PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

ALAN GEWIRTH

Introduction: The Problem of Philosophy and Politics

In the fourteenth century, as in many other centuries, theoretical and practical reflection on the political and social order developed in intimate contact with philosophy. The great names in the history of fourteenth-century political thought were either themselves philosophers who, amid their common theological concerns, had written on technical problems of logic, metaphysics, or epistemology, like Egidius of Rome, John of Paris, James of Viterbo, Augustinus Triumphus, William of Ockham, and John Wycliffe, or else they were learned in and imbued with philosophic ideas, like Dante and Marsilius of Padua. It might seem a rather straightforward project, then, to determine either the philosophical foundations of fourteenth-century political thought or the political implications of fourteenth-century philosophy, or both.

The question of the relation of philosophy and political thought in the fourteenth century cannot, however, be dealt with so directly. For it involves not only historical but also logical problems, and not only problems about specific connections between particular philosophies and particular political ideas but even problems about the very relevance of philosophy to politics. We are all familiar, for example, with the widely divergent answers currently offered to the question of the philosophic basis of liberal democracy. According to Bertrand Russell, this basis is found in the empiricism of Locke and Hume; according to Dewey, it is the experimentalism of the scientific method; according to Maritain, it is the natural law of the scholastic tradition; according to Niebuhr, it is the Calvinist doctrine of original sin. Nor is this all; the divergence goes even deeper; for there are many philosophers today who declare that political ideas or institutions have no philosophic bases at all, and that philosophy has nothing to do with political beliefs. And when in this context we also remember
that the political conflicts of our time are often described as conflicts of rival philosophies, our perplexity is bound to be great.

The issues that are involved in a discussion of the connection between philosophy and political thought are many and complex, and there are many ways of dealing with them. We might ask what we mean by "philosophy," by "philosophic basis," and by "politics," or what are the many different things which men have meant by them, and we might then attempt by logical analysis to elicit the variety of relations between philosophy and politics which result from those meanings. Or we might study how, and in what senses, actually held philosophies or philosophic ideas have affected the course of actual political events, as, for example, Jefferson's knowledge of Locke and other philosophers influenced him in writing the Declaration of Independence. Or, conversely, we might also study how political events or attitudes have affected the thought of philosophers, as, for example, in the cosmologies or ontologies of Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, Alexander, Whitehead, and Russell. All of these are legitimate ways of dealing with some aspect of the question. But there is another way which, if not logically prior to these in all respects, nevertheless would seem to afford a means of coping with a fundamental aspect of the problem which is not dealt with by the other approaches. This is to select a concrete historical period, in which political conflicts took a very sharp form and evoked an extensive body of writings at once theoretical and polemical from men who were philosophers as well as publicists, and to ask what the relation was between what these men said as philosophers and what they said as publicists. The point of this last approach is that it should enable us to consider the logical relations between philosophic and political ideas in a practical context, with a large enough sample to make clear what were some of the possible variations in the relations in question. It is by this method that I wish to approach the problem of the relation between philosophy and political thought in the fourteenth century. To do this is not, of course, to overlook the fact that the century's political thought was subjected to many influences that were primarily non-philosophic from canon and civil law and from developments in political institutions themselves, and that important work relevant to politics was done by the civilians and canonists, including Bartolus, Baldus, and John Andreae. But the question of the relation between philosophy and political thought is sufficiently complex and important of itself,
both logically and historically, without for the present introducing such additional considerations.

The fourteenth century is peculiarly suited to the kind of inquiry here proposed. Its nearest analogue is perhaps the seventeenth century, where names like Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke figure as prominently in political thought as they do in philosophy. Yet even in these men, intensely concerned as they were with the political issues of their time, there was not the same degree of direct personal involvement as in the fourteenth-century political philosophers. It is easier to trace the practical alliance between Egidius of Rome and Pope Boniface VIII, or between Marsilius of Padua or William of Ockham and Emperor Ludwig of Bavaria, or between John Wycliffe and the Lollards, than it is between the seventeenth-century philosophers and the political figures or movements of their time. Whether this is because the decline of the Church led to a lessening of the political influence of philosophers and theologians as counselors to the wielders of political power, or for some other cause, is not our present concern; nor is it our concern to trace the direct ways in which Egidius may personally have influenced Boniface, or Marsilius, Ludwig. Our point is rather that the direct practical involvement of leading philosophers of the fourteenth century in the burning political issues of their time is one of the considerations which makes that century a peculiarly apt one for examining the perennially significant problem of the relation between philosophy and political thought.

**Historical Parallelisms**

Before entering directly on our topic, I wish to suggest from a rather different direction something of the contemporary relevance of a concern with the development of philosophy and of political thought in the fourteenth century. In both areas tendencies begun in the late thirteenth century were carried to such new heights of logical rigor, technical power, and explanatory fruitfulness that the results may well be described as revolutionary; and these achievements resemble modern developments to such an extent that historians have had to exercise exceptional critical restraint in order to point out underlying differences. In logic, William of Ockham, Richard Swineshead, John Buridan, and Albert of Saxony, among others, worked out doctrines of supposition, signification, *consequentiae*, and *insolubilia* which closely
resemble recent developments in mathematical logistic and semantics, including, for example, De Morgan's law and the logical paradoxes. In epistemology, Nicholas of Autrecourt, John of Mirecourt, and others set forth probabilistic and skeptical interpretations of empirical knowledge and causal inference which anticipate Hume's famous critique, as well as current emphases in such doctrines as the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. In natural philosophy, men like Buridan, Thomas Bradwardine, William Heytesbury, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen, and Nicholas Oresme did work on the latitude of forms, maxima and minima, the mathematical analysis of proportions of velocities, and the motion of the earth which has important continuities with the achievements of Copernicus, Galileo, and other giants of modern physics and astronomy.

In the field of political thought, the picture is similar. The fourteenth was a century of intense political conflicts, from the struggles between Philip the Fair and Pope Boniface VIII and between Ludwig of Bavaria and Pope John XXII in the first half of the century to the intermittent strife of the Hundred Years' War, the peasant revolts, and the Great Schism in its latter half. These events called forth a polemical literature of unparalleled intensity and depth, in which, as has already been said, philosophers played a leading part. The first decade of the fourteenth century saw in Egidius of Rome's De ecclesiastica potestate a work which wove together many strands from antecedent publicists, canonists, and theologians into a coherent and massive doctrine of what Egidius called the papal "plenitude of power," which historians have only with difficulty been able to avoid calling by such modern names as "sovereignty" and "totalitarianism." In the same decade, a theory very similar to Egidius' was presented with copious argumentation in James of Viterbo's De regimine Christiano. Again in the same decade, these papalist theories were given a reply of considerable intellectual force in the De potestate regia et papali of John of Paris, whose position, with its careful balancing of the temporal and spiritual authorities, has been declared by a leading Catholic theologian to correspond to "the contemporary doctrine and practice of the Church." In the first decade, too, elaborately argued proposals for world government under secular auspices were set forth in the Monarchia of Dante and by such writers as Engelbert of Admont and Pierre
The decades immediately following, embroiled in the struggle between Ludwig of Bavaria and Pope John XXII, saw not only the production of further comprehensive works in favor of papal absolutism by Augustinus Triumphus and Alvarus Pelagius, but the devastating reply of the Defensor pacis of Marsilius of Padua, who, for his theory of the people's legislative authority and the complete subjection of the priesthood to the secular state, has been likened by scholars to nearly every modern political thinker from Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Luther to Rousseau and Marx. Marsilius' work was followed within a few years by the voluminous political writings of William of Ockham, whose doctrines of the natural rights of the individual, the general council, and the limitation and balancing of royal and papal powers have evoked comparisons to, among others, Locke and the modern natural-rights tradition. In the remainder of the century, so far as we now know, no works equal in stature to these were produced. Yet in the writings of Lupold of Bebenburg, Konrad of Megenberg, John Wycliffe, Henry of Langenstein, and Conrad of Gelnhausen, much further work was done which has clear connections not only with the conciliarism of the following century but with other institutional and doctrinal developments leading both to the Reformation and to the modern sovereign state.

I have stressed the similarities to modern developments in this brief outline not because I think that this is the only or the chief ground on which to evaluate these works, but because it serves to underline the parallelisms between the historical status and contributions of philosophy and of political thought in the fourteenth century. Of course, this approach has omitted such other significant figures in fourteenth-century philosophy as the German mystics Eckhart, Suso, and Tauler. But even if we could fit these, too, into a scheme of parallelisms to political thinkers and similarities to modern developments, the fact remains that, for our present problem, to note these historical relations is only the beginning. What we are concerned with is the conceptual or logical relation between the two developments; specifically, what was the intellectual contribution which philosophy made to political thought in this period? Yet even this question is insufficiently precise for our present purpose. The philosophic and political ideas of the fourteenth century were propounded in so many complex forms, and in writings so voluminous in quantity, that to attempt the
task of analyzing their logical interrelations without setting up many initial restrictions would be to doom the inquiry from the start. We can illustrate this point, and derive some relevant suggestions for our procedure, if we initially consider the case of the logical relation between philosophy and politics in just one fourteenth-century thinker, William of Ockham.

William of Ockham

Ockham's voluminous writings, both philosophical and political, with their massive intricacies of technical terminology, distinctions, and argumentation, must still be read in largely inaccessible editions. Nevertheless, scholars over many generations have engaged in a continuing debate about the relation between the philosophical and the political aspects of Ockham's work. The chief contemporary proponents of the view that there is a close logical relation between Ockham's doctrines in logic, epistemology, physics, metaphysics, and theology on the one hand, and his politics on the other, are two Frenchmen, Lagarde and Baudry, each of whom is presently engaged, and has been for some decades, in writing a multi-volumed study of Ockham's philosophy and politics. The proponents of the opposite view, that Ockham's philosophy and his political doctrines are two logically independent bodies of thought, include Boehner (who until his recent death did a very large amount of work in elucidating and editing Ockham's logical works) and such other scholars as Scholz and Morrall.

