This commentary of *Emile* and the *Social Contract* reveals Rousseau in a new light by dwelling upon several aspects of his work that have not previously been explored. Yet they are significant enough not merely to modify rather seriously but also to enlarge and clarify his personal image and his place in the history of both literature and ideas.

The collation has entailed study from three points of view: historical, ideological, and literary or aesthetic including the mythological. I now propose to define briefly the advantages derived from each of these aspects in turn. At the same time, in every case I shall recall once more that we have the authorization, or rather, invitation, of the writer himself to approach his books, and particularly those under discussion, in the ways enumerated. I have examined them on the basis of his own evidence in order to learn whether his words are true or false, and I have discovered that they are abundantly true.

Let me deal first with the historical implications of my research. This comparison of *Emile* with the *Contract*, while accomplishing the initial purpose of investigating the Aemilian myths and their value to express the author's philosophy translated into abstract terms in the companion volume, has come upon and brought to attention some rather startling affinities between him and antiquity that help to situate him more precisely in the main currents of occidental civilization. The discoveries in question are a major feature of the collation and can hardly be lightly dismissed. That is especially true if, as Rousseau himself says, knowledge is mainly an awareness of relationships; for in that case not to know his affinities, herein revealed to a
vaster and fuller extent than ever before, is not to know him. The foregoing inquiry shows how scrupulously he cultivates his classical and religious inheritance, especially in the two books it fuses into one. It demonstrates that he belongs to Greek and biblical tradition far more intimately than we have hitherto supposed. It proves that he who has been called "the first modern man" preaches a doctrine as old as Christ or Socrates or, rather, Solomon. I emphasize all three since, although his ties with Socrates, Plato, and classical Greco-Roman literature and philosophy emerge rather impressively from a collation of this kind, so do his aesthetic and ideological associations with Solomon and Christ. The Platonic dialogues, the Solomonic books of the Old Testament, the Gospel stories and apostolic epistles have all left their mark on his thought, which has profited thereby as much as his art as a writer is enhanced by Socratic and biblical imagery. These are facts that we can no longer overlook and to which we can hardly remain indifferent. It is imperative to know that some of the greatest works of our culture are inseparable from one another and that Rousseau is a vital link in the chain extending from ancient Judaical and classical pagan civilizations to their modern Judeo-Christian and romantic counterparts.

By heeding his own admissions, we might long since have come to a better understanding of his affiliations, which, incidentally, I do not pretend to have exhausted in all their depth and immensity. Or we might at least have been alerted to their gravity, if we were too uninformed about Socrates, Plato, or the Bible to recognize them for what they are. For example, when he says that his writings are mere commentaries on the Scriptures, and that his masters are Plato, or Socrates, and Christ, to whom he repeatedly pays tribute in his books, we might have listened more solicitously or taken him more seriously. But in order to fathom his meaning, it is not enough to scrutinize passages in his work where such open acknowledgments occur. It is necessary to go much deeper and commit to memory the
acknowledged sources so that we might discern their verifiable presence in Rousseauist texts where they are barely mentioned or not at all.

Most readers will be especially struck by the enormous extent of his debt to Greek philosophy. Of course, this debt has not been completely ignored in the past. For example, the Spartan strain coming through Plutarch has always been known. But that is because it is so conspicuous and lacking in subtlety that it could hardly be disregarded. Some notice has also been taken of the influence of Socrates and Plato upon him, and small wonder since in the second Discourse that heralds his future he virtually begins thus: “I shall suppose myself in the Lyceum of Athens, repeating the lessons of my masters, with Plato and Xenocrates for judges, and the whole human race for my audience.” This phrase might well be applied to his entire career as a writer. Yet the influence to which it testifies has never been probed and measured in its complex, far-reaching, and widespread ramifications throughout the very warp and woof of his greatest works. The main reason is probably that its immense scope is most easily visible through an evaluation of myths; and although the Platonic and Socratic ones have been carefully appraised, Rousseau’s have gone almost totally unobserved. Unfortunately for us, since the similarity of his imagery to that of Socrates permits a most enlightening comparison of texts.

In Emile he confesses his debt to Socrates or Plato at crucial points in every part of the book. We have hitherto closed our eyes to this fact, but it is nevertheless true. He begins with a moving tribute to the Republic and calls it the finest treatise of education that has ever been written. True, he puts us off the scent by saying that it gives one an idea of public education and then failing to add that in the dialogue the latter is merely an image of private education, which is the real theme of the book as it is of his own. But it behooves us the readers to see that, for it is obvious to anyone who takes the trouble to familiarize himself with the great
classic. In the second part he makes an unmistakable gesture of gratitude to his Greek master at the very moment when he is preparing to broach the education of his “guardian of the constitution” and the laws. Suddenly he stops to hold up for our admiration the example he follows: “Plato in his republic who is considered so stern teaches children only through festivals, games, songs, and amusements.” We have only to proceed from there and take the hint furnished by himself to see that the Socratic guardian is the model of the Rousseauist and that their education is the same. At a critical juncture in the third part Socrates himself materializes in flesh and blood to teach Emile the most solemn lesson he has to learn, namely, that he requires to be governed by superior powers. As if this clue were not enough, at another turning point in the same part where the author proposes as a rule of instruction whatever it is useful to know, he goes out of his way to tell us that he is imitating Socrates. He says so undeniably. For, having induced Emile to want to know only what is useful and to ask, at every step taken by himself and his governor, “What is the use of that?”, the author comments: “Anyone who is taught to want to know only what is useful interrogates like Socrates.” This is a frank, outspoken assertion that he is using the word useful in the Socratic sense. He is actually referring to the Platonic text where the sage himself establishes this law of learning and defines what he means by it. If we go to the text indicated, as we are virtually invited to do, we literally fall upon the source material of his whole third part. It is disastrous to pass over these telling signs of the master’s presence in Emile. There are more in the fourth part. In the pages on Plutarch we are told that Emile imitates no one, not even Socrates or Cato. We ought to have seen that Jean-Jacques does and so does the author, especially since throughout the book the former consistently undertakes studies usually assigned to children. In the same fourth part, in the profession of faith, Socrates stands at the summit of both the affirmative and negative
phases of the piece. For instance, in the affirmative one, where Rousseau tries to identify the principle of conscience, he professedly avoids any doctrine that, like La Rochefoucauld’s, for example, would degrade Socrates or Regulus by attributing virtue to selfishness. Moreover, in discussing revelation in the negative phase of the creed, he reaches one of the greatest heights of eloquence in the book in the famous contrast between Christ and Socrates. Besides, again in the fourth part, in facing the vital issue of aesthetics, he has recourse to Plato’s Symposium as well as to Virgil and Tibullus to perfect Emile’s taste. In the fifth part he begins with a new tribute to the master, however ambiguous. Again he makes a pretense of differing from him, this time in the matter of feminine education as discussed in the Republic; but then he proceeds to display quite plainly that their differences in this case are simply a matter of imagery since he, unlike Socrates, uses the home and family to exteriorize the city. At the same time he borrows Socratic imagery to show that supposedly wise order of things embodied in the heroine. Later, when his heroes set out first in search of Sophia or wisdom and then in quest of the Rousseauist city, they are said to “travel” like Plato, which in both contexts is tantamount to admitting symbolically that they follow him, as in fact they do. Thus throughout the novel Rousseau loudly proclaims his debt to Socrates and the Platonic dialogues, especially the Republic and Symposium.

