to "divine wisdom" by the covenant of peace through an act of the enlightened human will intensified by love. Reflecting upon the society of the sexes,
Rousseau explains that man discovers principles or laws but his companion possesses the spirit of detail and observation that leads to their execution. Hence, “each contributes to the common purpose... each obeys and both are rulers.” Here again their reciprocal correspondence resembles that of the citizen to the subject or the sovereign to the state, which is really the solemn engagement of a man with his own noblest faculties. This pledge could hardly be better portrayed in its innermost and only really effective form than by the conjugal union. In the past we have been aware of the analogy without seeing that the one is a literary image of the other. The author himself suggests the politico-moral similitude by quoting from the Pauline chapter on the mystical body born of the union of Christ with his bride Ecclesia: in matters of religion, “women must receive the decision of fathers and husbands as that of the church,” or the holy city they symbolize in the context. They must do so because religion is a law in a presumably wise order of life governed by the covenant.

That he does indeed allude to the ideal city is even more evident when he defines the faith prescribed, which is the law of the civic creed in the Contract. He replaces the catechism and mysteries by dogmas “important to human society” that bid us do our duties toward our neighbor and ourselves. The dogmas he recommends here as in the Contract proclaim the existence of God, our judge and common father; they ordain in his name the practice of justice, charity, beneficence, mercy, and fidelity to our engagements with others; and they promise a future life where the Supreme Being will reward the good and judge the wicked. These dogmas, we are told, are compulsory for all “citizens,” and expressly preclude any others that breed intolerance. Their very nature lends more weight to the figurative or literary interpretation of woman in Emile, which, however, does not exclude a literal reading as well.

Rousseau’s conception of the third and last degree in her formation has even more allegorical overtones than the pre-
ceeding ones. It is ushered in by the awakening of reason in conscience. The rational faculty is given a twofold ministry to discharge. In a very simple form it enjoins duties of obedience and fidelity to the covenant upon which the diminutive city of the family stands. In a more complex form it reconciles the voices of conscience and public opinion whenever possible, in which case a woman must learn to make wise applications of the law of true opinion like the censor in the *Contract*. And as the latter defines opinions when they waver, so she too must learn to anticipate them and win their favor for herself by wooing them to wisdom. For her domain, like his, is a sort of government, as I have said, and is analogous to that of the prince, whose work she makes superfluous in the end. The symbolism is unfolding more insistently.

It is carried further when Rousseau considers the training of her reason. Before doing so, he reflects again upon the intuitive discernment of a woman who knows the art of pleasing men by virtue of subtle observation of the heart. He gives the example of Galatea in a Virgilian eclogue, who resorts to cunning wiles to induce a shepherd to follow her. We may infer that in Emile's case Jean-Jacques' earlier artfulness will soon be replaced by Sophia's, or even by his own since, according to the projected work on *Sensitive Morality* described in the *Confessions*, a man may invent such devices for himself to regulate his conduct. The writer of *Emile* adds that the practical tendency of a woman's mind with its firm grasp of human reactions not only enables a man to implement the moral laws found by himself, as we were told before, but even leads him to find them. She discovers "experimental morality" or psychology, while he reduces it to a system. Both together attain to "the most complete knowledge accessible to the human mind, that of oneself and of others." But this indispensable knowledge that is the fruit of their union is already bred in Emile, betrothed to Rousseauist wisdom from the beginning. His
education, presided over by that wisdom through the agency of Jean-Jacques, culminated in the previous part in the conscious cultivation of taste and discernment, making him sensitive to the beauty of an ideal order presented in a form to win his love and ultimately moving him to act and exteriorize it.

In the author's opinion that mythical order can assume visible form in a woman only if her mind is trained according to his concept of its nature and if the fine psychological observations of which she is capable are exercised, like Emile's hitherto, in worldly society, which also provides for the acquisition of agreeable knowledge and the formation of taste, as we know. Rousseau follows the example of the ancients by favoring the frequentation of polite society for young girls of marriageable age rather than for married women. But first, by way of precaution against evil, he would provide them with common sense, a love of honor, and a taste for the simple charms of family life and the little city of the home, the sanctuary of woman. If he succeeded, the woman he has in mind would give outward expression to virtues and a society regarded as impossible at the beginning of the book.

For experience furnished by social life teaches her the answer to the questions that were the theme of her childish conversations: "What qualities do men esteem? And what makes the true glory and happiness of a good woman?" Or if we prefer: Where is wisdom? Where is happiness? She learns what the Symposium teaches, namely, that propriety of life wins love and honor in the sight of men and moves them to seek honor for themselves in her eyes, since she is the natural judge of their merit as they are of hers. But for Rousseau the burden rests primarily with woman if the miniature city is to exist at all. He again holds up to her the example of her Spartan and Roman sisters of a heroic past. The love she must win is a love of the good and of the wisdom exemplified in them and is akin to that of the
Platonic dialogue, whatever other implications it may have.

But like Socrates weaving his myths in that work, he goes further. That love is not passive, any more than the Spartan’s love for Sparta or the Roman’s love for Rome. In Socratic speech it is the love of creative souls and impels them to pursue wisdom and all virtue. In the phraseology of *Emile* it arouses in the lover’s heart natural fervor for perfection and beauty, visualized in the beloved, and begets sublime acts in himself, leading him at last to the supreme sacrifice. For the author asks, in the language of the *Symposium* or even of Christ: “What true lover exists who would not lay down his life for his beloved?” Once more evoking the shades of medieval paladins, he observes that a chaste and virtuous woman wins devotion like theirs from all mankind as well as the love of a good and noble-minded man. Again using the language of the *Symposium*, he explains that “a lover serves his beloved as he serves virtue.” He adds that a virtuous woman, like her Spartan sisters—and he might have said like Sparta herself—rules over great and strong souls and “sends her lovers to the end of the world, to war, glory and death at her behest.”

Moreover, we are later told, in a passage occurring after Emile’s meeting with Sophia, that he must study a citizen’s duties in order to learn “for whom he must die,” a phrase to which I alluded above. The Aemilian texts as well as their analogy with the Platonic one suggest again that the hero’s love for the heroine is really a love of wisdom involving “political” responsibilities and the risk of death. If passages like these are mystical jargon, as some of us in the past have been tempted to suppose, then so is the whole *Symposium*, for the great concepts of the latter are recognizable therein. Without ignoring Judeo-Christian tradition, Rousseau hints broadly that here woman is for him a symbol of the Socratic “greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by far” and an image of “the beauty of institutions and laws” that generated the fervor of the Spartan patriot in the opening pages of the book.
The foregoing survey of her education in *Emile* shows that the writer uses the theme to convey his thought in a new and imaginative form. His statements may be taken literally if we wish. But he has already said that women will never again be mothers, as he also said that the city will never exist in the world. And so while he takes pains to record his thoughts upon such grave issues, he frames them in figures equally suited to convey the main message of his work, the Socratic ordering of a man’s inner life through effective modes of self-direction to make the mythical city a moral reality at least.

The allegorical character of the fifth part becomes even clearer in the brief portrait of Sophia that follows. The writer illustrates therein his previous treatment of the theme of womanhood. And yet there are subtle distinctions between Sophia, who is “woman,” and woman in general as wife and mother. In the case of the latter the exteriorization of the ideal city in the sphere of conjugal and family relations, however hypothetical, seems less so than in the portrait of Sophia, which appears to belong more obviously to the world of the spirit. Moreover, the mingling of Judeo-Christian elements with pagan is more highly accentuated in her. For example, she bears a striking resemblance to Antiope, heroine of *Télémaque*, whose Christian and Platonic qualities reflect the scholarship of her creator, the priestly Fénélon. In that treatise of education, written a half century before *Emile*, Antiope is betrothed to the hero Télémaque and like the latter’s governor Mentor is said to be “Minerva herself in human form.” Sophia too is Minerva, and her affinity to Antiope is hardly surprising since Télémaque is later reborn in Emile as Mentor is in Jean-Jacques, the Rousseauist figures being further christianized in the process. Such affinities as well as the portrait itself, like the earlier one, indicate that a purely literal and positivistic approach to the heroine and a neglect of literary values would be inadequate for an understanding of the author’s meaning.
In the portrait the fusion of Greek and Christian elements is evident in both physical and spiritual attributes. Describing the former, the writer, having said that Sophia does not at first appear beautiful, betrays the fact that he has in mind his own "classical" definition of beauty as the sum of the most common features, or eternal and universal traits. Yet he also ascribes to her a gentle, touching expression that belongs to Christian tradition in art and literature. Besides, he visualizes her in flowing garments that reveal the charm of her person and are as evocative of both traditions as the imagery of the book that enhances his concept of natural wisdom. Moreover, he endows her with talents that are both Platonic and Fénelonian. For example, she is deeply sensitive to cadence and music and grace of movement, qualities that are as characteristic of Fénelon's Antiope-Minerva as they are of the "true Muse" of the Republic, who is "music," the companion of reason and philosophy, and who guards against corruption of soul by the potent influence of beauty and of order. Sophia too exemplifies the beauty of harmony that saves the constitution of soul and of city. Rousseau imagines her "setting her house in order" like Antiope and thereby displaying the same love of grace, purity, and discipline as the Fénelonian heroine and a cast of mind like hers, bereft of "vain" ornaments, but pleasing, penetrating, and substantial. He bestows upon her an abundant capacity for practical observations that can translate all principles and powers into acts. He enriches her with other qualities too that in his view facilitate the same operations, such as Christian sensitivity, imaginative sympathy, patience, and charity. These moral virtues are, he says, the essence of her faith and life. Indeed, he sees her enamored of virtue by reason of its aesthetic appeal and the glory and happiness it promises a woman by winning her the love of a man of merit "whose character is written in her heart," as it is in the ideal city and as, conversely, the hero like the author bears her likeness and the city in his soul.
Having completed her portrait, Rousseau tells the story of her tragic fate. Suddenly the allegory becomes so translucent that an exclusively literal interpretation would be immensely perplexing.

Sophia, having grown to maidenhood, receives from her father instruction about the purposes of marriage and the principles to be followed in the choice of a bridegroom. In accordance with Rousseauist imagery the theme of marriage serves to convey ideas about the nature of the soul that may be "wedded" to wisdom and in whom the latter, in the language of the Symposium, may "walk and dwell and have her home." The purpose of the sacred covenant, says her father, is the common happiness, that of her parents, herself, and the bridegroom of her election. The principles prescribed to guide her are simple. She is to choose a man who would be honored by her and would also do her honor, being suited to her. The author's words are those of the Symposium, and the meaning is Rousseauist and Socratic at once. If she is indeed supposed to portray a wise order of human life, by her very nature she honors that of man and is honored thereby. But a man will be suited to her only if he typifies humanity at its best and in its pristine purity, not "disfigured by ten thousand ills." Such is the object of her search.

To guide her further, her father proposes an ideal of love, setting aside all other considerations. In other words, her bridegroom is to be a Socratic "lover of wisdom." The speaker urges her to seek a union of hearts, conformity of tastes and inclination, and thereby alludes to what were called the keystone of the vault of a "unanimous and harmonious" city or soul. He also alludes to the city by declaring that the law of love is that of nature, which civil laws may not oppose except at the expense of happiness and good morals. It is, however, a law or act of the will for Rousseau, as it is for the speakers of the Symposium. Sophia is therefore bound to obey it and remain "mistress of herself" in choosing her lover. Her task is all the more
difficult, she is told, since although she possesses spiritual riches, in the eyes of the world she is poor—as poor in popular esteem, we may add, as wisdom or the ideal city, where the word ‘finance’ is unknown. Hence she is now bidden to follow the law of reason rather than the inclination of the heart. The apparent discrepancy in the text is a matter of semantics. The inner feeling favored above is based upon real conformities, and consequently it is enlightened by intelligence and distinguishable from sentimental dispositions that lead us, in the vicar’s words, “to do other than we will.” Sophia is to avoid this pitfall by consulting her parents before making her choice. In a word, that choice is obviously to be governed by the laws of poverty or necessity and freedom, which are those of the Rousseauist city and of the wisdom it serves to symbolize.

If readers are skeptical, Rousseau is aware of it. To convince us of the truth of his words, he declares that she is not imaginary and that her name alone is of his invention; for she really existed, and her memory is still mourned by a whole honorable family. Then he decides to finish the story of a girl so similar to her that it might well be her own, and so he continues to use the same name. It is necessary to finish it with him in order to grasp his meaning. This new Sophia is sent to the town in search of “a master for life,” a “lover” to be her bridegroom. But her errand is vain: “she sought a soul and there was none to be seen.” Consequently she chooses none. On her return home she confides to her mother that she could enjoy love and happiness only with him whose “charming image is written in her soul.” The image turns out to be that of Fénelon’s Télémaque, son of Ulysses and prince of Ithaca in Greece who, according to legend, died many centuries ago. Sophia justifies her choice by saying that she was not formed for a man of her century and asks whether it is her “fault” if she loves “what is not.” Yet she adds: “I am not mad . . . . I am not a visionary: I do not want a prince, I am not looking for Télémaque. I know that he is only an imaginary person. I
am looking for one who resembles him. And why may he not exist, since I exist, I who have a heart like his? No, let us not dishonor humanity: let us not think that an amiable and virtuous man is merely chimerical. He exists, he lives, he is looking for me perhaps.... But what is he? Where is he?” These questions echo Jean-Jacques’ “Where is Sophia? What is she?”

According to the author, her search is futile to the end. She slowly draws near death, like her prototype, while “others are thinking of forcing her to the altar.” He admits at last that such love as hers is based upon notions of merit and beauty that are not to be found in nature. But, of course, neither is wisdom nor the spiritual state or city evoked by the love theme in the book, or the patriotic fervor it would generate if it ever took shape “under the sun.”