If we examine carefully this scholarly debate over the relation between Ockham's philosophy and his politics, we find that what the two sides are arguing about is primarily a logical question rather than a psychological or sociological one. They are not asking what there was in Ockham's personal psychology which led him from his philosophic views to his political ones, or how it was that a man holding his philosophic views would be motivated, given the conditions of his time and place, to hold certain political views. The question of the debate seems to be rather whether, quite independently of the accidents of Ockham's personality or society, there is some sort of intrinsic, logically "inevitable" connection between his philosophic ideas and his political ones. If, now, we scrutinize the logic of the debate itself, we see that the two sides are not in as much disagreement as at first appears. To a
large extent, the difference between them seems to derive from two points: first, the fact that they are considering two different phases or aspects of Ockham's political ideas; second, the fact that they start from opposite ends of the question.

In the first place, then, we must note that a complex system of political thought like Ockham's has two different phases or aspects, which we may call practical and theoretic. The practical aspect consists in specific recommendations on matters of policy; for example, as to how much power the pope should have in temporal or in spiritual affairs, or what the rights and duties of kings, popes, and private citizens are in respect to property. The theoretic aspect consists in elucidations of basic social and political concepts like "state," "people," "law," "property," and in general doctrines about the nature of social and political relations, as well as in the analysis of the intellectual methods used or referred to in dealing with these concepts or doctrines. To be sure, in a coherent political thinker like Ockham these two phases are often closely connected, in that he will appeal to his theoretic definitions and doctrines in support of his practical recommendations. Yet, that there is no necessary or logical connection between these is suggested by the fact that other thinkers may propound the same practical political recommendations without Ockham's theoretic political doctrines, or even with opposed ones.

Now the difference between those scholars who affirm and those who deny that there is a logical connection between Ockham's philosophy and his politics rests in part on this difference between the theoretic and the practical phases of his political thought. Baudry and Lagarde center attention on Ockham's general political definitions and theoretic doctrines, and they try to show how these are explicated by such of his philosophic ideas as his voluntaristic theory of God's absolute omnipotence, his nominalistic theory of terms and relations, and his theory of knowledge. Boehner and Morrall, on the other hand, center attention on Ockham's practical political recommendations, and they have no difficulty in showing how these are logically independent of Ockham's logic or metaphysics.

The second difference underlying the two divergent views on the relation between Ockham's philosophy and his politics consists in the direction in which the argument is made to run. Boehner and Morrall begin from Ockham's practical political recommenda-
tions—for example, his opposition to the papal plenitude of power—and they ask whether these recommendations logically imply Ockham's general philosophic doctrines. They reply in the negative, because, as has been said, the political recommendations can go hand in hand with many different and even opposed philosophic doctrines. Lagarde and Baudry, on the other hand, begin from Ockham's general philosophic doctrines, and they ask either how the political doctrines follow from these or how they are elucidated by the philosophy. And since Ockham, being a systematic thinker, does use his general philosophic concepts, methods, and doctrines to elucidate his political doctrines, although in ways not always reducible to a simple syllogistic pattern, Lagarde and Baudry are able to show that in this direction there is a logical connection between Ockham's philosophy and his politics. But these two positions are not at all contradictory. If I say that \( p \) implies \( q \), and you say that \( q \) does not imply \( p \), we are not contradicting one another. Nor are we contradicting one another if I say that the terms of \( q \), and even \( q \) itself, are contained in or explained by \( p \), and you say that \( q \) could nonetheless be understood and asserted without \( p \).

I have gone into these questions of the interpretation of Ockham not only for the sake of understanding his own thought but also in order to derive suggestions as to how to proceed in examining the relation of philosophy to political thought in the fourteenth century. From what we have found, it seems plausible that, at the very least, the philosophy will clarify the methods and the theoretic concepts and doctrines of the political thought. But for our present problem let us restrict ourselves to the practical phase of political thought. Our question, therefore, concerns the sense in which, and the extent to which, there was a logical connection between philosophy and practical political recommendations in the fourteenth century. In view of the difficulties and disagreements over the interpretation of Ockham, the best mode of approach would seem to be to take a fairly simple yet basic philosophic doctrine and see how it is related to an issue in practical politics which was argued by political thinkers. The most famous such political issue in the fourteenth century was that concerning the distribution of authority between the spiritual and temporal powers. Fortunately, there is available a major attempt to deal with the very question of the relation between the positions taken
on this issue and a basic philosophic doctrine. We shall take our point of departure, then, from an interpretation advanced by Martin Grabmann, whose extensive researches have contributed very considerably to our knowledge of fourteenth-century philosophy.

Grabmann's Correlations

In a famous and influential monograph published in 1934, Grabmann took over the view, previously advanced by Mandonnet and Gilson, among others, that on the fundamental question of the relation between reason and faith mediaeval philosophers were divided into three different doctrinal schools; and he correlated these schools with three different positions of mediaeval political thinkers on the relation between the state and the church. In the first place, there were the Christian Aristotelians, such as Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great, who held that reason and faith are each self-sufficient in their own respective spheres, and that reason and worldly knowledge must be subordinated to faith only where they touch on questions with which faith is concerned. With this, Grabmann correlated the political position of Aquinas and John of Paris which held that state and church are autonomous in their own spheres, and which accorded the pope only an "indirect power" in temporal affairs, so that the pope could intervene only when spiritual issues were at stake. Secondly, there were the Latin Averroists, including Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, who regarded reason as completely self-contained in its ultimate goal and who either cared nothing for theological dogma and faith or else viewed them from the standpoint of the so-called two-fold truth, according to which reason and faith often yielded mutually contradictory conclusions. Grabmann correlated this doctrine with the political position of Marsilius of Padua, who made the secular power completely independent of the papacy, so that the latter not only had no power, direct or indirect, over the former, but came under the control of the secular power even in spiritual affairs. Thirdly, there were the traditionalist Augustinians, like St. Bonaventura and Henry of Ghent, who completely subordinated reason to faith, holding that reason is powerless unless aided by faith. Grabmann correlated this doctrine with the political position of Egidius of Rome, James
of Viterbo, and other papalists, according to which the pope has a "direct power" in temporal affairs.

Without going into the technicalities of "direct" and "indirect" powers, and into the possible ambiguities of terms like "state," "church," "spiritual," "temporal," "secular," and so on, we may agree that what Grabmann has here presented seems plain enough. He has presented correlations which have an attractive symmetry because they take the form of a proportion: as faith is to reason in a given philosophy, so is the spiritual power to the temporal power in that philosophy's political offshoot. Nevertheless, this seems like an anomalous undertaking. For the terms of the correlations are a set of epistemological doctrines—doctrines about the relative abilities of human cognitive faculties (using "cognitive" in the sense in which both reason and faith were regarded as at least possible means of obtaining valid knowledge)—and a set of political doctrines. But we might well ask: What have the respective cognitive powers of reason and faith to do with the respective political powers of the emperor and the pope? It might seem that the anomaly would be removed only if the political struggle were viewed as in some way also a cognitive struggle—as if, for example, the debate over the relative political superiority of emperor and pope were made to hinge on the relative superiority of a rational faculty to which the emperor appealed and a fideistic or religious faculty to which the pope appealed. But this seems much too simple. Did not the emperor also proclaim his adherence to religious faith? And did not the pope also appeal to reason? Moreover, how could conclusions about matters as specific as those concerning the relative powers of emperor and pope be deduced from considerations as general as those concerning the relative powers of reason and faith? For the latter, like other epistemological issues, apply to a much broader range of subject matter than the political. Whether faith and reason are independent, or contradictory, or arranged hierarchically, is a question which bears on all the possible objects which could be known by faith or by reason or both; hence it seems difficult to grasp how such a general question can serve to differentiate positions to be taken on the specific issue of relative political power. And in addition to these considerations, there is another, perhaps even more obvious one. To set up such a correlation as we have been considering between cognitive faculties and political powers would appear to convert the political struggle into a purely theoretic affair far removed
from the conflicts of passions and values which it actually involved. It would seem to make it possible to settle, or at least to define, political disputes solely by means of an appeal to "factual" considerations of what reason and faith, respectively, can do.

These last two objections are recurrent items in current debates on the relation between philosophy and politics. The latter objection is sometimes referred to as the "naturalistic fallacy" in that one of its many versions in which it would consist not in trying to define a value term by means of non-value terms, but in trying to draw a value conclusion from factual premises which do not, as such, contain value expressions. In this guise, the objection would be: Even if, for example, faith is superior to reason, how from this does it follow that the pope ought to be superior to the emperor?

However hackneyed this example, it does suggest at least the beginnings of an answer to the objections; for the issue of the relative status of faith and reason was suffused with value considerations for all mediaeval thinkers. This was so for many reasons; one of them was that among the matters held to be objects of faith or reason or both was that of the proper mode of life for man, his true end. What this meant was that faith and reason were conceived not only as theoretic faculties but as practical ones: their deliverances bore not only on facts and causes but also on what men ought to be and do. Consequently, if faith is cognitively superior to reason, in that reason must be validated by faith and cannot attain to objects as important as those of faith, then the end of life which only faith can grasp, that of supernatural beatitude in the future world, is superior to the purely natural happiness which is all that can be grasped by reason. From this in turn it follows that the value-status of the pope is superior to that of the emperor, because of the superior value of the end provided for by the pope over that provided for by the emperor. And in a context where value considerations of relative moral dignity or worth were regarded as decisive arguments for the allocation of relative political power, the conclusion necessarily followed of the pope's absolute superiority, even in temporal affairs.

