A Reading of the First Liasse

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Readers of Pascal's Pensées tend to skip the first liasse. This is not, of course, to say that a great deal of scholarly attention has not been paid to it in the decades since the Lafuma edition of the Copie became the normal classroom text; but it is not scholars whom I primarily have in mind. The first-time general reader, confronted with “Les psaumes chantés par toute la terre” as the first paragraph, will as likely as not think to himself that the title “Ordre” means something technical which he can learn about later, or that it relates only to the controversies concerning the fragmentation and conjectural reconstructions of the text which he may have read about in a preface. He rapidly passes on to something more solid and more recognizable as prose—say the long fragment (44) on Imagination—and settles down to enjoy the vertiginous generalizations he has been led by a long tradition of selective quotation to expect from a French moralist like Pascal.

Had my untutored reader paused a little longer over the first paragraph of Ordre, pondering it in the light of what is still not too far from being general knowledge in Western culture, he would have learned that to read and enjoy the text as a series of discontinuous generalizations might not be the most appropriate response or, at least, the one to which he is invited. For “les psaumes chantés par toute la terre” has a fairly specific focus. It is a reminder of that cliche of religious apologetic which locates the first evidence for the existence of God in man’s experience of the visible world, a cliche summed up, in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, by Psalm 19: “The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handywork. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night showeth knowlege. There is no speech or language where their voice is not heard. Their line is gone out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world.” It is a tenacious doctrine: the twentieth-century television viewer is hardly less likely to have come across it than the seventeenth-century Frenchman; it is the foundation of vague enlightened Deism and the inspiration of much amateur science. It knows no
sectarian boundaries: a Huguenot of Pascal's time would recall its appearance as the cornerstone of Calvin's *Institutes* just as his Catholic counterpart would identify it as the substance of endless hours of meditation and preaching. As a representative and randomly selected collection of sermons reprinted throughout the period when Pascal was growing up puts it: "Bref, ce monde en toutes ses parties n'est autre chose qu'un livre qui propose, un tableau qui exprime, une voix qui presche, une trompette qui annonce, un heraut qui publie la Majesté, la grandeur, et les perfections de la Divinité."  

Here, then, is an initial paragraph which, in its echo of this vast and familiar tradition, provides the reader with some purchase on the text he has just opened. It is going to be about religious apologetic. There is no clue yet as to what direction it may take—for all he knows, it may turn into a treatise on optics or Rosicrucianism. What will his reaction be? It may be complacency, if he is a believer who has never doubted the proposition, or it may be a degree of rejection: this is the sort of stereotype which he thinks needs at the very least some sort of critical scrutiny. He will have to wait another five lines before he can make out how the text is likely to treat readers in his position; but meanwhile it is precisely that notion of critical scrutiny which is now introduced.

Qui rend témoignage de Mahomet? lui-même. J.-C. veut que son témoignage ne soit rien.  
La qualité de témoins fait qu'il faut qu'ils soient toujours, et partout, et misérables. Il est seul.

The first part of these remarks confirms, if nothing more, the opening impression: this is indeed a work of religious apologetic and it is going to take into account more than one religion, although its stance toward Islam (no doubt a seventeenth-century Frenchman would have said "toward the Turks") is from the first a combative one. The second part is more intriguing, not least because it is difficult to construe. Does it mean that it is the nature of witnesses to be everywhere in time and space as well as evidently not standing to gain from their testimony? Or does the "toujours" merely mean that this rule applies universally? One thing is clear: critical scrutiny can be applied to this subject in exactly the same way as it is to a lawsuit. The witnesses can be questioned and their suitability weighed; we can already begin to think about the sort of evidence that will be necessary. It is this idea of evidence that binds the three parts
of the first *pensée* together. We may for a moment suppose that the notion of bringing to bear on a familiar cliche the methods one is familiar with from the law might be particularly attractive to a sceptical *robin*; but we hardly need that sort of historical information to make some sense of the fragment.

