PART I

Imitation and Occasion

IMITATION AND THE TEMPEST

Defigurations of the Text

"IMITATION" in the Renaissance meant making something new from the art of another artist. This assumption about poetic composition is implicit in Ben Jonson's definition of imitation; the imitative poet, he wrote, was "to draw forth out of the best, and choisest flowers, with the Bee, and turne all into Honey, worke it into one relish, and savour."\(^1\) And it is also the assumption articulated by Petrarch, who, in writing to Boccaccio about the problem of imitating Virgil, used not the familiar bee but a filial metaphor, which was also common to ancient and Renaissance discussions of imitation:

A proper imitator should take care that what he writes resembles the original without reproducing it. The resemblance should not be that of a portrait to the sitter—in that case the closer the likeness is the better—but it should be the resemblance of a son to his father. Therein is often the great divergence in particular features, but there is a certain suggestion, what our painters call an "air," most noticeable in the face and eyes, which makes the resemblance. As soon as we see the son, he recalls the father to us although if we should measure every feature we should find them all different. But there is a mysterious something there that has this power. Thus we writers must look to it that with a basis of similarity there should be many dissimilarities. And the similarity should be planted so deep that it can only be extricated by quiet meditation.\(^2\)

To compare the new work to its model as one would compare son to father is to suggest how much the two works hold deeply in
common; the new work unmistakably bears the essence of the other. But it is equally important that there should be radical dissimilarities between the two. Just as the son is indisputably an individual entirely separate from his father, so the dissimilarities between the parent work and the imitation are so many that the new work stands securely on its own.

In placing the emphasis on the differences between the model and the new work, Petrarch followed the lead of one of his forerunners in the art of imitation, Seneca. In his well-known Epistle 84, Seneca answered his own question of whether or not the model would be obvious: “I think that sometimes it is impossible for it to be seen who is being imitated, if the copy is a true one; for a true copy stamps its own form upon all the features which it has drawn from what we may call the original” (84.9). For both Seneca and Petrarch, then, the poet’s object was to change the model so that the genealogical lines disappeared from sight and the parent work became hidden. If Petrarch differed from Seneca, it was in his consideration of the ability to notice resemblances. While Seneca held out the possibility that recognition might never occur, Petrarch assumed that “a certain suggestion,” “an air” would be glimpsed. But his emphasis, at the same time, on the “quiet meditation” needed for recognition implicitly acknowledged that recognition was not always easy.

It is not hard to see that these notions about how texts relate to each other apply in a general way to the relationship between The Tempest and the Aeneid. The two works are profoundly different from each other, but there is still an “air,” easily and frequently sensed, of the Aeneid in The Tempest: the storm-shipwreck-new love sequence ensures that. But to go further than making statements that sound as though we might just as well use the terms “influence” and “analogue” to describe the relationship of these two texts, and to reach the point where we can see The Tempest as a formal imitation of the Aeneid, we must also go further with our understanding of what the object of imitation is. Imitation is not merely building echoes of one work into another or taking the work of another writer and dressing it up for one’s own purposes. It involves the poet in the finest subtleties of another’s work, its art
and workmanship; in fact, it is the art that is often a primary object of imitation.

This point was forcibly made by Johannes Sturm in *Nobilitas liberata*, published in Germany in 1549 and in English translation in 1570 under the title *A Ritch Storehouse or Treasure for Nobilitye and Gentlemen*. Called "perhaps the most suggestive document in English that we have on the practice of imitation,"3 *A Ritch Storehouse* contains Sturm's instructions to his students on how to write well.

Sturm took the standard Renaissance position that good writing came from imitating other good writing. Although his subject was writing compositions for classroom exercises rather than writing poetry, he proceeded with the same assumptions about models and newness that we have just noted in the statements of Jonson, Petrarch, and Seneca. For models Sturm directed his students to the best authors; if they were to learn to imitate, then they had to follow Virgil, and this included learning how Virgil had imitated Theocritus and Homer. But what makes Sturm's book especially helpful for understanding what an act of imitation involved is the emphasis he placed, first, on the process of reading and analyzing the text to be imitated and, second, on the alternative methods available for changing that text into something new.

When Sturm took up the subject of reading, he distinguished the reading one did in preparation for imitation from the reading one did to acquire "knowledge and understanding." The chief distinction was that reading in preparation for imitation required more time and painstaking care; it required "a pawse or stay" (H7) because the object of the reading was to discover "the Arte or workmanship" (E3) that had gone into the text being studied. The students who would become these more pausing and observant readers were encouraged to notice what the text consisted of and how it had been put together. To that end, Sturm instructed them to attend to the arrangement of its various parts; they were to observe "the order and placing of things" (D5v), an exercise that made them pay attention to beginning, middle, and end. They were also to analyze the "handling" (D5v). Handling included what was treated briefly, what at length, and what was repeated; it also re-
ferred to the “kindes of wordes and formes of sentences” (D5*). Sturm elaborated this last point later in his discussion when he explained that “handeling . . . conteyneth as well the ornaments and figures of speach, as the polishing of sentences and reasons, as also the framing, knitting and numerousnesse both of members and whole Periodes, with the varietie of all those things compared together” (F8–F8*).

To aid further the process of observation and analysis, Sturm recommended that students perform three different kinds of noting—that is, three different methods of representing on paper the text being studied. One method was “when we write out whole places,” that is, take one segment of a text and copy it down word for word. In the second, which Sturm called “abridgements,” “we gather the summe of the same places in fewe words.” But it is the third kind of noting that alerts us to the fact that Sturm was urging his students to a higher order of thinking than what these first two methods alone might suggest. Sturm wanted to teach them to conceptualize a text and articulate its art; thus he recommended that they cast the patterns they perceived into linear shapes: “drawe out every part in figures.” Explaining that this exercise had also been done in Greece and Italy, Sturm first called these drawings “figurative draughts,” but later, considering that making figurations was what the author himself did, he suggested the drawings might better be called “defigurations” (D8). The concept of defiguration reflects in yet another way how a precursor text could be conceived of as art and design, a requisite step if the imitator were to be able to proceed from “defiguration” to “figuration.” Both of these terms are so rich in their connotations that we shall do well to fetch them from the Ritch Storehouse for our own critical purposes.

When Sturm left the topic of reading and analyzing behind to take up that of composition, his emphasis throughout was on hiding. To write was to conceal. “For he ought to be a hider of his Arte, which would be a good Imitator” (G4), Sturm explained; “an Imitator must hide all similitude and likeness” (G5*). Thus he advised that “we must first endeavour that our doing may appeare unlike the patterne” (G4*) and suggested that it might be necessary to get
a teacher to help with this step, "to shewe us how we may hide and cover lyke thinges by unlike using and handling" (G4). Being such a teacher himself, Sturm directed his students to try various techniques, such as "addition, ablation, alteration, and chaunging: wherein is contained, conjunction, figuration, commutation, and transformation, both of wordes and sentences, of members, and periodes" (G5). Sturm clarified this list by giving definitions of each term and illustrations.

His longest example was the familiar comparison of Virgil's first lines in the *Aeneid* to the Homeric lines that he therein imitates: "For as Homer sheweth the wrath and furie of Achylles, so Vergill painteth out Aeneas with more wordes and speciall tokens: so that in the persons there is varietie and in the handling there is likenesse." As Sturm proceeded with this example, he cited lines only from Virgil, for it would have been superfluous to have to write down for these students the corresponding lines from Homer. They would have known what he was referring to when he observed "what distinction of Genders, numbers, vowels or voyces is there," or that this "doth differ from the invocation of Homer by order and placing," or that "Vergil hath separated the proposition from that invocation, and hath changed the persons and matters, and hath recited more plentie of things which is proper to addition" (H3).

So self-assured was Sturm with this type of analysis that it comes as somewhat of a surprise to find him acknowledging that people might deny the intricate relatedness between texts. He introduced this point while considering one of Virgil's imitations of Theocritus: "But some will say, he useth not the same polishing of his sentence, nor the same wordes that Theocritus doth," and, again, "But peradventure some man will deny that this was done by imitation seeing the thinges be not all one in both writers" (H4). Sturm countered these objections, as we might expect, by emphasizing the large degree of difference that there had to be between the old text and the new one: "Imitation is not in things that be all one, but in things that be like, and that which is like, must be, not the same, but another thing" (H5). And he explained, moreover, that the imitator strove to make it impossible for "unskillfull persons" to perceive all of his art: "he would have it known whome he
imitateth, although he would not have it spyed, how and after what sort he doth it."

We should notice in this last remark both what was given and what was taken away. The imitator wished to be both a concealer and a revealer, Sturm suggested. If the copy was a true one, by Seneca’s standards, then the use of the precursor text would be concealed. But if his art was to be discovered, and so appreciated, then he had to do some revealing too. This meant, among other things, that he might decide to advertise that to which he was indebted and yet do so in such a way as not to remove the pleasure of the reader in discovering the artistry that the concealment itself promoted.

For mature poets setting out to copy an ancient text, the following of step-by-step instructions like those of Sturm would not always have been necessary. They would already have learned these habits of composition years earlier and also acquired through long acquaintance and frequent rereading a knowledge of classical texts that far surpassed what a school child might have. Such surely was the case for Petrarch, who spoke of knowing the classical texts so well as to have completely ingested them, intellectually and spiritually:

I have read Virgil, Horace, Livy, Cicero, not once but a thousand times, not hastily but in repose, and I have pondered them with all the powers of my mind. I ate in the morning what I would digest in the evening; I swallowed as a boy what I would ruminate upon as a man. These writings I have so thoroughly absorbed and fixed, not only in my memory but in my very marrow, these have become so much a part of myself, that even though I should never read them again they would cling in my spirit, deep-rooted in its inmost recesses.

Jonson alluded to knowledge of a similar kind when he remarked on the challenge it had been to annotate The Masque of Queenes (1609) for Prince Henry: “it hath prov’d a worke of some difficulty to mee to retrive the particular authorities . . . to those things, which I writt out of fulnesse and memory of my former readings.”

Creene, thinking about what permits imitation of a high order to occur and guided by Petrarch’s remarks about his knowledge of
texts, ascribes the capacity to imitate to this very “intimacy of conversation with the ancient text, a habitual interiorization of its letter and essence,” “a kind of assimilation [that] must occur if the modern text is truly to recall its paternal model imprecisely but unmistakably.”

While we do not have Shakespeare’s personal letters, as we have some of Petrarch’s, or prefaces and marginal glosses, as we have from Jonson, we do know that Shakespeare was well grounded in the many classical texts that had wide currency in the Renaissance and also that he would have had the same access to the techniques of and assumptions about imitation that his contemporaries had. As far as his specific knowledge of Virgil goes, we know that most of Shakespeare’s explicit allusions to Virgil in the canon as a whole are to material in the first six books of the Aeneid, and that of these most are references to the story of Troy’s fall, the love story of Dido and Aeneas, and the visit to the underworld. We may draw more than one conclusion from this information. What it suggested to T. W. Baldwin is that Shakespeare, like many people in his day, knew the first half of the Aeneid better than he knew the last half. That may be so. But the reuse of the same patterns over and over for different purposes also suggests something about how the patterns available in Virgil, and especially in the first six books, had become part of the permanent but moveable furniture of Shakespeare’s mind, intimately interiorized to the point where they were endlessly available for rearrangement and changing in one work after another throughout his entire oeuvre. Frequently, Shakespeare’s reuse of Virgil is as simple as an obvious allusion; but very often it is more complex. And occasionally, the Virgilian patterns become the chief means by which Shakespeare accomplishes a large and complex figuration.

Perhaps the most simple and obvious reference to Virgil in all of Shakespeare occurs in The Tempest in the conversation in act 2, scene 1, where the name Dido or Widow Dido is repeated six times. Also at this point, Gonzalo makes some statements about equivalencies: “This Tunis, sir, was Carthage . . . I assure you, Carthage.” It is possible to dismiss this entire conversation as idle chatter, or even as another example of the miscellaneous quality of some Renaissance citation of classical details. It is also possible to
wonder, as Frank Kermode did,\textsuperscript{10} whether the allusions are there to reveal anything. Two lines especially—"You make me study of that" and "What impossible matter can he make easy next?"—offer encouragement to anyone who is inclined to feel that the unusual specificity in the lines is in itself a signal to pay attention to them. What that specificity does refer to, I am arguing, is a complicated use of Virgil that Shakespeare, utilizing the procedures of imitation, has concealed. In order to gain access to this use, we need to pay further attention to the methods and principles whereby things can be hidden.