Obviously an exclusively literal reading of the story would be puzzling to say the least. As in the first presentation of Sophia, here too the element of mystery is too conspicuous not to be intentional. If we use our collation to solve the enigmas, the original Sophia who really lived would be the wisdom of Socrates as Rousseau sees it. In our confused world, says the sage in the sixth book of the Republic, the Muse of Philosophy, beloved of the lover of wisdom and queen of the republic “is left desolate, with her marriage rite incomplete: for her own have fallen away and forsaken her, and ... other unworthy persons... enter in and dishonor her.... Persons who are unworthy of education approach her and make an alliance with her who is in a rank above them.” This passage, which inspired the fragmentary sequel to Emile, vividly describes the fate of Socratic wisdom in actuality, where she is mourned by a “small remnant” of “worthy disciples of philosophy.”

The latter would be the grief-stricken “honorable family” of Rousseau’s text.

The new Sophia who loves Télémâque is, of course, his own understanding of wisdom. She is the heir of the Socratic one, but is also descended from Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion. Like her forebears she honors poverty. And her fate in actuality is conceived to be as tragic as that of her Socratic predecessor since she cannot exist in the abstract but must dwell in a soul worthy of her, and none is to be found. Or rather, the new Sophia finds one in Fénelon's Télémaque and will wed only a man who, like him, is "prince" of himself and a disciple of Minerva or divine wisdom. But such a one is not of the author's century. Nor is Aemilius or the Aemilian city of the Contract, which do not exist, probably never did and never will. In all cases he portrays "what is not." But although he admits that he is writing about an ideal, he borrows Sophia's voice to protest with Socrates that it is not an impossible one and that he is not a visionary after all. Nevertheless, since the existence of the hero and that of his city, taken in the usual sense or as a family, is far more problematical than Sophia's, her lot in life is the lot of the Socratic Muse, as we saw in the case of her counterpart in the Levite of Ephraim.

And so Sophia dies. But the author resurrects her at once. He also resurrects Télémaque in the person of Aemilius, upon whom he bestows her. Consequently he abandons actuality altogether in evolving his myths where the lovers come to life within the world of art and thought.

This is the very theme of his "lyrical scene" or prose-poem Pygmalion, which is universally regarded as an important work for a study of his psychology and aesthetics. Since it is textually derived from the foregoing story of Sophia and, like it and the Levite too, casts light upon Rousseau's view of Emile—facts hitherto unrecognized in published works—I must examine it briefly. Although he was not the first of the moderns to seize upon the ancient theme, which was treated in an opera-ballet by Rameau in 1748, yet later versions were inspired by the fame of his work.

Its protagonist, the sculptor Pygmalion, is obviously the author himself. In the opening lines of the poem he appears in his atelier surrounded by his works symbolized by pieces
of sculpture, only one of which is finished and that one is veiled. Similarly the Symposium has been compared to a statue, and in the Republic Socrates, the son of a statuary, uses the same comparison to describe the portraits of his heroes, as we have seen. He does so because, as we know, the Greeks of his era expressed inner harmony in their sculpture and painting, not in their literature—with some exceptions like the Platonic dialogues. There is only one of Rousseau's works that in his eyes has the beauty of a finished statue, and that is Emile. It would therefore be designated by the single completed piece in Pygmalion's studio. In his masterwork, as we have observed, he behaves like a Socratic artist and avoids images of moral deformity that abound in his other writings. The latter, which he calls "pamphlets" by comparison with this, would be the rough casts of other carvings in the prose-poem. These sculptures have reduced their creator to a state of discouragement and apathy comparable to Rousseau's reactions after the completion of his magnum opus.

The only object capable of stirring the sculptor's emotions is his "immortal work" that stands veiled like the holy of holies. In it he professes to have "surpassed the masterpieces of nature" that were the models of his art. Likewise for the writer, nothing in nature is comparable to the moral beauty expressed in his Emile. Pygmalion exclaims: "When my extinguished spirit no longer produces anything great, beautiful, worthy of me, I shall show my Galatea and say: 'This is my work.' " It is, he adds, "the most lovely of my works... the sanctuary of a divinity."

The name Galatea reminds us of the incident in Virgil's eclogue used in the novel to illustrate the feminine mind. In the lyrical monologue or dialogue, she becomes, like Sophia herself or the bride of the Levite, a new personification of Rousseauist wisdom, which, like its Socratic and Christian origins, has an element that is called "divine" and which, later abiding in the soul of Emile, is presented in very deed as a "divinity" whose sanctuary is the temple of the book.
In the prose-poem she is a “goddess,” “lovelier than Venus.” As the artist raises the veil to admire her graces, he declares again: “Nothing so beautiful has ever appeared in nature; I have surpassed the work of the gods.” His adoration of his own masterpiece recalls Jean-Jacques’ enigmatic words in the first portrait of Sophia: “We are in love with the image we create,” meaning an image of virtue and moral beauty such as the writer professes to offer in *Emile*. In this spirit Pygmalion cries out before the statue: “What! so many beauties have come from my hands... My mouth was able to...” The suspension points, which are in the text, and the allusion to the mouth confirm my suspicion that marble is used to symbolize the medium in which the artist really worked. He is dealing with language that, in the words of Socrates, “is more pliable than wax or any similar substance.” Suddenly the hero of the piece wonders whether the vesture covers the nude too much, just as the author of *Emile* says that Sophia’s robes are not made to conceal her charms. The sculptor decides to cut the garments lower to reveal more hidden seductions, but his hand trembles and the palpitating flesh rejects the chisel. This work, says he, is consecrated to the gods. Rousseau’s Greek master says the same of the art he favors in *the Republic*.

Like *Emile*’s Sophia, who sought a soul “written” in her heart and could not live without it, Galatea, says the sculptor, “lacks a soul” and needs one suited to her beauty. Impulsively he looks into his own and “the veil of illusion” falls, a phrase lifted right out of the first portrait of Sophia. He finds within himself a spirit where she might come to life, much as Rousseau liked to imagine that his own was worthy of the Aemilian heroine. At last Pygmalion borrows the speech of the unhappy admirer of Téléméaque, though Sophia is moral beauty in love with humanity instead of the reverse as here: “Such is the noble passion that leads me astray.” Moreover, as she protested that she had not lost her sanity, so he too denies that he is a madman or a vision-
ary: “I am not in love with this dead marble, but with a living being who resembles it.” This is almost a quotation from Sophia’s words applied to the Fénelonian hero. Again in terms suggestive of hers, he inquires whether it is folly or a crime to be sensitive to beauty’s spell. She poses the same question by asking whether it is a fault in her to love “what is not,” meaning a soul made in the image of absolute beauty to which Rousseau refers later in the phrase “there is nothing beautiful but what is not.” (Italics mine.)

Pygmalion like Sophia rejects the idea that the object of his love cannot live. Impelled by sudden hope, he calls upon the gods to give life to Galatea, invoking Venus especially, “the sublime essence” of true love, felt not by the senses but by the heart. “See this object; see my heart,” says he, much as Sophia asked: “Why may he not exist since I exist, I who have a heart like his?” Pleading for a hearing, the sculptor cries: “Where is the law of nature in the sentiment that I feel?”—words echoing the author’s about Sophia’s love for Télémaque. The artist then offers his own life to the creature of his hands: “It will be enough for me to live in her... Goddess of beauty, spare nature this affront, that such a perfect model should be the image of what is not.” These are the very words of Sophia, who also rebels against the dishonor done to human nature by those who regard her noble ideal as imaginary. The same terms lend themselves to both texts since to say that the sage is unreal is to say that moral beauty cannot live.

Just as the writer resurrects Sophia to inhabit the soul of Emile, so he brings her to life in the poem, where she reappears as Galatea. The statue, moving from the pedestal, recognizes herself only in Pygmalion, while his other works with their images of a disordered world are alien to her. The scene closes much as it began, and the artist exclaims: “Yes, worthy masterpiece of my hands, of my heart and of the gods, I have given you all my being: I shall no longer live except through you.” This means that paradoxically she resurrects the dying artist and becomes the everlasting
reflexion of the soul that fashioned her.

This interpretation of Rousseau’s poem, derived from the texts of his writings, can hardly be reconciled with that of Goethe. According to the German poet, Pygmalion, having put part of himself into his creation, refuses to allow the work to enjoy an autonomous existence, but insists that it be reabsorbed into his earthly life, with the result that art is dissolved in nature. Literary criticism shows that the opposite is more nearly the case and that though the artist’s work owes its life to him, he, on the other hand, lives and has his being only in his art that eternizes his own apprehension of moral beauty. At least, such is the author’s hope and intention, lyrically expressed in the poetic “scene” and powerfully manifested in Emile.

To recur to the novel, the death and resurrection of the heroine bring us to the end of the first “nave” of the inner sanctum of the Aemilian temple. Rousseau conveys the idea by spacing his text at this juncture and introducing a horizontal stroke of the pen to conclude the section devoted to Sophia or woman, where Emile’s name appears significantly at the beginning and end.

EX-VOTOS

In the next or central nave, which unlike the other two bears no label, the author reverts to the hero. This section is appropriately dedicated to the latter’s homage and offerings to Sophia. I say “appropriately” because, although we do not know for certain the function of the Greek chamber upon which Rousseau’s is herein modeled, archeologists have surmised that it was chiefly a treasury where things of value were kept such as votive gifts made to the divinity or plunder from famous battles among men. In the central part of its equivalent in Emile, the young man is to make choice of Sophia and place all his inner wealth at the feet of her in whom wisdom is reborn.

Just before the friends set out in search of her, Jean-Jacques addresses the reader in a discourse matching her
father's. It too is presented by way of precepts about the principles of marriage. After wisdom's quest for a noble soul comes the soul's quest for wisdom. This one is more practical since it must take account of the conditions of life in a man's bodily abode and earthly dwelling-place. That is the real difference between the two discourses that complement each other, without being redundant.

Since in choosing a bride Emile chooses a life for all time, the matter is a solemn one. The rules he follows relate to natural affinity, institutional distinctions based upon natural ones, intellectual formation, and finally physical beauty.

In recommending "natural" affinity, Sophia's only rule, Jean-Jacques like her father emphasizes the importance of reason in its application. For just as he previously distinguished between what is "natural" in the savage and social state, so he now distinguishes between what is "natural" in the savage and civil state. Whereas in uncivilized life all women suit all men, in society love is born of a perception of diversities in character and intellect and is therefore enlightened by reason, as we have seen, although it still remains a natural bond in the civil order. Consequently enlightened love must be the basis of the civil contract of marriage if the latter is to dramatize the formation of an ideal "political" association. Jean-Jacques points out that an alliance of that kind rather than one based upon distinctions of wealth and power, ensures human happiness by ministering to harmony of feelings and tastes, and the speakers of the Symposium say the same. The freedom of choice herein defended, unhampered by the sway of riches or prestige, corresponds to that which unites the freemen of the Rousseauist city. But in Emile's case the ruler claims the right to discover "nature's choice" since he who has made a man of the youth is in reality his father. His claims, which are also those of the Socratic ruler in the fifth book of the Republic, are valid since he is the law of reason that begets natural man in society. As we know, he has not waited until now to find the bride. He finally admits his
Socratic "duplicitv": "this feigned search is purely a pretext for acquainting him [Emile] with women so that he may feel the value of her who suits him. Sophia was discovered long ago." So was the city or wise order of the Contract for which the hero has been fashioned from birth as he has for her. The city, like Sophia, is supposedly suited to his nature as an active, thinking being, and the choice that favors both is primarily determined by this principle.

However, the speaker does not set aside institutional distinctions altogether, especially if they reflect natural ones like the moral and spiritual distinctions already mentioned. With respect to institutional considerations, Jean-Jacques prefers that Emile's bride be his equal in birth though not in fortune, as we know, since the author means to honor poverty in her as he does in the ideal city. But since the hero's property is probably his birthplace as his inheritance is the earth, his real wealth is herself and is the same as the essayist's in the previous part. As for equality of rank, if in actual practice it were impossible, then the ruler would select a bride in a station below her husband rather than above, so that civil order would accord with the natural one that "bids woman obey man." Symbolically this would mean that wisdom must serve human nature. If she governs man, as we have been told, she does so "as a minister [meaning "servant"]) reigns in the state." In objecting to a bride of higher rank, Jean-Jacques may also mean that Emile is worthy of his consort, unlike the "unworthy persons" of the Republic who make an alliance with Socratic wisdom in a rank far above them. On the other hand, the governor does not favor a bride of very lowly station either, on the grounds that it would be difficult to find in the dregs of society a woman with an appropriate idea of what is beautiful and honorable, which is supposed to be her special domain.

He thereby reverts to the moral and spiritual class distinctions that he admits. But he denounces lady pedants as he does all pedants, at the same time as he exalts Sophia's
vocation in the spheres of aesthetics and spirituality. He insists that she has only moderate instruction, as she has moderate personal beauty, for moderation is the key to both beauty and wisdom. He intends her bridegroom to adorn her mind with the talents and knowledge she needs to enhance her natural gifts.29

Such is the governor’s discourse on marriage, which, as I hinted in the antepenultimate paragraph above, has the same allegorical elements as Socrates’ treatment of the same theme in the fifth book of the Republic.30 The Greek sage too has his rulers secretly arrange marriages between guardians of the city and women of like nature and of similar capacity and character, both guardians and rulers representing faculties of soul related to Rousseau’s reasonable will that is entrusted with the choice rather than desire. But as I have said, the master’s recommendations about the choice of a bride have influenced the Rousseauist governor far less than the idea of the mythical marriage of the sage to wisdom. To this influence we must add that of other subsequent admonitions of the sage about the choice of a life. The latter occur at the end of the great classic in the vision of Er, to which I have alluded in discussing the creed. In that vision souls, in the act of choosing their lives, are advised by the sage to observe the very rules that determine the selection of Sophia. A man must, says he, seek and follow wisdom only, which teaches him to discern between good and evil, so as to choose always the better life. In making his choice, he must consider the bearing of all things upon virtue, such as the effect of beauty combined with poverty or wealth. He must study “the good and evil consequences of noble and humble birth, of private and public station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness and dullness, and of all the natural and acquired gifts of the soul, and the operation of them when conjoined; he will then look at the nature of the soul, and from the consideration of all these qualities, he will be able to determine which is better and which is worse; and so he will choose....” That is

[333]
exactly what Jean-Jacques has done in deciding in favor of Sophia, to whom his own philosopher-king will be wedded.