There were many other ways in which the papalists used the superiority of faith over reason to establish their conclusion. But they all involved the same principle of hierarchized value considerations. Hence, it was inevitable that first John of Paris, and, more drastically, Marsilius after him, should emphasize that secular government involves urgencies and necessities of its own, and
that these have nothing to do with the value considerations adduced by the papalists.\textsuperscript{26} These emphases were important steps toward what we might call a pure science of politics—that is, the concentration on specifically political conditions of power and government, as against the moral and religious goals which they might serve and by which they might therefore be evaluated.

From the considerations so far adduced, we can also see how the other two kinds of epistemological doctrines mentioned by Grabmann are correlated with the respective political doctrines. If, as with the Christian Aristotelians, reason and faith are autonomous in their own spheres, then the values or ends of life which they respectively establish are likewise autonomous (even though the temporal end is ultimately ordered toward the spiritual), and so too are the respective political authorities. This was, roughly, the means by which Aquinas and John of Paris arrived at their moderate conclusions concerning the normal autonomy of the spiritual and temporal powers, and the intervention of each in the sphere of the other only in exceptional circumstances.\textsuperscript{27} With the Averroist type of epistemological doctrine, the sequence is less clear. This is not only because the Averroists did not explicitly dwell on questions about the relative cognitive adequacy of reason and faith, but because by their doctrine of the so-called double truth they declared that faith alone reached truth, while reason, when it conflicted with faith, as it often did, attained at best only what was probable on the basis of sense experience. But in denying the power of reason to demonstrate many religious doctrines, such as eternal life, in asserting the contrariety of rational and religious doctrines, and in proclaiming that they as philosophers were proceeding by reason alone without regard for the deliverances of religious faith, the Averroists cut the ground out from under the Augustinian papalists' procedure of discussing within a single universe of discourse the relative values of faith and reason, of the goods of the next world and of this one, of the authority of the spiritual and the temporal powers. The way was thus left open for a politics based on rational considerations alone—and this was what Marsilius of Padua set forth in the first, and determining, portion of his political treatise.\textsuperscript{28} Having by this means set up a state dedicated to this-worldly values alone, he could then fit priesthood and papacy into it without serious alterations.

We are now in a position to ask somewhat closer questions about the correlation of philosophic doctrine with political thought in
the fourteenth century. "Correlation" is, of course, a vague word: it can refer to anything from an accidental conjunction to a logically necessary connection. What kind of correlation, then, was there between the relative status of reason and faith on the one hand and of the temporal and spiritual powers on the other? 29 Grabmann himself said that the correlation holds "only with certain limitations and reservations and only in broad outline." 30 This suggests that the correlations are not completely logical ones; that is, that to be a Christian Aristotelian, an Averroist, and an Augustinian, in the senses defined above with respect to the relation of reason and faith, did not entail simply by definition that in politics one was, respectively, a parallelist, an antipapalist, and a papalist. And this in turn suggests that it would not be logically contradictory to find Christian Aristotelians and even Averroists who were papalists, as well as Augustinians who were antipapalists. Now the first and third of these logical possibilities actually existed in the fourteenth century, and the second came closer to being realized than is generally known. I shall now deal with each of these "variants" in turn, in order to outline somewhat more fully the complex structure of this phase of the interrelations between the century's philosophy and its political thought.

Christian Aristotelianism and Papalism: James of Viterbo and Others

It will be recalled that Grabmann defined the Christian Aristotelians as those who, following Aquinas and Albert the Great, upheld the self-sufficiency of both reason and faith in their respective spheres. Now in Aquinas himself, reason and faith were correlated with nature and grace as the bases of their respective spheres of application. 31 And the relative autonomy of reason and faith did not remove the fact that the objects and values dealt with by faith were "higher" ones to which reason and its objects and values must be subordinated whenever there was intellectual or practical contact between them, although this contact was not conceived as regular or usual. To express this complex relation Aquinas used the formula "grace does not abolish nature but perfects it." 32 The relative autonomy of reason, then, meant the relative autonomy of natural, secular values; and one of the chief of these values was political society. To set forth this relative autonomy of the values of the secular political order, Aquinas
repeated the Aristotelian dicta that the state exists by nature and that man is by nature a political animal. This meant that the state existed not as a consequence of sin, or of any cause accessible primarily to faith or religion, but rather as an answer to certain inherent needs of men, ascertainable by reason, which they would have had even in the absence of sin.

Now this Aristotelian doctrine of the naturalness of the state was upheld by many papalists, including James of Viterbo, Augustinus Triumphus, Alexander of St. Elpidius, and Alvarus Pelagius. Thus, for example, James of Viterbo, writing of the three communities—the family, the city, and the state—declares:

The establishment of these communities or societies proceeded from men's natural inclination, as the Philosopher showed in the first book of the Politics. For man is naturally a social animal living in a multitude, which comes from natural necessity, because one man cannot sufficiently live by himself but needs to be helped by another. Hence too speech has been given to man, whereby he can express his thoughts to other men and thereby communicate and live more advantageously with others. Because therefore it is natural to man to live in society, there resides in men a natural inclination toward such communities . . .

It was in a similar vein that Augustinus Triumphus, having raised the question "Whether the pope can justly remove lordships and jurisdictions from pagans," went on to reply: "No, because according to the Philosopher in the first book of the Politics the lordship of one man over another is counted among natural benefits . . . But not only from believers but even from demons natural benefits have not been removed." Augustinus went on to underline further this autonomous value of the natural: "Infidels deserve to lose the power and liberty of grace, but not the power of nature. Consequently the natural order of governance which derives from the law of nature is not removed from them."  

The question which now arises is this: How could these papalists recognize the naturalness, the independent legitimacy, of the secular state, and still be papalists? For, as papalists, they held that the pope, being God's vicar, is endowed with plenitude of power in the sense of containing all power, temporal as well as spiritual, so that no other power is legitimate unless subjected to it. This in turn meant that the temporal ruler is at most the
“executive” or “minister” of the pope, requiring to be established and judged by the pope, and requiring also that his laws be examined and approved by the pope. And when in the pope’s judgment the ruler deserved it, the pope could depose him.\textsuperscript{37}

Nevertheless, it is not difficult to see how these far-reaching claims could be made consistent with the papalists' Aristotelian doctrine of the relative autonomy of reason, nature, and temporal government. For the papalists, like Aquinas himself, held that reason and nature are only \textit{relatively} autonomous. In this connection, the second clause in Aquinas’ phrase “grace does not abolish nature but perfects it” is highly significant. A typical papalist interpretation of it was given by James of Viterbo as follows:

The temporal power is established materially and in point of origin from men's natural inclination, and through this from God insofar as the work of nature is the work of God; but formally and in point of perfection the temporal power is established by the spiritual power, which is derived from God in a special way. For grace does not abolish nature but perfects and forms it; and similarly that which is of grace does not abolish that which is of nature, but forms and perfects it. Hence, since the spiritual power is in respect of grace, while the temporal power is in respect of nature, it follows that the spiritual power does not exclude the temporal but forms and perfects it. Indeed, all human power is imperfect and unformed unless it is formed and perfected by the spiritual. But this formation is approval and ratification.\textsuperscript{38}

What this approval involves is shown by James’s subsequent statement that “the temporal power must not use laws unless they have been approved by the spiritual power.”\textsuperscript{39} Moreover, James asserts, the spiritual power “can and must correct and direct the temporal power, and inflict on it not only spiritual but also temporal punishment by reason of its crime or delict, extending even to the temporal ruler’s deposition if the quality of his delict requires it.”\textsuperscript{40} In a similar vein, Augustinus Triumphus, despite his denial of the pope’s authority to remove political power from pagans, on the ground of the natural basis of such power, can nevertheless go on to deal in papalist fashion with the question “Whether the pope can deprive Jews of lordship over Christians.” He first makes the Christian Aristotelian objection that “natural right cannot be abolished by the pope . . . . But the lordship of one man over another is from natural law.” To this Augustinus makes the fol-
ollowing reply: “All unbelievers by reason of their infidelity deserve to lose power over those who are adopted sons of God. Consequently, the pope can deservedly deprive all unbelievers of such power.”

The papalists, then, could accept the Christian Aristotelians’ doctrine of the relative autonomy of reason and nature and yet subsume it under the ultimate control of faith and grace. There was, of course, always an at least latent instability in the equilibrium which Aquinas, John of Paris, Dante, and others tried to set up between the two spheres; for as Christians they had to admit the ultimate moral superiority of the realm of faith and grace. It was this instability which the papalists exploited in making explicit the hierarchic implications of such superiority.

Augustinianism and Antipapalism: John Wycliffe

Let us now turn to a second correlation set up by Grabmann: that of the Augustinian doctrine of the complete subordination of reason to faith with the political espousal of the direct, plenary power of the pope over the temporal ruler even in temporal affairs. In our examination of how the philosophic doctrine of Christian Aristotelianism was compatible with papalism, we might be said to have reached a conclusion not too different from at least the principle of Grabmann’s correlations, the proportion whereby, as faith is to reason, so is the spiritual power to the temporal. For when the papalists moved from the autonomy of nature and grace to the papal plenitude of power, this did ultimately involve the subordination of nature to grace, and hence of reason to faith. But when we consider how philosophic Augustinianism was correlated not with papalism but with antipapalism, we find that this very principle is completely overturned: the superiority of grace and faith over nature and reason now leads to the political superiority not of the pope but of the temporal ruler. History provides, in fact, abundant examples of this contrary correlation, both before and after the fourteenth century: for example, in the writings of Gregory of Catino and the Norman Anonymous in the eleventh century, and in Luther and Calvin in the sixteenth. However, to remain within the confines of the fourteenth century, we find a conspicuous example of this contrary position in John Wycliffe.
That Wycliffe belongs to the Augustinian philosophic tradition is quite clear. He declares that men can have no knowledge without divine illumination, so that reason is completely subordinated to faith. As against the Aristotelians, he holds that civil dominium is a consequence of sin. Like the papalist Egidius of Rome at the beginning of the century, Wycliffe also holds that no just dominium is possible without grace, and indeed, that without faith and grace there is neither king nor kingdom nor people; moreover, civil law is contained in divine law or at least presupposes it.