His own sayings are amply verified by an analysis of texts, where the evidence of close relationships between him and his Greek masters is overwhelming. The similarity of Socratic and Aemilian images, that first stirs the mind to suspect links between them, necessarily leads the classical scholar from one book to the other, and then the perception of ideological identity follows apace. Admittedly, many writers and thinkers have said the same things as Rousseau or Socrates. But it is by no mere coincidence, especially after the repeated avowals recorded above, that Socrates in
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the Republic and Rousseau in Emile—and less obviously in the Contract—consistently convey the same ideas, usually in identical words and metaphors, and always according to an analogous pattern, with only the slightest variations from title page to colophon. The points of contact between them are too numerous to be accidental. Rousseau's debt turns out to be massive. From a confrontation of texts comes the astonishing realization that Emile in particular might well be taken for a Rousseauist version of the Republic.

To admit this, it is enough to reflect upon only a few of the vast correspondences between them, even without including the identical myths that I shall discuss below. The main problem of Emile and indeed of all Rousseau's works is Socratic. I refer to the sphinx-like riddle of wisdom and happiness that he makes a point of formulating four times in the novel, as Socrates does in the Republic, and each time he does so in exactly the same context as the sage. Moreover, in Emile and the Contract, as in the Republic, early reflections upon so-called morality and justice in our confused world lead to the institution of an ideal order of things. In addition, in the case of all three books the latter is presented by way of an analogy between the soul and the city. And in all cases the formation of the moral being is almost identical. More still: as we have seen, the three great "waves" that Socrates must first overcome before he can establish his city are closely linked with the triple-tiered foundation of the Rousseauist order of city or of soul. In fact, the dominant leitmotiv of Emile, which is greatly expanded in the fourth part, is taken from the Republic. This is the idea of the friendship of reason for nature, used to represent the bonds that unite the freemen of the Rousseauist city. Finally, the entire fifth part is inspired by the Socratic lover of wisdom who alone can make the city a reality. These affinities are only a sampling of the many to be gleaned by following Rousseau as he makes his way through the Republic in the pages of the companion volumes that form the central work of his career.
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Again these are facts that we have never before suspected and can hardly go on ignoring. If we continue to expound his philosophy without taking them into account, we renounce fruitful possibilities of comprehension, whether or not he construes his sources correctly. For here I must insist that, in pointing to his dependence upon Socrates and Plato, I do not mean to imply that his interpretation of the Greek thinkers is orthodox. It may not be. That is for philosophers and political scientists to decide. My task is rather to add to our knowledge of the modern writer by bringing out affiliations hitherto unseen.

Indeed, a perception of them leads to a new understanding of *Emile* and the *Contract*, and broadens, deepens, and enriches our appreciation of both. We have formerly treated *Emile* as a pedagogical manual and the *Contract* as a political handbook in the narrowest sense of the words, whereas in fact both are philosophical works. They are quite as philosophical as the *Republic*, which, according to Rousseau, is not a political work at all but a treatise on education or, if we wish, on legislation. So are his own books.

Let us consider the *Contract* first to see how our knowledge of the book has been expanded by an awareness of its Socratic origins. There the author's purpose is not to provide the pattern of an earthly city for founders to follow. By imagining that it is, we reduce the scope of the treatise and minimize its value. It is true that, like Socrates and for the same reasons of clarity, he fancies the city mythically taking shape in the book. It is also true that, in other publications and at the invitation of statesmen, he adapts his principles to a new constitution for Corsica and a government for Poland. But it is he himself who assumes the formidable task, he who is the legislator of his own city of the *Contract*, as Socrates is of his, or so he claims, and who alone knows the philosophical implications of his "system." Moreover, in doing so, he is obliged to make concessions and modifications to adjust the scheme to a sphere for
which it was not really meant. Furthermore, he has no illu­sions at all about the practical or pragmatic usefulness of his ideas in that sphere, even in a mitigated form. In their original idealistic cast they would be useful only in the Socratic sense. And so he says repeatedly that his city does not exist and never will, and that if it did, men would be like blocks of wood or, to use Socrates’ word, like posts. He even says that, if he were a philosopher-king (“sage et roi”) in our world and could found such a city and change men accordingly, he would decline to do so.¹ In other words, he does not seriously visualize a city in the ordinary sense of the word governed according to his abstract principles, any more than his Greek master does. The Rousseauist city, like the Socratic one, exists in idea only. Since its pattern is a concept of the soul in its pristine purity and made in the image of God, it is itself proposed as the true sage’s pattern of educational or legislative processes, a pattern that is several times evoked in the Republic and in matching passages of Emile. It is intended to reflect a sublime prototype or mythical model of civil or civilized life that “he who desires may behold, and beholding, may set his own house in order.” The Rousseauist sage, like the Socratic, does precisely that. He orders, preserves, and governs his own life after the manner of that ideal city, as God orders, preserves, and governs the universe. He is a creator of order like the Maker or, rather, like the Socratic and Rousseauist carpenter who in the Republic is only once removed from the Artist of artists.

He accomplishes his purpose, in the view of both Soc­rates and his disciple, by no other means than an act of his own enlightened will. Nothing else can liberate a man’s powers or “force him to be free” in Rousseau’s own phraseology. For him as for his master nothing else is even lawful. To impose such restraint upon others is lawless, unless those “others” correspond Socratically to a man’s own faculties imaginatively exteriorized. Such action is also futile since no one can be changed from the outside. Rous­
seau's whole philosophy is built around this idea, which is entirely Socratic. In the vision of Er in the Republic, which I must again recall to the reader's mind, the Greek sage too shows the great danger of having men behave like posts. There we see souls, about to be reborn, ascend from earth and descend from heaven to a place where they are bidden to choose among samples of lives set before them and thus assume responsibility for their own destiny. Socrates explains that those who came from heaven and in a former life had dwelt in a well-ordered state made an unwise choice; their virtue was a matter of habit only, and they had no philosophy: "They had never been schooled by trial whereas the pilgrims who came from earth, having themselves suffered and seen others suffer, were not in a hurry to choose." Rousseau sees the same danger in any outward authority, except in the case of children, who must be taught to be sages and to need neither external laws nor government but only those of the Contract. That being so, what is the use of complaining, as we have been doing, that a city like his cannot exist on earth, since he was the first to say so, and that our fate would be worse if it did, since no one could agree more completely than he does? And what is the use of arguing about his demand for a unanimous whole and about the effects of such a demand upon majority rule, since he is simply saying that a true sage must be single-minded?