It is therefore time for the hero to find and "recognize" her. The friends begin their "journey" in search of her by bidding farewell to Paris, for, says the author, she is very far from there. Since he has already said that happiness is always close by and since it is to be found in her, the distance here must be spiritual rather than spatial and the "farewell" a symbolic one to the spirit of worldliness. Indeed, the travels of "our paladins"—for the two companions are thrice pictured as such in this context—have the same mystery about them as have all art forms. The theme can hardly be travel in the literal sense, which is treated later under that very title. The journey in this case would be a high point in the pilgrimage of life, projecting the explorations of the spirit as it follows the call of an ideal of happiness and wisdom that Emile must know for what it is.

The story of his progress contains a description of the conditions of the journey that may be taken as an imaginative definition of the three requirements for the attainment of wisdom. The first is to live in the present, making the most of every experience and adorning the days with a vivid appreciation of things and the performance of good deeds. The second is to make the pilgrimage on foot, since nothing but our own effort can transport us to the goal. Rousseau, describing Emile's delight in walking, is mindful of his own pedestrian expeditions, recorded in the Confessions, that enriched his knowledge of men and of things. Indeed, he momentarily identifies the young hero with Jean-Jacques when he writes: "If I am tired... but Emile is never tired." The suspension points, which are in the text, suggest that the two are one, who is the author himself recounting his own journeys in search of wisdom and happiness. He recalls ancient philosophers who were engaged in the same search and traveled the same way, as he also does in a note to the second Discourse. Those named are Thales, Plato, and Pythagorus, and he might have added Christ and Soc-
rates too. "How," he asks, "can a philosopher travel otherwise?" The "philosopher" is etymologically the "lover of Sophia" in the text, and the word implies the third requirement for the successful pursuit of wisdom: the love of learning. It is illustrated by the youth, who reads the book of nature and studies husbandry and natural history. All these clues suggest that the writer is describing a way of life that leads to wisdom and clothing it in myths to cover the nakedness of unembodied ideas, although he leaves us free to look no further than the myths if we so choose.

Lest we imagine that men do not go astray in the quest for wisdom, Jean-Jacques and his spiritual companion, that other and purer self, lose their way in valleys and mountains where there is no path to guide them or food to appease their hunger. The scene is reminiscent of the one in Montmorency wood at dinnertime. Here, as in the earlier one and in the allegory of the hunt in the previous part, the object is the same as in the myth of the *Republic* where Socrates and his hunting party are lost in a wood that is "dark and perplexing," in search of their quarry justice, called "the cause, condition, and preservative" of wisdom and all virtue. Once again we have the feeling that Jean-Jacques is no more lost than the sage. Suddenly a peasant appears to direct the pilgrims to a "house of peace," which happens to be Sophia's. He describes it as the dwelling of a good and generous family that is blessed by all the countryside. After more vicissitudes they reach their destination, which turns out to be on a nearby hillside like the white house with green shutters in the previous part.

The reception of the wayfarers is full of mystery, suggestive of symbolism. "The house of peace," a phrase reminiscent of the "man of peace" who is the vicar, is later called a "castle," perhaps because it is a castle in Spain that suddenly appears like a mirage in the desert. But in reality it is hardly more than a farmhouse, like the Stoic's "little farm of the mind," which I recalled in connection with the essay on wealth. The pilgrims, craving hospitality,
are welcomed by the goodman of the house and conducted to a modest guest chamber, comparable to Emile's rustic room elsewhere in the book, or the essayist's simple lodging at an inn. There they find fresh linen garments laid out in readiness as though this were indeed some curious shrine. Soon thereafter supper is prepared. The scene brings to mind the Gospel story where the disciples make ready for the Lord's supper, as well as the Symposium, or even the feast of Dido and Aeneas in Virgil's epic. But memories of these famous banquets are all eclipsed by the recollection of another in the Book of Proverbs where we are told that "wisdom hath builded her house... she hath mingled her wine: she hath also furnished her table." It is at the table that Sophia suddenly makes her entrance like an apparition. When Aemilius weeps over the fate of her parents, who may be identified with the two main Rousseauist laws that govern her life, she sees him as a reincarnation of Télémaque arriving in this new isle of Calypso with his governor Mentor-Minerva. For his part he recognizes her, not only by her name, but also by the sound of her voice. This is another allusion to her role as the Muse or Socratic guardian of virtue, companion of philosophy, and counterpart of Antiope-Minerva, whose charms she combines, however, with some of the emotional seductions of the nymph Eucharis in the Fénelonian story. The hero behaves like a man in a trance: "It is the soul of Sophia that seems to animate him." The words may be taken literally if we understand that, in the phraseology of the Symposium, divine wisdom takes up her dwelling in the soul and receives therefrom the life that she in her turn quickens and safeguards. The whole tableau has an emblematic flavor that can hardly be ignored.

Rousseau himself invites us to look beneath the surface by warning that all these details are no frivolous amusement on his part and that this is the most valuable phase of the book, which is "the romance of human nature" and ought to be the story of the race. He adds characteristically that
Emile’s mind, feelings, and tastes are fixed for all time by this lasting passion. In saying so, he is simply quoting from his earlier reflections on a woman’s vocation that secures the most essential part of the *Contract*. The cipher of Sophia’s name, already emphasized in the previous part, and the mystery of their meeting serve, we are told, to intensify the hero’s love of her charms, which is represented as a noble one, fostering in him a sense of propriety and honor and disposing all his inclinations towards what is good. This love of the beautiful and the good is that of the *Symposium*. The symbolism of the text is unmistakable.

It is increasingly accentuated in the story of Emile’s courtship, which assumes the form of homage to a divinity. Subject to Sophia and docile to Jean-Jacques, he is, we are told, “subject to the law of wisdom” and “docile to the voice of friendship.” In that state at the age of twenty he is about to experience what is described as “an intoxication... a delirium... the supreme happiness” of life and a foretaste of “paradise upon earth.” In the light of the essay upon wealth this would be a foretaste of the ecstasy of philosophic vision that crowns the education of kings at the end of Plato’s seventh book and of which they too are given a foretaste at the age of twenty, as we shall see.

This view of the “courtship” is confirmed by a second visit of the friends, who take lodgings for the summer not too far away. Emile and Sophia converse together in a garden which, we are informed, is that of the visionary white house of the essay. This earthly paradise is a suitable setting for their quasi-mystical discourse. The theme is Jean-Jacques’ or the reasonable will, of which Emile speaks to Sophia as passionately as the lover of wisdom in the *Symposium* who, having found and embraced a noble soul, is “full of fair speech about... the nature and pursuits of a good man.” The power extolled by the Rousseauist hero is to preside over his union with the heroine, as it does over the enchanting city of the essay and that of the *Contract* and Socratic republic.
There is further evidence that the essay upon wealth anticipates this part and therefore casts light upon it. The courtship encounters an obstacle, in Sophia's eyes, caused by Emile's reputed fortune. Of course, since, as Socrates says in the *Symposium*, love is poor and must engage in many labors in the pursuit of good and fair things. The young man, apprised by his governor of her feelings in this respect and hitherto unaware that he is "rich," is ready to renounce all else for her sake, to have the honor of being as poor as she is and worthy of her hand. Jean-Jacques protests that she cannot be "purchased" in that way, and that what she fears is not wealth itself but its effect upon the possessor. Hence Emile is bidden to offer her the treasures of his spirit by loving and serving her and her parents, for the sake not of passing fancy but of indestructible principles written in the heart. The latter are the laws of the city of the *Contract*, where the word "finance" is as unknown as it is to Emile or the essayist.

It is helpful to be conscious of the Socratic and Christian tonalities of the thought in this advice of Jean-Jacques, as well as in the essay. For example, in both cases the mood is close to that of the Sermon on the Mount. Like the essayist, Emile has presumably "laid up for himself treasures in heaven" rather than upon earth, and his heart is where his treasure is. There lie the coffers whose contents Sophia must see. The governor's advice also contains other recognizable evangelical echoes. For example, the warning that the hero may not "purchase" her seems to imply disapproval of the merchant man in the parable of the kingdom of heaven who, having found one pearl of great price, "went and sold all that he had and bought it." The same admonition conflicts with Christ's exhortation to a rich young follower who sought to attain eternal life: "Go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven." We can hardly ignore these famous parables in the context. Jean-Jacques, fearful lest Emile try to buy the right to enter into paradise, adheres more closely than
they do to the divine master's conclusions that it is hard for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God. It is scarcely necessary to repeat that Socrates was obviously of the same opinion. In *Emile* the treasures offered to Sophia are of a Socratic and evangelical order.

After she is reassured, there follows the promised foretaste of paradise or of the philosophic ecstasy that provides more clues to the myths. It comes about through the intervention of Jean-Jacques, who, wearing the mantle of Mentor-Minerva, is mediator between the lovers. He is the link between the heart and the object of its longing, defined as "the good that every soul of man pursues," and it is he who fulfills the aspirations of the sovereign will. Through him Sophia finally takes possession of Emile instead of the reverse, as the Socratic soul is said to be "possessed of wisdom." The effects are the same in both cases. The author portrays the "raptures," "intoxication," and "delirium" in which the ruler shares as he leads the lovers toward "the happy bond that is to unite them until death." The myth of the sage and the wisdom that suits him is becoming increasingly obtrusive.

It is highly accented from here to the end of this section. In the treasure house of the mythical shrine, Emile cultivates "music" in company with the Muse by dedicating to her all the agreeable talents he has developed, these being the arts over which the Muses preside and that preserve harmony in the soul. Rousseau writes: "As an idolator enriches the object of his worship with the treasures he loves best and decks out the altar of his God," so the lover pays homage to his beloved. He adds: "It seems to him that all beautiful things find their place only when they adorn the supreme beauty." The distinction between beautiful things and absolute beauty is expressed in the words of the *Symposium* and is by now familiar to the reader of this study of *Emile* and the Platonic dialogues where the supreme beauty is the idea of good and the ultimate object of love, manifest in divine wisdom. In his tribute thereto
Emile, like the lover of wisdom in the *Symposium* who "tries to educate his beloved," offers to Sophia a summa of his studies, which are "useless" in his eyes unless they pertain to her. So we are told in words recalling those of Socrates in the *Republic*, who also calls the same studies "useless" unless they are sought after with a view to the beautiful and the good. Accordingly, the Rousseauist hero dedicates to the heroine his knowledge of philosophy, physics, mathematics, history, and religion, which at this stage are to be brought together and interrelated. In doing so, he is on his knees before her and "imagines he sees the heavens open" above him. In the rarified atmosphere of the book, with its close affinities to the purity of the *Contract* and its correspondences in antiquity, the writer's phrases have an entirely different emphasis and broader scope than similar ones in love scenes elsewhere in his other works, where images of disorder abound. Love here appears as a myth for the conveyance of philosophic experience at its best, which does not exclude a literal reading as well.

The youth's formation at this stage is patterned after that of philosopher-kings at the end of the seventh book of the *Republic* where their education is completed. There the sage insists that his heroes, trained in physical and intellectual discipline, be "industrious" in the pursuit of philosophy or moral truth. To them, as I have said, he grants a foretaste of wisdom at the age of twenty when their studies have reached "the point of intercommunion." This foretaste takes the form of a comprehensive view of their entire education and its "relationship to true being," and hence, to wisdom. The Rousseauist hero enjoys an analogous privilege, represented as the delirium of love but adhering strictly to the author's original plan for the fifth part of his book, which we have in the past accused him of ignoring. His adherence to that plan is still more obvious henceforward.
If the foretaste of ecstasy described in *Emile* with such abandon results from the fulfillment of the sovereign will or law under the rule of Jean-Jacques, then, paradoxically, the condition of such blessedness is austerity. Rousseau invents more myths to emphasize this. Sophia is, he says, morally severe for the sake of preserving her integrity. For instance, she objects when Emile dares to kiss the hem of her robe in private, although her father permits him to kiss her lips in his presence. That is precisely because the natural feeling uniting them is governed not by the law of instinct or desire but by the law of reason that gratifies a man’s heart by gratifying his entire nature. Indeed, in this context we are told again that civilized love, in spite of its natural origin, is very different from “the gentle habit” of nature’s ways: it is based upon a perception of beauty and merit, betokened by exclusive preferences. According to the author, that is why it quickly grows into an unbridled ardor full of illusions of perfection in the beloved. Again we are free to observe that in this respect it is like a man’s love for the city. The remark is all the more valid since Rousseau adds that love, giving in return as much as it exacts, begets justice. We may also draw a parallel between the austere demands made upon both patriot and lover by the object of their love. Their fervor is, in the writer’s view, a betrayal of nature and of virtue only if it is accompanied by jealousy born of vanity. In that case pride replaces love, as nationalism replaces patriotism. Hence the Rousseauist myths emphasize the idea that there is a discipline or law of love and that Emile can win Sophia’s esteem and find happiness only by increasing his merit in her sight.

Subsequently the author develops further the double-edged Socratic idea that in all probability suggested the foretaste of wisdom and happiness now granted to the hero: the idea that throughout the book the latter’s studies all pertain to wisdom and that they are now brought together and interrelated.
To show first that Emile’s education has led him toward wisdom from his birth, Rousseau proves that the youth’s present passion, far from marking a break with the past, is a sign of continuity in his formation.