*pensée* 2 confronts the untutored reader with a rather different “order” of approach to such questions: it exploits the very fact that questions are running through his mind—“Que dois-je faire?”—and gives expression to the objection which may already be his response to the opening sentence: “Je ne vois partout qu’obscurités.” The very invention of such a voice may quicken his interest in the book he has opened: it is not going to be a treatise, it may even be like a drama. For here we have appearing, not as an object of derision but as a participant in a dialogue which (for all we yet know) may occupy the remainder of the book, a voice with which he may identify.6 “Je ne vois partout qu’obscurités” may indeed be his reaction to the notion that creation sings psalms; it may, for that matter, be his reaction to the text he is reading (for it would not be the only occasion on which Pascal draws attention to the struggle a reader has in understanding a text).7 The use of “je” directs his gaze upon himself. And two possible consequences of self-contemplation are then spelled out, with that brevity and almost mathematical leap across the trivial steps of an argument to its logical conclusions which our reader may by now be coming to relish as the characteristic tone of his text: “Croirai-je que je ne suis rien? Croirai-je que je suis dieu?” He may guess, if he has any commonsense, that the answer is going to lie between these two extremes, but also that they will be boldly faced. He will probably also note that behind these two positions there lie ancient philosophical systems and debates that a Christian apologist is obliged to engage with no less than the existence of other religions.

The exciting sense that the text is going to turn into a dialogue grows as we meet the third fragment, as does the play with the commonplaces of religious apology. The sonorous and alliterative statement that “toutes choses changent et se succèdent” may be a grandiose expression of the sceptical reader’s approach to religions that claim to trade in absolutes; the devout reader may confidently expect a denial of it; the seventeenth-century French reader would find himself confronted again by one of the tired but apparently inescapable topoi of preaching, meditation and religious poetry. They are all catered for and then confounded by Pascal’s
three points de suspension: "Vous vous trompez, il y a . . ." And the dialogue then becomes quite heated, at least on what seems to be the skeptic side: "Et quoi ne dites-vous pas vous-même que le ciel et les oiseaux prouvent Dieu?" We are back where we began, with the heavens declaring the glory of God, a notion here evidently mocked by the skeptic as he trivializes creation in terms of the sky and the birds, and accuses his interlocutor of having said this very thing (as it might be, in the first fragment). We have virtually a miniature preview here of the libertine's response to Sganarelle's elaborate demonstrations of the great chain of being, the French locus classicus of foolish theologizing on this theme, in Act V, Scene 3 of Molière's Dom Juan: "O le beau raisonnement!" The calm "non" of the reply comes as a shock, provoking what may be either a more serious question or a final scoff to show that the skeptic knows better: "Et votre religion ne le dit-elle pas?" The "non" here may disconcert more than just the skeptic; and the qualification that follows serves to reassure the devout, at the same time as it quite definitely and abruptly sides with those "qui ne voient partout qu’obscurités":

Car encore que cela est vrai en un sens pour quelques âmes à qui Dieu donna cette lumière, néanmoins cela est faux à l’égard de la plupart.

This is spoken with the voice of authority, such as one might expect to meet if one picked up an apology for the Christian religion; but what the voice says scythes through the tired dogmas and replaces certainty with doubt. It speaks confidently of God, it explains how belief in the clear evidences of his existence comes to be (for the believing soul is repeatedly reminded that he is "très légitimement persuadé"), but at that very moment it makes an act of faith in the sincerity of the skeptic. This exciting, dramatic text is not going to be one in which (save at a much later stage) the dice are loaded. Whether the "untutored reader" lives in the seventeenth or the twentieth century, the originality, freshness, and directness of this approach to him makes it very unlike the common run of religious pamphleteering.

As indeed does the next notion to hit him: something like a plan for a novel (or perhaps an allegorical play) which again starts not from an easy assurance that God exists but that he will have to be sought. It takes us back to fragment 2, the systems of thought which make of man a nothing or a god, and it promises a hard passage: "Lettre pour porter à rechercher Dieu. Et puis le faire chercher chez les philosophes, pyrrhoniens et dog-
matistes qui travailleront celui qui le recherche." The skeptic is, once
again, going to be met on his own ground.

As the idea of this possible scenario of a letter is more fully sketched
out, that skeptic now becomes a friend. When we deal with any friend,
we consult his wishes, we try to understand his motives; that is what our
authorial voice now once again shows himself willing to do, in another
fragment of dialogue which ends with a tantalizingly mysterious phrase:

Une lettre d’exhortation à un ami pour le porter à chercher. Et il répon­
dra: mais à quoi me servira de chercher, rien ne paraît. Et lui répondre:
ne désespérez pas. Et il répondrait qu’il serait heureux de trouver quelque
lumière. Mais que selon cette religion même quand il croirait ainsi cela ne
lui servirait de rien. Et qu’ainsi il aime autant ne point chercher. Et à cela
lui répondre: La Machine.