Nevertheless, in his political thought Wycliffe uses these ideas in a way which leads to conclusions sharply opposed to those of the papalists. He is emphatic, for example, that the pope has no power in temporal affairs, that his claims to such power are those of an antichrist, that the temporal ruler can legitimately take away from the clergy their temporal goods and can intervene in the governance of the church to correct abuses. The bishops have jurisdiction in spiritual cases by authority of the king. Moreover, one is not required to believe that the pope is head of the Church nor is subjection to him necessary for salvation.

It is not difficult to see how Wycliffe's antipapal ideas are consistent with his philosophical Augustinianism. Like the antipapalists of the investiture controversy three centuries earlier, Wycliffe simply claims for temporal rulership at least as much, and even more, divine sanction than he grants the papacy, so that the force of the papalists' elaborate justifications of papal power by appeal to God is either denied, or is divided between pope and king, or is ascribed more fully to the king. Thus he holds that the king as well as the pope is vicar of God—the one in temporal, the other in spiritual affairs; the king, moreover, is God's chief (praecipuus) vicar; he bears the image of Christ's divinity, the priest only that of his humanity, so that the king must rule the priest.

Averroism and Quasi-Papalism: John of Jandun

Let us now turn to the third correlation set up by Grabmann: that of Averroism with antipapalism. The sole instance of this correlation cited in his above-mentioned monograph is Marsilius of Padua, whose Averroism has long been stressed by commentators. While many Averroist writings on ethics have been discovered, from the hands of such philosophers as Siger of Brabant,
Boethius of Dacia, Egidius of Orleans, and Antonius of Parma,\textsuperscript{57} Grabmann declares that no political work from an Averroist other than Marsilius has yet been found, and he stresses the importance of overcoming this lack in order to be able to see more clearly the relation between Marsilius' political ideas and the Latin Averroism of the Paris faculty of arts.\textsuperscript{58}

There is, however, another fourteenth-century Averroist from whom we have copious discussions of political problems. This is none other than John of Jandun, long alleged to be the co-author of the \textit{Defensor pacis}.\textsuperscript{59} In his \textit{Questions on the Metaphysics} \textsuperscript{60} we find lengthy disquisitions on political philosophy which, so far as I have been able to ascertain, have completely escaped the notice of commentators.\textsuperscript{61} These political discussions are embedded in such \textit{quaestiones} as "Whether purely speculative philosophers should be permitted in the state," \textsuperscript{62} "Whether human happiness consists in wisdom," \textsuperscript{63} "Whether metaphysics is the principal science," \textsuperscript{64} "Whether metaphysics is a free science," \textsuperscript{65} "Whether speculative habits are more honorable than practical ones," \textsuperscript{66} "Whether custom in youth is the strongest impediment to the knowledge of truth," \textsuperscript{67} "Whether there should be one ruler in the whole world." \textsuperscript{68} I have dealt elsewhere with some of John's doctrines as they are presented in these questions; \textsuperscript{69} here I wish to consider them only in so far as they are relevant to the correlation of Averroism with antipapalism.

It will be recalled that Grabmann defined Averroism by its view of reason as self-contained in its ultimate goal and by its doctrine of the so-called double truth, whereby reason and faith often yielded contrary conclusions. Now John of Jandun is notoriously of this school, and in the \textit{Questions on the Metaphysics} which we are now considering, we find copious examples of it. Thus, for instance, on the question "Whether eternal substances other than the first one depend upon the first as on an agent and efficient cause," \textsuperscript{70}—a question involving the Christian belief in God as the omnipotent creator of all reality—John first presents detailed arguments in the negative, based on the Aristotelian doctrine that there are many eternal substances, and these, \textit{qua} eternal, could not be caused by an efficient cause. But then John concludes as follows:

This is what must be said to the question in accordance with the intention of Aristotle and the Commentator, who posit besides the
first substance other eternal substances. And if this were true
these others would not depend upon a true efficient cause acting
through motion. But nevertheless it must be said in accordance
with faith and truth that nothing beside the first substance is
eternal, but all [other] things have begun to be anew, and conse­
quently have been produced by the first principle as by an agent
through creation out of nothing, at least abstract substances. And
this creation is not motion nor generation taken in a univocal
sense like the motion of inferior things, but is a different, super­
natural production, which cannot be proved from sensible things
and from the natural things whence proceed the philosophers
who speak in a natural mode. But I only believe this firmly
and know it, not by reason arising from sensible things, and this
firmly makes me assent with reverence to the teachers of Scripture.
Hence, since I do not know how to demonstrate this from sen­
sible things, nor can it be demonstrated because it is above sensi­
bles and nature, it follows that in simply and faithfully believing
this I have merit. And in this too is proved the superiority in
power of creation and salvation over any natural agent. 71

Several points must be noted about this and many similar pas­
sages in which John of Jandun distinguishes sharply between what
must be said "according to Aristotle and the Commentator" and
what must be said "according to faith and truth." 72 In the first
place, John holds that philosophic propositions contradict those of
the Christian religion. Sometimes, to be sure, this contradiction is
mitigated by his noting of the different bases and methods of
philosophy and religion, but usually his position is that philosophy
and religion are dealing with the same questions or propositions,
and are giving contradictory answers to these questions. In the
second place, as has often been noted, 72 John of Jandun, like the
other Averroists, does not simultaneously assert the truth of the
contradictory propositions of philosophic reason and of religious
faith. He declares, rather, that only the latter are "true," even
though they cannot be demonstrated from empirical or natural
bases; while the propositions of philosophy, even though they can
be thus demonstrated, he does not call "true" when they contra­
dict faith. In the third place, consequently, there is a sharp dif­
ference between this Averroist view and that of the Christian Aris­
totelians. The latter uphold both a harmony and a separation of
reason and faith: harmony, in the double sense that reason can
demonstrate the "preambles" of faith, such as the existence and
unity of God, and is never in conflict with faith; separation, in that the bases and objects of reason are different from those of faith, which is why the two are never in conflict. Thus while both Thomas Aquinas and John of Jandun sometimes say that philosophic reason cannot demonstrate some religious doctrine, the assumptions of such statements are different. For Aquinas, they mean that a strictly philosophic argument can demonstrate neither the doctrine in question nor its contradictory; while for John of Jandun they mean that a strictly philosophic argument can demonstrate the contradictory of the religious doctrine in question. Moreover, Aquinas has no interest in pursuing or attempting proof of propositions contrary to faith, except in so far as they may bring out more clearly a truth of faith; while John of Jandun’s dominant concern is with the philosophic propositions themselves, and if these contradict faith they are still elaborated with great care and for their own sake, with but a brief disclaimer to the effect that in such cases the “truth” lies rather with faith. Whether or not Jandun was “sincere” in these disclaimers seems impossible to ascertain with any significant degree of conclusiveness. The salient point, however, is that he accepts such contradictions, and is concerned with the pursuit of philosophic reason for its own sake regardless of its impact on religious faith.74

Now on Grabmann’s correlation of reason-faith and temporal power-spiritual power, it might have been predicted that (parallel to the unresolved contradictions between reason and faith) John would hold that there is a sharp political conflict between the temporal and spiritual powers, and that (parallel to the obvious preference he evinces for pursuing philosophic reason for its own sake regardless of religious faith) John would tend to an antipapalist position, affirming not only the complete autonomy of the temporal power but also its superiority in political authority over the spiritual power. Yet, in fact, John’s political position is quite different. He is very far from being an antipapalist, and indeed he goes far toward conciliating the papalists. His complete doctrine on this matter is rather complicated, but we may note, to begin with, the way in which he deals with the question “Whether there should be one ruler in the whole universe.” He sets forth as an argumentum a contrario the consideration that the macrocosm should be like the microcosm, but “in the microcosm there are several rulers who are equally primary . . . such as the king
and the supreme pontiff, because neither wishes to be subject to the other.” John’s reply is as follows:

... We must say that in the whole universe there should be one ruler. And when you say that it is neither the king nor the supreme pontiff, it must be replied that it is the supreme pontiff, and although the king is not subject to him in temporal affairs, yet he is subject to him in spiritual affairs and in virtue. But you will say that this is spoken inadequately, because it applies only in the law of the Christians and not in the other laws. It must be replied that insofar as it is a matter of merit and of natural law, all men, of whatever custom or law, must be under the law of the Christians, which is proved with evidence and certainty by evident miracles, which belong to no one except to the maker of the law of the Christians. Hence too insofar as it is a matter of merit all men should be subject to the supreme pontiff, even though they are not. Indeed, the more they resist the Christian law, the more they err and fall away from reason.

It will have been noted that in this passage there is no attempt to derogate from the papacy, that, in particular, there is none of Marsilius’ effort to draw a sharp distinction between the merits and prerogatives of Christ and the Christian religion on the one hand and of the pope on the other. The evidence of Christ’s miracles is used to support the position that all men should be subject to the pope. In saying that the king should be subject to the pope in spiritual affairs, John resembles the Christian Aristotelians, but he goes beyond them in adducing natural law (de jure naturali) as the basis for the subjection of the king and of all men to the pope and the Christian religion.