The writer broaches the matter by asking whether the hero, who was subject only to the laws of wisdom, is now—at the age of twenty—living an idle life at the discretion of a child. Since the word child is written in the masculine gender, it may refer to himself. Yet the context suggests that it refers to Sophia. The reply to the question reads: “Happy is he that is conducted to wisdom in spite of himself!” To conduct him thither by winning his love is Sophia’s role in the book, and in a mythical sense she has fulfilled it from the first through Jean-Jacques.

To illustrate this, Rousseau continues to employ literary methods. He explains that the governor is like a clever artist under whose direction early inclinations, good habits, and tastes are carried forward from childhood and adolescence into “the yoke of manhood” that is docility to reason and the love of Sophia. This love, we are told, has been contrived by the “artist” because it embodies the very qualities he has been molding in the disciple at every step of the way so that the latter has only “to be himself” in order to woo her. Again Rousseau admits that the youth’s passion is the governor’s work. According to the text, it is not by chance that the lovers find and suit each other, that they live far apart, and that Emile’s visits are few and tiring. The latter remark shows that he is not idle at all, but must work as hard as the Socratic heroes and be “industrious,” or rather, “Aemilius,” to court his bride. For this reason he is separated from her, we are informed, as Leander was from Hero, which incidentally explains why he learned to swim the Hellespont in the second part: otherwise, asks the writer curiously, how would he be willing to die for her? The question implies that she does indeed embody the values for which he has been taught to live and die. The symbolism of the heroine is as transparent as that of Jean-
Jacques. Emile, recognizing the latter's part in his felicity, calls himself in gratitude "the child" of his mentor. Sophia is even more aware of the governor's role as she follows his secret advice regulating the austere circumstances of their visits. In him the law of the reasonable will presides visibly over a relationship that promises to crown his work.

Rousseau next provides a summa of Emile's education so far—such as the one offered to Sophia—and thereby exemplifies concretely Socrates' idea of granting his heroes a comprehensive view of their entire education in its relationship to wisdom. He thus brings together and integrates some of the most striking images in the book, which are, however, not merely Socratic but Judeo-Christian too.

First he evokes Emile the husbandman. The youth works with peasants round about and then is suddenly transformed into an image of the Socratic and Judeo-Christian "good husbandman" through the practice of beneficence and charity among them. For the object of his zeal is not simply the cultivation of the soil but especially that of the soul.

The image of the mythical husbandman is followed by a new image of the equally mythical Olympic victor of the second part who reappears in the youth of twenty. The latter can still run for cakes like other men. But like the Socratic heroes, and the apostle Paul too, he also runs a very different race with Sophia herself, who volunteers for this exercise. She is compared to Atalanta, who consented to marry only a suitor able to outstrip her in a race, and who incidentally appears at the end of the Republic too. Emile pursues her as he has done all his life long, though now he does so consciously. Then he lifts her in his arms and carries her to the goalpost, crying "Victory to Sophia!" as he kneels before her and confesses himself vanquished. This is surely the race for wisdom that a man may win only by his own autonomous efforts and that leads to the imperishable crown promised by the vicar in words worthy of both Paul and Socrates. In fact, we may reasonably see in Emile the
sage's "true runner [who] comes to the finish, receives the prize and is crowned" at the end of the Republic, winning wisdom and with it a paradise here and hereafter. Of course there is a link between the childish races and the manly one, as we foresaw in the earlier context. Indeed, Rousseau's very purpose here is to show the interrelationship of past and present. In the scene with Sophia he is saying, as clearly as subtle literary methods would allow, that the early training of the mind and will through those childish contests, and the practice of a shadowy form of justice therein, was the beginning of a race along a course culminating at the high point of spiritual formation now reached. To ignore this would be to ignore the substance of his art as a litterateur.

After the tableau of the "true runner" comes another of the mythical carpenter. Again we behold Emile "doing his own work" under a master craftsman, paying his debt to society with the sweat of his brow, and providing a new image of human justice. The text itself suggests that his real work is not the carpentering that builds material things, but rather the work of the Socratic or evangelical carpenter, namely, the practice of virtue that builds the city or temple of the soul. The deeper meaning emerges further into view when Rousseau points to the hero and exclaims "Ecce homo!" in remembrance of the carpenter of Galilee. It is even more conspicuous when Emile, visited at the workshop by Sophia, forbears to pay the master workman to release him from his contract in order that he might escort her home. By refusing to substitute money for duty, he recognizes the sacredness of contracts and proves that he is not a slave of wealth but a "lover of Sophia." So she herself says in the text. The artist is doing his utmost to draw attention to his myths and show that his real theme here is that of his original plan.

The Socratic "intercommunion" of studies ends with a tableau to show that the lover of Sophia is and ever will be the same lover of all humanity that we knew before. In-
indeed, we are told that, if he would win her, he must prefer humanitarian duties to the private object of his love, although she is otherwise jealous of her rights without, however, failing to be reasonable and just.

The ideas are conveyed in another well-devised myth or parable. One day the friends are summoned to the heroine’s presence but do not appear until the following morning. When they finally arrive, she betrays resentment of their apparent neglect. Jean-Jacques then relates the unhappy events that delayed their coming. They were detained by the performance of acts of Christian charity toward men of disordered life, notably an intemperate peasant—the very one who had originally guided them hither—and his unfortunate family, whose needs and sufferings they relieved on their way. When the tale is told, Emile declares courageously that Sophia cannot make him forget the rights of humanity, which are more sacred to him than hers. The just Sophia recognizes in her lover one who vindicates the universal claims of all mankind as well as her own. This brings her to consent spontaneously to become his bride. Then she too sets out, with “the zeal of charity,” to minister to the afflicted family that belongs to another order of things in the world. She is called “an angel from heaven sent by God,” since she too serves the “rights of humanity” by combining Christian mercy with Socratic justice. “Ecce femina!” says the author in a phrase that again calls to mind the divine master, whose wisdom is visible in her.

This allegory throws new light upon the great problem of humanitarianism and patriotism that I discussed apropos of the two creeds. Although Emile’s love for Sophia is an exclusive one like a man’s love for his own city, yet it does not exclude or overlook the “sacred rights” of humanity that are its source—which does not, however, make it compatible with cosmopolitanism, the love of “false” states that violate them and might even include his birthplace. The rights in question spring from natural law in the sense of the law of human nature, and have hitherto
been portrayed in two different spheres. In the foregoing scene they are implicit in the claims to pity made upon the friends by men of disordered life, victims of a "false," anti-social and uncivil state that frustrates human rights. Obviously a state of that kind also frustrates the laws of the just Sophia, who, however, has the same compassion for erring mankind as her votaries have. Human rights have further been portrayed in the guise of ideal Socratic friendship used as a cipher of universal natural and political bonds that are allegedly the basis of all Rousseauist society including an exclusive one like Sophia's. In that shape they generate a love of humanity in its pristine state that is as reconcilable with patriotic fervor as Emile's affection for Jean-Jacques is consistent with his passion for the heroine. For Rousseau both are essentially a love of human nature at its best, however difficult it may be for the average person to practice that love with equal intensity in its various forms.

The author touches upon the same question in many another work. In particular, his article on Political Economy contains a well-known passage where he contrasts Socrates and Cato, the sage and the citizen. When the former lived, says he, Athens was already lost and the sage had no "patria" but the world: whereas Cato bore his in his heart, challenged Pompey and Caesar on its behalf, and died when he saw no country left to serve. The writer therefore prefers Cato. But he knows full well that Socrates too bore his city within him and that neither one had a true city anywhere else. Only the Greek master bore his in his mind instead of his heart. Moreover, he confined his patriotic fervor to that inner realm and therefore declined to challenge the gods of this world in vain. According to his words, if a man of understanding tried to resist the beast-like natures about him, "he would have to throw away his life [as Cato did] without doing any good to himself or to others." This being so, he lives apart. But if he found a state suitable to him, he would favor the life of a patriot and would have a larger growth therein, although such a state would not be
best for most men. In fact, it would be a city of sages. Thus what really distinguishes him from Cato is first the quality of his "patriotism," which is intellectual rather than emotional, and then his aloof attitude toward the world as it is, as opposed to the Roman's sublime act of laying down his life in an élan of enlightened love for a city and its laws that still existed in his heart five hundred years after they had ceased to exist anywhere else. But the great sage passed beyond his theories and died a willing victim of a mere semblance of law in a state as disordered as the Rome of Cato's time. His voluntary submission after a lifetime dedicated to the discovery of true law long perplexed Rousseau; but since he died for the sake of his teaching, his death redeems him in the Savoyard vicar's sight, even though in the creed it is not considered comparable to Christ's. The writer obviously does not consider it comparable to Cato's either, since Socrates is moved by the dialectical intelligence as opposed to enlightened feelings. That is Rousseau's real quarrel with the master, which does not minimize his debt. We noted the cleavage between them in their attitude toward justice and sympathy. But in this respect the modern writer's teaching transcends not only the thought of Socrates but also the example of Cato, by the breadth of its Christian charity extended to men of ignoble life, visible in the foregoing myth of Sophia and the peasants. In Rousseau's view love of one's own city must somehow be reconciled with love of mankind, however disordered men may be, and the two are in fact as reconcilable as love of self and pity.

In other works, as we have seen, he deals with various aspects of the question of humanitarianism and patriotism. One might cite, for instance, his letter to the archbishop, where he complains that national political and religious systems do not respect the rights of humanity as they ought to do. One might also cite the Letters from the Mount where he is solicitous about doctrines useful to both universal and private societies and warns that in practice even the purest
patriotism, as opposed to national prejudice on behalf of the land of one's birth, can still lead to the neglect of mankind. Nevertheless, he regards love of a man's own city as a more powerful motive in human conduct than love of humanity. He does so long after renouncing his Genevan citizenship, for instance, in the Considerations upon the Government of Poland where he favors an exclusive society based upon human rights, even if it exists only in the hearts of men as Sophia exists in the heart of Emile.

The scene where Emile sacrifices the ecstatic contemplation of Sophia to heed the call of humanity brings to an end the Socratic foretaste of wisdom and happiness and the "intercommunion" of studies entailed therein. In literary terms the lovers are to be separated for a time. One day the governor abruptly asks the youth what he would do if Sophia were dead. Since she has already been resurrected from the dead as the spirit of wisdom in the book and since, according to Rousseau, that spirit will never again be seen in the shape of a city or family, she probably has only a mythical material existence anyway, like the ideal creatures that filled the author's life in solitude. Nevertheless, Jean-Jacques reassures his disciple and then addresses him in a long discourse designed to win his consent to leave his present state of blessedness and go abroad among the "false" states of the world.

In the discourse, which has puzzled many of us in the past, the writer again handles in a literary manner the great problems of education at this stage, problems magnified by the necessity for a transfer of government from Jean-Jacques to Emile. The youth is now to be taught that the object of his love does not exist among men in the sphere of his travels, but that the energy and intensity of that love must never impair his love for our poor humanity, although it must preserve him from the unworthy passions of others.

The governor begins his discourse by asking again where happiness lies, although he has obviously found it in wisdom, even if both have reality only in a Rousseauist world
of chimerical beings. He recalls the covenant of friendship to which he engaged himself at Emile’s birth for the sake of his disciple’s happiness that is his own. That felicity is now threatened, he says, by the enemy within, in the guise of exclusive affections with which the young man has not yet learned to cope alone since he still has a “minister of education” upon whom he relies. Jean-Jacques explains that the youth was previously subject only to the human bonds of friendship, but that now he is subject to personal attachments that give him a much more relative existence—like the Spartan’s, for example—by concentrating his growing sensitivity into a smaller private whole. These attachments, says the speaker, will threaten the former ones if they are governed by the law of desire exemplified in the theater. In that respect, one might infer, they are like a man’s love for the ideal city that threatens his love for mankind as it is, except in a few rare souls. Rousseau is presumably one of the exceptions according to his aforementioned statement to Malesherbes that his own love for the society of imaginary perfect beings is not incompatible with the love of humanity. Emile, who has successfully reconciled the two under the sway of Jean-Jacques, must now learn to do so himself.

In that case, according to the discourse, he must learn to rule his own heart by subjecting to the bond of necessity all desires that exceed human strength and cause misery and vice, such, one may fancy, as the desire for a corporeal Sophia. To rule himself in this way he is bidden not only to accept involuntary privations, as in the past, but also to sacrifice his feelings deliberately whenever the law of reason demands it, in order to practice an autonomous virtue. He is told that he will thereby learn to follow reason and conscience, be his own master, and not only govern his passion for Sophia—as Jean-Jacques has done hitherto—but subjugate all other loves, these being in all probability worldly passions for sensual gratification, gain, or glory. He is therefore advised that he must be skilled in “warfare” to face the aforementioned “enemy within,” or vagrant de-
sire, especially since he runs the risk of losing Sophia, as the speaker may lose Emile or, we might add, as any man may fall from grace or fail to attain the object of his love. The thought of losing Emile prompts the governor to ask: "What would be left of me then?" By posing this question, the author hints that the hero is natural man within himself redeemed by the pledge that induced these meditations.

Jean-Jacques concludes the discourse by asking once more; "Where is happiness? Where is wisdom?" The answer implies that they do not exist in the world of actuality, to which the heroes are about to repair. For Emile is told that he must love only imperishable beauty, which in Socratic terms would be that of wisdom or the heavenly city. By virtue of an inward adjustment to the law of necessity, he must detach himself like the vicar from everything else but the object of that love which liberates the spirit and permits a man to rise above vexations and enjoy the transitory graces of this life while he awaits a better one beyond the grave. In that case it is problematic whether those fragile beauties, even though they are a reflection of the absolute and constitute the Rousseauist "age of gold," include a corporeal Sophia. It is all the more problematic by reason of the governor's conclusion that, with the exception of the being "that is," "there is nothing beautiful but what is not." Surely we must infer, as we were told before, that in our disordered world she "is not," she who loves "what is not." She is meant to be not a reflection but "supreme beauty itself," as we were told, the love of which may conceivably be crowned only in death. And so, after a "foretaste of paradise" mysteriously vouchsafed to Emile in a blaze of summer sunshine, as the ghostly season approaches he is bidden to go down into another and different world to make his own practical and laborious effort toward the ideal.