As for Emile, it too now appears in a fresh light since a study of its intimate affinities with Socrates throws into new and larger perspective the real theme of the book and true preoccupations of the author, which, as in the case of the Contract, are self-discipline and self-government. In the fifth of the Letters from the Mount Rousseau declares that, in the preface to the novel and several times in the text thereof, he indicates that such is his subject. There he writes: "It is a question of a new system of education [in the sense in which he applies the term to the Republic] whose plan I submit to the inspection of sages, and not a
method for fathers and mothers, which never even entered
my mind. If sometimes, in common enough imagery, I seem
to address them, it is to make myself better under­
stood...." As we have witnessed, he makes himself
thoroughly clear, whatever imagery he uses. For example,
he says in the opening pages of *Emile* that his system would
be effective only if employed by someone who had himself
been educated according to it. The governor, he contends,
must be formed for his pupil and may undertake only one
education and no more. This can only mean, as Socrates
says, that the governor, who is the embodiment of reason
taught by experience, must foster and cultivate natural man
within the human creature of which he is a part. The only
education a man may pursue is his own. That is the lesson
conveyed in *Emile*. There Rousseau appropriates this Soc­
ratic conclusion in a very personal way as we have seen. In
speaking of the inner life of the sage, he is speaking of his
own as well as ours, and his ideal story of the race is that of
his own spiritual pilgrimage. Emile is natural man within
himself and supposedly in us all, conceived on the road to
Vincennes in 1749, or later in the forest of Saint-Germain,
and finally born or reborn at Montmorency. Jean-Jacques is
the "helmsman," or reason in the service of human nature,
who has learned the secrets of spiritual life "in the school of
misfortune" and who undertakes to guide the whole moral
being to wisdom and happiness. As we now know and need
not prove again, the writer admits the autobiographical
value of his work at every critical turning point in the novel:
when the governor subscribes to the oath of the covenant
that commits him to respect the constitution and rule ac­
cordingly; when Emile for his part is drawn into the same
conscious commitment; and finally when the moral or so­
cial person applies these principles in the conduct of life and
particularly in the innermost recesses of the spirit where
Sophia, or wisdom, abides. Rousseau implicitly admits it
again when his hero, searching through the world for a city
where alone he can live happily with her, is shown a pattern
of the writer's own city of the *Contract* whose laws and government, he learns, are enshrined within the sage since it is in fact a pattern for his formation.

That formation, Socratic in almost every respect, goes much further than we have formerly thought. Usually, the first two parts of the book are understood to deal with the nature of the sensitive being, the third with the development of judgment in the active being, the fourth with the growth of the reasonable being, and the fifth with a love story. This interpretation is, of course, true as far as it goes. But it overlooks the training of the Rousseauist will whose acts are Socratic laws and are defined accordingly, as it also overlooks the training of reason in the application of those laws or in the art of Socratic kingship. It overlooks too the fact that the author follows step by step the education of the Socratic guardian and philosopher-king, which is the discipline imposed by the sage upon himself. Besides, its exclusively literal and even positivistic approach has led us to complain that he neglects to follow his original intention and deal with wisdom in the love story; but in truth there, as much as anywhere, he speaks of little else, although he does so in Socratic imagery. Any work on *Emile* that ignores this, as well as the laws and acts of kingship, requires to be supplemented by fresh study. We *must* come to terms philosophically with the fifth part. We must treat it as if it were as essential to the story of the Rousseauist sage's education as the corresponding phase in the case of the Socratic, since it really is. It is all the more so, not only because it contains more than a quarter of the book, but because it relates to the most important phase, namely, manners, customs, and opinion, which are the "keystone of the vault" of the *Contract* as they are in the *Republic*. It is therefore necessarily connected with earlier parts, notably the early training of taste through beautiful sights and sounds, the Socratic orientation of reason, Sophia's first portrait, Emile's studies in aesthetics, and the essay on wealth, or rather, on happiness. wisdom, and beauty. We
may conclude that insight into the historical relationships of the work enlarges our knowledge of it to the same extent as is the case with the *Contract*.

Our knowledge of both is also increased by a comparison of the two books with one another. For this approach, too, we have the writer's authorization in his correspondence as well as in *Emile* itself. And his authorization proves to be justified. It is quite true, as he says in a letter of 23 May 1762, that the *Contract* is a sort of appendix to *Emile* and that both together make a complete whole. With equal justification Jean-Jacques in the text of the novel implies the same thing. When he sets out to provide the hero with an archetype of the ideal city that is really a pattern to lead him autonomously to Sophia, he explains that he is motivated by an oath sworn at the beginning of Emile's education and binding him to find wisdom and happiness for them both. The results of that search are therefore to be found not only in his work heretofore but also in the synopsis of the *Contract*, anticipated by his words and following thereafter.

These assertions of the author have been verified in the foregoing collation. The two productions, far from representing a cleavage in his mind, as we have thought in the past, are essentially one and are consequently more closely bound together than has been supposed even by recent critics who have pointed to links between them. In fact, the affinities of both to the *Republic* are enough to arouse suspicions about their mutual connections. The same affinities make the reader more sensitive to the myths of *Emile*, which provide easier access to the ideas they convey and help to bring out the identity of the latter and those of the appendix. Indeed, the parables and myths of the novel consistently turn out to be an allegorical version of doctrines of which the *Contract* is merely an abstract. The latter reduces the allegories to a state of disembodied ideas that in their turn are infused with fresh life by a collation with the imageries of the master work. My primary purpose herein has been to demonstrate this rather than to evaluate ideas
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as such. I have sought to achieve that purpose not abstractly but as concretely as possible by means of a juxtaposition and comparison of texts, a method suited to detect and reveal their kinship. The results constitute another major aspect of this study. They show that both treatises evolve according to a single plan—which is that of the Republic—the Contract following the novel step by step and carefully respecting the order of its composition as the two move together through four parts without ever taking leave of each other. My research also proves that the fifth part of Emile is a synthesis and consummation of all that precedes. Moreover, the intimate relationship of texts has emerged as self-evident. In other words, the texts have lent themselves freely to collation and comparison without being beaten into submission or tortured in any way. That is further proof that they do indeed match one another perfectly, as the author says.