The question hence arises: How can John, as an Averroist, regard reason as self-contained, and as contrary to faith on propositions of theology, including miracles, and yet endorse the king’s subjection to the pope in spiritual affairs? This, as we shall see, is not an easy question to answer. At least part of the answer, however, is to be found in the intellectualist emphasis which John shares with many other Averroists. He says that the highest good is “theoretic happiness” or wisdom, “which consists in the operation of the theoretic intellect in respect of the noblest object,” and he equates such happiness with the love and contemplation of God, which he conceives in the Aristotelian manner as this-worldly θεωρία or contemplation of “abstract principles.” Moreover, John
puts this theoretic happiness into a practical context, for he makes it the necessary condition for the morality of a society:

The wisdom which consists in the contemplation and knowledge of God and the other abstract principles is necessary for community and good living together, because without a knowledge of God men cannot formally operate well, although they can materially. Hence in order that the legislator may make his citizens good he needs to have knowledge of God either through himself, as through the habit of wisdom joined to himself, or through another wise man who will tell him and demonstrate God to him, in order that he may be able to instruct others. Hence too political happiness is ordered to theoretic happiness as its end.  

As this passage suggests, John makes it the function of the ruler to inculcate such knowledge of God in his subjects. Since the proper act of the ruler is to command, the ruler's political happiness consists in commanding the love and contemplation of God:

. . . Among all the acts of man the noblest is to know God, and in the act of commanding this consists political happiness in the ruler operating toward the knowledge of God, just as theoretic happiness consists in the contemplation of God. And this doctrine is marvelously close to the doctrine of the most pious legislator our lord Jesus Christ, who when he was asked what is the first commandment in the law, replied "Love thy God with all thy heart," and then the most pious legislator added: "and thy neighbor as thyself." Therefore political happiness consists in the act of commanding that men operate toward the love of God.  

The ruler does not himself have the knowledge of God. Hence he must receive it from someone else. But this can only be the "theoretic philosophers who teach the knowledge of God."  

Without such philosophers "the fulfillment of political happiness cannot be had." Consequently, the theoretic philosophers are "the final cause of the other parts of the state, just as . . . political happiness is ordered to theoretic happiness, and all the men in the state are ordered to the contemplation of God."  

Having thus exalted the philosophers, John goes on to suggest that at least ideally the philosophers would be priests. The theoretic philosophers, he writes,

are presupposed by the priests, because it is necessary for the priests to know God, and they must be theoretic, because in
Greek priests are called the elders, who must be wise. You say that the theoretic philosophers [etc.]. It must be replied that indeed the philosophers would wish to be priests if they were treated as they would deserve to be, but this is not done because prebends and benefices are given to low characters. Hence the priest must necessarily be wise and have knowledge of God . . . . The priests do not add anything over and above the theoretic men in regard to the contemplation of God except external acts . . . .

The philosophers, then, are priests in all but official status, because their function is to lead men to the knowledge of God. This near equation of priests and philosophers has an at least general background in the Aristotelian tradition; it is even found in Marsilius of Padua. But when Marsilius classifies the philosophers as priests, this in no way leads to the political hegemony of the priesthood, because his criteria for the allocation of political superiority are not intellectual ones. In John of Jandun, on the other hand, the philosopher-would-be-priests appear as the power behind the ruler's throne because of the theological-intellectual values of which they are the teachers, just as for the papalists the priesthood has ultimate political superiority over the temporal ruler because of the higher values subserved by the former. John's argument differs from that of the papalists in that the values to which he appeals are not supernatural but this-worldly and intellectual; yet, as we have seen, he readily equates these with the tenets of Christianity. He uses the Averroist intellectualist ideas to set the philosopher, and hence the priest and pope, over the ruler even in so far as the structure of values in this world is concerned. In saying that the secular ruler's commands must be guided by the theoretic philosopher acting as teacher of the "knowledge of God," John opens the way for precisely that papal claim to judiciary control over temporal laws which was the target of Marsilius' chief polemics. There is, then, a close connection between John's Averroism and his exaltation of the pope, the chief priest.

However, this combination of Averroism and quasi-papalism raises a serious problem. As an Averroist, John of Jandun frequently emphasizes, as we have seen, the contrariety between the philosophic reason which proceeds by demonstrations derived from sense experience and the religious truths to which he adheres by faith. But as a quasi-papalist upholding the political influence of the theoretic philosopher-priests, he also frequently claims that
"philosophy" and "reason" support the superiority of the Christian religion over other religions. Thus he says that "the more men resist the Christian law, the more they err and fall away from reason." Again, he writes that all laws besides the law of the Christians are with an admixture of error, such as the law of Mohammed that after this life there is had a life of pleasure and delight. Hence this is contrary to reason. But in a second way a particular law arises from a universal law without an admixture of error, so that nothing in it is contrary to reason, as in our law, the Christian.

Similarly, he says that faith can be referred to two things. In one way it can be referred to false laws, and in this way the faith of the vulgar is stronger, because they believe more in false laws than in philosophy, because they have not seen many things and do not know how to distinguish the true from the false . . . . In another way faith can be referred to the true laws, and in this way the faith of the philosophers is stronger than the faith of the vulgar, because philosophers believe more in what is true than do the vulgar. And when the Commentator said that the faith of the vulgar is stronger than the faith of the philosophers, he meant in false laws and not in true ones.

In such passages as these, John of Jandun is indicating a different relation between reason and faith than that which is characteristic of the Averroists. As an Averroist, he views the pair reason-philosophy as contradictory to the pair faith-truth. But in the above passages reason and philosophy are in agreement with faith, and truth consequently characterizes the former as well as the latter. However, there would be an insuperable difficulty here only if John of Jandun held that philosophic reason is always in contradiction to religious faith, and can never demonstrate anything pertaining to faith. Yet on the basis of the passages where he does affirm such contradiction and indemonstrability in particular questions, there is no need to interpret him as meaning that these relations hold on all questions. It is possible further to mitigate any seeming inconsistency in John's position by noting that the questions on which he asserts the contradiction and indemonstrability are theoretic ones of metaphysics, physics, and psychology; while
the questions on which he declares the agreement of reason and faith are rather the practical ones bearing on the kinds of "laws," characters, and ends or values with and by which men ought to live. In Marsilius of Padua, likewise, reason and faith are in agreement on some kinds of questions, in separation on other kinds, and in contradiction on still other kinds. But in his case the agreement bears on political questions, the separation on metaphysical and cosmological questions, and the contradiction on moral questions.92

To what extent, then, do these complexities in John of Jandun's view of the relation of reason and faith affect Grabmann's correlation of Averroism with antipapalism? Since Averroism was defined in terms of the contrariety of reason and faith, does not John's view that reason and faith are in harmony on practical matters separate him, to that extent, from the Averroist position? And since John's quasi-papalism seems to be necessarily connected with this harmonizing strand of his philosophy, does not this remove or at least strongly mitigate the "refutation" here suggested of Grabmann's correlation? For it appears that John's view that the philosopher-priest with his knowledge of God is the final cause of the state depends upon precisely that phase of his doctrine wherein reason and faith are not in contradiction. For if they were in contradiction, then the philosopher's knowledge of God could not be utilized by the priest, and the ruler would be faced not with a single theology most ably presented by the philosophers, but with a double one, the "true" one presented by the Christian priests "according to faith and truth" and a "rational" one presented by the philosophers "according to Aristotle and the Commentator."

Nevertheless, these very points emphasize the difficulties in the way of attempts like that of Grabmann's correlation. For the fact that a philosopher may hold one view of the relation of reason and faith in theoretic questions and another view in practical questions, suggests that it is not from his view on theoretic questions alone that his practical political conclusions can be inferred. More generally, any attempt to derive political conclusions from general epistemological doctrines must always presuppose an extension of those doctrines to the very political concerns which are at issue. Consider, for example, Russell's view that empiricism, because of its tentativeness and its consequent opposition to rationalist dogmatism, provides the philosophic basis of the tolerance characteristic of liberal democracy.98 This view assumes that the empiricist's tentativeness will always be translated into the democrat's tol-
erance; but such a translation would involve many specifically practical questions of moral character and of political institutions, and these in turn are by no means identical with the epistemological trait itself. Similarly, John of Jandun could hold that on theoretic questions philosophic reason and religious faith were in contradiction, and yet he could find what seemed to him adequate grounds for not translating this theoretic contradiction into a practical political opposition. This non-translation need not by any means be considered an incoherence in his total doctrine; instead, it may have reflected his conviction that the requirements of practical political institutions are different from those of theoretic philosophy.

The question of John of Jandun's position also involves some deeper problems about the interpretation of the Averroist tradition. From Averroës himself there stemmed a rhetorical conception of both politics and religion as based on considerations of social utility rather than of ultimate truth.¹⁴ For law exists not in order that we may have knowledge but in order that we may become good. And the reason for this is that the perfection of man is acquired only through assemblages of men in states, and the assemblage, i.e., the state, will be perfect only because of goodness, and not because of knowledge.¹⁵

This was echoed by Siger of Brabant when he wrote that the legislator does not lay down rules about first principles according to his opinions but according to what is more beneficial to men and according to the ways in which he can give more guidance to the good; but sometimes men may be made good through what is false and frivolous.¹⁶

John of Jandun, in his Questions on the Metaphysics, quoted at least four times Averroës' dictum that "the assemblage, i.e., the state, will be perfect only because of goodness, and not because of knowledge."¹⁷ Hence, it would not be anomalous, but rather quite in keeping with the Averroist tradition, for John to hold as a theoretic philosopher that reason and faith are in contradiction, while at the same time holding as a practical political philosopher that the view to be taken of the relation of reason and faith must reflect what is needed not "in order that we may have knowledge" but "in order that we may become good."
Conclusion

What, then, is the upshot of our inquiry? We have tried to examine some of the ways in which philosophy was related to political thought in the fourteenth century, using Grabmann's influential correlations as a point of departure. And we have seen that these correlations are not logically necessary. While an explicit definition of "logically necessary correlation" has not been presented here, we have been assuming at least a criterion of the absence of such necessity: the correlation of the two items $A$ and $B$ is not logically necessary if $A$ is found accompanied by the opposite of $B$, and vice versa. The logical pattern of our argument has thus resembled a negative application of the method of difference: we have shown that (where $A$ is an epistemological doctrine about the relation of reason and faith, and $B$ is a practical political position) $B$ can be had even when $A$ is removed and replaced by the contrary of $A$, so that there is no logically necessary connection between $B$ and $A$.