\section*{Variation and Reversal}

Upon finishing Sturm's book, his students were presumably prepared for the task of writing something. As we have seen, this process would involve first reading and analyzing a text and then setting out to vary it. Varying being the handmaiden of imitation, the students could replace syntactical units of one design with those of another design, one word or image with another, and units of one length with those of another length. Something that had come at the beginning now could come in the middle or at the end, and one rhetorical device could stand where a different one had stood; tone, occasion, context, order, and style all could change. And, again, if the art were good, if the copy were true, the originating work would be obscured, at least from the superficial view.

When Sturm chose illustrations to show his students how to arrive at such results, they were inevitably short ones. Even though he knew how Virgil's whole work had been imprinted with Homer's, he illustrated that use and others with one or two sentences or a few lines of verse. The changes on which he focused are comparable in size and degree, we might say, to that of changing and rearranging the furniture in the smallest room of a house. What is moved is not moved very far; what is added, even though it fits in perfectly, can be found because, the room being small, there are not many places to look. Moreover, the observer who would understand all the changes can stand at the door and see the entire room all at once.
In comparison to what is required when one analyzes a few lines or a single passage, analyzing the imitative techniques in a longer work is not only a bigger task but also a different one. There is not only more to do, more places to look, but when the object of imitation is long, the art of imitation has involved larger and different features of structure than can be contained in a few lines. A longer work contains all the smaller structures of vocabulary and syntax. But there are also the larger structures within which the smaller ones are contained, and which are superimposed upon, bridge, or bind them together.

In the following pages, I shall suggest what the range of imitative techniques consist of in *The Tempest*. We shall look at some instances of imitation that give recurrence to smaller segments in Virgil and also illustrate various degrees of hiding and changing. We shall consider, too, how Shakespeare has organized his imitation and, in the process, structured his whole play, using some of the larger structures of character, action, and meaning in the *Aeneid* for these ends. These structures, moreover, are not simply those which a modern reader might deduce from the *Aeneid*, but are also those defined by a long tradition of allegorical interpretation with which Shakespeare and his contemporaries were familiar.

A logical place to start is where Shakespeare did, namely, with the tempest that begins the play. The first stage direction reads, "A tempestuous noise of thunder and lightning" (*Tempest*, s.d.I.1), and the action opens on a ship and its passengers about to be wrecked in a storm. Were Sturm doing this analysis, he would no doubt have first remarked that Shakespeare begins where Virgil begins. But here it is not Virgil's first phrases that Shakespeare copies, as Virgil began by copying Homer's first phrases, but Virgil's first action, his "tempestas" (*Aen.* 1.53, 377), that shipwrecks Aeneas at Carthage. Shakespeare does, of course, move us a bit further into the middle of things by beginning at a point where the storm is already in full force. And he adjusts the ominous and despairing tone of Virgil's opening to something more suitable to comedy. The words near the end of the scene that seal this generic identity is the phrase "we split," repeated five times; a phrase that
tells an audience which knows other stories where ships split that all will be well, for occupants of ships that split are typically reunited, and in sound body.

Still, the occurrence of a tempest at the beginning of the play is a more complicated matter for a discussion of imitation than it might first appear to be. One could say that Shakespeare, by beginning in the same way Virgil began, is being quite open and direct about the work which is the parent of his new play. The reuse of the same action in the same place allows his text to be "ostentatiously diachronic," to make an "explicit adoption" of Virgil's text. What complicates the truth of this statement is that Virgil's tempest had, over the centuries, been reused by writer after writer until it had passed into the literary language as topos, convention—even as cliché. No literate audience experiencing this first scene and inclined to relate it to earlier works would think only of the *Aeneid* as a precedent. It would be possible to argue, then, that by beginning *The Tempest* with a tempest Shakespeare was being explicit about nothing; in itself, the tempest contains no information whatsoever about the genetics of this work. It may not even be Virgil's storm: "the fact that the same descriptive system appears in two texts does not prove influence; nor does it prove that any such influence, if real, is of significance." The only thing that can make the opening seem to be a compellingly significant, though changed, copy of Virgil's opening, is our awareness that the *Aeneid* is a constant presence in the rest of the play.

Provided such presence can be established, one option we have in assessing the technique of imitation represented in the tempest is to consider that the familiarity of Virgil's storm as a topos allows Shakespeare to imitate that topos frankly without his ostentatious reuse calling attention to itself as imitation. By being so overt, he is, on the one hand, revealing his art; he offers information that authorizes us to scrutinize his procedure for still more connections to Virgil. But because what he offers is so obvious, so conventional, it is equally effective at deflecting that attention, even concealing his art. Only after the play has been searched for other traces of Virgil is it possible to see that the tempest at the beginning, far from being merely conventional, is virtually necessary.
Another imitative technique Shakespeare uses is that of translation, the technique that played such an important part in the development of the sixteenth-century lyric and sonnet. When Shakespeare translates Virgil for a word or phrase in *The Tempest*, a metamorphosis occurs simply in the act of changing languages. But however much is changed, translation provides a way of citing the parent work that is sometimes more specific, sometimes more traceable, than what is exemplified by a topos. Moreover, translation provides a means whereby the old text can actually be inserted into the new one, providing the materials out of which the new text is made. The new text thus becomes the container and the bearer of the old.

One of the best-known uses of Virgil in *The Tempest*, one that editors have always accurately glossed, happens to be also an example of translation. In the second scene of the play, where Ferdinand first sees Miranda, Shakespeare has him utter the phrase that Aeneas speaks when he sees his mother disguised as a huntress at Carthage: "o dea certe" (*Aen.* 1.328) becomes "Most sure the goddess" (1.2.424). What distinguishes this translation from some others in the play is that it is a verbatim translation of a famous phrase and appears in a context (a man seeing an extraordinary woman) that prompts reader or audience recognition. Like the tempest in the first scene, this line is an obvious repetition that need cause no stir; it can be, and often has been, taken as merely an incidental allusion by a poet who works eclectically and whose poetry is often randomly intertextual. Nevertheless, both the topos and the translation remain in the text as encoded points of entry for anyone who would recognize that Shakespeare is somehow being newly and truly serious about the relationship of the whole play to the *Aeneid*.

In other instances, however, Shakespeare's use of Virgil's topoi and language is obscure. A changed context and a dismantling of phrases can make the use of Virgil almost disappear from sight. An example of this more hidden use, and one that combines the technique of imitating a topos with that of imitating by translating, occurs in that florid speech by the otherwise nearly speechless Francisco (at 3.3.40 he has three more words), who describes Fer-
dinand swimming to shore. In response to Alonso's lament that his son has been drowned, Francisco offers the opinion that Ferdinand must still be alive; certainly when Francisco saw the prince swimming in the sea, he had appeared strong enough to make it to shore:

Sir, he may live:
I saw him beat the surges under him,
And ride upon their backs; he trod the water,
Whose enmity he flung aside, and breasted
The surge most swollen that met him; his bold head
'Bove the contentious waves he kept, and oared
Himself with his good arms in lusty stroke
To th'shore, that o'er his wave-worn basis bowed,
As stooping to relieve him: I not doubt
He came alive to land.

(2.1.109-18)

Within the large general pattern of the journey-storm-wreck sequence that occurs early in both the Aeneid and The Tempest, this description of Ferdinand's coming to shore may seem broadly analogous to Virgil's description of the Trojans swimming from their ships to the Carthaginian shores. But the specific details of the speech about Ferdinand originate elsewhere in the Aeneid, namely, in the passage in the midst of the famed Laocoon episode in which two snakes swim to shore and, after attacking the son of the priest Laocoön, wind themselves around the waist and throat of Laocoön himself.

Here is the comparable passage from Virgil:

and lo! from Tenedos, over the peaceful depths—I shudder as I tell the tale—a pair of serpents with endless coils are breasting the sea and side by side making for the shore. Their bosoms rise amid the surge, and their crests, blood-red, overtop the waves; the rest of them skims the main behind and their huge backs curve in many a fold.

ece autem gemini a Tenedo tranquilla per alta
(horresco referens) immensis orbibus angues
incumbunt pelago pariterque ad litora tendunt:
pectora quorum inter fluctus arrecta iubaeque
sango ineae superant undas; pars cetera pontum
pone legit sinuatque immensa volumine terga.
(2.203-8)

In constructing the passage that describes Ferdinand, Shakespeare appropriates for his own use several of the key verbs, nouns, and images that Virgil used for the snakes, and with a degree of exactness that leaves no doubt about their origin. Both Virgil and Shakespeare emphasize the power of the swimmers by describing them as high in the water. Virgil pictures the snakes as “breasting [incumbunt] the sea”; their “bosoms rise amid the surge [fluctus], and overtop [superant] the waves.” Shakespeare follows Virgil when he writes that Ferdinand has been seen to “beat the surges under him,” has “trod the water,” and having “breasted the surge” has kept “his bold head / 'Bove the . . . waves.”

But although Shakespeare retains all of these details from Virgil, he also changes many things. First of all, he makes an alteration in the persons and in the number, as Sturm would say; he changes two serpents into one man. He also changes the nature of these swimmers: in Virgil, the serpents come as a death-bringing menace and ill omen; in Shakespeare, that menace is eliminated and replaced by a Ferdinand who comes as a heroic victor. To this end, Shakespeare remakes the huge backs (terga) of the snakes into the “backs” of the surges that Ferdinand rides. And he exchanges the association of the serpents with threat and slaughter for Ferdinand’s strong ability to battle with the sea, to defeat the “enmity” of the water and “the contentious waves.” In fact, so welcome is the healing and mediating power that resides in Ferdinand that the shore seems to stretch out to help him reach it, “the shore, that o’er his wave-worn basis bowed, / As stooping to relieve him.”

One of the most important points about Shakespeare’s imitation here has still not been made and has to do with the fact that the Laocoon passage occurs in a different place in Virgil from where Virgil’s tempest and the narration of Aeneas and his men swimming to shore occur. Were we to assume that Shakespeare’s use of Virgil depended upon the matching of corresponding parts of narrative lines, then we might anticipate that the only place in Virgil’s text where we might find something that corresponds to Ferdi-
nand's swimming is in *Aeneid* 1, where the action of the storm and shipwreck yields to the action of swimming. But because Shakespeare is imitating Virgil, not using him as a source for plot, he responds to his text by varying it. What this means, as always, is that a detail that one poet used in one place may be used somewhere else by another. It also means that things that were not in the same place before may now be in the same place. Varying causes separation of some things, conflation of others. And while this method may obstruct recognition of the connections between Shakespeare's text and Virgil's, it confirms a sense of what Shakespeare is doing. He is not borrowing a plot; he is imitating, and this requires handling Virgil's text discontinuously.

It should also be apparent from what has been said so far that, in this example of varying, one important characteristic of the imitation is that here Shakespeare alters Virgil to the point of reversal. Shakespeare may repeat Virgil's words, but the changes he makes in context result in his being able to use Virgil's text for effects and for matter that are opposite to those it originally possessed. This use of Virgil, it should also be noted, differs decidedly from what we see in the "o dea certe" line, as well as from the use of a tempest for an opening.

All three of the examples of imitating Virgil noted so far—the tempest, "o dea certe," and the Laocoön passage—together offer a chance to ask how much of Virgil would have to recur in any studied imitation of the *Aeneid*. Although even the first six books of the *Aeneid* hold virtually an infinite number of things that could be imitated, it may be taken for granted that anyone considering a rigorous imitation of them would be obliged to copy many of the most well-known things, from some of the very famous lines ("o dea certe" and "Italiam non sponte sequor," perhaps) to many of the most famous narrative kernels. Sturm acknowledged this requirement when he wrote about what one might choose to imitate from Cicero; he recommended going first to the sections of Cicero "which have either some necessarie, or some notable place in them. I call that necessarie that is almost ever to be used" (E7v).

The Laocoön episode qualifies as one such "place" in the *Aeneid*; likewise, in *Aeneid* 1 so do the tempest and the reaction of Aeneas
to being shipwrecked, in *Aeneid* 2 the Trojan horse conspiracy, in *Aeneid* 4 the cave episode at Carthage, and, from the underworld episodes of *Aeneid* 6, both hell and Elysium, both the Sibyl and Anchises, both the joyous prophecies and the lamentation.