It is, of course, important to be aware of this. Not that it matters in an absolute sense whether his thought actually possesses unity or does not. But it concerns cultured persons in general and scholars in particular to know the facts of the case.

The realization that the two books are basically one modifies our view of both as much as an understanding of their associations with the Republic does. It confirms that Emile is as certainly a treatise on citizenship, law, and self-government as the Contract is. It also discloses that the latter, even though its principles are as universal, eternal, and therefore as static as those of Emile, presents them by way of a gradually evolving educational process as much as the so-called pedagogical work does. Rousseau like Socrates "imagines the State in process of creation" to see "the justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also." Both his books describe one and the same process. A consciousness of this shows further what their affiliations with Socratic thought accentuates, namely, that each one deals with faculties of soul, their alleged natural or normal
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constitution and proper administration to which every man of understanding is invited to accommodate his life. In both Rousseau proposes to sages a solemn spiritual commitment that integrates the entire person or human creature into a closely knit whole, subjects all its parts to the reasonable will, and thereby brings it into communion with great leaders of the past and present, especially his own chosen masters. The intricate and presumably well-balanced moral relationships that result in the inner realm are those of an ideal city, and for him they must prevail in civilized life, although they do not and cannot materialize in a political order in the external world. His ultimate and proper domain, like that of Socrates, is the soul, from which, in his eyes, all social reform must come. Consequently, the only remedy he favors to heal the disorders of the world is integrated, humanistic man as opposed to the amoral savage or his immoral modern counterpart. Any other scheme is, in his opinion, sheer quackery. He proposes that solution even though such a man has never been seen since the time of Socrates or Christ. He is exhorting men to come out of the woods and abandon their primitive, unsocial, or anti-social ways not by changing material things in the sphere of actuality but by changing life through the action of the spirit, as we have seen. For him that is the only way to create a real bond among them and to generate sympathy, friendship, and love in their midst, at least theoretically. Through that bond alone the unearthly new Geneva, Sparta, or Aemilian Rome of his desires really existed in his imagination and filled him with characteristic ardor for "his own city" or ideal image of the soul. His patriotic fervor, undiminished after the renunciation of his Genevan citizenship, has nothing to do with the Calvinist republic or national prejudice on behalf of the land of his birth. Theoretically it may be combined with the love of human nature in mankind since that love is supposedly its very source, however difficult it may be in practice for most of us to embrace the race of men, including the most disordered souls, and
love them all with equal energy. On the other hand, the same fervor can hardly be reconciled with cosmopolitanism, which for Rousseau means a love of the false states of this world, states quite alien to his own view of the true one as seen in the two books under discussion. The interrelationships of the companion volumes greatly clarify his philosophical and psychological aspirations in both.

The consciousness of their intrinsic identity increases our knowledge of them in other ways too. For instance, a collation of the *Contract* with *Emile* explains the presence in the former of certain chapters in the second, third, and fourth parts hitherto deemed repetitious or regarded as useless padding. In fact, it reclaims for readers eight chapters of the treatise, formerly as lost to criticism as most of the fifth part of *Emile*. It reveals that, far from being expendable as we have always believed, they are among the most significant of all. For example, in the past—and this applies to all critics without exception who have written on the subject—we have been setting aside and eliminating from serious consideration chapters 8, 9, and 10 of the second part. Since in those chapters Rousseau defines his laws, as a study of the texts shows in the light of a collation with *Emile* and comparison with the *Republic*, we must now admit that we have heretofore failed to recognize the laws for what they are. In the third part we have hitherto been willing to dispense with chapter 8, where he discusses the effects of wealth on government and maintains that the freest men are those with fewest needs and equivalent material resources. That is one of the most vital and central chapters in the book, for he formulates therein a fundamental rule of the Rousseauist and Socratic order of life. In the fourth book we have in the past been disposed to treat lightly chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. We have dismissed them as affording a rather irrelevant essay upon primitive Roman institutions. We may as well lop off the heads from what Socrates calls in the *Republic* the statues of his heroes. For in chapter 4 Rousseau brings his Socratic city to the birth,
as we can see if we decipher the imagery and compare it with *Emile*. In chapters 5 and 6 he deals with very real powers necessary for good government and indispensable to preserve a balance of faculties, which, in his Socratic view, is the mainspring of a felicitous inner life. The same may be said of chapter 7. Indeed, if we ignore it, we are ignoring what he himself calls the most important laws of all—manners, customs, and opinion, which are the "keystone of the vault" not only of the *Contract* but of *Emile* too, or rather, of his whole philosophy. The reader can see for himself how urgent it is for political scientists and philosophers to be informed of the bearing and scope of these chapters that correspond to some of the most significant parts of *Emile*. As a collation shows, the said chapters must be accepted as an integral part of the treatise, and their relevance and effectiveness must be recognized if we are to achieve even an elementary knowledge of the work and its author.

There is still more to be said about the value of a collation of the two books in question. As we have seen, the method leads to a clearer conception of the subject of each part of *Emile*. The main themes are as follows: first, reflections upon the covenant of friendship; second, the training of the will and other powers through the application of the laws of necessity and freedom, the latter being that of negative education and including the one about the natural bent; third, the training of reason in the art of government or kingship; fourth, initiation into social order; and finally, the foretaste of wisdom and civil order, all within the precincts of inner life as in the case of the *Republic*. In the end the social contract of friendship is perfected by the civil contract of marriage, which brings to fulfillment all principles and powers called into play from the first and symbolizes initiation into the ultimate beatific vision of wisdom.

As I have said, the associations of *Emile* and the *Contract* with one another and the *Republic* can best be recognized by approaching Rousseau's masterwork through his
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aesthetics, including his use of myths. The examination of this aspect of the novel is another basic contribution of the present study to Rousseauist scholarship. In the past what I have called the artistic, imaginative content of the book has been overshadowed by ideological theorizing or stylistic, positivistic analysis. To my knowledge it has never been the subject of a published commentary. The fact that it has been overlooked results in a serious lacuna in the Rousseauist bibliography. The omission is serious not only because the matter is interesting in itself but especially because a treatment of it leads to worthwhile historical and ideological disclosures. The omission is all the more grave by reason of the author's own statements in the text of the book where he underlines the role of aesthetics in his philosophy and also says quite frankly that he is using the language of symbolic expression in his writing. "All my ideas are in images," says he in the fourth book of the memoirs in a phrase comparable to others in *Emile*. His own words are an open invitation to consider the novel from a literary and artistic standpoint and to cope with the problems entailed therein. In order to see how imperative it is to do so, one has only to formulate a few conclusions from the foregoing study relating first to his aesthetics in general and finally to his use of myths.