There has been a shift of position here: the reader is taken into the
confidence of one participant in the dialogue, he is made to see how the
friend can be persuaded. Equally well, should he feel himself to be in
the role of the skeptic, he is flattered by it being made clear that his
knowledge of religion is not negligible (faith has to be absolute, he thinks,
and his simply cannot be). Again his good will is taken for granted—"il
serait heureux de trouver quelque lumière"—and his guess that, for him,
the exercise will prove to be pointless is answered by a "ne désespérez
pas" which may console and certainly excites the curiosity: where will
this search, this story of the letter, end? For the moment it seems to in­
volve a gnomic utterance which again incites to further inquiry: "La
Machine."

At this point, like Pol Ernst,⁹ let us mark a pause. Our untutored
reader has been bombarded with dialogues, letters, a meditation on the
nature of evidence, a sweeping away of the traditions of apologetic. If he
is a Christian, he has been given hints that his position is reserved (for he
may be one of those "quelques âmes à qui Dieu donna cette lumière");
more importantly, if he is a skeptic he has found himself faced not with
condemnation but with sympathy. His sincerity has been accepted right
from the beginning: it is going to become one of the cornerstones of the
text, whether because his honest difficulties in finding evidence of God in
Nature will lead to a rethinking of the mode of God’s revelation and even
of God’s character, or because his curiosity and desire for the chase—
awakened here—will form the basis for a whole depiction of human per­
sonality in general. This start to an apology, however, is highly original
only in terms of what we normally expect of that genre; in terms of the art of persuasion it is merely an application of the old rule that you must begin by getting the audience on your side, the captatio benevolentiae which is the function of any classical exordium. As Pascal puts it elsewhere, in De l'art de persuader, "quoi que ce soit qu'on veuille persuader, il faut avoir égard à la personne à qui on en veut, dont il faut connaître l'esprit et le coeur, quels principes il accorde, quelles choses il aime; et ensuite remarquer, dans la chose dont il s'agit, quels rapports elle a avec les principes avoués, ou avec les objets délicieux par les charmes qu'on lui donne." It may be stated the other way round: to persuade, you have to know your audience and appeal directly to them; in a work of persuasive apologetic, this means beginning not with God but with Man, perceived as a creature of doubt but also honesty, and above all as receptive to modes of discourse (dialogue, drama, narrative, allusion, sententiousness) which stir his interest. To paraphrase a remark of Hugh Davidson's, one might say that Pascal begins with man and his suppositions. One might even say that here rhetoric has determined theology.

With the mention of "La Machine," we come to a reference which is impenetrable to the "untutored reader." He will find it again in fragment 11, but it is not until the famous Pari that this doctrine of man's psychological automatism, able at one and the same time to encompass and confound the view of man as either ange or bête, will be fleshed out. This is the moment, I think, when the first liasse changes direction and begins to set out to its reader a number of plans, or to expand some of the ideas contained in its first part. Thus we find the notion of other religions, the germ of liasse XVI, again alluded to in fragment 8, and no fewer than three further mentions of a letter (in 7, 9, and 11). But there is no need to abandon our sequential reading and adopt the quite different strategy implied by a genetic approach. In the classical account of rhetorical dispositio, the exordium with its generalities and captatio benevolentiae is followed by section called propositio or partitio. It is the occasion for the author/orator to reveal to his audience the way he intends to divide up his material, and is not infrequently accompanied by enumeration for mnemonic purposes. Fragment 6 follows this pattern precisely:

(1.) Partie. Misère de l' homme sans Dieu.
(2.) Partie. Félicité de l' homme avec Dieu.