It can, of course, be argued that all of these notable "places," on which thousands of readers and hundreds of commentators had previously focused attention, do in fact reappear in *The Tempest*, and that they do so by way of the different systems used to organize the imitation. One of the most obvious of these is the use of the Dido and Aeneas love story as the model for the love story of Ferdinand and Miranda, a pattern that is present from the moment of their first meeting in act 1 all the way through the game of chess in act 5. But Shakespeare alters, even reverses, the model so that the Virgilian patterns this time tell a story of true love, not lust, and of right choice rather than delay and diversion.

A somewhat less obvious use of Virgil is that which produces the series of conspiracy plots: Prospero’s expulsion from Milan, Antonio and Sebastian’s plot to overthrow Alonso, and Caliban’s to overthrow Prospero. Shakespeare patterns all three episodes on Virgil’s tale of how the Greeks conquered Troy: all three involve victims who will be threatened or attacked while they sleep. In these instances, the sack of Troy not only presents an event out of which the action for a play can be made (as the love-test Leir gave his daughters in the old play suggested an action for a new one) but functions also as a cultural premise. Although this premise may be variously stated, it includes the notion that to attack a sleeping city is to attack order and civility, and thus it also shows that, however strong any society is, it is not strong absolutely. These ideas are so embedded in the traditional readings of Virgil’s story of Troy's fall that Shakespeare can transfer them to his own new work simply by transplanting the narrative kernel that represents them. Significantly, the Virgilian narrative of the fall of Troy is not treated in *The Tempest* simply as a memory of a past event but is represented by Shakespeare as a circumstance that is alarmingly recurrent, essentially repeatable.

In a third system of organization, Shakespeare again employs this method of repetition but applies it to character instead of ac-
tion. Here I refer to the use he makes of Aeneas as the basic model for nearly all of the male characters in the play, not only Prospero and Ferdinand but also Alonso, Gonzalo, and Caliban. The differences among these characters are a result of rhetorical varying; in the case of Caliban, Shakespeare reverses the pattern and parodies it until Caliban becomes an anti-Aeneas figure. In other instances, he either combines more than one pattern to make a new construct, or he disassembles the parts of a pattern. An example of the latter is his redistributing, among several different characters, the mixed reactions that Aeneas had upon arriving in Carthage. In response to the storm and shipwreck they have experienced, Gonzalo offers comfort to others, Antonio and Sebastian complain, Alonso falls into despair, and Ferdinand, whom Shakespeare sets above the others, feels a calm settle over him. Even as the story of Troy includes a set of ideas that can be transferred to a play by copying the pattern of Troy, so does the figure of Aeneas. All of these details help us to understand why Nosworthy and Kott could define so differently how the Aeneid is in The Tempest; it truly is in there in more ways than one (and often simultaneously).

**Imitation and Allegory**

In considering the theory and practice of Renaissance imitation as it is applicable to Shakespeare's art, we need to return to Sturm once more to address more directly the issue of what it is “the duetie of an Imitator” to imitate (G4), what things are “worthy of imitation” (G3). On this subject Sturm made two points that are especially relevant to The Tempest. The first, though long in implication, can be quickly stated. According to Sturm, “what is worthy of imitation” was “whatsoever is worthy of prayse” (G3'); this remark grasps the commitment of epideictic as well as the commitment to favor the best poets for one's imitations. A second point Sturm made was that it was the duty of the imitator to include in his imitation not only what was apparent but also “what is secret, and is not expressed” (G4); he was to imitate the “hidden and secret poyntes,” which included “sometime a further meaning than is expressed in wordes” (G3').
This point is crucial to a study of imitations of Virgil because of the tradition, well known in the Renaissance, that the *Aeneid* was a text that contained, as both Thomas Phaer and Richard Stanyhurst acknowledged in the prefaces to their translations of it, “many misticall secretes,” many “hidden secrets.” Spenser made a like acknowledgment in his “Letter of the Authors” when he declared that he was following the practices of Homer and Virgil by presenting the virtues “clowdily enwrapped in Allegorical devises.”

What these writers were referring to was the medieval and Renaissance tradition of reading Virgil’s text allegorically, a tradition which, as it evolved, treated the allegorical meanings as a constitutive part of Virgil’s text, and as having been intended by Virgil, not added by his interpreters. Thus the *Aeneid* text we read today is, in a very particular sense, not the text as Renaissance readers knew it. To them, the *Aeneid* besides being all of Virgil’s text, was also all of the philosophical meanings that they understood to be in it and that they could read in the various commentaries on Virgil.

This perception that Virgil’s text was both open and secret gave rise to various systems of reading that operated simultaneously for any reader. On the one hand, the story of Aeneas was said to comprise the adventures of an exemplary public hero. In *The Defence of Poesie*, Sir Philip Sidney referred implicitly to this system when he recommended Aeneas as the model for virtuous action: “Only let Aeneas be worn in the tablet of your memory.” Such a reading is humanistic and educational in its orientation; it considers the adventures and trials of the hero to be the means to a public end, the founding of a new civilization. As William Webbe remarked in *Discourse of English Poetrie*, “Under the person of Aeneas [Virgil] expresseth the valoure of a worthy Captaine and Valiaunt Gover­nour.” This reading of Aeneas as an ideal public figure was also what lay behind Tasso’s conclusion that, of all the noble actions that a poet composing heroic poetry had ever devised, “the noblest action of all is the coming of Aeneas to Italy.” This way of reading Virgil’s text is pertinent to a consideration of *The Tempest* because it illuminates, by confirming, our sense of the play as deeply political and as deeply and importantly tied to the epideictic tradition.

But knowledge of a system wherein the *Aeneid* is read allegori-
cally is also helpful because it furnishes a widely disseminated example of how Virgil's text could be conceptualized, conceptualization being the mental operation on which successful imitation so often depended. Although there is much variety as one moves from one commentator to another—Fulgentius in the fifth century, Bernardus Silvestris in the Middle Ages, and Cristoforo Landino in the fifteenth century—19—it is possible to make a few careful generalizations about this tradition of reading the hidden or secret story in Virgil. Generally it is true that the commentary was discursive and philosophical in content, that it espoused Platonic doctrine and assumed Virgil was a Platonist,20 and that it addressed itself primarily to the first six books of the Aeneid, the same books that are the object of Shakespeare's imitation. Also, the commentators read these six books as a maturation process of one sort or another. In the case of Fulgentius and Bernardus, the progress related by Virgil in six books was that of the six ages of man, the progress from infancy to the wisdom of old age. Landino, however, read it as the journey of the soul toward wisdom. It will be assumed as we proceed that Shakespeare would have worked with, or would have possessed eclectic knowledge of, these differing but still highly complementary readings—as indeed surely did many readers of his time, who were used to seeing the Aeneid printed in an edition that surrounded Virgil's text with an enormous critical and glossarial apparatus. But whatever eclecticism might have existed for Shakespeare or his contemporaries, and however much all these commentaries overlap, the reading that found in the Aeneid an allegory of the soul, rather than the ages of man, is always the one more relevant to the art of The Tempest.

In considering how Shakespeare might have used or been affected by this commentary tradition, we do well to recall the instructions in conceptualization that Sturm gave his students when he described for them methods of defiguration. When he instructed them to represent the text through line drawings, he was trying to get them to perceive the form of the text as an abstraction, and then to represent their perceptions in a nontextual way. What the commentary tradition offered Shakespeare that was similar to Sturm's method was, first of all, a set of ideas, and so abstractions,
to which the text of Virgil was understood to refer. Even as Sturm’s defiguration drawings were suggested by a text but not constructed from pieces of that text, so too the body of meanings in the commentary tradition was not textualized by Virgil but by his followers, in the texts they wrote about his text. Virgil’s text might have given rise to those meanings, but it did not itself express them. To the extent that it is possible to talk about the *Aeneid* as providing a sequentially ordered pattern of events that corresponds to a sequence in *The Tempest*, we shall do better to look for the correspondences in the sequence of philosophical and ethical states of being that the commentary describes than in a plot outline of the *Aeneid* itself. For what Shakespeare seems to have done in *The Tempest* was to use that sequence—the organized discourse of this commentary tradition that tells of an educational process—as one organizing principle for composition. In other words, for the purposes of the imitation, Shakespeare has treated the commentary tradition as a continuous text and Virgil’s literal narrative as a discontinuous one. And if both the commentary tradition and the *Aeneid* were utilized in the composing of Shakespeare’s play, it is, then, possible to use both of them to trace the transformations that he wrought on both. Before we can be more specific, it is necessary to set down a brief summary of Landino’s method of reading Virgil.

Called by modern critics “the prince of Virgilian allegorists” and “the most impressive and influential of the fifteenth-century Virgil scholars,” Landino included his commentary on Virgil’s first six books in the *Camaldolese Disputations*, first printed in 1480. Subsequently, these views were summarized, along with those of his predecessors, in many of the Renaissance editions of the *Aeneid* that printed commentary in the margins and in introductory notes and essays. To produce his reading of the soul’s progress toward perfection, Landino did not follow the chronology of Virgil’s narrative (as had Fulgentius and Bernardus) but the chronology of Aeneas’s actions, and so discussed the books of the *Aeneid* in the order 2, 3, 1, 4, 5, 6. Thus, Landino saw in *Aeneid* 2 and the story of the Trojan War a representation of the soul’s efforts to subdue the passions. The departure from Troy and the
subsequent adventures in *Aeneid* 2 and 3 figured the spirit's initial resistance to the passions and its new tendency toward virtue. The progress of the soul is continually threatened by recurrent disruptions of appetite which throw it off course, the most significant of which is represented for Landino by the arrival of Aeneas at Carthage and his experiences with Dido (*Aeneid* 1 and 4). But finally, in *Aeneid* 6, the narrative of Aeneas's arrival in Italy and journey to the underworld, the soul comes to rest in an intellectual experience that unites it with truth.

Landino's commentary is very detailed, but a summary of it reveals the importance he attributed to the Carthage experience and to the arrival at Italy in *Aeneid* 6 as representative of two poles between which the soul, struggling toward goodness, must move. Gavin Douglas, whose translation of the *Aeneid* was well known in sixteenth-century England and was used by both Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey, and Thomas Phaer for their own translations, showed in his marginalia that he too understood the significance that Carthage and *Aeneid* 6 had in Landino's system. Of the several references to Landino in Douglas's glosses, the most detailed treatment occurs at the point in the translation where Aeneas arrives in Carthage, at which point Douglas summarized Landino by stating the significance of Carthage in terms of the ultimate goal: "Eneas purposis to Italy, his land of promyssion." Here is this gloss in its entirety:

*Cristoferus Landynus, that writis moraly apon Virgill, says thus: Eneas purposis to Italy, his land of promyssion; that is to say, a iust perfyte man entendis to mast soueran bonte and gudnes, quhilk as witnessyth Plato, is situate in contemplation of godly thyngis or dyvyn warkis. His onmeyssabill ennemy Iuno, that is frenzeit queyn of realmys, entendis to dryve him from Italle to Cartage; that is, Avesion, or concupissence to ryng or haf warldly honouris, wald draw him fra contemplation to the actyve lyve; quhilk, quhen scho falsy by hir self, tretis scho with Eolus, the neddyr part of raison, quhilk sendis the storm of mony warldly consalis in the iust manis mynd. Bot, quhoubeyt the mynd lang flowis and delitis heirintyll, fynaly by the fre wyll and raison predomynent, that is ondirstand, by Neptun, the storm is cessit, and, as follois in the nyxt c., arryvit in sond havin, quhilk is tran-

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quilite of consciens; and fynaly Venus, in the vi e. following,
schawis Ene his feris recouerit again, quhilk is, fervent lufe and
erchite schawis the just man his swete meditationys and feruour
of deuotion, quham he tynt by warldly curis, restorit to hym
again, and all his schippis obot on, be quham I ondyrstand the
tyme lost.26

As important as this gloss is, and suggestive as it is of Landino's
influence in England, we know from reading Douglas's accom­
panying translation that such a reading was for him only half the
story. The translation itself is a heavily politicized one, emphasiz­
ing not the story of private life that could be read allegorically in
the Aeneid, but the story of public life that Virgil's narrative tells,
Aeneas's founding of a new civilization. Aeneid 6 has great impor­
tance for both, as the arrival in Italy is the occasion on which the
goals toward which both stories strive come to fulfillment. What
can be found in Douglas that is not apparent in Landino, then, is the
more common tradition of reading Virgil as telling at the same time
at least two stories, one a public tale of political commitment and
one an allegorical treatment of an intensely private struggle. As
Bernardus said, "we treat Virgil both as poet and as philosopher,"
one who observed a method of "twofold teaching" (p. 3).