The speaker of the discourse adheres closely to the advice of Socrates in the final pages of the seventh book of the Republic following the "foretaste" of wisdom and integra-
tion of studies discussed above. The sage, introducing his heroes to the study of philosophy—or, if we wish, initiating them into the love of wisdom—also fears lawlessness. Since that study is intended (as in the Rousseauist text) to lead them to discover the true law of justice in the inner man and to practice virtue in the highest sense, he takes precautions lest they come to regard as an amusement what ought to be an orderly and steadfast pursuit. Even later when they finally reach the "beatific vision" itself (as distinguished from the "foretaste") and are unwilling to descend to human affairs, for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell, he still ordains that they take their turn at "politics" as a matter of duty, although they do so only in "the good and true city," as he shows at the end of the seventh book. Thus Rousseau concludes the section on Sophia much as the sage concludes his study of that city. Moreover, in the next two books Socrates too embarks upon a review of evil and false states and shows how easily his kings could become slaves of passion therein. And as he sets out, he poses the question of the relative wisdom and happiness of his own state and of others, the very question framed by Jean-Jacques when he proposed to Emile that they engage in a similar survey. In both cases the answer is the same. Wisdom and happiness are not to be found among the disordered states of this world. The sage decides that his kings must be content to cultivate "divine wisdom" within or "the city within," and live accordingly. Its "pattern" is absolute beauty—Rousseau's "supreme" and "imperishable beauty"—that is not to be found on the earth and is the ultimate object of Socratic and Christian love. Hardly anything could be so valuable as the ancient text to heighten the symbolic quality of Rousseau's, since their affinities are undeniable and are abundantly disclosed in intimate correspondences of thought, word, and image.

To revert to Jean-Jacques and Emile, the latter is as reluctant as the Socratic heroes to leave the better life, and
suggests marriage as an alternative. It is rejected for three reasons. First, he wishes to wed Sophia because she "pleases" him. He has yet to understand as well as Jean-Jacques does that she "suits" him. Again the love of wisdom is governed not by pleasure or desire but by the law of the enlightened will that secures happiness. Second, he is too young for marriage. We may take this literally to mean that he may not enter the conjugal state before the age of his majority, then twenty-five, or figuratively to mean that he may not be wedded to wisdom until he is ready to be released from his governor's custody, which would be at the same age. However we take it, he will be united to Sophia two years later when they are twenty-five and twenty years old respectively, the age favored by Socrates for his heroes' nuptials in the fifth book of the Republic. The third reason for delay is that before he enters a private civil order by way of marriage and seals his pledge to the covenant that secures it, he must know his place as a citizen therein. He must study the pattern of the city, its laws and government, as compared with existing evils, and learn "for whom he must die." These words, suggestive of the Symposium, refer to Sophia as though she were in reality the image of a realm for which he must live and die, as I have observed. They echo earlier ones about his tiring visits that teach him to be willing to die for her, and are related to others on the formation of the woman for whom a man will lay down his life and who sends him "to war, glory, and death at her behest." Throughout the whole context here, the heroine emerges as more mythical than corporeal.

At this juncture the influence of the Christian Fénelon is again combined with that of Socrates. Emile's reluctance to face the earthly warfare necessary for virtue is so great that the governor is obliged to exercise the dictatorial authority vested in him and force him to be free, to do not his pleasure but his will. And so at the moment of parting, when Sophia has given Emile her Télémaque as a guide on his travels, he is "drawn away" by the superior power of
Jean-Jacques. Likewise, in Fénelon’s book Mentor-Minerva is obliged to use extraordinary means to force his disciple to leave the nymph Eucharis and the enchanted island where she lives. The young prince never again sees either one. But as I have said, Sophia resembles not only the nymph but especially Antiope, the hero’s betrothed, from whom he must also part for other reasons, namely, to become worthy of her by following the call of duty. The latter idea is present in the scene of Emile’s departure. He leaves Sophia in order to find her again by Socrates’ “longer and more circuitous way.”

VIATICUM

The last nave of the mythical inner chamber of the spirit bears the title “Voyages.” There are only three subtitles in the whole book, including “The Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar” in the middle of the previous part, whose tripartite shape is thereby emphasized. As I have said, the other two occur at the beginning and end of the present part and have the same effect. The entrance to the first nave bears the rubric “Sophia or Woman” and is matched by this one that contains a summary of the Contract or a political profession of faith, essentially identical with the religious creed.

There are several reasons for the title. For example, Emile now relives the wanderings of Télémaque on a modest scale. Just as that Greek hero goes upon his travels in search of his father, Ulysses, whom he finds at last in his own city of Ithaca, so his modern counterpart goes abroad looking for the city of his heart, whose prince he recognizes at last as his own father, the new Ulysses. The title is likewise suggestive of the epic journeys of Ulysses himself, whose adventures in quest of his island home Emile has long since read in the Odyssey. It is also evocative of the wanderings of Aeneas, who goes through the world seeking a site for his city and finally settles in Latium where the Rome of Aemilius was born. But, as I have already pointed
out, the main source of inspiration here is Socrates, who surveys the "false states" of this world in the eighth and ninth books of the *Republic* before taking refuge in "the city within" whose "pattern is in heaven" and whose laws govern the sage's life upon earth.

The title has other implications. It is derived from the Latin "viaticum," meaning "provision for a journey." This journey in quest of the ideal city on earth is an image of the pilgrimage of life like the earlier one in quest of Sophia, where the author defined the conditions indispensable to attain that object. Here the "provision" in question is his whole philosophy, which, according to the preface, is necessary for those who wish to prosper on their way through the world and find happiness here and hereafter. To establish a psychological link between the search for the city and the search for Sophia, he has recourse to the artistic device of parallelism that always helps to clarify his meaning. For instance, in each one he warns that travel must be undertaken for love of knowledge. And in both he cites the example of Plato and Pythagoras, whose pedestrian expeditions were a form of study. Moreover, in the same way that Jean-Jacques on the former occasion engaged in a "feigned search" for Sophia, who had already been found long before, he now goes looking on earth for a city that has already been found in the place where she too exists, the domain of the heart and the mind. And just as the previous search was simply a pretext for acquainting Emile with women so that he might feel the value of her who suits him, so the present one is a pretext for acquainting him with "false" states that he might cherish the one that suits him and is "his own." These facts, combined with the presence of mystery in both texts, suggest the need for a literary rather than an exclusively literal reading.

The purpose of this second peregrination is further elaborated as the parallelism continues. As on the former journey Emile studied the great book of nature and natural history, he now studies the nature of mankind and the natural his-
tory of the race to avoid national prejudice. At the same time he examines his civic relations with his fellow citizens and consciously analyzes the nature of government and its various forms including that of his birthplace to see whether or not it is "suited to him." For, as in the case of the covenant of friendship that prompted this Odyssey, at twenty-five years of age he is free to confirm or abjure, by his choice of residence, the historical contract to which he was pledged by his ancestors. The combination of the study of human psychology and political philosophy at this stage shows that he is looking for a city patterned after the nature of man.

The difficulties confronting him are set forth by Jean-Jacques. The latter explains to Emile that the youth is soon to be released from the external authority of his governor and must rule himself independently, for the "laws" are about to make him "master of his property and of his person." Yet in the next breath the speaker warns the future "master" that he now runs the risk of depending upon everything, including his patrimony, which is presumably his birthplace. After these admonitions he is advised that he must choose his own life. Of course, he has already done so by choosing Sophia, but that was through the complicity of powers unrecognized by him until after the choice was made. And so he is told that he must decide for himself what kind of man he intends to be, how he means to spend his days and earn his livelihood, which is not, however, the main business of human life. Will he be a lover of gain or glory and seek his fortune in commerce, offices of power, the army, or finance, where he must cater to the vices and prejudices of others and fall a prey to them himself? In this vein the speaker describes the dilemma of a man trained in Socratic law to become guardian and ruler of his life, and now faced with the risk of living in a lawless society full of slaves and tyrants.

Jean-Jacques' speech to Emile virtually alludes to Plato's eighth and ninth books where Socrates describes the evil
plight of men who live in “false” states. These are the military state, the oligarchy of wealth, the democracy that in his view indulges multitudinous desires, and the tyranny where passion prevails. Such states threaten ruin to his kings. Until their majority, says the sage, their safety has been assured by the authority that the law has exercised over them, “and the refusal to let them be free until we have established in them a principle analogous to the constitution of a state, and by cultivation of this higher element have set up in their hearts a guardian and ruler like our own [to give life and movement to the city within], and when this is done they may go their ways.” This is the crucial point now reached by the Rousseauist hero. Jean-Jacques follows the master to the letter.

The question is, Which way will Emile go? He replies that his employment will be the practice of beneficence and justice, which, incidentally, is the employment of the Socratic and Judeo-Christian carpenter king. It is also that of Jean-Jacques, whose “work” is often said to be Emile, the cultivation of the ideal man within us. As for the “play” that men call “work,” the hero chooses husbandry in order to be happy and live independently with Sophia by acquiring each day the ingredients of felicity that are health, strength, and the necessities of life. He longs only for a little “farm” in some “corner of the world” to be his own. The word “farm” (métairie) was also applied to the visionary white house of the essay on wealth. In the context of the book his ambition is puzzling. One of the first lessons he learned was that there was “no corner” of the world that he might call his own. If there is and it enslaves him, as he has just been warned, can he be more than a symbolic husbandman, like Jean-Jacques, cultivating his spiritual powers under the guardian and ruler that is said to deliver men from the disorders of gain and prestige? On the other hand, one might also ask whether Sophia’s solitude is not the farm of his fancy; and if so, why is he looking for another? The logical reply to that question is only one more
reason for suspecting that her retreat is as mythical as Fénelon's enchanted isle, especially in the light of Emile's forthcoming vain search for the object of his desire.

In his response Jean-Jacques commends the choice of wisdom in preference to power and wealth. But he wonders — logically enough after the parable of the sower — in what "corner of the world" a man of property can live free and independent, in peace and justice, without compromising his honor, and yet manage to escape the fate of the biblical Naboth dispossessed of his vineyard and his life by the wicked King Ahab and his wife Jezebel? Contrary to Voltaire in the conclusion to Candide, Jean-Jacques doubts whether to "cultivate one's garden" really ensures happiness, if the famous phrase be taken literally. One may infer that if Emile is to rule his own life, he cannot possess anything or live after the manner of the earthly cities where he dwells. That is why the governor now sketches for him the ideal city of the Contract, where the orderly relations of powers allegedly reflect those of human faculties. This is the "pattern" to which Socrates too reverts at the end of Plato's ninth book, and with which the sage, both Socratic and Rousseauist, strives to conform his life.

It is not surprising that the idyll of Aemilius and Sophia with its summa of the hero's education, implying all the principles of Rousseauist wisdom of Emile and the Contract, is interrupted by a frank synthesis of the latter or of Political Institutions, interposed between images of the heroine in the innermost chamber of the mythical temple. Rousseau could hardly say more clearly that the city to which Emile aspires is formed by a man's pledge to wisdom and is made to suit him as she is. The demands she makes upon him are, like those of Jean-Jacques, set forth in its principles and precepts that are his own. He now acquires an awareness of their particular application to his present circumstances.

These precepts, says his governor, are those of "political" law, called "natural and political" law to emphasize
the anthropological and ethical implications of Rousseauist citizenship. He admits that the study of true law is a “useless” science except for someone like Emile, for whom, we recall, the only useless knowledge is whatever does not pertain to Sophia. This obviously does. It is therefore comparable to Socrates’ “useless” studies that are popularly so-called since they relate to the beautiful and the good instead of to shopkeeping. It is also useless since it discloses “what must be” but, alas, “what is not,” and never will be except in the inner realm where the hero and heroine of the book have their being. As I have said, in all cases the writer proposes a canon of moral truth that is “the nature of things” as he visualizes it. The mythical Emile is, we are told, far from indifferent to his new studies, for it is not immaterial to him to know whether the outer and inner worlds meet in one or do not. On the contrary, he who cherishes human rights is eager to find a government that safeguards them, as that of the Contract supposedly does, so that he might live under its rule. He is stimulated in his search by a love of justice and (moral) truth to which the author of the treatise professes to devote his work. Its principles are now to be defined by Jean-Jacques as a standard to judge the positive laws of established civil societies and guide the hero in his present plight. I shall give a simple exposition of them to underline their relationship to the context here.

The young man, about to be “set free,” is told that all men are by birth naturally free and independent. And he who intends to dispose of his freedom by entering into a union with Sophia is made to realize that human beings can be united only by an act of the will (or law), since force cannot produce any permanent bond between them. This instruction about the nature of a genuine union among men is equally true of an integration and correlation of faculties within the soul. Emile is himself intended to be an example of such a harmonious whole, of one whose virtue is not what Socrates calls an enforced virtue. He may therefore
conceivably achieve happy self-expansion in the exercise of paternal rule, which Jean-Jacques discusses in his synthesis. Of course, that rule is an image of the rule of law that is as rooted in the nature of man as fatherhood is, and that the disciple is now to exercise autonomously. According to the governor, a father—the Socratic symbol of law—has the same restrictions as that organ of the human will and his authority over his children is limited to what is "useful" to themselves. He adds, moreover, that at the age of reason they become the judges of such "usefulness" and masters of self, as his own disciple is destined to be. If they continue to obey the father or submit to another in his place, as Emile defers in the end to the laws of which he is begotten and which, in the person of Sophia, preside over his whole life, it is of their own free will. According to the speaker, slavery pertains not merely to the thralldom of bodies but to the repression of the human person and of inner life or morality that springs from the free operations of conscience and reason required of us by nature herself. It is she who ordains that men govern themselves as Emile is now bidden to do.

