These papers reflect some of the widely varied interests of the scholar to whom they are dedicated. The topics thus may seem to differ widely and the views expressed, as was to be expected and indeed welcomed, to diverge as well. Still, as was to be hoped for, the affirmations that underlie all of them do not really differ. Professor Seidlin need hardly defend himself against a suspicion of being among the alien corn. The great Greek revival in Germany has never struck classicists as lying outside the boundaries of their proper interests. That it does lie outside the boundaries of professional competence of the classicist is quite another matter, and although a number of us did read Goethe's *Iphigenia* in college for comparison with Euripides, at least one of us is now thankful for a clearer understanding of it. Indeed, far more classicists tend to feel that the fourth century is more alien than Goethe, and a large number of those in the humanities have for some years regarded the twentieth century as a disaster area best avoided by those who wished to escape corruption of their taste. Yet all
these papers in different ways and not by design have demonstrated, in the affirmations that underlie all of them, the continuities in spite of the disruptions and the essential vitality of the classical tradition. All the papers, then, even if illustrating at times what Robert Frost called the truths that are in and out of fashion, have as their point of reference their firm adherence to the truths that men keep coming back to. And they have kept coming back to them when they realized, as the English philosopher Austin once said, "Importance isn't important; truth is," though few in the United States in the present century would venture to state as flatly and as succinctly as the director of the Ashmolean Museum recently did, that "in this world the useful exists for the sake of the useless."

There is, to be sure, a divergence in conclusion between the papers of Professor Babcock and Professor Rutledge on the one hand and Professor McDonald on the other, on the question that has pressed upon all of us with increasing urgency, which is to say, the hopes for the future of classical learning. That the classics in Greek and Latin have survived disasters in the past and have risen from the dust there is no dispute. That the themes and concerns of the first century B.C. are not alien to the twentieth century Professor Rutledge has thoroughly shown. Yet Professor McDonald's paper challenges the assumption that the current crisis of the humanities in general and the classics in particular will in its turn pass away. His position is a reasoned one, based on his unfailing respect for evidence. He has not needed to show at length that we and the whole Western world are in an unhappy period; it has seemed to some at times in human history that man was little lower than the angels, but at other times, and the latter half of the twentieth century is one, man has impressively ex-
tended the distance. The culture of the twentieth century no longer seems to please more than a few of its customers, and one could save a good deal of the paper squandered in the law school at Yale on this subject by saying that a very great many of more thoughtful men would agree in essence with the father in *Sabrina Fair*, “I have lived in the twentieth century . . . as long as any man and longer than most. And I feel I know as much about it as the next man . . . The twentieth century! I could pick a century blindfolded out of a hat and get a better one!”

No doubt neither Professor McDonald nor any one of the rest of us would take quite so dangerous a gamble unless the third century and the fourteenth century after Christ were removed from the hat—ages that compiled an impressive record of human misery, although possibly not quite so much mindlessness and mendacity as are now our daily experience in public discussion. Yet the third and fourteenth centuries were followed by the fourth and fifteenth centuries, not only by fixed numerical habit but by impressive human endeavor, and the men and women of those periods accomplished much and rebuilt much. In his thorough examination of that first and crucial renaissance to which we owe so much of what it preserves for modern man, but which we so often regard as merely a period of transmission, Professor Heimann does well to remind us of elements of discontinuity in the fourth century, and Professor Rutledge is right in urging us to look with more sympathy and understanding at our own century.

Yet it seems hard to deny that the present prospects for the humanities are not bright. Professor Babcock has done well and worked diligently to try to set within an intelligible framework, for which a definition is not yet possible, the voices of dissent. If I understand his discus-
ation, the New Humanism, if it is humanism in any sense we can recognize, is a discontinuity of the sharpest kind, if indeed it is not a counter culture that loses all meaning when it cannot be in opposition. No one, in any event, is likely to maintain that some kindly act of providence will save us. Yet those human efforts, as in Avianus's fable of putting one's shoulder to the wheel of the mired cart in collaboration with help from on high, have been and are being made. Surely, we can give our aid, remembering, as Heraclitus noted, that "the eyes and the ears are untrustworthy witnesses when the soul is barbarous".