The aesthetic approach is authorized in both *Emile* and the companion volume, where Rousseau teaches that taste guides the course of human life. He does so especially in the second and fourth parts of each and in the fifth part of *Emile*. In the *Contract* his aforementioned "keystone of the vault" or law of opinion defines what is beautiful or pleasing, and honorable or admirable, and thereby shapes manners and customs of which the censor is custodian. For the author the secret of what we judge good or evil is to be found in what we believe beautiful and honorable or the reverse. The doctrine is that of Socrates, who contends, by an identical process of reasoning, that the city stands or falls on the nature of its pleasures. The same doctrine reap-
pears in *Emile* where the law of opinion governing the beautiful or honorable is regarded as determining the success of all others. For example, Rousseau is guided by this conviction in the second part where he broaches the education of his guardian of the laws, and makes ethics and aesthetics as inseparable as they are for his master, who never dissociates the two. In the third part he professes to teach what is “useful” but openly admits that he is employing the word as does the Greek sage, for whom the only useful knowledge is whatever is related not to shopkeeping but to the pursuit of the beautiful and the good. In the fourth part the social and moral order is Socratically crowned by aesthetics, which are again linked with ethics in the first portrait of Sophia, and in *Emile*’s studies in taste, culminating in the essay on the ecstatic contemplation of the beautiful and the good where the whole fifth part is foreshadowed. Obviously beauty is of primary concern to Rousseau in both *Emile* and the *Contract*.

For that very reason he is far from indifferent to the imaginative content of the masterwork in particular. He takes to heart his own precept that it is important to please men in order to serve them, and that “the art of writing is no idle [or useless] pursuit when it is employed to proclaim the truth.”

The latter maxim is a Rousseauist form of the Socratic one that the useful is whatever leads toward truth, meaning moral truth or the beautiful and the good. In pursuing this object and seeking to please, the author of *Emile* intends to behave like a Socratic artist. He never loses sight of the context of the *Republic* from which the leitmotiv of his book is taken. There the sage exhorts all artists to express in their works that grace and harmony which, like goodness and virtue, are said to depend on “the true simplicity of a rightly and nobly ordered mind and character.” He expels from his republic those who depict images of moral deformity and admits only the ones who are gifted to discern the beauty that is “the effluence of fair works” and draws the soul into likeness and sympathy or friend-
ship with the beauty of reason. This passage and its sequel, to which Rousseau was so deeply indebted for the main theme of his book, was also decisive in shaping its artistic character, at least in his own intentions. As we saw in Pygmalion, he liked to imagine that his work was as faultless in beauty as the "statues" of Socrates' kings in the great classic. The Socratic concept of the artist who portrays only the beautiful and the good is clearly the ideal to which he aspires in Emile.

The question arises as to how it is possible to reconcile those aspirations with the professed aim of his literary art, which is to portray the human heart in its folly and its misery, as well as moral and psychological truth in the absolute sense. The difficulty is more apparent than real. Everywhere in Emile, and even in the last part, we are constantly alive to the presence of an alien world that, although it never becomes obtrusive enough to overshadow the ideal order or usurp the center of the stage, is still the background of the story. Rousseau shows how its existence stirs the soul to life and moves it to exercise its powers, of which we are never really conscious until they are challenged. For example, the Savoyard vicar becomes aware of the soul only as a result of the contradiction between man's evil plight and the excellence of his nature. In Emile that contrast is something with which the human spirit must contend, and this fact accentuates the psychological realism of the book in spite of its lofty idealism.

For the author does, in fact, adhere therein to the main purpose of his "classical" aesthetic doctrine. He uses a variety of visual forms to portray his concept of universal and eternal human qualities and especially the inner world, its principles, orderly processes, threatened deviations, and existing and ideal relationships with the material and moral environment. The same is necessarily true of the Contract. In both, notwithstanding the rarified atmosphere that distinguishes them from his other works, he betrays exactly the same interest in human psychology as he does
ROUSSEAU'S SOCRATIC AEMILIAN MYTHS

everywhere else. In all of them he makes a profound and comprehensive study of inner man (including the actual and the "true"), which, like the "classical" writers of antiquity or of the French seventeenth century, he regards as the one theme worthy of literature. And in the two books in question the results are as valid or as invalid as they are anywhere else in his work, since they are no different. It is only the external form that varies from the early Discourses to the last autobiographical compositions, his researches being presented in a variety of disguises. They may take on the air of a historical survey or a philosophy of religion or citizenship or a pedagogical treatise or even a story of his own life. But behind the disguises there is always a preoccupation with man in general, which was consistently a prime motive of his writings however we may evaluate the results. In this respect, as in many others, he stands in direct antithesis to his famous contemporaries. The abyss between them lies largely in a difference in attitude toward literature. They use it as a pretext for moral, religious, or political theorizing and turn it into a glorified kind of propaganda. He takes the opposite course. For example, in Emile he uses the social, religious, and political preoccupations of the day as pretexts for artistic creativity, and turns them into the mythical substance of literature in the traditional sense of the word with its psychological and spiritual implications.

In doing so, he is guided not only by his readings but especially by a personal intuitive vision of man and the world, based upon observation and experience and supplemented by what we call "classical" common sense. His appeal to that faculty in the pedagogical novel and elsewhere also sets him apart, at least in his own eyes, from some of the other great literary men of his time. According to him, they constructed their theories and "philosophical" systems by means of speculative reason frequently divorced from the facts of reality. Consequently he complains of their lack of psychological realism. By contrast he pro-
fesses to rely upon knowledge and judgment acquired by personal contact with beings and things. In fact, Emile and the Contract testify to a richly varied cultivation of life and a long, patient, and tenacious application of the mind to arrive at a conception of spiritual truth on that basis. We may therefore conclude that his "classical" qualities are authentic. They result from a genuine effort on his part to adhere to his Greco-Latin aesthetic profession of faith. That is true even though when he carries the doctrine into the sphere of practical creative activity, his achievements may be unorthodox at the same time as they become suffused with "romantic" lyricism.

If they are thus transformed, it is because, as we have seen, his observation of the nature of man and the human condition is also largely based upon a close watching of his own soul and inner life. Of course, that was likewise the case with Montaigne, whom he greatly admired and who was the first French litterateur to probe the mysteries of the human spirit by plumbing the depths of his own. Rousseau's mode of procedure is much the same in Emile, where, however, he employs it rigorously enough to pass beyond the innermost recesses of the self and reach general characteristics that are common to us all and always have been. But it is largely the subjective approach that explains his peculiar view of the soul, as well as his emotional presentation of it in the two main parts of the novel. This emotional quality, typical of him, belongs to Judeo-Christian art from the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century. His "romantic" embrace of the "classical" psychological object does not necessarily preclude a realistic apprehension of human nature, at least in some aspects of it if not in all. His introspective attitude may even intensify his grasp of the theme. The reader must decide that matter for himself.