autrement

(1.) Partie. Que la nature est corrompue, par la nature même.
(2.) Partie. Qu'il y a un réparateur, par l' Écriture.
Now, a *propositio* is not necessarily exhaustive; it acts as a guideline through the narratives, arguments, "confirmations" which constitute the section of the discourse primarily concerned with proof. And proof, as it happens, is the subject of the very next fragment, with its suggestion that proof is itself part of the wider art of persuasion ("Par la Machine"), and that proof and faith are different. Theoretically, at any rate, this brief reference perhaps provides an answer to the apparent disparity I noted earlier between Pascal's simultaneous acceptance and rejection of rhetorical strategies in *De l'art de persuader*: while "les vérités divines . . . sont infiniment au-dessus de la nature," that is no reason why men may not be guided towards them by means of those same pointers and witnesses we read of in the first fragment, *fides ex auditu*. And the quotations here from Romans may make us reflect on Paul's elaborate outline in chapter 1 of that Epistle of the evidences of God in Nature. Paul is there anxious to show that the ungodly are rightly condemned, "for the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse" (Rom. 1:20). It is perhaps at this point that our reader, recalling the rejection of that idea in the earlier part of the *Masse*, understands the novelty of what he is reading—a recasting of the tradition of apologetic exemplified by Paul into terms that are acceptable to the "modern" skeptic. He is reading a text the basis of which is to be his own rejection of that tradition and his own radical doubt about the clichés he associates with religion.

One of these will be justice, or at least the abstract idea of it. And is not the radicalism of thought already noted in fragment 2 now brought to bear on exactly that question in fragment 9?

*Dans la lettre de l'injustice peut venir.*

*La plaisanterie des aînés qui ont tout. Mon ami vous êtes né de ce côté de la montagne, il est donc juste que votre aîné ait tout.*

*Pourquoi me tuez-vous?*

It is obvious that this will need to be filled in, as it is for example by fragment 51, in the same way as the elliptical "ils ont pris le divertissement" of the next *pensée* will be rounded out by the whole of the eighth *liasse*. But those will be merely examples—albeit magnificent and memorable ones—of the rhetorical device of amplification, and in essence the idea of what Richard Parish calls an "anthropological" apology is al-
ready sketched out in this rapid survey of the fragility of human institutions, of man’s persistent attempts to avert his gaze from the abyss, indeed of man’s own psychological automatism.

That appeal to man through a study of man, reinforced by the references to “La Machine” in fragment 11, is now reformulated in the very different register of the twelfth and final fragment:

Les hommes ont mépris pour la religion. Ils en ont haine et peur qu’elle soit vraie. Pour guérir cela il faut commencer par montrer que la religion n’est point contraire à la raison. Vénérable, en donner respect. La rendre ensuite aimable, faire souhaiter aux bons qu’elle fût vraie et puis montrer qu’elle est vraie. Vénérable parce qu’elle a bien connu l’homme. Aimable parce qu’elle promet le vrai bien.

Again, this is programmatic, but its tone is one of exhortation rather than exposition. It carries the reader forward by its persuasive rhythms, by repetition, asyndeton, antithesis, isocolon: what may be technically identified as the schemes appropriate to the “sublime style” of a peroration, in fact, just as the personification of “la religion” is the appropriate trope of prosopopoeia. The text speaks of two levels of persuasion—“montrer” and “faire souhaiter”—and at the same time operates on those two levels. The intellectual and the emotional are not separated but fused into a single, though complex, appeal.

Throughout the *Pensees* that appeal will be based firmly and in the best rhetorical traditions on an analysis of those to whom it is made. The dogmatistes will be confounded by the pyrrhoniens, and vice-versa; the Jews will be confronted with their own venerated prophecies of a Messiah; the gambling man will be offered a wager; the lawyer concerned with title will be handed a bulky brief of preuves. Each group, however, will be approached by a captatio benevolentiae, their cherished beliefs or particular emphases will be adopted, nor will they be refuted. Since all types of libertin are men, how could it be otherwise in a religion which is “vénérable parce qu’elle a bien connu l’homme”? Like its phrasing, the method will be antithetical, and breathtaking in its use of the figure of concessio:

Tous leurs principes sont vrais, des pyrrhoniens, des stoïques, des athées, etc. . . . mais leurs conclusions sont fausses, parce que les principes opposés sont vrais aussi. [619]
In a sense this extends the question of voices in the *Pensées* beyond those who actually speak in it, for Pascal peoples the text with what John Cruickshank has called the "ideas and sentiments which he expressed not to represent his own outlook but that of the *libertins* to whom his apology was addressed." To return to our untutored reader, the play of mirrors which confronted him when he opened the first *liasse* continues far beyond it: his own possible opinions are reflected or refracted back to him, though constantly modified by his growing sense of a controlling authorial presence. I spoke earlier of the vertiginous generalizations he might have opened the book to seek. When he finally comes to the most anthologized remark of all—"Le silence éternel de ces espaces infinis m’effraie" (fr. 201)—will he not recognize in it not some autobiographical Angst on the part of his author but his own inability (now subtly tinged with terror) to discern those evidences of God in Nature with which the *liasse* began?