Men bear rule, the governor continues, or delegate it to others freely according to their will, by favor of a prior conventional bond or covenant that creates civil society, as it also does moral man. He formulates the familiar words of the covenant of promise. By its terms, as we know, individuals—like individual powers and desires within man—subject themselves and all they have to the sovereign power or active thinking being and become an indivisible part of a moral collective whole that represents civilized or humanistic man born of the act of union. Since Emile exemplifies the engagement in himself, he will see it as that of Rousseauist moral man who is social and civil man. Such a man, the governor explains, is committed to the sovereignty of his own higher being and applies this principle in the disposition of his life. Although the hero's personal commitment has been freely assumed in en-
lightened forms of love and moves him spontaneously to seek his happiness in that of the objects of his love, or rather, in the gratification of conscience and in the service of wisdom, he must now learn that the bonds formed by that commitment are a law, the one and only fundamental law of the moral being. The pledge can be renounced, says the governor, only if it proves harmful, which, to his mind, is preposterous. The human will it hallows and exalts seeks only the good of the integrated person as a whole and can have no other object, for, as the vicar said, men are free to will their good but not to harm themselves according to their "pleasure." In injury, says Jean-Jacques, could hardly come to the various parts from inner adjustment to the spiritual sovereignty proposed, which need therefore give no guarantee of fidelity to the pledge. Harm could come only from a betrayal of the engagement by the parts themselves, such, for example, as might arise through the desire for gold or glory that enslaves the soul. Emile, who has been taught to respect his promises as sacred and to rule by obeying his own sovereign will, has already learned the advantages of doing so. One of these, says the governor, is freedom, meaning freedom to obey the self that is made to rule, and to pursue the human spirit's loftiest aspirations. Another advantage, which would allegedly ensue, however, only if the human will were enshrined as law in objective reality, is the protection of Rousseauist property. But since this is not the case, Emile's coveted vineyard is not safe: and, as we shall see, he will have to find the necessities of life in some other way. Such is the bearing of the first part of the *Contract* on the hero's present problems.

Jean-Jacques synthesizes more briefly the following two parts of that work. He ponders over the nature of law as an act of the sovereign will applicable to the entire moral person, as opposed to the acts of partial factions that divide a kingdom against itself.

This raises the question of the application of law in particular cases. The moral person, says the speaker, may
transform itself into a democratic governing body for the purpose of appointing leaders to do its will, if it so chooses. But, he warns, such leaders are neither sovereigns nor representatives of sovereignty in which they share but which can never be alienated to them as individuals. They are merely officers of the people, and as subjects of the law are entrusted with its execution and the maintenance of civil and political freedom. By emphasizing the importance of self-governance in rulers, he suggests that it is perilous for a man to entrust the "helm" to anyone but himself, or rather, his own best faculties, if he is to be properly governed and his freedom safely ensured. Emile exemplifies this. To show the hero the need for objectivity in acts of the governing power, Jean-Jacques, like the author of the *Contract*, represents the ruling faculty in geometrical terms as intermediary between subject desires and sovereign will, all of which must do their own proper work indicated by the nature of each. He exposes the perils of government in far-flung realms where a man hardly shares in sovereignty at all and where manners and customs are at variance with law. Analogously the same evils would arise in the soul of one who, instead of expanding spiritually, extends his being through time and space in search of worldly benefits. He explains that in such cases the governing power is necessarily intensified for purposes of active life, but then it allies itself with lawless elements and private interests to silence the moral will of man. Proceeding from these considerations, he summarizes the ideas of the *Contract* on the various forms of government, their rectitude and effectiveness, and suggests that aristocratic rule, which is that of the reasonable will, suits a state—or a man—whose range is that of neither giant nor dwarf but is of natural and normal proportions like his disciple's. At the same time he warns that government is capable of as many forms as the state has citizens, implying that the only true one is self-government, for which the young man has been trained from the first, and which is of course entirely consistent
with aristocratic but not democratic rule.

He crowns his discourse by developing the brief "Conclusion" of the Contract that was to be treated in the work Political Institutions. This is the only chapter of the fourth part of the treatise to which he alludes and the only one that remains to be included in this collation. The writer of the Contract states simply that his book, to be complete, would have to take account of the external relations of the ideal city in war and peace. These relations, he says, would be governed by international laws enforced through federation. As we have observed, the idea is extravagant if he envisages an affiliation of many mythical cities, since the existence of one is hard enough to imagine. And how could he suppose an association of his "true" state with the "false" ones of this world, to use his own Socratic expressions? Or in his favorite Pauline terms, can there be any accommodation of his covenant of promise to the covenant of bondage allegedly prevailing in our midst? He has consistently rejected the idea. Hence in the Contract, where the city appears miraculously materializing as such, the problems of external relations seem purely academic and are not developed. Of course if we pierce the imagery, they are as real as they are in Emile, since the city seen as a magnified image of a well-ordered life might indeed come to the birth in a human soul as it does in the novel, where the matter of external relations is critical. Emile, though bound to great spirits of the past and present, must also live among "false" states and learn not only what his relations with them might be but also what their own are with each other. Jean-Jacques illustrates these problems in the conclusion of his discourse.

He paints a melancholy picture of what he and his disciple have beheld in the world and what we can see for ourselves not merely in life and history but also in the eighth and ninth books of the Republic: the wretched state of men perpetually buffeted in their internal and external contacts with each other, and subject not to law but to tyrannical
passions that create a state of warfare within and among them and expose them to foreign conflicts as well. Their misery, he says, is the result of an imperfect historical evolution that combines the evils of an allegedly “natural” state of independence with those of a so-called “civil” condition of slavery. In his eyes this combination of evils explains the futility of past attempts at federation, since he can visualize affiliation only among “true” states possessed of sovereignty. By contrast with this course of events, the Aemilian order is presumed to combine the supposed advantages of the Rousseauist natural and civil order, freedom and morality. But Emile has learned that to expect to find his city and its laws in the sphere of actuality is both absurd and undesirable, for then virtue would be a matter of habit and necessity and men would be like blocks of wood, or “posts,” as we remarked. He says so, observing that he and his governor seem to be “building” their “edifice” with wood instead of men. On the other hand, any sort of alliance of the Aemilian city with our disordered world is just as absurd and undesirable, although Emile will not withdraw altogether and a society of friends or city of the heart is never impossible.

After the pattern of the Contract has been revealed, the ruler identifies the city of his fancy with the Fénelonian one in Télémaque, transfigured not only by the wisdom of Mentor-Minerva but also by Christian charity. According to him, if the friends search for it in vain that is because, unlike Fénelon’s heroes, they are neither God nor even king in the usual sense of the word and so they cannot imitate those models by re-creating cities and their rulers but must content themselves with doing the good that is the work of men. Indeed, they would decline to rule over others even if they could: “If we were kings and sages, the first good deed we should do for ourselves and for others would be to abdicate our kingship and become ourselves again.” Of course they are kings and sages; but their kingship is not of this world, and the Rousseauist philosopher-
kings do not rule in objective reality. Nor do the Socratic ones, as we see at the end of Plato’s ninth book where the sage reverted to the soul. The Rousseauist philosopher-king, like the Socratic, rules over himself and his own city or inner realm without trying to convert other people living outside the covenant except by the force of his example. To try to change them in any other way would, in his eyes, be not merely unrealistic but unlawful and immoral, a violation of all the principles of Emile and the Contract, as well as of the Republic. For him the impulse for reform must come from within the human spirit. Men cannot be “forced to be free” unless they are already committed to the covenant and its laws by an act of their own enlightened will and are themselves the ordering agent.

Apart from this basic difference, Jean-Jacques’ city is indeed the Fénélonian one. The travelers examine the tokens of good government, defined by Fénélon exactly as they are here and in the Contract and related works. A good administration in the sight of both writers favors population by encouraging marriages. This criterion accentuates the value of the governor’s work in Emile, which fosters marriage as an image of the autonomous inner bond of a man with his highest self. The same criterion also provides Rousseau with a new pretext to underline the primacy of volition in the contract by specifying that the conjugal union, like any other, must not be an effect of force, or laws against celibacy, which are as bad as those enjoining it. He protests against such enactments, even though, in his Project on Corsica—in the region of imperfect actuality—he discriminates against celibates by limiting them to the class of aspirants to citizenship. A further sign of good government for himself and Fénélon is the even distribution of population over the whole territory in agricultural districts outside the urban center of the city-state. This is illustrated by Jean-Jacques’ rule in Emile that is represented as particularly effective in rural surroundings, as we know. The friends on their travels verify the author’s fond illusions
that men closer to nature are also closer to goodness. In the society of country folk the young man's virtues are supposed to run less risk, although his aegis at all times is his love for Sophia.

The denouement of the novel begins at this point, as Rousseau indicates by the use of spacing and a horizontal line. The last conversations of the travelers refer back to questions posed when they set out in search of wisdom and happiness. With that object in mind, what conclusion has Emile reached about his future? This is tantamount to asking which is more conducive to his goal: the Rousseauist covenant that aims to secure the life and liberty of persons, or the historical one that consolidates property? Or how can fidelity to the one be reconciled with the demands of existence under the other? Such is the theme of the hero's dialogue with his governor, treated not abstractly but through cunningly contrived myths.

Since this is the case, and since the myths are largely inspired by the second half of Plato's ninth book, it would be helpful to recall the latter before broaching the Aemilian text. I was obliged to allude to it earlier since, in the preamble to the separation of Emile and Sophia and again at the outset of the peregrination abroad, Rousseau reviewed the Republic cursorily from the end of the seventh book to the end of the ninth. In the present context he exploits the latter more fully and leaves me no alternative but to revert to it. There the sage solves the problem of wisdom and happiness posed by himself as well as by his modern disciple, as I have said, when they began their survey of false states. He concludes that the happiest of men is the lover of wisdom who is master of himself and knows a felicity that the votaries of gain and glory do not know, which is the fulfillment of the human spirit according to its nature. Speaking of the others who engage in injustice to indulge their lusts, he warns them that it is ignoble and unprofitable to happiness to enslave the god in man to the beast. He contrasts them with the sage who is ruled by divine wisdom within that

[365]
suits his nature and who preserves his freedom of action by regulating his property and prestige so as to guard against the sway of wealth or power, which cause disorder in the soul. Such a man is statesman and ruler in the aforementioned “city . . . within him.” It is not the land of his birth but a city that “exists in idea only” and whose “pattern” is laid up in heaven. He “will live after the manner of that city, having nothing to do with any other.” This Socratic text is the inspiration of Emile’s dialogue with Jean-Jacques.

The hero, like the Socratic sage, finds happiness in the wisdom of the “true” covenant and remains as his governor has made him, faithful to “nature and the laws.” Thus he ratifies the pledge of friendship again, before applying it in the intimate domain of the soul, and promises to be loyal as man and citizen to the “natural and political law” of the Contract. He discusses the two theoretical advantages: freedom and security of life or Rousseauist property. The freedom he enjoys is the Socratic liberation of his noblest faculties. But in the present order of things it entails detachment from all property. This includes his coveted vineyard or “corner of earth,” which would, he says, threaten his spiritual freedom through the intrigues of covetous desire. It also includes his mysterious inheritance which, as I have said, is probably his birthplace and would constitute, in the terminology of the Contract “the public domain of the sovereign,” if men were indeed sovereign in the land of their birth. But in the book they are not. And under the covenant of bondage a man’s needs (Rousseauist property) are at the discretion of other men’s passions. He explains his dilemma thus to his governor: “When you wanted me to be at once free and without needs you wanted two incompatible things for I cannot withdraw from dependence upon men except by returning to dependence upon nature.”

Hence in an earthly society the two objects of the “true” covenant are incompatible, as we suspected from the first. In choosing the covenant that frees the spirit even for the
victim of other people’s passions, Emile is forced to renounce security in the matter of needs, which would involve dependence upon men that enslaves. He withdraws from such dependence and declines to rely upon his inheritance. If it subjects him, he will abandon it, providing for his needs as best he can and facing privations and death itself under nature’s law of necessity. In his view submission to that law frees him from enslavement to men, so that his faculties can perform their appointed tasks, the wise will exercising its natural sway over desire. The same law is, of course, also that of Jean-Jacques, whose disciple again recognizes him as the “father” who begot him. Emile concludes that all he needs to be happy is Sophia or what Socrates calls in the analogous text “divine wisdom dwelling within.” Such are the hero’s conclusions about wisdom and happiness, imparted in the form of highly suggestive allegories that naturally lead a classical scholar to the Platonic myths.

In his reply Jean-Jacques again commends the choice of wisdom. In his opinion the disciple is wise not to seek freedom under the sway of the laws of passion or property, which are those of bondage. It is to be found, says the governor confirming the young man’s words, in obedience to the eternal laws of nature and of order, or rather, of conscience and of reason written in the heart of the sage and replacing all others in his life. Thus he describes the laws of the Contract, as readers are beginning to suspect, and the sage is Emile. Those laws are kept, after the example of the Mosaical stone tablets, in the ark of the covenant within the mythical temple where the city exists and Sophia resides. The hero, like Socrates and Cato or the citizens of Rousseau’s new Poland, bears his city in his person. Indeed, the author says in the Considerations that the true sanctuary of laws and government is not to be found in fortresses, which will forever be taken by tyrants, but in citadels within, by the effects of education or legislation answering to man’s nature and the decrees of his highest
faculties. So far the ideal is basically the one in the Republic, however suffused with emotion.