The bulk of our discussion has been concerned with the variant correlations themselves. However, the reasons or grounds for those variations have been at least implicit in our discussion of them. Most generally, there is the distinction between the theoretic and the practical which was emphasized near the end of our preceding section in connection with John of Jandun. Men may agree in philosophy while disagreeing in politics, as well as conversely, because of the different objects, bases, and ends of theoretic philosophy and practical politics. This need not mean that practical political views cannot be based on "truth"; but the truths and methods relevant to politics are not necessarily the same as those relevant to theoretic philosophy.

A specific instance of this general point appeared in the case of Wycliffe. He agreed with the Augustinian papalists both in his philosophic doctrine about the relation of reason and faith and in his theoretic political position that political superiority belongs to God's chief vicar. But the minor premise which Wycliffe subsumed under this major premise was the opposite of that of the papalists, for he held that the king, not the pope, is God's chief vicar. In the case of James of Viterbo, in a somewhat similar way, the pattern was that of a shift from initial agreement with the Christian Aristotelians on their major premise, to a specification of the meaning of that premise which involved a disagreement.
For when he said that "grace does not abolish nature but perfects it," he upheld, like the Aristotelians, the autonomy of the "secular" state; but he so interpreted the concept of "perfection" that the secular state came under the papal authority for the fulfillment of its own values.

It may, however, be objected that our "disproof" of Grabmann's specific correlations proves little or nothing about the general relation between philosophy and politics. For if two philosophers have the same philosophic doctrine but differ in political views, there is always the possibility that one of them has not fully understood the meaning or "implications" of his philosophic doctrine, or has not argued from it correctly. A further objection may be derived from the familiar way of treating the idea of a "plurality of causes"—the idea that an effect may be the result of many different causes. This idea is usually refuted by the argument that if the effect is subjected to a sufficiently careful analysis, the alleged plurality disappears: the specific effect in question always has one, and only one, kind of specific cause. Similarly, it may be held that the political "effects" or "conclusions" with which we have dealt here, and which we have shown to follow from or accompany different "causes" or philosophic doctrines, have been too gross; if they were analyzed more carefully, they would be seen to stand in a one-to-one relationship with appropriate philosophic antecedents.

To the first of these objections I would reply that while the possibility always exists that a philosopher has not argued correctly from his premises, the burden of proof always rests on the objector to show where this is so. I think it would be difficult to show this in the cases of James of Viterbo, John Wycliffe, and John of Jandun, with whom we have dealt here. The second objection has, I think, more point. There is, indeed, a need for more precise analysis of doctrines, both philosophic and political, in order to see their possible logical relations. The bulk of this paper may, in fact, be viewed as further confirmation of the view which recent historians have been developing that the traditional classifications of mediaeval philosophers under such rubrics as "Augustinian," "Christian Aristotelian," and "Averroist" are too gross to be very helpful. For the assumption of such classifications is that various doctrines occur together and may hence be grouped under a general name like "Augustinianism," and, moreover, that this "to-
getherness” is logically necessitated. What we have seen in this paper is that the assumption underlying such general classifications is untenable in the case of Grabmann’s correlations. But precisely for this reason it may be held that, if we analyze Augustinianism and the other general philosophic “positions” into more carefully selected components, there may still remain a tight correlation between at least some of the latter and political doctrines. However, is not the view taken on the relation between reason and faith such a component? Whether or not one defines “Augustinianism,” “Averroism,” and so on, by the view taken on this relation, the traditional idea that there were these different views has not been refuted. To be sure, further analysis of the views on this relation itself has led us to see that some thinkers may uphold a contrariety between reason and faith on some questions, a mere separation or distinction on other questions, and a harmony or agreement on still others. But even so, and notwithstanding the other possible views on the relation between reason and faith, we have seen no grounds for holding that there might be a logical connection between any such analyzed views and practical political doctrines; and we have seen abundant grounds for holding that there is not such a logical connection.

Moreover, if we turn to the political side of such alleged correlations, and if we make the same demand that the political doctrines in question be more fully analyzed, there is always the danger that a political idea will in this way be analyzed out of its practical relevance. The idea that the pope should be politically superior to the king, or conversely, was a living, practically cogent fact in the fourteenth century. Of what relevance would it be to analyze this idea to the point where what emerged was something quite different from what men actually believed and acted on? We have here another difference between “effects” or “consequences” in theoretic science and in practical politics: in the latter, the phenomenal, including the ideas which men consciously uphold, is the real in a far more irreplaceable sense than is the case in the domain of theoretic science.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude, from our negative examination of Grabmann’s correlations, that philosophy is irrelevant to practical politics. For a philosophy consists of more than a series of discrete propositions such as those about the relation of faith and reason which we took as isolated units for the purpose of
our inquiry. It consists in a whole interconnected pattern of ideas which emerge more or less directly in the way men look at the world. And practical politics consists not merely in overt acts or patterns of behavior but in processes of thought and volition that accompany and, in part, are considered to justify the behavior. Consequently, for men to agree in practical politics involves more than that they subscribe to an isolated position such as that the king should be politically superior to the pope, or conversely. It involves in addition the set of values, including ways of looking at the world, which is considered to justify the position. At what point the insistence on these values would remove or make impossible practical political agreement in action is a serious and complex question. But there can be little doubt that even though an Averroist like Marsilius and an Augustinian like Wycliffe agreed on the need for restricting the papal power and ensuring the "secular" ruler's supremacy, life in a Wycliffian state would be a far different thing from life in a Marsilian state. The Augustinian principles of Wycliffe, with their emphases on a religiously based righteousness, would force men to live with ideas and institutions quite different from those of the less moralistic, far more secular Averroism of Marsilius. To judge properly the logical relations between philosophy and politics, then, would require taking each of these relata in a far broader scope than the analytic method of this paper has permitted.

Moreover, to view the relation between a philosophic doctrine and a political belief exclusively in respect of their logical connection is insufficient for grasping how philosophy actually operates in political action. Such operation always occurs under definite historical conditions; consequently, the meaning of a philosophic doctrine, so far as its relation to politics is concerned, depends on the historical circumstances in which it is propounded. It is the variety of these circumstances which accounts, at least in part, for the multiple correlations that we have found between philosophic doctrines and political views. An adequate account of the bearing on fourteenth-century political thought of the philosophic ideas of the period, then, would have to deal with more than the logical relations between concepts. It would have to concern itself also with what philosophers thought they were trying to accomplish by their ideas, and with the historical factors that conditioned both their thought and their accomplishments.


3. For a discussion of how political attitudes (or at least political analogies) have influenced philosophic theories, cf. L. S. Feuer, “Political Myths and Metaphysics,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XV (1955), 332 ff.

4. For references to the texts, see P. Boehner, *Medieval Logic: An Outline of Its Development from 1250 to c. 1400* (Chicago, 1952); Boehner, *Collected Articles on Ockham* (St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1958); E. A. Moody, *Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic* (Amsterdam, 1953). The works listed in this note and in the two following notes are only a very small part of the rich historical materials dealing with these subjects.


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7. Edited by R. Scholz (Weimar, 1929).


11. The *Monarchia* is found in *Tutte le opere di Dante Alighieri*, ed. E. Moore (Oxford, 1924), pp. 339-76; there are several English translations. Engelbert's *Liber de ortu, progressu, et fine Romani Imperii* is in *Maxima bibliotheca veterum patrum* (Lyons, 1677), XXV, 563-78. Pierre Dubois' *De recuperatione Sancte Terre* is edited by C. V. Langlois (Paris, 1891); there is an English translation by W. Brandt (New York, 1956).


14. There are two critical modern editions, one by C. W. Previté-Orton (*The Defensor Pacis of Marsilius of Padua* [Cambridge, 1928]) and one by R. Scholz ("Marsilius von Padua, *Defensor Pacis*,” in *Fontes juris Germanici antiqui* of the *Monumenta Germaniae historica* [Hanover, 1932]). There is an English translation by A. Gewirth: *The "Defensor Pacis": Translated with an Introduction*, which is Vol. II of *Marsilius of Padua, the Defender of Peace* (New York, 1956).

15. A critical edition of Ockham's political works is in course of publication; so far only two volumes have appeared: *Guillelmi de Ockham opera politica*, ed. J. G. Sikes et al. (Manchester, 1940 [Vol. I], 1956 [Vol. III]). Ockham's longest and most important political work, *Dialogus*, must still be read in the old edition of M. Goldast, *Monarchia sancti Romani Imperii* (Frankfurt, 1611-14), II, 398-967. His *Breviloquium de principatu tyrannico* has been published in a critical edition by R. Scholz (*Wilhelm von Ockham als politischer Denker und sein Breviloquium de principatu tyrannico* [Stuttgart, 1944]) and in an edition based on one manuscript by L. Baudry (Guillelmi de Occam, *Breviloquium de potestate papae* [Paris, 1987]).

16. Lupold of Bebenburg's *Tractatus de juribus regni et imperii* is found in *De jurisdictione, auctoritate, et praeminentia imperiali ac potestate ecclésiastica*, ed. S. Schard (Basel, 1566), pp. 828-409. Three works of Konrad
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17. For the still very incomplete critical edition of Ockham's political works, see n. 15. A critical edition of his non-political works is now being prepared: Guielmi Ockham opera omnia philosophica et theologica, ed. E. M. Buytaert et al. (St. Bonaventure, N. Y., and Paderborn).