Rousseau, like his famous models, formulates the results of his psychological research, particularly in Emile, in the language of symbolic expression, as he himself says. Even
if he had not said so, we might have surmised that he was having recourse to myths and parables because of his professed predilection for Plato and the Bible, which swarm with both. Yet by comparison with the ancient ones, his own are practically unknown. The investigation of them is one of the foremost aims of this study, since, as I have hinted, a collation of *Emile* with the *Contract* would be virtually impossible without it. That inquiry has shown that the Aemilian myths are, almost without exception, identical with those of the writer’s sources and, like his psychology, are “romantic” and “classical,” Greek and biblical at once. They represent fragments of a past more than 2,500 or rather 3,000 years old, rearranged and harmonized into a new organism designed to give outward expression to the author’s intellectual purpose. The main reason we have not previously detected them or dealt with them on a large scale is that Rousseau transmutes their substance and character into his own and then handles them with the subtlety and unostentatiousness of a “classical” writer. But once we sense their existence, we discover that they make only the most reasonable demands upon the insight and sensitivity of anyone who tries to fathom them.

By way of conclusion, it might be helpful to review a few of the salient images in the collation and bring out their Socratic and Judeo-Christian qualities and ideological implications. This will provide an opportunity to gather together into a brief synthesis some of the results achieved in all three aspects of the work: the inquiry into Rousseau’s Socratic and Judeo-Christian affinities in image and idea; the comparison of *Emile* and the *Contract*; and the exploration of his use of mythical forms that leads to a revelation of the aforesaid affinities and thereby renews, expands, and enhances our knowledge of his writings and especially of these two.

Apart from the Socratic and Judeo-Christian analogy of soul and city, the most impressive of all images is the biblical one of the temple that is the key to the structure of
Emile and turns into a Socratic "citadel of the soul" in the Contract. In spite of the origin of the image, the temple of the book is basically of Greek design. Indeed, the foregoing study shows that in form as well as content the novel is an outstanding monument of the Greek revival in French art. Yet this study also demonstrates that the mythical temple is gradually transfigured in character to conform with the biblical nature of the image, especially in the innermost chamber where the intimate, inward mystic spirit of Christianity prevails as a powerful source of poetic lyricism and immense psychological expansion. In fine, the transcendental concept of the temple structure, combining elements affiliated with both traditions, is eminently suited to convey the idea that some of the choicest features of occidental culture provide the framework of the author's art and thought.

Within this architectonic ensemble innumerable other images testify to a similar accommodation of equally varied ingredients of artistic and intellectual inspiration. The few that are not Socratic and biblical are borrowed from Robinson Crusoe, Plutarch, La Fontaine, and Fenelon. I shall choose examples from each of the five parts of the masterpiece and indicate their historical origins and ideological associations.

In the first part, the dedication of the book to a mother, the new Geneva and city of Sophia or wisdom, whose citizens are her children, provides an initial link not only with the Social Contract, written in honor of the same mythical city, but also with the Socratic republic, which is mother and nurse of its citizens and is personified in the Muse, its queen. This is Socrates' "royal lie" and the first "wave" that he must overcome to establish his city. However, the Aemilian image, idealizing womanhood from the first, is, of course, also Judeo-Christian. It is followed by the myth of the swaddling clothes analogous to the social fetters that prompted the writing of the Contract as well as the novel. Both metaphors are comparable with the Socratic myth of

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prisoners burdened with chains in an underground den and awaiting their release and ascent into the upper world through the saving power of education or legislation. Rousseau recounts the same Socratic ascent in his companion volumes. In *Emile* he paradoxically imagines the possible release of his own "prisoners" through an impossible idealization of the home and family that becomes a non-Socratic and Judeo-Christian symbol to foreshadow the perfect city of the *Contract*. The city is also anticipated in the latter treatise by corresponding reflections upon the family. Thereafter both books contain Socratic warnings against tyranny and slavery, a cipher of evil passions that threaten the natural or ideal order of things in soul or city. These admonitions are followed in each case by a concrete presentation of spiritual engagements regarded as ultimately conducive to that order. For example, in *Emile* the Socratic personification of reason in Jean-Jacques, friendly to man or human nature in Emile, is motivated by friendship to make a Socratic and biblical covenant of peace instead of property, like that of the *Contract*, for the sake of human happiness. The covenant of friendship is, as we now know, an image of the lawful social bonds envisaged by the "royal lie." Its formulation leads in *Emile* to a Socratic attack upon charlatanical physician-statesmen who go about doctoring and complicating disorders instead of calling upon the services of a true physician and renewing the constitution, as Rousseau professes to do in his two books. The austere felicity he visualizes in both is equally Socratic and Judeo-Christian and consists of the freedom of human faculties from slavish and tyrannical desires, and enjoyment of the necessities of life or, if we wish, Rousseauist "property."

As we have seen, the second part of *Emile* is divided into two sections, the first of which is the most theoretical of all and contains the substance of the entire corresponding part of the *Contract*. There, as in the latter, the author gives precedence to the discipline of the guardian will through the
agency of reason in the application of law, and provides for the imposition of narrow bounds upon vagrant desires to free the sovereign faculty. The idea of disciplining the will under the guidance of reason before dealing with the ruling power itself and entrusting the moral being to the enlightened will or habit of order to make the latter into an autonomous authority is Socratic, and so is its embodiment in law. And the Rousseauist laws of necessity, negative education, and the natural bent, or rather, of necessity and freedom, reinforced by the law of opinion are all defined, in the books herein collated, in exactly the same way as they are in the Republic. Their object in every case is also identical, namely, the common good or unity, which Socrates tries to secure by means of his second "wave," the control of every form of property, including the family, by the highest powers with a view to avoiding dissension in the moral being and fostering common feelings. Although Rousseau subsequently handles the latter in his own way, his ideas on property hardly differ for practical purposes from the Socratic and are no less favorable to the laws and their intent.

These laws govern the educational process described in the second section of the same part of Emile where the Rousseauist "guardian" is trained after the manner of the Socratic, in spite of a contemporary facade. His formation consists of Greek "musical" education, including "false" myths that illustrate the law or "strain" of necessity, such as those of the Socratic husbandman, lawbreaker, and promise-breaker. The said myths have great ideological value. For example, they entail a confrontation of the Rousseauist covenant, or law of peace, with the historical one of property, a confrontation that accentuates the opposing attitudes of each toward material possessions. The author thereby contrasts what he regards as a "false" order of human life and a "true" one. Proceeding to describe the latter, he passes from the "strain" or law of necessity to that of peace and freedom (including the law of negative education and the natural bent) that fosters and cultivates
the natural constitution through "true" myths, harmony, and rhythm. The myths in question, such as nighttime games and miniature Olympics—both to a considerable degree Socratic—teach the hero to see in the dark and have no fear, and to use his mind and will in the exercise of a primitive kind of justice. Other forms of "musical" education in the Greek sense provide Socratic shadows of images of the beauty, harmony, and taste that are to characterize and safeguard the mythical city. The ultimate aim is always to ensure the same ascetic happiness promised in the beginning.