One way of explaining how Shakespeare responded to this tra­
dition in his own imitation is to say that he invented a way of telling
these two stories as one. He structured the central political action
of the play—Prospero's plot to regain his dukedom—so that it in­
corporates a series of educational journeys.27 By the end of the play
we have the sense that all the characters have been on progresses,
as Gonzalo indeed suggests when he remarks that among all that
has been found "in one voyage" is "all of us ourselves / When no
man was his own." Admittedly, some (Prospero, for example)
started before others, and some do not progress as far as others.
Caliban, for example, does not get much beyond "Carthage." There
is, as well, the more particularly enacted educational
progress of Ferdinand, whom Prospero disciplines, tests, and fi­
nally rewards. This story of moral progresses is virtually the same
as the story of the soul's journey that Landino read in Virgil. It is,
moreover, the continuous "text" that Shakespeare transfers to The
Tempest from the medieval and Renaissance Virgilian tradition, where he uses it (not the chronology of Virgil's narrative) as the framework within which, and on which, to construct the intricate details of his imitation. Because this story is essentially philosophical and moral in content, a discourse in every sense of the word "commonplace," it conceivably can be told in or with any number or variety of specific plot structures and narrative kernels. In this instance, however, and with this discursive chronology in place, Shakespeare is able to move freely about in the text of the Aeneid, disassembling that literal narrative and rearranging its bits and pieces as it suits him in order to invent the new speeches and new actions for the play he is writing.

While Shakespeare's management of the Virgilian text attests to an expert craftsmanship, it also confirms Greene's sense that one effect of imitation is that it "shook [the] absolute status" of the precursor text "by calling attention to the specific circumstances of its production." 28 Grasping some features of Shakespeare's disruption of the Aeneid, Kott thought that it signaled a rejection of Virgil. 29 Another possibility is that the rewriting was gauged so that the imitation would better suit new circumstances of production. Although Shakespeare changed Virgil, he also worked a change on contemporary authoritative symbols, an intervention that amounts to a disruption of more than one kind of absolutism.

OCCASION AND THE TEMPEST

Imitation and Occasion

Although the art of imitatio involved a writer's turning to the past, it also required that the new writing take the author's own age into account. Thomas Greene recounts how the remaking of Homer involved Virgil in a Romanizing of Greek art:

Virgil deals with the Homeric shadow . . . by transmuting each minor form through context into something new and Roman. Thus his fable of transitivity was orchestrated everywhere by a transitive technique that demonstrated the fact of preserva-
tion but also the fact of transmutation. This special historical character of Virgil's poem makes it the central and supreme expression of Roman civilization.

A similar act of rewriting is what makes The Tempest so deeply resonant of its own historical time; like Virgil, Shakespeare transmutes minor forms through context into something contemporary. His medium is rhetorical structures; his set of referents, as is appropriate for an imitation of Virgil, is national politics—the royal children, the contemporary debate on monarchy, and the projects for colonization. The resulting transitive and mediating maneuvers legitimate both the imitation and his engagement of contested issues. High politics are as necessary to an imitation of Virgil as is the imitation of key narrative kernels.

The high politics in the Aeneid most obviously concern the story of Aeneas's founding of Rome and the accompanying celebration of the reign of Augustus. Renaissance imitations of Virgil typically repeat this combination. They tell stories of heroes involved in grand quests and public undertakings along with praising a contemporary ruler. In Orlando furioso, Ariosto celebrated his patrons by making Ruggiero the founder of the Este line. Tasso, who dedicated Gerusalemme liberata to Alfonso II, duke of Ferrara, made Alfonso's ancestor, Rinaldo, a central hero and had his work prophesy the glorious deeds of Rinaldo's descendants. Spenser, who dedicated The Faerie Queene to Queen Elizabeth I, had Arthur read the history of Britain while Guyon read the history of Faeryland, and, later, in Merlin's prophecy about the progeny of Britomart and Arthegall, foretold the coming of the reign of Elizabeth. In these works, as in The Tempest, the most immediately accessible referential aspects are laudatory. The degree to which the works also evaluate the contemporary situation is more difficult to estimate, but evaluation is nonetheless routinely felt to be present, and also to be a feature of the best imitative writing. An analogous situation exists for readers of the Aeneid.

As is the case with some of the works written in imitation of Virgil's epic, the most easily recognizable political elements—the implicit prophecies, in books 1, 6, and 8, of the glories of Augustus and Actium and the golden age to come—strongly support the idea
that Virgil’s stance toward his ruler was an enthusiastically celebratory one. And indeed, precisely for this reason, these elements constitute an aspect of the work that has been somewhat troubling to Virgil’s critics and admirers throughout the centuries. Ariosto, for example, complained that “Augustus Caesar was not such a saint, / As Virgill maketh him by his description,” and Thomas Hobbes pondered, in his “Answer . . . to Sir William Davenant’s Preface before Gondibert,” whether Virgil’s attention to Augustus was anything more than flattery, a question that stirred considerable interest in some of the writers of Alexander Pope’s generation as well.3 Yet despite the extravagance of the praise conveyed in Virgil’s prophecies, there are, nevertheless, elements in the epic that tend to complicate this version of the relationship between the poet and his ruler. Only if one concentrates exclusively on the overt references to Augustus and his age can one accept without qualification the notion that, as Boccaccio put it, Virgil’s purpose was to extol Augustus and his family as he exalted “the glory of the name of Rome.”4

One can easily lose the sense that Virgil’s attitude toward Augustus was that of single-minded praise when one considers—in the context of Virgil’s “historical present”—some of the implications of the story he tells. The central complication, of course, is that Virgil’s poem is not about Augustus and Actium, but about an ancient hero from the distant past. Yet it focuses on a plot that had a particular relevance in the aftermath of Actium, the activities involved in bringing two “peoples” together. And if one attempts to approach that story as an Augustan plot—as many readers have felt compelled to do—one’s assessment of the politics of the Aeneid inevitably becomes more problematic. Two of the most notoriously complex aspects of the work, the outcome of the Dido-Aeneas affair and the final scene of the work, Aeneas’s killing of Turnus, can help us illustrate some dimensions of the interpretive issues. In both of these incidents resides the problem of the Aeneas-Augustus relationship, especially as it centers around Aeneas’s callousness.

The Dido-Aeneas affair is a place in the Aeneid where discussions of Virgil’s indebtedness to his predecessors often expand to include patterns available in the poet’s historical present, the most
famous of which is the love affair between Mark Antony and Cleopatra. And needless to say, one's conclusions will vary according to the historical pattern about which one is thinking. Like Antony, Aeneas is waylaid by a foreign queen, and his entanglement with her threatens the future glory of Rome, even as Antony's similar involvement presumably did. With this historical pattern in mind, the most noteworthy aspect of Virgil's episode is the way he changes the outcome so that Aeneas abandons Dido, choosing for himself the greater destiny which is Rome. To the extent that Aeneas shadows Augustus throughout the poem, a shadowing that Dryden and many other readers have insisted upon, Aeneas's rejection of Dido in favor of Rome might suggest the triumph of Octavius (Augustus) over Eastern luxury and decadence at Actium. Or it could support Dryden's conjecture that the story is a subtle justification for "the divorce which not long before had passed between the Emperor and Scribonica." Any connections drawn between Aeneas's choices and Augustus's actions are bound to complicate the theory that the poem is a celebration of Virgil's emperor, however. For Dido is not an entirely unsympathetic character, as the reactions of centuries of readers testify. Her charges of cruelty and coldness linger in our minds and return to us as we consider Aeneas's final ruthless actions in book 12.

The final action of Virgil's work features a proud warrior, without a sword and begging for pity, being refused mercy by Aeneas and, out of revenge for the death of Pallas, killed. The death of Turnus is the culmination of the war between the Latins and the Trojans, a combat that has, by this point in the text, been identified as a tragic civil war in which good people have been wasted on both sides. In other words, it has become a dramatic image of what Virgil's contemporaries have recently lived through. Earlier in book 12, in Jupiter and Juno's discussion of this war, we are reminded that one way of dealing with a war between two peoples who should be one is to compromise, a path Juno is finally willing to take. Providing a poignant contrast to that compromise is the bloody revenge that Aeneas insists on taking against Turnus at the end of this book.

One consequence of this ending is that it opens up the text in
such a way that, in the words of Michael Putnum, it can “negate any romantic notion of the Aeneid as an ideal vision of the greatness of Augustan Rome.” While there will always be those who will be able to find justification for Aeneas’s action by arguing, with Giraldi Cinthio, that “it seemed contrary to justice to let a wicked man live,” the circumstances under which Turnus is killed make it less easy to regard Aeneas as “a model for Augustus, or more unfortunate still, a glorification of the accomplishments of Rome through his character and life.” The very least that must be said about Virgil’s ending is that it is handled in such a way as to allow into his work precisely those views of Augustus to which his opponents were most committed—namely, that his coming to and holding of power were products of his cruelty to his enemies and his needless slaughter of them. In other words, Virgil devised an ending that had the capacity to unsay what the prophecies had earlier said.

A last point about Virgil’s ending that lies at the heart of the general problem we are considering is that Aeneas’s final brutal act is an important imitative moment in the work. For this climactic moment, Virgil reproduced the action at the center of the Iliad, the wrathful Achilles’ slaughter of the noble Hector. It is possible to explain this episode as one more instance in which Virgil’s modeling on the Greek epic calls attention to himself as a rejuvenator of the best ancient art. However, in the context of the discussion of how Virgil addresses his contemporary world, another option presents itself—namely, that Virgil imitated this particular aspect of Homer at this particular place in his text as a way of commenting on the nature of the action he was portraying. Recalling the image of a pitiless Achilles hardly promotes the sense of a triumphant ushering in of a glorious future; rather, it epitomizes the tragedy that a brutal war has produced. As such, this imitative moment exists not only as rejuvenated old art but as a potential device for making a political statement that calls into question the validity of the unambiguously celebratory statements made earlier in the text.

At issue in The Tempest is the extent to which Shakespeare’s reworkings of Virgilian structures may be said to be simultaneous reworkings of certain aspects of the contemporary culture. As with
the *Aeneid*, the most accessible referential aspects of *The Tempest* are the idioms of congratulation and mystification. The contemporary representation of James I as a philosopher-ruler and patriarch, the flattering representation of royal children, and the idealizing court masque were all part of the rhetoric in which King James and his contemporaries confirmed his authority and associated it with the national identity. Despite the clarity with which these materials recur in the play, what makes it impossible to read them as unambiguous repetitions of court ideology has to do both with the nature of the conflicts that the play narrates and with the nature of the political conflicts contemporary with the play. There may be no exact correlation between what is inside the play and what is outside of it, but the conceptual similarities that do recur are sufficient to allow the voices of opposition, competition, and conflict to be recalled, if not actually heard. The topic of royal children, inside the play and outside it, can illustrate the point rather quickly, even as it reminds us of the link between the play and the *Aeneid*.

One parallel between the plots of the *Aeneid* and *The Tempest* and the story that was being lived out at the court of King James involves the education of princes. Throughout the *Aeneid* the idea persists that the hope for the future resides in the children, and thus also in their being properly prepared, an emphasis that Virgil locates most importantly in the story of Anchises' teaching of Aeneas in *Aeneid* 6 and in the frequent reminders to him that he must look to the needs of his son. Likewise, Prospero, a father and ruler, takes Ferdinand in hand as soon as he gets to the island and uses the time he spends there to prepare him for marriage and rule. Expressed in typical romance form through a series of trials, the progress of this moral education repeats the same sequence that the Virgilian allegorists described.

The attention King James devoted to the education of Prince Henry was, of course, part of his own self-image as one whose contribution to England's destiny would be distinct and distinguished. In Henry and his other children, James had something to offer England that had not been available from any other monarch, without serious complications, since Henry VII. His providing
Henry a humanist education, his plans for a lavish investiture, and his establishing for Henry the court at St. James Palace were all consonant with the effort to display himself and the prince as guarantors of the nation's future, and thus to authenticate his own worth to the nation.

The spiritedness with which the English people responded to this offer attests to its success. Interest in Henry ran especially high in 1610, the year of his investiture as Prince of Wales. Londons Love, a pageant organized by London officials to celebrate the investiture, generated so much enthusiasm that the Speaker of the House of Commons dismissed the House; the "Drums and Fifes were so loud," as the "Lord Mayor and Citizens of London in the Liveries of their several Companies" waited for Prince Henry to proceed from Richmond down the Thames and to Whitehall (Commons Journals, p. 434). Other evidence of the nation's participation in the mystification of Henry exists in the records showing whose sons were sent to him to learn the ways of a courtier, in the masques written to celebrate him, and in the artists who sought his patronage and dedicated their works to him. George Chapman, one poet who secured that patronage, dedicated his translations of Homer to Henry, including the partial translation of the Iliad made in 1609 followed by the completed translation in 1611. As Graham Parry remarks, "Not surprisingly, the prefatory material attributes to the sponsor of the translation the full range of Homeric virtues and grandeur."