This cardinal aspect of free thought has, then, been seized upon as a starting-point, and by the end of the *liasse* has been conjoined with many and various others. What links them is not merely the demonstrable rhetorical *dispositio* of the piece, important though it is if we are to grasp the coherence of the moves from general to particular points and back again to a general one, nor even the traces of a systematic *elocutio* which can modulate from the striking question and the sonorous allusion to the "division en points" and then to the *oratio numerosa* of fragment 12. This apparent disorder in fact shows the unity of the *liasse* and its author’s attentiveness to the precept that "l’éloducce contin ne ennuie"; its fragmented nature exemplifies in some detail the profoundly writerly perception that "la nature agit par progrès, itus et reditus. Elle passe et revient, puis va plus loin, puis deux fois moins, puis plus que jamais, etc." The formal rhetorical organization of this brief text is however but one manifestation of the larger meditation which it contains: a meditation which includes in its sweep the traditions of apologetic that constrain St. Paul as well as Pascal’s more immediate predecessors, the traditions of radical free thought which encompass Montaigne as well as Lucretius, and yet which remains firmly based upon a precept (of rhetorical theory rather than form) which will guide the inquiry to its end—the principle that one’s audience is to be treated as if sincere. The implications for a Christian apologetic addressed primarily to those who do not believe (as opposed to a ratification for the faithful) are immense. Since it is commonplace to exploit the "mere jottings" of the first *liasse* as a gloss on
“later” longer pensées, I hope it will be permitted to conclude by citing one of the papiers non classés, or pensées mêlées (no 781) as a gloss which unfolds those implications, more particularly those of its very first sentences, and prefers Matthew and Isaiah to Paul:

Préface de la seconde partie.
Parler de ceux qui ont traité de cette matière.
J’admire avec quelle hardiesse ces personnes entreprennent de parler de Dieu.

En adressant leurs discours aux impies leur premier chapitre est de prouver la divinité par les ouvrages de la nature. Je ne m’étonnerais pas de leur entreprise s’ils adressaient leurs discours aux fidèles, car il est certain que ceux qui ont la foi vive dedans le cœur voient incontinent que tout ce qui est n’est autre chose que l’ouvrage du Dieu qu’ils adorent, mais pour ceux en qui cette lumière est éteinte et dans lesquels on a dessein de la faire revivre, ces personnes destituées de foi et de grâce, qui recherchant de toute leur lumière tout ce qu’ils voient dans la nature qui les peut mener à cette connaissance ne trouvent qu’obscurité et ténèbres, dire à ceux-là qu’ils n’ont qu’à voir la moindre des choses qui les environnent et qu’ils y verront Dieu à découvert et leur donner pour toute preuve de ce grand et important sujet le cours de la lune et des planètes et prétendre avoir achevé sa preuve avec un tel discours, c’est leur donner sujet de croire que les preuves de notre religion sont bien faibles et je vois par raison et par expérience que rien n’est plus propre à leur en faire naître le mépris. Ce n’est pas de cette sorte que l’Écriture qui connaît mieux les choses qui sont de Dieu en parle. Elle dit au contraire que Dieu est un Dieu caché et que depuis la corruption de la nature il les a laissés dans un aveuglement dont ils ne peuvent sortir que par J.-C., hors duquel toute communication avec Dieu est ôtée. Nemo novit patrem nisi filius et cui filius voluit revelare.

C’est ce que l’Écriture nous marque quand elle dit en tant d’endroits que ceux qui cherchent Dieu le trouvent. Ce n’est point de cette lumière qu’on parle comme le jour en plein midi. Ou ne ditpoint que ceux qui cherchent le jour en plein midi ou de l’eau dans la mer en trouveront et ainsi il faut bien que l’évidence de Dieu ne soit pas telle dans la nature. Aussi elle nous dit ailleurs: vere tu es deus absconditus.