The third part of both books is mainly Socratic, although to some extent it is also Judeo-Christian. Yet in Emile it is dominated by the modern image of Robinson Crusoe, whose sovereignty and kingship are compared in the beginning of the Contract with those of Adam or of man. The image is characteristic of the writer and gives those pages of the novel a contemporary air. Nevertheless, it is used to typify the Rousseauist student king, who is the real theme therein and who remains Socratic in spite of his Robinsonian garb. For this part of the two works, dealing with the governing faculty, is linked with Socrates' third "wave," which is the theory that philosophers must be kings, meaning that reason must rule in soul or city. In both Rousseau's texts that faculty is regarded more or less Socratically as a "mean proportional" between subject desires and sovereign will, a middle power whose strength and purpose are those of the moral being. In Emile the author uses a sequence of similitudes to indicate that his object is indeed the cultivation of reason in the art of government or orientation, exactly as it is in the same part of the Contract. The myths are well contrived to exemplify concretely this phase of Emile's progress, which matches the Socratic prelude to the formation of philosopher-kings. In brief his education is that prescribed by the sage for his own student kings. The imageries in question begin with what I called the little similitude of the sun, since it prefigures the big one in the
CONCLUSION

next part and serves to symbolize the dawn of reason. It is followed by what I called the parable of the conjuror Socrates and the myth of Montmorency forest, both of which are Socratic and portray the hero's need for positive government by an enlightened aristocracy of superior powers or the true kingship of Adam or of man, rather than of monarchs, if he is to find his way to civilized life. That Socratic and biblical kingship is foreshadowed in both Rousseau's books by the image of Robinson Crusoe, which is greatly expanded at this point in *Emile*. By way of preparation for the more difficult exercise of the governing power in a social setting, each book sets forth the fatal effects of wealth upon that power and upon the whole moral being, and each exemplifies the duty of the ruling authority to anticipate such effects, ensure the preservation and prosperity of the human constitution and guard the latter against abuses and dissolution. These principles are illustrated in *Emile* by a new image of kingship, that of the Socratic and Judeo-Christian carpenter who learns "to do his own business" within a social framework and to execute a "shadow of justice" by paying his debt to society with the sweat of his brow. His best faculties are thereby schooled for the practice of real justice and higher forms of sovereignty and kingship.

The fourth part of *Emile* is dedicated to the further formation of the philosopher-king. There the author shows the enormous value of lawful social bonds to combat passions and sophisms. He does so by evolving the Socratic metaphor of friendship into a vast allegory at four crucial points occurring before and after the profession of faith. Each time he virtually quotes the words of Socrates that furnish, as I have said, the leitmotiv of the book. The Socratic passage in question concludes "musical" education in the *Republic* and is by now familiar to the reader of this study. According to the sage, a youth who has received the true education of the inner being will praise the good and hate the bad "even before he is able to know the reason
why; and when reason comes he will recognize and salute
the friend with whom his education has made him long
familiar.” Mindful of this passage, Rousseau relies upon
Emile’s recognition of the voice of friendship to offset
temptation at critical moments before the intervention of
faith when the hero is initiated first into Plutarch’s more
tragic biographies, and then into harsh lessons of life con­
veyed through the enactment of fables inspired by La
Fontaine. In both cases the acknowledged friendship of
reason for human nature is conceived as effective armor
against passions and errors that also haunt the writer of the
Contract at exactly the same juncture. After the profession
of faith the author has further recourse to the Socratic text
when he comes to closer grips with the problems of desires
and sophisms besetting the soul from within and allayed
through the ministry of friendship that permits a harmoni­
ous ordering of inner life regarded as real justice. For
example, in the great scene of the covenant where passion
is made known to the hero in his own person, the leitmotiv
recurs, reason comes and Emile definitively recognizes and
salutes his familiar friend. Again later when sophist seduc­
ers make their appeal to the soul, he discomfits them by
acknowledging the voice of friendship and responding to its
call. Such are the four contexts wherein Rousseau alludes
in Emile to the famous phrase of the Republic. This is a fact
that has never before been even suggested in a published
work, but which we need to know if the book is not to
remain forever enigmatic.

Many ideologically invaluable myths and other literary
processes are also to be found in the middle section of the
fourth part, the profession of faith. Indeed, it is itself one of
the greatest myths in the book and contains the real
similitude of the sun or the author’s concept of revelation
that is supposed to consecrate the philosophy of Emile and
the Contract. It is both Socratic and Judeo-Christian. Since
he calls it the “song of Orpheus,” I concluded that it is

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meant to tame the wild beast element in man and sustain the "friendly" voice of reason that favors human nature and the human will. It coincides essentially with the civic creed of the so-called "political" treatise. But in the masterwork religious faith is a profoundly personal experience, giving reality and incentive to the expanding inner life of a "leader" and strengthening both reason and will against lawless feelings and fallacies. In the appendix it is a creed for the common people (or subject desires) and, like the brief one in the last part of Emile, is added at the end of the book to sanctify a mythical city and its laws in the world of men and things where, however, that city can never be seen. In fine, it may not be said that in the matter of religion the Contract violates the order of the novel.

In both books the creed favors the ratification of the Rousseauist Socratic and biblical covenant of peace and of freedom that is meant to liberate human beings from the tyranny and slavery of passion. In each case the sovereign ruler or philosopher-king suddenly appears in an awesome setting to bring about the "wise order" of the Contract by "doing his own business" and providing for the operation of lawful government. And in each case the governing faculty is reinforced by special devices that maintain the proper balance of powers within the moral person. Not the least of these, as we know, is the censor's Socratic law of true opinion concerning beauty and honor, as it is described in the Contract. The fact that it has already been mentioned above in various contexts underscores its immense importance. This "universal saving power of true opinion," as Socrates calls it, is alleged to guarantee the soul against dangers of every kind. Its action, hitherto discreet, now becomes almost obtrusive and is illustrated in Emile's introduction to an image of Sophia and also in his study of aesthetics, which finally prepare him for participation in social life. At that stage the novelist takes great strides in carrying out his design, indicated in the ratification of the
covenant, to intensify the bonds of friendship through love and make the taste for moral beauty an irrevocable choice. He thereby uses the law of opinion to ensure the safety of an ideal order of things and secure the soul against threats from within or without.