In associating Henry with classical ideals, Chapman was following what had become a typical way to refer to him. Jonson's Oberon, performed at court on January 1, 1611, and featuring Henry dancing the title role, proclaimed: "He is above your reach. . . . He is the matter of vertue. . . . He is a god, o'er kings; yet stoupes he then / To teach them by the sweetnesse of his sway. . . . 'Tis he, that stays the time from turning old / And keeps the age up in a head of gold" (ll. 338–51). This same style marked the sermon preached in the College of Westminster the day before the prince's investiture as Prince of Wales. The chosen text—"Create in mee a new heart," Psalms 51:10—was used to praise a perfection seemingly already realized: "such a young Ptol-
omey for studies and Libraries; such a young Alexander for affecting martialisme and chivalrie, such a young Josiah for religion & piety.”

Consistent with this image of potential greatness was the proposal of Henry as a unifier of dissenting groups, as even the above examples have suggested. During 1610, when James and Parliament were quarreling over finances, the king and his supporters repeatedly invoked the need to finance Henry—both the investiture and St. James Palace—as one reason to increase the king's supply. In Henry the concerns of the entire nation could be united, as James explained: “As for him I say no more; the sight of himselfe here speakes for him” (McIlwain, p. 319). Even the choice of Parliament as the location of the investiture was implicated in this effort. Held there on June 4, 1610, “in open Parliament, bothe Howses sitting together,” this event in itself became one more way for James to ingratiate himself with a Parliament whose support he needed if he was to settle his problems of supply. Here and elsewhere the effort to create a stable and unambiguous image of the prince was a means of countering national unrest and suppressing the effects of social and political tensions. So successful was the effort that even historians have responded slowly to evidence suggesting that Henry was also a source of conflict.

Despite James's rhetoric about the unequivocal value of his son, there was considerable concern that the cost of Prince Henry's court would be exorbitant and thus an exacerbation of the nation's already serious financial problems. With spending habits like those of his father, the prince could offer little assurance that the worst fears were ill-founded. In 1611, he even admitted that “he was 'like enough to prove an unthrift,' ” a likelihood that has provoked from Pauline Croft the wry remark that “Henry's premature death in 1612, although a political blow, was nevertheless a financial relief to the crown, and the significance of the four-year break between 1612 and prince Charles' majority in 1616 should not be underestimated as a monetary factor of some significance.”

In *The Tempest*, Shakespeare rhetorically portrays the young prince as an exemplary figure. Like the idealized Henry and the ideal pattern for education that many read into the story of Aeneas,
Ferdinand evolves steadily toward perfection. Moreover, also like the idealized Henry, he becomes the means in the play through which various factions move toward relationship and reciprocity. Prospero instructs the son of Alonso, his erstwhile enemy, betroths his own daughter to that son, and then gives him back to Alonso as a reward for repentance. Despite these features, the element in Ferdinand's role that resonates with current affairs is the strong emphasis upon exercises in discipline and self-control in Prospero's education of him, an emphasis that registers contemporary anxieties, especially about the expansion of royal power and excessive royal expenditures.

Thus, the play can as easily be read as a complicated response to a real-life situation as a reworking of the Virgilian pre-text. In the latter case, quite striking are the changes wrought on Virgil by refashioning Ferdinand as a chaste Aeneas. To effect that change, Shakespeare guided the imitation in a direction involving simplification rather than complication of the structures that he adopted from Virgil. Unlike Aeneas, Ferdinand is not a conflicted figure. In his portrayal of Ferdinand, Shakespeare flattened Virgil, weakening the tensions that dominate the parent work. This method surprises us, so accustomed are we to finding that Shakespeare made his sources more intricate than they originally were.

Another way of understanding the implications of this compositional strategy, and one that makes sense particularly when read in the context of James's court, is that the presentation of Ferdinand as an ideal is a rhetorical choice that created options for the author. It furnished him with a "charitable attitude" with which to confront some contemporary issues that were full of conflict and that, in the view of court critics, required correction. The play's presentation of a prince might well remind one of Henry, yet Ferdinand's characteristics are not only the characteristics that Henry possessed but those his critics wished he had. Thus the flattening and weakening of the Virgilian tensions cooperate with this style of instruction and criticism.

A different handling of royal children is evident in the case of Ferdinand's sister, Claribel. In this instance, the anxieties about royal policy are presented quite directly, and by means of a differ-
ent rhetorical technique. Shakespeare casts the presentation of the court party’s response to the wedding of Claribel, Alonso’s other child, in the style of vituperation or blame, epideictic’s alternative to praise. The story of Claribel, whom Antonio and Sebastian describe as having been married to the wrong person, someone who lives too far away, is, of course, homologous to the marriage negotiations for Prince Henry and Lady Elizabeth. Speculation and advice about how James would or should use the marriages of his children to effect political allegiances had been continuous since his accession. Some felt that if Elizabeth were married to a Protestant (the most favored being the Palatine prince from Germany whom she eventually did marry), then Henry should be married to a Catholic (a Spanish infanta or the daughter of Henry IV of France), a plan that this committed Protestant prince eschewed. Another option was to marry both children to the Catholic offspring of the duke of Savoy. In the several months immediately preceding the November 1, 1611, performance of *The Tempest*, negotiations for all these possibilities were in progress. The ambassador of the duke of Savoy arrived in England on March 23, 1611, and was still pressing his suit on November 29, 1611. Meanwhile negotiations were continuing with both France and Spain, the latter of which (in October 1611) withdrew the offer of the first infanta for Henry and offered the second instead, much to the consternation of the king.

Sir Walter Raleigh wrote two letters to James on the subject of the marriages, declaring against the Savoyan suits. His letters record how the contemporary argument against these suits was structured. The similarity between the structure of that argument and the manner in which Shakespeare states the case against Claribel’s marriage is striking.

Raleigh’s central argument was that to marry the Savoyans would be to increase the risk of Spanish, and so Catholic, treachery against England: “Savoy and Spain are inseparable, and . . . Savoy dare not offend the pope nor the emperor” (p. 237; cf. pp. 239, 241, and passim). Besides, Savoy, he noted, was too far away: “Our kings of England . . . have no business over the Alps” (p. 234), and such a marriage for Princess Elizabeth would necessi-
tate that she “be removed far from her nearest blood... into a country far estranged from our nation as any part of Christendom” (p. 235). Raleigh and others preferred that Elizabeth marry Frederick of Germany and that Henry either marry the French Catholic princess or bide his time, “keep his own ground for a while... While he is yet free, all have hope” (p. 250).

In *The Tempest* the complaints about Claribel’s marriage parallel these contemporary anxieties about James’s arranging proper marriages for his children—a structure that is supported also by a Virgilian context. Claribel has been married in Tunis, and Tunis, Gonzalo explains, “was Carthage.” Immediately afterward, in a conversation among Alonso, Antonio, and Sebastian, Alonso laments and his comrades reproach him with the fact that he had married Claribel to someone too far away: “You were kneel’d to, and importun’d otherwise, / By all of us” (2.1.124–25). The marriage itself may have been a “sweet” (2.1.69) wedding, but now that the child remains physically removed from her own land—“So far... removed / I ne’er again shall see her” (2.1.106–7), so far away that now she “is banish’d from your eye” (2.1.122)—her absence signifies to her father and countrymen the precariousness and unpredictability of their own future, a future that might have been better secured had the marriage been to someone else.

In addition to the complaint about distance, there is also a more specific reprimand for choosing the wrong nation. Sebastian complains that the king did not marry Claribel to a European, was not willing to “bless our Europe with your daughter” (2.1.120). Instead of following counsel, Sebastian complains, Alonso decided to “loose her to an African” (2.1.121), Africa being as alien a land to an Italian as a Catholic marriage would have seemed “alien” to the proponents of Protestant matches for James’s children. In producing this argument about mistaken political marriage, the play supports the faction that was urging against Savoy and thus associates blame with anyone who takes another position.

Because the discourse of this contemporary issue recurs in the play in generalized, metaphoric, and analogic rhetorical structures (there are no overt topical allusions to track down, nothing more specific than the reference to Europe), it can disappear from sight
once the controversy and the language that created it are no longer current. This capacity for disappearance, characteristic of any discourse, also suggests how a work can become newly contemporary, as would have been the case when *The Tempest* was played for the betrothal festivities of Princess Elizabeth in 1613. So universalized can the play’s images appear to be that the play, performed at a later date for an exceedingly context-rich occasion, could take on the concreteness of this new situation. Like all other drama that is newly “authenticated” by a new audience “in terms of live contemporary issues,” *The Tempest*, too, exists as an “abstract . . . blueprint,” the referentiality of which always depends on what an audience knows and thinks about.

Be that as it may, the handling of the story of Ferdinand’s education and of the attitudes toward Claribel’s marriage suggests some of the ways in which the play textualizes the contemporary culture. It does not report or replay what has been going on, but it does tell analogous stories, repeat in similar circumstances familiar arguments, and make points in ways that signal acceptance of some cultural values and rejection of others. In all of these instances, the play—its stories and its languages—is a set of responses to current situations, just as any speech act is a response both to language and situation. It is “a rejoinder in a given dialogue,” “shot through with dialogized overtones . . . [and] calculated nuances on all fundamental voices and tones of this heteroglossia.” Moreover, as a response, it is written with the working assumption that, even as it is a response so will there be response to it: “All rhetorical forms, monologic in their compositional structure, are oriented toward the listener and his answer.” If these statements are always true, they are more immediately true whenever the rhetorical form is oral and in front of an audience.

Like Ferdinand and Claribel, Prospero is also a response to Virgil through contemporary situations. In his roles as father and magus ruler, Prospero participates in the most mystifying terms of royal ideological representation. But where he exercises control over other characters, the implications of his actions are more ambiguous. In part, that ambiguity and complexity result from the exceedingly wide range of patterns from Virgil that Shakespeare
used to create him, including Aeneas, the gods, Priam, and, in one instance, Ovid’s Medea. Another indication of this complexity lies in the various ways that the part of Prospero (especially in relation to Ariel and Caliban) reconstitutes the political languages of high politics, especially the languages of monarchy and colonization.

**The Limits of Royal Power**

The topic of royal children illustrates the method that will be used throughout this study of *The Tempest* to identify and suggest the range of the play’s referentiality. Central to the method is attention not only to what was happening at the time of its writing, but also to the language in which the arguments about what was happening were cast. In the case of the children, laudatory materials dominate the extant documents. But when it comes to the debates on royal power, a detailed record of the nature and degree of conflict is available. These highly polemical documents record the characteristic features of the opposing arguments, information that is indispensable for estimating the response the play registers.

By 1611, the year of *The Tempest*, the discussion in England about how much power a king should have had been going on for at least three hundred years. During the reign of Elizabeth, the topic elicited frequent and vigorous debate. In the early years of the reign of James, and especially during the parliamentary session of 1610, these debates resumed, and for more than one reason. The English had been, from the start, suspicious and fearful of this Scot sitting on England’s throne; James had been injudiciously and repetitively articulate about his own notions that a king’s power was absolute, and the agendas he set for his first Parliament, which ran in three sessions from 1604 to 1610, gave the king and the Commons what we can see in retrospect to have been a best possible context for expressing fear and contending for power. Those agendas featured the king’s plan for uniting England and Scotland and his request that the sovereign be given more suitable financing—clearly the two most important issues of the first years of the reign. Both topics were brought up in 1604 during the first session of Parliament. By the end of the second session, which ran from 1606 to
1607, the king's project for the union had, in effect, been defeated. During the third and final session of this Parliament—which met for twelve months (February 9, 1610, to February 9, 1611)—the focus of debate was the project for a financial settlement, a project that was also destined to fail.

James's summoning Parliament in 1610 for the purpose of settling the matter of supply was, in itself, an entirely reasonable move. At the outset of his reign, Parliament had allotted the king a generous financial grant, partly in celebration of his accession, but then in subsequent years it had taken no further action on supply, distracted as it had been by the Gunpowder Plot and the issue of the union of England and Scotland. As a result, by 1610 the court was in a state of financial emergency, a crisis brought about not merely by the king's extravagance but by the fact that the Crown's income from patrimonial property, wardships, knights' service, and purveyances was no longer adequate to the court's needs. This fiscal situation had been inherited from Elizabeth, who had taken extreme measures in her later years to acquire adequate financing, and James could not leave the matter unsettled any longer. But when he requested supply, the Commons responded not with money but with arguments.