20. Cf., for example, the discussion of how Ockham uses the concepts of epieikeia, bonum commune, and necessitas to deal with such practical problems as the canonical obstacles to the marriage of Ludwig of Bavaria's son, the secular ruler's competence to impose on the clergy extraordinary taxes in time of war without papal consent, and various other issues about the relations between the temporal and spiritual powers, in C. C. Bayley, "Pivotal Concepts in the Political Philosophy of William of Ockham," Journal of the History of Ideas, X (1949), 199-218.

21. To support this statement adequately would require a comparative study far more extensive than can be undertaken here. Examples of what is meant are likely to be misleading unless relevant qualifications are introduced. With this warning, however, reference may be made to the ways in
which Ockham, John of Paris, and Marsilius of Padua, amid their divergences in theoretical political definitions and doctrines, yet agree in their conciliarism and their opposition to the papal plenitude of power. To be sure, this agreement is not complete; there are also differences on these practical matters. Nevertheless, (a) it is doubtful whether these differences outweigh the similarities in political recommendations which distinguish all three thinkers from, for example, the papalists; (b) it is also doubtful to what extent these differences can be traced back to differences on the level of theoretical politics; (c) it is also doubtful to what extent their practical agreements can be traced back to agreements on theory. In discussing this whole question, it is important to avoid making the concept of "theoretical political doctrine" part of the meaning of "practical political recommendation," so that the proposition "There can be agreement in practical political recommendations amid disagreement in theoretic political doctrines" would become false by definition.

22. Thus, for example, Lagarde holds that from Ockham's view that the will is the essential attribute of all rational beings, both God and man, there follows his reduction of all law to will (La naissance . . . , VI, 91-92, 185, 212); Lagarde also believes that there is a "rigorous parallelism" between the epistemological characteristics which Ockham ascribes to the concepts whereby theoretic reason apprehends reality and those which he ascribes to the precepts which the practical reason apprehends as "natural laws" of morals and politics (ibid., VI, 141 ff.). (I am doubtful about the extent of the legal "voluntarism" and "irrationalism" which Lagarde attributes to Ockham.) Likewise, both Lagarde and Baudry emphasize how Ockham's nominalist doctrine that only individuals are real, and that relations and composites are real only in virtue of the individuals related or compounded, eventuates in his attacks on the reification or personification of social groups as entities distinct from their members (Lagarde, "L'idée de représentation . . . ;", pp. 436 ff.; Baudry, "Le philosophe et le politique . . . ;", pp. 211 ff.).

23. Cf. Boehner, "Ockham's Political Ideas" (Collected Articles on Ockham, p. 446): "Ockham's political ideas in their great outlines could have been developed, so far as we can see, from any of the classical metaphysics of the thirteenth century . . . ."


25. P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'averroïste latin au XIIIe siècle (2d ed.; Louvain, 1911); E. Gilson, Etudes de philosophie médiévale (Strasbourg, 1921), p. 51.


27. Thomas Aquinas Summa theologiae II. II. qu. 60. a. 6. ad 3; qu. 147. a. 3. Resp.; De regimine principum I. xiv; Commentum in quattuor libros sententiarum Lib. II. Dist. xlv. qu. 2. a. 3. Expositio textus, ad 4; John of
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Paris De potestate regia et papali cap. v, x, xii ff. (Leclerq, pp. 183-85, 194-201, 209 ff.).

28. Cf. Defensor pacis I. i. 8; I. iv. 2; I. v. 10, 11; I. ix. 2, 3; I. xii. 1.

29. In his initial presentation of the correlations, Grabmann uses such general expressions as the Bedeutung or the Einwirkung of the Aristotelian philosophy für or auf the mediaeval theories of the relations between church and state, and refers to his own procedure as one of setzen the political positions zu the philosophical doctrines (op. cit., pp. 5-7).

30. Ibid., p. 7.

31. Cf. Summa theologica I. qu. 1. a. 8. ad 2; qu. 2. a. 2. ad 1; II. 1. qu. 109. a. 1.

32. Ibid. I. qu. 1. a. 8. ad 2: "Cum enim gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat, oportet quod naturalis ratio subserviat fidei . . . . "

33. De regimine principum I. i.

34. Summa theologica I. qu. 96. a. 4. Resp.

35. De regimine Christiano I. i (Arquillière, p. 91). See also II. iii, vii (pp. 176-77, 232). Cf., to the same effect, Alexander of St. Elpidius Tractatus de ecclesiastica potestate II. viii, in Bibliotheca maxima pontificia, ed. J. T. Roccaberti (Rome, 1698-99), II, 24; and Alvarus Pelagius De planctu ecclesiae I. xlii, in Roccaberti, III, 69.

36. Summa de ecclesiastica potestate qu. 23. art. 3.

37. See James of Viterbo De reg. Chr. II. iv, vii, viii, ix, x (Arquillière, pp. 208, 234-35, 260-61, 273, 283, 295); Augustinus Triumphus S. de eccl. pot. qu. 1. aa. 1, 3, 4; qu. 44. a. 4; qu. 46. a. 2; Alexander of St. Elpidius Tract. de eccl. pot. II. cap. iv-ix (Roccaberti, II, 18-27); Alvarus Pelagius De planctu eccl. I. xxiv (Roccaberti, III, 33).


40. Ibid. (pp. 234-35).

41. S. de eccl. pot. qu. 24. a. 6.

42. Orthodoxa defensio imperialis, in Monumenta Germaniae historica, Libelli de lite, II, 584-42.

43. Tractatus eboracenses, in ibid., III, 645-87.


45. De civili dominio I. viii. (Poole, I, 127); De officio regis xi (Pollard and Sayle, p. 247); De ecclesia xiv (Loserth, p. 321).

46. De civili dominio I. i, xxiiii, xlii (Poole, I, I ff., 156, 349); De officio regis iv (Pollard and Sayle, p. 72). Cf. Egidius of Rome De ecclesiastica potestate II. iv, vii, viii (Scholz, pp. 48 ff., 70 ff.).
47. *De officio regis* vi (Pollard and Sayle, p. 146); *De potestate papae* vii (Loserth, p. 138).

48. *De potestate papae* xii (Loserth, pp. 326-28).

49. *De civili domino* II. v (Poole, II, 36); *De ecclesia* xv, xvi (Loserth, pp. 337 ff., 376-77, 384 ff.); *De officio regis* vi (Pollard and Sayle, p. 120).

50. *De officio regis* vii (Pollard and Sayle, p. 186).


52. *De ecclesia* xix (Loserth, p. 464); cf. i (p. 5).


54. *De officio regis* i (Pollard and Sayle, p. 4); *De ecclesia* xiv (Loserth, pp. 314-16).

55. *De officio regis* iv (Pollard and Sayle, p. 79).

56. *Ibid.* i (pp. 13-14).


58. Grabmann, "Studien über den Einfluss . . .," p. 46; and "Die mittelalterlichen Kommentare zur Politik des Aristoteles," *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Phil.-hist. Abt., 1941, Heft 10, pp. 24-25. Cf. Lagarde, *La naissance . . .*, III, chap. ii. No trace has been found of Siger of Brabant's lectures on Aristotle's *Politics* (which Pierre Dubois reported hearing; see *De recuperatione Terre Sancte* 132 [Langlois, p. 121]).

59. For reasons why John is not co-author, see A. Gewirth, "John of Jandun and the *Defensor Pacis*," *Speculum*, XXIII (1948), 267-72.

60. *Quaestiones perspicacissimi peripatetici Joannis de Gandavo vulgo cognominati de Janduno in duodecim libros metaphysice iuxta Aristoteli et magni commentatoris intentionem ab eodem exactissime disputate . . .*. (Venetiis . . . sumptibus heredum . . . Octaviiani Scoti . . . 1525). (To be abbreviated hereinafter as *Quaest. in metaphys.*)

61. Thus, for example, Grabmann writes: "Das einzige Werk, in welchem Johannes von Jandun sich über politische Dinge äußert, ist die soeben genannte Schrift *De laudibus Parisius, die aus dem Jahre 1324 stammt*" ("Studien über den Einfluss . . . ," p. 51). N. Valois, in his brief review of John's *Quaest. in metaphys.*, does not mention these political discussions, despite the light they shed on his position that John was co-author of the *Defensor pacis* ("Jean de Jandun et Marsile de Padoue, auteurs du *Defensor pacis*.")
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62. Lib. I. qu. 18.
63. Lib. I. qu. 1.
64. Lib. I. qu. 21.
65. Lib. I. qu. 22.
66. Lib. I. qu. 17.
67. Lib. II. qu. 11.
68. Lib. XII. qu. 22.

69. Cf. my article cited above, n. 59. For other references to, and discussions of, John's political ideas, consult the entry "John of Jandun" in the Index to my Marsilius of Padua, I, 333; see also II, 435-42.

70. Quaest. in metaphys. Lib. II. qu. 5 (fol. 26N ff.): "Utrum substantiae aeternae aliae a prima dependant a prima tanquam ab aliquo agente et efficiente."