In *Emile* the fourth part concludes with the aforementioned Socratic and Judeo-Christian blessed vision of beauty and wisdom that is meant to enshrine the law of true opinion at a high point in the book, as keystone of the vault of the mythical temple. That vision is remote from the abstractions of esoteric philosophy and reaches its culmination in the ecstatic contemplation of the white house and its mysterious inhabitants. If, as Rousseau says, there is nothing beautiful—or honorable—but what is not, here we behold the moral beauty that "is not," except in the realm of inner experience in the case of richly endowed individuals. The piece is, of course, unmatched in the *Contract*, where such intimate personal fulfillment would be out of place in the imagery of an exteriorized city.

The entire fifth part of *Emile* is also an intense spiritual adventure, and since, like the philosophic ecstasy at the end of the fourth, it is confined to the inner resources of philosopher-kings, there is no matching part in the appendix. There the author's doctrine is clearly seen to belong to the only domain where men can be really autonomous if they so choose.

This part, containing the great myth of Sophia and honoring her, is full of other Socratic, Judeo-Christian, and Fenelonian myths that lead the reader through a maze of paradoxes to reach the ideas thus arrayed and discern therein the source and substance of the *Contract*. But without an interpretation of imaginative forms, the writer's meaning would be puzzling to say the least. For instance, having relegated the city and its freemen, together with the family and its members, to the land of lost causes in the world of space and time, he now apparently resurrects them
all, as he does in the *Contract*, and fancies the little society of the home actually materializing to typify its larger counterpart. The imagery is, as I have said, Judeo-Christian rather than Socratic. But in truth he uses it to portray the love of wisdom that consummates the education of his Socratic philosopher-king. For Sophia, like the Socratic Muse or her Judeo-Christian Solomonic and evangelical equivalent, embodies the wisdom of the ideal civil order that is the goal of the hero's life. The symbolism of her person emerges from Rousseau's treatment of her formation, which is as enigmatic as his handling of her earlier portrait was, and resounds with telltale echoes of the *Symposium*.

The symbolism of the heroine explains why the author, having said that Emile's feeling for Jean-Jacques is his one and only unfailing affection, recounts the hero's enduring love for Sophia. It also discloses why, having declared in Paris that wisdom and happiness are always "nearby," he announces paradoxically that she who promises both is very far thence, apparently referring to spiritual rather than spatial remoteness. The same literary device further reveals why, after admitting that Sophia is dead—like her unfortunate prototype and like the wise order or city of his fancy—he brings her back to life again, as he does the Spartan city of the *Contract*. In speaking of her predecessor, he clearly alludes to the Socratic Muse of Philosophy, whom he christianizes through the influence of his own persuasions combined with that of a vicar of Christ, the priestly Platonist, Fénélon. The new Rousseauist Sophia, resurrected for a skeptical age, is therefore the heir of both the Socratic and Judeo-Christian ones. The visionary apparition of the heroine, presented as the object of a courtship, affords the hero a Socratic "foretaste" of the blessed contemplation of wisdom and beauty, consisting of an equally Socratic intercommunion of all studies previously undertaken and related thereto.

The myth of Sophia, like the dream she incarnates, is

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counterbalanced by a philosophical profession of faith con­
tained in an abstract of the Contract, or rather, of Political
Institutions, and encompassing the teaching of both books
from the first. It leads to Emile’s fruitless search through
the world of matter for the Aemilian and Fénelonian city,
christianized like the heroine and matching not merely the
aforesaid abstract but Rousseauist wisdom herself, for the
order he seeks is the only one where he might live happily
with her on earth and where the two worlds might fuse into
one. But in the sphere of actuality it is as mythical as she
appears to be. Emile learns that the city, and probably
Sophia too, exist only in the kingdom within by virtue of an
inner covenant of peace pledged to ensure the moral free­
dom essential to felicity. He also discovers that the neces­
sities of life, that other ingredient of austere Rousseauist
happiness, belong to the domain of a very different pact—
the pact of property—that allegedly favors the rich at the
expense of the poor and sacrifices the weak to the strong,
and the just to the unjust. Finally the governor, having
proved that there is no corner in Europe where Emile may
dwell with Sophia, directs him back to that corner where
she abides, the human spirit where the Rousseauist city is
enshrined. In case the anomalies already mentioned do not
suffice to arouse our curiosity, the writer thrice refers to her
in the masculine gender. Whatever else she may be for
Emile, she is essentially Socratic “divine wisdom dwelling
within him.” She is the genius that has presided over his
education from his birth and to which he is finally wedded
in a mythical Socratic marriage or beatific vision that takes
place in a spiritual world fashioned after the same prototype
as the appendix.

The interrelationships that permit this broader interpreta­
tion of Rousseau’s works and include verifiable ties with
Solomon, Christ, Socrates, and the Platonic dialogues,
especially the Republic, bring to the surface two remarka­
ble characteristics of the way of life he teaches. Approp­
riately enough they are respectively associated with his laws of freedom and necessity.

The law of necessity accentuates his austerity. The very condition of the spiritual expansion he means to favor and foster is poverty. The cultivation and growth of man's noblest powers as he visualizes those processes is, in his view, possible only for persons who are content to limit themselves in material things to the mere necessities of life and are willing to forgo all else. The age of gold he promises vanishes with the amassing of gold. Happiness for him springs only from his own concept of wisdom and beauty, which positively excludes the possession of property in the modern sense of the word or in any other sense, unless it be akin to Socratic or the earliest Judeo-Christian asceticism.

Another aspect of his philosophy that looms large in this study is his extreme conservatism. The ideal order of things, born of his law of freedom, comes about through an act of the will on the part of privileged individuals who, far from thinking about reforming other people or indulging the desire for power or prestige, consider the main business of life to be the education of oneself, and the constant exercise of sovereignty and kingship in the domain of inner experience. We have seen that education thus conceived is the very theme of *Emile* and the *Contract*. It is a continuous and never ending effort at personal evolution, having nothing at all to do with revolution. That is so in spite of the disorders to which Rousseau's own startling statements, distorted by the licentious dispositions of men and colored by the follies of the time, have given rise. The conservative aspect of his thought, like his austerity, is typically Socratic as well as essentially Judeo-Christian. Both identify him as an authentic heir of the mainstreams of occidental tradition, however falsely he may interpret certain of their precepts.

In fine, to be aware of his purpose and affinities as a writer is to understand the extent of the vandalism wrought by the perpetrators of the *Emile* case, whatever their inten-
tions may have been. That the work is conceivably of a persuasion other than one's own, or of a design more or less suited to one's taste, is as irrelevant as one's private opinion of the author. But, unfortunately, provocative works of art and of thought like Emile and the Contract will always be a prey to the extravagances of the religious, moral, or political temper of which mankind is so tragically a victim.

2. Republic 2.369.