As the 1610 session opened, the specific issue that engaged the opposition was the matter of the customs the Crown levied on imported and exported goods. Traditionally, the English monarch had levied such impositions for the regulatory purpose of protecting English merchants from foreign competition. Desperate for revenue, James and Salisbury had recently increased the impositions beyond what was needed for regulation, thereby altering the function that impositions had served in the past. Although their action was legal, and certainly in conformity with the 1606 court decision in Bates's Case, some in the Commons interpreted the move as an extension of the royal prerogative. What the Commons feared was not the custom of imposing in and for itself, but the action of increasing the impositions without consulting Parliament. The fear bred by this action—that the king was inclined to overextend his power—was increased all the more by his next move, the proposal that the system for supply be changed to one of a guaran-
teed revenue. While most modern historians agree that this proposal, the Great Contract, was a good plan, one that would have benefited the people as much as the king, some in Parliament feared that once the proposal was passed the king would no longer need to summon Parliament, a situation that would eliminate their voice in government. Others, who supported the king, thought that the Great Contract would actually reduce the royal prerogative.

In the earlier 1606-07 session, devoted to a large extent to the Union, the focus of debate had been on how the relationship between England and Scotland might be defined, a topic which produced a discourse concerned with issues of equality, preference, and benefit. In the later session of 1610, an identifiably different discourse predominated. Devoted almost entirely to the question of the king’s finances, this session developed a discourse—a lexicon and a set of arguments—that kept the debates focused on the relationship between king and subject. If the subjects were to supply the king, the Commons wanted to know what he would give them in return. What did each owe to each? Or, put somewhat differently, what were the limits of the king’s power?

King James typically defended his position by arguing that he had the right to all the power he already was exercising and all that he planned to exercise, a position he articulated by comparing kings to gods, to fathers, and to the head of a body: “In the Scriptures Kings are called Gods, and so their power after a certain relation compared to the Divine power. Kings are also compared to Fathers of families; for a King is trewly Prens patriae, the politique father of his people. And lastly, Kings are compared to the head of this Microcosme of the body of a man.” He gave this speech to Parliament in March as part of his strategy to contain and divert the opposition raised by his policies. While James had his supporters in Parliament, those who opposed him cast their arguments in the oppositional language that had been dignified in England by generations of use. They said that a king who exercised a transcendent power was one who deprived his subjects of liberty, threw them into bondage, and treated them as slaves.

So important were these debates considered at the time that
documents from this Parliament were given unusually wide distribution. The speech of James just cited was printed at least four times in 1610. Pauline Croft has covered other details of this subject with just the thoroughness we need at this point: "Numerous copies were circulated of Salisbury's speech of 15 February, which opened the discussions on the great contract, and his speech of 10 July defending impositions was also widely copied. . . . the terms of the great contract as concluded in July 1610 were discussed in every county as members returned home with instructions from the Commons to sound out their neighbours' opinions. [William] Hakewill's remarkable attack on the legality of the new impositions, and the list of the Commons' grievances presented at the end of the fourth session, were also circulated. . . . Perhaps most striking of all was the appearance in 1611 of a hitherto unprecedented collection of printed parliamentary material, aiming to defend the proceedings of the house of Commons over the great contract. This volume claimed to have been printed abroad, to avoid the censorship of the privy council." Also notable in this record of what was printed is John Chamberlain's expression of anxiety about what might be printed. In a letter of May 24, 1610, he reported that James's March speech, which "strained so high and made so transcendent" the royal prerogative, had "bred generally much discomfort"—so much discomfort, in fact, that there was now the "wish that this speech might never come in print." Finally, two important speeches of the opposition—those by Hakewill and Whitelocke—were to be printed in 1641, a detail that further corroborates our sense of the clarity and fullness with which these earlier documents were understood to have articulated the issues at hand.

Taken together, these details suggest the importance of this session of Parliament, the contemporary interest in high politics, the availability of news, and, especially important to this study of The Tempest, the contemporary availability of the language in which these events were discussed. The discourse that developed to argue the relationship between king and subject was not a private language but one produced in the public arena of court and
Commons and then distributed for public knowledge. Once in circulation, it was available for any number of different projects or discursive practices.

It would be possible to formulate in different ways just how *The Tempest* relates to this context, how it manages to "draw the real into its own texture." The thesis to be pursued here is that the political discourse, especially of 1610, is re-presented by Shakespeare in fictional constructs that imitate the language—that is, the metaphors, idioms, and rhetoric that James was using to represent his identity (the king as god, father, head of a microcosm)—as well as the rhetorical structures that the opposition parliamentarians were using to represent the identity they felt they would acquire as subjects to such a king (the subject in bondage and servitude). Prospero, a ruler with magical and thus transcendent powers, stands in homologous relationship to King James and his concerns about his rights to a certain amount of power and to be served (and supplied) properly. Ariel and Caliban, who are in bondage and who continually express their longing for freedom, are homologous to the metaphors, idioms, and rhetoric used in the Commons to express the subjects' right to liberty and freedom, their right to present grievances or to "complain," and their fears of "restraint" and loss of property.

To the extent that different attitudes toward rule and subjection find expression in *The Tempest*, the play authenticates and validates both sides in the debate while at the same time producing an argument for constitutionalism. *The Tempest*, then, does not only mystify the court of the current political scene; it also dignifies public debate and demystifies absolutist claims and strategies—all of which deepens the significance of the play's repetitions of a classical text that was understood as a mirror of the time and also the importance of the presentation of such a play on the Jacobean stage. We may not know how *The Tempest* was received, but we can estimate the possible applicability of plays in general, a subject Andrew Gurr has addressed: "The fictional presentation of affairs of state, in a city devoted to the art and trade of 'application,' is probably a sharper guide to popular and even governing modes of thought about politics and society in Shakespeare's time than is the
case today. The fictions of the state were certainly not so marginal to the affairs of state, because imaginative thought had few other outlets, and none with the coerciveness of the minds of men in company."

The best context in which to examine the relationship of this play to its time is that which takes the most complete account of what was happening in politics in the year prior to the play's first performance. An especially important source, therefore, are the parliamentary records of 1610–11. As one would expect, many of the details of the debates they record involve the recitation of numerical figures and historical precedents as the Commons sought to arrive at a solution to the problem. More relevant to *The Tempest*, however, is the language aimed, not at arriving at a solution, but at laying out the theoretical issues of rule and rights that this fiscal situation brought into focus. Just as Ariel seeks Prospero's assurance that in exchange for tasks performed Prospero will grant him freedom, so the Commons wanted the king to know that they expected something in return for their willingness to grant supply.

This point was made powerfully at the very outset of the session, when the Commons responded to the king's request for supply not by talking about it, but by requesting a conference with the Lords, at which they demanded to know, "'What the King will give to his subjects?' *Quid mihi dabis?*" (Gardiner, p. 13). Before they would supply the king, they wanted to know which grievances he would satisfy. As Henry Montague told the Lords, the Lords might have special knowledge of royal powers, the "*arcana imperii*," but the Commons knew much about "*vota populi*" (Gardiner, p. 14).

This insistence that the king express a willingness to satisfy grievances was but one strategy developed by the opposition for arguing that the king's use of impositions seemed to be an abuse of the royal prerogative. Other strategies involved rhetoric that would, for them, satisfactorily define and characterize the kind of power that James was exercising, or seemed to want to exercise. Especially notable in these arguments is the fact that the opposition appropriated for its own use the language of natural law, language that in so many other instances had been used to defend absolute
Henry Martin argued that the king's imposing showed "an arbitrary, irregular, unlimited, and transcendent power" (Gardiner, p. 88). Later, Martin's emphasis on notions of arbitrariness and irregularity was replicated in John Hoskyns's explanation that a royal power that has no limits "is contrary to reason" (Gardiner, p. 76), and again, in a remark from the discussion in April 1610, that "To stretch prerogative so as to extend beyond measure" is something that "nature itself speaks against" (Gardiner, p. 152).

Significantly, those in the Commons who were arguing against the king explained that the danger in such immeasure and irregularity was that it could result in a loss of liberty so serious as to amount to a change of status for the people. Thomas Beaumont expressed the "Fear, that our whole Liberty be swallowed up" (Commons Journals, p. 430), and Adam Blackwood feared that "we [would be] all Slaves" (Commons Journals, p. 399). The more precise definition of how the status could change came from Whitelocke, who warned that if they allowed the king to set up a system whereby he could get all the money he wanted "without our consent," they would in effect be changing their status from that of subjects—people who had rights before the law and could plead and intreat to the king—to that of tenants, and "tenants at his will" (Learned and Necessary Argument, B4). They would find themselves in a position, in other words, whereby the king could, if he would, appropriate the subjects' goods. And this alteration was of such consequence, explained Whitelocke, that it "subverteth the fundamental Law of the Realm, and induceth a new forme of state and government" (B4).

Of the documents produced by the Commons during these debates, two of the most important were the Petition of Right and the Petition of Temporal Grievances, both of which were printed at the time. The former (not to be confused with the more famous Petition of Right of 1628) was entered in Parliament on May 23, 1610, and then delivered to the king. The main thrust of this petition is the Commons's insistence that there be no infringement of "the ancient and fundamental right of the liberty of the Parliament" to debate freely the king's use of his prerogative, for only if
this right is protected is it “possible for the subject either to know or to maintain his right and property to his own lands and goods.”

The Petition of Temporal Grievances (accompanied by a Petition of Ecclesiastical Grievances) was presented to the king at Whitehall on July 7, 1610. In attendance at this presentation were the Privy Council and twenty members of the House of Commons. In this document, the Commons reminded the king that there was nothing more “precious” to them than “to be guided and governed by the certain rule of the law, which giveth both to the head and members that which of right belongeth to them.” As even these examples show, both the Petition of Right and this later document contain language that emphasizes that the king was subject to restraint. A notion of restraint did not mean that the king was not absolute, but, as Whitelocke had earlier insisted, it did mean that the absolute power of the king, the “Suprema Potestas,” did not exist in the king by himself, but in “the King in Parliament” (Learned and Necessary Argument, C).

The rhetoric that King James and his supporters developed to counter these arguments focused on the issue of the legality of the impositions and on the need to protect the king’s prerogative. Arguing the legality of supply, Francis Bacon explained that “the question is not whether the King may alter the law by his prerogative but whether the King have not such a prerogative by law.” Choosing the Great Contract rather than the impositions as the focus of his contribution to the discussion, Sir Julius Caesar argued against the Contract on the grounds that it would diminish the royal prerogative. And that diminution would, in turn, lead to the king’s losing control of the people, for it would “free” them “from the King’s greatest lawfull power” (Gardiner, p. 175). Anxious that Parliament find a way to supply the king other than by way of the Contract’s guaranteed income, he explained that “to strengthen the King is to preserve the state” (Gardiner, p. 176).

Like the arguments of the Commons, the arguments of Bacon and Caesar emphasized the implications of any actions they now might take. Those implications were also the concern of King James, whose power and policies were the focus of all the discus-
It is, then, of particular interest to notice what he had to say on these matters. In his first speech to this Parliament, on March 21, 1610, he included the placating remark that "Kings will be glad to bound themselves within the limits of their Lawes" (Mcllwain, p. 309), and, in a statement quite similar to the one Whitelocke would make later in the year, he even explained, "For the King with his Parliament here are absolute (as I understand) in making or forming of any sort of Lawes" (Mcllwain, p. 311). Obviously, James was in part anxious to dilute the Commons's impression that he was a maverick foreigner out to disrupt the English way of doing things. He took the position that the king was not like a god who "spake by Oracles, and wrought by Miracles," but rather he became "Lex Loquens" (Mcllwain, p. 309).