Notes

1. Most recently by A. R. Pugh (The Composition of Pascal’s Apologia, Toronto: U. of Toronto P, 1984, pp. 29-45), who notes that “one naturally assumes
[this bundle] to have been the basis of an opening chapter,” calls it “puzzling,” and then goes on somewhat confusingly to attack Pol Ernst’s treatment of it as “by definition a first chapter.” My sympathies go to Pol Ernst’s attempts, in Pugh’s words, to build “a hypothetical introduction out of these twelve fragments alone” (Pugh, p. 29); indeed, what I am attempting is a restatement of Ernst, *Approches pascaliennes* (Paris: Gembloux, Duculot, 1970, pp. 17–47). The difference is that I am pretending, for the moment, that there is no need to try to reconstruct Pascal’s “project” but merely to try to understand his “notes.” The question I explicitly ignore here has been neatly put by Jean Massard: “Faut-il voir dans cette liasse un simple dossier de travail, sorte d’échafaudage qui aurait disparu de l’œuvre achevée? Ou bien Pascal avait-il l’intention de s’expliquer devant ses lecteurs de l’ordre suivi? (Les Pensées de Pascal, Paris: Sedes, 1976, p. 179). If this were a sermon, my text would be Hugh Davidson’s remark that “Pascal seems intent on introducing not systematically but succinctly all the terminology necessary for his apologetic argument” (*The Origins of Certainty: Means and Meaning in Pascal’s “Pensees,”* Chicago and London: 1979, p. 75). Quotations are from Pascal’s *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Louis Lafuma (Paris: 1963).

2. The King James Bible version, vv. 1–4 (my emphasis); the psalm is n° 18 in the Vulgate. In view of Pascal’s echo of the last sentence, Sellier’s (unsubstantiated) gloss on this text seems to me excessively narrow: “Le peuple juif,” he says, “dispersed dans tout le monde connu, chante, sans en comprendre la portée réelle, les Psaumes où le Messie est annoncé. Hostiles aux chrétiens, les Juifs sont à leur insu les meilleurs témoins de la vérité du christianisme” (*Pensees*, ed. Philippe Sellier, Paris: 1976, p. 40, n. 1). This interpretation connects the sentence neatly to the non-Christian religion mentioned in the next, and I should certainly not want to exclude it; but it offers none of the cross-references to fragments 2 and 3 which I hope to demonstrate. Ernst’s reading (*Approches pascaliennes*, pp. 35–37) is much wider.


5. Etienne Molinier, *Le Mystère de la Croix* (Toulouse; 1635), p. 63. First published in 1628, this collection was reprinted in 1635 and 1643.


7. See n° 257.

8. N° 110; cf. n° 382.

9. See his graphic plan (*Approches pascaliennes*, p. 40) where he marks a break here between the “préliminaires à l’Apologie” and the outline or “dessein de l’Apologie elle-même” which follows it.
10. Oeuvres complètes, 356. This contrasts with Pascal's apparent disavowal of the principle earlier in the same text: "tout ce qu'il y a d'hommes sont presque toujours emportés à croire non pas par la preuve, mais par l'agrément. Cette voie est basse, indigne et étrangère: aussi tout le monde le désavoue [. . .] Je ne parle pas ici des vérités divines, que je n'aurais garde de faire tomber sous l'art de persuader, car elles sont infiniment au-dessus de la nature . . ." (Ibid., 355).

11. The Origins of Certainty, pp. 4–5: "Pascal appears to see proof as implied in a play of suppositions and what may be advanced as suitable presuppositions. Since he is not discovering the truth but defending it, he starts logically with suppositions and moves backward to what they presuppose [. . .] Pascal characteristically begins with Nature and Scripture, with man and God; the proofs we find relate to these two."

12. And, of course, its simple meaning will have to be explored. Ernst (Approches pascaliennes, p. 34) reads: "Dans la Lettre «De l'Injustice» peut venir la plaisanterie . . ."; this enables him to speculate at some length about the difference between this and other Lettres. Pugh follows him (The Composition of Pascal's Apologia, p. 32). Sellier places a comma after "venir," yet somewhat perversely makes the words that follow it into a separate paragraph. One might construe "de l'injustice" in the Lafuma text as a partitive.


15. Here I have preferred Sellier's punctuation (ed. cit., 319, n° 635). The fragment is n° 771 in Lafuma.