71. Ibid. (fol. 23A-B): "Hoc modo dicendum est ad quaedam secundum intentionem Aristotelis et Commentatoris ponentium citra primam aliquid substantias aeternas. Et si hoc esset verum non dependeret a vero agente per motum. Sed tamen dicendum secundum fidem et veritatem quod nihil citra primum est aeternum, sed omnia incoeperunt de novo esse, et per consequens producta fuerunt a primo principio tanquam ab agente per creationem ex nihilo, saltem substantiae abstractae, et illa creatio non est motus nec generationii univoce dictus cum motu inferiorum, sed alia productio supernaturalis quac non potest convinci ex sensatis et ex naturalibus ex quibus procedunt philosophi naturaliter loquentes. Sed tantum firmiter hoc credo et scio, non de ratione orta ex sensatis, et hoc firmiter facit scripturae doctoribus reverenter assentire. Unde ex hoc quod nescio demonstrare ex sensatis, nec potest quia est super sensibilia et naturam, tunc simpliciter credendo et fideliter habeo meritum, et in hoc etiam probatur creationis et salvationis excellentia vigoris super agens quodlibet naturale."

72. Cf. John's discussions of the eternity of the world (ibid. Lib. I. qu. 16 [fols. 11E-13B, esp. at fol. 13A-B]); the human intellect's knowledge of God (ibid. Lib. II. qu. 4 [fols. 22M-26M, esp. at fol. 25O-Q]); the infinite regress in the accidental orders of efficient, material, and formal causes (ibid. Lib. II, quas. 6, 7, 9 [fols. 28B-29J, 30C-O, esp. at fols. 28N, 29H, 30I]); whether God has a passive potentiality or only an active one (ibid. Lib. V. qu. 37 [fol. 77C-M]); the real separability of accidents from substances (ibid. Lib. VII. qu. 1 [fols. 87L-88O, esp. at fol. 88G]); the immortality and plurality of the human intellect (ibid. Lib. XII. qu. 4 [fols. 129F-130C]); whether God understands anything other than himself (ibid. Lib. XII. qu. 21 [fols. 142C-143H, esp. at fol. 143A-B]).


75. *Quaest. in metaphys.* Lib. XII. qu 22 (fol. 1431): "Sed in minori mundo sunt plures principes aequae præmi, sicut in homine sunt plures dominantes quorun unus non est sub alio nec obedit sibi: ut rex et summus pontifex, quia neuter vult esse subjectus alteri."

76. *Ibid.* (fol. 144C-D): "Unde ad propositum debemus dicere quod in toto universo unus debet esse princeps. Tu dicis quod non est rex nec sumus pontifex. Ducendum quod sumus pontifex, et licet rex non subsit sibi in [spiritualibus, imo in] temporalibus, tamen in spiritualibus et virtute. Sed dices, quod insufficienter loqueris, quia tantum in lege christianorum et non in aliis. Ducendum quod inquantum est de condigno et de jure naturali omnes homines cujuscumque moris et legis debent esse sub lege christianorum, quae est probata et certitudinaliter per evidentia mirabilia, quae nulli competunt nisi legis facttori christianorum. Unde etiam inquantum est de condigno omnes debent esse sub pontifice summo, quamvis non sunt. Immo plus errant et deficient a ratione, quanto plus resistunt legi christianae."

I have bracketed the three words *spiritualibus, imo in* since the passage does not make sense otherwise. It is to be noted, however, that these three words also occur in the Venice editions of 1554 and 1586, the relevant passages from which I have consulted in microfilms from the Bibliothèque Nationale and the British Museum, respectively. I have not been able to consult the manuscripts. It is interesting to note, in comparison with this passage where John holds that the *summus pontifex* should be the single ruler over the whole world, that in the *De laudibus Parisius* John holds that it is rather the king of France who should be the ruler: "Illustrissimis et precellentissimis Francie regibus monarchicum totius orbis dominium, saltem ex nativa pronitatis ad melius jure, debetur" (*Tractatus de laudibus Parisius* II. 8, in *Paris et ses historiens*, ed. LeRoux de Lincy and L. M. Tisserand [Paris, 1867], p. 58). This work was completed on November 4, 1323 (cf. the *explicit*, p. 78), probably a decade or more after the *Quaest. in metaphys.*


78. *Quaest. in metaphys.* Lib. I. qu. 1 (fol. 1F, 2A): " . . . Sapientia quae est in contemplatione et cognitione Dei et aliorum principiorum abstractorum necessaria est ad communicationem et bonum convictum, quia sine cognitione Dei homines formaliter non possunt bene operari, licet materialiter unde ad hoc quod legislator suos cives faciat bonos, opus quod habeat cognitionem Dei per se ut per habitum sapientie sibi adjunctum vel per alium sapientem qui dicit sibi et demonstrat sibi deum, ut possit alios instruire, unde etiam felicitas politica ordinatur ad felicitatem speculativam, sicut ad illud quod est finis, et sic ad illud."

felicitas politica in principe operanti ad cognitionem Dei, sicut etiam felicitas speculativa consistit in speculatione Dei. Et haec doctrina mirabiliter pro­pinqua est doctrinae plissimi legislatoris domini nostri Jesu Christi, qui cum ab eo quaereretur quod est primum mandatum in lege, respondit, Dilige Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo, et postea subdit piissimus legislator: et proxim­um tuum sicut te ipsum. Ergo in actu praecipiendi operari ad dilectionem Dei consistit felicitas politica."

80. Ibid. (fol. 15C): "... Felicitas politica consistit in nobilissimo actu practico, scilicet, in praecipere, et praeceptum est cognoscere et diligere Deum, et hoc praeceptum princeps facere non potest nisi per cognitionem Dei per se vel quia recipiat cognitionem Dei ab alio qui hoc sciat, et hoc est per specula­tivos philosophos qui docent cognitionem Dei."

81. Ibid. (fol. 15A): "Illi debent permitti in civitate ex praecepto et ordi­natione deliberata sine quibus non potest haberi complementum felicitatis politicae. Haec est manifesta quia finis necessitat alia, cum sit optimus. Sed sine viris speculativis secundo modo dictis non potest haberi complementum felicitatis sufficienter ... isti philosophi cum permittuntur in proprio opere ut speculari et doctrinari ita quod non molestantur per opera politica et artes, tunc maxime prosunt ad complementum humanae felicitatis, ut inten­dere et docere ad cognitionem Dei et substantiarum abstractarum, ad quas sic se habet intellectus noster sicut oculus noctuae ad lumen solis. Et sic ex praecepto permissi in civitate melius possunt cognoscere ardua et nobilissima et docere aliquos cognitionem talium, quia non sunt intricati aliis operibus prudentiæ et artis."

82. Ibid. (fol. 15K): "Dicendum quod speculativi viri sunt finis aliarum partium civitatis gratia cujus, quia sicut omnes homines sunt propter speculativa viros tanquam gratia cujus, sic tota civitas propter illos, et felicitas politica ordinatur ad felicitatem speculativam, sicut omnes homines in civitate ordinatur ad speculationem de Deo."

83. This refers to the argumentum a contrario (fol. 14F-G) that philosophers must not be permitted in the state because they fall under none of the six parts of the state listed in the seventh book of Aristotle's Politics (VII, 8. 1328b 3 ff.).

84. Quaest. in metaphys. Lib. I. qu. 18 (fol. 15I-K): "... Philosophi ... praesupponuntur a sacerdotibus, quia sacerdotibus necessarium est cognoscere deum et debent esse speculativi, quia in greco sacerdotes dicuntur seniores, qui debent esse sapientes. Tu dices quod speculativi etc. Ducendum quod immo vellet sacerdotari si fieret eis sicut esset condignum, sed non sic fit, quia praebenda et beneficia dantur idiotis, unde sacerdos debet esse neces­sario sapiens et habere cognitionem de Deo. ... Sacerdotes non addunt supra speculativos viros ad speciem speculationum Dei nisi actus exterieores."


86. Defensor pacis I. vi. 9.
87. Marsilius, on the other hand, says that only "by faith alone" does he hold the Christian religion to be superior to other religions. Cf. Defensor pacis II. xxx. 4.

88. Quaest. in metaphys. Lib. XII. qu. 22 (fol. 144D), (quoted above, note 76).

89. By "laws" (leges) John of Jandun, like the other Averroists, means religions. Cf. the Introduction to my translation of Defensor pacis, p. xc.

90. Quaest. in metaphys. Lib. II. qu. 11 (fol. 35E): "... Omnes leges praeter Christianorum legem sunt cum admixtione erroris, sicut lex Mahumeti est quod post istam vitam habitur vita voluptuosa et delectabilis. Unde hoc est contra rationem. Secundo modo oritur lex propria a legi communi sine admixtione erroris, ita quod nihil est in ea contra rationem, sicut in nostra lege, ut Christiana."

91. Ibid. Lib. I. qu. 16 (fol. 14E): "Dicendum quod fides potent referri ad duo. Uno enim modo potent referri ad falsas leges, et sic fides vulgi est fortior, quia magis credunt falsis legibus quam philosophiae, quia non viderunt multa et nesciunt discernere verum a falso... Alio modo fides potent referri ad verum, et sic fides philosophorum fortior est fide vulgi, quia philosophi magis credunt veris quam vulgares. El quando Commentator dixit quod fides vulgi fortior est fide philosophorum, intellext in legibus falsis et non in veris."


95. Averroës Metaphysicorum expositio media II. iii (Aristotelis opera cum commentariis Averrois [Venice, 1560], VIII, 55D): "Lex enim non est ut sciamus, sed ut boni fiamus. Et causa est, quoniam perfectio hominis non acquiritur nisi per congregationes hominum in civitatibus, et congregatio, id est Civitas, non erit perfecta nisi propter bonitatem, et non propter scientiam. Quare, ut homines sint boni necessarium est lex, non ut sciant."

96. Siger of Brabant Quaestiones in metaphysicam Lib. II. qu. 16 (ed. C. O. Graiff [Louvain, 1948], p. 74): "... Legislator non ponit de primis principiis secundum quod opinatur, sed secundum quod magis conferens est hominibus, et secundum quod magis potest instruire bonis; aliquando autem per falsa et frivola possunt homines fieri boni."