However willing James was to acknowledge the importance of law and the ways in which a king is not a god, he nevertheless used this comparison to express that quintessential nature of the king's position: "The State of Monarchie is the supremest thing upon earth: For Kings are not onely Gods Lieutenants upon earth, and sit upon Gods throne, but even by God himselfe they are called Gods." Kings resemble gods in many ways; even as gods "create, or destroy, make or unmake," so do kings "make and unmake their subjects" and have power "of life, and of death" over them. In fact, kings can "make of their subjects like men at the Chesse" (Mcllwain, pp. 307–8). In these metaphors, James was developing language that Salisbury, the Lord Treasurer, would imitate when he referred to the king as the "primum mobile" (Gardiner, p. 52), and that Bacon would use when explaining that it was the nature of a king to be the "principale agens" (Gardiner, p. 67). James hoped, of course, that this language of agency could be translated into trust. To that end, he assured the Commons that he would not abuse his power and that he had no intention of saying one thing in public and then contradicting it in private: "Kings Actions (even in the secretest places) are as the actions of those that are set upon the Stages, or on the tops of houses" (Mcllwain, p. 310).

On the specific issue of supply, James had two especially important things to say. First, he stated flatly that subjects owed him supply, a position that, in itself, no one would deny. In exacting
payments, James said, the king only took that which the subject was bound to give. His second point, and the one that eventually triggered the Commons to issue their Petition of Right, was that, because supply was his right, the Commons was not to dispute the matter. On this issue, James scolded, the Commons was to restrain itself; the Commons was to be quiet. Thus the reasoning rhetoric of explanation, reassurance, and definition joined the language of threat; the power of gods was not to be questioned.

The outcome of this year-long debate was that James finally silenced Parliament by dissolving it before any resolution had been reached, an event which some historians have in retrospect thought may have been “a turning point in the financial and constitutional history of the early seventeenth century.” Ideally, some would say, Parliament’s role was not to make the king’s task impossible (even as the king’s was not to prevent Parliament from meeting) but to “produce union between crown and people.” As Bacon would tell James in 1611, a Parliament had two purposes, “the one for the supply of your estate; the other for the better knitting of the hearts of your subjects unto your Majesty . . . for both which, Parliaments have been and are the ancient and honorable remedy” (Spedding, p. 280). Early in 1611, that remedy seemed not to be available. Having dissolved Parliament, the king would not call it again until 1614, when it would meet for only two months.

In The Tempest the central metaphors of the debates of 1610 are literalized in a fiction that reproduces the structures of the opposing arguments. As a magus, Prospero is like a god, a first mover; he makes and unmakes all the situations on the island. He also takes it for granted that Ariel and Caliban should serve him (supply him), that they should be punished if they complain, perhaps even silenced. The position of each of them in relation to Prospero is not, of course, the same: Ariel serves an apprenticeship; Caliban has been made a prisoner. At times Ariel seems to reflect the king’s faithful followers, at others, he exhibits the formally obsequious behavior that even a distraught Commons would use when confronting the king. Likewise, Caliban images the displaced native of Virginia or Ireland, but also the English fear of being made “slaves” in their own land. Whatever the case, together these char-
acters represent the issues of service and supply, restraint and complaint from different angles, which, in combination and in juxtaposition, present a complex and provocative picture of the issues of reciprocity as they were being debated at this time. Depending on one's perspective, supplying the king could be understood, or experienced, either as that which was paid in return for freedom or as that which represented the loss of freedom. To serve Prospero is to give him his due and secure for oneself the promise of a good life in the future; to serve Prospero is also to add to his power.

If The Tempest plays off the dialogic nature of the topic at hand, it also credits constitutionalism as the standard which, of necessity, had to be activated if the dialogue was to reach a harmonious closure. A commonwealth can thrive only when there is both sovereignty and liberty. The king's mysterious and secret powers (the arcana imperii) and the voice of the people (the vota populi) must somehow be made to coexist. Restraint on both king and people is the only means through which each acquires more freedom and power. Displaced into the love plot in The Tempest, this idea recurs in Miranda's pledge to be Ferdinand's servant and in his rejoinder that he will be her husband "with heart as willing / As bondage e'er of freedom" (3.1.88-89). Likewise, Prospero, who appears at one point "on the top (invisible)," and has the power to do anything he wishes to the people on the island, decides at the end to surrender his magic, an action that curbs his power. Thus the play legitimizes the king's position while at the same time exerting pressure on it by legitimizing the position of the opposition. While "order," then, is a value the play espouses and, like the masques, a value to which it refers in the actual world, the play nevertheless acknowledges the stance, taken by many, that it was royal authority, not the Commons, that was growing disorderly.

That stance had been expressed so strongly that it was remarked in a conference of the House of Lords that anyone who could put questions to a ruler as the Commons had "did either look for a Tiberius or Sejanus" (Gardiner, p. 121). That such a remark could be voiced at this time makes Shakespeare's choice of a Virgilian text as his precursor for this play all the more interesting. Like James, Augustus had the reputation of being a peace-bringer. But he also had been called a tyrant, one who had destroyed Rome's
mixed government and deprived the people of their liberties, the tradition to which Ariosto referred when he remarked that Augustus "was not such a saint" as Virgil had made him. It was this aspect of Augustus that caused some readers to question Virgil's integrity in writing poetry to celebrate him. For Shakespeare ostentatiously to play off the central Jacobean idioms for royal power in a work that engages Virgil's central text is also for him to participate in this dialogue concerning the poet's right relationship to the ruler. Shakespeare honors and celebrates James by representing the monarch's godlike, fatherlike role, but he also shows concern for the just use of that role.

Colonization

The context of the parliamentary debates on the limits of royal power enlivens as well as qualifies the important work that has been done on *The Tempest* as a colonization play. For the most part, recent interest in this topic has focused either on how periods later than *The Tempest* appropriated the play for their own colonizing—or, more often, decolonizing—projects, or on the presence in the play of a Renaissance discourse of colonization. Central to these discussions are the means by which the play establishes a dialectic on issues of exploitation and legitimation. As in the debates on the limits of royal power, at issue in colonization were questions about rule and subjection, who had the right to how much power over whom.

It is important to my argument to establish that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the discourses of English monarchy and constitutionalism and the discourse of colonization were linked. More specifically, there was a great deal of lexical and metaphoric crossover between the language of rule and the language of colonization. Each discourse provided idioms and metaphors for the other; likewise, each could appropriate the rhetoric and structures of argument that were developed in the other. For example, in 1610 King James used the language of colonization for one of his defenses of royal power. Comparing kings to gods, fathers, heads, and also colonizers, James insisted that "Kings had their first original from them, who planted and spread themselves in Colonies.
through the world" (McIlwain, p. 308). Here King James used the idea of colonization to buttress his argument that nothing must be allowed to diminish the power of kings because that power was the origin and ensured the continuance of civilization. As colonization rhetoric was appropriated by the king to defend his power, so did both defenders and detractors of colonization mine the commonplaces about rule to bolster their positions.

The documents from the Virginia project illustrate this point from several angles. In the sermons and treatises written to defend and promote the project, writers addressed the issue of whether or not England had the legal right to take the land of another people. Anxious to answer those who had charged that England had no such right, the author of *A True Declaration of the Estate of the Colone in Virginia, With a confutation of such scandalous reports as have tended to the disgrace of so worthy an enterprise* (London, 1610) devoted the first section of his treatise to the issue of whether or not plantation was "lawfull." Among his many defenses is an argument from historical precedent: "why that should bee lawfull for France, which is (in us) unlawfull: that which to Rome was possible, (to us) is impossible: that which to others is honourable, and profitable, (in us) should bee traduced, as in commodious, base, and contemptible." There is also an argument that some of the property the English had acquired had not been taken but purchased: "Paspehay, one of their Kings, sold unto us for copper, land to inherit and inhabite." Earlier, Robert Gray, in *A Good Speed to Virginia* (London, 1609), addressing this issue of "right or warrant" and appropriating for his own argument the notion that rights to property cannot be violated, had explained that, because the natives "have no particular proprietie in any part or parcell of that Countrey, but only a generall recidencie" (C3-C4), it was unnecessary to apply the same legal or constitutionalist standard to this situation: "there is not meum & tuum amongst them: so that if the whole lande should bee taken from them, there is not a man that can complaine of any particular wrong done unto him" (C4).

But discourses about the right to rule over another were not confined to discussions about whether or not England had the right to dominate the native American population. This rhetoric was also
present, and in the most complex ways, in the documents that es­tablished the organization of the Virginia Company and pre­scribed the governance of the Jamestown colony. After suffering great losses in its earliest years, in 1609 the Virginia Company un­dertook a project for reorganization, an initial step of which was to secure from James a second charter (issued May 23, 1609). In­sofar as a central aim of this charter, drafted by the constitution­alist Edwin Sandys, was to shift control of the company away from James and disperse it among the organizers of the company, it stands as one more document from the period that attests to an anti-absolutist project. At the same time, however, this document changed the form of government in the colony from that of a pres­ident who reported to a council to that of a governor who was given "absolute power and aucthority to correct, punishe, pardon, governe and rule." In addition, the institution of martial law was soon to follow.

When William Strachey, who helped codify the laws for the colony, returned to England in 1611, he brought with him the completed manuscript of these laws. Published in January 1612, Lawes Divine, Morall and Martiall, etc. served in part to assure those who wanted to invest in Virginia that their own interests were being protected. The use of martial law did not, however, meet with universal approval. While it could also be argued that severe discipline was required to maintain order in this isolated and vulnerable community, still, both contemporary and modern commentary have characterized these laws as "draconian." In 1612, The New Life of Virginea would advise that the "dutie towards your Colonie [is to] let them live as free English men, under the government of just and equall lawes, and not as slaves after the will and lust of any superiour." And in 1624, the report from the colony would recall that, when Sir Thomas Dale arrived in May 1611, "He immediately published most tyrannous and cruel laws sent over by Sir Thos. Smythe."

While this mix of detail can be variously interpreted and ac­counted for, in itself it provides an example both of the ideological complexities of the situation and of how this situation displays the problems of subjection from different angles. Equally to the point
for this study is that the overlapping features among the discourses of absolutism, constitutionalism, and colonization, especially as these features can be identified as present in *The Tempest*, make it impossible to separate them, and thus their contexts, from each other in the play. Or, put positively, the indistinguishability of these discourses in *The Tempest* is a central feature of its metaphoric and parodic structures, which depend on the ability of the metaphors of rule and rights to blend with and collapse into the metaphors of colonization. Each enhances the others and suggests the implications of the others. The “picturing function” of these metaphors “make[s] discourse appear.”

In addition, this coincidence suggests both the impossibility of and the distortion involved in distinguishing the play’s participation in the language of colonization as a discourse relevant only to the colonization of the New World, the plantation context that most English and American scholars have privileged for this play. The colonization of Ireland was also contemporaneous with the play and was routinely acknowledged at the time as analogous to the colonization of the New World. Moreover, the discourse about the plantation of Ireland is older and much more developed, certainly in regard to issues of rule. (England’s formal project to take over Ireland had been in process since the 1560s.)

To recognize this point raises more than one issue, including the problem of setting limits when one engages in the task of historicizing a literary text. In any study of intertextuality, often it is impossible to limit consideration to a single progenitor, or even to a set number of progenitors, because others are so much like the one at issue or have themselves been crossed by the same progenitors. In this case, the problem seems to be especially acute, however. For if one eliminates the Irish context, one has eliminated both the older discourse and also the discourse that fully elaborates the link between colonization and constitutionalism. The central reason for pursuing the Irish colonial discourse for the study of *The Tempest* is, then, precisely the fact that one of its principal constituents is constitutional language. In addition to clarifying for the modern reader the points of contact between a colonial and a constitutional
discourse, the documents of the Anglo-Irish conflict also confirm that a colonial discourse contains a language of mystification as well as a language of resistance.

A constitutionalist perspective on early Ireland is one that modern historians have only recently begun to develop. Nevertheless, this perspective, and the discourse on which it depends, is readily accessible in the vast amount of Irish material available, including *The Chronicle of Ireland* in Holinshed's *Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland* (1587), a multivocal work which tells the story of the Anglo-Irish struggle in detail over many years, and often with considerable sympathy for the Irish. This source also corroborates how deeply rooted in English culture was the story of the Irish struggle and also how constitutional issues had come to be a staple of this subject. Another set of documents that contains this discourse are letters, pamphlets, and speeches from the early years of the reign of James that record the plans for and problems with planting Ulster. This latter group of documents (many of which are contained in the *Calendar of State Papers, Ireland*) demonstrates how much attention was being given to the Irish project during the period contemporary with the writing of *The Tempest* and, again, how standard a part of this discourse were constitutional issues.

That plantation is the focal point of *The Chronicle of Ireland* is apparent at the outset, for the chronicle is dedicated to Sir Henry Sidney, Sir Philip Sidney's father, who developed the system in the 1560s for planting Ireland and held the position of lord deputy of Ireland at the time this chronicle was being prepared. The authors largely responsible for the chronicle were Richard Stanyhurst and John Hooker alias Vowell, both of whom displayed an intimate knowledge of the idiom of colonization.