Subsequently Jean-Jacques appears to modify his disciple’s Socratic attitude. Unlike the Greek heroes Emile is not to withdraw completely to the city within. He must have something to do with other states. He has duties as a citizen in his birthplace, even if “his own city” and its laws do not exist in external reality. Here the speaker observes the Socratic distinction between the two: pays and patrie. The former allegedly has only a caricature of a contract, semblances of laws and appearances of government that are nevertheless traces of order to be found in actuality, reflections of the IDEA of harmony. They have therefore served to make him love the good and abhor evil. Moral action of that sort is possible only in human society, however imperfect. Of all men, says Jean-Jacques, the hero alone will sacrifice his interests to the common good, be just among the wicked, and rule like a philosopher-king over himself. If we ask why a man would practice virtue among anarchists and immoralists, the reply is to be found throughout Emile, the Contract, and the Republic and is restated by Socrates in the text that inspired the dialogue of Emile and his governor: the sage, unlike most of us, is convinced that justice and wisdom, by their very nature, suit the nature of the soul, since he regards them as an orderly disposition of human faculties according to the proper or normal function of each, and finds happiness therein. The Rousseauist governor, in representing his disciple as “the just man” among the wicked, implies like Socrates that injustice suffered by such a one is as powerful a motive for the harmonious and felicitous operations of the soul as justice obtained. Nevertheless, the ancient sage favors withdrawal, whereas Emile is bidden to live among his compatriots and there to practice virtues fostered by the “true” covenant of whose nature and existence they are unaware. Unlike the writer, he is told, he need not live in exile since he has not assumed the sad task of speaking the truth to men, but his “example
will serve them better than all our books.’” That example is, however, enshrined in a book that is intended to provide an image of a kind of wisdom and happiness accessible to anyone.

The hero’s return to his birthplace is explained in the novel not only by the need for the presence of a pattern of well-ordered life in a haphazard society but also by the hope that that pattern may materialize in visible form beyond the person of Emile. This faint hope is founded upon two unlikely hypotheses: that the family may in some exceptional case become what it could be but paradoxically never will be, and that it may in turn expand its influence through a patriarchal pastoral life that Jean-Jacques now mysteriously recommends to his disciple, who, however, has no farm in the material sense and never will have. Indeed, the governor having admitted that there is no corner of the earth where Emile may live in peace with Sophia, and having counseled him to return to the land of his birth, paradoxically directs him back to that corner where she abides, although we know that they had to “travel” far from his birthplace to find her. In the country where she dwells, says he, gentle natures are still to be found, beneficence may yet bear fruit, and men may revive the desert solitudes. But the hero must always be ready to emulate his Roman forebears and leave the ploughshare to serve his patria. Together with Fenelon, Rousseau clung to his dream of a golden age of rural and family bliss. Yet the paradoxes in the text betray his skepticism and make a literal reading virtually impossible, though some readers may disagree.

The question arises as to whether there is a real cleavage between him and Socrates in this context. Admittedly the Socratic philosopher withdraws altogether from our unruly world whereas Emile does not, although sometimes the latter’s desert solitudes dangerously resemble withdrawal. Nevertheless, the Rousseauist hero does indeed have relations with a chaotic world, as we have seen; and their nature, as illustrated earlier, underlines the other distinctions
between his creator's thought and that of the Greek master: Emile's city and its laws are enshrined in the heart as well as in the mind: they extend justice to include mercy, and enlarge the scope of sympathy to embrace enemies and men of lawless life. These are serious differences between the two thinkers. Moreover, the Rousseauist hope of material expansion through family or rural life and the emotional images of both are obviously quite foreign to Socrates. But even for the sage's modern disciple they are unrealistic and paradoxical; and in any case, as I said earlier in the chapter, images and settings do not change the essential identity of thought, which is, however, greatly christianized in Rousseau's case.

To bring out more forcefully the close relationship between his concept of the good life and the master's, despite their differences, we must look to the end of the tenth and last book of the Republic where the love of simplicity and "golden mediocrity" is also exalted. There in the Socratic vision of Er, Odysseus or Ulysses is reborn, as he and Téléméaque are in Emile. Indeed, he is the last of a host of souls to be reborn into the world and to choose a new life among the "samples of lives" set before them. And he chooses the same simple life as the Rousseauist hero. The ancient text reads: "... Disenchanted of ambition... he [Ulysses] went about for a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who had no cares; he had some difficulty in finding this which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody else; and when he saw it, he said that he would have done the same had his lot been first instead of last, and that he was delighted to have it." The choice of the wise Ulysses is also Emile's, though in the former case there is no question of family or farm. Rousseau's affinities with Socrates are visible even when he pretends to oppose him.

Jean-Jacques' circumspect advice to his disciple resembles that of the vicar to the exile and further justifies my comparison of the religious and political creed. The similar-
ity is impressive. In a far land the vicar confessed his natural faith to the outcast and disclosed a celestial pattern for the ordering of human life. But at the same time he urged his protégé to return to his own land and faith even though neither conformed to the heavenly model, there to practice the lesson of detachment. Jean-Jacques teaches the same lesson. In some distant clime he reveals to the exiled Emile the principles of natural and political law, divinely inscribed in the heart of the sage, as a source of harmony in human affairs. Yet he sends him back to his own country where chaos allegedly prevails, that he might rise above it. The two texts are perfectly symmetrical. Moreover, the conservatism of both, which is, of course, that of the *Contract*, is striking. Nothing could be less revolutionary than they are. There is no question of changing material things in objective experience but only of changing life by the action of the spirit. The writer’s conservatism is further accentuated by his lofty idealism and use of mythical forms, as well as by his skepticism. Not that he doubts the reality and feasibility of the version of moral truth proposed. But he has no faith in men’s willingness to achieve it.

To conclude the story, the governor’s happiest day dawns when his work is consummated and Emile is wedded to his bride. They are united “in the temple” by an indissoluble bond, after having loved one another for three years and sought one another for a lifetime. The “temple” is surely not the place of darkness in the second part, nor yet the symbolic hostel in the fourth. It must be the mythical one of the soul and of the book where the betrothal originated. As for the ceremony, it may be taken as a marriage in the literal sense if we wish. But *Emile* is a literary work wherein the symbolism of marriage, which has already emerged into the highest possible relief, can hardly be ignored in the present context, especially since for the writer there is only one “indissoluble bond,” namely, that which sanctifies all others and upon which fidelity to every other engagement depends. This is the Rousseauist covenant or
social contract, which finally takes the form of a civil contract externalized in marriage in accordance with the Calvinist view. These considerations are enough to make us suspect that we are now witnessing the sacred nuptials of the sage, corresponding to the mythical "marriage rite" of the Socratic philosopher-king and the Muse, his queen, anticipated in the sixth book of the Republic, where the Greek master broaches the education of his kings, and consummated at the end of the seventh. Indeed, we can hardly fail to see that Rousseau is portraying an initiation into the ultimate beatific vision of wisdom, a "foretaste" of which was previously granted.

This interpretation is confirmed by the marriage ceremony itself, of which we have, in fact, a detailed account. The latter is to be found in a discourse of Jean-Jacques addressed to the lovers, wherein some of us have in the past accused the writer of questionable taste. In reality there is nothing salacious or unsavory in the text. The reason for the misunderstanding is that we have failed to recognize the monologue as an imaginative projection of the marriage rite performed by the ruler, as is the case in the Republic. Indeed, it concludes with a sacramental "treaty." The word occurs twice as it did in the first part of the book in reference to the covenant of Jean-Jacques and Emile. It accentuates the link between the beginning and end and is another clue to the mythical quality of the present scene where the governor himself presides over the "sacred" union of the true prince and wisdom, which is visualized in an allegorical manner outside the "temple."

The controversial solemnities begin when he proposes to the bridal pair a way of prolonging the happiness of love in marriage to create a paradise, a diminutive city of the blessed, upon earth. The object can be achieved, he says, if those who engage themselves forever to "the most sacred of contracts" perpetuate their commitment by the constant action of enlightened love. In other words, Emile must continue to be a "lover of Sophia," or philosopher, while she,
for her part, must continue to suit and please him by preserving the integrity of her nature. Socrates is of the same opinion. The Greek sage, having said that licentiousness is forbidden in his city where matrimony is sacred in the highest degree, contrives marriages between the best men and women at the prescribed age who "breed only with the sanction of the rulers," or rather, ruling faculties in the soul. These faculties, which have been formed in Emile to make him ruler of himself, are still personified in Jean-Jacques, who is performing the last act of his Socratic mission. He still embodies the enlightened will that governs desire in the union of hero and heroine. And so he formulates the covenant anew whereby Emile enters a select society of just men who hold sway over themselves.

It contains the same "clauses" as the one in the first part, which is definitively ratified now that the hero is of age. First, he and his bride are to remain faithful to the covenant that unites them since fidelity is "the most sacred of all rights." That is because it signifies obedience to the one and only fundamental law. But this clause has an essential corollary to provide for the correlative of obedience which is consent. The union of Emile and Sophia is not an effect of force. To illustrate his meaning, the governor objects to the "constraint" of so-called conjugal rights and contrives to make each of the consorts exclusively dependent upon the covenant's law of love or enlightened feeling. He would thereby avoid all "subjection." In that way, says he, a man's lawful love for his bride will be stronger than any lawless desire for the "stranger." That is the theme of an Old Testament passage already cited in the previous chapter. It is also the theme of the Pauline allegory of the two covenants represented by the free woman and the bondmaid who are the covenant of promise and of bondage to which I have alluded, corresponding to the Rousseauist and historical one. Jean-Jacques' allegorizing expresses the idea that "hearts are bound" by the former "but bodies are not enslaved," for the enlightened love or act of consent
that gives rise to it becomes itself the only law. Under its sway, according to his words, the contractant remains "master of his person" and exercises his will freely in order to win for himself the only lawful happiness that leaves the human spirit intact and springs from wisdom herself. Such are the two clauses of the "treaty," which is not for that reason a "double" one as we have hitherto supposed. Emile subscribes to it, and this may be taken as the "marriage" ceremony. Since the covenant is in the very nature of Rousseauist wisdom whose spokesman is Jean-Jacques, he answers for Sophia without consulting her. He says so. The allegory portrays in a literary manner the civil rights of the Rousseauist citizen.

After establishing the sovereignty of the will in his first discourse, the speaker institutes the ruling power in a second one, addressed to Sophia alone. In the past it has met with the same fate as the other on our part. This time he is curiously careful to make a distinction between the usual relationship of a man and his bride and that of Emile and Sophia. Emile is the head whom the woman obeys, but since, in this case, she is Sophia, he is to be "led" or "conducted" by her. The word is the same one previously applied to Jean-Jacques' government of his disciple. The reason is clear enough, as we have seen. As the governing power of a city or moral person executes the sovereign will to give movement to the active thinking being, so Sophia makes an appeal to the heart to implement the commands of reason and ultimately secures them by fostering the habit of order as a principle of moral growth. The speaker exhorts her to reign over herself as well as Emile, for then she can recall him to "wisdom," to "virtue and reason," or rather, to herself, if he chances to stray. For the governor warns that the ecstasy of love does not last forever. One may observe that it lasts no longer than that of philosophy or virtue, which it is suited to symbolize. It is not a permanent state of soul, and in the end is replaced, says he, by a "sweet habit" that unites a man for all time with the bride
of his choice, corresponding to the Socratic "life of his choice." Such is the dialectic that leads to the establishment of Sophia's reign, which may or may not be that of a woman but is surely that of Rousseauist wisdom. Again the basic "treaty" is confirmed and the little city set in motion, certainly within the soul and perhaps also within the family.

Once the moral person is autonomous and the habit of order is secure enough to replace laws, Jean-Jacques withdraws, like Mentor in Télèmaque, the Socratic image of law in the Republic,72 or the Pauline one in the Epistle to the Galatians. He does so, he says, in favor of "another." The word is in the masculine gender, like the "child" that ruled Emile in an earlier text. Moreover, the governor, in retiring, says to the hero: "Today I abdicate the authority you entrusted to me and here is your governor." The latter word, too, is masculine, gouverneur, instead of the feminine equivalent.73 Nor is the name of Sophia even mentioned at this juncture. Again one is inclined to see in her a mystic companion who has entered the mythical temple where alone she belongs. Jean-Jacques' transports of emotion and tears of joy as he beholds his work in the fullness of its consummation are comparable with those of Pygmalion. In Sophia he abides with Emile all the days of his life, like Télèmaque's Mentor, who disappears into the empyrean promising the hero: "My wisdom will never leave you... It is time that you should learn to walk alone." One suspects that Emile too is now walking alone in the midst of an invisible company of lofty spirits evoked in the essay on wealth, the letters to Malesherbes, the Confessions, and the Dialogues.

However, the imagery of marriage provides the author with an opportunity to express once more his preference for private education. The book closes with Emile's announcement that he hopes soon to have the honor of being a father. Unlike other fathers he will educate his own son, to make him into a man and citizen. Again the ending stands in counterpoise to the beginning where Rousseau proclaimed
unequivocally that it is a father’s duty to educate his children and raise up citizens to the state, and that domestic training is the only hope of salvation for modern society. Yet even this turn of events may be taken in a literary rather than exclusively literal sense. It may be interpreted in the light of Socrates’ discourse in the Symposium. If so, it would mean that Industry wedded to Wisdom begets not merely mortal children but an autonomous spiritual being generating the moral beautiful, temperance, justice, and all the virtues that may spring from such a union to perfect human society. In that case domestic education would represent the self-discipline of the autodidact, which transformed the young scapegrace of the central pages into the wise Savoyard vicar and now promises to bear fruit in the life of some new disciple reborn of Emile.