Stanyhurst, a Dubliner by birth, wrote two sections of *The Chronicle of Ireland*, one on the reign of Henry VIII and the other a digressive "Description of Ireland." No more conventional here than in his translation of Virgil, Stanyhurst scattered citations of the *Aeneid* all through the "Description"; at one point, in describing the building of the walls of Ross, he quoted fifteen fourteeners
from Thomas Phaer’s translation of Virgil’s description of the building of the walls of Carthage (p. 31). Because glorification was not Stanyhurst’s style, the citation suggests a debunking of what the English planters were attempting; it also gives us another example of how aspects of Virgil’s text, in this case its colonizing motifs, could be variously appropriated.

While Stanyhurst’s personal point of view is difficult to discern, it is clear that his stake in this story was a political one; he places himself in relationship to the narrative of Irish history by identifying his father, James Stanyhurst, Speaker of the House in the Irish Parliament (1557, 1560, and 1568), as a man known for “his exact knowlege in the common lawes,” and as one who had challenged in Parliament both Sir Henry Sidney and Thomas Earl of Sussex, Sidney’s predecessor (pp. 64–65). Moreover, in the “Description,” Stanyhurst included many stories of the trouble the native Irish had had with the “English conquerors” (p. 33). Typical of these narratives, and of their vituperative tone, is the account of how an Irishman charged the English lord deputy with being “the meane and instrument by which his majesties subjects are dailie spoiled. Therefore I as a loyall subject saye traitor to thy teeth” (p. 49). Later this “loyall” Irishman charged that the lord deputy was “content to wink at the miserie” of the subjects as long as “your mouth were stopt with briberie” (p. 51).

John Hooker alias Vowell, who oversaw the editing and revision of the 1587 edition of Holinshed’s Chronicle, had an even closer association with the constitutional issues and language of colonization. Known to have made a speech in the 1569 Irish House of Commons defending the royal prerogative, he is identified in The Chronicle of Ireland as “one of the citizens for the citie of Excester at the parlement holden at Westminster” in 1571 and 1560 (p. 345). Most of the narratives he recounts deal with confrontations between the representative of the English Crown and the representatives of the Irish people, with debates over what each owes to each, features that allow us to recognize how ideologically and discursively akin were the ongoing project of colonization and the early seventeenth-century quarrels between King James and Parliament.
For *The Chronicle of Ireland*, Hooker covered the period of Irish history that included Henry Sidney’s tenure as lord deputy and James Stanyhurst’s tenure as speaker of the house. Typical of the power struggles during this period was the stormy session of Parliament in 1568. There was Stanyhurst’s confrontation with the lord chancellor, in which, answering the opening oration on how order in society depends on obedience to law and the queen, Stanyhurst cited those aspects of law that preserve the “liberties and freedoms” of every Parliament. He enumerated the Commons’ demands that members of the lower house have free and safe passage to and from Parliament, that only Parliament have the right to punish its members for wrongdoing, and, like the Commons in 1610, that Parliament “have libertie to speak their minds freelic to anie bill ... & matter” (p. 342). On subsequent days, there were heated debates on the subject of supply, and specifically of impositions, which, as in the Parliament of 1610, turned into a discussion of the “authoritie of a prince, and what was the dutie of a subject” (p. 344). There was also fierce dispute over whether or not the various burgesses had proper representation in Parliament and how such a matter should be determined. Among the disputants was one Edmund Butler, “who in all things which tended to the queenes majesties profit or common-wealth ... was a principall against it” (p. 343). So disorderly did these debates become that they seemed “more like to a bearebaiting of lose persons than an assemblie of wise and grave men in parlement” (p. 345).

Resistance to plantation, especially in the form of arguments about liberty or law, marks many of the stories Hooker tells. There is the stubbornly subversive response of the city of Waterford, which, upon being requested by the lord deputy to send him military assistance, “did verie insolentlie and arrogantlie returne an answer by waie of disputing their liberties with hir majesties prerogative, and so sent him no aid at all” (p. 365). The power struggles were not limited to contention between the Irish and the English, however; some of the most serious were those between the English settlers themselves and the lord deputy. The Englishmen in Munster, for example, rebelled against another matter of supply, this time cess (“the prerogative of the prince to impose
upon the countrie a certain proportion for the feeding of men and horses in the military”), and defended their recalcitrance by claiming that this imposition “was against reason and law” (p. 390), the same argument used in 1610 to challenge James. This matter was settled, in the Crown’s favor, only after representatives were sent to Queen Elizabeth, who, like James after her, took the standard position that subjects had to supply the monarch because supply provided them with protection (pp. 391–94).

Just how contemporary an issue Irish colonization was at the time of The Tempest is indicated in part by its inclusion—immediately after an update of the Virginia venture—in John Stow’s Abridgment (1611). According to the Abridgment, the next phase of the plantation of Ireland was “The plantation of the north of Ireland by Citizens of London,” a project that would involve three hundred persons, who, being “furnished with all things necessary, and with all conveniency were sent to Ulster.”

James’s March 1610 speech to Parliament also documented the attention Ireland was receiving; here James singled out Ireland as one of the projects that was draining the treasury, a point to which others repeatedly returned during this long year of debating.

But among the most compelling Anglo-Irish documents from this period are those which recount the actual plantation effort and the implications of it as it was being experienced. These documents include the correspondence from Sir Arthur Chichester to King James, Salisbury, and the Privy Council. As lord deputy of Ireland, Chichester was, from the beginning, involved in James’s plans to plant Ulster. He wrote instructions on how to proceed and sent descriptions of the various counties and the resources available in each; he also warned against the difficulties that might arise. In other words, he gave more than one view; he wrote of the glory the project would bring to king and nation but also of the problems it could cause the people.

How plantation would enhance the king’s power is the theme of Chichester’s letter to James on October 14, 1608, in which he proclaimed James to be “the sole proprietor” of Ulster “as the native lords thereof were formerly” and announced that he might retain these lands “in his Crown for ever, for his honour and increase of
his revenues” (p. 68). In his letter of March 10, 1609, he acknowledged the financial advantages of the project to the “private persons whom His Majesty intends thereby to encourage and gratify” (p. 157). But in this same communication he also warned that “few here will bear any part of this intended plantation,” all being “either not able or not content to undergo the conditions” (p. 161). Chichester knew, too, that the discontent came not only from the Irish. A month earlier, he had complained to the Privy Council that “The treasury here is emptied long since . . . the soldiers of necessity are forced . . . to cess upon the countries adjoining . . . with incredible bitterness and grudging of both sides.” Urging the council to an immediate remedy, Chichester insisted, “The King saves nothing by this protraction of time, and yet the subject is much damned and discontented” (pp. 143-44). Surely, James had to be remembering such requests when, in his March 1610 speech to Parliament, he referred to the supply he needed to carry on his projects in Ireland (McIlwain, pp. 319-20).

Two other motifs dominating Chichester’s communications had to do with fair division of lands and fair payments to the king, the issues of meum et tuum that also occupied the Parliament of 1610. Writing of the County of Armagh in 1608, Chichester explained the tenacity with which the natives were holding on to their land: “many of the natives in each county claim freehold in the lands they possess” (p. 63). But he also expressed concern for the rights of the planters, suggesting that they pay no rent to the king until “after the expiration of certain years of freedom” (p. 63). Two years later, on January 27, 1610, Chichester was yet more specific about how to balance what the king got against what the English subject in Ireland got: “The King’s greatest advantage will be the power, wealth, and prosperity of the new undertakers. Therefore he [Chichester] likes not that the undertaker should be bound to pay so present a rent as is projected; but . . . have three years’ absolute freedom, and the following three years to pay but half the rent, and after that, the whole” (p. 356). Meanwhile, the Irish natives were uneasy too. As Chichester wrote to Salisbury on September 27, 1610, the natives “repine greatly at their fortunes and the small quantity of land left to them upon the division” (p. 502).
Consequently, their thoughts were turning again to the rebel Tyrone and possibly also to his son, for “they will rather die than be removed to the small proportions assigned to them” (p. 503). In 1610, some in Parliament spoke as though they felt nearly the same way.

Because our own historical period is especially interested in discourses of colonization, and in what these discourses disguise, the presence of such a discourse in *The Tempest* is more apparent now than at any other time in history. The value of including the Irish materials in a study of the play is that they clarify the point that inherent in the colonial discourse was a critique of the implications of absolutist and imperialist subjection. Insofar as the play is cut through with a colonial discourse, it does indeed dramatize “the practice and psychology of colonization,” but not only because colonization was being practiced in Ireland and Virginia; the language of colonization also imaged the impact and implications of absolutism within England itself.

*The Tempest* reproduces the critique of colonization that was available, but in a fictional narrative structured metaphorically, so that it represents as equivalent (makes no distinction between) an Other who is subject to an absolute king and an Other who is subject to a colonizer—in America and in Ireland. Thus, Ariel’s contract with Prospero, whereby Ariel will work for him in return for freedom, is as analogous to the situation of the Irish undertaker seeking a fair schedule of rent payments as to the English Parliament promising James supply in exchange for a proper settlement of their grievances. Caliban’s compulsion to raise a rebellion is likewise as analogous to the native Irish inclined to call again for Tyrone as to the English Parliament refusing to grant supply when so few of their grievances had been addressed. And all of these situations are analogous to the experiences of those in Virginia whom the Indians had threatened to kill if they did not leave and who found themselves subjected to an English authority wielding martial law.

In taking time to emphasize the Irish material, I do not mean in any sense to diminish the importance of the New World context through which many of the most important new perspectives on
The Tempest and colonization have been worked out. My aim, rather, is to qualify and extend the implications of that context, and also to furnish corroborating evidence that the issues of exploitation and the structures of power relations that critics have been finding in this text can be fully accounted for through documentation from the historical period of the play. Thus, if my own argument puts emphasis on the degree to which colonization images the problem of absolutism, in so doing it also provides a critique of the mentalité of colonization.

Finally, however one may see the implications or effects of the colonial discourse in The Tempest, no argument for its presence can do without the acknowledgment that the Virgilian presence in The Tempest in itself would all but require some treatment of the idea of colonization. Even as the Aeneid celebrates the reign of the imperialist Augustus, so also is it a colonizing text—indeed the archetypical colonizing text of all time. As Richard Waswo has argued, no other work has been more important to the process by which the West has naturalized the concept of colonization; its narrative of a great destiny to be fulfilled in the founding of Rome has offered itself to all of Western culture as a paradigm for the expansion and transmission of culture and ideology from one place to another. 91

During the Renaissance, the Aeneid most certainly functioned as an archive by means of which those involved in plantation could take stock of their project. If Stanyhurst could be ironic about plantation, and Strachey could be referred to as “a fytt Achates for such an Aeneas, as is our Noble & worthy Generall the lord Delawarre,” 92 someone like John Davies could use Virgil to validate his success. In a letter dated November 8, 1610, Davies, the person whose central contribution to plantation was that he developed ways to interpret the law that would increase England’s ability to secure control of Ireland, 93 summarized for Salisbury the legal grounds upon which the king of England could proceed against the lands of the Irish. Having sufficiently covered the problems of and procedures for land division, he noted that the project at Colrane, where the store of timber was particularly grand, was going better than anyone had expected, a success that made him think in Virgil-
ian terms. There were, he said, “such a number of workmen so busy in several places about their several tasks, as methought I saw Dido’s colony erecting of Carthage in Virgil.” (Davies then quotes three lines from the Aeneid.) It is an expression of confidence in the imperialist motive quite like that in the report for the Council of Virginia: “Why that which to Rome was possible, (to us) is impossible?”

We cannot tell whether it makes any sense to ask which had more agency in the writing of The Tempest, the imitation of Virgil or contemporary political issues of rule and colonization. But we can say that for an imitation of the Aeneid, imperialism and colonization were obvious contemporary topics to play off, and for discussion of the contemporary political situation, the Aeneid was a most obvious precursor to rework. Ultimately, then, the political and the aesthetic fall together with a degree of compatibility and mutual dependency that calls into question any attempt to separate them, as indeed is often the case in texts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In The Tempest, Shakespeare both naturalized and problematized the Virgilian idiom in such a way as to bring the Virgilian text into dialogue with the problems of power as they were being experienced in his own time, and specifically as they were being expressed through the discourses of constitutionalism and colonization. To make Virgil over for one’s own time meant coming to terms once more with what makes civilizations possible and with what threatens that possibility.