Before concluding, I should like to recall the role played by the Republic and the Symposium in this part, in order to accentuate the theme as that of the original plan. Under the title "Sophia," Rousseau objects to Socrates' ideas on the education of woman in the fifth book of the Republic but like the sage in another context uses her to personify wisdom as the object of his hero’s love, a theme that he handles according to the teachings of the Symposium. He then reverts to the same fifth book to show that it is the ruler who decides upon the choice of Emile’s bride. Since that decision implies the choice of a life that is the subject of the vision of Er in the conclusion to the Republic, he turns to the famous text for further inspiration. In the middle part where he deals with the courtship of Sophia, or foretaste of the beatific vision, he finds his point of departure in the climax of the formation of kings at the end of the seventh book of the great classic. In the pages on travel and the pattern of the city unlike all others, he goes to the eighth and ninth books to show that the world is full of false states and that the only true one is the "city within" where the hero finally takes refuge, though he lives in the world as we know it. At the end, where there are more echoes of the
vision of Er, the nuptials are those of the Socratic ruler and queen of the city, presided over by a true philosopher-king according to the Greek sage's advice. These affinities are impressive. Yet the substance bears the stamp of Rousseau's spirit wherein the heart and feelings play a role not accorded to them in the model. The sphere of action in his case is therefore less abstract and more familiar. He takes the Socratic world of dialectic, animates it with feeling, and brings it into the domain of ordinary life, transfigured by insight and poetic genius.

Besides, however deeply his myths and ideas are rooted in Socratic tradition, they are just as deeply embedded in Judeo-Christian imagery and belief. An example of particular relevance here is the idealization of woman that is Judeo-Christian in tone and implications, in spite of the close affinities between Sophia and the Socratic Muse. The woman to whom Emile is dedicated is a combination of both strains of our culture. She is the mythical Sophia, that "chimerical" spiritual and social order of the Contract which, in the eyes of Rousseau, could alone restore peace to human life, but never will.

1. Here we are led into what George Eliot, in Romola, calls "the inner chamber and sanctuary of life" or "the inmost cell of consciousness" (The World's Classics [London: Oxford University Press, n.d.], pp. 256, 347).
2. One chapter of the Contract remains to be discussed: see the section entitled "Viaticum" in this chapter in the conclusion of the summary of the Contract.
3. See, for example, O. C., 4:lxxxvi.
4. See chapter 2 above. In the past, few of us have connected the beginning of Emile with the end, or taken the latter seriously. Broome, in Rousseau: A Study of His Thought (London: Arnold, 1963), pp. 100 ff., shows that past interpretations border on the ridiculous.
5. Cf. Plato The Symposium (Diotima's speech reported by Socrates).
6. Rousseau was seduced by the idea as he interpreted it in his early youth, but in his literary debut was already wondering about its value thus interpreted: see, for example, the dedication of the second "Discours." Cf. the discussion of the family early in chapter 2 above.
7. In this context Burgelin, commenting upon the linking of love and perfection, refers to the Symposium and Phaedrus: O. C., 4:743 n. 1.
8. In connection with the fifth part of "Emile" Burgelin recalls the Platonic theme of pedagogical love, but does not develop the idea since that is not his task: O. C., 4:cxvii.

9. Cf. The Republic 4. 424; 6. 499. Cf. also Prov. 8:22-30, ending thus: "Then I was by him, as one brought up with him...."


13. We have hitherto observed the similarity of the two creeds but have not yet explored their relationship and its symbolic implications: see, for example, O. C., 4:729 n. 1.

14. See "Emile," p. 743. See also pp. 745 and 823. Cf. p. 599 where the vicar speaks of the man who dies for the public good. Cf. also p. 249 where Rousseau begins by depicting Spartan patriotic fervor in a context comparable to this concluding passage upon feminine education. References in this note include all quotations in the paragraph.


17. "Est-ce ma faute si j'aime ce qui n'est pas? Je ne suis point visionnaire; je ne veux point un prince, je ne cherche point Télémaque, je sais qu'il n'est qu'une fiction; je cherche quelqu'un qui lui ressemble: et pourquoi ce quelqu'un ne peut-il exister, puisque j'existe, moi qui me sens un coeur si semblable au sien? Non, ne déshonorons pas ainsi l'humanité: ne pensons pas qu'un homme aimable et vertueux ne soit qu'une chimère. Il existe, il vit, il me cherche peut-être; il cherche une âme qui le sache aimer. Mais qu'est-il? Où est-il?..."


20. In the sequel to the novel Rousseau, like Socrates, envisages the dishonoring of the Lady Philosophy and the decline of the little city, with the result that Emile, like the Socratic philosopher, is thrown back upon the order of friendship, and reason again replaces the habit of order.

21. See P. Burgelin, La Philosophie de l'existence de J.-J. Rousseau (Paris: Plon, 1957), pp. 168-80; J. Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: la transparence et l'obstacle (Paris: Plon, 1957), pp. 90-92. We have not in the past recognized the affinity of the piece with "Emile." See also L. Millet, La Pensee de Rousseau (Paris: Bordas, 1966), pp. 160-62. In the latter the unfinished statues are unidentified, but Galatea is seen as "Absolute Beauty," which is, of course, true since Rousseau's apprehension of absolute beauty is to be found in Emile. The musical score of Rousseau's "Pygmalion," unworthy of the monologue, is, with the ex-
ception of his own overture and andante, the work of Horace Coignet. The first Parisian performance is mentioned in the “Dialogues,” O. C., 1:964. For Rameau’s work see “Confessions,” O. C., 1:383.

22. The Republic 2. 361; 4. 420; 7. 540. For the Socratic artist: ibid., 3. 401. Note that the Symposium is said to possess a beauty “as of a statue.”

23. Pygmalion complains that his genius has deserted him, that the marble comes cold from his hands. Cf. C. C., 15:132, letter to Rey. 29 January, 1763: “Les disgrâces ont achevé de m’ôter le peu de génie qui me restoit... je le [cet ouvrage] trouve si froid...”

24. “Quand mon esprit éteint ne produira plus rien de grand, de beau, de dignes de moi, je montrerai ma Galathée, et je dirai: Voilà mon ouvrage!... la plus belle de mes œuvres.... Je ne sais quelle émotion j’éprouve en touchant ce voile [qui le couvre]... je crois toucher au sanctuaire de quelque Divinité.... Pygmalion! c’est une pierre; c’est ton ouvrage. Qu’importe? On sert des Dieux dans nos temples... qui n’ont pas été faits d’une autre main.” The latter words and the “santuaire de quelque Divinité” are particularly significant in the light of the mythical temple of “Emile.”

25. “… Voyez cet objet, voyez mon coeur... céleste Vénus... où est la loi de la nature dans le sentiment que j’éprouve... il me suffira de vivre en elle [Galathée].... Déesse de la beauté, épargne cet affront à la nature, qu’un si parfait modèle soit l’image de ce qui n’est pas.” The last words cited below read: “Oui, digne chef-d’œuvre de mes mains, de mon cœur et des Dieux... je t’ai donné tout mon être; je ne vivrai plus que par toi.”


28. “Cette feinte recherche n’est qu’un prétexte pour lui faire connoitre les femmes, afin qu’il sente le prix de celle qui lui convient. Dès longtemps Sophie est trouvée....”


30. For this paragraph see The Republic 5. 458-61 (laws of marriage); 10. 619 (regarding the choice of a life).


33. Cf. Socrates’ definition of the philosophic nature in The Republic 6. 485-87. A philosopher must love truth and learning, delight in “pleasures of soul” and be a spectator of all time and all existence.” With regard to the Greek philosophers, see note x to second “Discours,” O. C., 3:213.

34. “Emile,” p. 783, where on their second visit they go astray for the third time.

35. In this “house of peace” wisdom has sequestered herself in a secluded retreat where, according to the “man of peace,” the vicar, the voice of conscience may still be heard: “Emile,” pp. 601, and cf. 506-7. The Gospel story mentioned below is in Mark 14:13-16. For the banquet of wisdom: Prov. 9:1-5.
36. Burgelin also sees in Sophia a combination of Eucharis and Antiope: O. C., 4:775 n. 1, 778 n. 1, 798 n. 2. For the beauty of the virtues that is Sophia’s: The Republic 6, 504. Cf. 7, 518: “... The virtue of wisdom more than anything else contains a divine element which always remains.”

37. Rousseau often alludes to the symbolism of the book. Apart from the many examples already given there are two in the present context: pp. 777-78, where he calls his book a “novel” and refers to an earlier passage on the symbolism of Sophia’s name. Cf. p. 657. Even the governor’s comments on the name in the present case lend themselves to a symbolic interpretation: “N’y a-t-il qu’une Sophie au monde? Se ressemblent-elles toutes d’ame comme de nom? Toutes celles qu’il verra sont-elles la sienne?” To the reader of Plato these words contain veiled allusions to what Socrates calls the many “false forms” of wisdom as opposed to the one true form.

38. For the effect of finance upon human faculties see chapter 5 above and The Republic 8, 553.


40. Burgelin explains the role of the governor here in a similar manner: O. C., 4:789 n 1.

41. “Comme l’idolatre enrichit des tresors qu’il estime l’objet de son culte, et pare sur l’autel le Dieu qu’il adore, l’amant a beau voir sa maîtresse parfaite, il lui veut sans cesse ajouter de nouveaux ornemens... C’est un nouvel hommage qu’il croit lui rendre... Il lui semble que rien de beau n’est à sa place quand il n’orne pas la suprême beauté.” Rousseau adds: “Il se figure d’avance le plaisir qu’il aura de raisonner, de philosopher avec elle, il regarde comme inutile tout l’acquis qu’il ne peut point étoier à ses yeux: il rougit presque de savoir quelque chose qu’elle ne sait pas.” The Socratic distinction between useful and useless studies, the latter unrelated to wisdom, further confirms the symbolism of Sophia. (Italics mine.)

42. The references for the Socratic images are as follows: the good husbandman is at the end of book 9 (referring to the method used from the first); the carpenter is in books 3 and 10; the Olympic victors appear in books 4, 5, and 10, and the lover in books 6, 7, 9, and 10. Observe how Socrates too reviews his images.

43. This is Rousseau’s doctrine, however impractical it may be: “Emile,” p. 548 (opposes exclusive friendship). Cf. “Lettres à m. de Malesherbes,” O. C., 1:1144-45. He praises cosmopolitanism in the second “Discours,” loc. cit., p. 178, allegedly under Diderot’s influence, but disapproves of it in “Emile”: p. 249. It is important to define terms here. Patriotism is love of a man’s “own city” in the Socratic sense; nationalism is love of one’s birthplace; cosmopolitanism is love of the “false” states of this world. It is impossible to understand Rousseau without making the Socratic distinction between a man’s “own city” and the land of his birth.

44. O. C., 3:255. For Rousseau’s perplexity mentioned below see “Morceau allegorique sur la revelation” in ibid., 4:1053.

45. The Republic 6, 496-97.

46. For nationalism: “Emile,” pp. 635-36 (no concession is made to “national prejudice” in matters of religion), 828 and 831-32 (Emile travels to avoid the influence of national prejudice), 855 (he maintains correspondence abroad for the same purpose). For the problem of patriotism and humanitarianism see “Lettres de la montagne,” O. C., 3:706 n. See chapter 5 above, n. 71.

[380]
47. Rousseau is opposing the "inner (or secret) doctrine" of his contemporaries that favored the inclinations of the heart: cf. his "Observations" on Stanislas' reply to the first "Discours"; O. C., 3:46 ff. Cf. "Confessions," loc. cit., p. 468. He condemns it too in the first and third "Dialogues" and in the third of the "Rêveries"; see, for example, O. C., 1:1022. Cf. C. C., 4:162, letter to T. Tronchin, 27 February 1757, where he opposes the idea of following the inclinations. Cf. "Lettre à m. de Franquières." O. C., 4:1143.


50. For the age: O. C., 4:lxxxv and 833 n. 3.

51. See note 14 above.

52. The Republic 9. 589-92. When Jean-Jacques asks Emile what kind of man he intends to be, he is quoting from ibid., 2. 365.

53. Burgelin proposes the comparison: O. C., 4:836 n. 1.

54. The phrase "what is not" is applied to Emile, Sophia, and, by implication, to the city of the Contrat in "Emile," pp. 762, 821, 836-37.


59. The whole passage reads: "Je me souviens que mes biens furent la cause de nos recherches. Vous prouviez tres solidement que je ne pouvois garder a la fois ma richesse et ma liberté, mais quand vous vouliez que je fusse a la fois libre et sans besoins, vous vouliez deux choses incompatibles, car je ne saurais me tirer de la dependance des hommes [in the matter of the necessities of life] qu'en rentrant sous celle de la nature."

60. See, for example, O. C., 4:858 n. 1. But the laws are not defined.

61. See "Considérations," loc. cit., pp. 1013-29 (especially 1018) on the military system and the plan to subject members of the government to a very gradual system of promotions.

62. Rousseau finally solves what seemed to him like a contradiction in Socrates, who reveals true laws to men and then submits to false ones.


64. Rousseau shows the same moderation in the "Considérations," regarding the admission of the middle classes to government and the freeing of peasants in Poland: loc. cit., pp. 1024 ff.


[381]
66. See chapter 5 above, note 94.
67. See, for example, O. C., 1:201 n. 1. Burgelin, in O. C., 4:866 n. 1, is right to observe that "reason must necessarily play a part in everything."
68. See pp. 267-68.
69. The Republic 5. 459.
71. See, for example, O. C., 4:863 n. 1.
72. The Republic 9. 590-91. The "habit of good order" that is Rousseau's object is also that of Socrates: ibid., 4. 425.
73. See p. 867 and cf. p. 799, "... Ici finit ma longue tâche, et commence celle d'un autre. J'abdique aujourd'hui l'autorité que vous m'avez confiée, et voici désormais votre gouverneur."